

GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents



- (1) Box no. 2241
(2) Folder title/number: (4)
Japanese Population

(3) Date: ?

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
021	d

(5) Item description and comment:
Secret

(6) Reproduction: Yes No

(7) Film no. _____ Sheet no. _____

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

ANNEX 2 (Situation Forecast: Japan)

1. DISSIDENT JAPANESE POPULATION: Distribution and Strength

a. General

All available current information indicates that the Japanese people as a whole do not pose a threat to the Occupation. They have accepted and generally cooperated with the Occupation for more than five years, and with the peace treaty in the offing, the great majority look to the U. S. and the West for future guidance and cooperation. In the recent local elections held in April 1951, in which issues involving the peace treaty, establishment of U. S. bases in Japan and the possible future rearmament of Japan played an important part, the conservative groups favoring complete alignment with the U. S. and other Western allies won an overwhelming victory. The Japan Communist Party, on the other hand, received only 0.9 percent of the total vote, the poorest election result for the Communists since the Party was revived in 1945. Since these elections were featured by a record-breaking turnout of 91 percent of eligible voters, the impressive conservative victory removed any fears that an extreme-left, pro-Communist Government could by any legal means assume power at any time in the near future.

Although some ultra-nationalist, anti-American groups undoubtedly still exist in Japan, their present influence is believed to be negligible. The principal possible danger with regard to the Japanese population would be a future loss of confidence in U. S. strength, which might lead to passive submission to Communist aggression.

During the past year Japan has enjoyed a remarkable economic recovery and has made significant strides in political experience, and the efficiency of its government agencies, particularly the law enforcement and internal security agencies, has shown considerable improvement. Japanese civil police and National Police Reserve are believed capable of bringing under control any civil disorders which might occur under present conditions and currently planned expansion of police forces and law enforcement agencies should further strengthen the Government.

SECRET

SECRET

Notwithstanding the great improvement in the internal situation described above, certain influences exist in Japan which constitute potential hazards to domestic peace and order, and under certain conditions might develop into serious obstructions. Under circumstances such as a serious threat of invasion by foreign Communist forces, dissident elements might effect disturbances which could seriously interfere with internal law and order or with the defense of the Japanese islands.

The term "dissident" applies to that portion of the Japanese population who, in the event of a civil uprising, would be "potential hostiles." This portion would be physically and/or mentally opposed to SCAP and U. S. military forces based in Japan and to the Japanese Government and its internal security agencies. At present this dissident portion of the population consists almost entirely of the Japanese Communists and their supporters, together with the leftist Koreans and other pro-Communist minority groups.

Detailed information on this subject is contained in General Headquarters, Far East Command, Periodic Intelligence Summary: Internal Factors and Security Problems for the Occupation Forces, 15 May 1951 (Revised). For current developments on this subject, attention is invited to daily entries in the Japan Section of the G-2 FEC Daily Intelligence Summary.

b. Potential Participants in Civil Disturbances

Communist

Since its revival in 1945 the Japan Communist Party (JCP) has been the legally established political Party of the extreme left; at the same time it has served as the Japanese agency of the international Communist apparatus which aims to create a world Communist state under the domination of the USSR. Throughout its history it has served as an outpost for extension of Soviet policies in Japan.

During the first four years of the Occupation the JCP grew with remarkable rapidity and by February 1950 reached its peak registered membership of 108,593. In addition to its officially registered membership the Party at that time was estimated to have about 50,000 unregistered or secret members plus possibly 500,000 active sympathizers throughout Japan, and an even larger number of "passive" sympathizers. The JCP reached its peak of political influence

SECRET

SECRET

during 1948 and in the January 1949 elections received a popular vote of 2,934,583 (9.6 percent of the total votes cast) and succeeded in electing 35 of its candidates to the Lower House of the Diet. At that time the JCP also was at the height of its influence in the labor movement and controlled or strongly influenced about 75 percent of Japanese organized labor. During the year following this peak the Party suffered serious set-backs in its popular support and influence within the labor unions. This decline in political strength was evidenced in the Upper House elections held in June 1950, when the Communists succeeded in electing only 3 of its candidates, and received only 5.6 percent of the total votes cast. In the meantime, in January 1950 the Cominform severely criticized the JCP for its policies of "passive revolution" and called on Japanese Communists to take a more aggressive stand against the "imperialistic" Occupation. During the next few months, following Cominform policies, the JCP conducted an increasingly intensive campaign of propaganda and agitation against the Occupation and U. S. policies in general. These activities reached a climax on 30 May 1950 when U. S. military personnel were assaulted by Communist demonstrators in Tokyo. Following the arrests and sentencing of eight of the 30 May assailants, JCP propaganda attacks became so violent that on 6 June SCAP instructed the Japanese Government to purge the 24 members of the Central Committee. This was followed by the purge of 17 editors of the JCP organ, Akahata. As a result of the purge a Provisional Central Guidance Department was formed as an interim executive body to take over the functions of the Central Committee. In spite of the purge of its Central Committee and in defiance of increased Government pressure, the JCP intensified its anti-Occupation line and on 26 June after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea the Akahata was suspended by SCAP order. This was followed by suspension of numerous other JCP propaganda organs throughout Japan during July and August 1950. Several local JCP committees also were dissolved and numerous agitators and propagandists were arrested. A sensational development during this period was the complete disappearance of 9 purged Central Committee members who had been summoned to report to the Attorney General's Office. As of 15 May 1951 only one of the missing purgees had been apprehended.

Increasingly strict police surveillance of JCP activities, coupled with the dismissal of Communists from government strategic industries during the

- 3 -
SECRET

SECRET

latter part of 1950, further weakened Party influence and caused a rapid decline in JCP membership. As against almost 109,000 registered members in February 1950, the JCP on 30 April 1951 had only 59,033 officially registered members, plus possibly 30,000 unregistered or secret members and 150,000 to 200,000 Japanese sympathizers. The table on page 11 compares JCP strength with population by prefecture as of 31 March 1951. The JCP's influence in the labor movement likewise has dropped to a point where less than 10 percent of Japan's 5-1/2 million organized workers belong to unions under JCP control or heavy influence.

As a result of the successive blows to the JCP organization the Party's overt activities have reached the lowest ebb since the JCP reorganized in 1945.

Although the JCP is no longer important as a legally established political Party in its function as an instrument of world Communism, it is still a well-organized and dangerous subversive force, functioning to all intent and purpose as an illegal i.e. underground organization even though it has not yet been outlawed by the Japanese Government. At the present time the Party appears to be cautiously avoiding any violent activities in order to retain legality as long as possible, but at the same time it is making intensive preparations for covert activities to be conducted after outlawing of the Party.

Intensive investigations during the past year have produced a large number of conflicting reports on the exact nature of the JCP underground organization but it is clear that the JCP has by this time set up a sufficiently effective covert apparatus to carry on a continuing program of subversion. This is evidenced by the fact that violently anti-American propaganda organs continue to be published secretly in spite of all police efforts to apprehend the responsible persons; purged Central Committee members have successfully evaded the police since July 1950; JCP agents continue to gather information on U. S. military installations and activities. While it is unlikely that an effective armed organization can be established by the JCP unless it receives substantial outside aid, the Communists' potential for inciting scattered civil disorders and mob violence and for conducting sabotage campaigns must not be discounted.

Labor

At present approximately 530,000 union members, out of a total of

SECRET

SECRET

5-1/2 million, belong to organizations controlled or strongly influenced by Communist leaders. This represents a remarkable decline in the efforts of Communist influence in the labor movement since the end of 1948 when the JCP dominated about 75 percent of organized workers in Japan. During the summer of 1949 the JCP lost a large number of its labor leaders in the personnel re-trenchment program; a more recent blow to Communist labor strength was the "red purge" of Communist elements in private industry and government service which began with the dismissal of 200,000 JCP members in the electric power industry at the end of August 1950, and was followed by the dismissal of approximately 11,000 Communists from other private industries and approximately 1,200 from government agencies.

As a result, the Communists potential for interrupting vital services such as railway transportation, communications, and electric power through strikes and labor sabotage is now almost non-existent. The one field where the Communists retain controlling power is in the metal and machine tool and automotive industries. There is still a serious threat of sabotage in such industries presently fulfilling procurement demand contracts for war materiel.

Koreans

Representing the largest foreign group in Japan, the Koreans are estimated to number approximately 800,000, about two-thirds of whom either are, or have been, members of Communist-dominated organizations. Being by nature excitable and easily aroused against constituted authority, they are ideally suited for the rabble rousing tactics of the Communists and are avidly cultivated by the JCP. It is believed that the majority of these Koreans place their sympathies with the North Korean cause and its Soviet puppet government. This sympathy is more openly expressed whenever it appears that the war is progressing favorably for the North Korean-Chinese forces. The Koreans are potential trouble makers and their fondness for mass disturbances and their deep rooted antipathy for the Japanese make them a constant internal security threat.

Since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, leftist Korean leaders have covertly reorganized their youth affiliate, the Korean Action Corps, into a quasi-military unit potentially capable of sabotage and guerilla-type action. At present, the reported strength of this organization approximates 12,500 with branches located in 41 prefectures of Japan.

- 5 -
SECRET

Chinese

The second largest foreign minority in Japan is that of the Chinese which (including Formosans) totals about 41,000. Ideologically, they appear disinclined toward Communism, but their commercial ties with the homeland encourages their acceptance of the government in power. This is manifested in the Chinese communities where the leadership has definitely passed from the conservative to the leftist factions and organizations. The JCP has taken an active interest in the resident Chinese associations and the Chinese have responded with support for the leftist demands. Influential Chinese, for business reasons, have supported the Communist appeal for direct trade with Communist China which has been so seriously effected by the recent embargo.

In 1949, leadership in Chinese communities in Japan passed from the conservative to a small but influential leftist faction which is believed to have strong backing from the Chinese Communist Party. Dominated by the leftist faction, Chinese residents' associations cooperate closely with the Japan Communist Party and its front organizations, supporting the extreme leftist propaganda demands for the overthrow of the "reactionary" government in Japan and voicing their opposition to Occupation policies. Chinese blackmarket and smuggling activities are increasingly directed toward support of the Communists, and agents and emissaries from Communist China are frequently reported to smuggle into Japan. By underground methods, close working relationship is maintained between Chinese and Japan Communist Parties on a high level. The Chinese Communist Party is expected to put greater pressure on Overseas Chinese in Japan to gain political and financial support in the same way that it has done in Southeast Asian countries. It may be anticipated that a large portion of the Chinese population in Japan will eventually fall under the domination of the Chinese Communist Party.

Demobilization of Military Personnel and Repatriates

Demobilized military personnel in Japan, numbering more than 6,500,000 constitute a potentially dangerous segment of the total population mainly by virtue of their former disciplined state and their consequent susceptibility to strong leadership. Also to be considered amongst elements capable of fostering a revival of ultra-nationalism, are several million repatriates who as emigrants tasted the fruits of Japan's drive to create a "co-operative sphere."

SECRET

Of the repatriates, those returned from Soviet-controlled areas may be considered as the most likely dissident element.

Upon the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the USSR hedged on the return of the majority of the Japanese under its control until they had been subjected to an intense Communist indoctrination program. Groups of repatriates returning from mid-1948 showed increasing evidence of the efficacy of this program.

The Japan Repatriates League, which presently boasts 80-100,000 members, the majority of whom are non-Communists, is directed and controlled by a small group of Communists who have been able to secure the top offices of this organization.

The great mass of the demobilized personnel and repatriates have been peacefully absorbed into Japanese society without disturbing its tranquility. The Japan Repatriates League in itself presents no immediate security threat, but, should the economic-political situation undergo serious deterioration, this organization might readily serve as the nucleus of a Communist-inspired insurgent force.

Religious Groups

The chief potential threat to Japan from religious groups lies in the creed of Shintoism. So far, however, no reports have been received indicating that Shintoism is now being used as a vehicle for revival of ultra-nationalism or opposition to Occupation policies. Its potential as a threat lies in the future, and most particularly in the post-occupation period.

The minor religious groups which hold similar views are more properly classified as ideological groups which use religion as a prop to their basic creed of nationalism. As quasi-religious groups, the keynote of their creed appears to be a continued reverence for the emperor system. A few of these groups have members who were identified with right-wing Thought groups before the war. As religious movements, however, they represent a negligible threat until and unless united with more popular national movements, such as Shintoism.

2. CAPABILITIES

a. Ground

The extreme leftist elements in Japan, comprising the JCP, Communist Korean groups, Communist-controlled labor unions and other groups subject to

- 7 -
SECRET

JCP infiltration and control in the past have been alert to exploit spontaneous disorders or incite riots wherever and whenever possible. Generally such riots and minor disorders have been quickly controlled by local police and by the arrest of leaders.

A strong possibility existed after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea that a Japan-wide revolt might be inspired by Communist elements, especially during the first months of the war when U. S. forces in Japan were at minimum strength and Japanese internal security forces had not yet been developed to their present strength. Fortunately, before the actual outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the purge of JCP leaders and prompt police action against agitators reduced the leftist potential for a coordinated nationwide uprising. A possibility still exists that localized uprisings coupled with acts of sabotage could be inspired in various parts of Japan for the purpose of interfering with Japanese Government functions and U. S. military operations, but the increased efficiency of National Rural and autonomous local police forces, and establishment of the well-trained and armed National Police Reserve are factors which could quickly bring these uprisings under control.

While the threat of Communist-inspired violence is not totally absent in any prefecture of Japan, the following are considered to be the more critical areas:

Tokyo-Kanagawa: This heavily populated metropolitan area, embracing the national capitol city of Tokyo and the key port and industrial city of Yokohama together with numerous smaller critical industrial centers, is the hub of the nation's transportation and communications networks. It includes numerous U. S. Armed Forces installations and Japanese heavy industry centers supplying critical materials for the U. N. Forces in Korea. The area has a large foreign national population, and further contains the controlling headquarters of the Japan Communist Party and most of the Communist-line potentially subversive groups in Japan. Any organized agitation throughout Japan would have as a primary mission the isolation of this area, the disruption of civil government and the frustration of attempts of police and Occupation forces to restore order therein.

Hyogo-Kyoto-Osaka: This region contains much heavy industry centering around the manufacturing center of Osaka, together with critical port,

SECRET

storage and transportation facilities. With a heavy foreign national population and numerous remaining centers of Communist influence, it constitutes a particularly sensitive target for any potential uprising.

Yamaguchi-Fukuoka: Enveloping the strategic Kammon Strait between the major Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu, this area is a center of heavy industry, mining and shipping. Its concentration of Koreans and other foreign nationals is the heaviest in Japan, and it is a focal point of much illegal sea traffic between Japan and Korea. The nation's largest steel mills are contained in this area, as well as the undersea Kammon tunnel forming a vital rail link between Honshu and Kyushu. Its proximity to important U. S. air bases, in addition to other factors, renders it an important potential objective of subversion by hostile groups.

Hokkaido: While all available information indicates that the concentration of Communist and pro-Communist elements in Hokkaido is comparatively light numerically, Hokkaido is reported to be the scene of considerable clandestine illegal activity by Communist groups. The strategic position of the island and its vital coal mining and shipping industries make it a likely target in any general plan for Communist uprisings.

b. Air

No air activity.

c. Navy

No formal naval forces exist; however, the well-established smuggler shipping systems may be utilized to bring in limited amounts of supplies and large numbers of personnel. This same system could then be utilized to facilitate the escape of leaders as the revolt is brought under control.

3. **CONCLUSIONS**

The Communist factions which advocate the overthrow of the legally constituted government and the substitution of a Communist-type government, are the most serious threat of Japan and the Occupation. In their attempts to bring this about, the Communists are making every effort to exploit the basic animosities of the potentially dissident groups such as foreign minorities, demobilized servicemen, labor unions, and youth groups. Of these, the Koreans in Japan, with their basic dislike for the Japanese and their proclivity for

- 9 -
SECRET

SECRET

riots and mass disturbances, must be considered a constant source of trouble. Repatriated military personnel are a lessening source of danger since it appears that their Communist indoctrination was of temporary effect and the great majority have been peacefully absorbed into Japanese society. Communist-controlled labor unions and groups of unemployed day laborers should be considered as a continuing source of potential local disorders. These unions having control of workers in the metal, machine tool and automotive industries are potentially dangerous because strikes or internal sabotage in these fields might seriously hamper the fulfillment of contracts for war material, while groups of unemployed might be organized for mob action.

Although the extreme leftist anti-American elements represent only a small proportion of the population and currently have a negligible influence on Japan's national affairs, any future development which would cause the majority of the populace to lose confidence in the strength of the U. S. and its Western allies would be accompanied by general unrest and uneasiness which could be exploited by the Communists as an opportunity to initiate widespread disorders.

SECRET

SECRET

Japan Communist Party Strength in Relation to
Total Population
(as of 31 March 1951)

<u>PREFECTURE</u>	<u>REGISTERED JCP MEMBERS</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Hokkaido	3,725	4,021,050	.09
Aomori	1,196	1,281,325	.09
Iwate	505	2,294,203	.04
Miyagi	1,136	1,596,307	.07
Akita	1,238	1,283,710	.10
Yamagata	1,028	1,346,492	.08
Fukushima	1,972	2,026,482	.097
Ibaraki	1,673	2,044,578	.08
Tochigi	1,426	1,557,860	.09
Gumma	2,280	1,608,894	.14
Saitama	1,083	2,132,221	.05
Chiba	1,815	2,140,511	.08
Tokyo	6,529	5,417,871	.13
Kanagawa	2,941	2,317,551	.12
Yamanashi	1,638	815,485	.20
Niigata	3,366	2,435,451	.14
Toyama	331	998,349	.03
Ishikawa	931	936,653	.02
Nagano	2,310	2,079,682	.11
Shizuoka	1,605	2,407,102	.07
Aichi	1,302	3,226,116	.04
Gifu	866	1,524,812	.05
Mie	1,246	1,451,100	.08
Fukui	282	733,374	.04
Shiga	224	872,775	.025
Kyoto	740	1,784,753	.04
Osaka	2,594	3,515,225	.07
Hyogo	1,143	3,156,888	.04
Nara	150	778,677	.02
Wakayama	308	979,982	.03
Tottori	933	592,863	.16
Shimane	807	903,576	.09
Okayama	885	1,650,285	.05
Hiroshima	740	2,045,923	.04
Yamaguchi	883	1,505,532	.06
Tokushima	588	869,290	.07
Kagawa	415	934,123	.04
Ehime	529	1,481,106	.04
Kochi	921	868,385	.10
Fukuoka	1,853	3,312,577	.06
Saga	626	931,336	.07
Nagasaki	771	1,565,558	.05
Kumamoto	669	1,786,058	.04
Oita	939	1,245,689	.08
Miyazaki	843	1,052,483	.08
Kagoshima	418	1,766,514	.02
TOTAL	60,403	80,276,777	.07

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

DOYLE O. HICKEY
Lieutenant General, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. F. ENNIS
Brigadier General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

SECRET