

-2-

for meritorious services. Articles 33 and 34 are to be revised so as to provide for the election of the members by law.

6. Creation of a Standing Committee.

A standing committee is to be organized by the Diet to carry on the functions of the Diet while it is not in session.

7. Establishment of the Cabinet system.

The cabinet composed of the prime minister and the departmental ministers will have jurisdiction over administrative matters. Cabinet responsibility to the Diet is to be stipulated. It is to be provided that the prime minister and the departmental ministers are at the same time state ministers.

8. Abolition of the Privy Council.

Article 56 is to be eliminated.

9. Increase of the powers of the Court of Law.

Administrative suits may be instituted relating to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authorities. These suits come within the competency of a Court of Law. Court of Administrative Litigation will be abolished. Article 61 is to be revised to this effect.

The State must indemnify damages caused by the illegal acts of government officials.

10. Abdication.

The Imperial House Law is to be revised to provide for abdication.

11. Abolition of the nobility system.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 246 dated February 9, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Transmitting Translations of Recently Published Constitution Revision Plans".

TRANSLATION

Communist Draft Constitution Revision Plan

(Mainichi, December 30, 1945)

1. Sovereignty shall reside in the people.
2. The Diet administers sovereignty. Men and women over eighteen shall vote and be eligible for elective office. The Diet selects the members of the government.
3. The government is responsible to the Diet.
4. The members of the Diet are responsible to the people.
5. The people shall possess political, economic, and social freedom.
6. The people's right to labor and to education shall be guaranteed.
7. Race and class discriminations shall be abolished.

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 246 dated February 9, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Transmitting Translations of Recently Published Constitution Revision Plans".

TRANSLATION

Draft Constitution Prepared by Dr. TAKANO Iwasaburo

(Yomiuri-Hochi, January 28, 1946)

I. Sovereignty and the Head of the State.

The sovereignty of Japan rests in the people.
The Head of Japan is the President elected by the people.
The term of office of the President is four years. The President may be reelected but not to be elected three times.
The President represents the State internally and externally.
The right of legislature belongs to the Diet. The President convokes, opens and closes the Diet according to the decision of the Diet. The President cannot dissolve the Diet. The President may convoke a special session of the Diet in case of necessity for public good during the period when the Diet is closed. The President executes the administrative right and appoints or dismisses the State Ministers.

Treaties are concluded by the President after having been approved by the Diet.

Peerage, ranks and merits are abolished. The effect of this provision is retroactive.

II. Rights and duties of the people.

The people have freedom of residence and removal.
The people have freedom of communications.
The right of private ownership of the people shall not be violated except in case of necessity for public good.
The people have freedom of speech, publication, and assembly.
The people have the duty of observing the Constitution and of living harmoniously.
The people have the duty of paying taxes.
The people have the duty of work.
The people have the right of living.
The people have the right of receiving education.
The people have the right of rest.
The people have the right to cultural enjoyment.

III. The Diet.

The Diet consists of the First and Second Houses.
The First House is organized by the Members directly elected by the people in conformity with the provisions of the Election Law. The Second House is organized by the Members elected from the various strata of the occupational groups. The term of office of the Members of the Diet is three years, one third of the total Members to be elected every year.

No one can be a Member of the both Houses at the same time.

Bills that have been passed by the First House cannot be repudiated by the Second House.

Neither

-2-

Neither House can vote unless more than one third of the Members are present.

The proceedings of the both Houses are open to the public and are published as stenographic record.

Both Houses, in accordance with the respective decision, may appoint Committees in respect of special questions and sub poena witnesses.

The Members of the Houses are not responsible outside the Diet for what they say or vote inside the Diet.

The Members of both Houses are immune from arrest during the session of the Diet except with the approval of the Diet or in case of flagrant delict.

Both Houses may vote no-confidence in the Cabinet or individual Ministers. In this case the Cabinet or Ministers must leave their posts.

IV. Government and Ministers.

The Government is organized by the Ministers with or without portfolio.

V. Economics and Labor.

Land is owned by the State.

The means of production necessary for public good must be nationalized gradually in accordance with the decisions of the Diet.

Labor must not exceed 8 hours a day.

The remuneration for labor shall not fall below the level required for the cultural life of the workers.

VI. Culture and Science.

No discrimination is permitted between men and women for receiving education or other culture.

All education must be based on the pursuance of truth or clarification of facts.

VII. Justice.

The right of justice is exercised by the courts in conformity with the provisions of the Law Concerning the Constitution of Law Courts and the Jury Law.

The right of justice is not violated by the right of administration.

The administrative courts may be established to handle cases where the rights are violated or legitimate interests are injured by the decision of the administrative office.

VIII. Finance.

The revenue and expenditure must be provided in the budget in detail and accurately and be approved by the Diet every year.

The budget must be presented first to the First House. The Second House cannot reject the items or amount approved by the First House.

Taxes must be levied fairly. Care must be taken not to place undue burden upon the people by unduly stressing the consumption tax.

The final

-3-

The final account of the revenue and expenditure must be presented to the Auditing Board, and after getting its approval the Government must present it to the Diet for its approval during the next fiscal year.

IX. Revision of Constitution and
People's Plebiscite

When a revision of this Constitution is considered necessary in future, a draft must be prepared by the President, or the First or Second House and presented to the Diet for deliberation. In this case, no discussion can be opened unless more than two thirds of the Members of both Houses are present. No decision can be taken unless approved by the two-thirds majority of those present.

When there is a question affecting the interest of the whole people which is considered necessary to be referred to the plebiscite of the people, it must be decided in conformity with the aforementioned procedure of the Constitutional revision.

The Privy Council is abolished.

ER
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PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
Washington
Secret

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

SECRET
FEB 15 1946
8 P.M.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 2-946

152
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
TOKYO.
FOR ██████████ ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER

Ref URTEL No. 90. DEPT appreciates prompt assistance already given such matters and wishes to receive for study copy of Constitutional Revision Bill recently reported approved by Cabinet.

Bymer
(JCP)

CR
FEB 16 1946 P.M.

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
FEB 15 PM 7 54
TELEGRAPH
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740.00119 Central Japan / 2-946
Confidential File

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PLAIN

Moscow via War

Dated February 9, 1946

Rec'd 10:45 a.m., 9th

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Secretary of State
Washington

380, Ninth.

Soviet press February eight publishes Tass Tokyo despatch reporting recent intensification in Japan of movement for creation of united peoples' front initiated by Hitosi Yamahara and San Jo Hosaka. Despatch states that desire of simple people for united peoples' front is particularly noticeable in connection with forthcoming elections. In questionnaire 72% favored united peoples' front, 14% (employers in majority) opposed and remaining 14% expressed no opinion. Popular demands bound up with creation of united front converge on three basic questions: Solution of food problem, purge of reactionary militarist influence from institutions and democratization of country.

Sent Dept 380; repeated Frankfurt. Dept please repeat to Tokyo.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

EJH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 11 1946
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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
FEB 11 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 13 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 2-946



010 EUROPEAN AREA DIVISION
(ADE)
MAR 12 1946
Department of State

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN
DISTRIBUTION OF
MAR 5 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File 1711

MEMORANDUM

To: Department of State, Washington
From: American Legation, Canberra.

Attached is the sixth of the weekly summaries of Australian press comment on the occupation of Japan which has been forwarded to Supreme Commander, Tokyo, in accordance with the Department's telegraphic instruction no. 130, December 27, 1945, 5 p.m.

760.00119 Control (Japan) 12-27-45

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/2-946
CS/LF

BY OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION
MAR 6 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 9, 1946.

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(Japan) 12-27-45
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SCAP TOKYO

February 9, 1946

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CLEAR

Via US Navy (Harman)

SCAP,

TOKYO.

NINTH

Following is summary of Australia press comment with respect to Japan for period ending February 8.

All Australia press carried report of Prime Minister Chifley's statement regarding arrangements for and composition of British Commonwealth occupation force which is to be commanded by Lt. General J. Northcott of the Australian Military Forces and is to include British, Indian, Australian and New Zealand forces.

All Australian papers on day following publication of Prime Minister's announcement carried report of General MacArthur's message to Prime Minister Chifley welcoming the Australians.

Only other item of interest which appeared during period was an article by George Caiger in Sydney Morning

Herald

- 2 -

Herald of February 5 expressing opinion that Japanese people were not being sufficiently informed of significance of war guilt trials. Caiger stated in part, "About one Japanese in a million realizes that these trials are establishing a new precedent in human affairs. The very idea of a precedent in law is totally strange to them. The Japanese can understand victors shooting the conquered. They feel that the elaborate processes being followed mutely witness the weakness of the Allied case. Unless the full significance of the trials is patiently and clearly expressed to the Japanese through their press, radio and cinema they will either scorn us for being sadists as we now scorn them or be flattered by the attention (as when no less than five American generals took part in Yamashita's trial) or brood over it with plans for ultimate revenge."

MINTER

DJ/jmp

SCAP TOKYO

February 9, 1946

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CLEAR

Via US Navy (Harman)

SCAP,

TOKYO.

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MINTER

DJ/jmp

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

~~ACTION COPY~~ *JA*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: FE
INFO:
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Paraphrase before communicating to anyone.

6356
Tokyo via War
Dated February 10, 1946
Rec'd 5:32 p.m., 17th

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Secretary of State
Washington

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
FEB 18 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Unnumbered, February 10.
WAR DEPARTMENT SERIES CA 57708.

Message signed by Bishop for Secretary Department of State from SCAP through WARCOS. Difference in internal number should be noted. Our number 89, February 9 is CA 57708.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

EDA

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 27 1946
LIAISON OFFICE

FEB 20 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /2-1046

Confidential File

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



SPECIAL ASSISTANT

11 February 1946

FEB 12 1946

MR. McCORMACK

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: SA/Mc - Mr. Alfred McCormack
FROM: FEI - Charles B. Fahs *CBF*
SUBJECT: SFE 147/2

O.K. Please return to Mr. Fahs

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1115

The attached draft, which is due for discussion in the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC in the near future, was prepared primarily under the direction of Colonel Bonesteel of OPD. It is the result of very involved discussions in the working party of which I was chairman and in the Far East Subcommittee.

As I told you orally the other day, this present draft in my opinion is satisfactory as far as FEI and to the best of my knowledge as far as your wider interests are concerned. In my opinion the problem of knowledge here of intelligence requests put to SCAP in the field by representatives of other nations can be solved through improved relations with MIS and CAD and cannot be handled effectively in this paper, which by original definition is confined to the subject of international coordination.

Three defects remain:

1. The problem of intelligence as well as that of policy is vastly complicated by the failure of General MacArthur to discriminate clearly administratively between staff organizations for his role as SCAP and his role as CINCAFPAC.
2. The procedure for clearance of requests through SWNCC outlined in paragraphs 6-a and 6-c may be a clumsy one.
3. The phrase in paragraph 6-e "in the field of scientific research and development" is probably too broad.

These three questions are more directly the concern of Mr. Penfield and Mr. Martin, who sit on the Far East Subcommittee, and have been discussed with them. I think that they may more properly carry the ball at this stage and propose to make no further moves myself.

Attachment: 1

FEI:CBFahs:lk
*State Dept.
Far East
Intelligence Division
from Fahs*

SECRET

FEB 14 1946 - 25

740-0119 CONTROL
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SECRET FILE

*File*SECRET**SECRET**COPY NO. 25SFE 147/26 February 1946Pages 1 to 6

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE
FOR THE FAR EAST

PROVISIONS FOR THE COORDINATED EXPLOITATION OF JAPANESE
INTELLIGENCE TARGETS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

- References:
- a. SWNCC 216/D
 - b. SFE 147 Series
 - c. Minutes SFE 49th Meeting
 - d. Minutes SFE 52nd Meeting
 - e. Minutes SFE 54th Meeting
 - f. Minutes SFE 57th Meeting

Note by the Secretary

1. The enclosure, a proposed revision of SFE 147/1 in light of comments at the 57th SFE Meeting, is circulated for consideration by the Subcommittee.

A. F. Richardson
Commander, USN
Acting Secretary

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E N C L O S U R E

PROVISIONS FOR THE COORDINATED EXPLOITATION OF JAPANESE
INTELLIGENCE TARGETS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate a U. S. policy for international coordination in the exploitation of intelligence targets in Japan and areas in the Far East and Pacific formerly occupied by the Japanese and now under American command.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. Coordination of and action upon requests received from other nations for intelligence and intelligence material under United States control in Japan or in areas in the Far East and Pacific formerly occupied by the Japanese and now under American command should be effected by CINCAFPAC or CINCPAC, each in his respective area of authority, acting under policy guidance of the State, War and Navy Departments.

5. The following rules should be considered as general guidance in implementation of the above principle:

a. All governments participating in the Far Eastern Commission are recognized as entitled to that intelligence necessary to enable them effectively to perform their functions with respect to occupation and occupation policies for Japan.

b. Except when included in the definition in a above, intelligence related to operations during hostilities or the Japanese military and naval organization, tactics and technology, should be provided when requested, to governments which actively participated in the war against Japan, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph e below.

SECRET

c. Intelligence requested by a government which actively participated in the war against Japan to enable it to administer its territories or liberated areas in the Far East or to protect the property and rights of its citizens therein should be provided, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph e below.

d. Political, commercial, geographic or other intelligence not specified above, requested by a government which actively participated in the war against Japan may be provided, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph e below, if such provision be considered in the best interests of the United States and there is adequate reciprocity in the exchange of intelligence by the requesting nation.

e. Intelligence which, in the opinion of the American Commander responsible for action on and coordination of requests, would jeopardize the security of the United States; prejudice United States relations with a foreign government with which the United States maintains friendly relations; or derogate from United States advantages in the field of scientific research and development, should not be provided without specific reference to and authorization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, where appropriate, by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

6. a. Intelligence covered in paragraph 5 a above will be transmitted on the initiative of the commander concerned through established channels to the Far Eastern Commission. Specific requests for intelligence required by the Far Eastern Commission or a member government thereof should be forwarded by the Department of State on behalf of the Far Eastern Commission to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for transmittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in turn to CINCAFPAC or CINCPAC as appropriate.

b. Requests from a single government for intelligence covered in paragraphs 5 b, c and d above should be made to CINCAFPAC or CINCPAC through the military representative of that government on the staff of SCAP or CINCPAC respectively. If there is no such representative, the request should be made through diplomatic channels to the Department of State, Washington, unless the intelligence required is military or naval, in which case the request should be made through the appropriate attache

SECRET

to the War or Navy Department. These requests will be forwarded by the State, War or Navy Departments through established channels to CINCPAC or CINCPAC.

c. Requests from governments other than those which actively participated in the war against Japan should be made through diplomatic channels to the Department of State, Washington, unless the intelligence required is military or naval, in which case the request should be made through the appropriate attache to the War or Navy Department. Action on these requests will be taken by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above Conclusions as a statement of United States policy and so inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Forward this paper to the State, War and Navy Departments for information and such implementation as is deemed appropriate.

SECRETAPPENDIX "A"FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. This paper concerns the question of sharing with other nations the results of United States exploitation of Japanese intelligence targets. It was raised specifically by a British proposal for the establishment in Washington of a "combined executive organization" with functions similar to those of the former Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee in London. This latter organization served to coordinate the interests of British and U. S. governmental departments for intelligence of military or political significance in areas liberated from German control by SHAEF
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1538 approved the principle that international coordination of intelligence targets in the Far East should be effected by the supreme authority in each occupied and liberated area. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific was notified of this decision and authorized to permit other Allied nations to have access to intelligence or intelligence targets essentially related to (1) that nation's operations during hostilities, (2) its responsibilities in connection with the occupation and control of Japan or other Far Eastern area, or (3) its government of liberated territories, subject to appropriate reciprocal action by that nation with respect to intelligence or intelligence targets under its control.
3. The British were informed of the substance of the above decision by the United States Members of the Combined Intelligence Committee and the suggestion was made that British target lists and plans for target exploitation with respect to Japan be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through the senior British officer with him.
4. Further Joint Chiefs of Staff action on JCS 1538 was to request the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to formulate a policy for international coordination in the exploitation of intelligence targets in the Far East.
5. The problem was referred by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East on 26 October 1945. The Subcommittee subsequently (52nd SFE Meeting,

S E C R E T

20 November 1945) limited the scope of the paper to international coordination in the exploitation of Japanese intelligence targets in areas under American occupation.

SECRETAPPENDIX "B"DISCUSSION

1. The JCS decision assigning responsibility for international coordination to CINCAFPAC is adequate to permit coordination of local intelligence, collection and procurement operations in areas of CINCAFPAC responsibility, but should be extended to include similar directives to CINCPAC.
2. In addition it is considered that further definition of the types of intelligence to be supplied other governments is necessary to assure the ability of the United States to meet its international commitments with respect to the occupation of Japan and at the same time to enjoy such intelligence advantages as may properly be derived from the major role played by U. S. forces in her defeat.
3. It is felt that the above mentioned commitments do not necessarily obligate the United States to share all intelligence exploited equally with the other occupying powers or powers represented on the Far Eastern Commission. Certain Japanese intelligence must be safeguarded for United States security. Sharing with other nations intelligence which the Japanese had collected against the United States and certain other countries, would be contrary to U. S. interests.
4. The advantages mentioned in paragraph 2 above and the concept of United States control over intelligence in Japan can be justified on the grounds of initial United States occupation of Japan. Unless other governments making up the group of Allied Powers for whom SCAP accepted surrender of all Japanese forces, share with all the Allied Powers, Japanese intelligence from the areas they occupied after surrender, the United States has no obligation to share all intelligence from Japan.



46 **SECRET**

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE


WASHINGTON, D. C.

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SWN-3896

20 February 1946



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Reorientation of the Japanese.

- References: a. SWNCC 162/2
- b. SWNCC 162/4
- c. Item 3 Minutes 36th SWNCC Meeting

At its 36th meeting the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, after amending, approved SWNCC 162/2.

In approving the paper the Committee agreed that:

a. This report be transmitted to the War and Navy Departments for their information, to the State Department for implementation and to the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission for his information.

b. The integrated program as developed by the State Department pursuant to the "Conclusions" in paragraph 4 of the revised approved paper be submitted to SWNCC as early as possible for its consideration as a matter of priority.

Copy number 71 of the revised approved paper is forwarded herewith for information and such action as may be deemed appropriate under subparagraphs a and b above.

It is requested that the enclosed copy number 74 of SWNCC 162/2 be forwarded to the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission for his information.

Similar letters have been forwarded to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. Freeman Matthews
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS,
Acting Chairman

Enclosure:
Copies No. 71 and
74, SWNCC 162/2

SECRET

740.00119 (CONTROL (JAPAN)) / 2-2046

Confidential File

NR 894.42

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**SECRET**THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.SWN-3896
20 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Reorientation of the Japanese

References: a. SWNCC 162/2
b. SWNCC 162/4
c. Item 3 Minutes 36th
SWNCC Meeting

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For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Enclosure:
Copies No. 71 and
74, SWNCC 162/2

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS,
Acting Chairman

COPY TO ACCOMPANY ORIGINAL

SECRET

S E C R E T

COPY NO. _____

19 February 1946STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEDECISION AMENDING SWNCC 162/2REORIENTATION OF THE JAPANESENote by the Secretaries

1. At its 36th Meeting the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, after amending, approved SWNCC 162/2.

2. Holders of SWNCC 162/2 are requested to substitute the attached revised page 9 for the one contained therein and destroy the latter by burning.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SECRETCOPY NO. 71SWNCC 162/28 January 1946Pages 9 - 17, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEREORIENTATION OF THE JAPANESEReferences: a. SWNCC 162/D
b. SWNCC 162/1
c. SFE 116 SeriesNote by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this paper has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. These comments will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

S E C R E TE N C L O S U R EREORIENTATION OF THE JAPANESE

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. What action should be taken to fix U.S. responsibility for basic planning for and the continuing development of the reeducation and reorientation of the Japanese people for the purpose of bringing about the development of a peaceful and democratic Japan?

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. Since many of the initial steps designed to attain the basic objectives of the Allied Powers through reorientation and reeducation of the Japanese have already been taken by SCAP in compliance with his current directives or soon will be implemented, it is unnecessary at this time to specify further action in detail as contemplated in SWNCC 162/D.

b. The long-range character of reorientation makes it desirable to fix at this time the U.S. responsibility for basic planning and continuing development in order that (1) the present program as implemented by SCAP may be properly integrated with the long-range program of reorientation, and that (2) the transfer from military to civilian control may take place in an orderly manner.

c. Because of the inherent nature of the problem, the basic planning for and continuing development of a U.S. program of reorientation and reeducation is an appropriate responsibility of the Department of State subject to existing arrangements

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with respect to control machinery for Japan and the channel of command for issuing instructions to SCAP.

d. The Department of State should immediately undertake basic planning for and the development of such a program for the approval of SWNCC, and where necessary, for that of the FEC. Such a program should be implemented by SCAP and where appropriate and after coordination with SCAP by the State Department in the United States.

e. This program should be considered as a matter of priority and should be given adequate support in funds, material and facilities to insure that maximum advantage is taken of present more favorable psychological conditions of the Japanese people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

a. The paper be transmitted by SWNCC to the JCS for comment as a matter of priority.

b. After receipt of the comments of the JCS, the SWNCC approve the "Conclusions" in paragraph 4 above.

c. This report be transmitted to the War and Navy Departments for their information, to the State Department for implementation and to the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission for his information.

d. The integrated program as developed by the State Department pursuant to the "Conclusions" in paragraph 4 above be submitted to SWNCC as early as possible for its consideration as a matter of priority.

SECRETAPPENDIX "A"FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 by the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and the Republic of China states:

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest. We insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

"The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."

2. The "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC 150/4/A) made public by the President on 22 September 1945 states:

"The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

3. Among the principal means for the achievement of these objectives this statement indicates the following:

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"The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations."

"The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other United Nations."

4. The introductory paragraph of the President's announcement states in part:

"Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately."

5. On 31 August SWNCC considered SWNCC 162/D, a memorandum by the Under Secretary of the Navy entitled "Positive Policy for Reorientation of the Japanese". The Committee concluded that there was need for a comprehensive report on the positive steps that should be taken in the reorientation of the Japanese in order to implement the objectives set forth in the basic statement of policy subsequently made public in the President's statement of 22 September 1945. The Committee directed its Subcommittee for the Far East to prepare such a report.

6. By a directive of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued on 22 September 1945 a special staff division of Supreme Headquarters was established, designated as the Civil Information and Education Section, charged with advising the Supreme Commander on policies "relating to public information, education, religion and other sociological problems of Japan and Korea." The section is further charged with "expediting the establishment of freedom of religious worship, freedom of opinion, speech, press and assembly by the dissemination of democratic ideals and principles through all media of public information. It has the responsibility of making clear to all levels of the Japanese public

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the true facts of their defeat, their war guilt, the responsibility of the militarists for present and future Japanese suffering and privation and the reason for and objectives of the military occupation of the Allied Powers. It is also responsible for keeping the Supreme Commander factually informed of public reactions to the occupation and rehabilitation program in order to ensure a dependable basis for program formulation and modification of policies and plans." Extensive implementation of this directive already has taken place in Japan and additional steps are being planned by SCAP.

7. By Presidential Executive Order 9608 of August 31, 1945, the foreign information activities of the Office of War Information and of the Office of Inter-American Affairs were transferred to the State Department. In accordance with this executive order, there was established in the Department of State on August 31, 1945 an Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC). The office functions under the direction and supervision of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations. According to the Order establishing the Office it is responsible for:

- "a. the coordination and direction of the formulation of policies and the taking of action in the field of international information and cultural affairs;
- b. the development of policies and programs promoting freedom of information among peoples;
- c. the furtherance of international interchanges of persons, knowledge, and skills with other countries;
- d. the coordination of the programs and activities of other federal agencies in the international interchanges of persons, knowledge and skills with over-all United States foreign policy."

8. The members of the ad hoc committee appointed by the Subcommittee to consider 162/D have made available to appropriate staff officers at the State Department, Office of International Information and Cultural Activities the results of their studies and research on the subject of this paper.

SECRETAPPENDIX "B"DISCUSSION

1. Most Japanese, in greater or lesser degree, at present share a common attitude of mind of which the following are salient elements:

a. The persistence of feudal concepts, including class stratification, the glorification of the military, and a habit of subservience to authority.

b. A belief in the superior qualifications of the Japanese for world leadership, closely connected with the cult of emperor-worship fostered in recent years by the military to serve their own purposes.

c. Extreme racial consciousness, and an anti-foreign complex, which, however, is often combined with great admiration for foreign achievements and learning.

2. It is probable that the attainment of the ultimate objectives of the Allied Powers in regard to Japan cannot be assured in the absence of changes in these ideologies and ways of thinking, which have in the past motivated the Japanese people as a whole in the pursuit of chauvinistic and militaristic policies.

3. It will not be necessary to recast all Japanese cultural concepts; rather, it is proposed to develop those particular Japanese concepts which will create new attitudes of mind conforming to the basic principles of democracy and fair dealing.

4. It is recognized that the character of our occupation of Japan and the commitment to act through the Japanese Government require that the approach to the Japanese be made through their own leaders. It is also recognized that the Japanese may offer resistance to new ideas and points of view advanced directly by the occupation authorities, whereas the same ideas, put forward by leaders of their own and in whom they have confidence, may very well be favorably received and acted upon. There are numerous Japanese

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who, through prior contacts and earlier education, will be disposed to accept and assist in the development of our ultimate objectives and along lines which will further the interests of the United States. For this reason a fundamental responsibility of the Allied authorities in Japan should be to seek out such persons, ensure that they are placed in positions that will enable them to accomplish these aims, and afford them counsel, guidance and support.

5. If it is to be successful the process of reorientation cannot be restricted to formalized education or to a mere reform of the educational system. It must be extended to a reeducation not only of the youth but of the population as a whole, and must be developed in such manner as to reach into the minds of the Japanese through every available channel. The influence of Japanese leaders in every field should be utilized as well as all appropriate media, including books, text books, periodicals, motion pictures, radio, lectures, discussion groups and the schools. The methods of approach and character of materials used must be carefully considered, must be persuasive rather than didactic, and must be designed to ensure the maximum response and acceptance by the Japanese.

6. On the national level, our objective should be to encourage the Japanese to develop the political responsibility of the individual citizen, and thereby to develop a gradual reorganization of the Japanese political system. It is axiomatic that the only effective political reform must stem from the people themselves. Political reforms imposed solely by the fiat of a military occupant will either be resisted by the people, or will be ignored by them. Our policy must be designed to supply to the Japanese themselves the ideas and incentives essential to the indigenous development of a political reorganization stemming from the people as a whole.

7. The Japanese are a literate people. They realize that an education is desirable and this fact coupled with their habit of obedience to authority and uncritical acceptance of the teachings of

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their leaders, makes them receptive to a process of ideological re-orientation which is properly presented. One of the most effective means of achieving this objective will be to furnish information concerning the world outside Japan.

8. It will be the policy of the United States not to repress ideas and information from other sources, but to ensure an adequate presentation through Japanese media and channels and an adequate understanding by the Japanese of the aims and ideals of the United States. Other aims and ideals will undoubtedly be promoted, and it is essential, in order to give the Japanese a true picture and enable them to make up their minds intelligently as to their future in relation to the United States and the world at large, that we present our case effectively and comprehensively.

9. It should be borne in mind that a process of reorientation will only be effective as it goes hand in hand with some gradual improvement in the economic condition of the ordinary Japanese toward whom it is directed, as compared with the conditions existing at the time of surrender. To this end, it is essential that the economic policies of our occupation, including the encouragement of appropriate agrarian and economic reforms, be integrated as a part of the entire process of reorientation of the Japanese, and that whatever relief is furnished and whatever economic improvement is made be utilized in influencing the minds of the Japanese in the direction of such reorientation.

10. The entire program in type and scope should be designed so that it can be carried on by the Japanese themselves following withdrawal of controls, and, to this end, it will be essential from the beginning to encourage participation by local groups and organizations. It must be emphasized that reeducation promptly and adequately made effective will materially speed the development of a responsible and trustworthy government in Japan, thereby materially shortening the period of occupation and reducing the commitments of the United States.

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11. In the main reorientation will be accomplished through the channels of information, education and religion. Unlike other aspects of the occupation, information, education and religion will present long-range problems extending in some instances over several decades. At the same time the ground work for these aspects of the reorientation program must be laid at once, lest there crystallize in the Japanese mind attitudes and concepts the possession of which would defeat the purposes of occupation. Reorientation and reeducation are primarily civilian tasks and will require large numbers of civilian experts for their performance. Their early recruitment by some agency of the U.S. Government would appear to be essential to the success of any program.

12. While the process of reorientation has already been initiated by SCAP, it will necessarily extend beyond the earlier and predominantly military phase of our control of Japan into the period of predominantly political and economic controls. The program of reorientation should be considered as a unit, designed to cover both phases of control. It is of great importance to give early consideration to its implementation in the later phase. The principal responsibility for the long-range aspects of reorientation will rest ultimately with the Department of State. In order to assure continuity to the program and to bring about an orderly transition from military to civilian control it is of utmost importance that arrangements be made for the Department of State to assume responsibility for its execution at as early a date as feasible.

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February 21, 1946

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE U. S. REPRESENTATIVE
FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Pursuant to instructions from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee there is attached for your information copy #74 of SWECC 162/2 "Reorientation of the Japanese".

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March 4, 1946

Mr. Fearey is correct in stressing the fact that the Japanese are sentimentally attached to the person of the Emperor but at the same time are willing to permit radical changes in the imperial institution. Certainly it is true that a large percentage of the people wish to retain the Emperor system in some form.

I believe, however, that Mr. Fearey may overestimate the present devotion of the Japanese to Hirohito. For example, it is my own impression that the Emperor's call on Gen. MacArthur weakened rather than strengthened the imperial prestige. Otherwise, why did the Japanese Government immediately suppress the photograph of the meeting (published only after SCAP rescinded the Jap order) and why did the Imperial Household indirectly attempt to get the Supreme Commander to return Hirohito's call?

While the present campaign to "democratize" Hirohito may win popular respect for the Throne and increase its supporters, there will also be Japanese who view the process in a cynical light. I think it is too early to say that the Japanese now have great confidence in the Emperor.

SWNCC papers testify to agreement within the U.S. Government that the Emperor system should continue, in restricted form, if the Japanese so desire. However, change in Articles I, III, and IV of the Constitution would seem to be essential as SFE 141 recognizes.

JKEmmerson/

JKP you will remember SPE decided to delete reference to articles I, III & IV of the constitution in SWNCC 208 "constit. Reform" but to include it in SPE 141 "Institution of the Emperor" HB

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS APR 8 - 1946

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 11, 1946.

NO. 248

SUBJECT: Transmitting Memoranda Prepared by TSURUMI Yusuke.

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington.

Sir

Office of JAPANESE AFFAIRS FEB 1 - 1946 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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I have the honor to transmit two memoranda prepared by Mr. TSURUMI Yusuke, member of the Japanese House of Representatives and Secretary General of the Progressive Party, on the subjects "Some Observations on the Effects of the Directive of January 4, 1946" and "A Brief Sketch of the Changes That Came Over the Three Political Organizations During the War." Mr. TSURUMI prepared these memoranda to summarize views which he expressed in a conversation with the Honorable Nelson T. Johnson and Dr. George H. Blakeslee of the Far Eastern Commission and Dr. Karl C. Leebrick of this Mission.

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Summary. The memorandum on the SCAP directive of January 4 presents the opinions: that the directive is not as favorably accepted as previous directives; that it is too sweeping in its disqualification of former officeholders; that the severity of the punishment, without a trial or hearings, is unfortunate; and that it is based on incorrect information about the political organizations active during World War II. The second memorandum gives a brief statement of the origin, organization, and policies of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Youths' Corps of the I.R.A.A., the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in its first and second phases, and the Political Association of Great Japan. It is the thesis of the memorandum that this last named association was anti-militaristic and had as members many leaders who should continue their leadership of Japan today. All these groups are included in the directive without distinction. End of Summary.

Mr. TSURUMI's views should be considered against the background of the fact that he was an officer of the Political Association of Great Japan (Dai Nippon Seijikai) and hence falls within the scope

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of the directive, complained of in his memoranda, which disqualifies such persons from holding office. These expressions are believed to be representative of a considerable number of Japanese politicians of all groups, many of whom instinctively distrust new influences and younger leaders, and, ignoring the spirit behind the directive, are swayed by the way in which their own personal position may be affected. Further information concerning the attitude of Mr. TSURUMI and his present activities is contained in this Mission's despatch no. 215 of January 19, 1946.

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop
Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

attached file
Enclosures:

1. Memorandum, "Some Observations on the Effects of the Directive of January 4, 1946."
2. Memorandum, "A Brief Sketch of the Changes that came Over the Three Political Organizations During the War."

Original and hecto to Department.

Copy to: General Headquarters.

HECTO
02/21/46 SENT TO FR 800
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Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 248 of February 11, 1946, from the Office of United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting Memoranda Prepared by TSURUMI Yusuke."

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF
THE DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY 4, 1946

By TSURUMI, Yusuke, Politician,
Writer, Well known as a lecturer
in the United States.

The directive that the American Headquarters addressed to the Japanese Government on January 4, 1946 has a significance which if not correctly explained has the danger of being missed by the Americans. It is different from other directives issued by the American Army of occupation during last year. These were appreciated by the Japanese and their intentions had never been questioned or doubted. The last one, however, is making an entirely different impression not on the masses but on the thinking elements in Japan. These thinking Japanese are not articulate, much less aggressive, but reticent and quiet. But these are the people who really run the country. So I will try to analyze their psychology and explain the causes of their apprehension.

In the first place, the point most alarming to them is the sweeping nature of the directive. If this is applied in a comprehensive manner, it will drive a great number of able and honest people from the positions of usefulness and disrupt the continuity of governance in Japan. These people will not be replaced by younger and more desirable people as the directive aims, but by people not only inefficient but even dubious in character.

Those who served as moderating influence during the war are hit by this directive, while those who worked hand in glove with militarists and yet were not important enough to hold any positions of consequence will be left untouched. And it is particularly these people that will supersede the former in the coming election.

Take for example the case of Mr. Katsu Kawasaki. He was a Parliamentary Councillor of War in 1924, and comes consequently within the scope of this directive. But was it not the able and unrelenting attack of Kawasaki on the I.R.A.A. on the floor of the Diet in February 1941 that stopped the arrogant march of Nazism in Japan?

Then take another case. Mr. Fusajiro Ichinomiya's name is well known among the Japanese intellectuals as one of the most conscientious liberals in the Diet. It was he who opposed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, the Japanese-German alliance in 1940 and gave a spirited support to Takao Saito at the critical moment of the latter's political career after his famous speech in 1940. Yet Ichinomiya is classified as an undesirable personnel simply because he held the position of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Navy under Yonai in 1937.

I am citing only a few prominent cases. The most iniquitous part is that when these honest men are driven out of political life, their places will be filled by local politicians of unsavory character.

In the second place, the thing that is rather difficult of comprehension for the quiet and thoughtful people is the severity of the punishment meted out by the directive. It deprives the person in

question

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question of most important civil rights for an indefinite period of time without allowing any means of defending himself. Even the ordinary right of self defense in legal procedure granted to a criminal suspect is denied him. When we think of the enormous number of persons involved, it raises a serious question in the minds of many.

In the third place, the directive is a pretty complicated document and in some cases leaves large margins in their interpretation and application. The aim of the directive is clearly stated at the start by the quotation from the text of the Potsdam Declaration. It is to eliminate those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest. In that case it is difficult to understand why the section c of item 2 puts the three different political organizations in the same category.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and the Political Association of Great Japan were not of the same nature or had the same purpose to pursue. They were entirely different in character.

How these three different organizations came into existence and how they reacted on the political situations of Japan during the war needs a special study. This will help to understand the politics of Japan not only during the war but also at the present moment. I attach a brief survey of the political situation during the war with special reference to the formation of these three political organizations.

The reporting of the directive and its reactions by the vernacular papers was not all too reassuring to the thinking elements in Japan. Frankly these people are amazed at the sudden change of front by the press after the American Army of occupation moved into Japan. They give an impression to the thinking Japanese that they are anxious to please the Americans and not report truthfully. The reactions that are taking place in the minds of the thousands of honest people are not printed in the vernacular press. If the American authorities think that these are the public opinions of Japan, I am afraid, it entails some serious danger.

I have had occasions to talk with not only the people past middle age but those in their thirties and twenties. These people are frankly disturbed in their minds over the directive. They were sincere in appreciating the fair and just treatment of Japan by America. They are therefore all the more distressed because they began to apprehend if the real intention of America in issuing this directive was not to disrupt the political continuity of Japan and give her over to irresponsible elements of the country. In the changing psychology of a people passing through a national crisis, this kind of misunderstanding sometimes lodges a dangerous explosive in their minds and if left unattended to may bring about a damage in the long future all out of proportion to its original cause. The gravity of the situation being such, I made bold to state frankly the effects that the directive are bring^{ing} forth in Japan beyond the ken of the outside observers.

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 248 of February 11, 1946, from Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting Memoranda Prepared by TSURUMI Yusuke."

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE CHANGES THAT CAME OVER
THE THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE WAR.

By TSURUMI Yusuke.

I. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

This was organized under the second Konoye Cabinet in September, 1940 by the rightist elements, instigated by young Army officers. Its aim was to destroy Parliamentarism and create in its place a strong political organization after the pattern of Kyo de Kai in Manchukuo.

At first it swept every political obstacles off its way and seemed to attain its goal of being the only political organization of the country.

The opposition came, however, in the Diet, when the budget for 3,000,000 was presented to its financial committee. Mr. Katsu Kawasaki interpellated the government about the nature of the organization. Premier Konoye could not answer this veteran debater and absented himself. Hiranuma spoke on his behalf and changed the nature of this organization from a sole political organization of the land into a subsidiary one attached to the executive branch of the government. Thus parliamentarism was saved from extinction. Yet the original nature of totalitarianism remained ingrained in this organization and always threatened to destroy Parliamentarism. The appropriation increased every year and reached to ¥40,000,000 later. The officers of the I.R.A.A. were, therefore, very well paid.

II. The Youth's Corps of I.R.A.A.

When the I.R.A.A. was stamped officially as a subsidiary organization of the administration, its sponsors tried to resurrect the original idea of taking politics out of the hands of M. P.'s and created the Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. This was in a way the combination of Hitler Jugend and Sturm Abteilung. It did not confine its membership to the youth but invited any elements favoring totalitarianism.

Its aim was to undermine the strength of political parties by taking their adherents away from them. In those days political parties had to dissolve themselves under the government's pressure and were denied to have any branches in the country. Branches were only allowed to the I.R.A.A. and its Youth's Corps.

The general election of April, 1942 was conducted mainly through this Youth's Corps. The branches of this Youth's Corps selected the candidates for the Diet. They at first wanted to close the doors to former political party members and monopolize the candidacy to themselves. But a compromise was agreed upon and former party members were also included in the candidacies. They succeeded, however, in electing a great number of their own candidates with the help of the government intervention.

III. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.---The First Period under General Abe.

This society was organized immediately after the general election and included almost all the M. P.'s---even those who were not recommended by the Youth's Corps. Except Yukio Ozaki and a few others

- 2 -

others joined this, even including men like Hatoyama, Seigo Nakano, and Dr. Ashida. The idea of one party for one state was achieved ostensibly.

The nature of this organization was made public by its president, General Abe, in his inaugural speech. He said in effect, "The government and our party are the head and tail of the same thing and move in unison." It was financed entirely by the government. Therefore, during General Abe's presidency, this party was a part of the government.

IV. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society---The Second Period, under Admiral Kobayashi.

After the fall of Saipan in June, 1944 opposition to Tojo grew stronger every day until it was strongly voiced by this party and brought about his downfall. From that moment the nature of the party underwent a drastic change and when Koiso Cabinet came into existence and Admiral Kobayashi succeeded to General Abe as its president, he expressed the sentiment of the party in his inaugural speech by saying, "From now on we will assume a strict neutrality toward the cabinet and each measure that the government presents will be judged on its own merit." He also severed the financial connection of the party with the government and financed it with contributions he raised from among private citizens.

The party, therefore, became an entirely independent organization under Kobayashi.

V. During Kobayashi's period there arose in the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society a new movement. It was to make it a still more independent political party by creating branches all over the country with members recruited from among the people as was the case in the old days of political parties. This was opposed by the army and did not materialize. But the agitation kept on going until late in 1944, a committee was organized within the party to find out the means of strengthening the party. Its aim was the abolition of the I.R.A.A. and the Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. On January 12, 1945, this committee passed a resolution to dissolve the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, as well as the I.R.A.A. and Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. This was a very important event. Its aim was to cut the shackles of the army dominion of a political party asunder and assert its political power. It was due to the weakening of the army in the fields of battle and its consequent decline of power at home. Premier Koiso consented to this in principle but delayed its execution for three months. It was after his cabinet fell and was succeeded by Suzuki that a new political party came into existence. It called itself the Political Association of Great Japan. The significance lies in its dropping the prefix of "Imperial Rule Assistance." Its nature was definitely anti-army and as its result quite a number of former members of the I.R.A. Political Society refused to join this new party and organized different groups.

One group was financed by the former Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet, Mr. Shinsuke Kishi and was headed by Mr. Sekiya Ino, Minister of Agriculture in Tojo Cabinet. It included 31 M.P.'s close to the army. They called themselves "Gokoku-Doshi-Kai"

or the defense

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or the Defense of the State Political Association.

Another group was organized by M.P.'s close to the Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. It was headed by Mr. Kazue Miura and called itself "Yokuso-Giin-Domei" or "Youth's Corps M.P.'s League." It had 22 M.P.'s.

There were still others who did not join these above groups. Men like Kunitoshi Tsukamo, whose connection to Tojo was notorious joined the group of independents.

The Political Association of Great Japan was engaging vigorously in the creation of local branches all over the country and recruiting members from among the people. It met with opposition from prefectural governments and friction with bureaucrats was growing daily when the war came to an end in August, 1945.

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

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The Minister of Switzerland presents his com-

pliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the

honor to request the Department of State to approach the

competent American authorities to obtain permission for

Mr. and Mrs. Rudolf Wolfer of Zurich, Switzerland, to travel

to Yokohama, Japan. Mr. Wolfer is sent by the firm de

Schulthess & Co., Zurich, Switzerland, to relieve their

representative in Japan, Mr. Pestalozzi who has been stationed

in Yokohama throughout the war. Mr. Pestalozzi was assistant

chief and temporarily chief of the Delegation of the Inter-

national Red Cross Committee in Japan. Also for some time

he was employed at the Legation of Switzerland in Tokyo in

the division of foreign interests. The firm de Schulthess

& Co deals in Chinese and Japanese raw silk and has a branch

in New York which was established in 1918, the Charles

Rudolph Corporation of New York, 220 East Forty-Second Street

The Minister would be grateful to be informed

whether military permits can be granted to the above persons

for

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VISA DIVISION
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Department of State

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
FEB 13 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

VISA DIVISION
Note to Switz.
FEB 28 1946
J.M. AP
Department of State

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for their travel to Japan.

Washington, D.C., February 11, 1946.

Mr. Lampiche, of the Legation,
was informed that unless
the Wolfers would be sent in
a diplomatic capacity to Japan,
military permission would not
be granted. He will so advise
the Swiss Foreign Office.

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LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND

WASHINGTON, 8 D. C.

The Minister of Switzerland presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to request the Department of State to approach the competent American authorities to obtain permission for Mr. and Mrs. Rudolf Wolfer of Zurich, Switzerland, to travel to Yokohama, Japan. Mr. Wolfer is sent by the firm de Schulthess & Co., Zurich, Switzerland, to relieve their representative in Japan, Mr. Pestalozzi who has been stationed in Yokohama throughout the war. Mr. Pestalozzi was assistant chief and temporarily chief of the Delegation of the International Red Cross Committee in Japan. Also for some time he was employed at the Legation of Switzerland in Tokyo in the division of foreign interests. The firm de Schulthess & Co deals in Chinese and Japanese raw silk and has a branch in New York which was established in 1918, the Charles Rudolph Corporation of New York, 220 East Forty-Second Street.

The Minister would be grateful to be informed whether military permits can be granted to the above persons

for

- 2 -

for their travel to Japan.

Washington, D.C., February 11, 1946.

W.3. Ca/mp

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland and refers to the Legation's Note dated February 11, 1946 (File No. W.3. Ca/mp) requesting that permission be obtained from the competent American authorities for travel to Japan for Mr. and Mrs. Rudolf Wolfer of Zurich, Switzerland, to relieve their representative in Japan, Mr. Pestalozzi, who has been stationed in Yokohama throughout the war.

Information has been received from the appropriate American military authorities that it is regretted that permission is not being granted at this time for the entry into Japan of individuals who are travelling on business.

Department of State
Washington

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March 4, 1946

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 11, 1946

File

Mr. Elbridge Durbrow
Division of Eastern European Affairs
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Durbrow:

Pursuant to our conversation of February 8, 1946
I am submitting herewith the information requested by you
on the employees of the Soviet Government Purchasing Com-
mission, who are proceeding to Japan to take up their new
duties as members of the staff of the Economic Adviser to
the U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.

Sincerely yours,

F. Garanin

F. Garanin
Chief, Consular Division

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/2-1146
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APR 29 1946

Mr. Vladimir Pogonin
Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the U.S.S.R.
Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born October 5, 1905 in Tambovskaya Province, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Zinaida Pogonina, wife.
Born October 20, 1904 in Molotovskaya Province, U.S.S.R.

Yuri, son, born in 1930.

Mr. Mikhail Mikoulin
Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born November 4, 1902 in Stalinskaya Province, Ukr. S.S.R.

Mrs. Evgenia Mikoulina
Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born September 18, 1919 in Chita, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Evdokia Chitaia, mother of Mrs. Mikoulina.
Born in 1889 in Odessa, U.S.S.R.

Mr. Nikolai Izvekov,
Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born March 12, 1899 in Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Maria Izvekova, wife.
Born June 15, 1897 in Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Aleksander, son, born in 1927
Nikolai, son, born in 1932
Valentin, son, born in 1939

Mr. Ivane Klotchkov
Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born November 12, 1902 in Smolenskaia Province, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Anna Klotchkova,
Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born February 16, 1910 in Smolenskaia Province, U.S.S.R.

Mr, Aleksander Maleev

Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born February 13, 1918 in Gorki Province, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Natalie Maleeva, wife

Born August 25, 1918 in Orel, U.S.S.R.

Ninel, daughter, born in 1943.

Mr. Gennady Oglobline

Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born April 8, 1923 in Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Alexandra Sheviakova (Ogloblina)

Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born May 10, 1923 in Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Alexander, son, born in 1944.

Mr. Ivan Motin

Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born August 15, 1907 in Kalininskaia Province, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Maria Motina, wife.

Born October 24, 1909 in Saratovskaia Province, U.S.S.R.

Elena, daughter, born in 1937

Alexander, son, born in 1944

Mr. Evgeni Khocialov

Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born January 16, 1908 in Gorki Province, U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Lydia Khocialova,

Employee of the Staff of the Economic Adviser to the
U.S.S.R. Member in the Allied Council for Japan.
Born June 30, 1911 in Seshoretzk, Leningrad Province, U.S.S.R.

Igor, son, born in 1932

Yulia, daughter, born in 1944.

3,

The passports of these persons were submitted to Mr. Ira Meyer, Visa Division, Department of State on January 29, 1946.

Kindly withdraw our request for military permits for Mr. Victor Likhatchev and his wife, since Mr. Likhatchev is not going to Japan as was originally planned.

F. Baranin

Consular Division
Embassy of the U.S.S.R.
Washington, D.C.

37



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 11, 1946

No. 247

SUBJECT: Transmitting Memorandum on Current Japanese Attitudes
On the Emperor Institution

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OFFICE OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAR 4 - 1946

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 22 12 00 PM '46

Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECORDS BRANCH

I have the honor to enclose copy of a memorandum on the above subject by a member of the staff of this Mission prepared as of possible value to a consideration of the Japanese Government's Constitution revision proposals expected to be announced the end of this month.

It is brought out in the memorandum that the fundamental attachment of the masses for the Emperor remains as strong today as in the past, if not stronger, but that the synthetic, never fully accepted doctrines of "State Shinto" built up during recent decades have fallen away with unexpected rapidity and with no appearance of any regret. An estimated 90 to 95 percent of the general population support retention of the emperor institution in some form, and all except a very small proportion of the educated and ruling classes are of the same view, some for reasons of purely personal advantage but others from a genuine conviction that democracy will develop on a sounder basis under the institution than without it.

This memorandum does not attempt a political analysis of the complex "Emperor problem", but is merely an examination of the attitudes of the Japanese toward the Emperor. There has been observed by officers of this Mission an effort on the part of Japanese of diverse backgrounds to present the case for retention of the Emperor, suggesting the possibility of a directed program. While support of the Emperor is almost universal, such support should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the Japanese expect and for the most part will welcome changes in the official status and position of the Emperor.

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

MAR 7 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Enclosure:

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Memorandum dated
February 11, 1946.

Original

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Original and hectograph to Department
Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP

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39

Enclosure to despatch No. 247 dated February 11, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Transmitting Memorandum on Current Japanese Attitudes on the Emperor Institution".

MEMORANDUM

February 11, 1946

Current Japanese Attitudes on the Emperor Institution

The following review of current Japanese attitudes on the emperor institution may be of value to a consideration of the Government's Constitution revision proposals, or lack of proposals, on this subject, expected to be made known the end of this month.

The central feature and foundation of the Japanese emperor system has been the sentimental attachment of the masses of the people for the person of emperor, whom they regarded as deeply and personally concerned for their welfare and whose task they sought to ease by complying to the best of their ability with the orders issued in his name. Although his lofty and secluded position and association with the distant past surrounded him with an aura of pseudo-divinity invoking reverence and awe, respect for his authority and obedience to his will resulted essentially from a very human affection which the people felt for him, and which they believed he felt for them, and relatively little from fear or superstition.

This basic attachment remains as strong today as in the past, if not stronger. The Emperor's reported opposition to the war, his decision to conclude peace over the opposition of the military, his reported distress at the people's suffering, his difficult position under the occupation and willingness to humble himself even further in the popular interest by calling hat in hand on the nation's conqueror, and his known desire, stronger than that of his ministers', for the growth of democratic institutions in Japan, have confirmed in the people's eyes his concern and affection for them. His New Year's Day Rescript denying any claim to divinity detracted not in the least from their devotion to him, but merely carried further a process begun months earlier with his surrender broadcast when, as one Japanese put it, "The Emperor came down from a position high in the skies and became the real Father of our nation".

But while the fundamental attachment has remained and strengthened, the synthetic, never fully accepted doctrines of "State Shinto" grafted to the institution during recent decades have fallen away with unexpected rapidity and appearance of finality. Interviews with representative members even of the most highly indoctrinated soldier, farmer and laboring classes indicate that the disillusionments and lessons of defeat, the occupation and a free press have resulted in the thorough discrediting of these doctrines and the identification of the Emperor with them, along with the military who propagated them. The fact that attendance at the great national shrines ever

New Year's

-2-

New Year's equalled only one percent of former times, and it is now planned to establish places of public amusement at Yasukuni and other leading shrines to maintain them in existence, means little by itself, but considered in conjunction with the evidence from other sources supports the view that State Shinto has fallen into a state of general disrepute. At the same time, it would be going too far to state that it could never or in any circumstances be revived.

Beside a strengthened devotion, the general population today feels an instinctive dependence on and confidence in the Emperor, as they do not the Government or any other individual or group, to preserve the nation in the difficult times ahead. With him they feel essential unity and harmony can be maintained and Japan may eventually regain a measure of prosperity and self-respect, while without him they foresee disunity and disaster. The people, many of them, appreciate the necessity for radical change, but are strongly desirous that those changes be carried out under the authority of the Emperor. Informed guesses, supported by public opinion polls, are that from 90 to 95 percent of the people wish the emperor institution retained in some form.

For the educated and ruling classes the emperor has been and is today less, if at all, an object of devotion than an instrument of control for their own and, according to their varying lights, the national interest. With the exception of a small number of Communists, leftwing Social Democrats and a sprinkling of leftist writers the educated classes unanimously favor retention of the emperor system. Some, mainly politicians, bureaucrats, landlords and industrialists would preserve the institution as a bulwark of wealth, privilege and position. Others desire it retained out of a genuine conviction that democracy can be more successfully introduced under the institution than without it.

Those of this latter view, typified by Professor TAKAGI, former Ambassador HORINOUCHE and others of liberal reputation, are frank in stating that they do not believe Japan ready for democracy. They stress the almost complete lack of political education, or almost any other kind of education, of the masses, maintaining that in their present degree of understanding of the issues involved they are not in a position to judge intelligently the type of government or leaders they want. The freest and most unfettered election would merely return candidates familiar from the past or agitators and demagogues. A period of tutelage in the broadest sense, lasting at least ten years, during which the emperor, and, by implication, enlightened advisers around the throne, would retain sufficient authority to prevent uncontrolled swings to right or left is essential, they hold, if democracy and not mere demagoguery, or a reversion to the very forms we are seeking to destroy, is to be achieved. When reminded that this reasoning strangely resembles that of the Meiji leaders in stifling democratic tendencies 60 years ago, they reply that the fundamental difference in objective--in the former case centralized leadership for the development of Japanese power, and in the latter, education in the theory and responsibilities of democratic government--should be clearly apparent.

Support of

-3-

Support of the emperor institution in some form by all the major parties, and the recent modification of the Communists' former unqualified stand on the issue, reflect the almost universal popular view that the institution should be retained in some form. Just what form is a subject of widely varying opinion. The Progressives, while recognizing the inevitability of reduction or abolition of the emperor's war, treaty and emergency powers and an increase in the power of the Diet, desire the institution retained with a minimum of change. The Liberals' position is substantially the same except that they would state specifically that the Emperor has no legal or political responsibility. The Social Democrats would reduce the emperor to a purely decorative role in charge of rituals, but have not yet decided whether it should be specifically provided that sovereignty resides in the people rather than the emperor. The Communists would entirely abolish the emperor system as a state institution, leaving the question of the retention of the Imperial Household (i.e., presumably, its continued support from State funds) to be decided by the people. The Government's position reportedly approaches the Progressives most closely, leaving Articles 1 through 4 of the Constitution virtually unchanged.

It is noted that SFE 142, September 25, 1945, "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System" contained no reference to these Articles, that SFE 142/1, November 13, 1945, a revision of the Conclusions of the former document, included the recommendation that the Supreme Commander suggest, if necessary, that modification of Articles 1, 3 and 4 may be necessary if a democratic government responsible to the will of the people is to be established, and that SWNCC 228, November 27, 1945, again omitted reference to those Articles, indicating some indecision in the matter. It is submitted, in the light of the above discussion, that Allied insistence on modification of these Articles, as, for example, by requiring that the revised Constitution specifically state that sovereignty lies with the people, would merely arouse resentment and confusion, and would be unnecessary and ill-advised provided the new Diet approves the revision bill without these changes and provided the essentials of democratic government are ensured. It might be argued that the people would take greater interest and participate more actively in democratic development if they understood that they possessed the ultimate powers of government in theory as well as in practice. On the other hand we cannot confidently state that the many Japanese of genuinely liberal view who believe that democracy will develop on a sounder and more lasting basis under the emperor institution than without it are wrong.

Robert A. Fearey

800.1
RAFearey:jwb

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 2-1246

CS/HS

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland, and with reference to a conversation on January 18, 1946 between Mr. Bisang of the Swiss Legation and Mr. Turner of the State Department in regard to the matter of the title to be used by the diplomatic agent of the Swiss Government in Japan, has the honor to inform the Minister that there is no objection to the use of the title "Swiss Diplomatic Representative in Japan", it being understood that all relations between the latter and the Japanese Government will be conducted through and under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

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Department of State,

Washington,

February 18, 1946.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 12, 1946.

No. 249

Subject: Transmission of SCAP Directives. Index No. 1,
September 2, 1945 to No. 666, January 28, 1946,
Bound in Six Volumes.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Office of
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MAR 12 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAR 12 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Officer in Charge of the Office of the United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to the Department's airgram no. A-40, December 12, 1945, regarding copies of the directives issued by SCAP to the Japanese Government, and to transmit under separate cover a numerical file in single copy, comprising six volumes, of all the directives to the Japanese Government thus far bound.

Additional volumes of the directives will be forwarded to the Department as they are received from the General Headquarters.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/2-1246

Accompaniment:

SCAP Directives,
in six volumes.

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 12 1946

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MAR 28 1946

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(Japan) / 2-1246
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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 12, 1946.

No. 249

Subject: Transmission of SCAP Directives. Index No. 1,
September 2, 1945 to No. 666, January 28, 1946,
Bound in Six Volumes.

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Accompaniment:

SCAP Directives,
in six volumes.

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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London

Dated February 12, 1946

Rec'd 5:19 p.m., 12th



Secretary of State

Washington

1742 Twelfth


JAP 7. No significant comment in British press on occupation of Japan for week ending February 9.

Sent to Dept as 1742 repeated to Supreme Allied Commander Tokyo via army channels.

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FEB 13 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 2-1246

*Fila
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

HM/R
Central
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1946

DATE: Feb 12, 1946

SUBJECT: Japanese Interests -- Swiss abandonment of protection thereof, and possibilities for taking care of the situation in the future.

PARTICIPANTS:
JA - Mr Turner
SPD - E. Williams III.

COPIES TO:
REH.

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See Martin, et al.
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(Japan) / 1-15*

This Document Must Be Returned to (JAPAN) 740.00119 CONTROL 12-1246

Mr Williams called on Mr Turner this morning and said that he and Mr Hibbard had been considering the problems raised by Swiss relinquishment of Japanese interests in several countries, including specifically Venezuela, Argentina, and Spain. Mr Williams inquired whether Mr Turner had seen anything new on the matter and also whether he had given it any special thought.

Mr Turner replied that he understood that the whole problem lay in SPD's jurisdiction and that in consequence we must have seen everything that he had and likewise that he had given no thought to a solution for the problem presented by the Swiss.

Mr Williams then asked whether there had been any reply to Mr Turner's telegram to Tokyo (Deptel 83 of 1/24/46) respecting the designation of the ~~Japanese Minister~~ Swiss Diplomatic Representative there. Mr Turner showed Mr Williams the reply which had come in this morning and of which Mr Turner had only an original from War. The substance of the reply was that SCAP had no objection to any title deemed suitable by the Dept and the Swiss (or any other neutral) but that in every case it should be made clear that the sole avenue of access to the Jap Govt is to be through SCAP. *800.515-BWA/2-846*

Mr Williams then referred to Bern's Tel 322 of 2/6/46 and pointed out the the Swiss objections to continuing to protect Jap Interests abroad were apparently based on (1) lack of "direct relations" and (2) difficulty of access to archives in the countries where they had been protecting Jap Interests. Mr Turner replied that in his view these reasons were only being used by the Swiss as excuses to assist them in their obvious aim of getting out of the representation business; But that it was true that SCAP's reply had fortified the Swiss in the position adopted very nicely.

DC/pointed out the the Swiss objections to continuing to protect Jap Interests abroad were apparently based on (1) lack of "direct relations" and (2) difficulty of access to archives in the countries where they had been protecting Jap Interests. Mr Turner replied that in his view these reasons were only being used by the Swiss as excuses to assist them in their obvious aim of getting out of the representation business; But that it was true that SCAP's reply had fortified the Swiss in the position adopted very nicely.

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Mr Williams then showed Mr Turner Venezuela's A-36 of Feb. 4 indicating that the Swiss would probably do in Venezuela what they have already done in Argentina - namely; drop responsibility for the protection of Japanese interests without looking any farther to see who might pick it up - and referred again to the subject of Japanese interests, this time with the emphasis on what the future might bring.

Mr Williams set out the apparent possibilities and the objections to each:

- (1) Resumption of the task by the Swiss.
- (2) Permit the host Govts to take over.
- (3) Get the Swedes to do it - world-wide.
- (4) Set up interim offices.
- (5) No representation for the Japs.

Mr Williams then said that he personally had reached the painful conclusion, after considering the cons for all the pros above-listed, that the Allied Powers could only expect to find themselves holding the bag in this matter, and inquired as to Mr Turner's reaction to that thought. (4 Powers protection) -

Mr Turner agreed with the conclusion, and said that if anyone had asked his opinion earlier his answer would have been along that line. He asked whether SPD had discussed it with any other division, such as JK which would have an interest. Mr Williams said "no" and that within SPD the discussion had so far been only on a most informal and exploratory basis. Mr Turner then pointed to the fact that a decision of the sort contemplated would have to be taken by someone quite high in the Dept and asked whether SPD would be presenting the subject in memorandum form. Mr Williams replied that he had as yet no way of knowing, but that he was aware that all rough corners would have to be sanded off before presentation to higher levels and that since it is up to SPD to worry about the representation of Japanese interests, SPD would probably be going into the subject in a big way very shortly, and that Mr Turner could expect to be kept informed.


E. Williams III

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OPD 091.112 (6 Feb 46)

12 February 1946

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DC/R

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
(Attn: Office of Far Eastern Affairs)

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1946
Department of State

SUBJECT: Request of Swiss for Accrediting of Diplomatic
Representative in Japan

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 6 February 1946, subject as above, requesting that steps be taken toward having Mr. Pierre-Rene Micheli, Counselor of Legation in Tokyo, accredited as Swiss Diplomatic Representative in Japan.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific recommends accreditation of Mr. Pierre-Rene Micheli as Swiss Diplomatic Representative in Japan. In this connection, the Supreme Commander of The Allied Powers has no objection to the adoption of the title "Swiss Diplomatic Representative in Japan", but desires that the Department of State stress that all relations with the Japanese Government must be conducted through the Supreme Commander of The Allied Powers.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

R. L. Vittrup
R. L. VITTRUP
Colonel, GSC

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
FEB 19 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 20 1946

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 13, 1946.

No. 251

Subject: Transmitting Copies of Report of Japanese Government Organization.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1946 FEB 22 PM 12 00

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RECORDS BRANCH

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 12 1946
Department of State

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAR 12 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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retained one copy
and other copy
sent to OAR
HR

The Officer in Charge of the Office of the United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward under separate cover two copies of a Report on the Organization of the Japanese Government, in two volumes, prepared by the Government Section, General Headquarters, SCAP. It is suggested that the Division of Japanese Affairs and the Interim Research and Intelligence Service may be interested in this report.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/2-1346

Accompaniment:

Two copies Report
in two volumes

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 12 1946

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

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740.00119 Control
(Japan) 2-1346
[Signature]

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 13, 1946.

No. 251

Subject: Transmitting Copies of Report of Japanese Government Organization.

The Officer in Charge of the Office of the United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward under separate cover two copies of a Report on the Organization of the Japanese Government, in two volumes, prepared by the Government Section, General Headquarters, SCAP. It is suggested that the Division of Japanese Affairs and the Interim Research and Intelligence Service may be interested in this report.

Accompaniment:

Two copies Report
in two volumes

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 13, 1946

MAR 18 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 250

OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
MAR 1 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/R

SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments
During the Week Ending February 9, 1946.

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1946 FEB 22 PM 12 00

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECORDS BRANCH

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

MAR 18 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.00115 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 2-1346

CS/LF

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch
No. 241, February 5, 1946, and previous, transmitting weekly
reports on political parties in Japan, and to transmit here-
under copy of this Mission's latest report "Political Parties
in Japan: Developments during the Week Ending February 9, 1946".

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop

Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosure:

Copy of report dated
February 12, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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WJSebald:jwb

MAR 12 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 27 1946

740.00119 Capital
(Japan) / 2-1346

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Enclosure to despatch No. 250 dated February 13, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending February 9, 1946".

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 12, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING
THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 9, 1946.

Summary. The fact that political parties in Japan have in the past been tainted with scandal, venality, and double-dealing makes it imperative that the parties undergo a thorough house-cleaning if persons of ability, character, and genuine love for their country are to be persuaded to enter the political scene. The problems which will face the new Diet are of vital importance. Announcement of the Government's clarification concerning the recent SCAP purge directive has increased the difficulties of party leaders, as some eighty percent of former Diet members have become ineligible under the Cabinet's decision. A number of Social Democrats feel that their past records should speak for themselves and exceptions made in their cases. The Japan Farmers' Union, largely controlled by the Social Democrats, was organized on February 9 and claims some 300,000 members. The Parties were quick to use as political capital the Four Ministers' Statement regarding the control of illegal seizures of plants by employees. A Social Democratic leader, KATAYAMA Tetsu, considers most independent parties to be rightist in view, but of little political importance. SAKOMIZU Hisatsune, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the SUZUKI Cabinet, plans to issue a call for the formation of a young men's party based firmly upon support of the Emperor. The Social Democratic Constitutional Revision Committee plans to produce, according to KATAYAMA Tetsu, a truly democratic plan for revision of the Constitution. All parties, except possibly the Communists, are now agreed that the Emperor must be continued, but with some modification of his prerogatives. End of Summary.

General

In a pessimistic editorial on February 9, Mainichi complained of the generally low caliber of the more than 2,500 candidates who have already appeared to contest a total of 468 seats in the forthcoming general election. Political parties were taken to task for producing quantity--250 or 300 per party--rather than quality. The paper pointed its finger at what it termed a weakness of democracy, namely, that the majority speaks. The Social Democratic Party was particularly criticized for putting forth a large number of candidates, with the clear implication that few people of high standing have been attracted to its banner.

The political parties in Japan have in the past been tainted by unsavory odors of scandal, venality, and double-dealing, a reputation which was hardly improved by the supineness of politicians during the past five years. Consequently, it is only with difficulty that persons of ability, character, and genuine love for their country can be persuaded to subject themselves to the rough and tumble circus of the Japanese political arena. Political parties in Japan being what

they

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they are, it is customary for the candidate to seek the party rather than the reverse. The problems which will face the new Diet are of vital importance to Japan. The problems and the manner in which they are handled are of importance also to the United States and the world. Unless and until the political parties themselves clean house and seek candidates of the highest reputation, however, it appears unlikely that the caliber of the House of Representatives can be raised to a level commensurate with the gift of democracy.

Difficulties facing the several major parties were increased by the publication on February 9 of the Government's policy regarding the forthcoming screening of candidates for the election. It was estimated by Chief Cabinet Secretary NARAHASHI Wataru that some 400 candidates are ineligible because they were "recommended candidates", i.e., sponsored by the TOJO Cabinet, in the last election. In this connection, it is interesting to note that prior to the Cabinet release, NARAHASHI had been besieged by numerous candidates seeking informal approval of their candidacy. Under the policy as announced, even the Social Democratic Party, previously thought to be practically immune under a literal reading of the SCAP purge directive, will be seriously affected. It is estimated in some quarters that such prominent leaders as MATSUMOTO Jiichiro, SUGIYAMA Motojiro, KAWAKAMI Jotaro, and TAMAN Kiyoomi are now ineligible. It is apparent that the right-wing element of the Party has been heavily hit and it may be anticipated that the difficulties hitherto experienced in keeping the leadership of the Party together will be increased. The gap between the right and left wings of the Party is gradually widening under pressure from the leftist press, with such left-wingers as KATO Kanju, MIZUTANI Chosaburo, SUZUKI Mosaburo, and KURODA Hisao refusing to hew to the right-wing line of the Socialist Party.

Mainichi estimates the effect of the Government's policy upon the major parties as disqualifying some eighty percent of the former Diet members, as follows:

| <u>PARTY</u> | <u>"RECOMMENDED CANDIDATES"</u> | <u>ELIGIBLE</u> |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Progressive | 238 | 27 |
| Liberal | 28 | 20 |
| Social Democratic | 7 | 10 |
| Cooperative | 22 | 5 |
| Independents | 35 | 10 |
| | 330 | 72 |
| Totals | | |

It is at once obvious that any clear-cut definition of who should be purged immediately raises questions in the minds of affected persons and their friends. A number of candidates who for many years were associated with the labor movement, for example, feel that every dog is entitled to one bite. They argue that it is patently unfair to use the "recommended candidate" formula as a basis for disqualification in their cases. They go on to assert that an examination of the record will show that they have in the past, with one possible exception, been steadfast in their principles. Rationalization of this kind is fully in keeping with the Japanese propensity for eliding weak points and stressing the strong.

On balance, it would appear that a thorough purge may assist to some extent in cleansing Japanese political circles, but the real

problem,

-3-

problem is one which will require much time, patience, and political understanding on the part of the Japanese people. Until Japanese public opinion can be mobilized upon an intelligent democratic plane, it is doubtful whether basic reform of the parties will be accomplished.

Japan Farmers' Union

In accordance with previously announced plans, the inaugural ceremony of the Japan Farmers' Union (Nippon Nomin Kumiai) took place on February 9. It is, in fact, a re-birth on a national scale of the former Japan Farmers' Union (Nippon Nomin Kumiai), Greater Japan Farmers' Union (Dai Nippon Nomin Kumiai), North Japan Farmers' Union (Kita Nippon Nomin Kumiai), and the Federation of Japan Farmers' Unions (Nippon Nomin Kumiai Sodomei), all of which were ordered dissolved by the Government on March 13, 1942, prior to the general election. The newly organized Union is reported to comprise some 300,000 members. Its president is SUNAGA Konomu of Gumma Prefecture, a former farmers' union leader; the secretary-general is NOMIZO Masaru of Nagano Prefecture, a veterinarian active in farmers' union circles. The Central Executive Committee is composed of eleven members of whom all but one are acknowledged members of the Social Democratic Party. The one exception is KURODA Hisao, suspected by leading Social Democrats to be a Communist, although not yet an acknowledged member of the Party. KURODA has been appointed to the key position in charge of education and the press.

According to an estimate made by a leading member of the Social Democratic Party to the writer, approximately seventy percent of the rank and file of the Union are Social Democrats, 10% have Communist leanings, and 20% have no party affiliations. It is the hope of the Social Democrats that this 20% can be attracted to the Social Democratic Party. At the time of writing, committees for the study of the Union's platform have not yet been appointed. Press reports, however, indicate that the principal problems to be attacked include:

- (a) A thorough reform of the land system.
- (b) The food problem.
- (c) Democratization of farm villages.
- (d) Cooperation with various democratic bodies (cooperative societies, fishermen's unions, labor unions, etc.) and the establishment of a movement for unification of the farmers' front.

Control of Production by Laborers

In an endeavor to stop further instances of the illegal seizure of plants by employees, the Cabinet on February 1 issued a statement over the names of four ministers. The statement in effect warned labor that such illegal seizures would in the future be severely dealt with, although the principle of freedom to strike was acknowledged. The political parties were quick to make capital out of this statement. The Progressives and Liberals generally agreed with the Government, although both parties expressed dissatisfaction with the slowness of the Cabinet to act more quickly. The Social Democrats, while not entirely condemning the statement, took exception to its tone of blaming labor alone. The Communists, however, violently

opposed

-4-

opposed the statement on every ground, and insisted that labor should have the right to seize plants. They argue that production is increased thereby and unless employees are allowed to seize plants, their fundamental rights under the Potsdam Declaration are violated.

Independent Parties

Mr. KATAYAMA Tetsu, Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party, in a personal interview recently expressed his views concerning the numerous independent candidates and independent parties, stating that the great majority of these parties are against the Communists, but leave the Social Democratic Party alone, or at least do not make direct attacks against the latter. On the other hand, he observed that if the Communists were driven underground, the independent parties would undoubtedly attack the Social Democrats. Consequently, he can only surmise that the majority of these parties are extreme nationalists and are probably receiving their funds from nationalistic quarters. So-called "independent candidates" are considered a nuisance to regularly organized parties in that they are constantly badgering party leaders for support and assistance. Furthermore, independent parties often amount to no more than two or three persons who adopt high-sounding names with a view to obtaining funds or feeling their way in the political world. Mr. KATAYAMA referred to this custom among small politicians as "Diet disease".

SAKOMIZU Hisatsune, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the SUZUKI Cabinet, has stated that he is readying plans for combining many of the younger elements of the independent parties and, if successful in the forthcoming election, will have himself appointed president of such new party. He will then issue a call for all younger elements of the recognized groups to enter his circle. The principal object of the new party is to bring forth young, vigorous leaders in Japan and to rehabilitate the country in every respect through the leadership of the Emperor. SAKOMIZU visualizes his new party, admittedly still in the planning stage, as an Emperor's party which is to play a role similar to that of the young leaders active at the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868).

Social Democratic Party Constitutional Reform

According to KATAYAMA Tetsu, the Constitutional Revision Committee appointed by the Social Democratic Party will render its report at about the end of February. KATAYAMA stated that the Social Democrats are convinced that the Japanese people desire to retain the Emperor and would not sanction an abrupt change, such as abdication. On the other hand, as the party's draft Constitution will indicate, the Emperor should have his prerogatives taken away, except for the following:

- (a) The right to give recognition to learning, art, and culture.
- (b) The right of amnesty.
- (c) The power to represent Japan in foreign affairs, but only in a "decorative" capacity.
- (d) The right to order the largest party to form a Cabinet.
- (e) The right to sanction legislation duly passed by the Diet, but no veto right.

It is

-5-

It is interesting to note that all the major parties now agree that the Emperor should be kept in some form, and even the Communists appear to have softened their previously outright demand for abolition of the Emperor per se. Likewise, it is also becoming increasingly apparent that Japanese political leaders are becoming more sensitive to eventual treatment of the Emperor under a revised Constitution.

Further changes which will appear in the Social Democratic draft Constitution, according to KATAYAMA, include abolition of the Privy Council and the peerage, supremacy of the Lower House, reformation and change of the House of Peers into a body comprising occupational representation, increased independence of the judiciary, and clear-cut absolute guarantees of fundamental human rights.

William J. Sebald

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WJSebald:jwb



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 13, 1946.

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*Classification changed
to Secret*

NO. 252

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Japan.

*JA/W. Turner
March 1, 1946.*

Office of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 21 1946
Division
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1946 FEB 21 PM 12 11

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor briefly to review progress made, to appraise present conditions here, to summarize general views of this Office and to seek guidance regarding United States policy toward future integration of Japan's position and role in the overall Pacific picture.

During the past five months important steps have been taken to ensure freedom of speech, religion and assembly, and to initiate basic reforms. By defeat and by the broad directives of the occupation the traditional Japanese structure has been socially, politically and economically shaken. The Imperial institution has been altered in official and popular concept. The initial general result has been good and there is evidence of faith in our intentions as expressed by SCAP. Good will has been established by the generally splendid behavior of American occupation forces and the patently just manner in which SCAP has sought to carry out our major initial program. To some extent the Japanese people are beginning to exhibit evidence of an awakening political consciousness. Press, radio and almost all public organs, now under new management, have indulged in a surprising spate of "democratic" criticism and comment regarding things Japanese, especially the Government. Much desirable progress has been made which may not be easily reversed.

Nevertheless, it appears certain that insufficient time has elapsed for the masses in Japan to understand or absorb the import of this newly-found freedom. The Japanese lack "historical experience" of liberty and "personal experience" of individualism. The question remains whether future developments will result finally in the birth of a truly democratic consciousness throughout the masses or a reversion in essence to totalitarian or controlled society under new and perhaps radical leadership.

One of the greatest occupational problems is that of resumption of normal activity which is retarded by uncertainty, lack of materials, impending but indefinite reparations, the spectre of uncontrolled inflation, and the difficulty of the Japanese rapidly to assimilate changes.

DCR - NE Unit

While outwardly friendly toward our occupation personnel, the Japanese

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- 2 -

Japanese are restive and bewildered. Suspicions exist that the United States has ulterior motives. Japanese appreciate that "democracy" is to prevail but are as yet unaware of its meaning or who will replace discredited former leaders and officials. They cannot visualize the future which the United States foresees for Japan. The Japanese realize that monopoly is to be broken up and small business given opportunity to develop, but many wonder what will take the place of former large well-integrated concerns. To the Japanese many of these enterprises were benevolently paternalistic and gave concrete evidence of Japanese ability to hold a place in a competitive world. The masses remain politically undeveloped, basically reluctant to assume unfamiliar responsibility and subject to enormous emotional stresses. They need time.

On the other hand the inherent diligence of the people is showing some effect, and rehabilitation, however slowly, is under way. Their problem of existence has been so accentuated by economic destruction and loss of fortitude occasioned by the surrender that it now overshadows every other consideration.

One result of this struggle for existence is the growing desire to find a nostrum for solving all difficulties. In this search, the leftist groups with their positive revolutionary doctrines have an advantage hardly commensurate with their numbers. The vast majority of the Japanese positively favor retention of the Emperor system, albeit with some modification. Nevertheless, opportunistic oratory about "democratic" liberalism and freedom by such personalities as NOSAKA Sanzo, Communist leader, finds a receptive audience. Perhaps partly because of his political and ideological schooling abroad, he is the outstanding leader with political acumen and popular appeal who has emerged to date.

Our ultimate aim is believed clear, namely, to establish a peace-loving democratic Japan incapable of renewed aggression, worthy eventually to be sponsored for membership in the United Nations organization, and able to participate in expanding and mutually beneficial economic and cultural exchanges with the United States and other countries.

In the implementation of this policy a number of fundamental problems may arise. There may well be an interplay of major forces working against achievement of our basic aim. Among them might be numbered first, the desire of certain elements in all Asiatic countries "to expel the foreigner"; second, the latent nationalistic ambitious and potentially dangerous urge of the Japanese people, perhaps especially strong among demobilized officers and men; and third, the revolutionary drive of militant communism.

Our traditional idealism in Asia need not be allowed to overshadow realism in dealing with a complex problem. It is suggested that the adverse forces mentioned would require settlement of the problem of economic as well as political colonialism or its synonym, "imperialism", and constructive steps to bring about pari passu with successive phases of the occupation an expanding livelihood under democratic free enterprise. If our policy in Japan is to succeed and if Japan is to be made to contribute to the success of our Pacific policy as a whole, it is submitted that we need to take positive steps to remove uncertainty and instability.

There should


- 3 -

There should be provided clearer prospects of a better life for the common man under democratic friendship with the United States than can be envisaged under a Japanese program supporting Asiatic exclusionism, nationalistic expansionism or communistic alignment.

The recent announcement by the Secretary of State that work will begin in the not distant future on the development of a "Peace Treaty" with Japan is believed to emphasize the desirability of giving careful study at the highest level to certain basic aspects of policy. Among them, we would list the following: (a) length of period during which the United States will support with positive measures, if necessary, the implementation of American policy in Japan; (b) whether American policy envisages the retention and utilization geographically of Japan within our concepts of security; (c) the degree to which, in the light of our overall Pacific policy, it may be desirable to develop integrated relationships between Japanese and American economies; and (d) the extent to which it may be desirable to take positive action to develop eventually a Japan with close friendly political, economic and cultural ties with the United States.

Present conditions, with the American Supreme Commander, American occupation forces, and numbers of trained American specialists in Japan, afford opportunities and give an advantage which will not again arise in the conceivable future.

Respectfully yours,


Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

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Original and valid to Department.

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WJSebald/MWBishop:vs

FEB 13 1946

In reply refer to
OIG

My dear Colonel Johnston:

Reference is made to a conversation between Mr. Schuler of the Division of Occupied Areas and your office on the subject of various cable requests from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo for large quantities of books for the use of Military Government in Japan and Korea. Please be informed that no funds from the budget of this Office would appear to be available at the present time for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

Parker May
Executive Officer
Office of International Inform-
ation and Cultural Affairs

Colonel Dana Johnston, GSC,
Chief, Propaganda Branch, G-2
War Department,
Pentagon Building,
Washington, D. C.

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Madrid

DC/R
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Dated February 14, 1946

Rec'd 8:42 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

811.111 YGUAL,
PEDRO

293, Fourteenth

Request urgent reply EMBTEL 237 / Feb 6 in view
of DEPTTEL 170, Feb 5.

BUTTERWORTH

119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-2146

MRM

PLAIN

Subject - #237 Visa case

*#170 Regarding Spanish Embassy here requested
permission for assignment of Ygual in
place of Mariano Vidal.*

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FEB 14 1946

No. 88

CONFIDENTIAL

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information
of the Acting Political Adviser a copy of FEC paper 20
of February 8, 1946, entitled "Exercise of Criminal and
Civil Jurisdiction Over United Nations Nationals".

Enclosure:

FEC 20, Copy No. 77.

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/2-1446 CS/D

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Department of State
Washington

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
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Charge Department:

Charge to

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated
to anyone.
CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 15 1946

[Handwritten signature]

AMEMBASSY,

MADRID.

395

Conf Figures communicated you in DEPTS 250, Feb 19
REEMBS 393, Feb 27) tentative working figures for
six month period in no wise to be regarded as alloca-
tion. Export program still on month to month basis.

DEPT informed by AGRI export 15,000 tons was
authorized to move late Feb or early Mar. In addition
cargo 8,200 being scheduled for Mar. With 8,500 shipped
in Jan this makes total 31,700 in wheat.

In addition 202,500 cwt flour, about 12,000 tons
wheat equivalent, shipped Jan. This makes total
45,700 tons. Amount flour shipped Feb 1 to Mar 11
still not ascertained.

*Bynes
(E.G.C.)*

OR *MSD*
MAR 15 3 P.M.

LDH
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3-15-46 *[Signature]*

Cleared with
Agri.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 15, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 257



DC/R

SUBJECT: Left-wing Faction of the Social Democratic Party

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
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 2-15-46

I have the honor to forward as an enclosure an analysis of the left-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party, prepared in the General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

The enclosure is an excellent presentation of one of the major problems facing the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. It describes the left-wing faction as a loosely organized group of traditional leftist-socialist elements who, with their small former Labor-Farmer Party membership as a spearhead, are enabled to infiltrate the Social Democratic Party. According to the analysis, the aim of the left-wing faction appears to be to effect a radical change in the character of the Social Democratic Party by transforming it into a militant proletarian party. By espousal of the Communist-proposed "popular front" program, the left-wing in effect constitutes an arm of the Communists within the Social Democratic Party, thus embarrassing the leadership of the latter.



It is evident that the Social Democratic leadership is faced with the prospect of an eventual schism, caused primarily by conflicting personalities and differences of ideological views. It would appear that the Cabinet's clarification of policy regarding SCAP's purge directive of January 4, as announced on February 9, will further increase the relative influence of the left-wing faction through the probable elimination of several influential right-wing members.

Interviews with five unaffected right-wing members of the Central Executive Committee have brought forth further information concerning this factional strife. These members

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stated that some fifteen percent of the 110 members of the Central Executive Committee, and four of the thirteen members of the Standing Executive Committee are under Communist influence. (This represents a far larger proportion than would be justified, as yet, by the relative proportion of the rank and file who espouse Communist theories.) The Communist-influenced members of the latter committee were named as KATO Kanju, MIZUTANI Chosaburo, SUZUKI Mosaburo, and KURODA Hisao. The right-wing members interviewed evinced considerable sensitivity to and irritation at implications concerning their motives as portrayed in the leftist press. They sensed a plot on the part of the Communists to infiltrate the rank and file of unions controlled by right-wing members, with the object of seizing eventual control of the Social Democratic Party. They stated that the leadership of the Party would be strengthened by a clear-cut victory at the polls, an eventuality which appears less likely if the Cabinet's announced policy regarding implementation of the January 4 directive is literally enforced.

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop
Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosure: *att m*

Copy of memorandum
of 30 January 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department

800 Parties
WJSebald:jwb

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Enclosure to despatch no. 257 of February 15, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Left-wing Faction of the Social Democratic Party".

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence

Research & Analysis
APO 500
30 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:

Subject: The Left Wing Faction of the
SHAKAITO (Social Democratic Party)

Pursuant to verbal orders of the Commanding Officer, Research & Analysis Section, OCCIO - Opns, the following analysis of the Left Wing faction of the SHAKAITO has been prepared. This survey is based upon interrogations of leading members of this group (including ARAHATA Kanson, KOSORI Jinji, and TAKANO Minoru), as well as of other leftist informants (including the journalist OKURA Asahi), information in OCCIO files, and current reports in the press.

1. ORIGIN AND GENERAL CHARACTER

The Left Wing of the SHAKAITO is a loosely organized, self-conscious group of traditional left-socialist elements. It has an experienced leadership dating back to the pre-war proletarian movement. On the basis of present information, two such sources may be distinguished:

a. NIHON MUSANTO (Japan Proletarian Party). This organization, led by KATO Kanju, was formed in 1937. The MUSANTO was the political expression of the more militant wing of Japanese trade unionism, organized by the leaders of the Labor-Farmer Proletarian Council, established in May 1936. Its supporters included the strong Tokyo Transport Workers Union and the ZENKOKU HYOGI KAI (National Council of Labor Unions).

The MUSANTO group represents roughly one-quarter of the strength of the SHAKAITO. However, the views of most of this group tend to be somewhat vague. It is not organized into a disciplined faction, but rather acts as a rank-and-file base for the activities of the left-wing leaders. Men of this character--an ill-defined but militant left-wingism-- are generally referred to as the MUSANTO group. The more self-conscious Left Wing leaders were also members of the MUSANTO, but they are better characterized in terms of their older affiliation:

b. RODO NOMINTO (Labor-Farmer Party). More often referred to simply as the RONOTO, this organization should not be confused with the NIHON RONOTO, a relatively right-wing labor-farmer party led by ASO Hisashi, who later became a leader of the chauvinist wing of the SHAKAI TAISHUTO (Socialist Mass Party). The leftist RONOTO was active 1926-28 under the leadership of OYAMA Ikue, now in the United States. With their own organization underground, the Communists used the RONOTO as a vehicle for their activities.

The RONOTO

- 2 -

The RONOTO group inside the present SHAKAITO is small, but represents the spearhead of the organized Left Wing. It contributes an experienced leadership which informs the faction as a whole with tactical and ideological sophistication. Several of its members were among the founders of the KYOSANTO (Communist Party).

2. PERSONALITIES

a. KATO Kanju, while perhaps not the actual leader of the left-wing faction in the SHAKAITO, is its best-known figure. He has long been known as a left-wing labor leader, but without Communist ties. Elected to the Diet three times, in 1932, 1936, and 1942, he also headed the short-lived MUSANTO (Proletarian Party). He has been under police surveillance, and imprisoned for a time, but in general he escaped rigorous treatment during the war. Some left-wing leaders are critical of KATO on such counts as (1) his alleged enrichment during the war through the operation of a factory producing machine oil-- a story, which, while not confirmed, is often repeated; and (2) a lack of firm political principle as evidenced in his attempt to organize a party in collaboration with Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichiko shortly after the surrender. KATO is a member of the Central Committee of the SHAKAITO, and head of the Labor Section.

b. ARAHATA Katsuzo uses the pen-name "ARAHATA Kanson", is an ex-communist and probably the chief organizer and "intellectual leader" of the Left-Wing faction. He was a member of OYAMA's RONOTO, is a volunteer organizer for the RODO KUMIAI (Labor Union Federation), in effect a full-time socialist politician, despite his lack of a formal post. He is well-known as a left-winger, and his statements have been quoted at length by the press.

On 15 January JIJI news agency commented as follows:

"While Mr. ARAHATA holds no leading position, at least officially, within the Social Democratic Party, being a plain member of the party, he is known to exercise no small influence over the nation's labor union movement. It is known that the majority of member unions, except for those of traffic workers, of the Socialist-affiliated National Federation of Labor, are under the direct influence of this veteran socialist. Those labor unions now under Mr. ARAHATA's personal influence are estimated to have an aggregate membership of some 20,000. At the same time, . . . Mr. ARAHATA, because of his outstanding career in the nation's labor and socialist movement in the past, is known to enjoy high esteem by the left-wing members of the Social Democratic Party, and therefore to sway no small influence over the party itself."

c. ONO Shunichi is sometimes ranked with ARAHATA as a leader of the aggressive group within the Left Wing, but this public recognition is based largely on his position as editor of the MINSHU SHIMBUN, published in Tokyo. Actually, ARAHATA is the more experienced individual and likely to be more influential from the point of view of Left Wing strategy. ARAHATA considers ONO a "good democrat" but not really in the socialist tradition. ONO is new to politics, though he is said to have visited Russia during the Revolution as a doctor and research chemist.

d. SUZUKI Mosaburo, associated with KATO within the group, is also a well-known figure. He was active in the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and in the MUSANTO, and was imprisoned during the war. He is also a member of the Central Committee of the SHAKAITO.

e. Other leaders

- 3 -

e. Other leaders of the Left Wing are TAKATSU Masamichi, SHIMAGAMI Zengoro, YASUSHIRA Shikaichi, KITADA Ichiro--all of the Central Committee of the SHAKAITO. TAKANO Minoru, of the ARAHATA group, is active in the RODO KUMIAI SODOMEI (Labor Union Federation).

3. ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH

a. The Left Wing faction of the SHAKAITO represents a definite minority of the party, and is concentrated primarily in the Tokyo area. Out of a total SHAKAITO membership of 20,000-30,000, the Left Wing claims approximately 2,000 adherents 500-600 of whom are in Tokyo-to. JIJI (15 January) reported that 30% of the 103 members of the Central Committee may be considered leftist members of the SHAKAITO.

b. The strength of the faction is not accurately represented by the number of its adherents. In the MINSHU SHIMBUN, published in Tokyo under the editorship of ONO Shunichi, the group has a vigorous public organ. This weapon will be strengthened with the imminent assumption of the editorship of the paper by YAMAKAWA Hitachi. YAMAKAWA is not a member of the SHAKAITO, and therefore not subject to even the loose party discipline which prevails in the organization. At the same time, his point of view is close to that of the left-socialists and it may be expected that the paper will continue in effect as an organ of the Left Wing of the SHAKAITO. YAMAKAWA was a founder of the KYOSANTO (Communist Party), broke with them in 1927, and is presently a well-known and effective proponent of the "popular front"; he was one of the chief organizers of the popular-front demonstration held in Hibiya Park on 26 January.

c. A small group of about ten Left Wing leaders have held a series of meetings on party problems. These meetings have been led by ARAHATA, but have also been attended by KATO Kanju. The factional organization of the Left Wing is being consolidated through the establishment of a formal inner-party group known as the DOSHI-SHA (Comrades' Society). ARAHATA has acted as spokesman for the group and plans for the publication of a fortnightly magazine, "DOSHI" ("Comrade") have been announced.

4. PROGRAM

a. Basically the program of the Left Wing is to effect a radical change in the character of the SHAKAITO, transforming it from a right-wing socialist, reformist organization with leanings toward the lower middle class and better-off workers, into a militant proletarian party. More specifically the immediate program of the faction centers around the following issues:

b. The faction has publicly demanded the "purification" of the SHAKAITO. Spurred on by the SCAP directives of 4 January, the ARAHATA group has demanded the elimination of the extreme right-wing elements, including but not limited to those directly affected by the SCAP order. ARAHATA, in a public statement, charged that the party leadership was "willfully closing its eyes" to the fact that several prominent men, such as KONO Mitsu and KAWAKAMI Jotaro are affected by the directives.

KOBORI Jinji, a member of the ARAHATA group, has stated that the most reactionary influences in the SHAKAITO are those whose origins are in the NIHON RONOTO (see 1, b above): SUGIYAMA Motojiro, MAEKAWA Shoichi, KAWAMATA Seion, and MIYAKE Soichi. These men are reported to have been members of the GOKOKU DOSHI KAI (Association of Patriots), which opposed the surrender and was organized by KISHI Shinsuke, a

suspected

- 4 -

suspected war criminal now at Sugamo. The Left Wing elements opposed the admission of the GOKOKU DOSHI DAI members at the time of the formation of the SHAKAITO.

c. The Left Wing leaders are actively espousing a "popular front" program, more particularly some sort of unity with the Communists. In this respect, they constitute objectively an arm of the Communists within the SHAKAITO, giving aid and comfort to the Communist program of embarrassing and discrediting the SHAKAITO leadership.

d. The SHAKAITO policy on the Emperor has also been under attack by the Left Wing. While the latter group does not favor a forthright attack on the Tenno system, being content to strip the Emperor of political power, they have objected to positive statements in support of the Throne which have been issued by SHAKAITO leaders. The Left Wing has been impatient with the earlier stand of the Communists on the Emperor, but appears to be in close agreement with the position upheld by NOSAKA Sanzo, Communist leader recently returned from Yanan.

e. The Left Wing vigorously opposes the attempt to form a coalition SHAKAITO-JIYUTO (Liberal Party) government. Thus ARAHATA has stated, "For the Social Democratic Party, which has among its platforms 'rejection of capitalism and enforcement of socialism' to attempt to form a coalition government with the Liberal Party which is nothing but a pinch-hitter for the imperialistic bourgeoisie, would not only constitute a flagrant violation of the party's announced policy but would serve only to incur resentment of the people and to mark the beginning of the collapse of the party."

5. PERSPECTIVES

a. The Left Wing is deeply dissatisfied with the present leadership of the SHAKAITO and over a period of several years it may be expected that the single party structure will be unable to embrace all of the discordant elements.

b. However, the orientation of the Left Wing leadership is toward the rank and file of the party. This group has no wish to be separated from the membership and will make every effort to remain inside the party as long as there is any possibility of winning over significant sections of the party ranks. ARAHATA has stated that the Left Wing will remain inside the party even if the leadership should consummate a coalition with the Liberal Party.

Approved:
R. L. G.

P. S.
Research Analyst



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, February 15, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 258

Office of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs
MAR 4 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten initials: JRF, FE, OA, CP

SUBJECT: Views of Some Leading Japanese Businessmen

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1946 FEB 25 AM 10 54

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECORDS BRANCH

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 - 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Handwritten notes: I-TRA, I-FAIR, I-ORIC, I-TEC

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/2-1546

I have the honor to forward as an enclosure a memorandum of remarks made to a member of the staff of this Office by a group of Japanese businessmen, representative executive members of various Mitsui corporations.

The problems which appear to worry Japanese businessmen most, as brought out in the memorandum, are obscurity of the future no matter how severe it may be, the uncertainties of reparations payments, failure to receive guidance from their Government concerning rehabilitation of Japanese economy, question of hastening required dissolution of the "Zaibatsu" in order to provide for creative economic and industrial ability to "get on with the job", mounting unemployment resulting from inaction, and finally, the danger, which, to them at least, is real, that help may be sought from non-American nationals to the detriment of future American trade relations with Japan. The additional danger of economic chaos resulting from too rapid a disintegration of the large combines is stressed, with a clear implication that such chaos will hasten the communisation of Japan.

These opinions are frankly those of leading businessmen who, rightly or wrongly, have come under a cloud. The word "Zaibatsu" has been so blithely and almost indiscriminately bandied about in both the United States and Japan that the views of anyone formerly or presently connected with large Japanese industries are apt to be discredited before expression. It is believed, however, that it should not be forgotten that many Japanese industrialists were formerly international traders and well-connected with American business. These same "Zaibatsu" represent the best proven economic ability in Japan.

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Their
DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE


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HECTO
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Their universal attachment to the controlled-economy theories of the Japanese militarists is open to question, at least in some instances. In the belief that the blanket incrimination of all economic leaders in Japan has not yet been proved, it is submitted the remarks of these persons will be of real value to the Department as presenting another view of the Japanese situation.

Respectfully yours,



Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosure: *att 2*

Copy of Memorandum of
Conversation dated
February 12, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department
Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP

800
WJSebald:jwb

Enclosure to despatch No. 258 dated February 15, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Views of Some Leading Japanese Businessmen".

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

February 12, 1946

Participants: Mr. MITSUI Takaatsu, Partner of Mitsui Holding Company;
Mr. MIYAZAKI Kiyoshi, President, Mitsui Trading Company;
Mr. MATSUMOTO Kisashi, Managing Director, Mitsui Head Office;
Mr. SASAKI Shiro, President, Mitsui Real Estate Company;
Mr. OKADA Shinji, President, Sanki Kogyo K. K.;
Mr. MASUDA Katsunobu, President, Taiwan Sugar Company; and
Mr. Sebald.

Subject: Views of Leading Japanese Businessmen.

Mr. MITSUI Takaatsu invited Mr. Sebald to an informal luncheon on February 12, 1946. The luncheon was held in an executive dining room of the Mitsui Main Bank Building and the other guests present were representative executive members of various Mitsui corporations. The Japanese guests expressed themselves with unquestionable sincerity and frankness seldom found among Japanese except those who have become accustomed to Western thoughts and ways of business. In view of the important positions held by these men and their past broad experience, it is believed that their ideas, probably typical of most successful Japanese industrialists and businessmen, are worthy of some consideration. It is also believed that these remarks serve in a measure to throw light on the thinking, political and economic, of a section of Japanese society which for the most part has not heretofore actively presented its views on the situation in Japan. Their remarks are summarized in following paragraphs:

The greatest worry of Japanese business leaders today is the uncertainty which circumscribes their every effort, plan, or suggestion. It is obvious to anyone with even a smattering knowledge of economics, that the fundamental problem of Japan today is the failure quickly to rehabilitate industry in some form. Without production, inflation is a certainty, and such attempts at alleviation as the capital levy are only temporary stop-gaps which will, in the final analysis, only increase the problem.

The Mitsui organization has the capital, organization, brains, know-how, and connections throughout Japan to undertake practically anything which is desired, but is baffled at every turn in its efforts to assist in improving Japan's present condition. For example, immediately after the surrender, the Mitsui organization prepared a practical plan whereby the big companies were to be mobilized in an endeavor to attack the problem of housing in Japan. The plan envisaged the formation of a new non-profit company which would draw on the entire business world in Japan for this purpose. The plan had two objectives: to alleviate the housing situation and to furnish work for the numerous unemployed in Japan. At first, the General Headquarters were sympathetic, but eventually, the plan was disapproved, but no alternative was offered.

If the Mitsui organization is to be dissolved, and every one was in agreement that it will be, what can be

done

-2-

done to hurry along the process? What can the organization do to democratize itself? These questions are fundamental. The Mitsui interests are vast, employ many thousands of people, their capital is frozen, and no credit is forthcoming from the banks. The result of this stagnation is that the organization is cannibalizing itself: employees have to be paid or laid off; in the latter event, the unemployment problem is increased and the Government is doing nothing to insure the livelihood of the jobless. The result is the disintegration of an organization which could be put to work to assist in Japan's economic rehabilitation, and also an increase, by leaps and bounds, of social unsettlement and unrest.

The problem of reparations must be settled. The so-called Zaibatsu is not concerned that a certain proportion of its heavy industry is to be taken for reparations. What does concern the business leaders is the fact that no decision is made. It would be better to decide that all heavy industry is to be taken for reparation payments than allow this uncertainty to continue. The capitalists see no point in attempting to convert to peace-time industry, even if this were possible, only to have the installations taken away at some future date for reparations payments. Even if they were told to convert, banks will not advance money, and the capitalists' own capital is frozen. Even attempts to take the initiative are generally denied. Thus, an application was recently made to start a soap factory, one of the critical needs of Japan. The application was denied. The general rule that the Mitsui and other large interests can start no new enterprises obviously prevents a peace-time economy from beginning. Small entrepreneurs are given permission to construct various factories and plants, but lack of the required organization, capital, "know-how", and ability severely limits their effectiveness. That the result is a wasteful process in an already desperate economy is proven by the general economic stagnation in Japan today.

The Mitsui organization has attempted not to add to the unemployment problem, but cannot carry on alone. In the case of certain Mitsui enterprises which are continuing operations, labor now insists that part of their wages be paid in rice. When application is made to the Government for rice, the reply invariably is that there is none available. Mitsui recently applied to the Government for permission to increase cultivation of staple products on a large scale. The Government disapproved of the plan submitted on the pretext that the Government is working on its own plan. Thus time is wasted, and time is of the essence, and the situation continues to deteriorate.

Either the Government must "grab the ball" and start the wheels of industry, or industry itself must do it. However, industry cannot, because it is frozen by lack of capital, refusal to allow new undertakings, and general uncertainty and bewilderment. In consequence, the general atmosphere is one of frustration at every turn. The very people who can most help the General Headquarters in carrying out its policies, and they are only too willing so to help, are barred by Governmental red tape, refusal to clarify policies except in vague, general terms, and the propensity for giving negative decisions with no alternatives offered.

The large

-3-

The large business interests in Japan have always been pro-American in their sentiments, but the present seemingly destructive trend of American policy, without encouragement or assistance in reconstruction, is rapidly alienating previous ties of good will. As a result, business leaders in Japan are beginning to think about the possibilities of help from non-American quarters. This would be most unfortunate, but desperation makes for strange bed-fellows.

The so-called Zaibatsu cannot understand why there is so much commotion to "break up" the big combines. As a matter of fact, with the present tax structure in Japan, it is practically impossible for any large organization to continue in existence and also make a profit. After all, even Americans must admit that profit is one of the impelling motives of business; without profit, any organization will eventually fall apart. This is well illustrated by the fact that many of the "Mitsui" companies competed among themselves. Furthermore, Mitsui enterprises were not solely financed by the Mitsui Bank. On the contrary, Mitsui companies placed their business with those banks which advanced loans at the lowest rate of interest.

Mere "bigness" should not necessarily be taken as "badness". American Telephone and Telegraph Company, General Motors, United States Steel, Du Pont, Ford, and other large American corporations were cited as precedents for "bigness" which yet had the blessing of the American people. As Japanese companies, under the lash of the military, it is hardly reasonable to expect the large Japanese combines to do otherwise than carry out the instructions of the Government during the war.

Too rapid a disintegration of the large combines can only result in economic chaos in Japan. Once such chaos does result, Japan will be ripe for Communism, already growing as a result of the clever infiltration of Communists among the workers in all branches of industry. Is it believed that a Communistic Japan is in the best interests of the United States?

Mr. Sebald found the Japanese so eager to present their views that it was generally unnecessary for him to offer direct comment or actively to enter the discussion which was in both Japanese and English. He confined himself to occasional general questions designed to elicit their views on certain aspects of the situation.

William J. Sebald

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WJSebald:jwb

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: FE
INFO:

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ERA- H
No paraphrase necessary.

7421

Tokyo via War

Dated February 15, 1946

Rec'd 10:01 a.m., 20th

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State

Washington

104

~~Unnumbered~~, February 15

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/2-1546

This is Bishop's 140 of 15 February, please pass to Secretary of State from SCAP, information Moscow Military Mission and COMGEN China.

There follows a political summary of the period 7 to 13 February.

Government. Categories were listed by the Cabinet of those who are disqualified from holding public office under appendix A's paragraphs C and D of the 4 January directive and expressed the "hope" that the Tojo "recommended candidate" of the year 1942 and all the others who would probably fall under G would not run for office in the elections. The list was extended to 119 of the affected "ultra-nationalistic" societies under C. It was announced by the Secretary of the Cabinet that paragraphs E, F, and G would also be soon clarified; that A and B are self explanatory; and confirmed that the "recommended candidates" would be denied eligibility certificates by the government. This ruling affects Ministers Kobayashi, Ogasawara, and Matsumoto, and Matsumaya, Director of the Communications Board. It is expected the government will ask that Matsumaya and Matsumoto be exempt on the grounds that they are indispensable and that the resignations of Kobayashi and Ogasawara will be accepted.

A draft was presented by Matsumoto to the Emperor which embodied his constitution revision proposals; he reportedly advised the Emperor that no alteration was necessary of Articles 1 to 4 except for the substitution of the term "supreme" for "sacred", if the rest of the document is democratized effectively. It was reported that the important sections of the Cabinet and the constitution investigation committee were in

favor

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- Unnumbered, February 15, from Tokyo via War

favor of the alternative plan for the revision of the constitution which the committee prepared which involved substantial modification of the opening articles. It is expected that the report of the constitution revision committee of the Socialist Party will be submitted by the end of February. It has been privately indicated that the draft would make provisions for the Emperor as "the honorary symbol of the state", who would in decorative capacity represent Japan in foreign affairs, order the majority parties to form new governments and sanction but not veto legislation which the Diet passes. The peerage and Privy Council would be done away with and provisions made for the supremacy of the Lower House and the complete reorganization of the Upper House.

There has been appointed a committee of 29 of the leading educators, including the bureau directors and Vice Minister of the Ministry of Education to work with the U.S. Education Mission. It was decided by the Cabinet to set up an independent bureau under the Minister of Welfare to assist the newly repatriated and overseas Japanese. It is reported that the Government is planning to introduce at the next Diet a bill for unemployment insurance. In an interview with Tokuda Communist leader, it was maintained by the Welfare Minister that an owner had the legal right to shut down his factory paralleling the right of the workers to strike; following a conference of representatives of all the concerned agencies of the government a definitive policy would be announced.

It was urged by the labor groups that the protective laws of mining, factory, store employees, and other workers be revised. A United Press labor union was organized formally by representatives of employees of 30 leading news agencies, broadcasting companies, and newspapers, as representatives of 13 miners unions conferred on the setting up of a National Union.

A gathering of leading industrialists were informed by the Industry and Commerce Minister that the Japanese economy's reconstruction was finally under way with the coal production for January twice that of last November and the imminent revival of the cotton textile industry, and he urged that efforts be increased to the utmost. It is reported that the Government is planning transportation privileges and extra food rations to assist in labor recruitment. The Minister of Transportation acceded partially to popular demand by announcing there would be a 30% to 50% reduction in scheduled increases in rail fares for trips longer than 15 kilometers. The Bank of Japan's

Governor.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-3- Unnumbered, February 15, from Tokyo via War

Governor urged that outstanding long term loans be collected, that new loans be restricted to those which were for genuinely productive uses. It is reported the Government is planning to start a survey of property by a late February or early March emergency decree in preparation to the imposition of special taxes. The recent appointment of Mrs. Kore Tomiko as Deputy Mayor of Kure was ruled illegal by the Home Ministry pending the reform of local laws of the government to permit women to hold such posts.

SCAP. The War Minister in Higashi-Kuni, General Shimomura Sadamu, and Shideh (*) were ordered arrested for ordering the Doolittle flyers' execution. In the Yokohama war crimes trials Ishida Kitaro was sentenced to 30 years at hard labor. Two requests were forwarded to the 8th Army by the Legal section for common trials of war crimes suspects who were charged with similar but separate offenses. It is anticipated that many cases will be disposed of speedily by such trials. It is stated that Allied participation in "minor" war crimes commissions and prosecution staff may soon be expected. Infractions have been revealed through investigations of the 25 September directive which ordered that silk and silk stocks be frozen; the government ordered that this directive be enforced strongly. Ordered delivered to China were 1.8 million mulberry seedlings, 1.5 million grams of silk worm eggs, and specific quantities of vegetable seeds.

Parties.

The unexpectedly strict interpretation that the Government gave to the purge directive has again thrown the political situation into confusion. Some Japs that are politically conscious and the press were somewhat taken back by the thorough order of the Government. It was urged in some quarters that the elections be postponed in order that there would be time for new candidates to be recruited. This would affect about 330 of the last Diet's 400 members who are reported to be disqualified for the elections that are approaching and that leaves as candidates only 5 Cooperatives, 10 Socialists, 27 Progressives, and 20 Liberals. According to the Home Ministry, would-be candidates number 1931 and this includes 1 Sumo wrestler and 39 women who as of 10 February had applied for eligibility certificates. These included 32 Cooperatives, 83 Communists, 221 Liberals, 224 Socialists, and 331 from various minor parties and 793 in addition. 90% of these candidates are making their first attempt. Liberals and Progressives are reported to be planning

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CONFIDENTIAL

-4- Unnumbered, February 15, from Tokyo via War

planning to support capitalism on a united front and oppose the popular forces that are rising. Elements of the Liberals are becoming increasingly concerned over the amount of political power that the purgees are retaining and their practice of submitting substitute candidates. These Liberal elements recommended the complete withdrawal from all activities of a political nature by these ineligible. It is reported that the following Liberal leaders have been disqualified by the Government's purge: Ando, Matsuno, and Makino. Socialist leaders are disqualified as follows: Tama, Watanabe, Sugiyama, Matsumoto, Kinoshita, Sakamoto, and Kawakami. It was privately stated by Hirano Rikizo, the Socialist leader, that he doubted that the party would be able to survive without these men who are all (except for Matsumoto) in the Right Wing elements, and he predicted that the party would unite with the Communists because control of the party would go to the Left Wing.

An eleven point revised "Nosaka line" election platform was published by the Communists and this advocated that a republican type of Government be established. From 24-26 February the Fifth Congress of the National Communists (the second since the surrender) is scheduled for Tokyo and their main job is to take up the so-called "supreme" platform which is designed to do away with the impression (given by the opponents of the Communist Party) that the Communists desire a violent revolution, abolition of private property, or dictatorship of the proletariat. This meeting would also make clear the objectives of the party, clarify the present Bourgeois Democratic Revolution, and at some later date with the assistance of most of the people the party would raise the country to a better social system than is obtainable by capitalism by democratic and peaceful methods. Ozaki Yukio, who has been a Liberal member of the Diet since 1890 has indicated that he may run in the elections in accordance with the demand of the public and in a lengthy statement that Ozaki published, the abolition of the Emperor was demanded.

The Japanese Farmer's Union (sponsored and controlled by Socialists) was formally organized and was reported to have a membership of 300,000. This party immediately called upon the Minister of Agriculture to stop the program of compulsory requisitioning of food and to stop the eviction of tenants and other landlord actions under the Land Reform Law.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

(*) Apparent omission

MJF

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

CORRECTION

ERA--
No paraphrase necessary.

7421

Tokyo via War

Dated February 15, 1946

Rec'd 10:01 a.m., 20th

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Secretary of State

Washington

Unnumbered, February 15

The serial number of this message received as unnumbered should be corrected to read 104.

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 Correction noted
 FEB 21 1946
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TELEGRAPHIC SECTION

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Moscow Military Mission

CSB *Cards corrected 2/27/46*

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Please expedite reply DEPTTEL 224 FEB 5.

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Requesting name of
Chinese member or Allied
Council for Japan.

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)

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Subject: Interview of
SAKOMIZU Hisatsune with
the Emperor.

SAKOMIZU was Chief
Cabinet Secretary under
SUZUKI and has written a
series of articles describ-
ing events leading up to
the surrender.

His interview suggests
the forces responsible for
the Emperor's strolls ~~xxx~~
through the streets and ~~xxx~~
other democratizing activi-
ties. SAKOMIZU belongs to
the "around-the-Throne"
groups who would save the
Emperor at all costs.

JKE



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 16, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 260

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
FEB 1 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. SAKOMIZU Hisatsune with the Emperor

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1946 FEB 24 AM 10 56
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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

FEB 1 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/2-1646

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 259, February 16, 1946, transmitting a memorandum of conversation between members of this office and Mr. SAKOMIZU Hisatsune, who discussed certain attitudes of the Emperor and mentioned several events in support of his remarks.

There is transmitted hereunder a memorandum of conversation conveying the gist of an interview with the Emperor by Mr. SAKOMIZU Hisatsune, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Suzuki Cabinet, on February 8, 1946. It is asserted that Mr. SAKOMIZU has obtained the informal privilege of direct access to the Emperor and is therefore in a position possibly to influence Japan's future policy, should the Emperor decide to take a more active part in the Japanese Government.

Opinions concerning Mr. SAKOMIZU vary. It is generally admitted that he is a person of considerable ability. On the other hand, he has been termed by some reliable Japanese, an ambitious bureaucrat, and one whose record is clear only because of his ability to avoid open entanglement with ultra-nationalistic factions. In personal interviews, Mr. SAKOMIZU has given the impression that he is a person of sincerity and honesty, but with strong ambition. An "independent" candidate in the forthcoming election, he has obviously given much thought to a speedy rehabilitation of Japan. He is adamant in his conviction that the only method of democratizing Japan is to place the Emperor at the head of a reformative movement.

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
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There is good reason to believe that Mr. SAKOMIZU aspires to the position of Premier with a view to collecting about himself a "young men's" Cabinet--men of 40 to 55 years of age.

Current activities of Mr. SAKOMIZU are of the "behind-the-scenes" type so frequent in Japan. The opinion is hazarded, however, that given a proper combination of circumstances, Mr. SAKOMIZU may readily become one of the future leaders on the Japanese political scene. He may well favor democratic changes in government, but it is believed that he would combine social and economic conservatism with any political liberalism. A leader of this type may be most successful in gathering support providing reasonable stability is obtained in Japan.

Respectfully yours,



Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosure: *att 2*

Copy of memorandum of
conversation dated
February 11, 1946

Original and hectograph to Department
Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP

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