

1 Witness Creighton Questions by: The Chairman

2 The Chairman: After that the war came and we were
3 involved and there was no particular reason to follow up
4 your message, was there?

5 Captain Creighton: I would conclude that that was the
6 cycle of events, yes, sir.

7 The Chairman: That is all.

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Witness Creighton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: I have some questions since the
3 Chairman has asked questions.

4 I show you page 5125 and I show you a longer message
5 signed by Admiral Phillips as well as Admiral Hart, to
6 Washington, that was replied to, and the reply follows
7 the message that I handed you, and I want you to see whether
8 or not that does not reply to the message of Admiral
9 Hart, and also to your message as to what our intentions
10 were?

11 (The document was handed to Captain Creighton.)

12 Captain Creighton: You are asking my opinion about
13 something very intricate, that I never heard of before, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: What was Commander Baecher telling
15 you just now?

16 Captain Creighton: He was trying to explain that this
17 matter which had been produced since the war, that Admiral
18 Hart had sent it in. Quite frankly, I was so busy reading,
19 I did not pay attention.

20 Senator Ferguson: It was prior to the war, and it
21 was a reply prior to the war, but that actual message was
22 not sent until after the attack. It shows an answer to
23 Admiral Hart's inquiry.

24 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

25 Captain Creighton: Are you asking my opinion on this

Witness Creighton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Mr. Keefe

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matter, sir?

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Senator Ferguson: Yes, if you know anything about
it.

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Captain Creighton: It means nothing to me at the
moment.

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Senator Ferguson: That is all.

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The Chairman: All right. Thank you very much,
Captain.

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Mr. Keefe: Let me ask a question of the Captain,

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Mr. Chairman.

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The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Keefe.

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Mr. Keefe: I understood you to say, Captain, that you
were pretty busy all the time at the dock yards to arrange
for incoming ships, their repairs, berthing, and all that
sort of thing, that you were tremendously busy where you
were.

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Do you have any recollection of the convoys that came
into Singapore consisting of American ships carrying British
troops late in November, 1941?

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Captain Creighton: No, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Do you have any recollection of the American
liner, Manhattan, which had been converted into a troop carrier,
which came to Singapore in the latter part of November, 1941?

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Captain Creighton: I recall only that she arrived there

Witness Creighton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 with troops after we were in Java. I do not remember
3 the circumstance that you are speaking of.

4 Mr. Keefe: It did not come until after you had gotten
5 out of Singapore?

6 Captain Creighton: I think by the difference between
7 the date you give me and the one I remember, there were
8 two different arrivals. I am thinking of February, and you
9 of November.

10 Mr. Keefe: The reason I ask you that, I just finished
11 reading last night a diary of a sailor on this Manhattan
12 who described the course of this convoy from Halifax to
13 Singapore.

14 Captain Creighton: Yes.

15 Mr. Keefe: Convoying or carrying troops, one of a
16 large number of ships, American warcraft, that went to
17 Singapore convoying these troop carriers.

18 I am wondering if you were there when they arrived.

19 Captain Creighton: If they came in November, I was
20 there, but I do not remember their arrival. They could come
21 very easily without my seeing them, or being aware that they
22 were there.

23 Then, too, they might have gone to the civilian anchor-
24 age, which is very large, of course, or to the dock yard it-
25 self, in which case I would have seen them.

Witness Bicknell questions by: Mr. Richardson

Hawaii prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir, I went on duty in October, 1940.

Mr. Richardson: You were there during 1940 and 1941?

Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: What was your section?

Mr. Bicknell: I was the Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, and also the contact officer for the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. Richardson: Will you explain to the committee what your general duties were under your assignment?

Mr. Bicknell: My general duties were to keep the Department Commander thoroughly informed as to activities within the civil population on the Island of Oahu, and the other Hawaiian Islands, and to contact all visiting officials and business men coming back from the Orient especially, in order to obtain any information which they might have on the general situation in the Pacific area.

I also was responsible for the internal security of the Islands, and for observations of all measures necessary, counter-intelligence measures necessary to protect any information from getting into enemy hands, or prevent any espionage that might be conducted in the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. Richardson: Colonel, with what other organizations

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1 Witness Bicknell questions by: Mr. Richardson

h5 2 did you have immediate liaison?

3 Mr. Bicknell: I had immediate liaison with the
4 Federal Bureau of Investigation, the District Intelligence
5 Officer of the Navy, the Federal Communications Commission
6 and, in fact, all territorial and Federal departments, such
7 as customs, immigration and treasury.

8 Mr. Richardson: Who was your immediate superior?

9 Mr. Bicknell: My immediate superior was General
10 Fielder, who was at that time Colonel Fielder of G-2 of
11 the Hawaiian Department.

12 Mr. Richardson: From what source did you seek to get
13 the information that you were supposed to report?

14 Mr. Bicknell: We used every available source. Our
15 principal source for obtaining economic information and
16 information about the Far East was from businessmen returning
17 on liners or coming in on the clipper ships from the Orient,
18 interviewing them, getting their opinions; interviewing
19 any officials of the British or other national military
20 organizations that came through Hawaii, as well as picking
21 up the intercepts on all Japanese radio stations, reading
22 the Japanese language papers and obtaining some papers from
23 the Orient and piecing all of that information together.

24 Mr. Richardson: Now, Colonel, was your job a uniform
25 job, or did you do most of your work in civilian clothes?

Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Bicknell: Practically all of my work was done
3 in Civilian clothes.

4 Mr. Richardson: What did you have to do with the
5 furnishing of the information based on the alleged burning
6 of codes and papers by the Japanese consul?

7 Mr. Bicknell: That information was given to me by the
8 agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of investigation and
9 I in turn passed it on to the Chief of Staff and Staff of
10 the Hawaiian Department at their regular staff meeting on
11 Saturday morning, December 6, 1941.

12 Mr. Richardson: How often were staff meetings held?

13 Mr. Bicknell: Staff meetings were held every Satur-
14 day.

15 Mr. Richardson: And who was supposed to attend those
16 staff meetings?

17 Mr. Bicknell: All members of the General And Special
18 Staff of the Department Commander.

19 Mr. Richardson: Who was the Department Commander?

20 Mr. Bicknell: At that time, General Short.

21 Mr. Richardson: Would he attend these Saturday convoca-
22 tions of his staff?

23 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: Who would attend in his place?

25 Mr. Bicknell: The Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips.

Witness Bicknell

Questions by : Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Was there a general discussion at
3 those meetings of the fact, or of the intelligence that
4 you would report?

5 Mr. Bicknell: There was hardly ever any discussion
6 of it. The facts were simply laid out. Once in a while
7 there would be a question asked about the significance of
8 the fact, but very seldom.

9 Mr. Richardson: Do you recall the incident of the Mori
10 message?

11 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: Who brought that to your attention?

13 Mr. Bicknell: That was brought to my attention by
14 the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

15 Mr. Richardson: What steps did you take to acquaint
16 General Short with that message?

17 Mr. Bicknell: I called Colonel Fielder and told him
18 that I had some information that was extremely important,
19 that it should be given immediately to the Department Com-
20 mander, and Colonel Field said that they were planning on
21 going out for dinner, but he would talk with General Short.

22 I asked him to urge the importance of it upon the
23 General, that we see him, and he told me to be out at Fort
24 Shafter within the next ten minutes, that they would wait
25 for me.

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Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 So I went out there, and did arrive. General Short
3 and Colonel Fielder were waiting and the message was shown
4 to them.

5 It had been in my hands only a matter of less than
6 an hour.

7 I told them I felt that the thing was highly suspicious
8 and highly significant, that I had not had time to evaluate
9 the message but it did seem to me of utmost importance at
10 that particular time.

11 Mr. Richardson: They heard you?

12 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Richardson: How long was your conference?

14 Mr. Bicknell: Not more than five minutes.

15 Mr. Richardson: There was no unpleasantness or criticism
16 in connection with it?

17 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: Was there a remark made there by
19 General Short that indicated he thought you were a little
20 too sensitive on the question of intelligence?

21 Mr. Bicknell: I would not say there was any remark
22 made like that. The remark made by General Short was
23 that the message was a very true picture of what was going
24 on in Hawaii at that time.

25 I remember I thought that was just the trouble with it,

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Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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it was too accurate a picture.

I would say that the general reaction was perhaps I was somewhat intelligence-conscious, but nobody told me so in so many words.

Mr. Richardson: You spoke a moment ago about the fact that the espionage condition in Hawaii was part of your duty.

Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: I will ask you whether you have prepared, as a part of your notes, a statement in relation to your estimate of the espionage situation there in Hawaii?

Mr. Bicknell: Yes, I have, sir.

Mr. Richardson: I wonder if you would consult that and read it to us? It is not very long, as I remember it.

Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

Mr. Richardson: I might say, for the information of the committee, that I feel, and have felt that our testimony here, specifically on questions of espionage, was a little vague.

I went over this statement. It seemed to be a very admirable statement and it would save time if the Colonel was permitted to read it.

The Chairman: All right, Colonel, go ahead.

Mr. Bicknell: From the angle of security Hawaii,

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during the period 1930-1941, was totally unguarded and presented a mecca to agents and observers of any foreign government. This state of affairs, however unwelcome to the Army and Navy, had the full protection of our civil law, a condition which should never be allowed to exist again.

Pearl Harbor, lying low under the surrounding hills, was constantly in view of any and all who cared to look. Japanese training ships, tankers, and auxiliary vessels frequently called in port with all crew members, both officers and men, fully equipped with binoculars and cameras, enjoying shore leave and the hospitality of the local Japanese colony. Invariably, parties of officers were entertained in Japanese homes, on the heights, where the entire installation of Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, and other airport facilities could be leisurely and minutely observed. At some of these homes, situated on the crown of high ground, elaborate, lattice-work orchid houses had been constructed from which careful observation could be made by large parties of individuals who would remain completely screened from observation by neighbors or others passing on nearby roads.

Photography, in the earlier part of this period, flourished in Hawaii. As late as 1939, after the visit of the United States Fleet, a large photograph showing the entire panoramic view of Pearl Harbor, with each ship clearly defined

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at its anchorage, was publicly displayed in the show windows of a Japanese photography shop. There were no prohibitions except those placed in effect by the commanding officers of various posts, stations or cantonments. General prohibition of photos of the crater in Diamond Head as well as certain other specific military and naval areas were adopted and placed in effect by Territorial Law which restricted flying over these areas. It was physically impossible to prevent promiscuous photography inasmuch as every road, every hilltop, and many private homes offered the most excellent vantage points for obtaining clear and detailed photographs.

Because of these topographical features, practically all of the islands' protective installations were accessible to photographic recording. In view of this, it was perhaps an exercise of good judgment on the part of the military authorities not to waste much effort in attempting to put an end to this practice.

Another course of complete, detailed and vital statistics as readily available to enemy agents as to other interested persons, were the many publications issued at frequent intervals by official and semi-official agencies of the government. Reports of Planning Commissions, including detailed and accurate drawings; charts; and statistics on all matters such as communications, telephones, electric power plants,

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2 distribution lines, transformer stations; public transporta-
3 tion such as railroads, buses and streetcars; water supply
4 including sources, reservoirs, distribution mains, gates
5 and shut-offs; and all such data could be purchased for
6 thirty-five or fifty cents.

7 In some instances the demands for appeasement and better-
8 ment of labor conditions added to the problem. Many of
9 the plantations, utilizing the services of Japanese labor,
10 made every endeavor to improve their morale and contentment.
11 Such a program included the maintenance of homeland culture
12 and practices with the erection of temples, entertainment
13 of visiting Japanese priests, officials or crew members
14 in large parties, sometimes given at company expense.

15 Personal contacts would thus be established with indi-
16 viduals who often had detailed information relative to
17 maneuvers, new gun placements, and other similar matters.
18 In many instances, friends or relatives of these employees
19 lived adjacent to the channel into Pe^{rr}l Harbor and were
20 intimately acquainted with the movements of naval vessels
21 in and out of the base, their silhouettes, new equipment,
22 and other features viewed from only one or two hundred yards
23 away.

24 No positive identification was required of seamen leaving
25 and returning to a visiting Japanese vessel. Passes were

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2 issued, but not photographic passes. To the average customs
3 guard one Japanese closely resembled another. It was not
4 possible for an individual to leave the boat and for another,
5 entirely different, person to don the uniform and use the
6 pass to re-embark with no suspicion being aroused. Hence,
7 all precautions against illegal entries was frustrated.

8 In considering such illegal entries, it should be remembered
9 that a great many Japanese ships passed by and entered into
10 Hawaiian waters. Precautions were adopted against smuggling
11 by having each ship closely followed into port by a Coast
12 Guard cutter. However, the ever-present Japanese fishermen,
13 equipped with sampans having cruising ranges of thousands
14 of miles were quite capable of meeting the larger ships many
15 miles away from any possible observation. Indications do
16 exist that such methods were employed to bring in some un-
17 desirable individuals who were not discovered prior to the
18 opening of hostilities.

19 The sampan fleets were divided into three main classes;
20 deep sea and long range; offshore and short range opera-
21 tions; and shallow-water, bait-catching equipment. In the
22 first classification, the boats were large, seaworthy, radio-
23 equipped, and quite capable of prolonged cruising at sea.
24 The second classification included smaller but often equally
25 well equipped craft which cruised around each of the islands

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in the Hawaiian group, and whose crews were intimately acquainted with reefs, caves, landing places, tides, currents, and local wind and sea conditions. Thirdly, small boats operated within the bays, locks, and harbors, netting small fish to be used as bait for the larger craft.

The operators of these boats knew every detail of these waters, the depths, nature of bottoms and, most important of all, were always present to observe any operations or maneuvers. Through 1938, 1939 and part of 1940 these small boats had access to Pearl Harbor itself, cruised about where naval craft were at anchor, encroached upon landing areas of large seaplanes, and were constantly aware of any change in details of channels, currents, and other features.

The fishermen themselves were a clannish group, having their own "huis" or associations and acting for their own interests in maintaining price levels, demanding special privileges, etc. They also made trips back to the homeland and spent periods of time in the Japanese Fishing Schools in order to become more efficient in their art. At intervals, officials from these schools visited Hawaii and brought new ideas, methods of operation, and perhaps, even other thoughts from the Empire. When these fishermen were back in Japan they were "entertained" by various officials, and it is safe to assume that their information was carefully

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2 evaluated. In some cases they were royally entertained and
3 visited certain naval establishments in Japan. Every indi-
4 cation points toward a well-planned system of total espion-
5 age with perhaps the individuals themselves having little
6 or no knowledge of their own direct contribution.

7 The Japanese themselves developed a system of such total
8 espionage which perhaps outranks any other similar system
9 in the world. Even at home, in everyday life, it is
10 carried out meticulously. The supervisor of the organization
11 in the government directs his state or provincial deputies.
12 They, in turn, direct the district or city leader. Under
13 these the territory is broken down into areas or wards,
14 then to neighborhoods and, finally, to blocks. The block
15 leader has in his possession a plan showing each house in
16 his block. He has further data on who lives in the house;
17 how many children; where each is employed; details as to
18 possession of an automobile, electric icebox, telephone,
19 radio receiver, sewing machine, and other information,
20 including a list of visitors who call at regular or irre-
21 gular intervals, where mail is sent and from whom received.
22 All such data is minutely recorded and reported periodically.
23 Should an individual move to another block, the information
24 on him is passed on to the new block leader and dropped from
25 the records of the first. Such a means of constant surveil-

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2 lance precludes any suspicious acts on the part of the
3 individual from passing unnoticed. Mail and communications
4 from relatives or friends abroad, and the business and finan-
5 cial affairs of the family, are always under complete obser-
6 vation.

7 Everyone is familiar with the usual depiction of the
8 prewar Japanese tourist or traveller. His field glasses,
9 camera, and sketch pad were always in evidence. He took
10 pictures by the millions and all went back to Japan for
11 examination. As a tourist, member of a trade mission, a
12 minor official, an observer, a priest or a student, he flooded
13 our country as well as others, always taking photos, collect-
14 ing picture postcards, vital statistics, trade journals,
15 pamphlets -- in fact, everything on which appeared even a
16 scrap of vital information. These too, always went back to
17 Japan and became available for evaluation, compilation and
18 file. Japanese banks, business houses, transportation
19 companies, tourists, bureaus, etc. were opened in many
20 cities and localities both in Hawaii and on the mainland.
21 Each formed a little collection center of its own and
22 gathered data of a specific nature.

23 No comparable system either for the collection of world-
24 wide information or to protect the interests of our country
25 existed in the United States prior to the war. The American

Witness Bicknell

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2 people have always demonstrated a complete lack of appre-
3 ciation of such institutions and a simple, naive belief
4 that these practices are not in keeping with the American
5 way of life. Nevertheless, this nation seems somewhat
6 alone in such ideals. Others carry on intelligence activi-
7 ties in times of peace to prepare for war. Under normal
8 peacetime conditions we rely solely on our military, naval,
9 and commercial attaches for such information and ignore the
10 fact that they are handicapped from the start through their
11 official status and that their movements and activities are
12 greatly curtailed. No further argument is required when we
13 realize the great wealth of information in the hands of
14 Japan at the start of this war as compared to the meager
15 dribbles of similar information in our possession on Japan
16 and the Japanese.

17 It can be safely stated that the enemy had complete
18 knowledge of our Hawaiian fortifications, general defenses,
19 armament, naval and air strength, as well as many details
20 of our military, naval, and air facilities. The only thing
21 they lacked was knowledge of our secret military plans which
22 had been well guarded, resting solely in the hands of
23 military and naval commanders and members of their immediate
24 staffs.

25 The much debated question as to whether the attack by

1 Witness Bicknell

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2 Japan could have been foreseen in time to have taken protec-
3 tive action is involved and highly controversial. During
4 the entire year preceding Pearl Harbor, the situation had
5 been developing in steady steps with an absolute certainty
6 of the result.

7 The Japanese had long been discussing, preaching and
8 advocating the Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-Prosperity.
9 Selected representatives of many Asiatic countries convened
10 in Japan to hear discussions of the principles of East Asian
11 coprosperity. In these delegations were many Japanese resi-
12 dents of each area represented. Some Japanese from Hawaii
13 participated.

14 The war with China gave clear indication of Japanese
15 action and a pattern of the methods adopted by and to be
16 expected from their government. We had felt the ever-
17 increasing tension with the bombing of the Panay and other
18 similar events which took place in the Far East. We had
19 listened to their great volume of radio propoganda directed
20 toward those countries included in their conception of the
21 Sphere of Prosperity. These programs clearly indicated the
22 working of the Master Minds and gave every reason to believe
23 that it was their intention to build up an Empire in Asia
24 from which would be expelled every influence and semblance
25 of control by the British, Dutch and Americans. There was

1 Witness Bicknell

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2 no denial of this intention. Japan desired to strengthen
3 her economic and military position. Raw materials needed
4 in her island empire were to be obtained in China, India,
5 Burma, Thailand, and the Dutch East Indies. Strongpoints for
6 the defense of this empire also were to be located in these
7 countries.

8 Should it be possible to oust western influence and
9 power from the countries included in the Greater East
10 Asia Sphere of Co-Prosperity, Japan would be able to control
11 the Asian situation. With the Dutch and British already
12 involved in war with Germany, the opportunity for expansion
13 was present. Should the United States become involved in
14 the war in the Atlantic, her resources and strength might well
15 be diverted from the Pacific. If Japan had assurances from
16 Germany that the attention of our forces could be held in the
17 Atlantic, there seemed to be no logical reason why the
18 Japanese should not strike.

19 To assure a successful coup, it was only required that
20 what strength the United States and Britain had in the Pacific
21 be neutralized in one great blow. Germany had demonstrated
22 the power of the blitz-krieg -- an example for the Master
23 Minds.

24 As a result of the years of gathering information from
25 every conceivable source, Tokyo was well aware of all strong-

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2 points and defenses, as well as the general offensive
3 strength which could be thrown against her in the Pacific.
4 She had been softening up the peoples of Thailand, Burma,
5 and the Dutch East Indies through general Fifth Column
6 activities and radio propaganda. Her military and naval
7 machines were fully equipped, well supplied, and ready to
8 move at the moment's notice. All was in readiness. It was
9 only to be determined how and when the strike would be
10 made.

11 To succeed fully, Japan had to predetermine what counter-
12 action unsympathetic nations would be able to take against
13 this great move to envelope all Eastern Asia. American forces
14 in the Philippines, particularly the air force, might cause
15 some trouble and delay. Reinforcement of the garrison in
16 these islands must be prevented. To obstruct reinforcement
17 it would be necessary to prevent any American or British
18 naval support from becoming available for convoy and pro-
19 tective service, without which no troop or supply movements
20 could be made into the Philippines in the face of Japan's
21 superior naval strength, submarine and air support.

22 The espionage system was working well; information was
23 available daily from Hawaii, reporting ships in port -- arrivals
24 and departures. Other sources kept Tokyo well informed of
25 the location of Dutch naval units and the few British ships

1 Witness Bicknell

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2 then available. The Japanese staff had a complete picture
3 and could readily determine the plan for action.

4 Mr. Richardson: Now, Colonel, let me ask you this
5 question:

6 From your experience in Hawaii, as Assistant G-2,
7 your observation of espionage development there, did you
8 have any doubt at any time during the two months prior to
9 Pearl Harbor that Tokyo had complete information as to
10 Pearl Harbor, the location of the ships from time to time
11 in Pearl Harbor, the way in which our fleet was using Pearl
12 Harbor, and all of the details in reference to the military
13 occupation or military use of the Harbor as a base?

14 Mr. Bicknell: I have no doubt whatsoever.

15 Mr. Richardson: Then in estimating your espionage
16 problem in Hawaii, you took it for granted that Tokyo
17 knew all of those details?

18 Mr. Bicknell: I did.

19 Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions.

20 The Chairman: Did you communicate your information
21 and judgment with respect to that, to General Short, or
22 Colonel Phillips?

23 Mr. Bicknell: Those estimates were submitted, Mr.
24 Senator, through the form of intelligence estimates.

25 The Chairman: Written?

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Questions by: The Chairman

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2 Mr. Bicknell: Written. They were mimeographed,

3 I think some 50 copies were printed.

4 The Chairman: How often were those estimates furnished?

5 Mr. Bicknell: They came out at least bi-weekly,

6 and in some cases weekly.

7 The Chairman: So that your size-up of the situation,
8 as you have outlined it here in this memorandum was known
9 to the commanding officers in the Hawaiian Islands, and at
10 Pearl Harbor?

11 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman: Both military and naval?

13 Mr. Bicknell: That is right, yes, sir.

14 The Chairman: Now, when you got this message on the
15 night of the 6th of December, which you felt was important
16 enough to take it over to General Short and Colonel Phillips --

17 Mr. Bicknell: Colonel Fielder.

18 The Chairman: Colonel Fielder, who was with General
19 Short?

20 Mr. Bicknell: Yes,,sir.

21 The Chairman: Not Phillips?

22 Mr. Bicknell: That is right.

23 The Chairman: Fielder was your immediate superior?

24 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

25 The Chairman: They were both going to the same dinner

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: The Chairman

2 that evening?

3 Mr. Bicknell: That is right.

4 The Chairman: Where was it that they instructed you
5 to take this message?

6 Mr. Bicknell: To Colonel Fielder's quarters.

7 The Chairman: To Colonel Fielder's quarters?

8 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

9 The Chairman: General Short was to be there?

10 Mr. Bicknell: Yes. Both waited there for me.

11 The Chairman: They waited there to receive it before
12 going to the dinner?

13 Mr. Bicknell: That is right.

14 The Chairman: And they went on to the dinner after
15 they got the message?

16 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: What was it in the manner or bearing
18 of General Short that created the impression in your mind
19 that he was a little impatient with your intelligence com-
20 plex, if that is the proper word?

21 Mr. Bicknell: Well, it was the general reaction that
22 the points in the message which I considered most suspicious
23 seemed to be everyday affairs in their minds.

24 The Chairman: In other words, what you had thought was
25 unusual and therefore that you were impelled to seek them out

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1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: The Chairman
2 to divulge, was by them regarded as just a matter of
3 routine, and of no more importance than any other message
4 they had received?

5 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

6 The Chairman: What time in the evening was that?

7 Mr. Bicknell: That was somewhere in the vicinity of
8 6 o'clock in the evening.

9 The Chairman: You did not see them after that?

10 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

11 The Chairman: Until after the attack?

12 Mr. Bicknell: That is right.

13 The Chairman: Are you familiar with the equipment,
14 by way of airplanes and antiaircraft and all other equipment,
15 radar stations, and all the whole series of things that
16 were there both on the part of the Army and Navy at the
17 time of the attack and immediately before it?

18 Mr. Bicknell: Only in a general way. That is, I
19 did not know the complete details of where every gun or
20 where every position was.

21 The Chairman: You were familiar with it in a general
22 way?

23 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

24 The Chairman: And you had an over-all picture of
25 what was there?

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: The Chairman

h25

2 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

3 The Chairman: Was it part of your duty to form an
4 estimate as to the effectiveness of what was there by way
5 of material and equipment?

6 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir, that was not within my province.

7 My province was more counter-intelligence and external
8 intelligence, rather than anything pertaining to operations
9 which was more of a combat intelligence nature.

10 The Chairman: Would you be able to express an opinion
11 as to whether the fullest possible use was made of what was
12 there in the way of equipment, men and material, on the day
13 of the attack or immediately before it in preparation for
14 it, or in an anticipation of any possible attack?

15 Mr. Bicknell: Well, I am in a position to say that
16 I could observe the action of the Navy, because I saw the
17 attack from a point two miles behind Pearl Harbor, and
18 900 feet above it.

19 Within four minutes, three or four minutes after the
20 original torpedo had been dropped, into Pearl Harbor, the
21 entire Naval forces opened up with all of their anti-aircraft
22 and in fact on the second round of that one plane that
23 was shot down there in Pearl Harbor. So I should say,
24 from what I could observe, a very effective and efficient
25 use was made of all of the equipment which the Navy had

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: The Chairman

h26

2 on hand.

3 That was all that was within my immediate line of
4 vision.

5 I could not say anything as to the Army equipment.

6 The Chairman: Would you be in a position to express any
7 opinion as to whether the steps taken in anticipation of
8 a possible attack, or to avoid it, or to counteract it,
9 were fully realized and appreciated, and made effective?

10 Mr. Bicknell: I would not know about that.

11 The Chairman: You would not know about that?

12 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

13 The Chairman: That is all.

14 Mr. Cooper.

15 The Vice Chairman: As I understood it, Colonel, you
16 were G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

17 Mr. Bicknell: I was the Assistant G-2.

18 The Vice Chairman: The Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian
19 Department?

20 Mr. Bicknell: That is right.

21 The Vice Chairman: You made these evaluations as to
22 the local situation existing there with respect to espionage?

23 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: Every week for some of the time, or
25

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h28

2 The Vice Chairman: Of 1941?

3 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: And if it did not occur then, that
5 it might go until the following April?

6 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: That was in your estimate, in your
8 report submitted?

9 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: Now, as I understood from you, you
11 received this information about five o'clock on the after-
12 noon of December 6, 1941 from the FBI agent in charge there
13 at Honolulu, about the Japanese consul burning these import-
14 ant papers?

15 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir, that was the Mori message I
16 received at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of December 6.

17 The Vice Chairman: I see.

18 Mr. Bicknell: The information in regard to the burning
19 of the codes came to me from the FBI, I believe, on the 5th
20 of December, and that information on the burning of the
21 papers was given to the assembled staff on the morning of
22 December 6th.

23 The Mori message did not come to my attention until
24 five o'clock on the afternoon of December 6th, and it then
25 was reported immediately to General Short.

1 Witness Bicknell

h29 2 The Vice Chairman: By six o'clock you had reported
3 it to General Short in person?

4 Mr. Bicknell: That is right.

5 The Vice Chairman: Together with General Fielder?

6 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Then it was that you got the impres-
8 sion tht he thought you were too intelligence-minded?

9 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right. Thank you.

11 The Chairman: Senator George.

12 Senator George: No questions.

13 The Chairman: Mr. Clark.

14 Mr. Clark: No questions.

15 The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

16 Senator Lucas: Colonel, when you received this message
17 on December 6th, what was the conversation that you had with
18 the FBI about the message?

19 Mr. Bicknell: I was at home on the afternoon of Decem-
20 ber 6th, and Mr. Shivers, the agent in charge, called me
21 at home and said he had something of high importance that he
22 thought I should see immediately. I went to down, and was in
23 town within 20 minutes and he showed me this message which had
24 just been finally translated, and said this thing looked very
25 significant to him, that something was going to happen. I
read the message over and agreed with him, and immediately
called General Fielder.

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1. Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2. Senator Lucas: How long had you known Mr. Shivers?

3. Mr. Bicknell: I had known Mr. Shivers ever since he
4. came to the islands in 1939.

5. Senator Lucas: Did you know that the FBI were tapping
6. the telephone lines of the Japs at the time?

7. Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

8. Senator Lucas: Did you know that the Navy was also
9. tapping telephone lines?

10. Mr. Bicknell: I did not.

11. Senator Lucas: The Navy never gave you that information?

12. Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

13. Senator Lucas: Now what information was exchanged in
14. the way of intelligence between your Intelligence Department
15. and the Intelligence Department of the Navy?

16. Mr. Bicknell: As far as my Department was concerned,
17. everything that we received was given to the Navy.

18. Senator Lucas: In other words, whatever you received
19. in the way of intelligence, you evaluated it and transmitted
20. it to the Navy?

21. Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

22. Senator Lucas: In Hawaii?

23. Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

24. Senator Lucas: What about the Navy giving to you
25. the information that they had?

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Mr. Bicknell: They gave us whatever they thought
3 was proper to give, but I know that certain information never
4 was received from them.

5 Senator Lucas: What do you mean by that?

6 Mr. Bicknell: Well, just as an example, these inter-
7 cepted telephone calls. I knew they were intercepting them,
8 I knew what calls they were intercepting, but they never
9 told me anything about it. I know when the original winds
10 message came down that Captain Mayfield knew about it, but
11 he never told me anything about it. Instances of that
12 kind, where I felt there was certain information which they
13 were not allowed to pass on to their corresponding numbers
14 in the Army.

15 Senator Lucas: Was that a regulation that the Navy
16 had, not to permit to pass that on?

17 Mr. Bicknell: I do not know.

18 Senator Lucas: Even though it might have been the
19 regulation not to transmit magic word for word, was there
20 any regulation which prohibited them from transmitting to
21 the Army the substance of whatever they received, regardless
22 of where they got it?

23 Mr. Bicknell: I would not know that, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: Anyhow, there were certain important
25 matters that came to the Navy in the way of intelligence that

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 you?

3 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: You were the Intelligence Officer at
5 that time, were you not?

6 Mr. Bicknell: I was the Assistant Intelligence Officer.

7 Senator Lucas: The Assistant Intelligence Officer?

8 Mr. Bicknell: Yes.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, did General Fielder ever discuss
10 that question with you?

11 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: Did you know that the Army was alerted
13 to sabotage only on December 7?

14 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Lucas: How did you get that information?

16 Mr. Bicknell: I saw where the troops were, and after
17 the movement had started I learned that the order had been
18 issued to Alert No. 1. In my outfit a counter-intelligence
19 crew had been on a full alert since the 1st of November.
20 We had been on a 24-hour watch, and had been since the 1st
21 of November, so it made no difference to us. When the
22 order was finally issued that Alert No. 1 went into effect,
23 then we learned of that, but it made no difference to our
24 set-up, because we were already in full alert.

25 Senator Lucas: Regardless of the fact that the order

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 was issued, your outfit continued to be on the alert that
3 you had been following previous to the time of the last
4 order that came out by General Short?

5 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: Had the FBI man received similar messages
7 previous to this, or had he tapped wires to obtain information
8 of this kind?

9 Mr. Bicknell: To the best of my knowledge, that was
10 the first one that had been received.

11 Senator Lucas: Now here it is:

12 "(J) Hello, is this Mori?"

13 As I read this I would like to have you stop me, if
14 you will, and point out, if necessary, what you consider
15 the significant part of this message which caused you and
16 the FBI man to become somewhat worried about the situation.

17 "(J) Hello, is this Mori?"

18 "(H) Hello, this is Mori."

19 What does the (J) mean there?

20 Mr. Bicknell: J?

21 Senator Lucas: J says "Hello, is this Mori?"

22 Mr. Bicknell: That is Japan.

23 Senator Lucas: And "(H) Hello, this is Mori."

24 What does the "(H)" mean?

25 Mr. Bicknell: That is Honolulu.

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1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: "Japan: I am sorry to have troubled
3 you. Thank you very much.

4 "Honolulu: Not at all.

5 "Japan: I received your telegram and was able to grasp
6 the essential points. I would like to have your impressions
7 on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes
8 flying daily?

9 "Hawaii: Yes, lots of them fly around.

10 "Japan: Are they large planes?

11 "Honolulu: Yes, they are quite big."

12 Mr. Bicknell: That is all significant, are the airplanes
13 flying daily, and what type. If they are quite big they
14 could be long-range reconnaissance planes, and "They are
15 flying daily" gives some idea of whether they were carrying
16 on long-range reconnaissance in daylight hours.

17 Senator Lucas: Now did you discuss that phase of it
18 with General Short?

19 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Or General Fielder?

21 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: Did they read this message in its
23 entirety?

24 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: Did they say anything about that particular

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 phase of it?

3 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir, they said that that was a very
4 true picture of what was going on in Hawaii.

5 Senator Lucas: That is all they said?

6 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: They were in a hurry, were they?

8 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Lucas: "Japan: Are they flying from morning
10 till night?

11 "Hawaii: Well, not to that extent, but last week they
12 were quite active in the air."

13 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: That is another significant statement,
15 I take it?

16 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: "Japan: I hear there are many sailors
18 there, is that right?

19 "Hawaii: There aren't so many now. There were more in
20 the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last
21 year.

22 "Japan: Is that so?

23 "Hawaii: I do not know why this is so, but it appears
24 that there are very few sailors here at present.

25 "Japan: Are any Japanese people there holding meeting

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?"

3 Mr. Bicknell; That is very significant. I believe
4 there was a great doubt in the minds of the Japanese officials
5 as to what the Japanese in Hawaii would do in case war should
6 break out between the United States and Japan.

7 They had been subjected to American influences for a
8 long time. Many of the American-Japanese had been back to
9 their mother country and had found that they could not speak
10 that language, that they had lost their taste for Japanese
11 customs of old, and that they did not like Japan, and that
12 they were happier back at home in Hawaii.

13 I believe the Japanese, in thinking of any possibility
14 of reaction in Hawaii, were especially apprehensive them-
15 selves as to what the younger Japanese would do, whether
16 they would support Japan or whether they would support the
17 United States. They had no doubt whatsoever as to what
18 the older ones would do, they were bound to be loyal to
19 Japan, but they did have a very great doubt as to the action
20 of the younger generation of Japanese.

21 As to holding large numbers of meetings, at that time,
22 as you perhaps recall, Japan was beaming propaganda in
23 large degrees to the countries which it was about to attack.
24 They also beamed more innocuous stuff to Hawaii. They were
25 perhaps looking to find out whether or not their propaganda

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Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 was bearing fruit, and were these ideas which were being
3 broadcast on the radio being taken up, and were the people
4 holding meetings, and was there any indication of activity
5 amongst the local Japanese.

6 That is a possibility; I do not say it is a probability.

7 Senator Lucas: Were they holding meetings at that
8 time in Hawaii?

9 Mr. Bicknell: They were holding meetings, but they were
10 holding meetings at that time in Hawaii at our instigation,
11 where we were trying to Americanize them and cement their
12 loyalty to the United States, so any information they got on
13 that might be misleading.

14 Senator Lucas: Colonel, did you feel that the Japanese
15 situation in Hawaii was so desperate that nothing but a
16 sabotage alert should have been in existence after that war
17 warning message came on November 27?

18 Mr. Bicknell: My feelings on that question have been
19 expressed to practically every commanding general whom I
20 have come in contact with, and that was that we would never
21 have any sabotage trouble with the local Japanese, and we
22 did not.

23 Senator Lucas: Were you there in 1940?

24 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: You had an all-out alert at that time,

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 did you not?

3 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: And did you experience any difficulty
5 with the Japanese people at that time?

6 Mr. Bicknell: None whatsoever.

7 Senator Lucas: And following the attack on Pearl Harbor,
8 do you know of any acts of sabotage that were committed by
9 the Japanese?

10 Mr. Bicknell: There was not a single act of sabotage
11 on December 7 or thereafter, no, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: Well, the message goes on:

13 "Japan: Are any Japanese people there holding meeting
14 to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

15 "Hawaii: No, not particularly. The minds of the
16 Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting
17 along harmoniously.

18 "Japan: Don't the American community look with
19 suspicion on the Japanese?

20 "Hawaii: Well, we hardly notice any of them looking
21 on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We
22 are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get
23 along very well. All races are living in harmony. It
24 appears that the people who come here change to feel like
25 the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 things, but these are limited to newcomers from the
3 mainland, and after staying here from three to six months,
4 they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people
5 in the islands.

6 "Japan: That's fine.

7 "Hawaii: Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amused.

8 "Japan: Has there been any increase in" - and there
9 is a blank there - "of late? That is, as a result of the
10 current tense situation.

11 "Hawaii: There is nothing which stands out, but the
12 city is enjoying a war building boom.

13 "Japan: What do you mean by enjoying a war building
14 boom?

15 "Hawaii: Well, a boom in many fields. Although there
16 is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army,
17 civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel.
18 Most of the work here is directed towards building houses
19 of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters,
20 electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and
21 University have quit school and are working on these jobs,
22 regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this
23 work.

24 "Japan: Are there many big factories there?

25 "Hawaii: No, there are no factories, but a lot of small

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

3 "Japan: Is that so?

4 "Hawaii: It is said that the population of Honolulu
5 has doubled that of last year.

6 "Japan: How large is the population?

7 "Hawaii: The population increase is due to the present
8 influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the
9 mainland.

10 "Japan: What is the population?

11 "Hawaii: About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there
12 were about 150,000 people.

13 "Japan: What about night time?

14 "Hawaii: There seem to be precautionary measures taken."

15 Mr. Bicknell: That is significant, that taken together
16 with the next question.

17 Senator Lucas: Yes, the next question is:

18 "Japan: What about searchlights?

19 "Hawaii: Well, not much to talk about.

20 "Japan: Do they put searchlights on when planes fly
21 about at night?

22 "Hawaii: No."

23 Mr. Bicknell: That is very significant. If we put
24 the searchlights on at night when the planes are flying
25 around, that means long-range reconnaissance ships are trying

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 to find the island to come back. That is the only reason
3 the searchlights are turned on, to help the ship find its
4 way back after a trip. If the ship leaves in the morning
5 and it does not come back until after dark it gives you
6 some idea as to how far the reconnaissance may be.

7 Senator Lucas: Colonel, as the Assistant Intelligence
8 Officer, did you have the right to make any significant
9 suggestions that you thought this message contained when
10 you talked to General Short?

11 Mr. Bicknell: I would have had the right, sir, if I
12 had more time to evaluate it, but I just received the message
13 in my own hands, and realizing that it was significant, I
14 went directly to the General with it. I had not had time
15 to even give this thing more than one or two reads.

16 As I said, I felt it was highly significant, and I
17 still feel it was highly significant. It may be perfectly
18 innocent, but from an intelligence angle, and putting it
19 together with the information that we already had, that
20 the Japanese Consul was burning papers, and we knew that
21 the condition in the Pacific was serious, a message of this
22 type did, and still does, seem highly significant to me.

23 Senator Lucas: If you had not thought it was significant
24 you would not have requested an interview with General Short
25 around his dinner hour, would you?

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Mr. Bicknell: That is correct.

3 Senator Lucas: Did both General Short and Colonel
4 Fielder read this message?

5 Mr. Bicknell: As I remember it, they put it down on
6 the table and Colonel Fielder read it over General Short's
7 shoulder as he turned the pages.

8 Senator Lucas: Then this telephone conversation con-
9 tinues:

10 "Japan: What about the Honolulu newspapers?

11 "Hawaii: The comments by the papers are pretty bad.
12 They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I
13 don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the
14 community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan
15 daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

16 "Japan: What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu
17 make in Hawaii?

18 "Hawaii: A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the
19 American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries
20 of the press.

21 "Japan: Are there any Japanese people there who are
22 planning to evacuate Hawaii?

23 "Hawaii: There are almost none wishing to do that.

24 "Japan: What is the climate there now?

25 "Hawaii: These last few days have been very cold with

(12)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii.

3 Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual
4 climate."

5 Mr. Bicknell: That information would be very helpful
6 about the weather, especially the fact that it was unusual
7 weather, to a task force commander. Of course I do not want
8 to be accused of taking advantage of information we had after
9 the attack, but to inquire about weather conditions and the
10 extent of any cold front, that information right there would
11 be extremely valuable to them.

12 I have felt that it was quite possible, in reconstructing
13 the attack on Pearl Harbor, that the Japanese task force
14 came in behind the cold front which they used as a screen
15 against a possible observation from the air. The official
16 Japanese movies of the attack show a cold front when the
17 airplanes were taking off from the carriers. The timing of
18 the attack is such that there is a strong possibility in my
19 mind that that is now it was planned, to move behind that
20 cold front and use it as a screen to prevent any aerial
21 reconnaissance from sighting the fleet, and therefore the
22 date of the attack was primarily the date when they could
23 come nearest to the islands, within striking range of the
24 islands behind that cold front. It might even have been
25 the 6th, 7th or 8th. But that type of information in that

1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 one paragraph would be extremely helpful to anyone de-
3 siring to know those conditions.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, this fellow Mori was not just
5 talking for his health.

6 Mr. Bicknell: Mrs. Mori was talking.

7 Senator Lucas: What is that?

8 Mr. Bicknell: Mrs. Mori was talking. This is his wife.
9 The Doctor did not talk.

10 Senator Lucas: Did you ever find out to whom she was
11 talking?

12 Mr. Bicknell: It was a Japanese newspaper that the
13 call originated from. But there is one thing again that
14 must be borne in mind. This conversation was between Honolulu
15 and Tokyo. It was scrambled. The Japanese had the scrambler
16 in Tokyo in order to unscramble it. Anybody in the Pacific
17 Ocean between Hawaii and Tokyo with a scrambler could
18 unscramble this and listen to it, whether they were in
19 Tokyo or whether they were a thousand miles from Hawaii.

20 This information is open to interception by anybody
21 having the scrambling device which was used on that circuit.

22 Senator Lucas: "Japan: Is that so?

23 "Hawaii: Here is something interesting. Litvinoff,
24 the Russian Ambassador to the United States, arrived here
25 yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 He made no statements on any problems.

3 "Japan: Did he make any statements concerning the
4 US-Japan question?

5 "Hawaii: No. Not only did he not say anything re-
6 garding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention
7 anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he
8 was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

9 "Japan: Well, that means he was very different from
10 Mr. Kurusu.

11 "Hawaii: Yes.

12 "Japan: What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

13 "Hawaii: A very good one here. He impressed the
14 people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

15 "Japan: Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

16 "Hawaii: Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian overnight. He
17 has already explained for the mainland.

18 "Japan: Do you know anything about the United States
19 fleet?

20 "Hawaii: No, I don't know anything about the fleet.
21 Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not
22 know much about the fleet."

23 Mr. Bicknell: That, to me, is also very significant.
24 That could be a very nice cover-up. The Japanese already
25 knew all about the fleet, they did not have to talk on the

(13)

1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: Senator Lucas
2 telephone about that. They were getting daily reports
3 from their Consul as to movements of ships in and out of
4 Pearl Harbor. They did not have to ask any questions about
5 that at all.

6 Senator Lucas: Hawaii further says: At any rate,
7 the fleet here seems small. I don't know if all of the
8 fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left
9 here.

10 "Japan: Is that so? What kind of flowers are in
11 bloom in Hawaii at present?"

12 Mr. Bicknell: That is significant.

13 Senator Lucas: Why is that significant?

14 Mr. Bicknell: Perhaps I am too intelligence conscious,
15 but in the last war I spent a lot of my time in intelligence
16 and cryptography, and an open code is one of the most commonly
17 used methods of passing on information.

18 "What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?"

18 What in the world does a Japanese newspaper want to
20 know about flowers in Hawaii? Then, as you go on, you see
21 that this conversation will pick out the two flowers, only
22 two flowers of the many that were blooming in Hawaii at that
23 time. And there is some misunderstanding about the poinsettias
24 which you will discover in the next question.

25 Senator Lucas: "Hawaii: Presently, the flowers in bloom

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus
3 and the poinsettia are in bloom now."

4 Then there is a note: "Japan does not seem to know about
5 poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

6 "Japan: Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the
7 suspension of importation of Japanese goods?"

8 Well, when the fellow in Japan who was talking did not
9 catch the significance of poinsettias undoubtedly the so-called
10 secret code, or whatever they had, was not working quite
11 properly.

12 Mr. Bicknell: The thing is, on the original record
13 of this interception, there seems to be somewhat of an argument
14 in there. It is badly mixed up with static. But the best
15 we could make out of it in listening to the original was
16 there was some question in his mind as to what the real
17 point was in this.

18 Senator Lucas: Continuing further:

19 "Japan: Do you feel any inconvenience there due to
20 the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

21 "Hawaii: Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much.

22 There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which
23 come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese)
24 left in stock to last until February of next year, at any
25 rate it is a big inconvenience.

1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 "Japan: What do you lack most?

3 "Hawaii: I believe the soy is what everyone is worried

(14) 4 about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the

5 merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are

6 having a hard time.

7 "Japan: Thanks very much.

8 "Hawaii: By the way, here is something interesting

9 about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here.

10 The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibi-

11 tion, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors

12 are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business

13 came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation

14 of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice

15 from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake

16 here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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"(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called 'Takara-Masamune', that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

"(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?"

Mr. Bicknell: We go back there to that same question.

Senator Lucas: Yes. You explained that before.

Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: (Reading)

"(H) About fifty thousand.

"(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

"(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

"(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?"

Mr. Bicknell: Highly significant.

Senator Lucas: Yes.

Mr. Bicknell: They are again trying to find out what

1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: Senator Lucas
2 the Japanese feeling are, are they more inclined toward
3 loyalty to Japan or loyalty to the United States.

4 Senator Lucas: (Reading)

5 "(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About
6 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who
7 have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

8 "(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

9 "(H) No. They do not draft any first generation
10 Japanese.

11 "(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

12 "(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may
13 increase since more will be inducted in January.

14 "(J) Thank you very much.

15 "(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

16 "(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

17 "(H) Wait a moment please?

18 "(J) off phone."

19 Now, Colonel, did the Navy, the Army or the FBI pick
20 up Mrs. Mori following the outbreak of war?

21 Mr. Bicknell: We picked up, on the afternoon of the
22 7th of December, both of them, Mrs. and Dr. Mori.

23 Senator Lucas: Did you ever have a talk with Mrs.
24 Mori about this conversation?

25 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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3 loyalty to Japan or loyalty to the United States.

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20 up Mrs. Mori following the outbreak of war?

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22 7th of December, both of them, Mrs. and Dr. Mori.

23 Senator Lucas: Did you ever have a talk with Mrs.
24 Mori about this conversation?

25 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Notwithstanding all of this information
3 that you had, notwithstanding the fact that you transmitted
4 it on the night of the 6th to General Short?

5 Mr. Bicknell: I think it would have been very difficult
6 indeed to make any conclusions out of this that would have
7 predicted accurately that we were to be attacked on the
8 following morning by air. I think it is an indication that
9 something will happen and quickly, but to draw the inference
10 that it was going to hit Pearl Harbor would really be
11 stretching the imagination.

12 Senator Lucas: Did you know about the ship movements,
13 did you know that the Japanese were reporting ship movements
14 in and out of the harbor?

15 Mr. Bicknell: I did not know that until after this.
16 I knew it on the day of the 7th.

17 Senator Lucas: How did you learn that?

18 Mr. Bicknell: Because the minute the war started we
19 placed the Japanese Consulate under protective custody of
20 the Honolulu Police Force. The boys went in the consulate
21 and found a large tub of papers burning in one of the rooms.
22 So they explained to the Consul that that was considerable
23 of a fire risk and put the fire out, put the papers in
24 burlap bags, which later we received, and found in them
25 portions of messages, portions of code books being burned,

1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: Senator Lucas
2 and these were transmitted immediately to Captain Rochefort
3 and within a short time he was able to give us some informa-
4 tion on some of these messages, a few of them being movements
5 of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor.

6 Then the next day or two we also subpoenaed all of
7 the records of the various cable companies and from those
8 we got a complete file of the reports they had made.

9 Senator Lucas: Were any of these messages, that you
10 pieced together there and found that the Japanese Consulate
11 had received, decoded and translated previous to Pearl Harbor?

12 Mr. Bicknell: Not that I know of.

13 Senator Lucas: What was this conversation that you
14 had with the General Staff about the burning of papers --
15 on December 5, was it?

16 Mr. Bicknell: The 6th.

17 Senator Lucas: The 6th.

18 Mr. Bicknell: That was at the regular weekly meeting
19 of the staff where all matters of importance were brought
20 up, and I told them that reliable reports had been received
21 to the effect that the Japanese Consulate were burning
22 their secret papers.

23 Senator Lucas: Was General Short there when you made
24 that statement?

25 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Was Colonel Phillips there?

3 Mr. Bicknell: Colonel Phillips was there, yes, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: He was?

5 Mr. Bicknell: He was there.

6 Senator Lucas: There is some question as to what you
7 said. According to the evidence here it is contended that
8 they believed that it was another routine daily duty of where
9 they burn a lot of papers.

10 Mr. Bicknell: If it was a routine duty why would one
11 of the trusted members of the Consulate be telephoning to
12 somebody else in great excitement about it? If it was a
13 routine affair they certainly wouldn't be telephoning to
14 each other about it.

15 Senator Lucas: Was that explained?

16 Mr. Bicknell: At that time I didn't know that, at
17 that conference I didn't know those facts.

18 Senator Lucas: Did any members of the staff know of
19 this conversation?

20 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: What did you say, in substance, about
22 these particular papers when you discussed the question
23 before the staff?

24 Mr. Bicknell: I said, substantially, that I had received
25 confidential information of a very reliable nature that the

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Japanese Consulate were burning all of their secret papers.

3 Senator Lucas: All of their secret papers?

4 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: And that information came from the FBI?

6 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: Do you know whether or not that information
8 was ever transmitted to the Navy?

9 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir, it was.

10 Senator Lucas: Whose responsibility was it for having
11 that transmitted to the Navy?

12 Mr. Bicknell: That was Mr. Shivers' responsibility.

13 Senator Lucas: So it not only went to the Army, that
14 they were burning all of the important papers in the Consulate,
15 but it also went to the Navy?

16 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: That was on December 6th?

18 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: That very question was discussed at
20 the staff meeting at that time?

21 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: And it was following this meeting with
23 the staff where you had the discussion as to the burning of
24 important papers that the Mori message came along?

25 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Murphy

2 Senator Lucas: That was submitted on the same day
3 to General Short and Colonel Phillips?

4 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: That is all.

6 The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

7 Mr. Murphy: Colonel Bicknell, I want to ask you two
8 questions.

9 The Chairman: The Chair would like to announce that
10 at the conclusion of Colonel Bicknell's testimony I desire
11 to have a brief executive session.

12 Mr. Murphy: Colonel Bicknell, what difference do you
13 think it would make in the disposition of the forces in
14 Hawaii up to December 7, 1941 if General Short and Admiral
15 Kimmel had the magic which was available to Washington?

16 Mr. Bicknell: That would be rather hard for me to say,
17 but I would say that if we had had in Hawaii all the informa-
18 tion which was available from all intelligence sources, I
19 feel certain that General Short would have gone into a full
20 alert.

21 Mr. Murphy: Well, I am going to separate the two.
22 First of all, there was considerable information in Hawaii
23 which the Navy had which you didn't have?

24 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: Then assuming that there was available to

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 the message of General Marshall, when he was questioned
3 about the message of General Marshall, he said the most
4 significant thing in that message, to him, was the informa-
5 tion about the burning of codes, that was highly important.

6 Do you know whether or not he had information about
7 the Japs burning these codes before December 7?

8 Mr. Bicknell: I doubt very much that he had, other than
9 what information I have just related about the local Japanese
10 Consulate. There was a great deal of confusion existing
11 that we didn't get straightened out until after the attack.
12 The message that you have mentioned, relative to the Japanese
13 burning their codes, destroying their codes in other parts
14 of the world and the local Japanese situation. That came
15 about due to the fact that Captain Mayfield, District
16 Intelligence Officer, called Mr. Shivers, I believe somewhere
17 around the 3rd or 4th of December, and asked him if he knew
18 that the Japanese Consuls were burning their codes. The
19 FBI did not know about it and thought he meant the local
20 Consulate. They redoubled their efforts and observation
21 of the local Consulate and then discovered that the local
22 Japanese Consulate was burning their codes. That was turned
23 back to the Navy as confirmation that they were burning
24 the codes, but at that time the FBI did not know that
25 Captain Mayfield was talking about another message.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Well, the confirmation as to the Japanese
3 at Hawaii, that wasn't until the 6th of December, was it?

4 Mr. Bicknell: There is some question as to date on
5 that. My belief was that I received that information late
6 on the 5th, but I may be mistaken.

7 In refreshing my memory with Mr. Shivers while he was
8 in Hawaii just recently, he seemed to think it was the 4th.
9 I can't remember those dates.

(3) 10 Mr. Murphy: Well, the Navy at Hawaii had messages on
11 the 3rd about codes; they had messages on the 4th about codes.
12 Did they pass that on to the Army?

13 Mr. Bicknell: They didn't pass it on to me.

14 Mr. Murphy: Did you hear about it on the 3rd or 4th?

15 Mr. Bicknell: I heard about it.

16 Mr. Murphy: What difference do you think it would make
17 in your judgment if you knew that on the 3rd?

18 Mr. Bicknell: If I had known that on the 3rd I would
19 have gone to the General with that message and pointed out
20 to him the significance, the probable significance of that,
21 the same as I did with the other ones.

22 Mr. Murphy: What significance would you give to it?

23 Mr. Bicknell: I would say that when an Embassy or
24 Legation starts destroying its codes it is a sign that we
25 are coming to a very rapid end of peaceful relations.

1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you had no contact directly
3 with Captain Layton, did you?

4 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: Did General Fielder have any contact
6 directly with him?

7 Mr. Bicknell: I don't know.

8 Mr. Murphy: Did you know that Captain Layton was
9 giving in sanitized form certain information to the Intelligence
10 Officer of the Air Corps?

11 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: Did you wonder why he would give it to
13 him and not to your office?

14 Mr. Bicknell: It didn't make much difference so long
15 as I got it.

16 Mr. Murphy: Did you get it from the Air Corps?

17 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: In other words, the Air Corps man would
19 get it from Captain Layton and transfer it to you?

20 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Well, you were never permitted to see
22 any of the messages as such, were you?

23 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: You got it in sanitized form second-hand?

25 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Senator Ferguson

2 Mr. Murphy: You do think it would make a difference
3 if you had magic in Hawaii?

4 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: All right. No other questions.

6 The Chairman: Mr. Gearhart.

7 Mr. Gearhart: No questions.

8 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

9 Senator Ferguson: In the answers to the Senator from
10 Illinois when he read you the Mori message, do you want
11 to convey to the committee that you conveyed all that informa-
12 tion to General Fielder and General Short?

13 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: That is what is now known as hind-
15 sight?

16 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: An examination of the details of
18 this message leads you to that conclusion?

19 Mr. Bicknell: Exactly.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, after you told them about the
21 message and the information that you gave them that evening,
22 did you examine it again in detail until after the attack?

23 Mr. Bicknell: I took that message back to the office
24 and examined it for about an hour, and we had then just
25 ended a period of 24-hour duty and I decided that I needed

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 to get some rest and so I locked it up in the safe and
3 went home about 9:00 o'clock to get rested up. Needless
4 to say I didn't have a chance to look at the message for
5 sometime thereafter.

6 Senator Ferguson: You indicated that an examination of
7 the Mori message led you to the opinion that they were
8 speaking there as to what the attitude of the Japanese
9 would be in the case of attack. Did you know a man by the
10 name of Saiki?

11 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did you know there was a full-page
13 advertisement in the Hilo Tribune Herald calling a mass
14 meeting of alien Japanese at 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, the 7th?

15 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: As an Intelligence Officer, did
17 you ever look into that question?

18 Mr. Bicknell: Never heard of it before, sir. That
19 is on the Island of Hawaii. It never got to me.

20 Senator Ferguson: It never got to you?

21 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: And that there was some claim that
23 they got mixed up on their dates, because of the international
24 date line, would that refresh your memory?

25 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, as I understand it,
3 you didn't get directly from the Navy the fact that they
4 were burning codes in Washington or destroying the code
5 machine?

6 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever convey that message
8 to General Fielder, then Colonel Fielder?

9 Mr. Bicknell: I never received any information that
10 I could substantiate enough to say that it was authentic.

11 Senator Ferguson: So you didn't convey it to anyone
12 else?

13 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: It had never reached even a good
15 rumor stage; is that it?

16 Mr. Bicknell: That's right.

17 Senator Ferguson: I noticed in your affidavit to
18 Colonel Clausen this language:

19 "Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941 I
20 learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and
21 papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington,
22 London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere."

23 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir..

24 Senator Ferguson: That is what you and I have been
25 talking about?

Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: That you thought it was from Navy
4 sources?

5 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: But it wasn't such that you conveyed
7 it to anyone?

8 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Then that should be added to your
10 statement to Colonel Clausen?

11 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: In explaining that message?

13 Mr. Bicknell: That is right.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, had you ever known the
15 Embassy in Hawaii to burn any papers in the yard?

16 Mr. Bicknell: I have known that everybody in Hawaii
17 burns papers in the yard, but they don't burn them inside.

18 Senator Ferguson: When was it they first burned them
19 inside, was that on Sunday?

20 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir, that was the date that I am
21 in doubt about. It was either the 3rd or 4th, when the
22 FBI intercepted a telephone call from one of the attaches
23 of the Consul saying that they were burning all of these
24 secret papers.

25 Senator Ferguson: But you learned later that that

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 was not a fact because they were burning them on the day
3 of the attack?

4 Mr. Bicknell: They had to retain one code right up
5 to the very last minute. There was a tremendous volume of
6 messages to burn. They were burning those inside the house
7 in a tub. They couldn't possibly burn all of the papers
8 there were to burn in such a short period of time. When
9 the police went in there on the morning of the 7th there
10 was 5 burlap sacks of stuff that still had not been burned,
11 but which had been torn in pieces. There was a pile of
12 ashes there of all the papers that had been burned.

13 So it was the volume that prevented them from getting
14 rid of it. If they had built a bonfire outside they could
15 have disposed of them, but they were burning them inside
16 the Consulate.

17 Senator Ferguson: Did you mention to General Short
18 or General Fielder that this message, the Mori message, had
19 been on a scrambler phone?

20 Mr. Bicknell: I don't think I mentioned it because
21 it was so obvious. All messages were scrambled.

22 Senator Ferguson: You say all messages were scrambled?

23 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir. Every message was scrambled.

24 Senator Ferguson: Between private citizens?

25 Mr. Bicknell: All radio telephone, overseas telephone

Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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to get what they were talking about.

Senator Ferguson: At least you didn't have the code words to ever figure that out?

Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you look over these ads in the various papers, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the other papers, the Advertiser?

Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever look over those ads?

Mr. Bicknell: You mean the jumbo silk ad?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Bicknell: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever find anything?

Mr. Bicknell: Absolutely nothing.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Hook follows

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1 Senator Ferguson: At this time, I would like to make
2 this statement:

3 I asked Captain Zacharias about that ad. Since then
4 I have had a letter from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, and
5 also a memorandum from Riley Allen on the same question.

6 I think to complete this record, that this ought to
7 go in the record. I have shown it to Mr. Kaufman.

8 The Chairman: Without objection that may be done.

9 Do you want it printed in the record?

10 Senator Ferguson: I think that it ought to be spread
11 on the record.

12 Mr. Murphy: May I inquire if it is claimed there is
13 any significance to it?

14 Senator Ferguson: No. It is claimed there was not.
15 This witness's testimony was along the same line. You saw
16 no significance about this ad at all?

17 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

18 The Chairman: It may be spread on the record.

19 (The letters referred to are as follows:)
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1 HONOLULU STAR - BULLETIN

2 Honolulu 2, Hawaii, U. S. A.

3 February 5, 1946

4 Senator Homer Ferguson (Mich.)

5 Member Pearl Harbor Investigating Committaa,

6 United States Senate,

7 Washington, D. C.

8 Dear Senator Ferguson:

9 News dispatches from Washington report that an advertise-
10 ment which appeared in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin December 3,
11 1941 , has become a matter of inquiry and discussion by the
12 Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee.

13 The question appears to be whether this advertisement
14 was inserted for a subversive purpose by agents of, or sympath-
15 izers with, the Japanese government, and whether such agents
16 or sympathizers sought to disseminate information unfriendly
17 to and dangerous to the security of the Hawaiian Islands at
18 a time when the Japanese carrier fleet was approaching
19 Oahu to strike on the morning of Sunday, December 7.

20 It was perhaps natural that immediately after that surprise
21 attack, and when we who live in Hawaii had ample reason to
22 fear another and greater assault, rumors of information
23 and propaganda "planted" in the newspapers and in radio broad-
24 casts should become current.
25

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2 The story of the Hawaii Importing Company's ad is one
3 of those rumors, which quickly grew to considerable propor-
4 tions by word of mouth repetition, but which, like other
5 reports of sabotage and "fifth columnist" activities, proved
6 under competent, impartial examination, completely baseless.

7 Our own office, in common with the intelligence service
8 of the Army and the Navy, and the FBI, investigated this
9 particular rumor. All were satisfied the advertisement had
10 no enemy motive or design.

11 The facts are covered in the enclosed affidavit from
12 Porter Dickinson, assistant general manager of the Honolulu
13 Star-Bulletin, who, at the time of the Japanese attack and
14 thereafter was advertising manager of the Star-Bulletin.

15 I send this to you so that if you feel there are any
16 unanswered questions concerning the authenticity and the
17 bona fides of this advertisement, the answers will, I think,
18 be apparent. Like some others of the imaginative reports
19 which leaped into Circulation here and on the mainland
20 after Pearl Harbor, this rumor may be hard to exterminate
21 forever, and we are ready at any time to reiterate the
22 accompanying statement.

23 Yours very truly,

24 /s/ Riley H. Allen

25 /t/ Riley H Allen

Editor.

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February 1, 1946

MEMO TO: RILEY ALLEN

RE: HAWAII IMPORTING CO. AD OF DECEMBER 3, 1941.

Now that the Hawaii Importing Co. ad which appeared in the Star-Bulletin on December 3, 1941 has been brought up before the Pearl Harbor investigating committee, it might be well to review what happened at the time and shortly after publication of this ad.

1. The same ad appeared in both the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser. The Star-Bulletin published the ad on December 3, 1941 and the Advertiser published it on December 5, 1941.

2. It had been the practice of the Hawaii Importing Co. to repeat ads which appeared first in the Star-Bulletin a few days later in the Honolulu Advertiser.

3. The Hawaii Importing Co. had run practically the same ad a year previous on December 2, 1940. The ad was of the same size, and carried the same illustrated heading. A good many items were the same as carried in the December 3 1941 ad.

4. The Hawaii Importing Co. had run for several years previous on approximately the same date, ads of similar type.

5. The names carried in the ad were questioned by

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

many, but proved to be bona fide names of materials.

6. The drawing used for the heading of this particular ad was the same that appeared in the ad of December 2, 1940.

7. Shortly after December 7, 1941 the FBI, office of Naval Intelligence and Army Intelligence, all investigated this copy through the management and personnel of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Hawaii Importing Co.

8. Following a very close examination of the copy and all persons involved in the placement of this copy, the three agencies gave the Hawaii Importing Co. a clean bill of health.

/s/ Porter Dickinson

/t/ Porter Dickinson

(Notary seal)

Assistant General Manager

HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Second day of February, 1946.

/s/ John F Stone

Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit

Territory of Hawaii

My commission expires July 15, 1949.

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Witness Bicknell

questions by: senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not your testimony or your ideas as to the conversation between you and General Fielder on the night of the 6th in any way conflicts, or have you talked it over since that time?

Mr. Bicknell: I haven't had an opportunity to talk with General Fielder on that. I don't think there is any conflict.

Senator Ferguson: So there can't be any doubt about the record, I wish that you would try to recall as nearly as you can, if not the exact words, at least the substance of the conversation that you had in relation to the message, the Mori message on the 6th?

Mr. Bicknell: It is five years ago. Five years is a long time.

The one thing that I do remember is General Short saying, in effect, that he didn't see anything very wrong with the message, because it was a very accurate picture of what was going on in Hawaii, and I ventured the remark that I perhaps felt it was too accurate a picture.

Now, I haven't any recollection other than that.

Senator Ferguson: That is the substance of the conversation as you remember it today?

Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know of anything that

Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 you can give us here that would aid us in the solution
3 of this problem that we are confronted with, as to how this
4 could happen and Hawaii not be alerted to it?

5 Mr. Bicknell: I might say, if it is not the wrong
6 thing, that I feel we might expect another Pearl Harbor un-
7 less we can develop an intelligence service that is a coordi-
8 nated and efficient intelligence service, where all informa-
9 tion obtained from all sources comes to some one central
10 point and is properly evaluated and made available to all
11 the agencies involved.

12 Unless we do that and unless we place ourselves in such
13 a position, and if we have one or two or three or four
14 separate agencies working on intelligence and not coordinating
15 their endeavors, we are not safeguarding the interests
16 of our nation.

17 Senator Ferguson: In other words, when you divide
18 intelligence and do not give all of the services the entire
19 picture, you really destroy the value of intelligence?

20 Mr. Bicknell: That is true. I think that this trouble
21 we have had, that you are now trying to solve, is not a
22 question of personalities. It is a question of system,
23 the system was wrong.

24 We did not have trained intelligence people. We had
25 very few trained intelligence officers in the Army and Navy

Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 anyway, and when you try to put that information in a
3 pigeon-hole and do not give it proper circulation in rela-
4 tion to other available information, you are destroying
5 the entire objective of your plan.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did the Army in a way treat this
7 intelligence as a minor branch, in your opinion? Did they
8 give it the full meaning that it should have had?

9 Mr. Bicknell: I think that is a question of personality.

10 Some few general officers that I have known give intelli-
11 gence the highest regard. Others give it little.

12 General Herron, formerly Department Commander at the
13 time I went on duty in Hawaii, gave it the highest import-
14 ance. That is one of the reasons he called me back, was
15 to reorganize his Intelligence Department and his G-2 in
16 such a way that it would function properly, should any
17 emergency arise.

18 Senator Ferguson: And, now, should we understand that
19 you personally feel as an Intelligence Officer in G-2,
20 second in command, that you did all that you could with the
21 information that you were furnished, that you feel that if
22 you had had all of the information here in Washington, as
23 well as elsewhere, that America had, that you would have
24 been able to see a different picture at Hawaii on the 6th
25 and 7th of December, 1941?

Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Colonel, all of this -- from all of the intelligence that you had, and all of the information that was available to you as Assistant Chief of Intelligence, of G-2 in Hawaii for some time prior to the 6th of December, did you have or obtain any impression or idea that Hawaii was to be the object of an attack by the Japs?

Mr. Bicknell: There was nothing, sir, to give you any idea as a definite idea, but there was always -- in considering intelligence, one of the first precepts is to avoid surprise.

And probabilities are just as important.

I believe that in figuring out any military problem that the possibilities and probabilities must be given consideration.

Now, the fact that the Fleet was in Hawaii, the fact that our air forces were in Hawaii, and the general evaluation of the Japanese plan to work down through the Indies and Singapore, which seemed evident, it would appear that the only thing that would deter them in doing that would be interference from our air or Navy forces. Therefore, it would seem to me that Hawaii could be placed very near the top of

Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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a list of possible attacks by the enemy.

Mr. Keefe: I gathered the impression from a statement that you made a few moments ago, that it was your opinion that if you had had certain intelligence that was available in Washington, and which was not furnished the Hawaiian Department that you perhaps would have been in a better position to stand up and argue with the Commanding General on the question of alerting.

Mr. Bicknell: I think that is true. If we had had all information, we might have been able to do that.

If we had had meteorological information as to the formations to the west and northwest, if we had had the full import of the so-called winds message, if we had had the magic, it would have been much easier to say that the possibility of an attack was increasing in importance, rather than decreasing.

Mr. Keefe: Were you surprised, yourself, by the attack?

Mr. Bicknell: Well, naturally, when you are looking out of your window on a peaceful Sunday morning and see a battleship blow up under your eyes, you are pretty apt to be surprised.

Mr. Keefe: I don't mean that, of course. I mean, was the fact that the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning a surprise to you, as the Assistant Chief of G-2 of the

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Hawaiian Department?

3 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir, I think it was.

4 Mr. Keefe: I am trying to find someone among all of
5 these witnesses who have been here, who was not surprised.
6 You were veering pretty close to that position.

7 Mr. Bicknell: I think I must admit I was surprised.

8 Mr. Keefe: You finally landed in the same category
9 with everybody else. Everybody was surprised here in Wash-
10 ington and in Hawaii.

11 That is all.

12 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

13 The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

14 Mr. Murphy: Colonel, you said that General Herron had
15 placed intelligence as being of the highest importance.

16 Where did General Short place it?

17 Mr. Bicknell: I never became as well acquainted with
18 General Short as I was with General Herron, perhaps due
19 to the fact that I had not served with General Short long
20 enough, and that he did not have much confidence in a
21 reserve officer. But I have the feeling, that with intelli-
22 gence from the information that I was passing on, that I
23 have previously reviewed this afternoon, and these estimates
24 in these military attache reports that went to Washington
25 every week, and all of the information that was going

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 through, it was rather uncommon not to have some questions
3 asked it about it by the Department Commander.

4 Mr. Murphy: Well, you had predicted war at the end
5 of November, had you not?

6 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: Were you ever asked about your prediction?

8 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: Nobody paid any attention to it, did
10 they?

11 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir, they did not;

12 Mr. Murphy: And the reason you shifted it over to
13 February because of the weather conditions?

14 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: In other words, if they didn't attack
16 toward the end of November, there would be such a change
17 in weather conditions that you predicted an attack in
18 February?

19 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: You said that you didn't have the meteorological
21 information.

22 Mr. Bicknell: We didn't have it.

23 Mr. Murphy: But the Navy had some pretty good men
24 on it, didn't they?

25 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h13

2 Mr. Murphy: And they did have quite a Navy set-up
3 for meteorological data, which was not furnished to you?

4 Mr. Bicknell: That is right. That is the point
5 that I made in my remarks about a correlated intelligence
6 agency. The information should be available.

7 Mr. Murphy: Did you know anything about the lost
8 carriers, the carriers that couldn't be accounted for?

9 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Did you know anything about the expecta-
11 tion that there were carriers in the Marshalls?

12 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Did you know about the submarines that were
14 sighted at Saipan and were predicted as moving eastward?

15 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: If you had had the data which you now know
17 the Navy did have at Hawaii, do you think that the magic
18 at Washington would have added much to it in order to inform
19 you so that you could predict more likely a possibility of
20 attack?

21 Mr. Bicknell: You are telling me something that I
22 never heard before. I will say again that if we had informa-
23 tion of that type, perhaps I could go even further in my
24 statement to you and say that we would have been in a
25 better position to make more definite predictions as to

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl4 2 what might be expected.

3 Mr. Murphy: Were you in Intelligence shown the message
4 of the 24th of November which said that there is a possibility
5 of an attack in any direction? Did you know such a message
6 was sent to Hawaii that there was a possibility of an attack
7 in any direction, on November 24?

8 Mr. Bicknell: I have a vague recollection of it.

9 Mr. Murphy: Were you shown the war warning of the 27th?

10 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir, I heard that. Colonel
11 Phillips read it to the staff.

12 Mr. Murphy: Did he read it on that Saturday morning,
13 or before that?

14 Mr. Bicknell: No, that was the day it arrived.

15 Mr. Murphy: Did you see the Navy message, "This is
16 a war warning"?

17 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: Did you ever know they had sent a message
19 "This is a war warning"?

20 Mr. Bicknell: I knew it after the 7th.

21 Mr. Murphy: You never heard it before?

22 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: In other words, you in Intelligence were
24 pretty much in the dark as to what the Navy was doing in
25 Hawaii?

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h16

2 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir, but in these days of
3 modern communications, and in these days of situations
4 we are so rapidly facing, that question is not as important
8 as it used to be.

6 For instance, here on the mainland, we can handle
7 information of a highly secret nature over protected wire
8 circuits.

9 It could be sent from Washington to San Francisco
10 in perfect safety over a special wire network. It is now
11 possible to go from Hawaii to -- from San Francisco to
12 Hawaii in 9-1/2 hours by airplane with courier. It isn't
13 like the old days when it used to take many many hours to
14 get a message through by codes and ciphers and all the
15 machinery that is gone through.

16 A courier might be well on his way to a distant point
17 with the message in the time that it would take to do that,
18 with the message in personal custody.

19 Mr. Clark: Under conditions as they existed in the
20 last war, General Marshall seems to have taken particular
21 precautions to safeguard the secrecy of magic by confining
22 it to just as small a circle as possible.

23 Mr. Bicknell: That is true.
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Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 Mr. Clark: Now, do you agree or disagree with that report?

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3 Mr. Bicknell: I think it is perfectly possible in a case
4 like that that you do not have to send out the information
5 that you obtain from magic sources, but orders could be pro-
6 perly prepared based on that information and forwarded to the
7 necessary commanders.

8 Mr. Clark: Well, you think those orders should have
9 gone beyond what were issued in this case?

10 Mr. Bicknell: I do not know enough about the Washington
11 angle of this thing to form an opinion.

12 Mr. Clark: I will take as an illustration the message
13 from General Marshall of the 27th. Do you think that more
14 should have been stated in that order?

15 Mr. Bicknell: There again is a question of judgment. My
16 personal point of view is that the department commander is to
17 judge what the local conditions are and take action that he
18 considers appropriate. That is why we have a department com-
19 mander and a Lieutenant General, who does not wait for some-
20 body else to tell him what to do. He must draw his own con-
21 clusions and take action.

22 Mr. Clark: And when he receives a message of that char-
23 acter he would be supposed to exercise that independence of
24 judgment?

25 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Mr. Clark: That is all.

3 Senator Lucas: May I ask one question on that point, Mr.
4 Chairman?

5 The Chairman: Yes, Senator Lucas.

6 Senator Lucas: You were familiar with the message sent
7 by General Marshall on the 27th?

8 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Lucas: Were you also familiar with the reply of
10 General Short's?

11 Mr. Bicknell: Only from what I have read in the newspa-
12 pers.

13 Senator Lucas: You were not consulted?

14 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

15 Senator Lucas: You never saw the message?

16 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: You know what it is. All he said in reply
18 was, "Alerted to sabotage, and liaison with the Navy." Do you
19 think that was responsive to that original message of the 27th?
20 Maybe I shouldn't ask you that.

21 Mr. Bicknell: I don't think I can answer that.

22 Senator Lucas: All right.

23 The Chairman: Did you say you were a reserve officer?

24 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

25 The Chairman: And I think you remarked that General Short

1 Witness Bicknell

Questions by: The Chairman

2 I'll not think much of reserve officers.

3 Mr. Bicknell: I have that feeling.

4 The Chairman: Is that a chronic attitude of regular Army
5 officers toward reserve officers?

6 Mr. Bicknell: No, sir.

7 The Chairman: It is not. What is your present occupation?

8 Mr. Bicknell: I am Regional Manager of the Veterans'
9 Administration in Honolulu.

10 The Chairman: Oh, I see. Under General Bradley?

11 Mr. Bicknell: Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman: Well, Colonel, the committee thanks you
13 for your appearance here and for the trouble you went to to get
14 here from Honolulu to testify and appreciate very much your
15 cooperation.

16 Mr. Bicknell: Thank you.

17 The Chairman: You are now excused.

18 (Witness excused.)

19 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum here
20 that Colonel Bratton referred to, he got it from the Army,
21 made by Pettigrew, that he had written for Bratton and that
22 Bratton had turned it over for higher authority, but I would
23 like to have it marked as an exhibit, not part of the record,
24 but as an exhibit.

25 The Chairman: It will be marked as exhibit 156, I think.

1 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I ~~am~~ just wondering on that
2 exhibit of Pettigrew, if it is the whole exhibit. I thought
3 it was a lot bigger than that.

4 Mr. Kaufman: Five pages.

5 Mr. Murphy: I know, but isn't that the beginning of a big
6 exhibit?

7 Mr. Kaufman: What is that?

8 Mr. Murphy: I thought there was a lot that followed that.

9 (The document above referred to
10 was marked Exhibit No. 156)

11 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, we have prepared in our
12 office a complete list, - there is in one of the exhibits in
13 some one of the earlier hearings a partial list, - of the
14 current newspaper headlines in the Hawaiian and Honolulu
15 daily newspapers relating to the general international war
16 situation.

17 We have prepared a complete copy of those headlines which
18 we would like to have extended in the record so that there
19 will be in the record a complete list.

20 The Chairman: You want that printed as part of the hear-
21 ings?

22 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

23 The Chairman: That will be done.

24 (The document above referred to is in words and
25 figures as follows, to-wit:)

(Insert)

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HONOLULU ADVERTISER

HEADLINES

November 7, 1941

KURUSU CARRYING SPECIAL NOTE TO F. D. R. FROM PREMIER
TOJO

Japan Ready to Act Unless Tension Eases

JAPAN WAITS BEFORE MOVE IN FAR EAST

Aggression in Pacific Appears Shelved Until Kurusu's
Mission has been Completed in U. S.

INVASION HELD TOO DIFFICULT BY OFFICIALS

Offensive May Start in Middle East Soon; Invasion
of Continent Impracticable at Present

November 13, 1941

TOKYO RADIO ASSERTS WAR IS ALREADY ON

Any Military Moves Only Logical Result of Encirclement
Policy, Japanese Staff Says

ENVOY UNDISMAYED

CARRIES BROAD POWERS TO ACT

Kurusu Denies Taking Message, Implies Errand of Bigger
Scope

1 November 14, 1941

2 JAPANESE CONFIDENT OF NAVAL VICTORY

3 November 26, 1941

4 AMERICANS GET WARNING TO LEAVE JAPAN, CHINA

5
6 HULL REPLY TO JAPAN READY

7 November 27 1941

8 U. S. -- JAPAN TALKS BROKEN OFF AS HULL REJECTS

9 APPEASEMENT

10 Full Surrender Demanded in U. S. Statement

11
12 Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades

13
14 November 28, 1941

15 Parris Island, S. C. -

16 This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage
17 balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like
18 an air monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged
19 structure protected there from bomb splinters. The helium
20 sausage may be used to protect beachheads, bridgeheads and
21 other strong points, thereby differing from the British technique
22 which keeps them flying over London. The Marines encamped on
23 Parris Island, S. C., have a special training school on these
24 balloons.

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1 November 29, 1941

2 U. S. REJECTS COMPROMISE IN FAR EAST

3 Washington Insists on Maintenance of Status Quo,
4 Withdrawal from China by Japan Army

5

6 U. S. WARPLANES MAY PROTECT BURMA ROAD

7 Protective Force of 200 Planes, 500 Pilots Held
8 Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese9 November 30, 1941

10 KURUSU BLUNTLY WARNED NATION READY FOR BATTLE

11 Foreign affairs Expert Attacks Tokyo Madness

12

13 LEADERS CALL TROOPS BACK IN SINGAPORE

14 Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at Parleys; Nightly

15

16 Blackouts Held in P. I.: Hawaii Troops

17

18 Allerted

19 December 1, 1941

20 JAPANESE PRESS WARNS THAILAND

21

22 BURMA TROOPS ARE REINFORCED

23 British, Indian Units Arrive at Rangoon

24

25 F. D. R. HURRIES TO PARLEYS ON ORIENT CRISIS

26 December 2, 1941

27 JAPAN CALLED STILL HOPEFUL OF MAKING PEACE WITH U.S.

1 Thailand Now in Allied Bloc, Press Charges

2
3 JAPAN GIVES TWO WEEKS MORE TO NEGOTIATIONS

4 Prepares for Action in Event of Failure

5
6 MALAYA FORCES CALLED TO FULL MOBILIZATION

7
8 QUEZON HELD TO BLAME IN P. I. DEFENSE DELAY

9 December 3, 1941

10 HUGE Pincer Attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted

11 Pepper Visions Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns

12
13 U. S. DEMANDS EXPLANATION OF JAPAN MOVES

14 Americans Prepare for Any Emergency; Navy De-
15 clared Ready

16 December 4, 1941

17 HAWAII MARTIAL LAW MEASURE KILLED FOR PRESENT SESSION

18
19 JAPANESE PIN BLAME ON U. S.

20 Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R.

21 December 5, 1941

22 PROBE OF JAPANESE ACTIVITIES HERE WILL BE MADE BY SENATE

23 Spy Inquiry Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. by
24 State Department

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25December 5, 1941

PACIFIC ZERO HOUR NEAR; JAPAN ANSWERS U. S. TODAY

JAPAN CALLS IN NATIONALS-----
JAPAN HAS SECRET SHANGHAI AGENTSDecember 6, 1941

AMERICA EXPECTED TO REJECT JAPAN'S REPLY ON INDO-CHINA

Hull May Ask Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall

JAPAN TROOPS CONCENTRATED ON THAI FRONTMilitary Observers Say Few Units Have Been Posted
In NorthDecember 7, 1941

F. D. R. WILL SEND MESSAGE TO EMPEROR ON WAR CRISIS

Japanese Deny Massing Troops for Thai War

BRITISH FEAR TIENTSIN ROW, CALL UP GUARDSMay Isolate Concession to 'Prevent' Agitation
over U. S. -- Japan Rumors-----
HIROHITO HOLDS POWER TO STOP JAPANESE ARMY

HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN

HEADLINES

November 10, 1941

NAVY CONTROL FOR HONOLULU HARBOR

December 1, 1941

U. S. ARMY ALERTED IN MANILA

Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows

JAPAN ENVOYS RESUME TALKS AMID TENSION

December 4, 1941

Q JAPAN SPURNS U. S. PROGRAM

Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible

December 5, 1941

Q JAPAN PARRIES OPEN U. S. BREAK

FURTHER PEACE EFFORTS URGED

Tokyo Claims Policy 'Misunderstood' in Washington

as One of Force and Conquest

December 6, 1941

SINGAPORE ON WAR FOOTING

Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions

State of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation

Given

NEW PEACE EFFORT URGED IN TOKYO

Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock with U. S.

Proposed.

1 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I should like to request
2 that exhibit 143, which is the so-called Roberts report, con-
3 sisting of the transcript from that hearing and the exhibits,
4 and exhibit 144, consisting of the Hart transcript of evidence
5 and the exhibits, and exhibit 145, the Navy Court of Inquiry
6 and exhibits; exhibit 146, which is the Hewitt transcript
7 and exhibits; exhibit 147, which is the Army Pearl Harbor
8 Board transcript and exhibits; exhibit 148, which consists
9 of the volume of Clausen affidavits and attached exhibits,
10 and exhibit 149, which is the so-called Clarke report, be re-
11 ceived in evidence as such exhibits, the evidentiary part
12 thereof to be received by the committee with the same force
13 and effect as though the witnesses who were then in these
14 various respective reports sworn and testified, - with the
15 same force and effect as though the witnesses had been heard
16 and their testimony taken in this proceeding.

17 With reference to that part of my request affecting the
18 Clausen affidavits, there was extensive examination here about
19 them. While I do not regard them as of the same grade of
20 evidence as I do the sworn testimony by question and answer
21 which was taken on the other groups of so-called investiga-
22 tions, my reason for including them in my request is that I
23 think the committee is amply able to give those affidavits the
24 weight that they may consider them entitled to, and in view of
25 the fact that much reference has been made to various of the

1 affidavits here and considerable testimony taken concerning
2 them, it would be wise to include the Clausen affidavits and
3 exhibits as a part of this testimony and as a part of the re-
4 cord in this proceeding from an evidentiary standpoint.

5 Now, it has not been our intention to include in these
6 exhibits as thus identified the various conclusions and find-
7 ings and decisions of whatever nature that may have been reached
8 in, upon or concerning any of these prior investigations. It
9 had been our intention to include those documents in a separ-
10 ate volume which could be available for the examination of
11 the committee in a volume by itself, which raises the question
12 as to whether you would rather have it in that form or have
13 the particular findings and conclusions and whatever decisions
14 there may be appear in the record adjacent to the particular
15 exhibit, which would be the report of the transcript and
16 exhibits themselves.

17 It struck us that the separate volume idea, containing
18 all of those reports and decisions, would be better as a re-
19 ference matter particularly than to bring them into exhibits
20 relating to transcripts of testimony and other exhibits which
21 are a formal part of this record as a matter of the factual
22 record.

23 The Chairman: That matter was suggested some days ago and
24 I thought that we had decided that all these opinions and find-
25 ings, and so forth, to which you have referred would be printed

1 in a separate volume for convenience.

2 The Vice Chairman: We agreed to that.

3 The Chairman: I think that we decided to do that.

4 Mr. Richardson: All right, if that is the understanding.

5 The Chairman: It will be so ordered without objection,
6 to have them handled in that way rather than to have to run
7 back through a lot of other volumes and pick out the find-
8 ings and opinions that have been rendered by all these vari-
9 ous boards. I thought we had decided to do that.

10 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I noted one thing that
11 Mr. Richardson has asked us. In effect we are stating that
12 we are going to treat the evidence, for instance, given in
13 the Hart and the Hewitt evidence as if it were produced here
14 in open hearing.

15 I don't think that we were going that far. I think that
16 we as members of the committee should consider it but I think
17 it has a different value than that which is given here and
18 where every member of the committee has had the right of ex-
19 amination with the aid of counsel, and I don't think we
20 should agree as a committee that we are going to give it the
21 same weight as the evidence in open hearings.

22 The Chairman: The chair did not understand that the
23 counsel suggested that. That it would be considered for
24 whatever weight it has as if the same testimony were given
25 here.