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Review of Government and Politics in Japan

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PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Dulles Offers Defensive Alliance to Japan

U. S. Ambassador John Foster Dulles, Special Envoy of President Truman to arrange for the conclusion of a Japanese peace settlement, in an address before the American-Japan Society in Tokyo on 2 February invited Japan to join with the United States in a program of "collective" security against aggression. Dulles stated that should Japan accept this offer the United States would consider the retention of its armed forces in and around Japan as a testimony of the unity between the two nations.

The complete text of Ambassador Dulles' statement follows:

"I am happy to be again in Japan on a task of peace which the President has asked me to pursue in cooperation with General MacArthur. Already we are actively engaged in conversations with Japanese leaders, and I am glad to have this opportunity to explain publicly the principles which animate our Mission.

"Let me say first of all that we have faith that we are really building for peace and not for war. Many feel that it is, indeed, ominous that the peaceful Republic of Korea should have been suddenly attacked by heavily armed forces and that hundreds of thousands of North Korean and Chinese Communists are being driven to slaughter in order to gain a strategic position which has been coveted by Russia since the days of the czars.

"Irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. That clearly exposed fact carries a grave warning to us all. But it is not a warning which calls for panic or for a fatalistic assumption that general war is bound to come.

"The United States, I can assure you, is proceeding on the assumption that general war is avoidable. But also we assume that peace will not be gained merely by wishing for it. History has taught that time after time, but the lesson seems never to be learned. The reality is that to win peace requires vigorous, sustained and

well-directed efforts which compare in magnitude and sacrificial quality with the efforts required to win a war.

"The United States and others are now making such efforts. I think we are making them in time, and because of that I can bring you a message of hope, not of despair.

"No one can, of course, foresee surely what others may do. But it is possible to see how to gain a probability of security. It can come if the nations follow internationally the simple and and tested rules of conduct which, in a domestic community, give individuals a probability of security.

"Most of us have homes within which we live and where we keep our personal belongings and valuables. The first responsibility for making them secure falls on the head of the household. He must have only trustworthy people in the home. Otherwise, the household goods will probably be stolen. There is little safety, and little sympathy, for those who run their households so carelessly that criminals have the freedom of the homes.

"The prudent householder also keeps his valuables behind closed doors and often under lock and key. He does not leave them lying about where they can be picked up by sneak thieves. Locked doors and cabinets are no insuperable obstacles to bold robber gangs, but they deter the lesser criminals.

That leaves to be dealt with the extreme criminal elements who are capable of breaking in and entering with violence. As against them, collective measures are the only dependable deterrent. It is not practicable to keep armed guards in every house--that would be too expensive. But communities normally create a central law enforcement group, which can move quickly and surely into action if there is a violent robbery, and probably catch and punish those who violate the law. That generally frightens off even those who have the temperament for violent robbery. The result is that in a well-ordered community, robbers rarely indulge their evil ambitions. The

likelihood of failure is a deterrent to aggression.

"Most of the postwar international robberies that have occurred have been because nations failed to take internal precautions, such as are the personal responsibility of the householder himself. Nations have given opportunities within their own homeland to those who were the secret agents of international gangsters, and they did not put their valuables behind the national equivalent of lock and key. The result has been that, without any open armed attack, without a shot being fired, all or large parts of many nations have been robbed of their freedom and brought under the bondage of imperialist communism.

"In some cases the government and people woke up to the danger when the agents of the foreign gang had stolen much, but not all, of the power. Then there ensued an open fight, a civil war, to see who would control.

"Bolshevik communism had, however, showed a desire to avoid the possible consequences of a breaking and entering with open violence. Even in Korea, the attackers pretended that they were engaged only in civil war and that the Chinese Communist armies came in as 'volunteers.'

"Japan, as it looks forward to restored sovereignty, can draw some useful lessons from these elemental security principles, and from the consequences of ignoring them.

"The Japanese Government and people will, themselves, have the primary responsibility to take care of the dangers, often referred to as those of 'indirect' aggression, which fall short of invasion in force.

"Japan will have the duty to keep its homeland reasonably free of criminal agents. That requires, most of all, a healthy and vigorous Japanese society. A national household of 80,000,000 people is too numerous to be protected merely by trying to catch all the Communist agents. There is need for vigilance, but not for a police

state itself which creates the resentments which make alien penetration easier. It is impossible to prevent communism from penetrating into, and breeding in, societies where there is repression, misery and injustice on a large scale.

"The United States has been trying to help Japan to build a good society, and while peace will not end the friendly disposition of the United States, it will change the form of our relations and place primary responsibility upon Japan itself.

"The Japanese Government and people will also then have the primary responsibility to maintain in their homeland a protection corresponding to that of a householder who keeps his valuables under lock and key, so that they cannot be stolen except by a breaking in with violence. Any people who avoid that precaution are guilty of contributory negligence and receive and deserve little sympathy. Five years ago I said to my own countrymen:

"'If we neglect our military establishment, that may lead to a dangerous misjudgment of us by the Soviet leaders. They take it for granted that those who have precious things will, if they are able, maintain a force-in-being to protect them. They assume that a man who does not put a lock on the door of his house has nothing in it that he greatly values.'

"Just as the prudent householder has a duty to create protections which deter all who do not have the boldness to rob with violence, so every nation which wants to preserve its liberties has its own duty to maintain a sufficient screen so that its boundaries cannot be passed by hostile armies unless they are willing to take the consequence of open violence and killing.

"In the case of Japan, the problem in that respect is simplified by the fact that Japan is an island country, separated by water from the aggressive land mass of communism.

"When we turn from the dangers of 'indirect' aggression to those of direct aggression--that is, armed attack in force from without--a

different type of protection must be found, because while individual nations can singly cope with 'indirect' aggression, few nations can cope with full-scale armed attack by a powerful aggressor. As against that, the individual nation, like the individual householder, needs a collective security arrangement.

"The United Nations was formed for that purpose and its first stated purpose is to take effective collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace. The Security Council was given the duty to create an international force to deter aggression. However, this has been prevented by the Soviet Union through use of its veto power.

"At the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, the members took note of this dangerous paralysis and, with only the five Soviet bloc votes in opposition, recommended that each member nation should create forces which would serve as United Nations units.

"We can, therefore, expect gradually the bringing into being of an adequate international force, subject to direction by the United Nations. Until then, the deterrent to international robbery by large-scale violence resides in the commitment of national power to regional and collective security arrangements such as are authorized by the United Nations Charter.

"Today the principal deterrent power is possessed by the United States. We do not, however, intend to reserve that power only to protect ourselves. We are prepared to combine our power with that of others in mutual committals, in accord with the United Nations charter, so that the deterrent power which protects us will also protect others. Japan, if it is disposed to protect itself against indirect aggression can, if it wishes, share collective protection against direct aggression.

"That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct. That is the stock-in-trade of the Communist world. We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice.

"Under such a security program as we have outlined, based on cooperation with Japan and our other friends, the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States armed forces in and about Japan, as a testimony to the unity between our countries.

"Such an arrangement would create, for Japan, a situation very different from that of the Republic of Korea prior to June, 1950. The United States had withdrawn its armed forces from Korea, and it had no responsibility there other than as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations had never made it clear that an attack by North Koreans on the Republic of Korea would lead to an invoking of the immense power that was available to strike at the roots of aggression. The aggressors were tempted by the probability that the reaction to their attack would be localized, so as to give the aggressor every advantage and so as to subject the defenders to every disadvantage. Thus, the deterrent of powerful counter-attack was wholly lacking.

"If, however, there were in Japan the conditions I suggest, no aggressor could rely upon enjoying what General MacArthur has well called a 'privileged sanctuary.' Then an armed aggressor would be subjected to a striking power, the immensity of which defies imagination.

"The United States produces many times as much steel, oil, aluminum and electric power as does any other nation. We are now turning much of that into actual military power because we are not sure that those with aggressive intent ,respect any other form of power. Other free people are doing the same.

"All of that creates a powerful deterrent to a possible aggressor. That is not mere speculation. We already know that nations with proved aggressive intent and great military power have not used the method of open military conquest. That is not because of moral restraints, which they openly disdain, or because of the power of local resistance, but because of fear of retaliatory power used in the interest of collective security.

"You will have noted that the security program we outline does not require that the Japanese nation should become militaristic and create such land, sea and naval forces as tempted Japan down the road to destruction. Against that, the new Japan has rightly set its face. The program would realize the United Nations ideal, which is that the 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defense' shall be so implemented that 'armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.' In that way there can be security and peace.

"But what is peace?

"Peace is not just the drab business of seeking security. Peace is a positive and creative state which can and should enrich the life of every individual, of every nation and of the whole society of nations. Only that kind of peace is self-perpetuating.

"In Japan, there is natural concern as to how to lift up the standards of material existence. That is a hard problem. It needs to be studied. Our own study convinces us that the industry, the aptitude and the ingenuity of the Japanese people can assure the possibility of a rising economic standard through trade and commerce with the rest of the world. There is no reason for discouragement merely because Japan is itself relatively barren and densely populated.

"I come from an island, Manhattan, where over 2,000,000 people are crowded into 22 square miles. That island has no natural resources except a harbor. Yet it is one of the most prosperous areas of the entire world.

"There is no folly greater than that of measuring people's economic potential in terms of square miles per capita. The most sparsely settled areas are usually the poorest.

"Of course, new arts and new markets cannot be developed overnight. There are bound to be periods of difficulty. Also

defense programs are going to create temporary stringencies of most raw materials. There will be need for patience and persistence and for some sacrifice and perhaps for some outside help. But Japan can have a good economic future if she cultivates the goodwill of potential customers and if she devotes to industrial effort even a small fraction of the energy which, in the past, she devoted to building a war machine.

"Life, of course, is far more than mere physical living, and men are more than bodies. They have minds and spirits and the joy of life depends largely upon nonmaterial things. Here there is no limit to the capacity for creative development. The Japanese people have already demonstrated over the centuries the capacity to appreciate and to create beauty and culture. The distinctive position which the Japanese have already won in that respect holds out great promise for the future. The richness of the free world depends largely on the stimulus of diversity. The entry of Japan into the free world can greatly increase that richness for the benefit of us all. Some have much to give. All have much they can usefully receive. The Japanese people have distinctive qualities, the fruits of which we of the West would like to share.

"The great difference between the free world and the Communist captive world stamps out all diversity and forces each individual into a strait-jacket of conformity which is ignoble and in the long run, destructive of human welfare and progress. The free world stands for the right of men to be different and for each to develop peacefully in accordance with his own genius. That is what the other members of the free world will expect of a free Japan.. It is in that way that the Japanese nation can realize its worthy ambitions.

"The Japanese have always been ambitious people. That is a good thing. Nations, like individuals, have the right to be ambitious. Indeed, that is a duty, for people without ambition are

a liability to society. Ambition becomes dangerous only when it employs fraud and violence. The Japanese people, for a time, fell under leadership which tried, by force, to promote Japanese ambitions at the expense of the legitimate ambitions of others. The fact that that was a wrong method, which failed, does not mean that ambition itself is wrong.

"The new Japan has a great opportunity to exert an influence in Asia by what the founders of the United States called 'conduct and example.' Our founders had faith that the United States could exert a great liberating influence throughout the world. That was their ambition, and it was realized, although during that period of history the United States was a weak nation in the sense that it was economically poor and it had virtually no military establishment. Nevertheless, our nation won for itself a position of leadership and influence in the world and despotism receded under the force of our leadership.

"There is a certain parallelism between the present opportunity of Japan in Asia and the 19th century opportunity of the United States in the West. Then, most of Europe and South America was under the heel of despotisms and Russia, under Czar Alexander, had founded the so-called Holy Alliance to extend imperialism throughout the world. The Holy Alliance, after initial successes, collapsed because it could not compete with political liberty. The high tide of despotism steadily receded and the people of the European Continent and South America won freedom.

"That history can be repeated. Despotism such as now overruns much of Asia can never stand the nearby contrast of freedom so practiced by another Asiatic power as to produce the manifold richness of which freemen alone are capable. The Bolshevik leaders know the powers of example, and that is why they have invented the Iron Curtain in the hope of cutting off the magnetic influence which freedom always exerts upon the subject of despotism. Iron curtains can delay, but they cannot prevent, the inevitable. The

world will not persist half slave, so long as it is half free. The collapse of Communist despotism is a certainty, provided the free peoples exalt freedom by demonstrating what freedom means.

"It is that fact which presents the Japanese people with their new and historic opportunity in Asia. It calls for the finest qualities of which men are capable. No one who knows the Japanese--as friend or foe--doubts that they can develop these qualities. There have been ample demonstrations of Japanese valor and willingness to sacrifice. Unhappily these qualities have too often been used in efforts which misconstrued the nature of true g greatness. Greatness is not measured by ability to impose on others what they do not want. Rather, it resides in the ability to find new ways whereby all men can better realize their aspirations. Those who do that, attain a moral leadership and authority which all will welcome.

"These are the principles which inspire our Mission. To realize them is not an easy task. It is not just a matter of finding words to write into a treaty. That would be simple. But good results are rarely achieved in such an easy way. The total dictionary of noble words has already been exhausted by treaties which today are merely crumpled bits of paper littering the cruel path which humanity has had to tread.

"We do not believe any longer that treaty words are self-executing, whether they be words of promise or words of repression. A peace settlement cannot usefully attempt to dictate the future. It can, at best, create conditions which will make likely the good future that is sought.

"To find those conditions is the purpose of the exploratory talks upon which we are now engaged here at Tokyo, following similar talks with the Allied nations which are principally concerned. It is still too soon to prophesy the final outcome. There will probably be disappointments and what, to some, may seem injustices. It is never possible to put into effect lofty principles for the

future without some compromise with the existing realities created by the past. We can, however, already say that we seek a peace which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the integrity of the full sovereignty which peace will have restored; opportunity to share in collective security against direct aggression; opportunity to raise her standard of living by the inventiveness and industry of her people; and opportunity to achieve moral stature and respected leadership through the force of good example.

"These are the opportunities which we shall seek to create through a peace which will reflect a feeling by the victors that Japan is now a nation to be trusted. There are still, in some respects, understandable reservations. But confidence has grown during the period since the Surrender, as the Japanese people, responding to the just policies of the Supreme Commander, have loyally fulfilled the Surrender Terms. It is upon that solid foundation of justice and loyalty that we plan to build our peace--a peace of trust and opportunity."

Exchange of Letters on Fisheries Between Prime Minister Yoshida and Dulles

United States political advisor to Japan, Ambassador William J. Sebald, on 13 February released to the press an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and U. S. Ambassador John Foster Dulles concerning the Japanese position on fisheries for the immediate post-Japanese peace settlement period. Prime Minister Yoshida in his letter dated 7 February promised that the Government of Japan stood prepared after restoration of its sovereignty to enter into negotiations with other nations "with a view to establishing equitable arrangements for the development and conservation of fisheries..." The Prime Minister also stated that in the interval prior to a peace settlement the Japanese Government would establish a special Commission with the assigned responsibility of insuring that Japanese nationals and their vessels

would not violate established fishing preserves or conduct fishing operations in areas which had not been utilized by the Japanese fishing industry in 1940. Ambassador Dulles in his reply to the Prime Minister's letter, welcomed the assurance on the conduct of Japanese fisheries "as a good omen for the future."

The text of Prime Minister Yoshida's letter follows:

"February 7, 1951

"My Dear Ambassador:

"In connection with conversations which we have had about fisheries, I am glad to advise you as follows:

"The Japanese people largely depend upon fish for their food supply. They have, therefore, a very special interest in the conservation and development of fisheries. The Japanese Government recognizes that the problem of conserving and developing fisheries located in the high seas is a difficult one, and that these fisheries may be quickly exhausted unless there is concerted action for the conservation and development of fisheries. We are aware of the fact that certain countries have adopted international agreements and voluntary self-denying ordinances to prevent the exhaustion of high seas fisheries which are readily accessible to fishermen of their own country, and that if these conserved fisheries were to be subjected to uncontrolled fishing from other countries, the result would be international friction and the exhasution of the fisheries themselves.

"Accordingly, the Japanese Government will, as soon as practicable after the restoration to it of full sovereignty, be prepared to enter into negotiations with other countries with a view to establishing equitable arrangements for the development and conservation of fisheries which are accessible to the nationals of Japan and such other countries.

"In the meantime, the Japanese Government will, as a voluntary act, implying no waiver of their international rights, prohibit their resident nations and vessels from carrying on fishing opera-

tions in presently conserved fisheries in all waters where arrangements have already been made, either by international or domestic act, to protect the fisheries from overharvesting, and in which fisheries Japanese nationals or vessels were not in the year 1940 conducting operations.

"The Japanese Government will set up a Commission, composed of representatives of both Government and industry, whose duty it shall be to see that the above-mentioned prohibition is fully observed, and duly appointed representatives of interested foreign governments will be invited to sit on the Commission as observers.

"Any party the Commission finds guilty of violation shall be subject to substantial penalty, including revocation of his fisheries license.

"I trust that the foregoing voluntary arrangements will constitute convincing evidence of the desire of the Japanese Government to deal with this whole problem in an equitable manner, designed to promote goodwill and the mutual interest of all who, directly or indirectly, depend for their livelihood upon fishing in the high seas.

"I remain with the highest consideration,

"Most sincerely yours,

(signed)
Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister."

The text of Ambassador Dulles' reply to Prime Minister Yoshida follows:

"Tokyo Japan
"7 February 1951

"My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"I am in receipt of your letter of February 7th with relation to high seas fisheries. I note with gratification the position of your Government as therein set forth.

"It is a good omen for the future that the Japanese Government should already now indicate its willingness voluntarily to take measures for the protection of conserved fisheries.

"The Government of the United States, and I am confident other Governments concerned, will be prepared, promptly after the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan by a Peace Treaty, to enter into negotiations with a view to establishing equitable arrangements for the development and conservation of fisheries which are accessible to the nationals of our countries. I am confident that our Government will approach these negotiations in a spirit of goodwill corresponding to that which motivates your letter to me.

"Sincerely yours,

(signed)
John Foster Dulles"

Prime Minister Yoshida and Dulles Issue Statements on Tokyo Conferences

EPRime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Ambassador John Foster Dulles on the morning of 11 February issued simultaneous statements expressing their complete satisfaction with the conferences conducted by Dulles and Japanese leaders since the arrival of the Dulles Mission in January. The Prime Minister stated that his conversations with Dulles on a peace settlement for Japan had been "eminently satisfactory" and that a "large area of understanding" had been reached concerning the basic issues involved in the coming peace treaty. Yoshida warmly welcomed on behalf of the Government and the "preponderent majority of Japanese people" the Ambassador's invitation of 2 February for Japanese participation in a security arrangement with the United States involving the stationing of American armed forces in Japan. Yoshida expressly thanked the Dulles Mission for its treatment of Japan not as a vanquished nation, but as an equal. Ambassador

Dulles in his statement virtually echoed the phraseology of the Prime Minister, asserting that a "gratifying measure of understanding" had been achieved in all matters discussed in connection with the peace settlement. He also reaffirmed the principles to be embodied in a peace treaty and expressed his appreciation for the aid which had been accorded his Mission in enabling it to obtain a greater understanding of the multitude of problems studied.

The text of the Prime Minister's statement follows:

"Ambassador John Foster Dulles and his party arrived in Tokyo on January 25. Maintaining close contact with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and his Headquarters, especially the Diplomatic Section, they proceeded with characteristic American energy and speed to explore the avenue approach to the problem of Japanese peace settlement.

"In the past fortnight, I conferred with the Ambassador formally three times and met him on several other occasions, while our Government representatives engaged in daily exchanges of views with him and his colleagues. The results have been eminently satisfactory.

"We have the definite and heartwarming assurence of American determination to get peace, to give Japan a just and equitable peace and to support her admittance to the U.N. We have found a large area of understanding concerning the basic issues involved in the coming peace treaty.

"I desire to express my appreciation of the Ambassador's courtesy and friendliness in dealing with us. By treating Japanese not as a vanquished people, but as equals, he has shown special consideration to our national sentiments and sensibilities. He has taken pains to see leaders of political parties, Diet members, representatives of the press, business and labor and numerous other private individuals and listened to what they had to say. Such a chivalrous attitude on the part of the Ambassador

should go far to clear the ground for the rebuilding of the ruined citadel of Japanese-American friendship. In this connection, it is most gratifying that Mr. John D. Rockefeller III has come with the mission to formulate a program for the promotion of cultural intercourse between the two countries.

"On February 2 Ambassador Dulles delivered a public address expounding the principles of collective security and the need of self-defense and mutual aid for free nations, which elicited an enthusiastic response throughout Japan. In the face of the overt and devastating Communist aggression going on in Korea today, the Japanese Government and a preponderant majority of Japanese people warmly welcome the Ambassador's invitation to a security arrangement with the U. S. armed forces in and about the country. We realize fully our responsibility to protect ourselves and defend our own land, and do what we can in this respect. When we recover our independence and join the council of free nations as an equal member, the substance and scope of the Japanese contribution will be determined according to the extent of our economic and industrial recovery.

"On the occasion of the departure of Ambassador Dulles, I wish to tender to him and members of his Mission the profound thanks of the Government and people of Japan for their earnest and arduous labors which have proved so fruitful. I wish him a pleasant and successful journey to Manila, Canberra and Wellington and safe return to Washington."

The text of Ambassador Dulles' statement follows:

"Our Mission is leaving Japan after more than two weeks devoted to consultation with Japanese leaders regarding the future peace settlement.

"1. We have discussed here the principles, heretofore discussed with our Allies, which might be embodied in a Treaty of Peace with Japan. As was indicated in connection with the prior

conversations with our Allies, we foresee a peace treaty which would in simple terms formally end the war; restore full sovereignty to Japan; define the geographical area of that sovereignty; look forward to Japan's future membership in the United Nations; recognize Japan's inherent right of individual and collective self-defense; establish provisional commercial agreements, and provide for the settlement of claims. By the Preamble, Japan might express its resolve to adhere to the high principles of national conduct which have animated its postwar legislation and development.

"2. We have discussed the future security of Japan. On February 2nd, with the authority of my Government, I publicly stated that if desired by Japan, the United States would sympathetically consider the maintenance of United States armed forces in and about Japan.

"The Japanese Government has warmly welcomed that proposal and our many conversations here, and the manifold expressions of opinion which have come to us, convince us that it is the overwhelming desire of the Japanese nation that that proposal be accepted so that the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace will not leave a vacuum of power, with Japan totally disarmed and unable to defend itself. Accordingly, we have discussed provisional security arrangements between the United States and Japan.

"In this connection, we have pointed out that all regional or collective security arrangements of a definitive character, to which the United States becomes a party, must provide for 'continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid' by all of the Parties in accordance with the basic policy laid down by the 'Vandenberg' Senate Resolution of June 11, 1948.

"3. We have discussed the economic problems which lie ahead of Japan. We have come to the view that Japan can develop for her people a satisfactory and rising standard of living by her

own efforts and resourcefulness and industry of her people on the assumption that the Treaty of Peace does not place upon Japan heavy economic or financial burdens or major commercial disabilities. We have indicated that the United States would be disposed to continue to cooperate with Japan in the effort to find ways whereby the Japanese economy can find health and vigor as a useful member of the free world community.

"4. We have considered the development of cultural ties between our people. The relationship which we seek for the future is one which does not depend merely upon contractual or economic relations. There is a need for a sense of personal fellowship and of mutual regard. We look forward in peace to an association which will enrich both the peoples of the United States and of Japan by enabling each to draw upon the other's reservoir of knowledge, literature and art and upon its creative and sustaining sources of spiritual power.

"We leave Japan with a feeling that in all of these matters we have achieved a gratifying measure of understanding. We thank the Government, the political leaders and the many people of Japan who have, with sincerity, helped us to understand their problems and their aspirations.

"We have been greatly aided by the wise counsel of General MacArthur and his staff. Ambassador Sebald has taken an active part in all of our discussions. We have also had the benefit of consultations with members of the Allied Diplomatic Corps.

"The information we have gathered here enables us now to proceed in further discussions with our Allies which must precede the formulation of precise treaty terms. We shall go forward hopefully in this further advancement of our mission of peace."

Departure Messages Exchanged Between General MacArthur and Dulles

General and Mrs. MacArthur on 11 February travelled to Tokyo's Haneda Airport to bid farewell to Ambassador and Mrs. John Foster Dulles and his assistant, John M. Allison, on their departure to Manila to continue their exploratory talks on a Japanese peace settlement. The Ambassador who had been in Japan for 17 days commented prior to his departure: "I came here with questions; I go back with answers. I'm grateful to all the Japanese for the cooperation they have shown, and I'm particularly grateful to General MacArthur and his wise counsel." In conjunction with the departure of Dulles, SCAP's General Headquarters released an exchange of letters between the Ambassador and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Ambassador Dulles' letter, dated 9 February, read:

"My dear General:

"As our peace mission leaves Japan, I wish to express my profound appreciation for the assistance you have rendered us. If we have made progress along the road to peace--as I think we have--it has been due to the foundation you have laid and the wise counsel you have given.

"Your policies as Supreme Commander have so combined justice and mercy as to bring our late enemies to perceive and desire to share the ideals which animate our free world. That makes it possible for us reasonably to plan on a future era of peace, trust and opportunity to be shared by Japan. Without that foundation, our present task would have been hopeless.

"During the course of our current conversations with Japanese leaders, official and unofficial, you have given us broad counsel in the interest of all of the Allies who genuinely seek peace.

"Our mission has drawn its inspiration from your conception that early peace is now deserved by Japan and has become important to the welfare of all. We shall expect to carry on in

that spirit in the hope of contributing to the structure of just and lasting peace which has been your constant goal.

"Faithfully yours,

(signed)
John Foster Dulles"

General MacArthur on the following day replied:

"My thanks and deepest appreciation for your note of the 9th. I feel it does me too much credit.

"I am confident that the influence of the peace formula we seek for Japan will extend far beyond the immediate problem it seeks to solve. For a peace based upon such high concepts of justice and right, designed to erase the scars of war and restore the vanquished to a position of dignity and equality among nations, presents a new spiritual idea to mankind and evokes new standards of morality in international relations.

"That you and the other distinguished members of your mission have so patiently sought and considered the views of the Japanese people and their leaders as a check upon the wisdom of our own thinking cannot fail to strengthen the Japanese faith in the integrity of our country and its representatives.

"Under your able presentation you have given Japan a new appreciation of the great moral stature of the United States which I am sure will find a stirring response in the hearts of all of the people of Asia, both those who are still free and those who, prostrate under the sword of tyranny, yet covet the opportunity to be free. Yours has, indeed, been a high order of universal service.

"With assurances of warm regard, I am,

"Most faithfully,

(signed)
Douglas MacArthur"

Rockefeller Stresses Benefits of Cultural Exchange

John D. Rockefeller III, a member of the Dulles Mission to Japan, on 12 February in an address to a Lincoln Birthday Anniversary gathering sponsored by the American-Japan Cultural Society, stressed the benefits which might be achieved through a greater exchange of cultural knowledge between the nations of Japan and the United States. Rockefeller stated that it was his opinion that "cultural inter-change between our two countries will not only provide a sound basis for mutual respect and better understanding between our peoples but will also enrich our respective civilizations."

The text of Rockefeller's address follows:

"It is a real pleasure and satisfaction to be in Japan again. It is a particular satisfaction to be here as part of Ambassador Dulles' Mission with the primary purpose of discussing long-range cultural relations between the peoples of Japan and the United States. I feel it is most appropriate, therefore, that I have the honor to speak to you at this meeting which has gathered to commemorate the birth of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln has become a part of the cultural heritage of the American people. Even after almost a century has passed since his tragic death, his name has remained a lasting inspiration because his life so graphically exemplified the underlying ideals and principles which had guided the American people. Lincoln does not, however, belong to America alone. His concept of the dignity of the individual, together with his unshaken faith in the democratic way of life, have far transcended the national boundaries of the United States to inspire peoples in many parts of the world. There is a broad universality in the life and work of Lincoln and it should occasion no surprise that the Japanese people have in turn found inspiration in the life of this great humanitarian. So much of what Lincoln stood for are ideals which have long been familiar to all of us.

"So as we gather here to commemorate Lincoln's birth at a time when the world is still recovering from the ravages of a destructive war, it would seem to me fitting to take stock of ourselves for the long and arduous period of reconstruction that still lies ahead. I want to take this opportunity, therefore, to speak briefly on a matter which has long been on my mind. In this troubled world today so many of us have a clear conviction of the things to which we are opposed, but there are so few of us who have an equally clear conviction as to the things we favor. For example, we are clear in our minds that we are opposed to totalitarianism, militarism, communism and fascism, but we do not always have a full appreciation or understanding of the things we believe in.

"I recognize how important it is that we know what we are against so that we can take appropriate action, but it is even more important for us to have at the same time a clear understanding of what we are for so that we can build positively and constructively for the future. Life must be built on the principles of positive action if we are to make progress.

"Our lack of clarity of thinking on the positive side today is understandable when we take into consideration rapidly changing world conditions, the impact of one nation upon another as a result of modern communications, and the effects of the recent war. For the most part our ideas are broad and general. We tend to take too much for granted and often do not think things through carefully. But in this rapidly changing world with the problems it poses for all peoples, the situation calls for concrete, positive thinking.

"The problem, as I see it, is how we should approach a more specific formulation of our thoughts and expression of ideals. Two steps stand out in my mind. First, we should look back into our respective histories and draw strength and wisdom from the finer things our our heritage. You, on your part, have a rich resource of culture based on the many centuries of your civilization which few nations can equal. We are much younger and hence have a much

shorter past from which to draw. Nevertheless, because we are younger, other qualities stand out which we can turn back to. I have particularly in mind those fundamentals of character which inspired our leaders during the formative years of the American nation: courage, self-sacrifice, initiative. These are basic qualities which are essential to the people of any nation and from which all of us sometimes stand to draw away.

"I believe we can profit very greatly by studying the histories, the civilization and the culture of each other's countries and of those of other nations. Each of us will benefit by knowledge of the accomplishments and genius of the other and each can select for his own use what he feels will be most beneficial and helpful.

"The second step, as I see it, in the more specific formulation of our thoughts, is to determine in the light of conditions today what is basic and fundamental in our respective ways of life. We must decide what really counts in life, what is important to us, to our families, and to our societies. To illustrate the type of review and thinking which seems to me to be essential, may I refer again to my own country. We have made tremendous and important strides on the scientific and material side. However, we must make sure that the advance in the moral and spiritual side has not lagged behind. There are evaluations that all peoples must make for themselves in continuous self-appraisal.

"There is no easy answer to this question of clarifying our thinking in regard to what we stand for. While we must look to our leaders for initiative, the final responsibility rests with each one of us. This responsibility is vitally important as our decisions must represent the convictions of the people of our respective countries.

The necessity to arrive at a clear appreciation and understanding of what we stand for, as opposed to what we stand against is only too obvious. We must move ahead rapidly to crystallize

our thinking and make our ideas concrete and specific, for the ideas and plans of others are challenging our basic concepts and their methods are relentless and ruthless. They would like nothing better than to see us negative and confused. It is increasingly clear to all of us that we cannot effectively counter ideas by armed strength alone. We must have better ideas, a better way of life which is clear and positive and which has the driving support of the people behind it.

"We are in a critical period of world history today. It is a challenging period as so much in our social and economic life is in a state of flux. Change is the order of the day. Our future, our destiny are in our own hands and we can shape them as we will, for good or evil. If we think positively, if we know what we are for, if we feel a passionate devotion for the course we select, and if the nations of the free world stand together, we can look to the future with confidence.

"In conclusion, may I say that during my short stay in your country I have come to appreciate more fully than ever before the contribution which the culture of your country can make to the culture of mine. As I see it, our two cultures have much to offer each other.

"It is my feeling, therefore, that cultural inter-change between our two countries will only provide a sound basis for mutual respect and better understanding between our peoples but will also enrich our respective civilizations. The greatest benefits will be achieved if each of us contributes according to his own genius and each of us takes from the other according to the benefit to be derived.

"Our two countries have much in common. We have much to gain by working together. We in American look forward to increasingly close relations between the peoples of our two nations. May the spirit of Lincoln always be a mutual and binding source of inspiration. "

Prior to his scheduled departure from Japan on 22 February to rejoin the Dulles Mission in Washington, Rockefeller issued the following statement to the press on 21 February:

"The objective of long-range cultural interchange between Japan and the United States is, as I see it, to bring our peoples closer together in their appreciation and understanding of each other and to enrich our respective civilizations. If this end is to be attained each of us must contribute according to his own genius and each of us take from the other according to the benefit to be derived.

"During my stay in Japan I have had the opportunity of talking with many Japanese, both men and women; college professors and students, businessmen and representatives of labor, government officials and members of the press, religious leaders and professional peoples.

"Their suggestions as to long-range cultural relations between our two countries have been as helpful as they have been interesting. Several seem to me to offer particular promise:

"First, the great importance of not only the continuation of the exchange of persons program but also the increase in the numbers. Emphasis was placed particularly on younger people as well as those who have achieved distinction in their chosen fields.

"Second, the need for some form of cultural center to serve as a clearing house and coordinating agency for all forms of cultural interchange. It was suggested the center might have library facilities and meeting rooms in addition to its service function.

"Third, the benefit to be derived from the establishment of a research center for Japanese studies where scholars from abroad could join with scholars from Japan in work of mutual interest.

"Fourth, the desirability of the exchange of exhibits in the various fields of art. It was felt that contemporary art should be emphasized as well as that of the past.

"Fifth, the need for the exchange of books and other materials between our two countries. Such problems as copyrights and adequate translations were pointed out.

"During my visit to Japan I have been impressed with what I have been told as to the contribution which the United States can make to the culture of your country. However, as I leave after four weeks of conferences, the impression which stands out most sharply in my mind is what Japanese culture has to offer to the culture of my country.

"I am thinking particularly of the fields of art, philosophy and literature. The possibilities in relation to the field of art are, in my judgment, relatively unlimited: Architecture, painting, sculpture, textiles, ceramics, folkcraft, gardens, etc.

"As to Japanese philosophy and literature, a knowledge of them by my people can, I believe, further enrich our way of life.

"To those who have assisted me in my part of the Dulles' Mission I am very grateful. I return home with a feeling of enthusiasm for the opportunities which lie ahead for both our countries in the field of cultural interchange. We have much to gain by working together."

Sebald Refutes U.S.S.R. Charge U.S. Rearming Japan

U. S. Ambassador William J. Sebald, political advisor to General MacArtnur and United States member on the Allied Council for Japan, on 14 February refuted charges leveled by U.S.S.R. Council member Maj. Gen. A. P. Kislenko that the United States was engaged in rearming Japan under the pretext that Communists were threatening public order in Japan. Ambassador Sebald in denying the Soviet accusation stated that no accomplishment of the Allied Occupation stood out more greatly than Japan's complete demilitarization and declared that the United States would not look with favor upon a resurgence of military aggression in Japan, "never wanted it and fought a war over that issue." Sebald labeled

as "sheer fabrication" a charge by General Kislenko that Japanese pilots were being dispatched to the United States for training. As for Soviet charges that the United States was utilizing Japanese minesweepers in Korean waters, Sebald answered that the minesweepers were being utilized in a humanitarian effort to assist in combating illegal actions. Sebald further accused the Soviet Council member with utilizing the Council agenda as a propaganda springboard to support Japanese Communist politicians. General Kislenko had read to the group a long statement presenting his Government's charges concluding withthe expression of opinion that the actions of the United States in Japan were a "direct violation" of Four Power decisions on the demilitarization of Japan. Ambassador W. R. Hodgson of Australia, representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India, commented that he was not familiar with the views of all the countries he was representing, but knew that the Australian Government was gravely concerned with any possibility of resurging militarism in Japan and stated Australia "will be most vigilant to see that it never takes place." Lt. Gen. Ho Shai-lai, representing "Nationalist" China, commented that the question merited "careful consideration."

The remarks made by Ambassador Sebald at the 133rd meeting of the Allied Council on 14 February concerning the demilitarization of Japan follow:

"Of the many accomplishments of the Occupation no one stands out with greater clarity of completeness and finality than that of the demilitarization of Japan. It should be unnecessary today once again to review the details which, in summation, would be a final report of the complete demilitarization of the Japanese armed forces and destruction of primary and secondary war-making capacity. But, as the Soviet Member has introduced this subject for discussion today, I feel that I have no alternative to recalling to the Council some of the accomplishments in this regard.

"The subject of demilitarization was briefly touched upon in the Fifteenth Meeting of the Council held on September 18, 1946. At that time--nearly 4-1/2 years ago--the program of demilitarization, in compliance with basic directives, was already nearing completion to the extent, as indicated by the Chairman of that meeting, that 'all known Japanese armaments and war materials have been taken over by the Allied Occupation forces.' He further stated that all arms had been rendered inoperative or destroyed, and that approximately 40,000 pieces of artillery, cannon and mortars, as well as more than two million small arms, were included in the program. He indicated that arms were destroyed by burning, demolition, and other means. Furthermore, as of that time, more than 90 percent of more than one million tons of various categories of ammunition had been taken over by the Occupation authorities and destroyed. The estimate was made that the balance would be destroyed by late Autumn of 1946. He furthermore indicated that approximately 13,000 miscellaneous type aircraft had been taken over and destroyed; more than 3,000 tanks had been destroyed, although a small percentage were demilitarized and returned to the Japanese civilian economy to be used as bulldozers and for agricultural purposes. Among other items taken over were approximately 100,000 tons of chemical warfare supplies which were then in process of destruction, principally by dumping at sea. He also indicated the extent to which civilian type items were taken over by the Occupation authorities and returned to the Japanese Government for relief and rehabilitation purposes.

"The Chairman at the Fifteenth Meeting briefly touched upon the destruction of Japanese naval combatant vessels and indicated that all combatant naval vessels larger than destroyers and submarines were being destroyed by scrapping or sinking. He indicated that all towable submarines had been sunk and that those not towable were in process of being scrapped. In order to bring this

progress of demilitarization up to date, I can categorically state that the destruction of every combatant vessel of the Japanese Navy has long since been completed. A number of small non-combatant and unarmed vessels were turned over to the Maritime Safety Commission for police purposes as subsequently disclosed and discussed in the Council at its Seventy-seventh Meeting held on January 5, 1949.

"In my studies of this problem of demilitarization I have come across a statistical record prepared by General Headquarters, SCAP, of all captured and surrendered Japanese Army and Navy supplies and equipment in Japan and South Korea. This record consists of a compilation of some 150 pages of detailed breakdowns of all such equipment, and accounts for each single piece and part of such supplies and equipment including the destruction and disposition (if returned to the Japanese economy) thereof during the period September 1, 1945 to June 30, 1946. I will not take the time of the Council to read these 150 pages or even to place them in the record, but I merely wish to point out that if the record remains incomplete it is only by virtue of the failure on the part of the Soviet Member, in response to some five letters addressed to him by General Headquarters during 1945 and 1946, to furnish any information whatsoever on Japanese troops--including strength, armament, disposition of armament, etc.--in Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. General Headquarters is, of course, unable to complete its record of demilitarization in the absence of information from the Soviet Government regarding the disposition of the huge amounts of armaments and war supplies which were captured by the Soviet armed forces in the areas mentioned and turned over to them by the Japanese armed forces at the time of the Surrender. To this extent only does the story of the demilitarization of Japan remain incomplete. It would, indeed, be interesting to learn what has happened to the arms and military equipment which fell into the hands of the Soviet forces.

"I would now like, also, to say a few words concerning the demilitarization of primary and secondary war facilities. It is obvious that the changeover from a war-time to a peace-time economy is a highly complex problem having vast implications and entailing untold details. Time would not allow a complete examination of this subject which of necessity would require explanation by charts, statistics, and other descriptive data. General Headquarters is today not so constituted that it can, without notice, detail numerous statisticians, economists, and others to prepare an all-inclusive study of this kind. Suffice it to say that Japan's war-making capacity today no longer effectively exists and that this phase of the demilitarization program, to all intents and purposes, has long since been completed.

"There is, however, one facet of this problem which I believe warrants the time for comment. I refer to special purpose machinery and equipment. As is well known, the heart of any war-making economy is the extent to which such economy is supplied with special purpose tools and machinery. In October 1947 SCAP released all such machinery and equipment from reparations custody and directed the Japanese Government, regardless of ownership or location of the property, to destroy it within six months by scrapping or other approved methods. This action was coordinated with the Occupation forces and monthly reports of the status of the program were required together with the estimated dates of completion and detailed reports for each installation.

"Thereafter, a Cabinet Order was promulgated by the Japanese Government directing the owners or possessors of special purpose machinery to submit specific data concerning such machinery, including a plan for its destruction. After destruction the owners were to report the date and method of destruction, details as to expense, tonnage of ferrous scrap, recovered proceeds from the sale of scrap, and the value of the scrap unsold. The final report by

General Headquarters, SCAP, indicated that a total of 12,062 special purpose machines had been destroyed in compliance with the order. Of those, 8,588 were totally destroyed while 3,474 were partially destroyed by the destruction of their special purpose elements. Over 25,000 metric tons of ferrous scrap and over 570 metric tons of non-ferrous scrap were recovered. Nearly three-quarters of the machinery so destroyed was nationally-owned property. (It is my understanding that a detailed report dated December 10, 1949 covering these matters has already been made available to the Members of the Council through their appropriate representatives.)

"I would like to repeat that the absence of special purpose machinery precludes a war-making program and that regardless of how many buildings or factories might still be standing in Japan the war-making capacity of Japanese industry for practical purposes is nil by reason of the destruction of its special purpose machinery. No point would be served in tearing down buildings and peaceful industrial facilities, many of which are now devoted to peace-time industry for the purpose of stabilizing the Japanese economy in accordance with the Nine Point Economic Stabilization Interim Directive of 1948. I might add that in addition to the destruction of special purpose machinery and equipment, the Occupation, under the reparations program, authorized the shipment abroad of approximately 57,000 items of strategic importance such as machine tools, secondary metal working machinery, and laboratory research and testing equipment.

"As I have indicated, except for such facilities as are required to meet the needs of the Occupation, the demilitarization of Japan in this regard is also completed, with the possible exception that no reports have been received by the Supreme Commander from the Soviet authorities concerning the disposition of primary and secondary war facilities in Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and the Kuriles where, as is well-known, a substantial

portion of Japan's war-making capacity was located. While we have had numerous reports of stripping of plants of all kinds by Soviet forces in these areas, no official information of the extent to which these facilities may have been removed or destroyed or, on the other hand, may remain intact and in operation, has ever been received. Here again, the final story of the economic demilitarization of Japan cannot be written until the Soviet authorities accede to requests previously made for information on this subject.

"So much for the problem of demilitarization of Japan. Under this agenda item the Soviet Member has attempted to broaden discussion to include other subjects which clearly do not fall within the scope of the Agenda item. He has, for example, raised the question of the National Police Reserve. We are not discussing the police system of Japan at this meeting, nor is it proper that the various remarks made by the Soviet Member concerning rearmament and similar subjects be made the basis for discussion. We have been asked to discuss demilitarization--that I am willing to do.

"There is, however, one final observation which I should like to make with regard to the statement as a whole just read by the Soviet Member. I cannot help find a certain similarity in context and tone between the statement of the Soviet Member and a speech made on January 27, 1951 in the Diet by the Communist Member, Kaniehi Kawakami. It is, of course, not by accident that the Soviet Member, representing a government which is in fact ruled by the party of international communism, should take up the cudgel in Japan for the Japan Communist Party. That the Soviet Member should undertake to waste the time of this Council in his propaganda attacks against the Occupation is understandable--that is the Soviet pattern of behavior in international bodies--but what is not clear, is the purpose which underlies the introduction of this subject today. In the absence of any expla-

nation of this purpose, I think it would be helpful in arriving at proper conclusions, to tear away the verbiage of the propaganda attack which we have just heard, to clear the smoke-screen of double-talk, exaggeration, propaganda, and Moscow-directed purposeful policy, and find the crux of what the Soviet Member is attempting toaccomplish. I can only surmise what this purpose is, but I believe, firstly, that today's propaganda attack is an attempt to salvage Mr. Kanichi Kawakami who, contrary to SCAP policies, attacked the Occupation in his attempt to follow the directives of the Cominform. Secondly, I believe that the Soviet Member, today, is attempting, by indirection, to intimidate the Japanese Diet Investigating Committee which is presently examing the appropriateness of Kawakami's speech and which could, therefore, recommend his expulsion from the National Diet. I doubt that the Japanese National Diet will be so intimidated.

"We would, of course, be naive indeed, were we not to recognize the existence of threads which lead from the center of international communism, that forefront of imperialistic expansionism, to that tool, the Japan Communist Party. The context and tone of the statement to which we have just listened indicates, to my mind at least, that those threads lead directly into the National Diet of Japan where, under the cover of truly Democratic processes, the Japanese electorate has been bewitched and befuddled into electing representatives whose primary objective is to destroy the very system which has given them status in a body representative of the Japanese people.

"If my analysis of the purpose which underlies the introduction of this subject is correct, and I have no reason to question this analysis, then it appears to me the Soviet Member is utilizing this body, established in good faith by the Powers concerned at Moscow in 1945, for selfish and nefarious ends which were certainly not within the contemplation of those who agreed upon the Terms of Reference which cover the deliberations of this Council."

Sebald Leaves for Consultations in Washington

U. S. Ambassador William J. Sebald on 22 February left Tokyo for Honolulu to join the Japanese Peace Settlement Mission of John Foster Dulles and proceed with the Mission to Washington for what he termed "routine consultation." Upon his departure, Sebald issued the following statement to the press:

"I am leaving for Washington on routine consultation. It is my intention to join Ambassador Dulles and the members of his Mission at Honolulu and to proceed from there in company with Ambassador Dulles to Washington.

"As it has been more than eighteen months since I have last had an opportunity to meet with the officers of the Department of State and other Government Departments directly concerned with Japanese problems, I feel that it is desirable for me once again to obtain the views of those officers on matters within my province, and thus be in a better position to assist the Supreme Commander with matters pertaining to Japan. These consultations will be of a routine nature, having been planned several months ago, and there is no particular significance in my departure at this time.

"My present plans call for a stay in Washington of approximately three weeks. During my absence, Mr. Miles W. Bond, Deputy Chief of Mission, will act as my representative and will be in charge of the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, SCAP."

Japanese Government Extended Authorization for Direct Communication with Foreign Missions

The Japanese Government on 17 February announced the receipt of a GHQ, SCAP memorandum dated 13 February extending to it authorization to communicate directly with Foreign Diplomatic Representatives Accredited to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers subject, however, to certain limiting provisions. The text of this authorization, SCAPIN 2142, is presented below:

AG 091 (26 May 50)DS
SCAPIN 2142

13 February 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT: Authorization for Direct Communication Between the Japanese Government and Foreign Diplomatic Representatives Accredited to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

1. References:

a. Memorandum for Japanese Government, file AG 091.1 (4 Nov 45)GS, SCAPIN 237, subject: Official Relations Between Japanese Government and Representatives of Neutral Nations, 4 November 1945.

b. Memorandum for Japanese Government, file AG 091 (29 Jan 46)GS, SCAPIN 677, subject: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, 29 January 1946.

c. Memorandum for Japanese Government, file AG 091.112 (2 Dec 46)GS, SCAPIN 1372, subject: Contact with Japanese Officials, 2 December 1946.

d. Memorandum for Japanese Government, file AG 091 (28 May 48)ESS/EX, SCAPIN 1901, subject: Authorization for Direct Communication between Japanese Government Board of Trade and Firms, Persons, and Foreign Missions on Commercial Matters, 28 May 1948.

2. The Japanese Government is hereby authorized direct communication with the diplomatic representatives of foreign governments accredited to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, subject to the provisions listed below, the restrictions embodied in referenced memoranda being relaxed only to the extent of permitting such limited contact.

3. The Japanese Government may receive from and dispatch to the diplomatic representatives referred to above, written communications on the following subjects. Oral consultation is permissible only on matters on which written communication has been made.

a. Exit and reentry matters involving foreign nationals, except occupation force personnel, in Japan, as provided in Circular 3, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1950, and SCAPIN 2082, 20 February 1950.

b. Logistic facilities such as housing, office space, and supplies and services for foreign missions such as are not furnished by this headquarters.

c. Matters involved in protection of Japanese nationals and their interests abroad such as are handled by neutral foreign diplomatic missions on behalf of the Japanese Government.

d. Whereabouts and welfare cases; arrests and trials; financial and property matters (except war claims); rations; registration of nationality, births, marriages; deaths and estates; repatriation and deportation; and other routine individual personal status problems involving respective individual foreign nationals in Japan and individual Japanese nationals abroad.

e. Copyright, trade mark, and patent matters involving solely transmittal of correspondence and publications relating to procedural and administrative matters connected with copyright and industrial property registrations, laws and regulations, and excluding correspondence having to do with specific copyrights or copyrighted materials, trade marks, or patent matters, or transactions relating thereto.

f. Routine correspondence of an administrative, including fiscal, nature regarding transportation and communication facilities already authorized between Japan and foreign countries, such as authorized for telecommunications in SCAPIN 2085, 24 February 1950.

g. Routine correspondence of an administrative, including fiscal, nature between the Japanese Government and international organizations in which Japan maintains membership or has affiliations, or with which such correspondence is necessary.

h. Details concerning establishment of Japanese representation abroad, after agreement regarding such establishment has been approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

i. Details regarding Japanese representation at and participation in international conferences, after attendance has been approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

j. Routine correspondence concerning the execution of bilateral or international treaties or agreements, after their conclusion has been approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

k. Requests for official publications normally exchanged between governments; arrangements for exchange of scientific, educational, and cultural publications prepared by semiofficial and educations institutions.

l. Trade matters such as authorized by SCAPIN 1901 of 28 May 1948.

4. It is understood that communications on all other subjects, including those mentioned above when they involve interpretation of, or deviation from, standing policies, will continue to be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

5. The present authorization for direct written communication is a specific delegation of responsibility to the Japanese Government which will, therefore, submit to Diplomatic Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, copies of all communications it receives or dispatches under the provisions of this memorandum. The Japanese Government is instructed to use the English language, with such Japanese or Chinese characters as may be required to facilitate the reading of romanized names, in all communications authorized by this memorandum.

6. The accreditation of foreign diplomatic representatives in Japan remains unchanged, being solely to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

7. This direct channel of written communication does not in any way deprive the foreign diplomatic representatives of their right to continue transmitting communications authorized in paragraph 3, through this headquarters if they so desire. Both the accredited foreign diplomatic representatives and the

Japanese Government may, when either deems it advisable in any particular case and without direct reply on their part, refer any communication received which may be considered controversial, or as involving policy to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the latter's consideration, clarification, or reply.

8. The foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with which the Japanese Government may communicate directly under the provisions of this memorandum, unless this list is modified by subsequent memoranda, are:

a. The Australian Mission in Japan
b. The Belgian Mission in Japan
c. The Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Japan
d. The Canadian Liaison Mission in Japan
e. The Chinese Mission in Japan
f. The Danish Diplomatic Mission in Japan
g. The French Mission in Japan
h. The Indian Liaison Mission in Japan
i. The Italian Diplomatic Mission in Japan
j. The Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan
k. The Netherlands Mission in Japan
l. The Norwegian Diplomatic Mission in Japan
m. The Philippine Mission in Japan
n. The Portuguese Diplomatic Agency in Japan
o. The Spanish Diplomatic Mission in Japan
p. The Swedish Diplomatic Mission in Japan
q. The Swiss Diplomatic Mission in Japan
r. The Thai Diplomatic Mission in Japan
s. The United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan
t. The Uruguayan Diplomatic Agency in Japan.

9. In the absence of contrary indications from the Japanese Government, it will be understood that the channel of all correspondence between the Japanese Government and the foreign missions on subjects specified will be the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except that correspondence on international trade operations may pass directly between the missions and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

10. The provisions of this memorandum will become effective thirty (30) days after its publication.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

Budgets for Fiscal 1951-52 Passed by House of Representatives

The House of Representatives on 27 February by a vote of 213 to 118 approved without amendment the three Government-sponsored budgets for the fiscal year 1951-52. Passage came on the basis of sufficient Liberal strength in the House to override the combined negative vote of the Opposition parties. Prior to the vote, four representatives of the Opposition--People's Democrat Yasuhiro Nakasone, Social Democrat Kenjin Matsuzawa, Communist Hyakura Hayashi, and Social Democrat (Rikizo Hirano's newly-established party) Susumu Kobayashi spoke against the measures while Liberal Hisayuki Nishimura spoke for their approval. Nakasone argued that Japan was in danger of a recurring inflation and that, therefore, steps should be taken to increase import trade, readjust the domestic economy and install additional social security measures. He stated that the budgetary appropriations for war termination and the National Police Reserve were in need of reexamination and that the existing dollar-yen exchange rate should be revised. Matsuzawa called for a complete review of the budgets, abolition of inventory finance (the Foreign Exchange Control Commission), partial diversion of war termination appropriations to the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Board, and allocation of funds from the U. S. Aid Counterpart Fund to the Japan Export Finance Bank, National Railway Corporation, and to the Housing and Agriculture-Forestry Finance Banks. Upon completion of this final debate, the House voted as follows:

Affirmative		Negative	
Liberal Party	213	People's Democratic Party	44
		Social Democratic Party	34
		Communist Party	24
		Farmers' Coop. Party . .	7
		Labor-Farmer Party . . .	4
		(Hirano's) Social Democratic Party	2
		Independents	3
			118

The day prior to the House plenary session approval of the budgets the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives had adopted the three budgets by a 31 to 17 vote. Here again the Opposition had sought amendment of the budgets. People's Democrat Hideji Kawasaki moved that the Government withdraw and recompile the budgets along lines providing for: (1) the raising of ¥50,000,000,000 for inventory financing (Foreign Exchange Control Commission) from sources other than tax revenue; (2) increased funds for agriculture, soil conservation, price adjustments, equalization grant aid, social security, aid to small business, and education. Kawasaki's motion, however, received the support of only eight committee members and was defeated. Another Peoples' Democrat, Ichitaro Ide, in voicing objections to the budgets, declared: "Though the budgets were compiled carefully from a technical point of view, they do not meet the real needs of Japan's economy, as the necessity for supplementary budgets will prove. The inventory finance concept is not Japanese in character. The index on which the salary schedules were computed has changed. Government subsidies should not be eliminated. Regarding local taxes and equalization grant aid, local entities have been greatly neglected. Appropriations for agricultural improvement, education, social security and smaller enterprises are inadequate." Social Democrat Eiichi Nishimura added: "Because of the rise in commodity prices, the budgets will prove unsatisfactory. Finance Minister Ikeda has hinted that a supplementary budget may be required. This budget as it stands will not control inflation, promote production, or result in a self-sufficient economy." Communist Kazuharu Ezaki charged: "This budget is not for the Japanese people, but for Mr. Dodge (economic and financial advisor to SCAP and author of the anti-inflationary national economic stabilization program commonly referred to as the "Dodge Line") and it does not represent an autonomous viewpoint. It includes much pocket money for rearma-

ment, sends laborers into slavery for rearmament, pauperizes farmers, burdens small and medium enterprises, increases taxes and starves the people, and subjugates industry to foreigners. It is a war budget." In defense of the budgets, Liberal Yasuchi Miyahata stated that they faithfully carried out Liberal Party pledges and would make it possible for Japan "to proceed from stabilization to rehabilitation and independence."

Principal points of controversy on the budgets for 1951-52 centered on the ¥102,742,000,000 appropriation for war termination expenses and the ¥110,000,000,000 allocation in equalization grant aid to local entities. The Communists contended that the budget's war termination expenses were being utilized for the war raging in Korea and that the ¥20,000,000,000 appropriation for the National Police Reserve would go for Japanese rearmament. This was denied by Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda before the Lower House Budget Committee on 5 February. Replying to the interpealations of Communist Hyakuro Hayashi, the Finance Minister explained that the major share of the war termination appropriation was for repair of Occupation facilities, rental fees for Occupation-utilized housing and for payment of wages to some 300,000 employees of the Occupation. Ikeda stated flatly: "There is no truth in any assertion that the war termination funds were used to cover war expenses in connection with the Korean conflict." The Finance Minister also stated that it was his opinion that the appropriation for the National Police Reserve was in no way connected with the question of rearmament. Ikeda, however, admitted that the Government was engaged in a study of possible future costs of an armament program. He said: "It is true that the Finance Ministry is making a survey of the military expenses of all the nations of the world. No appropriation for rearmament has been included in the 1951-52 budget. I don't consider the ¥20,000,000,000 earmarked in the 1951-52 budget to cover the expenses for the National Po-

lice Reserve to be part of a rearmament effort." Questioned in detail about war termination expenditures by Communist Hayashi at a Budget Committee sub-committee session on 21 February, Director Kavata of the Finance Ministry's Bureau of Finance declared: "Last year we received procurement demands for completing air bases at Sagami, Oppama, Misawa, and other places, but we are not allowed to make public the outlays for these projects. War termination expenses up to last November totaled slightly more than ¥44,000,-000,000, 42% of the appropriation. It is not true that expenditures appreciably increased following the outbreak of the Korean War."

The Cabinet on 13 February rejected a request filed by 23 prefectural governments for an increase in local equalization grant aid in fiscal 1951-52. The prefectural action closely followed the recommendations of the Local Finance Commission which in January had recommended an increase in local aid from the budget figure of ¥110,000,000,000 to ¥120,975,000,000. The Cabinet's refusal to concede to the prefectural demand was dictated by its approved increase of ¥3,500,000,000 in local aid in the supplementary budgets for fiscal 1950-51 adopted in December 1950 and its authorization for an expansion in local bond floatations. Simultaneous with the Cabinet decision of 13 February on local equalization aid the Cabinet announced that the national government would foot 76.3% of all expenditures required for rehabilitation of buildings and areas devastated by natural disasters. The remaining 23.7% were left to be shouldered by local governments. Governor Iwataro Uchiyama of Kanagawa Prefecture in an appearance before the Lower House Budget Committee on 14 February attacked the entire system governing relations between national and local finances. Governor Uchiyama said: "Since the government appropriations for each prefecture are decided unilaterally by government authorities, it is a waste of time to ask the Local Finance Commission to use its good offices in relation to local finance. We

trust that the Diet will see to it that the unreasonable manner of making appropriations to local governments is corrected. It is a mistake first of all for the Finance Ministry to decide the amount of the equalization grant. Then the Local Finance Commission makes another mistake in allocating funds to local entities. No wonder local finance is attended by such extreme difficulties."

An additional point of interest in connection with the budgets of 1951-52 centered on whether there would be further increases in the basic wage level of public servants. Government employees in the supplementary budgets for fiscal 1950-51 had received an average increase of ¥1,000 over the previous wage level of ¥6,307. President Kiyoshi Asai of the National Personnel Authority before the House of Representatives' Budget Committee on 4 February stated that he had no immediate plans for advising a further raise. Replying to the interpellations of People's Democrat Hideji Kawasaki, Asai stated that statistics as of November 1950 indicated that the cost of living had risen only 3.5% since his wage raise recommendation and that this increase would not constitute sufficient basis for a further wage increase. Finance Ministry Bureau Vice-Director Tojo on the same subject before the House of Representatives' Local Administration Committee on 23 February asserted: "The consumer price index, rather than wholesale or retail price indices, were taken into consideration at the time the wage base was revised. Recent advances in specific commodity prices are not significantly influencing the consumer price index; hence, we do not believe it necessary to consider a wage base revision at this time. The revision effected recently was the Government's modification of the NPA recommendation."

The Cabinet's decision of January to slash taxes by ¥74,316,-000,000 in fiscal 1951-52 was clarified on 6 February by a detailed Finance Ministry report submitted to the Diet by Minister Ikeda. The report stated that the Cabinet's tax reform program would in-

volve a slash of ¥61,416,000,000 in personal income taxes through an increase in personal and dependent exemptions. Tax cuts to be effected through special exemptions for widows, students with part-time employment and others alone totaled ¥3,741,000,000. Corporation taxes were to be slashed by ¥2,958,000,000; liquor taxes by ¥6,777,000,000; and commodity taxes by ¥7,684,000,000. The budgetary estimates on revenues foresaw tariff incomes in fiscal 1951-52 reaching ¥4,920,000,000. This figure was based on a bill being prepared by the Finance Ministry to revise existing tariff regulations. It was expected that nearly half or ¥2,247,000,000 of the tariff revenue would be derived from imported foodstuffs, ¥240,000,000 from chemicals, and ¥80,000,000 from medicines and medical supplies.

Director Keiichiro Hirato of the Finance Ministry's Tax Bureau before the Lower House Budget Committee on 15 February revealed that the tax reform program would have the effect of reducing the number of taxpayers from the record total of 19,161,000 in fiscal 1949-50 to 15,307,000 in fiscal 1951-52. He explained that income taxpayers employed in agriculture would number 1,837,000 in 1951-52 as compared to 3,293,000 in 1949-50; businessmen paying taxes would be reduced from 2,245,000 to 1,895,000; and taxpayers employed in the professions would be cut from 651,000 to 442,000. The Finance Ministry in a report to the House of Councillors' Budget Committee on 22 February estimated that the nation's tax burden constituted 16.8% of the nation's total income as compared to 18.9% in the United States and 34.4% in Great Britain. When local taxes were included these figures increased to 22.6% in Japan, 26.6% in the United States; and 36.8% in Great Britain.

Among the points brought up in the public hearings conducted by the House of Representatives' Budget Committee on 14 and 17 February were the following:

Shigeto Tsuru, Professor at Hitotsubashi University, on 14 February stated: "The budgets were compiled on the basis of last October's commodity prices; since then domestic prices have advanced 20%. Therefore, the subsidy for imported foodstuffs to take one example, of ¥22,500,000,000 should be increased to ¥45,000,000,000."

Saburo Takagi, Director of the Federation of Private School Associations, on 14 February said: "Appropriations for education are only 4% of the budget, a very regrettable fact in view of Japan's abandonment of armaments and of her efforts to establish a cultural state. The inequality between the amounts appropriated for public and private schools is deplorable. Public schools with only 120,000 pupils will receive ¥14,000,000,000 while private schools with 950,000 pupils will get but 7% of that sum."

Saizo Goto, Chairman of the Medium and Small Business Committee, Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, on 14 February: "The tax burden still weighs heavily on business. For example, a Tokyo barber with seven chairs in his shop and seven dependents to support grossed ¥560,000 during fiscal 1950-51, of which ¥300,000 went for operating costs. Now he must pay a tax of ¥210,000 plus ¥110,000 in tax arrears for the preceding year. He is finding it difficult to make both ends meet. Other businessmen are in a similar position. Under these conditions it is hardly possible to expect any sizeable measure of capital accumulation. Counterpart funds should be set aside for the development of medium and small businesses and interest rates should be reduced. In addition, experimental and research costs should be deductible as business losses."

Shinichiro Omori, member of the Central Executive Committee, Japan Farmers' Union, on 14 February: "The farmers desire (1) an accumulation of agricultural capital, (2) measures to protect domestic producers of foodstuffs, and (3) modification of the Govern-

ment scheme for carrying out the Dodge plan. The plan for increasing food production by 10% cannot be materialized with the agricultural appropriation contained in this budget."

Takeshi Yamada, official of the Union of All-Japan Guidance Cooperative Association, on 14 February: "Because the price of domestic barley is threatened by the release of imported barley, farmers are afraid to increase their barley production; therefore, the plan for promoting increased barley production is in jeopardy. It is time to establish a firm agricultural policy."

Kanya Ito, Professor at Hitotsubashi University, on 17 February said concerning tax reductions: "I support the increased exemptions for basic allowances, dependents and disabled; the decrease in rates; and the exemptions for the aged, widows, working students, and insurance premiums. But I oppose the measures for encouraging capital accumulation which aid big business at the sacrifice of small and medium enterprises. The proposal to facilitate acquisition of equipment by authorizing a special depreciation reserve will benefit only large-scale operators."

Kaichiro Kaneko, Managing Director of the Jujo Paper Manufacturing Company, Ltd., on 17 February: "The tax burden on small and medium businesses, amounting to 40% of their income, or 44% if local tax is taken into account, makes it practically impossible for them to accumulate capital."

Shozo Horita, Vice-President of the Osaka Bank, on 17 February: "The working class is shouldering too heavy a tax burden. As a banker, I favor increasing capital accumulation by reinstatement of the anonymous deposit system, increase of the tax-exempt reserve fund, and no survey of deposits except in special cases. Time deposits last year were 10% of total deposits as against 60% in 1935. This is deplorable from the viewpoint of Japan's economic self-sufficiency."

Suezo Nakamura, Director of the Kyobashi Tax Office, on 17 February: "Tax offices have been discredited because they were

short of personnel and the officials were untrained, because assessments were difficult in the post-war confusion, and because people were ignorant of taxation. Tax administration is improving. Nineteen-Fifty assessments were made after actual investigation of each individual account."

Yeishin Nakajima, Deputy Chairman of the All-Japan Smaller Enterprises Council, on 17 February: "Taxes on small industries are heavier than on large enterprises."

Seiji Maeda, Director of the Legislative Counter-measures Division, Japan Federation of trade Unions, on 17 February: "I am not satisfied with the proposed tax revision as social policy. The basic exemption should be ¥50,000 instead of ¥30,000. The tax rate should be more than 55% on incomes above a million yen. A family exemption of ¥3,000 per capita is not enough. Luxury taxes should be increased considerably. The corporation tax should be graduated instead of holding to a uniform rate of 35%. Exceptions for foreign capital should be abolished."

Controversy Arises Between Public Utilities Commission and Nippatsu on Power Reform

The national power reform program inaugurated in January by the Public Utilities Commission became temporarily bogged down in February as a result of a bitter controversy over personnel arising between the Commission and the Japan Power Generation and Transmission Company (Nippatsu) led by President Junzo Kosaka. The controversy largely centered over the Commission's unilateral selection of presidents and board of director chairmen for the nine new power companies to be established in accord with the "Electric Enterprise Reorganization Order" approved by the Cabinet in December 1950. The issue developed to such proportions that for a time it appeared that the Government would be forced to intervene if any settlement were to be reached. But before this point was reached Commission Chairman Joji Matsumoto conceded to

the demands of the Nippatsu and the Public Utilities Commission withdrew its list of power appointees. The agreement which was reached with Nippatsu President Kosaka on 26 February provided that the Commission appointees would serve instead as company directors. The boards of directors of the projected power companies would be delegated authorization to name their respective presidents and chairmen rather than the Public Utilities Commission. This agreement from outward appearances at least appeared to have satisfied both Matsumoto and Kosaka. Matsumoto admitted that the Commission had carried its authority "too far" while Kosaka commented that there now remained "no reasons why we should continue to fight the PUC."

Prior to the Matsumoto-Kosaka agreement bitter words had been exchanged between the two sides in the controversy, the Public Utilities Commission maintaining it was representative of the Government to which the Nippatsu was subordinate and the Nippatsu claiming that the "arbitrary attitude" of the Commission constituted violation of the National Diet and public opinion. Kosaka accused the Commission of having established a system of boards of directors selected solely from former distribution company officials to head the new power companies. He testified before the House of Representatives" Budget Committee on 23 February that officials of the power companies named by the Commission had been chosen because of their connections with Yasuzaemon Matsunaga, a leading power figure and member of the Public Utilities Commission. Kosaka asserted that all the selections amounted to a conspiracy among "certain interests" closely connected with the Commission. Asked by People's Democrat Ichitaro Ide as to whether "top-ranking personnel were named through intrigue by Matsunaga's faction," Kosaka replied, "I believe so." Kosaka was especially critical of the selection of Ryutaro Takai, until recently President of the Kanto Power Distribution Company and a close affiliate of Matsunaga, to head the new Kanto Power Company. He stated that

he had supported Chairman Matsumoto's original plan to name Nikichi Araki, former Governor of the Bank of Japan, as president of the Kanto Company and Takai as vice-president. Subsequently, however, he stated that Matsumoto had changed his mind and replaced Araki with Takai. (Arakai on 14 February was named Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kanto Company.) Kosaka in his testimony received the support of Nippatsu. Vice-President Jugoro Meri and Susumu Fujita, Chairman of the All-Japan Electric Industry Workers Union (Denzan) Executive Committee. Fujita warned that the electrical workers' union would not cooperate with the new power establishment unless the Commission should reverse itself on the personnel issue, and stated that unless such action were taken worse conditions could be expected.

The Opposition parties also joined in the controversy. In a joint statement issued by all the parties with the exception of the Communists, the Opposition on 22 February expressed strong disapproval of the Public Utilities Commission's selection of Ryutaro Takai to head the Kanto Power Company. The communication delivered to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Commission Chairman Matsumoto accused Takai of "anti-democratic" tendencies in his dealings with the labor union of the Kanto Power Distribution Company. The Opposition declared that the appointment of such a person as Takai to a leading position in the projected power company would retard the smooth operation of the entire power reform program. First Club member, Ryosaku Sasaki, went further in criticizing the Public Utilities Commission. In a plenary session of the House of Councillors on 19 February, Sasaki charged that the Commission was under the complete domination of Yasuzaemon Matsunaga. Sasaki declared that eight of the nine new power companies to be established would be headed by former presidents of the old distribution companies and that the ninth company would be under the direction of one of Matsunaga's "henchmen." Sasaki declared: "The program worked out by the

Public Utilities Commission in compliance with the Potsdam Ordinance issued last year for reorganizing the electric power industry is inequitable. Members of the Commission are being influenced by certain groups. The presidents in eight of the new power districts will be carried over from the existing electric power distribution companies. Nippatsu will merely be absorbed. The new program establishes another big company in clear violation of the Economic Decentralization Law. Nippatsu President Kosaka says that the reorganization plan is so inequitable that he will not cooperate with it." The following day Commission Chairman Matsumoto replied to the charges of Sasaki. He denied that the Commission had been subjected to undue influence by Matsunaga, declaring that the five Commission members had an equal voice in all decisions arrived upon by the Commission. Another Commission member, Miyahara, before the House of Representatives' Budget Committee on 23 February admitted that although the opinions of veteran power figure Matsunaga were held in high esteem, decisions of the Commission were concurred in by all five members.

Meanwhile, the personnel dispute temporarily delayed the Public Utilities Commission from issuing its power reform directive to the nation's existing power distribution and generation concerns. (The directive had been scheduled for release on 23 February.) Contents of the directive, however, were revealed on 28 February. It included provisions for a total of 215 officials for the nine new power concerns, including 170 board of director members and 36 auditors. It was reported that the board chairmen, presidents and vice-presidents of the new companies would be selected at the initial board meeting slated for 1 May. The Commission directive among other things also provided for a special divident of ¥10 per share for all Nippatsu stockholders upon its dissolution and for renaming of the Kanto Power Company as the Tokyo Power Company.

Amendment of Police Law Proposed

Serious discussion arose in February over a proposal advanced by the Government for amendment of the three-year-old Police Law to enable expansion in the size and authority of the National Rural Police and simultaneously remove restrictions governing the overall strength of the nation's local autonomous police forces. The amendment proposal as made public, provided in effect for abolition of the Police Law's restriction of the nation's police strength to 125,000 members. It provided for expansion of the National Rural Police from a personnel strength ceiling of 30,000 members to 50,000 and for abolition of the 95,000 man limit placed on the nation's local autonomous police forces. Authority was to be delegated to local entities to retain at current strength, expand or completely abolish their individual police forces. Where local citizens favored retention of their police force, no ceilings would be imposed and the force could be expanded or reduced in accord with the popular will. In cases favoring abolition, the dissolved police forces would be absorbed by the National Rural Police. The amendment proposal also was designed to give the National Rural Police greater jurisdictional latitude by permitting the national police to invade the previous domain of local police in cases of insurrection, anti-Occupation activities, violations of organization laws and ordinances, narcotic traffic, illegal entrances into the country and smuggling. It made obligatory the exchange of information between the National Rural Police and local police in cases involving crime.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsuo Okazaki on 13 February stated that the revision of the Police Law would be submitted to the Diet in March following completion of consultations with officials of GHQ, SCAP. Okazaki revealed that the Government currently had financial measures for implementing the proposed amendment under consideration. Attorney General Takeo Ohashi on 28 February de-

clared that the bill would probably go to the Diet during the latter part of March and prior to the Diet's expected adjournment for April's local elections. The Attorney General previously had told the House of Representatives' Budget Committee that the primary purpose of the amendment would be to abolish the fixed number of personnel system governing the nation's police. Ohashi declared that while the Government stood prepared to encourage a strengthening of local police, at the same time, it would be ready to accept local police into the national police organization. He pointed out that while continuation of the Police Law in its present form had been desirable from the standpoint of democratization and decentralization of the national police, local police were proving a financial hardship on local entities.

Considerable criticism arose over the Government's projected police plans. Both the People's Democratic and Social Democratic Parties attacked the program as constituting a revival of the old centralized police authority. The People's Democratic Party maintained that the police amendment if adopted would result in a centralized police establishment with accompanying disregard for autonomous police. The People's Democrats also felt that the program would result in additional "unfavorable" impressions abroad. The Social Democratic Party while admitting that there were possible defects in the Police Law argued that rather than additional appropriations for increasing the National Rural Police the expenditures might be better earmarked for improving the equipment and mobility of the municipal, town and village police. The Social Democrats in addition maintained that there existed a definite need for an improvement in the promotion system for local police in order that they might be advanced into the National Rural Police or other government agencies after having passed qualifying examinations.

Both Eiichi Tanaka, Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, and Eiji Suzuki, Chief of the Osaka Municipal Police, on 16 February voiced their opposition to the Police Law amendment. Appear-

ing before the House of Representatives' Local Administration Committee, the two police chiefs were especially critical of any step which would place local police under the jurisdication and authority of the National Rural Police. Tanaka and Suzuki both charged that should municipal police become obliged to transfer criminal information to the national police, the old special thought police system would again become a reality. Closer liaison between the local and national police together with a more efficient exchange of information between various local police forces would serve the end of greater police efficiency, the two police chiefs added. At a joint meeting of the Diet's two Local Administration Committees and the House of Councillors' Budget Committee on 20 February, Tanaka declared: "I oppose any revision of the Police Law which aims at centralization. The Law should be amended so as to achieve decentralization, which is in conformity with the spirit of the new Constitution. A 30,000-man National Rural Police is adequate. Instead of appropriating funds to increase it to 50,000, the money should be transferred to the local finance equalization fund. Local autonomous police in small cities should be strengthened rather than abolished. The fixed number of local autonomous police should be decided by the respective local entities. Not only should the National Rural Police respond to requests for assistance from local bodies, but local autonomous police forces should aid each other. Because it will lead to conflicts, I oppose extending the authority of the National Rural Police as unnecessary; the two already exchange information in the spirit of mutual aid." Osaka Police Chief Suzuki also at the meeting concurred with the views of Tanaka and added: "Projected revision of the Police Law makes me apprehensive about resurgence of the centralized state police of the past, which would violate the fundamental concept of a democratic police."

Chairman Obata of the Local Entities Public Safety Commission Liaison Council in an appearance before the House of Representatives'

Local Administration Committee on 20 February also endorsed the views of Tanaka and Suzuki. He stated: "I see no need to increase the number of National Rural Police personnel. Instead, the budget therefor should be used to strengthen the local autonomous police. Authorizing the National Rural Police to investigate within the jurisdictional area of local autonomous police contradicts the spirit of a democratic police as stipulated in General MacArthur's letter and would result in duplication of investigations. Instead, I propose strengthening the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's Office and authorizing governors to request assistance from the National Public Safety Commission. Rather than requiring exchange of criminal information, an information organ composed of members of the National Rural Police and local autonomous police should be established. Provision should be made for small towns and villages to combine their police forces. Qualifications of members of the Public Safety Commission should be mitigated. When the National Rural Police assists the local police, expenses involved should be borne by the national treasury."

A different view, however, was taken by President Shiratori of the All-Japan Municipality Association who expressed the opinion that the Police Law as it stood was proving "inadequate." He stated before the Local Administration Committee: "It is financially impossible for every municipality to maintain a police force. Equalization grants therefor are insufficient. Local police should exist only in cities with a population above 30,000. Serious crimes such as smuggling should be handled by the National Rural Police."

The Nippon Times in an editorial on 24 February picked up the controversy, stating that the draft revision to the Police Law was not only logical but essential. The paper stated: "....during the past three years a number of defects in the police system have been revealed....The greatest defect in the present structure of the two police systems--National Rural Police and local autono-

mous police--has been poor liaison and jurisdictional jealousy. It should be pointed out that higher officials guilty of these faults would not be more cooperative under any new system, for their narrow-mindedness would guide their actions under any circumstances....the issue of extending the maximum limits for the size of the police forces is of secondary importance, and emphasis should be placed on the problems of increasing cooperative action and efficient liaison among the various peace preservation units. Considerable fears have been expressed by heads of autonomous police forces that draft plans for extending the authority of the National Rural Police will have the effect of revising a centralized police organ which was the core of the police state of the militaristic era. This danger, of course, must be recognized, and every effort must be exerted to prevent a revival of undemocratic practices. But it should be possible to avoid the pitfalls while fulfilling the definite need to establish a police structure which will not be impeded by prefectural or municipal boundaries in the carrying out of necessary police activities. Thus, the proposals in the draft revision bill to permit the National Rural Police the authority to deal with certain well-defined crimes are not only logical but also essential. Finally, the suggestion that those local governments whose financial or other conditions make it unwise to support their own police forces should merge it with the National Rural Police appears sound. Too many small villages are finding the support of a police force financially impracticable, and in many cases a local 'boss' sets himself up to subsidize a police force which becomes his private army...."

Mainichi on 4 February declared that as a compromise the National Rural Police should limit its functions as much as possible and turn its remaining responsibilities over to local police. In return, the paper stated that all cities with populations between 50,000 and 100,000 and all towns and villages should

merge their forces into autonomous prefectural police forces. The journal admitted that while this program might run counter to the philosophy of local government, it represented the "most realistic" approach and would prevent the criticism being leveled at the National Rural Police being strengthened.

Jiji Shimpo on 7 February openly came out for a merger of all local autonomous police, the National Rural Police and the National Police Reserve, stating, "It is only fitting and proper for a poor country to maintain the smallest possible police force and make it work efficiently." The paper stated: "The present state of inefficiency of the Japanese police is largely attributable to its division into the National Rural, local and National Police Reserve systems. If they are unified into a single system, it will gain much in efficiency." Jiji Shimpo hinged its argument on the threat posed by internal Communist violence. It said the Occupation objective of "wiping out the nation's coloring of a police state" had been accomplished "at the expense of weakening police competency" and that the time had come to revise the police system "to cope with the threat of indirect Communist aggression." The paper said: "Rearmament and strengthening of the police are absolutely necessary to safeguard Japan's security. The Government should approach GHQ with a plea for unifying the divided Japanese police forces, which is essential towards increasing police efficiency."

Government Denies Report on Establishment of Peace Preservation Ministry

Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsuo Okazaki on 28 February categorically denied reports published by the newspaper Yomiuri that the Government was considering establishing of a "Peace Preservation Ministry" to cope more effectively with any eventualities which might be created by communist elements. Okazaki, speaking on behalf of the Government, was quoted as terming the report as

"theoretically unthinkable." The Yomiuri story, published on 27 February, claimed that the Cabinet had under consideration a plan for achieving closer cooperation between the National Police Reserve, the Maritime Safety Board and the Immigration Service Division of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. To achieve this end--the first in a series to bolster the nation's defenses against communist-inspired violence and illegal entrances into the country by foreign communists--Yomiuri said the Cabinet hoped to unify the three agencies into a "Peace Preservation Ministry" under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister. The report said the Cabinet hoped to have the new Ministry established prior to the conclusion of a Japanese peace settlement, but were moving cautiously lest the Government leave itself open to charges of attempting to recreate the notorious thought police of pre-Occupation days.

Former Army and Navy Officers to be Accepted into National Police Reserve

Director-General Keikichi Masuhara of the National Police Reserve announced on 16 Februsary that the Police Reserve were preparing to accept 300 former Army and Navy officers who had been depurged in October 1950. Masuhara revealed that the 300 would be picked from the 3,000 who had been depurged following competitive examinations. Those selected, he said, would be commissioned as first and second class inspectors (captains and lieutenants) after completion of a two-month training course.

"Voice of Peace" Arrests Continue

The headquarters of the National Rural Police on 12 February reported that arrests in connection with the banned Communist publication "Voice of Peace" had reached 561. The journal had been ordered to suspend publication in January by the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's Office. It was regarded as the successor paper to the suspended Communist Party organ "Red

Flag" (Akahata). Simultaneous with its order for the "Voice of Peace" to suspend publication, the Attorney General's Office had directed the arrests of all persons connected either with publication or distribution of the journal. The arrested were held for questioning on charges of violating the national ordinance forbidding anti-Occupation activities. In making its announcement of arrests up to 12 February, the police also disclosed that seizure had been made of quantities of explosives, dynamite, percussion caps, small caliber ammunition and swords. Also seized were numerous copies of the banned paper and other Communist propaganda.

House Judicial Affairs Committee Reports on Korean Riots

The Judicial Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on 16 February overrode the objections of its Communist membership to approve a "fact-finding report" conducted by a Committee investigation team into the Korean disturbances in the Kansai area during the latter part of 1950. The Committee report stated that the series of riots conducted by Korean nationals in Kobe, Otsu, Nagoya, Osaka and Kyoto during late November and early December had been "skirmishes calculated to lead to a terroristic revolution." The riots, the report said, although camouflaged as a nationalistic anti-American movement for higher wages and full employment were all preliminary steps aimed at a systematic destruction of the prevailing social structure prior to a full-scale revolution of violence. It pointed out that the Kobe, Kyoto, Otsu and Nagoya distrubances had been engineered jointly by radical North Korean elements (the Korean People's Liberation Aid Society and the Democratic Women's League) and local Communist organizations. The Osaka incident, the report said, had been an independent action of the Communist Party. In submitting its report, the Judicial Affairs Committee included a series of recommendations for the Government to follow in order to preclude similar riots in the future. These recommendations

included: (1) legislation for deportation of troublesome Korean elements; (2) administrative measures to eliminate terroristic Communist cells at lower echelons pending the complete outlawing of the Communist Party; (3) amendment of the criminal procedures law to insure the authority of the nation's courts and provide punishment for disruptive courtroom tactics; (4) continued surveillance into the activities of the Korean Youth Action Corps; and (5) protection for law-abiding Korean nationals.

Speaking before the Judicial Affairs Committee, Director Hajime Suzuki of the Immigration Agency on 21 February reported that approximately 8,000 persons, chiefly Korean illegal entrants, had been deported in 1949 and another 2,300 during 1950. Suzuki stated that the repatriates were composed "mainly of illegal entrants who violated the Alien Registration Ordinance which requires that those entering or leaving Japan obtain permission of SCAP." He indicated that in the future such Koreans who were under prison sentence would be deported.

Kasuga Sentenced to Three-Year Prison Term

Shoichi Kasuga, purged Communist Party Central Committee member, on 16 February was sentenced to a three-year prison term by the Tokyo District Court for having failed to answer a subpoena issued by the Attorney-General's Office in July 1950. Sentenced together with Kasuga was his fellow defendant Masayuki Yamaguchi who had been found guilty of granting concealment to Kasuga in his Nagoya home. Yamaguchi received a prison sentence of one year.

Interpellations of Prime Minister's Administrative Policy Address Completed

The last two of the fifteen interpellators who had questioned Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida regarding his administrative policy address of January to the Diet completed their interpellations on the morning of 2 February. The two were Green Breeze Society member, Mrs. Mutsu Koto, and Social Democrat, Shoichi Aoyama, both of the House of Councillors.

Mrs. Kore interpellated: "All Japanese, especially the women, desire peace. We will not be deceived by communism, which outwardly advocates peace but inwardly aims at revolution. Japan's greatest problem after the conclusion of the peace treaty is whether it will be a Switzerland of the Orient or a Korea. The Prime Minister advocates self-defense by means other than armaments. But what does that mean? Preservation of peace is being confused with self-defense against aggression. It is feared that the Police Reserve Force is being misinterpreted as being a force for cooperation with the United Nations. How about establishing an organ in the Diet for supervising the Police Reserve Force?... If Japan is allowed to become a member of the United Nations, how will she contribute--by military cooperation or by conclusion of a military treaty?"

Prime Minister Yoshida replied: "Any country which cannot maintain its safety and independence ceases to be an independent country. Therein lies the issue of security, which has two phases: maintenance of domestic peace and defense against foreign invasion. For the former, there is the Police Reserve Force, which is by no means the beginning of rearmament. For security against foreign aggression, no country thinks in terms of its own defense power; collective defense is necessary. Hence, the existence of the United Nations. As to joining the United Nations, there may be some discussion of Japan's rearming. But we cannot be too careful in discussing this subject because it may cause doubt in the world about Japanese militarism."

Social Democrat Aoyama stated: "In concluding a peace treaty, fishery problems should not be overlooked. Since the end of the war, Japanese fishing beyond the MacArthur Line has been prohibited. In order to secure an adequate supply of fish for the nation, expansion of the fishing area is necessary. Only by an overall peace treaty, with reestablishment of friendly relations between Japan, Communist China, and Russia, could Japan secure a large enough

fishing area. But if an overall treaty is impossible, how will Japan's freedom to fish be secured? It is reported that the fishery agreement proposed by the United States provides for restricting our fishing to an area 150 nautical miles off the coast of Japan. Will the Government accept this? Recently, many Japanese fishing boats have been captured on the high seas. What does the Government intend to do about this?"

The Prime Minister answered: "Since the concrete contents of the treaty have not yet been disclosed, I cannot say what the limits of our territorial waters will be.. Expansion of Japan's fishing area has often been talked of. However, unless illegal fishing by Japanese outside the MacArthur Line ceases, the restrictions will not be removed. We ask for the release of those boats which were captured illegally, but there have been many Japanese boats captured because of their defiance of the MacArthur Line."

DISCUSSIONS OF PEACE ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Tokyo Conferences of Dulles' Mission Concluded

U. S. Ambassador John Foster Dulles, President Truman's special envoy to lay the groundwork for a Japanese peace settlement, in February concluded his talks with Japanese leaders and on 11 February left Japan for Manila and Canberra to continue discussions with the Philippine and Australian Governments on the question of peace with Japan. Dulles' departure from Japan closed seventeen days of virtually continuous discussions between Dulles and other members of his Mission and Japanese leaders. That the Mission to Japan had been a success was indicated in a departing remark attributed to Dulles at Tokyo's Haneda Airport: "I came here with questions; I go back with answers." The Presidential envoy in a statement to the press on the day of his departure said: "We foresee a peace treaty which would in simple terms formally end the war; restore full sovereignty to Japan; define the geographical area of that sovereignty; look forward to Japan's future membership in the United Nations; recognize Japan's inherent right of individual and collective self-defense; establish provisional commercial agreements; and provide for the settlement of claims." Dulles disclosed that close attention had been paid to the possibilities of having United States' armed forces stationed in and about Japan following a peace settlement to insure Japanese security; a treaty which would avoid the imposition of heavy economic, financial and commercial controls and burdens; and a greater development of cultural ties between the peoples of the United States and Japan. Dulles then stated that a "gratifying measure of understanding" had been achieved in all these matters. The senior American statesman also paid special appreciation to the counsel and assistance which had been rendered his Mission by General MacArthur. In a letter to the Supreme Com-

mander dated 9 February, Dulles said his Mission had drawn its inspiration from the General's conception that Japan was deserving of a peace treaty and that the General's combined policies of justice and mercy had made it possible for the United States to plan on sharing a future era of peace, trust and oppertunity with Japan.

Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl S. Johnson who had been in charge of the military members of the Dulles Mission commented prior to his leaving Japan on 10 February that the Mission's consultations with Japanese leaders had "progressed much further than was anticipated." "Everyone was anxious to reach a common understanding," Johnson said. "No better atmosphere could have been created for these talks." The results achieved by these discussions, he concluded, "should enable our two countries to live in harmony for many years."

The highlight of Dulles' visit came on 2 February when he delivered an address to the American-Japan Society offering Japan a program of "collective protection" against aggression which, if accepted, would result in the United States considering retention of armed forces "in and about" Japan as a testimony of unity between the two nations. Dulles, in making this invitation, observed that "today the principal deterrent power" to world-wide aggression was in the possession of the United States. He added: "We do not, however, intend to reserve that power only to protect ourselves. We are prepared to combine our power with that of others in mutual committals, in accord with the U.N. Charter, so that the deterrent power which protects us will also protect others. Japan, if it is disposed to protect itself against indirect aggression can, if it wishes, share collective protection against direct aggression. That, however, is not a choice which the U.S. is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation.... The choice must be Japan's own choice." The American Ambassador continued: "Under such a security program as we have outlined,

based on cooperation with Japan and our other friends, the U.S. would sympathetically consider the retention of the United States armed forces in and about Japan...." Dulles outlined at length the principles underlying the study being conducted by his Mission for a peace settlement which would restore Japan to an equal status among nations. He said: "....We seek a peace which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the integrity of the full sovereignty which peace will have restored: opportunity to share in collective security against direct aggression; opportunity to raise her standard of living by the inventiveness and industry of her people; and opportunity to achieve moral stature and respected leadership through the force of good example." Dulles asserted that he was exerting his influence to fashion a peace settlement "which will reflect the feeling by the victors that Japan is now a nation to be trusted" although "there are still in some respects understandable reservations."

In an exclusive interview with a United Press reporter on 7 February Dulles asserted that the United States would be willing to sign an agreement with Japan for protecting her against a "vacuum of power" upon the withdrawal of the Occupation forces should Japan request such protection. The Ambassador stressed, however, that such an agreement, completed simultaneously with the peace treaty, would not constitute a permanent guarantee of protection for Japan, but would remain valid only for such length of time as desired by the United States or until Japan had made other arrangements. Japan, Dulles said, might conclude a series of permanent bilateral agreements or might enter into a Pacific pact agreement similar to the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty. He stated that "it will be entirely up to Japan what steps she will take for her protection, but she will not get a free ride indefinitely."

"We will assist her for a time," said Dulles, "because if Japan were left without protection after the peace treaty she would be in danger of Russian Communists, Chinese Communists, and even possibly North Korean Communists." "If a screening force of American soldiers were here, the Communists would not attack because of their fear of retribution from America's military might, including our strategic air force," concluded Dulles. The Ambassador again on 9 February in an interview by a Kyodo News Agency reporter hinted at the possible conclusion of a pact binding the nations of the Pacific area to common defense. Dulles stated that his Mission would take a "sympathetic view" of any such proposals as might be made by the Governments of the Philippines, Australia, or New Zealand.

Dulles in February had continued his discussions begun in January with Japanese leaders in the fields of government, politics, business and finance, and labor. The last formal exchange of views between General MacArthur and Dulles was held on 9 February. The day prior to his departure Dulles called on the Emperor at the Imperial Palace. The third and final conference with Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was held on 7 February. The meeting which lasted about 50 minutes was attended by U. S. Ambassador William J. Sebald representing SCAP, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadao Iguchi, and Director Kumao Nishimura of the Foreign Ministry's Bureau of Treaties. A Mission spokesman following the conference commented that "there was a further and full exchange of views and a satisfactory measure of understanding" among the conferees. Authoritative United States sources expressed the belief that two major points had been clarified by the third Yoshida-Dulles conference: (1) that final decision on Japanese rearmament would be the sole responsibility of the Japanese; and (2) that the United States would maintain troops in Japan until the Japanese would be in a position to maintain their own security or cooperate on an equal footing with the United States.

Dulles, who had met with members of the People's Democratic Party in January, concluded his discussions with the nation's political leaders by conferring with representatives of the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties and with spokesmen of the Green Breeze Society (Ryokufukai), the major independent bargaining power in the House of Councillors. Social Democrats Mosaburo Suzuki, Chairman of the party's Central Executive Committee, and Secretary-General Inajiro Asanuma on 1 February outlined to the Dulles Mission their party's advocacy of an overall peace treaty participated in by the thirteen member nations of the Far Eastern Commission, permanent Japanese neutrality, and the party's opposition to leasing of military bases on Japanese soil to any foreign power. Following the conference, when asked to comment on the Social Democratic views, a spokesman of the Mission asserted that they were "understandable," but not surprising since the Mission members had been "prepared" for them through previous reading of documents. Suzuki stated that the meeting had been "satisfactory" and expressed the hope that an overall treaty might still be concluded inasmuch as Japan would in the future be an unarmed nation. Suzuki told reporters that should the Allied Powers grant permission for Japanese emigration, the population pressure and resulting low living standards in Japan which had contributed in party to Japan's expansionist policies of the past might be considerably alleviated. Suzuki added that he favored the return of Southern Saghelien and the Kurile Islands to Japanese sovereignty and asserted that "consideration" should also be given to the status of the Bonin and Loochoo Islands. A Mission spokesman disclosed that the two Social Democrats had left with the Mission copies of a memorandum defining in detail all the Social Democratic views on the forthcoming peace settlement. Suzuki on 10 February announced that he had augmented this memorandum with an informal letter to the Dulles Mission, further explain-

ing his party's opposition to a separate peace arrangement as well as stating that the Social Democrats would oppose the inclusion of a separate peace with an individual country or group of specific countries would ruin all hopes that might be entertained for an eventual overall peace settlement. It reaffirmed the principle of Japanese neutrality and said the question of collective security should be approached with caution since such an agreement would "run counter to the spirit of the United Nations and increase the possibilities of Japan becoming involved in war." Any form of Japanese rearmament was also rejected by Suzuki who claimed that it would neither serve the intended purpose of preserving national security nor would it enhance chances of close Japanese relations with other nations, especially Asiatic countries.

Seven representatives of the Liberal Party, including Secretary-General Eisaku Sato, Chairman Etsujiro Uehara of the party's committee on foreign relations, three Liberal members of the House of Representatives and two from the House of Councillors, on 2 February presented their views on the seven-point United States peace settlement policy announced in December 1950. Afterwards, Morio Sasaki of the Liberal delegation stated that although no details of the meeting could be revealed, "Prime Minister Yoshida's attitude toward Japanese peace problems seem to be confirmed by the United States authorities."

Five representatives of the Green Breeze Society, Ryutaro Takahashi, Muneyoshi Tokugawa, Sotaro Takase, Shunsaku Noda, and Genichiro Date, on 6 February outlined to the Dulles Mission their six-points for consideration in the peace settlement. These six points were reported as: (1) Japanese sovereignty to include the Kurile, Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; (2) United Nations guarantee of future security; (3) Japanese rearmament to fulfill the obligation of acceptance of Japan into the United Nations; (4) suspen-

sion of reparation payments; (5) removal of all restrictions on domestic industries; and (6) extension of permission to Japan for independent operation of civil airlines and maintenance of an aircraft industry.

Notable among those who discussed the peace settlement question with the Dulles Mission was Ichiro Hatoyama, a special memorandum purgee and former president of the Liberal Party. Public announcement of this meeting, which was held on 6 February, was not made until after Dulles' departure. Hatoyama was accompanied to this meeting by other purgees, including former Transportation Minister Tanzan Ishibashi, Mitsujiro Ishii, former Minister of Commerce and Industry; Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor; and ex-President Takasaki of the Manchuria Heavy Industry. Since all of the above had been barred from participation in public affairs some controversy arose in Japanese circles over the meeting. However, Attorney General Takeo Ohashi commented at a committee meeting in the House of Representatives on 21 February: "As Ambassador Dulles visited Japan as President Truman's special envoy, the interview can be said to have been beyond the reach of the purge decree."

Continuing his efforts to sound out Japanese views, Ambassador Dulles on 9 February met with three representatives of Japan's leading labor organization, the General Council of Japan Labor Unions (Sohyogikai). The three union leaders, namely Chairman Takeo Muto, Secretary-General Zengoro Shimagami and Asahi Okura, director of the union's section on international affairs, presented the Dulles Mission with a six-point policy which had been adopted by the union's Central Executive Committee on 3 February. They were: (1) an overall peace; (2) opposition to rearmament; (3) opposition to the leasing of military bases; (4) eventual Japanese membership in the United Nations; (5) the early attainment of Japanese political autonomy and economic self-sufficiency; and

(6) the

(6) the return of territories possessed prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.

Ambassador Dulles in an informal address to 12 women Diet members representing various groups and parties in the Diet on 6 February assured that Japan would soon be a member of, and receive the protection of, the United Nations. Dulles stated, however, that Japan would not have to await acceptance into the international organization to insure her security. "The United Nations Charter itself provides," he said, "that states which are not yet members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the principles of the Charter to maintain international peace and security." Dulles assured the women that the United States "feels bound to act in accordance with its deep conviction as to what is necessary to give the world the best chance of peace."

The Dulles Mission received a wide assortment of petitions and recommendations from numerous Japanese organizations. Among these was a petition entitled, "Wishes of Japanese Womanhood Concerning the Peace Treaty Problem" signed by twenty-seven women representing six national women's organizations, the Japan Women Voters League, the Japan Women Peace Association, Japanese Association of University Women, Japan Women Democratic League, Christian Women Temperance Union, and the Japan Young Women's Christian Association. Also submitting opinions were the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, the National Spiritual Revival League, National Christian Council of Japan, and the American Chamber of Commerce.

(For the complete text of various statements and documents relating to the Dulles Mission, see this report under PUBLIC STATEMENTS.)

Dulles Assurances Warmly Received by Japanese

Ambassador Dulles' two public statements delivered during

February concerning a peace settlement for Japan--his address to the American-Japan Society on 2 February, and his departure statement of 11 February--were in general received with warmth by Japanese leaders. The only notable exception voicing public disapproval being Chairman Mosaburo Suzuki of the Social Democratic Party. Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsuo Okazaki commented that he had received the impression from Dulles' 2 February address that "if Japan assumes a clearcut attitude on security, the United States will give cooperation and aid in line with Japan's wishes." Secretary-General Eisaku Sato of the Liberal Party welcomed the stress Dulles had placed on collective security as an indication that Japan would in the future be allied with the world's democratic states. "True independence, peace, and freedom," Sato stated, "exist only within the democracies." Sato declared that it had been heartening to learn the Presidential envoy had recognized Japan's right to self-defense--a line of thinking which the Liberal Party had consistently maintained. Sato similarly commented on Dulles' departure statement: "Our party and all other parties and interests are profoundly grateful that Special Envoy Dulles made a statement of such benefit to the future of Japan before his departure. Our party, unlike others that refuse to face reality, wishes to base its future actions on the Dulles statement and on the fact that Japan surrendered unconditionally."

Secretary-General Takeo Miki of the People's Democratic Party termed the Dulles speech of 2 February as "extremely impressive" and stated that Dulles had demonstrated his respect for the "national sentiments" of the Japanese people. Saburo Chiba, Chairman of the People's Democratic Political Affairs Committee, on 11 February said that the views of Dulles on the whole had been identical with those maintained by the People's Democrats. "To put it briefly," he said, "we must not rely solely on other countries for

our security; we must raise ourselves in defense of our fatherland." Sotaro Takase, Chairman of the Green Breeze Society's Committee on Political Affairs, said on 2 February that Dulles had been "friendly and encouraging." Takase said, "....in case of direct aggression Japan should defend herself as part of a collective defense army, but even this will not be forced upon her by the United States."

Social Democratic leader Suzuki, however, took a different view from his fellow politicians by frankly declaring that he had been "disappointed" with the implications in Dulles' address to the American-Japan Society concerning a "regional defense alliance." The meaning of this, he said, was that Japan would be forced to join in any future world-wide conflict. Suzuki declared that a military alliance with "one side of the world" was an "extremely serious" question for Japan which had pledged itself to a national policy of peace. Suzuki on 11 February warned that any military alliance with such countries as French Indo-China and British Malaya would in time involve Japan in "the continental dispute" raging over release from colonial controls and domination by communism. The facts, he said, should not be twisted under the cloaks of "collective security" or "self-defense." Suzuki was particularly critical of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who, he charged, had promised Ambassador Dulles that Japan would rearm following a peace settlement. "This is a serious national issue," he said. "We cannot permit the recrudescence of secret diplomacy."

Ichiro Ishikawa, Chairman of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, commented on behalf of business circles that he believed Dulles" address of 2 February had been very satisfactory. Ishikawa declared: "I believe Mr. Dulles understands the problems of securing raw materials and expanding foreign trade because he points to the need of raising Japan's standard of living."

Business circles also voiced strong support for rearmament. President Tadashi Okamoto of the Dai Ichi Trading Company on 11 February urged a "full-fledged ground force instead of such half-way measures as strengthening the National Police Reserve." From the field of labor, Secretary-General Takano of the National Federation of Trade Unions (Sodomei) commented: "If other countries maintain a similar basic attitude (as the United States), I feel there is possibility of an overall peace." Chairman Muto of the General Council of Japan Trade Unions (Sohyogikai) approved Dulles' assertion that "the United States will not compel Japan to exercise her right of self-defense."

The English language publication Nippon Times on 12 February cited the two-week stay of the Dulles Mission in Japan as having been "extremely gratifying to the Japanese people." The paper said: "Mr. Dulles has demonstrated to the Japanese people the sincerity and integrity of the United States in seeking to work out a just and honorable peace for Japan...It is particularly on the point of this nation's defense that the Japanese people have been reassured, for Mr. Dulles has made clear that the United States will guarantee with its total strength that there will be no 'vacuum of power.'" Commenting further on Ambassador Dulles' assurance that the United States would favorably consider retention of her armed forces in Japan should the Japanese desire such protection, the Nippon Times on 3 February said: "This is a choice ....on which the majority of the Japanese would not hesitate, for it means in effect that by accepting this invitation the whole force, moral and physical, of the free world would be arrayed behind Japan as ' a powerful deterrent' to a possible aggressor. Should Japan refuse, it would mean an open invitation for 'irresponsible militarism' to step in, and past and recent history has demonstrated that no amount of pious entreaties of neutrality or defenselessness can save this country from sharing the fate of

other nations which have been crushed and enslaved under Communist domination." And on 7 February, Nippon Times added: "....it is to be hoped that eventually a system of a regional defense pact to ward off aggression will be extended to the Pacific area. Japan would naturally be interested in such a collective security structure because of that age-old axiom which still holds true that there is strength in unity." Nippon Times in its discussion of the Dulles Mission also took note of the important role General MacArthur had played in making the peace discussions a reality. In its publication of 21 February the paper stated that "in the excitement of the visit of the Dulles Mission and of the unprecedented opportunity to air their views, the Japanese people forgot all too often that the foundations for these pleasing developments were the result of the just and humanitarian policies of the Supreme Commander." It continued: "History will not fail to record the General's magnificent role in bringing democracy to Japan, for the Japanese people, given the opportunity, are determined to contribute their share in the free world's efforts to attain a new era of peace, freedom and humanity. While the nation eagerly awaits speedy progress toward an early peace settlement, it is fully appreciative of all that the General has done in its behalf. Without the solid foundations made possible by General MacArthur, the work of building a just and lasting peace structure would have been impeded."

Mainichi on 11 February stated that the departing statement issued by Ambassador Dulles had given the Japanese people assurances that their two main hopes in a peace settlement would be realized--a sovereign nation and security. In stressing this second point--the invitation to an American-Japanese security agreement whereby the United States would station troops in Japan--Mainichi said, "We believe we have no choice but to accept this offer." Explaining this conclusion, Mainichi declared: "There

is no gain saying that there exists a threat to Japan. Yet she has no means of meeting any aggressor. She is in a position where she cannot but rely on some foreign power or powers for her security." The paper, however, expressed the hope that the security arrangement would only be transitional pending the time when the United Nations might be in a position to guarantee Japan's security. In the meantime, it expressed the hope that none of the fears being attached to the two-way agreement would develop into realities; i.e. restricted Japanese sovereignty, a diluted spirit of national independence, or exploitation of the situation by Communist propagandist.

Jiji Shimpo in reviewing the Tokyo conferences between Ambassador Dulles and Japanese leaders said on 11 February: "For all practical purposes, these were peace negotiations. They may represent Japan's first and last chance to have a voice in the peace. Since talks with other powers will bring about some changes, we must guard against premature optimism, but in general it was worth waiting until today for peace. The Japanese people now know clearly where they are going. The achievement of peace on these terms is due solely to the magnanimity of the United States." The paper expressed the belief that Ambassador Dulles had "correctly judged the beliefs of the majority of the people" in offering retention of United States armed forces in Japan to forestall a vacuum of power following a peace settlement. Jiji Shimpo at the same time pointed out that the guarantee would not be unconditional, but that Ambassador Dulles' references to "continuous and effective self-help" in his departure statement meant that Japan "must share in the sacrifices" involved in protecting her security. The publication believed that the determination of the majority of Japanese had been aptly expressed by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who stated in reply to Dulles' statement that "we fully recognize our responsibility to defend our own land."

Nihon Keizai on 3 February expressed its astonishment at the sympathetic and friendly manner in which Ambassador Dulles had approached the nation on its peace settlement. Should the Japanese respond to this attitude, the paper said, "it will result in a peace treaty which is the best not only for Japan and the United States, but for the world at large." It continued: "It is necessary to understand the policies and real intention of the United States with the same goodwill as expressed by Dulles. The United States is already viewing things from the bread world standpoint, transcending her own position. This embodied both in her attitude of emphasizing the United Nations and in her Japanese policy of forgetting the relationships between victor and vanquished. We should not take undue advantage of it."

Prime Minister Reports to Diet on Dulles Conferences

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida on 13 February reported to both Houses of the Diet on his three conferences of January and February with U. S. Ambassador John Foster Dulles concerning the peace settlement for Japan. In his report the Prime Minister confirmed the fact that he had signified approval of Ambassador Dulles' offer that the United States was prepared to render military assistance in safeguarding Japan from external aggression. Yoshida stated that he had taken the step in the belief that cooperation with the United States would be the most appropriate method of insuring national security during the present tense international situation. In this action, Yoshida expressed his belief that he would be joined by the majority of the nation. The Prime Minister made it clear that Japan would share in the task of defense to the extent permitted by her economic recovery following the peace settlement. "Our pride as a nation," he said, "would not allow us to accept security guarantees from others without making sacrifices ourselves."

Opposition leaders who had begun clamoring for the report with the departure of Ambassador Dulles promptly leveled their

customary criticisms at the Prime Minister. Secretary-General Inajiro Asanuma of the Social Democratic Party accused the Prime Minister of having been "too brief and abstract" and of having added nothing to his official statement issued two days previously upon the departure from Japan of Ambassador Dulles. Asanuma stated that it was a matter of regret that the Prime Minister had made no reference to the possible conclusion of a treaty with all the member nations of the Far Eastern Commission. He also warned that the Government was inviting charges of secret diplomacy unless it should begin keeping the public better informed. Takeo Miki, Secretary-General of the People's Democratic Party, summed up his feelings with the remark: "Perfunctory and nothing new." Miki stated, "I know there are things which the Prime Minister cannot divulge, but his report was so devoid of convincing facts that I cannot understand what the Prime Minister was trying to tell us." Miki joined Asanuma by charging the Prime Minister with "relying on secret diplomacy as usual."

The text of the Prime Minister's report follows:

"My conferences with Mr. Dulles were not in the nature of negotiations or exploratory talks for a peace treaty. They were an exchange of unreserved opinions on the peace settlement and matters related to it.

"Throughout our talks, I was deeply impressed by the goodwill of the United States toward our country. Mr. Dulles conveyed to me the earnest desire of his country that the United States and Japan, sharing in the responsibility of the democratic nations for their common defense, should be bound by friendly ties in the future. The United States no longer regards Japan as a former enemy.

"I have consistently believed that our nation should closely cooperate with the democratic nations of the world, especially the United States, in its efforts to develop its new destiny. I trust the bulk of the Japanese people are of the same belief. It

is extremely gratifying that the United States Government has revealed itself to be so lenient and so friendly disposed toward Japan.

"The broad lines of the Japanese peace treaty as envisaged by the United States Government are indicated by the so-called seven-point peace settlement policy of the United States. In fact, the seven points cover all of the contents to be contained in the peace treaty as contemplated by the United States.

"I shall not repeat here those terms which all of you already know. The reason why the United States has announced such broad lines of peace settlement for Japan is manifest when we contrast them with the basic policy I have just mentioned.

"We pray that the United States peace settlement policy for Japan will be accepted by other Allied Powers.

"The problem of security guarantees for the nation is perhaps the most controversial of the issues concerning the peace to be written for Japan.

"Security guarantees signify two aspects, the maintenance of law and order at home and defense against aggression from the outside.

"I have always declared that, fundamentally, the safety of a nation should be guaranteed by that nation with her own resources. Now, in respect of maintenance of law and order at home, I believe that there is little that we need worry about and I am looking forward to strengthening and improving police facilities to enhance public safety. As regards external defense, however, it can easily be imagined that there may arise a situation in which we cannot guarantee our national security by our own resources alone.

"In the present state of international tension, the free nations of the world have no other course than to counter Communist aggression with joint defense, no single nation being capable of guaranteeing her own security single-handed. The United States has made known her readiness to aid Japan with her troops in order

to expel external aggression if Japan so wishes. Now, such a relationship of cooperation with the United States would be a most appropriate method in the present international situation. I also believe that it would be wholeheartedly welcomed by the majority of the Japanese. Accordingly, I have gone ahead with the negotiations on that basis.

"Our pride as a nation would not allow us to accept security guarantees from others without making sacrifices ourselves to defend our own country. Also it is an obligation on the part of the peace-loving nations to cooperate for the sake of maintaining world peace. The nature and scope of the part to be played by Japan are to be determined in accordance with the extent to which she has recovered after she has joined the community of free nations. This is a point which Mr. Dulles has understood most fully.

"We have gone fully into the wide range of questions contained in the seven principles, concerning territory, membership in the United Nations, democratic reforms, reparations, assets abroad, war criminals, commerce and economy, fisheries, cultural interchange and other matters in which the people are deeply interested.

"I am glad to report that as a result of these discussions, as stated in the statements of February 11, we have arrived at an understanding satisfactory to both sides.

"As regards the East Pacific fishing grounds in which the United States has special interests, we have decided to settle the matter provisionally by taking a voluntary unilateriel measure.

"The United States is to negotiate with other Allied Powers on the basis of this understanding for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

"I am convinced that as a result of Mr. Dulles' visit to Japan, a long step forward has been taken toward a peace settle-

ment. And I pray that that proves exactly to be the case. That the peace negotiations have made such progress is largely due to the deep understanding and incessant help manifested by General MacArthur toward Japan. I wish to take this opportunity to thank the General on behalf of the nation."

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On 13 February Prime Minister Yoshida addressed a closed session of Liberal Diet members on the extent of his talks with Ambassador Dulles. The Prime Minister's report to his fellow party members given prior to his appearance in the Diet lasted approximately 25 minutes and was somewhat more specific than his subsequent address. The Prime Minister commented on the possibility of Japan joining in a collective defense alliance of democratic nations as well as on the problem of national rearmament, both of which subjects he avoided in his Diet report. Yoshida declared that Japan "as a matter of course" would be forced to assume an active role in some form of collective defense agreement although the matter of rearmament would have to be postponed until following achievement of economic rehabilitation. "Hasty rearmament," he said, "would make us prey to hostile powers, inviting their aggression and resulting in the nation becoming Red."

Since no public announcement was made of the Prime Minister's report to the Liberal Party, the only account of his address available was found in the party's weekly report submitted to Government Section. The gist of the Prime Minister's address was reported by the party as follows:

"It is impossible for Japan under existing circumstances to defend herself singlehandedly against external aggression. Therefore, it becomes necessary for Japan to rely upon a system of collective security supported by a certain group of democratic countries under which Japan, as a matter of course, will take an ac-

tive part in some manner as a link in the chain of these nations. But with the economic strength of the nation in its present status, any hasty step towards rearmament will invite aggression by hostile powers and will result in the collapse of the democratic alliance beginning with Japan. With such being the case, economic rehabilitation shall be of the primary importance with rearmament a matter to be considered later."

Prime Minister Charged with "Secret Diplomacy" in Interpellations on Dulles Conferences

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was roundly charged with "secret and arbitrary diplomacy" by the Opposition in interpellations opened in both Houses of the Diet on 14 February concerning the Tokyo Conferences between the Prime Minister and U. S. Ambassador John Foster Dulles. Leading the van of Opposition interpellators in the House of Representatives, Gizo Tomabechi, Chairman of the Peoples' Democratic Supreme Committee, accused the Prime Minister of having withheld important information from the Diet on his talks with the American envoy. The Prime Minister, Tomabechi declared, was still following the pre-war policy of "secret diplomacy." The Prime Minister in replying to the accusations of Tomabechi asserted that it was a natural assumption that "diplomacy is kept in secrecy." He made it clear that Ambassador Dulles had come to Japan to sound out opinions on a peace settlement, not to negotiate, and that, therefore, no concrete peace settlement agreements had been discussed. To the criticism that he had maintained an arbitrary position, Yoshida reminded his interpellators that they also had had an opportunity to place their positions before the American Ambassador from the United States.

Inajiro Asanuma, Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party, followed Tomabechi in the House of Representatives with the question as to how the Prime Minister had approached the matter of an overall versus a seperate peace settlement. Asanuma

declared: "An overall peace treaty will be conducive to a permanent peace, but a separate treaty will be charged with the danger of war." The Prime Minister replied that he could not comment on where the treaty would lead, "for diplomacy is not fortune-telling." To a similar question placed by Social Democrat Hiroo Wada later in the House of Councillors, the Prime Minister stated: "The United States is making efforts to write an overall peace. If this is not possible, the only way open for us is a majority peace. I cannot say whether our security will be threatened by a majority peace, but from what happened in Korea we can anticipate American aid when our security is endangered."

Tomabechi asked the Prime Minister about non-partisan diplomacy, sovereighty of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, collective security and economic recovery. The Prime Minister answered that he had advocated the establishment of a foreign policy based on non-partisanship all along, but that it could never be achieved without the cooperation of all parties concerned. He stated that he had conveyed to Ambassador Dulles the wishes of the nation concerning territories, but that no further details could be announced. The Prime Minister said: "I believe I have fully expressed the hope of the people to Mr. Dulles. However, I am not in a position to reply on concrete issues." Yoshida stated that security guarantees were a necessary item since no nation could defend itself singlehandedly against a mass attack.. He said: "It is common sense in the present-day world to defend collectively against collective attacks. Of course, Japan should guarantee her internal security with her own hands." "Alignment with the free democracies and anti-Communist defense are the only ways for insuring Japan's future," the Prime Minister continued. "Friendly relations with the United States are conditions for Japan's security and world peace." Yoshida asserted that although the United States Government was considering economic assistence

to Japan, the Japanese should work assiduously for their own economic self-sufficiency." He declared: "....the United States is fully aware of the need for economic aid, for Japan's economic collapse would mean the loss of a link in the anti-Communist camp. But I believe that Japan should try to rely upon herself and to break away from United States aid as soon as possible."

Social Democrat Asanuma asked the Prime Minister whether it had been true that he had accepted a suggestion for Japanese rearmament. In reply, the Prime Minister declared that he had not changed his opinion opposing rearmament at present and that, therefore, he was not contemplating any amendment of the national Constitution. He added that a proposal by one or more countries for a collective security arrangement to assure the safety of Japan would be welcome. Japan, he continued, could not possibly rearm at present even if she so wished inasmuch as her national economy could not afford the vast expenditures which would be required for any armament project.

In reply to Social Democrat Hiroo Wada who had expressed fear that a separate peace pact might provide a pretext for aggressive acts against Japan, the Prime Minister stated that Japan would at any rate be unable to remain neutral at a time when democracies in Korea and elsewhere were experiencing aggression without provocation. Other interpellations were made concerning possible revision or outright abolition of Occupation-inspired legislation and politics. The Prime Minister replied to these that the Japanese would not be subject to restrictions in amending legislation since "the United States intends to give Japan complete independence." "And I believe," said Yoshida, "the matter of war criminals and purgees will be transferred to Japan unconditionally." The Prime Minister concluded: "At the present stage, I cannot reveal details of the conference. However, I have already stated what the people want to know."

To this the Opposition disagreed. All the Opposition parties with the exception of the Communist Party submitted a joint statement to Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsuo Okazaki charging the Prime Minister with lack of sincerity in replying to their interpellations. The statement filed by Social Democrat Asanuma, Peoples's Democrat Takeo Miki and Labor-Farmerite Hisao Kuroda declared that the Prime Minister had been aloof, dogmatic and had completely betrayed the nation's expectations for a clear explanation of the Dulles conferences. They repeated their accusations of secret diplomacy and asserted the Prime Minister was "handling an important matter of state from a private viewpoint." Simultaneous with the Opposition's statement, Secretary-General Eisaku Sato of the Liberal Party countered with a statement that "it is common sense for diplomacy to maintain secrecy during negotiations" and blamed the Opposition for "using diplomacy as a weapon for political strife."

A gist of the interpellations of Giso Tomabechi, Inajiro Asanuma and Hiroo Wada and the replies of Prime Minister Yoshida follow:

Tomabechi: "The Prime Minister still adheres to the old secret diplomacy.

"Will you ask for supra-party cooperation toward accepting peace? We advised you to turn to the Social Democratic Party and other parties for cooperation, but there has been neither consultation nor contact, and there is no sign of your having called out to other parties. We do not intend to give a blank power of attorney to you. Mr. Dulles must have discovered that there are considerable differences of opinion within the country, and probably was regretful from the viewpoint of accelerating peace. Mr. Dulles must have keenly felt that Japanese statesmen should work for unification of public opinion with a frank frame of mind. Do you recognize the necessity for it, or do you not? What attitude are you going to take hereafter?

"Why does the Government advocate partial peace as against Mr. Dulles' efforts for overall peace?

"How will peace be restored with countries not signing the treaty? Even if the Soviet Union will not join, we should continue our efforts to the last moment. You are rash and indiscreet in the light of your responsibility. What do you mean by having a bias toward separate peace?

"Have you agreed to a trusteeship for the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands? The people are anxious to regain sovereignty over the Ryukyu and Ogasawaras. But I hear that you have agreed to a trusteeship for them.

"I think we must arm ourselves to a certain extent for self-defense. The present National Police Reserve Force will not fully serve the purpose. What measure do you intend to take therefor?

"The Government should appeal to the people to revise the Constitution for the purpose of completing the defense of our motherland. What do you think?

"If the stationing of United States forces in Japan is realized it will be made provisional, I think. Is it possible for us to make an agreement with the United States to the effect that she will not desert us in case of war between the United States and the Soviet Union?

"If we participate in a collective security guarantee agreement, we will be obliged to go to the aid of another signatory if it is invaded. This conflicts with the terms of the Constitution.

"We should urge that any restriction, restraint, or obstruction to rehabilitation of our economy be excluded from the terms of the peace treaty. We should not be discriminated against in foreign trade. Strengthening of the national defense power requires a large amount of expenditures. But it will be impossible for us to bear the entire economic burden for rearmament."

Prime Minister Yoshida replied: "As a matter of course, diplomacy is kept in secrecy.

"Supra-party diplomacy is a desirable thing, but if the other party refuses it, nothing can be done. I want you to hear me frankly; if my diplomacy were self-satisfied, as you say, I might have prevented Mr. Dulles from hearing the opinions of various circles.

"Concerning war between the United States and Soviet Russia, I can't answer as the matter is but one of imagination.

"As for friendship between the United States and Japan, I shall do my utmost for its promotion. Japan's future lies with the liberal and democratic countries. Collective defense is the way to safeguard Japan.

"If the economic independence of our country cannot be attained, it means a break in the anti-communist defense line."

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Asanuma: "Prime Minister Yoshida's address at yesterday's plenary session was too abstract for us to grasp its meaning, hence my interpellation.

"The peace conference will constitute a starting point for the Japanese people and the nation of Japan to rejoin the international community as a free people and a free nation and to recover the national autonomy and independence which were lost thru the war. We have proclaimed in our Constitution the renunciation of war and as a result of unarmed status shall be forced to live in a world where nations are being pitted against each other. It is for this reason that the form of the peace treaty comes to the forefront with consideration being given to an overall majority and separate treaty. An overall peace treaty will be conducive to a permanent peace, but a separate treaty will be charged with the danger of war.

"Prime Minister Yoshida in his administrative policy address in January expressed an opinion opposing rearmament in view of the possibility of giving rise to unnecessary suspicion and from the standpoint that we are financially incapable of bearing the expenses

involved. It is reported now, however, that the Prime Minister has recognized rearmament following the conclusion of a peace settlement. Is this true? Ithink that rearmament will be impossible under the present Constitution. Has Prime Minister Yoshida any intentions of amending the Constitution?

"With respect to foreign aggression, the Prime Minister has reportedly consented to a defense agreement opposing a certain nation or group of nations. This, in my opinion, will result in hostile relationships developing with the particular nation or nations excluded from the agreement and will present an excuse for aggression. What are the views of the Prime Minister on this subject?

"The final conclusion is that the sovereignty of Japan is to consist of the four major islands and such small islands surrounding her as may be decided upon by the Allied Powers. I, however, am of the belief that public opinion concerning the future territorial boundries of Japan is really serious. Accordingly, I should like to learn what is to become of the Loochoo Islands, the Bonin Islands, the Kuriles, etc.

"There can be no racial independence where there exists no economic autonomy. Japan should go ahead with plans for economic self-sufficiency through promotion of industry and foreign trade and utilization of her people's originality. But still our country is short on foodstuffs and resources. What does the Prime Minister have to say about security from these shortcomings?

"The peace conference will decide the future course of our race. Consequently the Yoshida Cabinet should agree to dissolution of the House of Representatives and the holding of a general election in accord with the free will of the people. I believe that it will be appropriate for the newly-elected government to thereafter assume responsibility for the peace conference."

Prime Minister Yoshida replied: "My address of yesterday should have been sufficient to enlighten anyone of my viewpoints.

"Although you state that a separate peace treaty will be conducive to war and that an overall peace will lead to peace, I say that no one can tell until the treaty has been concluded.

"My views on rearmament have not changed in the least from those I formerly held. Consequently, there remains no need for an amendment to the Constitution.

"The problem of territories is to be settled by the peace conference. Therefore, I can give no answer on the matter. I have, however, sufficiently informed the U. S. Presidential Envoy of the hopes maintained by the people of Japan.

"On the subject of economic self-sufficiency, the United States Government, I am confident, will extend economic aid to Japan in view of the fact that the U. S. Government is contemplating either a system of collective security or a definite security guarantee.

"I am giving no consideration to dissolving the House of Representatives.

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Wada: "The Dulles-Yoshida conference was the object of great attention because it dealt with Japan's position in the world and our destiny. Its contents should have been made public in detail so that the people might decide their own destiny by taking a positive attitude. But the conference was reminiscent of secret diplomacy; it was not carried out with the support of the people; and it is regrettable that the Government made only a fragmentary report to the nation.

"The United States peace formula is based on the 7-point principles made public last November, in which an overall peace treaty is not excluded. According to a spokesman for Mr. Dulles, Japan agreed on a military alliance including military bases or facilities, and arrived at an understanding about Japanese rearma-

ment, all of which makes it difficult for China and Soviet Russia to join the peace treaty. To what extent did the Prime Minister discuss the treaty formula?

"After concluding a peace treaty with the United States, will other countries be invited to sign that treaty? With what countries will peace be restored in case of a multilateral treaty? Following a separate treaty, can Japan refuse Soviet Russia, still a belligerent state, the right to station its troops in Japan? Is Japan guaranteed security against a Russian attack? Upon conclusion of a separate peace treaty, what becomes of the Potsdam Declaration and the surrender terms which place limitations on Japanese sovereignty?

"Of course, we desire United States-Japan friendship, but acceptance of a United States security guarantee is not what most Japanese want overwhelmingly. Our fundamental policy is to improve the living standard of the laboring masses and to relieve the poverty and pressure which breeds communism. As Japan is a part of Asia, its economic future depends upon Asiatic cooperation; Japan should move along as Asia moves. We should not widen the gap between two opposing worlds.

"What are the contents of the military alliance agreement? Will not such an agreement involve Japan in war? What is the nature of the collective security guarantee? What promise did the Prime Minister give Mr. Dulles on rearmament? Women and young people abhor war. Rearmament will not provide defensive strength, but will increase the financial burden, lower the living standard, and foster fascism or communism. The world will lose faith in Japan if the Constitution is revised to permit rearmament.

"Economic rehabilitation must be hastened. As to the economy, has an understanding been obtained guaranteeing a quantity of imported materials and foodstuffs for establishment of an independent Japanese economy? The fate of the nation should not be decided

without knowing this. Does not the Government intend to dissolve the Diet in order to ascertain public opinion?

Prime Minister Yoshida replied: "Mr. Dulles favors an overall peace treaty, but if it is impossible, we must consider a separate peace treaty. We did not discuss rearmament in detail. Japan at present cannot afford to rearm, it being economically unbearable.

"Concerning the security guarantee, we must provide our own domestic security but ask for collective security against foreign aggression, along the lines now followed by the United Kingdom and the United States. United States security aid to Japan should be accepted with gratitude. Concerning regional security, I had no conversation with Mr. Dulles. With regard to economic independence, the foreign trade of Japan permits of no optimism. I think that the United States will not forsake us while our economy is on the verge of collapse. We should do our best for economic independence.

"Whether Japan would be exposed to the danger of communist invasion in case of a multilaterial peace, I am not sure.

"I conveyed to Mr. Dulles the earnest desire of our people concerning territories.

"I have no intention to dissolve the House of Representatives."

DIET ACTIVITIES

Recommendation Made for Diet Recess in April

The House of Councillors' Steering Committee on 19 February approved a motion recommending a recess of the 10th Diet from 1 through 30 April to permit Diet members time to campaign in the nation's local elections scheduled for the latter part of April. The motion as submitted by Social Democrat Masao Nakamura read: "If the Government submits all bills to the Diet by the end of February, this House will do its utmost to comply with the Government's desire that deliberations thereon be completed by the end of March; and as soon as the budget (the Government's three budgets for fiscal 1951-52) is approved, the House will enter into recess." The Steering Committee agreed that the House would notify the Government of its decision and would urge the House of Representatives to take similar action. The schedule of business as recommended by the Steering Committee ran as follows:

1. Approval of the budget legislation and related measures by 31 March.
2. An "autonomous" recess for the local election campaigns from 1 through 30 April.
3. Resumption of Diet business on 1 May.

Government's Legislative Program Outlined

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Eiichi Inoue before the House of Councillors' Steering Committee on 14 February outlined the Government's legislative program for the 10th Diet. Inoue disclosed that the Government had submitted 29 bills to the Diet as of 13 February and would submit 22 additional measures by 20 February, 115 bills by the end of February, and 33 measures during March.

Included in the legislation already enacted into law by the 10th Diet as of the end of February were the following measures:

Government-sponsored legislation:

1. *Law for Transfer from General Account for Purpose of Increasing the Capital of the Foreign Exchange Special Account

2. *Law for Partial Amendment of Law for Compensation of National Public Service Personnel in Special Government Services

3. *Law for Partial Amendment of Law for Compensation of Employees in Regular Government Service

4. Law for Partial Amendment of Law for Enforcement of Imperial House Economy Law.

5. Law for Partial Amendment of Fisheries Cooperative Association Law

6. Law for Partial Amendment of Trademark Law.

7. Law for Partial Amendment of Patent Law.

8. Law for Partial Amendment of Utility Model Law.

9. Law for Partial Amendment of Design Law.

10. Law for Partial Amendment of Law Concerning Patent Attorneys.

11. Law for Transfer from General Account to Cover Shortages in Revenue in Postal service Special Account Law.

12. Law for Partial Amendment of Welfare Insurance Special Account Law.

13. Law for Partial Amendment of Law for Exception to Payment from Alcohol Monopoly Special Account to General Account.

14. Law for Partial Amendment of Agricultural Land Adjustment Law and Others.

15. Law for Partial Amendment of Social Education Law

16. Law for Partial Amendment of Horseshoers' Law.

Member-sponsored legislation:

1. *Administrative Scrivener Law.

2. Law for Temporary Measures Concerning Concurrent Holding of Position of Educational Public Service Personnel of Public School and Membership in Assembly of Local Public Body.

The following legislation had been approved by the House of Representatives as of the end of February:

1. Bill for the General Account Budget, 1951-52

2. Bill for the Special Account Budget, 1951-52

3. Bill for the Budget of Government Corporations, 1951-52
4. Bill for Partial Amendment of Income Tax Law.
5. Bill for Partial Amendment of Corporation Tax Law
6. Bill for Partial Amendment of Travelling Tax Law.
7. Bill for Partial Amendment of Registration Tax Law
8. Bill for Partial Amendment of Accessions Tax Law.
9. Bill for Partial Amendment of Stamp Tax Law;
10. Bill for Partial Amendment of Playing-Set Tax Law.
11. Bill for Partial Amendment of Special Taxation Measures Law.
12. Bill for Partial Amendment of People's Finance Corporation Law
13. Bill for Partial Amendment of Bill for Transfer from General Account for Appropriation for Loans in Special Account for Finance for Farm Settlers.
14. Bill for Port Construction for Development of Hokkaido.
15. Bill for Partial Amendment of the Marine Pilot Law.
16. Bill for Partial Amendment of Fire Defense Law (Member Bill).

The following legislation had been approved by the House of Councillors as of the end of February:

1. Bill for Partial Amendment of Hydrographic Activities Law.
2. Bill for Partial Amendment of the Law for Business of Massage, Acapuncture, Moxa-Cautery, etc.

* (Laws designated by an asterik were reintroduced and enacted by the tenth Diet after having failed to have been approved by the ninth Diet which adjourned 9 December 1950.)

Developments in Diet Affiliations

House of Representatives Secretariat Oike on 13 February received formal notification from Haruki Satake of the establishment of the new Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu-To) under the leadership of Rikizo Hirano and the dissolution of the Social Renovation Party. Sataka, former Secretary-General of the Social Renovation Party, disclosed that the Social Renovation Party had formally been dissolved as of 10 February and that the party's 4 members in the House of Representatives had affiliated themselves

with Hirano's Social Democratic Party established on the same date. The four members involved in the switch to the new party were Satake elected from Kochi, Miss Yoshie Oishi from Kyoto, Susumu Kobayashi from Niigata, and Hayashi Eto from Fukuoka.

The Liberal Party's strength in the House of Representatives was increased to 286 and Independent strength was reduced to 6 on 7 February when the party accepted a membership application filed by Independent Ken Inukai. Liberal strength in the House of Councillors was increased to 76 on 12 February when Liberal candidate Isao Matsudaira won a clear-cut victory in a House of Councillors by-election conducted in Fukushima Prefecture.

(For further information concerning the establishment of Hirano's Social Democratic Party and the acceptance of Ken Inukai into the Liberal Party, see this report under POLITICAL PARTIES; and for an account of Matsudaira's election to the House of Councillors, see this report under LOCAL GOVERNMENT.)

Diet Member Given Prison Sentence

The Tokushima District Court on 27 February sentenced People's Democrat member of the House of Representatives, Seiichi Okada, from Tokushima, to six months in prison for election law and political fund violations during the House of Representatives' election of January 1949. Okada, a supreme advisor to the People's Democratic Party and a former Minister of Transportation, immediately took steps to appeal the sentence to a higher court.

Disciplinary Committee Debates Kawakami Case

The House of Representatives' Disciplinary Committee in February opened its study into possible disciplining of Communist member Kanichi Kawakami for alleged anti-Occupation statements and slander during his interpellations of Prime Minister

Shigeru Yoshida in the House plenary session of 27 January. The legal basis for the action being considered by the Committee was presented by Liberal Morisaku Sasaki on 2 February who cited Article 58 of the Constitution: "....Each House...may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a member, a majority vote of two-thirds or more of those members present must pass a resolution thereon;" Article 119 of the Diet Law: "There shall not be used insulting language...in the House;" and Article 245 of the Rules of the House of Representatives: "Members whose actions are considered specially serious, by virtue of ...impairing the honor of the House, may be dismissed from membership by the House." Sasaki had charged that Kawakami's action of 27 January had involved the usage of improper language, injured the dignity of the House and had disturbed order in the House. Committee hearings were continued on the case throughout February, but failed to bring forth any attempt by Kawakami to retract his statements. Kawakami on 17 February flatly told the Committee that he would refuse to retract any of his remarks and notified Committee Chairman Muneaki Tsuchikura that the Committee might dispose of him in any manner it saw fit. This determined position of Kawakami's led Liberals supported by People's Democrats to move that Kawakami be given the alternative of apologizing for this action. There, however, appeared little likelihood that Kawakami would concede to this motion.

The hearings conducted on the Kawakami case were bitter and often digressed to charges and counter-charges between Liberals and Communists on Communist propaganda activities, Communist ideological concepts, conspiracy between representatives of the Soviet Union and Japanese Communists, and numerous other similar topics. Liberal Koichi Tabuchi on 10 February charged that Kawakami's interpellations had been delivered with the malicious intent of destroying the Japanese form of government. Proof that Kawakami's purpose was to bring about an armed revolution, Tabuchi stated, was

the fact that he had distributed printed copies of his speech among unlearned masses in order to turn them against the government. Liberal Eiichi Nishimura on 13 February picked up where Tabuchi had left off by asserting that the Communists with their Marx-Lenin philosophy regarded parliamentary government with contempt and viewed legislatures in capitalistic societies as "an organ to swindle and trample the people." Nishimura cited the case of purged Communist leader and former Diet member Sanzo Nosaka who had stated publicly on one occasion that "a peaceful revolution is possible for Japan under the Occupation," but had subsequently changed his mind following severe criticism and reprimand by the Cominform in January 1950. Liberal Takashi Naito on 17 February noted the point that recent proceedings of the Allied Council for Japan had resulted in the implication that there had been exchanges of information between the Soviet Union and Japanese Communists. Naito questioned Kawakami on this point as to whether he had received instructions from Soviet officials on his interpellations of 27 January, but this was denied by the Communist Diet member.

Kawakami in defending his statements of January asserted before the Disciplinary Committee on 2 February that "the disciplinary action against me is nothing but a form of persecution and oppression of the Communist Party and an insult to a Diet member." Kawakami on this date was also quoted as stressing the following points: (1) "It is improper for a Diet member's speech criticizing the Government to be considered cause for disciplinary action." (2) "My speech was by no means anti-U.S. propaganda; I quote from Newsweek (an American weekly publication) for January 22: 'The Korean war has greatly strengthened Japan's defenses....An embryo Japanese army--the 75,000-man national police reserve--is still in the organizational stage although it has made unexpectedly rapid progress. Half of the members are Japanese veterans of the last war.'" (3) "My speech did not contain anything purposefully in defiance of the

Occupation Forces." (4) "My statements do not violate Potsdam Ordinance No. 325." (5) "My criticism of Ashida (former Prime Minister and ranking advocate of Japanese rearmament) was within my right of free speech." (6) "Even the Social Democratic Party at its convention passed a resolution in favor of overall peace and opposing a separate peace."

Kawakami's denial that his statements were not in violation of Potsdam Ordinances No. 325 as well as Liberal Tabuchi's charge that copies of Kawakami's speech had been printed and distributed caused Attorney General Takeo Ohashi to comment before the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee on 28 February: "If his (Kawakami's) 27 January interpellation was printed and circulated outside the Diet, such action violated the Press Code and the Ordinance Concerning Punishment for Acts Prejudicial to Occupation Objectives (Imperial Ordinance No. 311 of 1946). The Government will examine the matter carefully to determine whether the Organizations Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 64 of 1949) was also violated."

Diet Invited to Join International Parliamentary Union

President Naotake Sato of the House of Councillors on 16 February reported to the directors of the House Steering Committee that he had received an official letter inviting the Japanese Diet to rejoin the International Parliamentary Union, an international organization for legislators with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Explanatory material was distributed among the directors who were to consider the invitation at their respective party caucuses.

Special Administrative Inspection Committee Established

The House of Representatives in plenary session on 6 February approved the House Steering Committee recommendation of January for establishment of a Special House Administrative Inspection Committee to replace the former Special Examination Committee.