




HAMILTON *VERSUS* MILL.



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Hamilton versus Mill

A THOROUGH DISCUSSION

OF EACH CHAPTER IN

*Mr. John S. Mill's Examination of
Hamilton's Logic and Philosophy*

BEGINNING WITH

THE LOGIC

PART I.—ON CHAPTERS XVII. XVIII. AND XIX.

EDINBURGH: MACLACHLAN & STEWART

BOOKSELLERS TO THE UNIVERSITY.

RIVINGTONS, LONDON, OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE.

1866

‘Now Jack was a boy of a bold temper.’—*Popular Tales*.

When the Justices of Cornwall (*read* Vienna) heard of this valiant action, they sent for Jack, and declared that he should always be called Jack the Giant-Killer.’—*Ibid*.

Λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἕκαστος γινώσκει, καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης ἀφ’ ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτὸν . . . ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδόν τε ἐγγίγνεται λέξω.—*ἸΗΟΥΣΥΔ. Π. 48.*

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Florence Blackburn

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

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ALL who take an interest in the doctrines of Logic and Metaphysics now held by the great majority of those who think with depth and energy, and in the fame of the great Hamilton who has expounded them or discovered them or matured them, cannot but rejoice to see the languid attention of the community (attention being all the evidence these doctrines need) reanimated by the somewhat enigmatical inburst of Mr. Mill's strange book among us.

A writer of considerable ability upon one subject, and of sufficient eloquence and popularity to be listened to upon any, has undertaken, on behalf, undisguisedly, of the semi-philosophical party, now known as Rationalists, to examine Hamilton, and to declare against him,—against his doctrines and against his fame. The result, however, reminds one a good deal of Balaam and Balak. The Rationalists may well exclaim, 'We took thee to curse our enemy; and, behold, thou hast blessed him altogether.' If it had been possible to remove Hamilton from his throne in the world of thought, if it had been possible to detect even the appearance of a flaw in any portion of the doctrines which he proclaimed, Mr. Mill would have done it. The intention, the party-need, and the stage-effects were present. But the attempt has entirely failed. Whatever he may have done against himself, against Hamilton he has done nothing. There was nothing that he could do. The great torch of the great man's philosophy remains as bright as ever; nay, as his own motto predicts, shines like all truth, all the brighter for the shaking it has had.

Mr. Mill's work, whose Rationalistic purpose is avowed at page 34, where it describes Hamilton's anti-Rationalism as extremely dangerous, and in chapter vii., where this description obtains more

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detail, is merely a hostile review-article of 560 octavo pages, which has, in its author's hands, fallen into such an arrangement that, while he professes in it to differ from Hamilton upon almost everything that Hamilton has written, he distinctly indicates his agreement with him, chapter by chapter, upon every one of these points, in the very same volume, and this to such an extent, that the uninitiated reader rises from the perusal of the book, wondering what all this coarse and clumsy condemnation means where, it is admitted by the critic, there is nothing to condemn. The drift of each chapter is as follows:—'I next proceed to expose the very grave errors of our author upon this all-important theory. I need scarcely say, however, that upon all the main points of it I am entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, whose view is that of almost all our thinking men, although there is something exceedingly flagitious in so eminent a man's altering and adding to the ordinary expressions, in some cases without any very obvious purpose or result, and something exceedingly shallow in so profound a thinker's being unable to discern the full import of the most valuable doctrines as understood by others. But what are we to expect from one who was always busying himself with the thoughts of others, and who devoted himself so immensely to the history of philosophical thought, as Sir W. Hamilton did, and who seemed, like him, to think a great deal more about ascertaining what he could honestly regard as true, than about establishing a system of his own. As to the minor points of his theory, we are compelled to dissent from him entirely, unless, indeed, we suppose that his words mean rather what his admirers hold them to mean than what they can appear to "connote" in his opponent's eyes; for the mere verbal difference is here of the greatest moment. In short, although he is one of the master spirits of the century, of amazing acuteness, elevation, and research, he is, I apprehend, one of the poorest and shallowest thinkers we have ever had.' I do not profess to give the precise words, but such is the burthen of Mr. Mill's song—the senseless and unvarying oscillations—recurring *ad nauseam*, aided by the art and slang of the mere review writer, throughout each of the twenty-eight chapters of the work, the upshot of the whole being one huge but most curious and unexpected panegyric. A writer thought by his own party, and even beyond the limits of his own party, to be a person of considerable ability, proceeds, he tells us, under the

strongest impulse of antagonism, to 'bring down' Hamilton (as he expresses the operation), and fails to do it,—owns that he fails! owns that it is only in the eyes of the ignorant he is able even to *seem* to triumph! What is praise, if this is not praise?

But this is not all. Our facts open up, it will be seen, another and a stranger vista still. Mr. Mill's pages betray to us, and not, apparently, as if he sought to hide it from the learned, that this mere semblance of a victory over Hamilton in the eyes of unphilosophical people not only is all the result he professes to have obtained, but was all the result he had aimed at from the first—all he had hoped for—in publishing his book!

1. One of the facts to which I now allude is this: *Without a single exception, every statement made against Hamilton's doctrines in this volume is utterly groundless.*

Of Mr. Mill's critics who have preceded me, some have pointed out that some of his statements were inaccurate, others that others were so; and these critics have reasonably inferred that upon these points he was mistaken, some of them hinting at a certain *animus* betrayed in his pages, which seemed to them to have contributed to mislead him. That is all very well for those who found him making some successful hits, and making only a few misstatements. They very properly called these misstatements 'errors,' and treated them as errors, and regarded them as errors. But that is not the case now laid before the public. That is not my case. If of the twenty-six chapters, in each of which a proposition is maintained against Hamilton, there is not a single one in which the proposition, so maintained, is not entirely inconsistent with fact—entirely groundless, it is hardly competent to the critic to set up the theory that Mr. Mill entertains so much animosity against Hamilton, and has an understanding naturally so deficient that he has been led by his want of understanding and excess of animosity to mistake error for truth, to this grotesque extent, in every separate chapter, and upon every separate proposition. This, I think, is going rather far. It will not be supposed, after what I have written, that I think too highly either of Mr. Mill's information upon these subjects, or of his capacity for them, or of his generous feelings towards Hamilton; but I think better of Mr. Mill than that alternative implies—a great deal better; and I maintain that, since every proposition against Hamilton in Mr. Mill's book is, even upon the simplest subjects, utterly groundless, utterly inconsistent with those

facts which Mr. Mill himself admits, the only reasonable view that we can take of matters is that he aimed at nothing more than a practical joke in publishing his volume,—a mere sham triumph over Hamilton in the eyes of those who understood neither him nor Hamilton. I do not ask any one to take my word for the utter groundlessness of every charge, and every chapter. This groundlessness I have to prove, and the proof must be complete, or it is *nil*. I only ask that, if the fact is as I state it, Mr. Mill's admirers will, as I am persuaded he himself will, do me the justice to see that I act with a great deal more consideration and indulgence towards him, in interpreting his book as a jest, than those do who would have me attribute to him all the ignorance, thick-headedness, and malice that it would be necessary to suppose, in order to account for such a book so written.

2. A second fact, which, even if the one just given were to be allowed no weight, would of itself alone be sufficient to necessitate the interpretation of Mr. Mill's book as a mere jest, is this: *Not only is each proposition alleged against Hamilton utterly groundless, but Mr. Mill himself admits, in the same volume, generally in the same chapter, that it is so*, admitting this either in express terms, as he in most cases pretty frankly does (in the question, for instance, whether we think with concepts or not, pp. 331, 341), or by taking great pains to reduce all his criticism to a mere difference between Hamilton's words and his own, which difference, as he gives it, no one can see, and which he knows that no one can see (as when he says that to think with the 'concepts' of words is a more circuitous expression than to think with their 'significations,' pp. 331, 332). Here, also, I am unconscious of any one exception to the rule. Mr. Mill *everywhere* withdraws his proposition, as well as asserts it; and what I ask is, not that any one should suppose, without the clearest proof, that every proposition is withdrawn, but how it is possible for us, *if* every proposition advanced against Hamilton is withdrawn, to regard the work in any other light than as a jest.

These, then, are the two facts which I pledge myself to establish, and I admit at once that, if I fail to do so in every particular, the whole theory of a practical joke falls necessarily to the ground, and that the ordinary theory of mistake and *animus*, or whatever other truer names we may choose to call these things, mutually acting and reacting upon each other, affords sufficient explanation of what then requires to be explained.

I would fain impress well upon my reader's mind that I am perfectly aware of the strangeness of the conclusion to which my facts drive me, or, as I may otherwise express it, of the secret purpose which the careful study of Mr. Mill's book discloses. Nor is it lightly that I have adopted this solution of the difficulty presented by the vast extent to which the statements contained in it are inconsistent with the most obvious facts. I am aware that, even with the two facts as I find them, most critics would have recourse to the ordinary expedient. Most of our most competent critics would either be silent altogether, as so many now are, or would set about accounting for these facts by assuming, *secundum artem*, a sufficient want of intelligence and of good feeling to make it possible for such facts to coexist with a serious intention on the author's part. I am, however, as I have said, precluded from taking this harsh view of the matter by the circumstance that such a book as that now before us—a thick octavo of grotesque misrepresentation and grotesque rebuke from beginning to end—would require the hypothesis of mistake and *animus* upon too large a scale,—upon a scale, in short, unprecedented; and this in the present case is entirely out of the question. I have said this already, I say it again, I cannot repeat it too often. Mr. Mill is, I have every reason to believe, of too gentle a nature to entertain a personal hatred to any one, much less to one of whom he could say, as he does of Hamilton, that although an unsparing controversialist, he never failed in candour, and never in his discussions aimed at anything but at the establishment of what seemed to him to be the truth. To attribute to any such hostile feeling, therefore, or unfriendly bias (as the *suppressio veri* of these days teaches us to call it), all or any of the misrepresentations of which this book consists, would be simply impossible; and there is quite as much to be said against imputing to Mr. Mill any of the thick-headedness which here obtrudes itself upon us in almost every page. Without drawing any inference from his popularity, which is great, and which his clear style of English and his liberal ideas would be sure to obtain for him, his understanding, to judge from his works on Evidence and Political Economy, is considerably above the average, far too much above it to warrant our ascribing to him all the rubbish, and all the blundering of which he has so liberally taken upon himself the odium in this volume. I, for my part, decline to

do it. Let others act as they think proper. I seek a more probable version of the facts than this.

The only plausible objection that can be suggested to supposing Mr. Mill's book a *plaisanterie* is that, if it were one, it would be a *mauvaise plaisanterie*, since it would amount to not only the grossest misrepresentation of one no longer present, who had laboured long and faithfully and powerfully with us at our most difficult problems, but also to a discouragement and entanglement, which must necessarily throw back philosophy for at least half a century. The answer to this is, that nothing of either kind can possibly result from Mr. Mill's comments upon Hamilton any more than if he had merely written on every one of the 560 pages the words, 'Hamilton is all bosh,' and that he knew it could not, and that we need not, therefore, think of his jest as a *mauvaise plaisanterie*, however much it may look like one. He well knew that his comments would neither represent nor misrepresent anything of Hamilton's to those not conversant with such subjects, and that to those who were, they did not constitute a contradiction of Hamilton at all, but, on the contrary, if anything, a massive confirmation; for if one with Mr. Mill's need could utter nothing except empty words against our philosophy and its great expounder, what stronger proof could have been given that there was nothing else that could be uttered against it? Mr. Mill's very harmless calculation seems to have been that the great majority of his readers, not being able to judge for themselves, should infer, from his air and manner, and learned words and obscure sentences, that he knew all about it, and that he saw clearly that Hamilton was wrong, and we all wrong with him; and he does not appear to have miscalculated. But we need not call this a *mauvaise plaisanterie*.

Another objection, but not a plausible one to the view thus opened up to us, is that there is a large amount of personal animosity displayed everywhere throughout 'The Examination,' which, however much controlled in the earlier portion of the work, degenerates towards the close into a perpetual growl, that so much antagonism as this might easily cloud even the clearest understanding, or otherwise produce misstatement, and that, this being the case, my hypothesis is unnecessary. To this I reply, that there is undoubtedly a large show of bitterness and animosity over the whole volume, which is by no means accounted for by the fact that

Hamilton never once alluded, in any way, either to Mr. Mill, or to anything that Mr. Mill had written, nor by the further fact of Hamilton's having unfortunately quoted the work of Mr. James Mill (the Critic's able father) as an 'ingenious' Treatise, which epithet has, it seems, so calumnious an import in literature that Mr. Mill junior is indignant (see p. 256) at its being applied to his father's work,—as indignant, almost, as if his father also had never been mentioned; nor is this accounted for by a process of literary jealousy, for Hamilton and Mr. John Mill were never in the same sphere of literature or thought,—the one being greatly the other's junior, and employed upon totally different subjects. But to me it is evident that the bitterness in question is part of the joke. It is a mere affectation, cleverly devised by Mr. Mill, to throw an air of earnestness over his work, of which it very often stands in need. His admirers, indeed, deny even the appearance of bitterness, assuring us that what is mistaken for it is Mr. Mill's ordinary, most courteous, and pleasant manner of writing controversially, and that he meant nothing by it but extreme politeness. This seems incredible, but it may be so. I must observe, however, that if this appearance of extreme personal discontent were absent, the work would appear to every one to be rather a tissue of odd praise, than, as these friends describe it, a tissue of courteous condemnation.

The only other objection I need advert to, is that respecting the *cui bono*. 'But why should Mr. Mill have done such a thing as 'this?' will be one of the first questions put; 'What earthly reason 'could he have had for doing it?' just as people asked the other day in the Pritchard case. The answer to this is, that his object in writing his book in jest was, most probably—let us say most certainly—the same as his object in writing the book at all; and he himself tells us distinctly why he wrote the book. He wrote it because he considered the Anti-Rationalism which he detected in Hamilton's writings 'extremely mischievous,' even in Hamilton's hands, but, as applied by Mr. Mansel, a good deal worse than extremely mischievous; in fact, so bad, that the new champion of the Rationalists would rather 'go to hell,' he tells us, than sanction such a doctrine. To render unpopular, therefore, with unphilosophical people the source of a philosophy which he and others looked upon as so injurious to morals and religion, seems to have been the whole *cui bono* of the matter,—the object of his having so courageously incurred the odium and discredit of writing an entire

volume of burlesque statements as truths in Logic and Philosophy. 'The Examination' of British Philosophy and of Hamilton thus turns out to have been written with a moral and religious purpose; but to be, nevertheless, a mere party trick, a frolic, a sort of pious fraud, set on foot by Mr. Mill to ingratiate himself with the Rationalists, in order, it would seem, to enter Christendom at their gate; the immediate aim of the trick being to make Mr. Mansel appear as much as possible in the light of a defeated champion, he being by far the most formidable opponent of the Rationalists, as we may gather from all the virulence and irritation with which they have assailed him. To bring about an appearance—even if it were but an appearance—so desirable, it was thought safer and more effective to attack his Philosophy in its source, and he being avowedly the disciple of Hamilton, as far as one great man can be the disciple of another, it recommended itself to Mr. Mill's judgment, as the greatest service he could render to his new platform, to publish this rationalistic squib, overthrowing Hamilton, at least to all appearance, through our British Philosophy so well expounded by him, and making mince-meat of all he ever wrote; for, if Hamilton was nothing, argued these wiseacres, Mr. Mansel could be nothing. And for this work, Mr. Mill was all the better qualified, from the circumstance that he had no philosophical reputation or *status* to lose by doing it, and that he was nevertheless popular enough to be regarded as an oracle by the multitude—even in philosophy. For what does the multitude know of philosophy? But how was it to be done? Hamilton, as well as Mansel, is a giant; ay, and of the two 'the elder and more terrible.' How was one but little versed in Metaphysics, however expert he might be supposed to be in Logic, to overthrow one of the greatest Metaphysicians and Logicians of all time, especially when, as far as he had any knowledge at all in either department, Mr. Mill also was himself, a follower and pupil, either consciously or unconsciously, voluntarily or involuntarily, of that illustrious man? It could not be done. There was no use in trying to effect anything in that direction. Matters might, however, be so contrived, that it should *seem* to be done. Ah, yes, should *seem*. The modern Jack might *seem* to kill his Giant. This is the task which, in the cause of Rationalism, Mr. John S. Mill has set himself to accomplish; and he works thus:—He creates as complete a chaos of pleadings special, and of terms philosophical, as he finds practicable, and when he has brought things to such a pass that, in the midst of

the dust so raised, he can seem to be saying one thing while he is really saying its opposite, and seem to be doing one thing while he is only doing another, he takes advantage of the confusion to *seem* to be striking fierce blows at his giant, when, in reality, he is not touching his giant at all, nor able to touch him. Such, every reader of 'The Examination' can satisfy himself, is the natural history of this eccentric and frolicsome volume, in which we find self-contradiction upon every point which it asserts, and which, innocent as it is in itself, must, to some extent at least, remain for ever a discredit to the enlightenment of these days; for would it have been written, men will justly ask hereafter, if it was to have been read by a well-informed public? Would any one have attempted to pass off such a set of statements upon a cultivated age?

I have now explained the grounds upon which it appears to me to be far more reasonable, and even more generous to Mr. Mill, to regard 'The Examination' as a feigned attack upon Hamilton, than to regard it as a serious one, Mr. Mill having been reduced to the necessity of adopting this expedient of a sham from having discovered (unexpectedly, it would appear) that there was nothing in Hamilton that admitted of being otherwise attacked,—nothing that was really assailable. And I have said that, whether the attack is looked upon as a sham or as a real one, there is matter of much congratulation and triumph for those who do not hold the philosophy of Mr. Mill's party, and who do hold Hamilton's, in the very unequivocal acknowledgment thus in either case afforded, on the part of so popular and intelligent a writer as Mr. Mill, that our Anti-Rationalistic Philosophy and its renowned expositor are upon all points unassailable. I should not, however, wish it to be supposed that, when I speak thus highly of Mr. Mill (and I do so most sincerely), I am one of those who mistake popularity and intelligence for philosophical prowess; and it is well to disabuse our minds of this confusion before dealing with such a book as his. Even in the account given of him by those who think most highly of his ability, there is nothing to mislead us upon this point. The questions now under discussion arise in Logic and Philosophy. On neither subject has Mr. Mill evinced research; for neither, predilection. Neither subject has ever occupied his pen at all; nor has he ever done anything that could even suggest the possibility of his being a judge upon either subject. On this point there is a great

deal of misconception abroad respecting Mr. Mill's own pretensions. He wrote two very pleasing and instructive volumes in his earlier days on the various kinds of Evidence, viz., Analogy, Chances, Induction, etc., in which he mentions how much assistance he derived from Dr. Whewell's great works upon the Sciences. He called this production 'a System of Logic,' which, however, it was not in any sense; nor had it anything whatever connected with Logic in it, except a few pages in the first volume, with merely a brief summary of the ordinary principles, referring his readers for particulars to 'existing Treatises.' The work itself only dealt with the truth of our Assumptions or Beliefs either in daily life or in the Sciences, and with the best means of determining which of these Assumptions are to be relied on, and which not. This sort of Art being as necessary to the fishwoman as to the astronomer, is, of course, immensely more extensive in its uses, or, as Mr. Mill expresses it, a 'Larger' Art than Logic is; for Logic merely treats of what is *a priori* or necessary in this exceedingly extensive Art. Such was Mr. Mill's work, miscalled 'a System of Logic;' and notwithstanding Hamilton's silence respecting it, on account, no doubt, of its being entirely outside the domain of Logic, Mr. Mill enjoys a fair reputation, especially among Materialists, as the writer of these volumes upon the Principles of Evidence. He has also bestowed much careful and useful thought upon some branches of Political Economy; and this is his special subject—his *forte*; although even upon this subject many of his other conclusions are as much controverted as his Female Franchise Theory and his Malthusian or Anti-Marriage Theory. On these subjects he has written much, and with great ability. On Metaphysics, or the Higher Philosophy, commonly called, *par excellence*, Philosophy, he has never written at all; and not that only. He has all his life through studiously avoided its discussions, as studiously as he has in the work upon Evidence above alluded to, and has never been known, either in private life, or before the world, as a student—no, not even as a reviewer—of those great questions at which men work, under that unpopular name. We cannot, therefore, wonder to find that, mixed up with all his affected misapprehension of Hamilton, Mr. Mill labours under a large amount of misapprehension of him, and of other philosophers, which is thoroughly genuine and unaffected. Whatever allowance we may make for his not being in earnest, he betrays in every page of what he has written not only an insuffi-

cient acquaintance with the propositions and the terms before him, but something that looks extremely like a native inaptitude or incapacity for all such inquiries ; and (which, however, is less to be wondered at) of those who look upon him as in earnest, there are few indeed, even among Materialists and Rationalists, who are not secretly surprised to see no more than what appears to them the present paltry quibbling, put forward as a first Essay in Metaphysics by the son of the able Philosopher to whom we are indebted for the ' Analysis of the Human Mind.'

To conclude these preliminary remarks. The reader sees clearly that the main point is not, after all, to determine whether Mr. Mill is in earnest or not. He sees clearly that what I undertake to do is to prove to his complete satisfaction—

1. That everywhere Mr. Mill's statement against Hamilton is groundless ;

2. That everywhere Mr. Mill himself admits it is so.

This is what I have to make clearly out. This is what the reader has to determine whether I have made out or not ; and that I am not *unlikely* to be able to do so, even the more sceptical may at least suspect when they find one of the most indulgent and most able of Mr. Mill's critics—himself an eminent philosopher, and pronouncing Mr. Mill one—pointing out to him how he mistakes everything,—to what an extent he (Mr. Mill) is in his own book unconsciously assenting to the very doctrines he is there opposing,—to what an extent he introduces us to ' self-contradictions in ' Hamilton' which do not exist at all—mere phantoms of his imagination—to what an extent he misunderstands Hamilton, how entirely insufficient the depth of thought is which he employs upon these subjects, and how perplexing a task it is for his critics to make his critical judgment, if taken seriously, harmonize in these matters with common sense. Professor Fraser writes in the *North British Review* for last September, long before any other criticism had appeared :—' Mr. Mill in *many* places, in the logical as in the meta-physical chapters, so it seems to us, *exaggerates* his own *differences* ' with Sir W. Hamilton, and Sir W. Hamilton's *inconsistencies with* ' *himself*,—and sometimes by a *misconception* of the Hamiltonian ' meaning.' And again—' But if what seems, on a *superficial* ' interpretation, to be a shallow truism, is found to be a profound ' truth, . . . and if *the chief alleged contradictions disappear*, and ' the essential Hamiltonian theory, so far as it goes, is found to be,

‘ at any rate, *one with itself*, and largely capable of assimilation with the best ideas of this age, we must respectfully ask Mr. Mill to consider whether *this critical judgment* truly forecasts the place that is to be finally adjudged by the philosophical world to Sir ‘ W. Hamilton.’ . . . The italics are mine ; and the only conclusion that I ask the reader to recognise as following from such remarks made by one of Mr. Mill’s most enlightened and most indulgent critics is, that what is there stated as being true with regard to many of Mr. Mill’s statements *may* not impossibly be true of *all*. That it *is* true of all is what I pledge myself to prove, having carefully ascertained that it is so.

The judgment of the *Westminster Review* for the January of this year is the only other criterion I need suggest of what is not impossible or unlikely in this respect.

The reviewer admits that he ‘ passes over’ many of Mr. Mill’s charges against Hamilton without comment. Of those which he adverts to, in no single one does he concur entirely with Mr. Mill, in most of them very little, in many of them not at all ; and one of the latter is that very important one (‘ Examination,’ chap. vii.) respecting the Divine Nature, and the meaning of the expression Divine Goodness ; where the critic ably defends Mr. Mansel against the preposterous comments of Mr. Mill, but evidently under an impression that Mr. Mill was serious when he wrote them, which mode of regarding them, adopted by so many critics, must of course be of great assistance to Mr. Mill in the task to which he has committed himself.

These objections of this reviewer to Mr. Mill’s charges against Hamilton are, be it remembered, from the pen of one who is professedly not only a very partial critic, but one of Mr. Mill’s own party. None else write in the *Westminster Review* ; and as to the charges contained in the three important chapters discussed in Part I. of the present work, this reviewer’s words are as perfectly explicit as upon all the rest, showing very clearly that, as far as even these ‘ some of the best chapters in the volume’ are concerned, it is not at all unlikely that an impartial critic should be able to prove that all Mr. Mill’s statements against Hamilton are utterly groundless.

The reviewer writes thus :—‘ When Mr. Mill says (p. 33), “ I consider it nothing less than a misfortune that the words Con-
‘ cept, General Notion, etc., should ever have been invented,” we

‘dissent from his (Mr. Mill’s) opinion. . . . We are more fully
‘in harmony with Mr. Mill in his two next chapters (c. xviii. *et*
‘*seq.*) on Judgment and Reasoning, which are among the best
‘chapters in the volume. . . . But we doubt the propriety of his
‘calling this “the Conceptualist theory,” since it has nothing to do
‘with Conceptualism in the special sense of antithesis to Realism
‘and Nominalism, but is, in fact, the theory of the syllogism as
‘given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted since’
(p. 28).

The reviewer, we see, here says that Mr. Mill is not only wrong in the 18th and 19th chapters, when he accuses Hamilton of mixing up something he calls Conceptualism with Judgments and Reasoning (which is all that these chapters are written about), but is also thereby placing himself in antagonism to all logicians since the days of Aristotle. This does not look much like harmony, fuller or less full, between Mr. Mill and his reviewer even in these two chapters. Observe, however, further. The reviewer says he does not agree at all with Mr. Mill in his charges against Hamilton about General Concepts in the 17th chapter, but agrees with him more fully on what he charges Hamilton with in the two next chapters. But what is it to agree with a person *more fully than not at all?* The reader will understand this. And does not such a state of things in the case of a partial critic and a partisan suggest a very considerable probability that an impartial critic will be able to prove, as I undertake to do, that there is not one single charge of Mr. Mill’s against Hamilton, from one end of the volume to the other, which is not completely and ridiculously without foundation, even in those chapters which are regarded by Mr. Mill’s friends as the most unexceptionable portions of the whole book?

That Mr. Mill himself was aware of this fact—an equally important section of what I have to establish,—must be separately dealt with in each chapter. The only general indication that can be here mentioned, of his being conscious of this unbroken series of fictitious charges lies in the probability, whatever it is, that such a series can be proved against him. If the latter is probable, so is the former also. It is improbable, as I have said, in the extreme, that Mr. Mill should have written a whole book of these so-called ‘blunders’ without knowing it.

SECTION I.

ON CHAPTER XVII.—GENERAL CONCEPTIONS.

MR. MILL'S propositions against Hamilton, under the head of Logic, begin at Chapter xvii. The main point at issue in this chapter is this :—When we think of things in the abstract, what do we carry on our thoughts with? Do we then think with words, or with the meanings—the general concepts attached to words? Do we think by the aid of knowledge + words? or do we think by the aid of words alone? Hamilton holds that we then think with knowledge + words. Mr. Mill holds, or affects to hold, that we do this with words only. The thing may be thus otherwise stated :—Mr. Mill denies, it will be seen later, that we have a conception of an individual chair, quite as positively as he does that we have a general conception of the class of objects called chairs; or that, when we think of that class of things, we think by means of a general conception or knowledge of what we are thinking about. Mr. Mill holds that we have nothing in either case to work with but words + the objects themselves of which these words are symbols. We have no conception, he tells us, either of the individual object, or of its class,—no concept, as with precisely the same signification (Ham., Lec. iii. 41-2) the word is also spelt,—no concept of either of them. Although this is Mr. Mill's view of the matter, as we shall see abundantly hereafter, it is only incidentally in this chapter that he extends his remarks to our concept of the individual. He here professes to discuss the case of general conceptions (general concepts) only, or the concepts of genera. It is therefore to his remarks on this point that we require chiefly to confine ourselves. And Hamilton's doctrine here is, that we have thought-symbols to think with and word-symbols to speak with; the thought-symbols and the word-symbols being therefore sym-

bols of one another. And of the thought-symbols (or conceptions) of things, Hamilton is very careful to explain that, when we think of the individuals or concretes, this symbol is an image in the mind, or a mental representation of the object; but that, in the case of abstract things, the thought-symbol of the genus is not an image in the mind, or an idea, but only that sort of general knowledge or general concept which can never constitute an image in the mind. Mr. Mill, on the contrary, affects to hold that, when we think of abstract things, we think with word-symbols only, for which, when we employ them, we have no concept present to the mind, and that we are able, nevertheless, to distinguish these word-symbols (of objects) from one another without this concept or portion of their import being attached to them.

Such is the strange doctrine which is expounded throughout this chapter against Hamilton, and of which we find a brief expression in such clauses as these:—‘Is it correct to say, that we think ‘by means of concepts?’ (p. 330). ‘To say, therefore, that we think ‘by means of concepts, is only a circuitous and obscure way of saying,’ etc. (331). ‘I consider it nothing less than a misfortune that ‘the words (general) concept, general notion, or any other phrase to ‘express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a class-name, should ever have been invented’ (*ibid.*) ‘Leibnitz knew ‘better than to say that, even in these cases, we think by means of ‘the concept’ (336). ‘On this point, therefore, a false apprehension ‘of the facts of thought is conveyed by the doctrine which speaks of ‘concepts as its instrument. Leibnitz would perhaps have said that ‘the name is the instrument in one of the two kinds of thinking, ‘and the concept in the other. The more reasonable doctrine surely ‘is, that the name is the instrument in both’ (*ibid.*), etc., etc. Now how would it be possible (even a novice will ask) to use conceptless or meaningless words as instruments of thought? How is it possible (it may be rather asked) that a second-rate or a third-rate Logician, or even a person who is not a Logician at all, should be able to come to such a wild conclusion respecting what we think with?

Mr. Mill’s defence for himself and his ‘System of Logic’ upon this point is, that we cannot think about class-qualities, except by thinking of them as the qualities of something concrete. We cannot, he tells us, think of swiftness without thinking of some definite thing that is swift, nor of 4 and 5 making 9 without

thinking of apples or bonbons. These abstract qualities, so abstracted, cannot, we know, exist *in rerum natura*; but Mr. Mill supposes that we cannot even think about them so abstracted,—we cannot even think about them except when we think about them as in the individual. The term ‘horse,’ in the abstract, clearly denotes no individual. It therefore, says Mr. Mill, denotes, in that case, nothing at all. It has no concept. We have no conception of what we mean by it. We use it without attaching any concept to it, either individual or general! Again, he argues that when we use the term ‘horse’ in this way as a class-word, we do not use it of anything that admits of our having an *image* of it in the mind. This is quite true, but mark his inference. We therefore use it, in such cases, without attaching any meaning to the word at all—without thinking about anything signified. What makes Mr. Mill suppose that we cannot think of that of which an image is impossible? Mr. Mill has not the image in his mind of Alexander’s war-horse. Yet can he not think about it without this image? He has not among his thoughts the *image* of that concrete entity which we call the human spirit of Alexander himself. Yet can he not think about it perfectly well without an image—ay, and even whether he is able, or not able, to understand that such a thing as the human spirit has a real existence?

Mr. Mill seems to have been well aware that the rank nonsense of this little piece of antagonism about thinking of things without our having a concept of what we wished to think of, would have been at once discerned if he allowed the least light to break in upon it. He has, therefore, endeavoured to cloud it over with a number of minor issues supposed to be connected with the question; and it is by the aid of the dense confusion thus made that he seeks to persuade the audience that his giant is hit and felled *ad libitum* throughout the chapter. I shall now indicate these minor issues.

1. One of them is this, Mr. Mill tells us, that the Philosophical world is, or was, divided into two factions—the one holding that when we think of classes we think with general conceptions of what we think about; the other holding that we then think without any conceptions at all of what we think about. He seeks to fasten the name of ‘Conceptualists’ upon the former of these factions, and that of ‘Nominalists’ upon the latter. Now, all who have the most elementary acquaintance with the history of Metaphysics are aware

that there neither are, nor ever were, two such factions, schools, or parties in Philosophy, nor any such controversy; and that the two names, 'Conceptualist' and 'Nominalist,' have no such meaning attached to them by any one. In this sense of the term 'conceptualist,' there never was a Nominalist who was not a Conceptualist, nor a Conceptualist who was not a Nominalist. Mr. Mill and his System of Logic are here, as everywhere else, entirely at fault.

The Nominalists, it is well known, held, against the Realists, that the genus or class existed only as a general conception or notion, and nominally,—not, as the Realists supposed, *in rerum natura*. In this the Nominalists were always and everywhere unanimous. Among the British Nominalists, however, and owing, it would appear, to a defect in our language, there have been a few writers whose Conceptualism, or knowledge of the genus, was by some critics suspected of being something different from that of other Nominalists. Locke was one of these few writers. His language, especially his use of the word 'idea,' has created some uncertainty as to what he held respecting the conception attached by him to the class-name. Some of his critics have supposed him to have written as if he held,—not that we could not think without having a conception of what we thought about, for there never was a question upon that point among mankind, not even in the time of Roscelinus,—but that the conception of, or knowledge of, a genus or class was an image (or *idea*) in the mind, any such abstract image (or *idea*) being a thing utterly impossible. Of these critics of Locke, some, as Berkeley, attribute his language to inadvertence and mistake, or seem to do so. Others, as Hamilton, consider that Locke's language only *seems* to bear this construction,—that in reality it does not, and that Locke himself never intended to speak of *abstract images*, but only of the knowledge which we possess of what we are thinking about.

The only objectionable sense that has ever been attributed to the language of Locke, or of the few other British writers now adverted to, is that here indicated, viz., that we have a mental image of a genus; but no one has succeeded in making it very clear that their language admitted of such a sense. Even Dugald Stewart, who writes so much about them and their supposed views, calling them 'Conceptualists' *par excellence*, admits over and over again that he is not quite sure what they mean to express in the language they use. 'It is not,' he says, 'a very easy matter to ascertain precisely

‘ what was their opinion on the point in question,’ viz., as to what was to be understood by *forming a general conception*—(*Collected Works*, ii. p. 189, etc.); and he acknowledges that he could only offer a conjecture on the subject. Surely this can hardly be spoken of as a great Philosophical Party (which is what Mr. Mill calls it), or to the smallest extent as a Party at all; for no one ever yet defended the supposed hypothesis, that we have a mental image of the genus; nor, as I have said, is it at all clear that any one ever held such an hypothesis. Then, as to the identity of Conceptualists and Nominalists in all cases and all senses, Brucker observes, even in a passage produced by Stewart himself, that from a very remote period the name ‘Conceptualist’ began to be used in all parts of Europe indiscriminately with ‘Nominalist’ (‘*Nominales Conceptuales dicti sunt.*’—*Ibid.*) Of the Nominalists, whom Stewart calls Conceptualists, in a special sense of that term, Hamilton truly says, that it is all a mistake to suppose that they differed in anything from the rest of the Conceptualists, and that no such difference could ever have even been suspected where the language of the country distinguished, as the German words, *begriff* and *anschauung*, do distinguish, between the abstract notion and the concrete notion—between the knowledge or concept which consists of an image in the mind, and the knowledge or concept which does not. But there never was a Conceptualist even in this, the only obnoxious sense (of thinking with abstract images), who was not also, and at the same time, a Nominalist.

Thus every one of Mr. Mill’s statements against Hamilton is here, as everywhere in these pages, inconsistent with the fact. There is no controversy whatever between the Nominalists and the Conceptualists. There never was. These were but two names for one and the same party. The doctrine of the Nominalists is not to the effect that there is no general knowledge of, no general conception of, what we mean by a genus. Some of them, if we are to believe their critics, have even gone so far as to hold that our general conception of the genus is an image in the mind. Nor do they ever say, as Mr. Mill does, that the class-word ‘horse’ suggests to the mind either some one particular horse, or nothing at all. Nor does Hamilton anywhere make such absurd statements on his own behalf. To affirm (as Hamilton affirms) that the Conceptualist does not ever really mean to say that we can have a general image in the mind, is not to affirm that we can have it, or that we do have

it, as Mr. Mill supposes Hamilton to affirm. To assert that the one statement is the other, is only the 'general mode of thought and habitual phraseology' of a giant-killer, not of a truth-seeker. In not one single passage does Hamilton affirm—on not one single occasion does he not strongly deny—that our concepts can ever be the abstract or general image (or idea) attributed to those who were by Stewart called 'Conceptualists.' Hamilton's propositions here are these two,—*first*, that general names have general concepts; and *secondly*, that no general concept can be an image in the mind. This is what Mr. Mill thinks ought to puzzle us in Hamilton's teaching; for it puzzles him, he says. He does not see how we can think of anything but images. But does it really puzzle him? or would he ever have chosen to pretend it did, were it not for the purpose of carrying on this sham discussion?

2. At p. 314 Mr. Mill makes a playful statement, with the intention that, to the undiscerning reader, it should appear a very grave one. He never loses an opportunity of illustrating his pet theory of inseparable association, and accordingly here tells us, apropos of abstract ideas, that the reason we cannot think of a human being who is 'neither tall nor short (nor intermediate), neither fat nor lean, neither black nor white (nor any other colour), neither man nor woman, neither young nor old (nor intermediate), but all and yet none of these at once,' is because we have never yet found such a human being in our experience (pp. 264-270); but that, whenever we do find a few such, or perhaps a whole nation of them, we shall recognise the fact now insisted upon by him, that there is no *a priori* impracticability in the hypothesis of an abstract human being. He even suggests that we may *reasonably* expect some fine day to discover an abstract human being of this description, or a nation of such, Expectation (p. 190) being native to men's reason! The existence of abstract ideas, as well as that of abstract objects, is not impossible, but is only made difficult by Unvarying Association! Was there ever such nonsense written? (See pp. 317, etc., and 338.)

3. Hamilton speaks of the concrete concept, or the concept of the concrete, *i.e.*, such as constitutes an image in the mind—such as can be realized in thought—and of the universal, or abstract, or general concept, *i.e.*, such as does not constitute such an image—such as cannot be realized in thought; and when he says that concepts *can* be made universal by abstraction, or, as he justly ex-

presses it, are potentially universal. Mr. Mill affects to think that this must be said of concepts already universal (p. 317); that what Hamilton says is, that concepts already universal can be rendered universal! But how, Mr. Mill, can that which is universal be rendered universal? Can anything be more universal than universal? and, pray, what is the supposed point in the platitude, which here follows, that although a concrete concept is not potentially universal, you think it is universally potential? Have you any clear meaning attached to your phrase, 'a potential concept?' What sort of concept is it? But Mr. Mill well knows that there is not here even the shabby joke that he pretends to. It is written only for those who do not understand him. It is all Pantomime.

4. Hamilton says, and all philosophers admit, that the mind *figures to itself* its images or ideas of things, and *understands* the relations subsisting between these images. It does not figure to itself the relations. It cannot do this. It merely thinks about them, discerns them, or understands them. Of all this (a distinction which Hamilton nowhere 'negatives,' but everywhere insists upon) Mr. Mill affects to dispute the accuracy (p. 318). He affects not to see that 'to realize in thought' and 'to represent in imagination' are both used by Hamilton of images in the mind, *i.e.*, of ideas or concrete notions; and that when Hamilton speaks of understanding things, or exercising thought about them, he does not necessarily speak of their being depicted to the imagination. The one thing is said of relations, the other of the objects between which these relations subsist. This puzzles Mr. Mill, he tells us, very much. He does not see that to think about a thing does not necessarily mean to have an image of it. But no one with the slightest philosophical power will have any difficulty. Mr. John S. Mill fearing this, and seeing himself thus driven by the giant into a corner, calls in another giant to his aid. He 'apprehends' (p. 318) that Berkeley would not have recognised a different action of the mind in the case of a relation and in the case of an object. Berkeley would not, Mr. Mill 'apprehends,' have only *thought about* the one and *had an image* in his mind—an idea—of the other. Is Mr. Mill so sure of that? Does he not know what distinction Berkeley draws between relations and objects in this respect,—between having a notion (or knowledge) of a thing and having an idea of it—an image of it in the mind? Let him turn to 'The Principles of Human Knowledge,' section 142, and let

him there read, 'It is also to be remarked that we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relation or habitudes between things.' Will Mr. Mill tell us if this is not saying distinctly that we image one kind of subject and think about another? 'Why do I talk of Berkeley?' asks Mr. Mill. Why, indeed? But Mr. Mill well knows that his motive in talking of Berkeley was to employ a little *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, where he had reason to hope that such an argument would be effective. So the Giants, that are expected to fight, shake hands.

5. Finding himself foiled at this point, and that there really is this distinction made and to be made between 'thinking about' a relation and 'imagining' the objects between which the relation exists,—that a relation cannot have a mental representation, though an object can, and that Hamilton nowhere 'negatives' this distinction, Mr. Mill turns to a fresh point, admitting this one, but slurring over the fact of his admission. He admits that relations can only be thought of, not imagined; but asks (p. 319), with marvellous *naïveté*, How is the universal concept a relation? He suddenly remembers, however, that Hamilton had taught him this in the quotation at p. 310, and muttering something about qualities not being general notions, but only the occasion of general notions, he, in his own ungraceful manner, admits himself at fault here also,—'Ah, yes; well, it will not hurt me to abandon this objection. However inappropriate the truth here is, however inappropriate it is just now to speak of a universal notion as a relation of resemblance, I admit it is one.' Such is the substance of Mr. Mill's words in the passage criticised.

6. The next expedient of which he bethinks him, in order to make it appear that Hamilton's general notion is an image, is to avail himself of the confusion connected with the not very English expression, 'to think a chair,' 'to think an inkstand,' etc., instead of to imagine a chair, to figure to one's-self an inkstand. This language is common enough now-a-days even in good writers, and Mr. Mill has appropriated it, using it much too often for him to plead ignorance of its import. But there is also the ordinary expression of very different import, 'to think about or of a chair,' 'to think about or of an inkstand.' We thus have two totally different meanings attached to the same word differently used, viz., to think a thing, and to think of or about a thing; and when

Hamilton uses the latter about relations, Mr. Mill affects to regard this as of the same import as the former, and to conclude that when Hamilton says we think of a relation, he means we have an image of one in the mind. I grant (he says) that an abstract concept and a concrete concept are, as Berkeley teaches, two totally distinct and different things,—the one an image or idea, the other a mere notion and no image. I grant, also, that the abstract concept is a relation, and cannot, therefore, be an image. But what I assert is, that Sir W. Hamilton contradicts himself, and negatives this distinction, when he says that the relation, though it cannot be imagined, *can be thought; though it cannot be imagined, can be imagined!* Mr. Mill knows very well that Hamilton makes no such statement; and, accordingly, seeks to thicken the confusion here by arguing that as a general notion is a relation, and a relation requires images of the related objects, it follows that the relation itself must be an image! Is this indeed true? Is the relation between two colours a colour? or between two sounds a sound? Is Mr. Mill so poor a Logician as not to see his own equivocation both in this remark and in the one preceding it? No. Hamilton does not contradict himself. He says nothing that identifies a relation and an image.

7. Mr. Mill represents Hamilton (pp. 337, 338, and elsewhere) as constantly vacillating between the two meanings of the term 'concept,' its abstract meaning and its concrete, whereas Hamilton never vacillated on the subject. He said that the word had two meanings, viz., only the qualities in which objects resemble one another, and these superadded to all the qualities by which they are distinguished from one another, and Hamilton used it in both, but without the slightest vagueness as to which meaning he in each case intended, saying, nevertheless, that the term ought, properly speaking, to have been limited to a single meaning. In all which Mr. Mill follows him. There is not the slightest vacillation or inconsistency in the matter.

Another giant is then put forward to engage Hamilton, although he does not seem in the least to do so. Mr. Mansel speaks of the mental image of a thing as the concept of the thing quite as distinctly as Hamilton does, and even a little more so. Mr. Mill then seeks to disparage Mr. Mansel's acquiescence in Hamilton's views, by saying that when we speak of a thing we do not speak of it as it is known, but as it is in itself. This is a monstrous mistake of

Mr. Mill's. We are obliged to be satisfied to speak of it and think of it as it is known. We have nothing else to deal with or speak of but *it, as it is known*. We know nothing of it as it is not known. If we speak of it otherwise than as it is known, we shall get into pretty difficulties.

Mr. Mill further seeks to effect this disparagement of Mr. Mansel's views, by pretending that 'the concept of a thing' means each person's own concept or knowledge of it. Now, it never means this. The concept of a thing denotes that knowledge of facts and qualities which all the best informed persons have ascertained as our correct knowledge of it, not (as Mr. Mill mistakenly supposes) what this or that ignorant person may fancy the thing to be.

Mr. Mill also says that, according to Hamilton and Mansel, if Cæsar reappeared on earth, this would be that all men's concept of Cæsar (including, of course, the length of time since his demise) corresponded minutely with that which we had of the living man before us; and Mr. Mill seems to think this fact fatal to our having concrete concepts, as Mansel agrees with Hamilton that we have. But what can Mr. Mill here mean? If Cæsar reappeared upon the earth to-morrow, would our concept of him then not be identical with that of yesterday? would the two concepts then not be of identically the same object? Or, if they were identical, would it not be true that Cæsar would have reappeared upon the earth? Surely Mr. Mill did not here mean the quibble that emerges in his words. Or again, if there were a dozen Julius Cæsars, our concepts of whom were identical, *i.e.*, of each of whom we knew exactly and minutely all the same things, without even variation in time or place, should we have more than one Cæsar to think of, and one concept to deal with? and if these twelve concepts, otherwise identical, varied in time and place, should we not naturally and necessarily think of each Julius as a separate Julius, instead of as the only Julius? Where is the supposed absurdity in all this except in the fact of its being introduced here by Mr. Mill as a reason for supposing that we cannot have a concept of the individual? But the drollest part of this droll page (339) is where our frolicsome critic, forgetting all his recent animadversion and depreciation, tells us that the giant he was fighting with is stronger than the one he brought in to oppose him,—that it will not do to kick against the pricks any longer, and that the true doctrine here, after all, is that of Sir William Hamilton, not that of Mr.

Mansel, although both hold precisely the same doctrine, viz., that we *have* concepts of individuals as well as generic concepts, and that these concrete concepts are images or presentations in the mind.

8. Finally, another Giant is ushered in. Sir William and Mr. Mansel (we are told) are not nearly so clear or correct on the subject of concepts, the concepts of the Nominalists, as Dr. Reid! I need not reply to such a comment. The fact is, that not only the statements of all three upon these concepts—both the individual ones and the generic ones—are, as every one knows, precisely identical; but that nothing can exceed Reid's explicitness as to the fact that all Nominalists were Conceptualists, describing as he does the question between them and the Realists as being 'Whether genera and species do really exist in nature, or whether they are *only conceptions* of the human mind.' (Ham. edit., p. 406.) But Mr. Mill's remark here, and all his remarks respecting concepts, would, from their captiousness and irrelevance, lead one to suppose him to be extremely dissatisfied with himself and his 'System of Logic' upon this point, to be engaged now for the first time in the thorough study of the question, and to be unable, as yet, to understand the great men who had already mastered and expounded it, all which he endeavours to conceal under this irrelevance and this captiousness.

I must not omit to state, that, as usual in all review-articles, where we buy, with a little praise, some credit for all our censure, or, with a little censure, some credit for all our praise, there are, after page 321, some ten pages in praise of Hamilton, and indeed even of Mr. Mansel, with powerful and beautiful passages quoted from their works on Logic, which leave all Mr. Mill's own writing on that subject far behind. This praise, however, is expressed with a patronizing air, which makes us smile when we consider the patron and the patronized, and when we reflect upon the poor self-praise in which it is intended to result. But all this is harmless; and as to the note placed at the end of the chapter to introduce its little *jeu de mots*, about not having a clear conception of what makes a conception clear, that also is very harmless. It can mislead no one, and requires no comment.

I have now examined each of Mr. Mill's propositions in this 17th chapter, both the leading one (that we do not think with concepts), and the minor ones, eight in number, and we see how

completely and evidently fictions of the imagination they all are. We see also that it is impossible, in the case of one so good-natured and intelligent as Mr. Mill, to account for such misstatements either by extreme ignorance and thickheadedness, as so many have done, or by vindictiveness and malice, as others seek to do, or by any other hypothesis than by supposing a practical joke aimed at, and the stage-effect which these statements afford, of confusion, haze, and mystification, under cover of which we are entertained with a grand *mêlée* of the Giants—Berkeley, Mansel, Whately, Leibnitz, Hamilton, Locke, Kant, and Reid,—all in turn overpowering, we are told, and overpowered, while the Giant-killer in the midst is enabled to appear, to his admiring audience, as striking heavy blows all the time with the sledge-hammer at his great adversary ; ay, on many occasions, as felling him to the ground. On the dispersion of the haze, however, at the close, we behold, to our surprise, the intellectual Giant of Scotland erect and magnificent and calm, as before, among his peers, not having been even touched by his little foe. It is Jack, on the contrary, as usual, who from his exertions in pirouette and somersault, is found upon all-fours at the end of the chapter, picking himself up with the awkward gestures of one who has come off second best in some affray, real or imaginary.

It only remains to show, by a few brief quotations, that Mr. Mill, although intent upon a joke, was not intent upon being thought a blockhead ; and that, consequently, with regard to the leading proposition, about our thinking with concepts (to which it was hoped that an air of probability and profundity would have been given by all the minor cavils of the chapter), he has, as usual, unequivocally withdrawn all he said.

He acknowledges as follows :—

1. That he was well aware he was wrong in condemning Hamilton for holding that we think with concepts. ‘ With the exception ‘ of a few minor matters, I find no fault in his theory ’ (p. 329). ‘ No one more fully than Sir W. Hamilton recognises the true ‘ theory ’ (p. 331).

2. That, when Hamilton says that we think with concepts, as well as words, he really says nothing contrary to what Mr. Mill himself intends to convey, when Mr. Mill says that we do not. ‘ To say that we think by means of concepts, is only a way of saying that we think by means of general or class-names. . . . It is ‘ possible so to define the terms that both expressions shall mean

'the same thing' (p. 331). 'The doctrines which they (those who hold that we think with concepts as well as words), have laid down respecting Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning (the mental results) have been capable of being rendered into *equivalent* statements respecting Terms, Propositions, and Arguments'—the verbal results—(p. 341).

3. That all writers upon these subjects (*i.e.*, all except Mr. Mill himself, or, as he prefers to express it, a great majority) are agreed with Hamilton that we think by means of concepts as well as words—are, in fact, like Hamilton, Nominalists instead of Verbalists. To read the account which he and Mr. Mansel, in common with the great majority of modern Logicians, give of our intellectual processes,—which they always make to consist essentially of some operation practised upon concepts,—no one would ever imagine that concepts were not distinct possessions of the mind, habitually dealt with by it quite apart from anything else'—apart from the object, for instance, of which it is the concept, or, if it is a general concept, apart from the mental image to which it belongs—(p. 331).

I have now shown that Mr. Mill withdraws everything which he affects to allege in this chapter against the general doctrine of all enlightened men, that we think with concepts. He admits that it is the doctrine of all enlightened men, if we except himself. He then admits that it does not differ, except in the minor matter of expression, from his own theory, the opposing parties here being, as Hamilton had taught him (p. 310), really at one. He admits, in short, that he holds Hamilton's and Mansel's theory on this point as much as they hold it themselves, and that this theory, as held by them, is perfectly true.

It may appear sufficient to have said thus much upon Mr. Mill's so-called 'Examination' of thinking with concepts instead of, as Mr. Mill had been supposing possible, thinking with words. Two important points, however, remain to be adverted to, as throwing light, Mr. Mill would say, on the character of the whole volume.

1. Mr. Mill says that although he sees that there is nothing really inaccurate in saying that we think with concepts, and that Hamilton was quite right in saying that 'the opposing parties are at one,' there nevertheless seems to him to be something more circumlocutory, and therefore less clear as well as more misleading,

in saying that we think with meanings to our words than in saying that we do not,—in saying that we think with concepts than in saying that we think with words. He writes thus:—‘To say, therefore, that we think by means of concepts, is only a circuitous and obscure way of saying that we think by means of general or class-names’ (p. 331). ‘I consider it nothing less than a misfortune that the words “concept,” “General Notion,” or any other phrase to express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a class-name should ever have been invented’ (p. 331). ‘The proposition, that we think by concepts, is . . . an unprecise and misleading expression of the truth’ (p. 341). Here, then, if any doubt remains on the reader’s mind as to the object of this chapter, he has to determine with himself, for Mr. Mill does not tell him, in what respect it is more circumlocutory, obscure, or misleading to a novice to say that we think with meanings or concepts, than it is to say that we think without them.

2. Since, however, Hamilton is, according to Mr. Mill’s admission, right in saying that it is with the meanings of words *plus* the words—not with the words alone—that we think, and that there really never was any room for controversy as to this point, Mr. Mill next suggests, apparently for no other purpose than in order to *seem* still to have something to say against Hamilton, that we should not call the meanings of words ‘concepts,’ but that we should call them ‘significations’ rather, or, still better, that we should employ his own little pet term ‘connotations,’ expressly invented by himself for this very purpose, and call them the ‘connotations’ of words; adding, by way of encouragement, that, as in Locke’s case so in Hamilton’s, this trifling alteration of a word would bring the writer up to Mr. Mill’s own level, which Mr. Mill naturally regards as the highest scientific level of the age. He writes thus:—‘I hold that nothing but confusion ever results from introducing the term “concept” into Logic, and that, instead of the concept of a class, we should always speak of the “signification” of a class-name’ (p. 332). ‘Little amiss except a mode of expression’ (p. 341). Alluding to Locke’s having also held that we think with meanings to our words, which meanings, however, Locke by an oversight called ‘Abstract Ideas’ instead of general notions or general concepts, Mr. Mill observes:—‘His admirable Third Book requires hardly any other alteration to bring it up to the scientific level of the present time, than to be corrected by

' blotting out everywhere the words " Abstract Idea," and replacing ' them by the " connotation" of the class-name' (p. 341).

These, then, are the two expressions—' significations' and ' connotations'—which are proposed to us as obviating the circuitous, obscure, and misleading character of the term ' concept!' Also as elevating us to the highest scientific level of the age! To think, then, by means of the significations of class-names, and, out of compliment to Mr. Mill, to think by means of these so-called ' connotations' of class-names, are phrases rather less circuitous than to think with the concepts of class-names; also less obscure and less misleading to those who do not understand the subject, nay—and let us not forget that—connected likewise with our scientific elevation! Will Mr. Mill be good enough, out of compliment to common sense, to point out in what respect he wishes us to believe that Hamilton's expression involves more circumlocution, more obscurity, or more misguidance than either of the phrases he proposes? Of course I am aware that *he* does not suppose his expressions to be better than the common one, which is also Hamilton's. I only ask in what respect he wishes the uninitiated multitude, for whom alone he writes, to believe that they are better.

Nor does he stop here. Other substitutes suggest themselves to him in the course of the chapter. At p. 330, for instance, where he is loudest in his denunciations of the circuitous, obscure, and misleading term ' concept,' he, with admirable gravity, proposes one of these substitutes—thus, ' Is it correct to say that we think by ' means of concepts? Would it not convey a clearer meaning to ' say that *we think by means of ideas of concrete phenomena, such as ' are presented in experience or represented in imagination, and by ' means of names which, being in a peculiar manner associated with ' certain elements of the concrete images, arrest our attention on these ' elements?*' (p. 330). This less misleading to the uninitiated! This rather more clear also for them, and less circuitous for all of us, than the common phrase ' to think by means of concepts.' Surely this must be what he means by a mode of expression attempting to be more philosophical than it knew how to be. But what on earth could Mr. Mill have hoped for from writing such rodomontade as this even for the unlearned of our enlightened times? Has he formed so very low an estimate of the understandings of the unlearned,—of those admirers for whose entertainment he has undertaken in these pages to overthrow a Giant?

We see then that, even upon Mr. Mill's own elaborate showing, it is not wrong to hold, nor either circuitous or obscure or misleading to say, that (as Hamilton taught, and as we all are conscious) we think by means of concepts as well as words. We see also that this whole chapter of thirty pages, with all its playful swaggering animadversion, is a mere sham, not really intended by its author to have a place in the serious literature of his country.

Those who here find themselves in the not very comfortable position of having been, by their applause of Mr. Mill, or by their grave censure, unconsciously supporting a Pantomime, will be very likely to complain that I make no allowance for a mistake, that Mr. Mill may have made a mistake as well as another man, and that I ought to have pointed that out, instead of ascribing the consequences of it to the tricks of the circus.

My reply is this, If every chapter in Mr. Mill's book were not, like this, each with its own full complement of circus tricks in it, I should myself have thought it sufficient to have proceeded in the usual way. But, as the book now stands, it would only be playing into Mr. Mill's cards—only joining his circus—that I should do so. In an ordinary case I should have dealt with this chapter as follows: I should have said, This writer makes a mistake. He writes thirty pages to show that we do not think with concepts + words, as all are agreed we do, but with words only; and what deceives him is that he never in his statements uses the alternative 'but with *words* only.' He always says 'but with *names* only;' forgetting that a name is a concept + a word, or a word + a concept, and not by any means a word without a concept. Thus, when he very justly saw that we think with names only, he supposed this to mean that we think with words only; whereas it means precisely the same thing as our ordinary expression,—to think with concepts as well as words. This sort of criticism would be just and reasonable enough in an ordinary case, and would account for everything; but I have too good an opinion of Mr. Mill's discernment to suppose it possible that such a criticism could apply to him. He knows very well that the term 'name' means a concept as well as a word, although he uses it to serve his purpose of confusion throughout this chapter as synonymous with 'word.' Or I might have, with great plausibility, described Mr. Mill as deceived by the fact, that *abstract* qualities cannot be thought of as existing; and holding that they, therefore, cannot

be thought of at all,—cannot even be thought of as not existing. This also would have accounted abundantly for all the ‘ blunders ’ of this chapter ; and it is possible that the entanglement here supposable may have encouraged the author to enter upon the rest of the mystifications in these thirty pages. But is it credible that Mr. Mill was himself mystified—himself entangled ? Out upon such rubbish ! Besides, as I have asked before, are we to suppose that Mr. Mill has written a whole book, consisting entirely of these mistakes from beginning to end ? Yet this is what those must hold who seek thus to interpret his 560 pages. No, no ; Mr. Mill knows well what he is doing. He makes no mistake ; at least, none of *that* very clumsy order. He has a reason just now for seeming to have a successful struggle with a Giant, which seeming can, of course, be only managed by contrivances. These contrivances, therefore, are what he aims at. Mr. Mill makes no mistake.

SECTION II.

ON CHAPTER XVIII.—JUDGMENT.

WE see, then, that it is a perfectly true theory, and perfectly correct to say, that we think by means of concepts, and that even Mr. Mill admits this as fully as any one can admit anything. He admits that all that there is amiss in this proposition—the only difference that there is between it and his own—is that it contains the term ‘concepts’ where his own has ‘significations’ (p. 332); and this Mr. Mill admits to be a mere verbal difference, of no other consequence, he thinks, than that it might mislead an ignorant person into the belief that we could form a mental representation—a mental image—of a genus, Mr. Mill having apparently sometimes had some impression that the term ‘concept,’ in Hamilton’s use of it, expresses only a mental image such as we have of a single object, whereas it applies equally in his writings to the general notion that we have of many objects. I say ‘sometimes,’ because, as we have seen already, Mr. Mill, when it suits his purpose of confusion, takes up the opposite impression, that Hamilton never uses it to denote the mental image of a single object.

In the first page of this chapter, Mr. Mill not only recapitulates this abandonment of his first point respecting what we think with, but voluntarily superadds the further admission that Hamilton’s view of Logic (which is, as we have seen, that of all Logicians) must stand or fall with the proposition that we think with concepts,—that, as Mr. Mill expresses it, it is ‘wholly grounded on ‘that proposition’ (p. 341).

Now, it is not a little startling to find that, notwithstanding the two admissions thus made—the one extorted, and the other volunteered,—Mr. Mill nevertheless glides back at once again to the protection of the bugbear which he has constructed out of

something that he calls 'conceptualism,' to frighten the giants with, and proceeds, in the same first page of the chapter, to controvert Hamilton's doctrine of Logic, in the case of Judgment first, and then in that of Reasoning, *expressly because*, as he there informs us, Hamilton has so founded this doctrine that it must stand or fall with the principle that we think with concepts, and *expressly because* there is only a verbal difference between this principle and his own. 'We shall ACCORDINGLY proceed,' he says, 'to 'examine' (read, to find all sorts of fault with) 'the explanation of 'Judgment and of Reasoning which Sir W. Hamilton has built on 'the foundation of the doctrine of concepts.' But we must not wonder. There is as much consistency in this act of Mr. Mill's as we need ever expect to find in the hero of our little Epic.

I shall, however, take the liberty here of keeping him to his admission, that, in this matter of using the expression 'concepts of 'words,' instead of 'significations of words,' there is nothing amiss except a mode of expression which he thinks apt to mislead the ignorant, and that, as far as that is concerned, therefore, Hamilton's view of Logic being wholly grounded upon it, and upon nothing else, rests, by Mr. Mill's own account, upon a solid foundation. Let us now next attend to what he finds amiss,—apart from the 'conceptualist' bugbear, and a mere mode of expression,—in Hamilton's account of Judgment, and what he writes the twenty-four pages about, of which this chapter consists.

MAIN ISSUE.

It will be seen that what he here objects to—let us say, affects to object to—in Hamilton, is Hamilton's saying that, of the two concepts compared in each judgment, 'the one concept is actually a part of the other' (p. 345). If Hamilton had only said 'co-existed with the other,' our worthy critic could have stood that; but when Hamilton speaks of a logical whole, when he speaks of the relation of whole and part between these two concepts, as all other Logicians do, from Aristotle downwards,—when he says that one concept is, not *along with* the other, but *a part of* the other,—then indeed the Giant-killer can stand the thing no longer, then indeed Hamilton is outrageously—multitudinously—wrong, and the Giant must be 'brought down.' Let us look a little into this.

Most people who know anything at all of Logic, know that there

are two Logical wholes,—the Individual and the Class,—the concrete totality or Individual, and the generic (abstract) totality or Class. The Individual is a whole, inasmuch as it contains in it, as parts of it, the qualities constituting the class to which it belongs; and the Class is a whole, of which all those individuals that are classed under it are regarded as the parts. The first is, strictly speaking, called a Metaphysical, the second a Logical whole; but it is equally true that they are both Logical wholes. Thus, when we say the boat is swift, the swiftness is here a quality distinguishing the class which we may call ‘swift things.’ It is, we are informed by the proposition, part of the boat spoken of—part of a swift boat, therefore, and this, not as a piece of the timber is part of it, but, in a logical sense, as an attribute—as its shape or size is part of it; and we can have no difficulty in seeing that the swift boat is consequently in the relation of whole to the swiftness, its part, as well as also to the boat *minus* its swiftness. Likewise the swift boat is one of the objects that go to make up the class, swift things, *i.e.*, is part of that class. The class is here, therefore, in its turn placed in the relation of whole to the swift boat, its part. It ought further to be remembered, that the Predicate is sometimes called *the whole in Extension*, and the Subject *the whole in Comprehension*; also, that all the qualities or parts which go to constitute the Subject-Whole are said to *determine* it—to fix more fully what it is; and to be contained *in* their whole, not under it; whereas, in the corresponding expression, the individuals or parts of the Predicate-Whole are said to be contained *under* their class or whole, not in it.

When we say, moreover, that the whole has its part in it,—that the swift boat, for instance, of which we speak, is swift,—this is called in Logic an Identical proposition; and it is so to the speaker, inasmuch as it is only saying that a thing which we know to exist does exist, or, in other words, that a thing which is, is. It is only to persons unacquainted with the facts that this is not, or rather may seem not to be, an identical proposition. But, strictly speaking, it is so even to them. For they know that what is said is, or pretends to be, of a swift boat, and they know that what is said of it is that it is swift. This is what in Logic is meant by an Identical proposition; and a little reflection will show the general reader that all our propositions or assertions are of this nature. They all state that one part of the whole thing spoken of is one part of

it. They are all Identical ; and all writers are agreed that they are.

Also, when we discern that the whole has this or that part in it,—that the swift boat, for instance, of which we think, is swift,—has swiftness in it, or has a good shape, etc., this is judgment, and can only result from knowledge real or supposed. It consists in discerning the attributes or parts of the whole—as of the swift well-shaped boat,—and in separating these attributes or parts in our own mind from the rest, in order to let them be brought together as for the first time in the mind of the person unacquainted with them, when he hears them from us. The judgment that thus separates—*i.e.*, the judgment of the person who knows the facts—is called in Logic an *Analytic Judgment*, from the Greek word signifying to *separate into parts* ; and the belief or apprehension hereupon formed by the person previously ignorant, who now puts together in his mind the separated parts, is called by some a Judgment also,—a *Synthetic Judgment*, from the Greek word signifying to *combine* ; but it is clear that *this* mental operation, or its result, can only be called a judgment in a very lax sense. All judgments, therefore, respecting what we already know, or are supposed to know, are Analytic Judgments, whether we choose to call them synthetic results, or not, with respect to those who are thereby only learning, and do not previously know the fact we state. Thus, the boat is swift, is an Analytic Judgment, with reference to all who know the fact ; and a synthetic judgment, only with reference to him who now hears it for the first time ; and thus also it is clear that *every* proposition represents and expresses an analytic judgment, whether there be any mind to which this proposition suggests also what by Mr. Mill is called a synthetic judgment, or not.

It will greatly assist the general reader to see the mass of utter nonsense brought together by the dexterous champion of the Rationalists into this chapter, if he bears carefully in mind these technical terms, and the distinctions they are intended to convey. It is behind these, for the most part, that the supposed battle is fought.

Now, what Hamilton and all Logicians, great and small, from Aristotle to this hour, say is, that there can be no affirmative judgment except where one congruent notion or concept can be the quality of another. Size, for instance, and virtue, are compatible or congruent notions—they can belong to one and the same third

object,—but we cannot say that virtue is qualified by size, nor size by virtue. We can, therefore, see no point for comparison or judgment between physical extent and virtue. All Logicians have also said that every quality is, logically speaking, a part of the thing in which it resides,—a part of the whole made up of that quality, and of whatever the thing would be without that quality, the thing without this quality being the other part. A swift boat is regarded as a whole, consisting of the set of abstract qualities which we call a boat with the quality swiftness superadded to them. Hamilton calls this quality part of the whole group thus formed. He does not, nor do any of us, call it one of the abstract qualities understood by the term ‘boat,’ nor does he call it part of those qualities. He calls it part of a swift boat,—one of the qualities of the group in which it exists. And what is there that we can call the part of anything, if this is not a part?

What Mr. Mill insists upon throughout this chapter in opposition to the Logical world, and to Hamilton as its representative, is that all this is false; that a quality is not *a part of* the group of qualities of which it is one, but only *coexists* with the group,—is only placed *along with* its own group; that when we have a qualified object, this qualified object cannot be regarded as a whole of which each quality is a part; that a swift boat is not a whole consisting of the abstract quality swiftness, *plus* that set of other abstract qualities which we designate a boat. He will have it that, in all such cases, each quality can only be said to coexist with, or, as he expresses it, ‘along with,’ the whole group. He describes (p. 345) the entire difference between himself and Hamilton as being ‘the whole interval which separates *a part of* from *along with*,’ and says that the quality denoted by swiftness on the one hand, and the group of qualities which we call a swift boat on the other hand, can not only coexist with one another, but ‘can be simultaneously possessed by the same object’ (*ibid.*),—*i.e.*, by some *tertium quid*. This reads like a *mauvaise plaisanterie* intended to obstruct the argument. Does he mean by the owner of the boat? If not, pray, Mr. Mill, what is the *tertium quid* in this case? But Mr. Mill well knows that there is none.

The point here at issue is very clear, and in a nutshell. Is the swiftness of the swift boat *part of* the swift boat, or is it not? Is the notion or concept of this swiftness part of the notion of a swift boat, or is it not? Is it only superadded to that of a swift boat?

But why superadd,—or rather, how can we superadd what is already there? The question is not whether swiftness is part of a group of qualities in which it does not exist,—whether it is part, for instance, of a boat which is not swift. The question simply is, whether it is part of a swift boat—part of the qualities of which a swift boat consists? and can anything, I ask, exceed the childishness of saying that it is not?—or the unreasonableness of those critics who represent Mr. Mill as making this assertion otherwise than in jest, and in order to carry out this little imitation or pantomime of the real and celebrated Jack the Giant-killer of antiquity?

What Mr. Mill and all of us are agreed about is, that when we think of, or judge of, anything, we do so *from our knowledge of that thing*, or what we believe to be our knowledge of it. We do not think of, or judge of, a thing *from our ignorance* respecting it, or from what we suppose to be our ignorance respecting it. Mr. Mill nowhere seriously denies this—nowhere, perhaps, professes to deny it at all; nor could he, we see, make a single statement if he did; for if he does not know what he states, or believe he knows, or at least pretend he knows, how can he state it? This reflection makes it easy for us to see, what every one, even Mr. Mill, is agreed about, that all our judgments are Analytic judgments, whether, in the minds of others, they be attended with a synthesis or not; and that all our propositions, when fully and unelliptically expressed, are Identical propositions. When I say the boat is swift, it is because I know it to be so,—because I know it to be of a swift one that I am speaking; and because, speaking of it to others, I am able, from this knowledge, to indicate swiftness as a quality of it, and, therefore, as a part of it. If I do not know that it is a swift boat that I am speaking of—if all that I know is that it is a boat of some kind, I cannot do this. How, in such a case, could I possibly do this? To say that the set of abstract qualities which we call a boat has the quality swiftness among its other qualities, is simply not true. It could never be true. Hamilton, as I have remarked, does not say this. All that any one can possibly intend to say, all that he has said, is, that a swift boat consists of certain parts or elements, one of which is swiftness. Thus every judgment must proceed, can only proceed, from knowledge, not from ignorance. We cannot, therefore, say the boat is swift until we have the knowledge that it is so. But when we have this knowledge or concept

of a swift boat, we have a logical whole, of which swiftness is one part.

Upon what principle can it be that Mr. Mill, agreeing with us in all the rest of what has been here said, denies this use of the term 'part,' and asserts that the swiftness, instead of being a part of the swift boat, is only *added* to the *swift* boat, existing *along with* it; the swift boat and the swiftness constituting thus the two parts of some other unnamed whole? What does he mean by saying that the swiftness predicated of the swift boat—and which Hamilton says, being predicable of it, is part of it—is not *part of* it, but only *along with* it? If Hamilton had said that swiftness was 'an attribute or determination' of a boat not known to be either swift or slow, or known to be neither, and was part of it, this indeed Mr. Mill might very reasonably have objected to. Swiftness would be no part of such a boat, but would, when *along with* it, become a part—not, I repeat, of such a boat, but of a swift boat thus created, *i.e.*, of the whole that is made up of swiftness, and of the boat that was not known to be either swift or slow. If Hamilton had contradicted all this, Mr. John Mill's antics here would have resulted from a zeal for truth. But Hamilton has not done so, nor anything that could be mistaken for it. On the contrary, he has said very distinctly that swiftness could not be regarded as part of such a boat, and could not be predicated either as being part of it or as not being part of it; and that swiftness was part only of a swift boat,—of the group of qualities so called, of which group it was one; and assuredly it is this. The part of a whole is that without which the whole could not exist,—without which the rest of the whole is only another part. Thus if $A+B=a$ whole, then A is not part of B , but part of $A+B$; and B alone is as much part of $A+B$, as A alone is. We see then clearly that swiftness is not part of what we understand by the word 'boat,' nor said by any one to be so, but only of a swift boat; and we see beyond all room for question that it is that, since every judgment is analytic and identical. We see that when an attribute is predicated affirmatively of a thing, it is part of that thing; which is what Hamilton said, and all that he said, and what Mr. Mill denies, saying that to hold this as persistently as Hamilton and all logicians do, is being as consistent as we need ever expect Hamilton and the logicians to be!

I have now carefully looked at Mr. Mill's denial of Hamilton's statement (which statement, be it ever remembered, is, as I have just

said, that of all Logicians) in every possible point of view, just as if Mr. Mill were quite serious in making it, and as if he really were the blockhead that such a denial implies. But I am very far from thinking that he is. I am persuaded he intended it only for those ignorant and infatuated partisans with whom it has so well succeeded, and that it was merely a histrionic artifice whereby he should seem to be cutting off his Giant's head ; and an artifice highly creditable, indeed, it must be admitted to be, to the knowledge of the world, that suggested it. The stage-effect of the thing has been completely successful, and those of Mr. John S. Mill's critics are much nearer the fact than they suppose, who say that all that he has said against Hamilton is groundless, but that he himself is a very sharp and intelligent writer. All I would say to these critics is, Why do they not carry these two very just reflections a little further ?

But here, as in the last chapter, they will argue, Why may not Mr. Mill make 'a mistake,' as well as others? Why may he not be sometimes misled by 'a little *animus*?' I answer, as before, that it depends on the 'mistake.' It depends on whether the 'mistake' is one which only a blockhead could make, or one which even a sharp, clever reviewer like Mr. Mill might have fallen into ; and it depends also on whether the whole book consists of these, or whether we find but one or two of them. What I said of the former chapter and its ingenious misrepresentations applies here also. If there were in the whole book but one or two such misrepresentations as the present one, I should have concluded that they were 'mistakes,' and that the present one was a 'mistake.' I should have here concluded that when Hamilton says the quality, predicated of the group in which it exists, is part of the group, Mr. Mill *supposed* him to have said that the quality, predicated of the group in which it does *not* exist, is part of that group,—that swiftness, for instance, is part of the boat that is known not to be either swift or slow. But I appeal to the reader who can understand these words, whether this is not the mistake of the idiot instead of the mistake of a 'clever' man? And if, as we shall see, every chapter contains a similar 'mistake,' are we to go on, chapter after chapter, describing this nonsensical rubbish everywhere as the 'mistakes and oversights' of a 'clever' man under the influence of a little *animus*? Would this not be almost, if not entirely, lowering one's-self to the intellectual level of those 'clever' Rationalists who acknowledge themselves unable to see a single inaccuracy, or, at the utmost,

more than one or two inaccuracies, in the whole book? Would this not be to take part one's-self in Mr. Mill's ignoble pantomime? —for ignoble, with all humble respect and deference, he must allow us to regard it.

We see, then, that there is here no longer any question as to whether we judge of things by means of our conceptions of them, or whether we judge of them without having any conceptions of them at all. The whole question now between Mr. Mill and us, or, as he delights to say, between him and Sir W. Hamilton, is as to whether the attribute of a thing is part of the thing; not, be it well observed, as to whether one attribute of a thing is part of another of its attributes, nor as to whether that which is *not* the attribute of a thing is part of the thing, but simply as to whether the attribute or quality qualifying any object is or is not part of that object. Mr. Mill writes twenty-four pages of his book to prove that it is not part of it, and that Hamilton's ignorance is insufferable when he says it is; that no intelligible meaning 'emerges' from the statement; that much vagueness of thought lurks under the specious appearance of philosophical precision which distinguishes it; that it is the very *crown* of those *sown* things which resemble self-contradictions (what can Mr. Mill mean by this strange metaphor?); finally, that Hamilton's thus describing the attributes of things as parts of the things, makes one despair of ever getting at the truth of anything.

Moreover, as I have just said, the real question now at last is entirely about the things themselves and their attributes; not, as in the former chapter, about the symbols with which we think of either. It is necessary, also, to fix carefully our attention upon this; for much effort is here made to conceal the fact. Not only does Mr. Mill fully admit in the former chapter and in this that we can judge of things by our conceptions of them quite as well as we can, without any conceptions of them at all, by means of words only; but he also concedes it as indubitable, that whatever symbols we use (whether conceptions or mere conceptless words), the relation of part and whole, if it exists between the things and their attributes, will exist also between the symbols of these; as, for instance, if A is the symbol for a house, and B for a room in it, then if the room is part of the house, B also is part of A. What we have now to settle, therefore, regards only the things themselves, and the attributes themselves, not the symbols of them,

with which we judge of them. Are the attributes parts of the things, or are they not? That is the whole question, and of this, when set forth in honest language, every reader can judge.

MINOR ISSUES.

I next proceed to indicate the four arguments by which Mr. Mill seeks to make it appear probable that the attribute of a thing is not part of the thing—the predicate in a judgment not part of the subject, and with which he dexterously surrounds this point as with a circle of enchanted castles, in each of which, in succession, he professes to overthrow the Giant. He tells us that if the quality were part of the qualified object, as all Logicians assert, and Hamilton at the head of them, the four following inconsistencies would result:—(1.) This would contradict Hamilton's own statement exactly three pages previously in his Lectures. (2.) This would make it necessary to hold that we judge of things as we know them, not as they are in themselves. (3.) This would make it necessary to hold that we cannot predicate individuals of one another; and (4.) This would ignore the fact that all our judgments are attended with a synthesis in the minds of those who are unacquainted with the facts we speak of.

1. *'If the quality were part of the qualified object, the predicate part of the subject, the effect of this would be to contradict Hamilton's own statement exactly three pages previously in his Lectures.'* This is pure fiction. The terms in which Hamilton gives the definition of Judgment (quoted by Mr. Mill, pp. 344-5), saying that swiftness is part of a swift boat, *do not* contradict, as Mr. Mill supposes they do, the terms in which Hamilton gives the same definition (quoted pp. 341-2), saying that in judgment we discern the relation of congruence between a boat on the one hand, and swiftness on the other, inasmuch they are both parts of the subject or mental representation, a swift boat. Instead of a contradiction, there is, every Logician knows, the completest harmony between these two statements, as is well explained by Hamilton in the three pages which intervene between them in his Lectures. It is precisely because the qualities called a boat are compatible with the quality called swiftness, that swiftness can be part of a swift boat.

Hamilton explains, as quoted p. 343, that the relation of congruence, here intended, is 'coincidence,' the 'being blended into one,' or the being 'conceived as one;' and that this union can only be effected where one of the two things in question 'can be an attribute or determination of the other,'—where the swiftness, for instance, can be an attribute of the boat. It is, he explains (*ibid.*), impossible for us to think of, as one, two qualities, or groups of qualities, or a quality and a group, when neither of the two can qualify the other,—when they can both of them only qualify some one other thing, but not one another; as, for instance, magnanimity and length. Does Mr. Mill mean to tell us that this distinction is too profound for him? or if, contrary to what he pretends, he is able to see it, does he mean to say that, in the former case, each attribute in a group is not part of the group of which it is one, although, in the latter case, each attribute only exists *along with* the other attributes, and is not part of them? Every one of his readers, whether they acknowledge it or not, will discern, and be shocked to discern, Mr. Mill's 'misapprehension' here. It is that of a school-boy. There is not, it is obvious, the least self-contradiction in Hamilton's words. There is not even the semblance of any.

All that Mr. Mill seeks to make out in this place, from p. 341 to p. 346, about two *Theories* of Judgment, as he calls them, is too paltry to detain the reader with it, not to say too mean, in any other except that jesting sense which most people acquainted with these subjects will, I think, agree with me in attributing to the whole book. Nor is it necessary under this head to point out the utter ignorance of Logic exhibited at p. 342 and p. 345 in Mr. Mill's jumble of what Hamilton says so truly and so clearly about the congruence of two propositions (of riches and beauty, for instance, predicated of the same subject); and what he says, with equal truth and clearness, about the congruence of the two terms in the subject of any one proposition, Mr. Mill supposing that the congruence of unity, when swiftness and greatness yield great swiftness, is the same as the congruence of compatibility when the boat is large and swift, and Mr. Mill consequently peering, amidst the roars of his audience, into the notion swiftness for the notion greatness, and into the notion riches for the notion beauty, just as one would look for anything in an empty jug. Then, as to the childish question at p. 344, Do we ever think of electricity as being

characterized and conditioned by polarity, so that we can have but the one notion *polar electricity*? Do we ever think of swiftness as being characterized and conditioned by greatness, so as to have but the single notion *great swiftness* from them? Of such a question I need take no further notice than to remark, that all who are old enough to know what these words mean, know that we do; and, as a proof, if proof were needed, that Mr. Mill only employed here, as usual, the specious appearance of philosophical precision, and was well aware that there was no truth in what he said, he proceeds immediately *more suo* to contradict himself, and acknowledges, in answer to his own question, that we do think of them as a single notion, of which they constitute the two elements, just as two and two constitute the single notion four. His scornful question against Hamilton's illustration is, 'Do we ever think (of) the two attributes electrical and polar as *a single notion*?' His answer to his own question is (yes), 'We think (of) them as distinct parts of *the same* (single) *notion*.' Of course, he took it for granted that the class of readers for whom he wrote would here detect nothing; but are we to believe his critics adverse or friendly who tell us that he was serious when he asked that question?

2. 'If the quality were regarded as part of the qualified object (the predicate part of the subject), this would make it necessary to hold that we judge of things as we know them, not as they are in themselves' (see from p. 346 to p. 348 inclusive, and from p. 352 to the word 'Ptolemy' in p. 354). The first question that here suggests itself is, How are we otherwise to judge of things than as we know them,—than according to our knowledge, conception, or notion of them? How can we judge of them according to what we do not know of them,—without any knowledge or conception or notion of the things we judge of? As long as we have a thing present to the senses, we may say, in a certain vague sense, that we judge of the thing itself, but even then it is not strictly true. The thing itself is indeed before our senses, but how much of it do we correctly recognise? How much do we not add to it that is not in it? How much of it do we not omit altogether? Even then, with the thing before us as it really is, we judge of it only according to the notion, concept, or knowledge that we are then able to adjust or readjust respecting it; and we find, as all know, different people sometimes forming very different notions or conceptions of precisely the same sense-phenomenon. But when the sense-

phenomenon is no longer present, how else can we judge of it but according to our conception of it,—according to what we know of it? That we *can* otherwise judge of it is the cardinal point of Mr. Mill's alleged theory,—a point which he nowhere explains, and which every one of his readers will be able to see he cannot explain. We do not see, therefore, how our being thereby obliged to judge of things according to our conception of them would be any serious calamity, or constitute any very solid objection to our holding that the attribute of a thing is part of a thing, even supposing that these two propositions were, in any conceivable way, connected with one another. But they are not. Our proposition is, that, whether we have a conception of the thing we are talking about or not, whether we have any knowledge of it or not, the attributes of that thing are parts of that thing.

But this is not all under this head that requires to be adverted to. We have the dog here returning to the food which its stomach had just rejected. In the 17th chapter Mr. Mill acknowledged that there was no truth in what he had been saying against the doctrine, that we think with our conceptions of things, and not either with the real things themselves, nor yet with mere words; and in the first of the Minor Issues in the present chapter, in the first objection to qualities being parts of things (which occupies the first six pages of his chapter), we had Mr. Mill advancing boldly into the world of thoughts, knowledge, concepts, and notions, and thinking like other men, and speaking of our concepts of things as exactly corresponding symbols of the things themselves,—as so exactly corresponding, that to compare the one was to compare the other. Here he comes, however, before us once more with an evident relish still remaining for the old disgusting fiction about thinking without knowledge, and disguising himself in the grinning mask of this something he calls 'Conceptualism,' in the hope of frightening us back, if possible, into the confusions and meshes of his 17th chapter.

The question upon which we are now engaged is, he tells us (p. 345), as to whether the attribute of a thing is a *part of* its group, as well as *along with* the other attributes of its group; and this, he admits, is the whole question. He then tells us in the very next page, that the first objection to this, which, he thinks, must occur to any one is, that it would limit our judgments to our knowledge; that it would render it necessary for us to compare our con-

ceptions of things when we require to judge of the things themselves! As a reply to Hamilton's having used the expression 'a part of,' instead of 'along with,' he there puts this question,—What! Do we never compare anything but notions—anything but our conceptions of things? Do we never compare the things themselves? We may ask him in turn,—Does he never compare anything but notionless words? Does he never compare actual things instead of words? We shall probably, both of us, return the same answer, that it is things only that we do ultimately compare—that we are at all ultimately interested in comparing; but that we require symbols to compare absent things, and that we only compare,—he, his words, and we, our notions; because we employ these respectively as symbols of the things. We, on our side, say further, that notions are quite as good symbols of things as mere notionless words are. We will venture to add, much better. Nay, so much better, that we defy him to show how he can do anything at all with *his* symbols (viz., words alone), or how he can make a single step without some concept (or conception) of the thing he thinks about.

But even if he can think of a thing, as he pretends, without any conception whatever of what he is thinking about, will he be good enough to say how this proves that the attribute, which is one in a group of attributes, is *not* part of the group of which it is one? What is the meaning of putting forward such a puerile objection as this to the obvious fact, recognised by all Logicians, that the attribute is not only *along with* the other attributes of its own group, but is *a part of* the group itself? Would not this clearly be the case, whatever the symbols were (thought-symbols or word-symbols) which might be employed by us as the instruments of reflection? How can the attribute of a thing be part of a thing when the symbols employed are two words, and not be equally well part of it when the symbols are two thoughts? What are we to call such reasoning as that with which we are here presented?

But Mr. Mill goes further. He not only writes as if he considered that the impossibility of our having notions or conceptions of things would make it impossible for the attribute to be a part of its group, but he also leaves the question respecting the attribute which is now the sole question before us, and occupies two pages and a half in seeking to recover some of the rejected dainty, and to prove

that thinking with notions instead of words upsets all possibility of belief or truth. He frankly admits, however, *more suo*, (*ibid.*), that his statement is without the least foundation, reconciling himself to this abrupt failure of his reasoning upon some hocus-pocus principle which he calls 'the entire inversion of the logical process of definition.' It is therefore unnecessary to do more than to remind the reader that, even if the statement had been well founded, it would have had nothing whatever to do with the question respecting the attribute being a part of its group, and to draw the reader's attention to the other 'sowings of self-contradiction, which are crowned' here. Mr. Mill assures us also, that there cannot be such a thing as a false judgment, but only a true one, and that belief likewise is an 'essential element' in every judgment (p. 347). But before he finishes his two pages and a half, he, *more suo*, again admits that a judgment may be entirely false, as well as true, and entirely disbelieved as well as believed. What is a pantomime if this is not a pantomime?

3. '*If the quality were part of the qualified object (the predicate 'part of the subject), this would make it necessary to hold that we 'cannot predicate individual objects of one another, which in Hamilton would be an inconsistency.*'—The portion of the chapter in which Mr. Mill expounds himself upon this point extends from the end of p. 348 to p. 354, and is so preposterously inconsistent with fact throughout, as well as wholly constructed upon equivocal expressions, that I defy any of his admirers, any even of his most adverse critics, to make it, in the least degree, probable that he was serious when he put it forward.

Mr. Mill's object in it is to make it appear that Hamilton's definition of Judgment is inconsistent with Hamilton's teaching elsewhere.

To do this, Mr. Mill places before us two propositions. In one he asserts, without proof, that one individual object cannot be a part, *in Logic*, of another. In the other proposition he proves to us, at considerable length, that Hamilton regards one individual object as predicable of another.

When Hamilton, therefore, here states the predicable (or predicate) to be always a Logical Part, he denies, says Mr. Mill, that an individual can be the predicable.

Now, any one can see that the truth of this conclusion depends upon the truth of Mr. Mill's assertion that one individual cannot be the Logical part of another. This assertion, which is notoriously

contrary to all fact, he does not even pretend to prove, but lavishes pages of proof upon the other proposition (that Hamilton regards one individual as predicable of another)—a proposition too well known to require any proof at all.

This is the whole of the subject now to be considered; but I trust that the reader will bear with me while, for greater clearness, I set this matter before him in two or three further different expressions of it, rendered necessary by the large amount of complication with which Mr. Mill has endeavoured to invest it.

He here asserts, that since predicates are Logical (also called Metaphysical) Parts, one individual object cannot be predicated of another,—cannot be combined in judgment with another. He does not employ a single argument to justify this conclusion, but affects an *ignoratio elenchi*,—affects to mistake what he had to prove, and devotes the pages ostensibly occupied with this point to proving (what needed no proof) that Hamilton, as well as all other Logicians, considered individual objects predicable of one another,—capable of being judged of with reference to one another precisely in the same way as general concepts are.

In other words, Mr. Mill says that, according to the ordinary definition of Predication or Judgment as here given by Hamilton, the predicate is part of what is true of the subject, and that, as this is the case, one concrete object cannot be the predicate of another,—cannot be assigned as the qualifying circumstance of another, being unable, says Mr. Mill, to be the Logical part of another; yet that Hamilton is, in his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, guilty of the gross inconsistency of teaching that one concrete object can be predicated of another.

It is important to draw attention to the fact, that Mr. Mill himself, anything that he may have elsewhere said to the contrary notwithstanding, admits, as fully as any of us, that the predicate is always part of the subject, as stated in Hamilton's definition, and that a general conception cannot only be such a predicate, but also such a part. It is only of the individual object that he denies the possibility of its being either a predicate or a part. He holds, he tells us, that concrete objects differ materially in this respect from mere *genera*; that such objects can in no case be judged of with reference to each other,—in no case be predicated of each other; and he acknowledges himself to be driven to this extraordinary conclusion by the fact that such objects cannot be Logical

Whole and Part to one another,—a relation which, as I have said, he has the candour here to admit subsists between every predicate and its subject. We cannot, for instance, judge of St. Paul's, he says, with reference to London, so as to predicate London of St. Paul's in any relation whatever; and the reason of this singular peculiarity is, he further tells us, because London can constitute no Logical Part of it. The only possible part here, of any kind, is, we are told, St. Paul's, and that is a physical part, not a Logical one. His words are more explicit upon this point than he can generally afford to furnish us with. 'Now, a concept, that is, a 'bundle of attributes, may,' says Mr. Mill, p. 349, 'be a part of 'another concept, and may be a part of our mental image of an 'individual object; but one notion of an individual object cannot 'be a part of another notion of an individual object. One object 'may be an integrant part of another, but it cannot be a part in 'Comprehension or in Extension, as these words are understood of 'a concept. St. Paul's is an integrant part of London, but neither 'an attribute of it nor an object of which it is predicable.' Now, he is quite right in saying that, if concrete objects cannot be Logical Parts, they cannot be judged of with reference to one another,—they cannot be predicates. Hamilton and all of us agree with him in this. But why can they not be Logical Parts? Here is the whole question, yet here Mr. Mill maintains a profound silence, and merely relies upon our supposing that as London is not a physical part of St. Paul's, it cannot enter into it as a part in Comprehension,—it cannot, as an epithet, form a Logical Part of it.

We then have Hamilton's alleged inconsistency. What Mr. Mill works at in all this, is to make it appear that Hamilton, by saying, as we all do, that the predicate is part of the subject, unconsciously agrees with him in holding that there can be no judgment,—no predication,—of concrete objects, and yet that Hamilton has the absurdity to say elsewhere that there is this predication of the concrete. The agreement with himself, he wishes to persuade us, is clear from the passage just now quoted, expressive of his own conviction that the concrete is not predicable, combined with Hamilton's statement, that in every judgment the predicate is part of the subject. The inconsistency of this alleged agreement with Mr. Mill is, we are told, to be found in the first and second volumes of the Lectures, in which Hamilton explains how all our first predications are of concrete things only.

It is obvious that the alleged inconsistency, and the alleged agreement depend entirely, as I have already said, upon the truth or falsehood of Mr. Mill's assertion, that concrete objects cannot be Logical Parts; for all parties are agreed that to be capable of being a part in Logic is to be predicable. The whole question therefore is, are concrete objects not predicable? Can they not be such parts? Can they not be judged of with reference to one another? Can they not be combined in Judgment? One single reason for saying that they cannot Mr. Mill does not give. He gives plenty of unneeded proof that Hamilton holds the concrete to be predicable. He does not give one word of proof that the concrete cannot be a part in Logic as well as the abstract. To prove what did not require proof, and to leave unproved what did, is an *ignoratio elenchi*,—I will add, an affected one on Mr. Mill's part.

By means of this *ignoratio elenchi*, Mr. Mill seeks to make it appear that Hamilton is guilty of an enormous self-contradiction. This is the sole object of the six pages. All Logicians are agreed—1. That Predication or Judgment employs concrete objects as Predicates quite as much as it employs abstract qualities for that purpose; and 2. That all Predicates are Logical Parts of their respective subjects. Mr. Mill affects to think these two propositions incompatible with one another; but instead of showing how they are so, or that they are so, he takes it for granted that this is clear to the reader, and employs long quotations and a large amount of his 'triumphant animadversion' in proving, as if this were what he had to prove, that Hamilton held the first of these propositions (about the concrete predicates), hoping that we should infer for ourselves from the animadversions and big words how excessively—nay, distressingly, inconsistent Hamilton was in holding the second also; how this was the crown of all the self-contradictions he had sown; how he must renounce one theory or the other; how the least that could be required of him would be to have one theory for concrete predicates, and one for those that are abstract; how, when he was occupied with either of them, he must have temporarily forgotten the other, etc., etc. This is all very clever, and very well; but why omit the proof of the only point in question? Why omit to explain how the two propositions are incompatible with one another? Would this have been omitted if the writer had been in earnest?

The *ignoratio elenchi*, as here employed, is a portion of Mr.

Mill's ordinary apparatus with the less informed of his readers. It is the 'Coat of Darkness' with which Jack approaches unseen to the very head of the Giant. He puts on the appearance of reasoning fairly at great length upon the point at issue, but is really quoting and writing, and very fair, upon a totally different point, which is not, to the smallest extent, at issue, but which he has dexterously managed that the reader should suppose identical with the one which *is* at issue. Instead of proving to us, as he has done, from Hamilton's clear and searching analysis, that our general concepts are furnished to the mind by our judgment of individual objects, and that Hamilton agreed with the rest of mankind upon this point (all which we all knew before), and making it seem from his censorious phraseology that in all this Hamilton was proving himself wrong, what the case required was that Mr. Mill should have shown how the predicate's being always part of its own subject made it impossible to predicate one concrete object of another. This he has not even attempted to show. He has merely asserted it, and re-asserted it.

The foregoing summaries of his proposition will help the reader to unravel the six tangled pages we have in this place to deal with. I now proceed to reply to it.

And first, I shall take the liberty of tying Mr. Mill to the post which he has affected not even to see, and ask him why he thinks that one individual object is not predicable of another—cannot be the logical part of another—cannot be that with reference to which another is judged of; why he considers, for instance, that London and St. Paul's are not predicable of one another. All the explanation he vouchsafes is that one individual can only be a physical part of another individual; and that it is the general concept only, if even that, not the individual concept, that can be a logical part; that it is the group of abstract qualities, not the group of concrete qualities, that can, if any can, be predicated of anything. But this is not explanation. It merely repeats his statement.

Now, that the theory thus set up (about the unpredicableness of concretes) is pure fiction upon Mr. Mill's part, everybody knows, who knows the meaning of the words he uses. It is not a 'mistake,' nor, in an intelligent writer like Mr. Mill, could be a 'mistake.' Let us look at the facts. When he says, p. 349, that St. Paul's is not an object of which London is predicable, he writes as if he thought (what no one that knew anything of Logic could ever think)

that to predicate one thing of another is to say that the latter *is* the former—is to declare the identity of the two; for that is the only sense in which it can be said that London is not predicable of St. Paul's. He seems to think, for instance, that to predicate swiftness of a boat is to say that a boat *is* swiftness, and that to predicate London of St. Paul's is to say that St. Paul's *is* London. This would be droll Logic indeed; and Mr. Mill is quite right to condemn it and repudiate it, if he suspects himself, or supposes that any one else ever said such a thing. No one individual object can possibly be another individual object, any more than one group of abstract qualities can possibly be another group, nor one notion another notion. But nobody ever intended to say that it could be, or that it was. In no case does the logical statement amount to that. If this were the meaning of Predication or Judgment, we could no more predicate one general concept of another than one individual concept of another, nor any one thing of any other thing. To predicate one thing of another, therefore, is not to say that the one is identical with the other. This is not, in any case, the meaning of the words 'to predicate,' or 'to judge.' They only mean the stating in what respect the one object does or does not enter into the qualifying circumstances of the other; and they denote quite as often the denial of a positive quality as the affirmation of one. In other words, to judge or predicate is to indicate the relation between two individual objects—the quality with which one thing determines or conditions another; and the quality or attribute so indicated is a logical part of the thing it qualifies. This is a very different affair from declaring one thing to be something else different from what it is—something that it is not—something over and above what it is, as Mr. Mill affects to suppose Judgment to declare. There is no identification of this kind ever in question when we use the word Judgment or Predication. Surely Mr. Mill knows that. He admits that a general concept can be predicated of a subject—can have a subject judged of with reference to it. We can say, This boat is a swift boat. Does he understand this to mean that the abstract group of qualities which we call 'a swift boat' *is* the concrete group we call 'this boat?' If he does, he is wrong. The abstract cannot be the concrete. We thought we had learned this from the author of the chapter upon General Concepts (c. xvii., *passim*). If, to escape from this self-contradiction, he professes to mean that the abstract group is a physical part of the concrete group, he is wrong

again. He is in another self-contradiction. The abstract is nothing at all physical, or in any sense real. We thought we had learned this from that doughty Nominalist who is too much of an Anti-Realist to have even any 'conception' of the things he applies his words to. He must therefore fall back again upon his original absurdity (the theory of identification), or he must indicate some other signification for the words to 'predicate' and to 'judge,' instead of that one, in order to justify his objection to the words being applied to concrete objects.

I recapitulate what I have said. When we predicate the group of abstract qualities, we do not predicate identity; we predicate of the subject the fact that these qualities determine it, condition it. In like manner, if we predicate the boat of the oar, or the oar of the boat, we do not predicate identity. We predicate of the one the fact that the other qualifies it, determines it, conditions it. This is Predication. This is Judgment. This is the Part and the Whole in Logic. If we predicate the boat of the oar, we say that the oar stands to the boat in the relation of being too light to row it with. The oar is too light for the boat. If we make the oar the predicate,—if we predicate the oar of the boat, we say that the boat stands to the oar in the relation of being too heavy to be rowed with it. The boat is too heavy for the oar. This is what we mean by predicating one concrete object of another; and this being too heavy for the oar is a logical Part of the boat, and the being too light for the boat is a logical Part of the oar. This is also what happens when we predicate of St. Paul's the fact that London qualifies it (say, surrounds it), or of London, that St. Paul's adorns it. 'To predicate' never has any other meaning than this. It never means that the one thing is the other thing, as Mr. Mill supposes it does. It never means this, even in the case of general concepts, although there also Mr. Mill sometimes supposes it to have this meaning. But let us listen to himself a little in the details of his bewilderment upon this subject.

'One notion of an individual object,' says Mr. Mill, p. 349, 'cannot be a part of another notion of an individual object;' *i.e.*, our notion (or knowledge) of the boat's keel is not part of our notion (or knowledge) of the boat; and our notion of A's being the builder of the boat is not part of our notion of the boat; and our notion of the boat's not being the sea is no part of our notion of the boat. In like manner, according to Mr. Mill, our notion of St.

Paul's and our notion of the Tower are no portions of our knowledge or notion of London; nor our notion of St. Paul's being built by Wren any part of our notion or knowledge of St. Paul's. All this is error or fiction, whichever we are to call it. One notion *can be* part of the other; and neither the boat, nor the keel, nor the builder, nor the sea, is a general concept, although each has been predicated of the boat, in its own relation to the boat. The same is true of St. Paul's and London. Every Logician knows,—in fact every reader, whether he is a Logician or not, knows that what Mr. Mill here states is inconsistent with the fact; for one notion of an individual object can be, and often is, part of another such notion.

The physical part of anything, says Mr. Mill (*ibid.*), cannot be a part in Comprehension or Extension. Let us see. St. Paul's is part of London. Here London and St. Paul's are predicated of each other in the relation of physical whole and physical part. The being a part of London is here a part, in Comprehension, of St. Paul's, just as being built by Wren is another part of it in Comprehension, or logical part of it; and these logical parts are as completely innumerable as its physical parts are. On the other hand, the being a part of London is an Extended Whole, of which St. Paul's, the Tower, etc., are various parts in Extension. It is not true, therefore, to say that the physical part of anything cannot be, when predicated (or converted into an epithet) of the thing, a logical part also—a part in Extension, or that *the fact of being a physical part* is not a part in Comprehension. This also is mere fiction, and what the veriest tyro in Logic knows to be mere fiction.

Mr. Mill says (*ibid.*) that St. Paul's is not an attribute of London any more than it is of Paris. Can it be necessary to contradict this? An attribute, whether it be an abstract quality, or the concrete qualifying object, denotes that which belongs to anything, or is supposed to belong to it. Does not St. Paul's belong to London? And if we seek for the logical part—the part in Comprehension, is not the fact of belonging to London this part in Comprehension, of St. Paul's? and is not the fact of having St. Paul's in it a part of London in Comprehension? But Mr. Mill says St. Paul's is not in any sense an attribute of London. Here even a schoolboy will enlighten him.

Finally, he says (*ibid.*) that St. Paul's is not an object of which London is predicable—that we cannot say, for instance, St. Paul's is not London. And suppose I predicate London of St. Paul's as not

being, or as being, the Metropolis, whose most central point St. Paul's is, is that not predicating London of St. Paul's? And do we not predicate one individual thing always of another individual thing when we mention the relation in which it stands to it, whatever that relation may be, since every relation qualifies, determines, characterizes, and being thus a quality, is part and parcel (logically or metaphysically, not physically, speaking) of the thing it qualifies? What! we cannot say, in correct Logic—in correct predication, St. Paul's is not London! Mr. John Mill is the son of Mr. James Mill!—we cannot predicate the one individual object of the other! Why, what on earth then can we predicate of anything, if we cannot predicate such things of such things?

If Mr. Mill had been, as so many of his critics suppose, a block-head, it would have been easy here, as elsewhere, to have in the usual way assigned him a misapprehension which would have led such a person into all these confusions. We might have assumed as most probable, for instance, that he confounded the noun-substantive and the noun-adjective together, fancying that, as of two substantives denoting totally different objects, the one could not well be the other, neither of them could be converted into an epithet of the other, or, at least, that if this were done, it would only be predicating of the one object, the epithet derived from the other object, not the other object itself. This, we see, would imply forgetfulness of that most obvious fact, already adverted to, that all concepts (general as well as individual) are substantives, and that, just as when we predicate swiftness, or any other general concept, of an object, what we declare the object to be, is not swiftness—the general concept's substantive, but swift, or having swiftness—the general concept's epithet; so when we predicate one individual object of another, it is only by employing it as an epithet, derived from and exhibiting some relation of it to the other object, that we can do this. The same principle applies to the concrete as to the abstract group. I only mention this misapprehension, possible to others, lest it should be supposed that I was overlooking anything that might be said in favour of the 'Stupidity and Vindictiveness' Theory, which the more gentle delight to call the 'Mistake and 'Animus' Theory, in accounting for the pages now under review. But the blunder in question, as anything but a *plaisanterie*, would be, I humbly suggest, of too childish a character to attribute it to Mr. Mill. Nor is it at all credible, as some will fancy it is, that

Mr. Mill was in the least degree confused or misled by Hamilton's using the terms 'concept' and 'notion' as convertible, and of concrete as well as of abstract objects; or that he here imagined the terms used in their restricted sense of abstract concepts only. That Mr. Mill was aware of Hamilton's practice in this respect, he himself states at pp. 338 and 346.

Can anything, then, be clearer than it is, that whatever concrete objects are to one another in reality, they can be judged of each other and predicated of each other as being that, and neither more nor less? We cannot, of course, predicate affirmatively either identity or any other relation between the two that does not exist. We cannot say that St. Paul's is London, or that London is smaller than St. Paul's. But we can predicate them affirmatively of one another in that relation, whatever it is, in which they stand to one another. Upon what grounds does Mr. Mill affect to deny that we can do this? In the Judgment, St. Paul's is part of London, or St. Paul's is in the relation to London of being a physical part of it: does Mr. Mill mean to say that the one object is not judged of with reference to the other—is not predicated of the other? Or does he seek to assert that we have not here a Whole in Extension and a Whole in Comprehension, as well as the corresponding Part in each? Or if Mr. Mill has been, as some of his admirers suppose, puzzled by the fact that we cannot with truth and belief predicate identity affirmatively where it is not, any more than any other relation where it is not, and has been thereby led to parade his discernment that we cannot say St. Paul's is London,—that we cannot predicate this identity of two distinct individual objects, any more than of two distinct general concepts, he will find, upon reflection, that he can predicate things negatively of one another even when he cannot do so otherwise,—that there are negative judgments,—that he can say, for instance, St. Paul's is not London, and that this is what Hamilton has provided for in his definition when he indicates the possibility of the notion predicated *not* constituting a part of the other. Mr. Mill will find that, either affirmatively or negatively, and in one relation, if not in another, all concrete objects, or individual things, are predicable of one another, and that there is not the faintest pretext for his assertion that in Judgment, least of all in Hamilton's definition of Judgment, 'one at least of the terms of comparison must be a (general) concept,' or that concrete concepts are not predicable of each other.

It is true that Mr. Mill immediately proceeds to back out of this quagmire, admitting, *more suo*, in this very place, that his whole argument was a sham. At p. 352, when speaking of those first judgments, from which, as Hamilton so ably explains, our general concepts or general notions are derived, and in which we have nothing but individuals, and our notions or concepts of individuals, for predicate or subject, Mr. Mill says, 'The judgments ' by which we constructed the (general) concepts have nothing ' to do with comparison of (general) concepts. It is the *Anschaung*, the intuitions, the presentations of Experience which we ' in this case compare and judge' (and therefore predicate of one another, p. 352). And he likewise, it is true, withdraws from all this self-misrepresentation when he assents, as he does (p. 343), to Hamilton's first statement of the definition, in which it is more explicitly mentioned that we can predicate one individual object of another. He does, it is true, completely withdraw here, as everywhere else, each of his nonsensical statements. But am I not, on that very account, all the more entitled to ask, Can there be any doubt that Mr. Mill acts thus intentionally? Can there be any doubt that he here consciously volunteers, in this reckless and self-denying manner, to throw away any little reputation that he might have enjoyed with his own party as a second or third-rate Logician (and they placed him even higher),—representing himself, as here, through several pages (348-354), utterly ignorant of the commonest principle of Logic? Can there be any doubt that he is, here and everywhere, satisfied with the mere semblance of a triumph over the Giant, and that he labours after this poor result for no other assignable reason than to make thereby his court to a religious party? But even if I am mistaken in the motive I assign for this strange conduct, can there be any doubt as to the strange conduct itself? and what are we to think of his admirers (for the most part these very 'co-religionists') who cheer him on, or rather push him on, in this path of self-destruction, ignoring his withdrawals, however distinct, and declaring him in earnest, however frolicsome? Cruel admirers!

When we thus become aware that the concrete object and the concrete concept are as predicable as the abstract, and that Hamilton and everybody, except, indeed, if we are to suppose him serious, Mr. Mill himself, hold this, it follows of course that the inconsistency (that 'Sword of Sharpness' so invaluable in a fight with

Giants) fabricated for Hamilton out of such cobweb matter as the denial of this fact, becomes necessarily a mere optical illusion, and even that, only to the more obtuse. It is, however, worth while to observe with what self-possession, strut, and liveliness it is brandished by little Jack.

Mr. John S. Mill having, as we have seen, adopted it as a fact beyond all doubt, that one concrete object cannot be judged of with reference to another—cannot be predicated of another, proceeds, accordingly, with this proposition to construct the requisite inconsistency. He assures us, for instance, that Hamilton holds this queer doctrine as well as himself—that he gathers the fact from Hamilton's saying that the predicate can always be a Part in Logic. He then reminds us that Hamilton holds, as we all know, and as we all hold, that we derive our *genera* from the interpredication of the concrete. Mr. Mill even takes great pains, in his simulated *ignotio elenchi*, to prove this. Hamilton's inconsistency is thus complete. How can we at once predicate the concrete and not predicate it?

A strange part of this business is, that Mr. Mill admits, in his own case also, the inconsistency with which he charges Hamilton. He is obliged to admit, as we have seen, where he hoped it would escape contrast, that we have our genera from concrete judgments, yet all through these pages insists that there can be no such judgments. He is precisely and really in the very position in which he affects to find Hamilton, viz., in that of holding that we have our classes from our judgments of concrete objects, but that we have no judgments of concrete objects to have these classes from. Mr. Mill's being here inconsistent is of no consequence. What is alone of moment in all this is, that we should keep distinctly before us Hamilton's real position here. Mr. Mill admits (and, *more suo*, in the very same page!) that Hamilton never said anything of the kind he here imputes to him, but that he asserts the contrary 'in the most decisive terms,' insisting that it is from judgments, in which only concrete objections and our conceptions of them are predicated of each other, that we furnish ourselves with general conceptions, and that there can be such judgments. Mr. Mill, nothing daunted, puts on the 'Cap of Knowledge.' He adopts the regress *ab ignoto ad ignotius*,—from what he knows nothing about, to what he knows still less about,—from what Hamilton says to what Hamilton does not say,—informing us that what he puts forward here as Hamilton's doctrine, in spite of Hamilton's assertions and explanations to the

contrary, is a little discovery of his own,—an inference which he draws from the important principle, discovered by himself, and just laid down about concrete objects, not being capable of becoming Logical Wholes and Logical Parts to one another. He argues that since he himself has discovered that the concrete predicate cannot be the Logical Part of its subject, Hamilton's having said that there is no judgment in which the predicate is not a Logical Part of its subject, places it beyond all doubt that Hamilton did not regard concrete objects as predicable of one another! Was there ever anything so puerile as this so audaciously placed before enlightened men to think about? From these two premisses—the first a fiction, the second a fact—our would-be Logician infers, gravely, we are told, and seriously infers, that Hamilton intended to say that individuals are in no way predicable of one another, precisely the contrary of what Hamilton did say,—nay, precisely the contrary of what 'is asserted,' Mr. Mill tells us, 'in the most decisive terms by Sir W. Hamilton himself!'

Hamilton then, to support Mr. John S. Mill's pantomime, must be thus fantastically understood to contradict himself,—must be understood to hold that there can be no inter-predications or judgments of individuals at all (since he holds there can be no judgment at all without this logical Whole and logical Part of which individuals are supposed not to be susceptible), yet that it is nevertheless from these very non-existent judgments of individuals alone that we have originally all our general notions. And Mr. Mill not only presents us with this singular inference respecting Hamilton—doltish or burlesque, as we may choose to view it,—but begs of us, with tears in his eyes, to reflect upon the shock and discouragement thus given to all human research by so able a philosopher as Hamilton, who, after explaining with the greatest care that all our predications or judgments—*all* without exception—begin in childhood by our comparing nothing but individuals—nothing but concrete concepts, concrete notions, notions of individuals, presentations of individuals in sense, should, 'a little more than a hundred pages after,' have defined Predication or Judgment in such a way as, upon Mr. Mill's new principle, entirely to exclude from it all inter-predication and inter-comparison of individual things. The scene here becomes exciting. In the strong light of Mr. Mill's patent (*viz.*, this impossibility of a Whole or Part in Logic) we discern an enormous self-contradiction of Hamilton's to bulk forth. The

‘triumphant animadversion,’ accordingly, is considerable—the Critic in despair—Philosophy in ruins (Mr. Mill calls Logic everywhere ‘Philosophy’)—and we find ourselves irresistibly compelled again to recede with Mr. Mill, *ab ignoto ad ignotius*, and to sympathize with the thrilling pathos latent in the remark (p. 351) about the *crown* of those *sown* things which self-contradictions so much resemble; but as to what these sown things are which have crowns in this compound metaphor, whether turnip bulbs, or cabbage heads, or merely French parsnips, no ‘intelligible meaning here, first or last, emerges.’

Mr. Mill, after assuming, upon the quixotic principle above indicated (about a logical part being impossible in the concrete), that Hamilton supposed we could not judge of St. Paul’s with reference to London, nor of any concrete object with reference to another, recommences again that disgusting process which reminds us of sick dogs and wallowing sows, and which, we hoped, in this case, we had seen the last of.

He expends two more pages here in explaining to us that we do not think with our conceptions of things. We are told that whether we regard our knowledge of iron, rust and water, as old or recent knowledge, we do not employ it when we judge of these things. We do not employ, he tells us, mental symbols, or knowledge of any kind, to think about such things,—no, not even in the absence of these things. We then think of them,—then, it would seem, most of all,—without any conception of what we think about. But that is, it seems, nothing wonderful. Even when they are presentations of sense, we have no conception of them,—no knowledge whatever of what we perceive by sense. Is it not a mockery, asks Mr. Mill, to speak to us of iron as it is known, and not as it is in itself? Is it water as it is known, or as it is not known, that rusts iron? and is it the iron as it is known that is rusted, or the iron as it is not known? When we think of iron or water for the first time, or for the five hundredth time, can it be pretended, asks Hamilton’s sportive Critic, that we do so with a notion of what we are thinking about? and if we judge of water with reference to iron, or, in other words, predicate water of iron, is it not clear that we do so without any conception of what we are comparing,—any conception of the water or of the iron? All this is far too like the ravings of a monomaniac to be accepted from Mr. Mill as the serious expression of his convictions, or as anything else but a

joke. In the hope of more effectually mystifying his readers, he uses the technical words 'thoughts,' 'concepts,' 'notions;' but these words always mean knowledge or conception. Hamilton said, as we all do, that we could not judge of iron at all without a knowledge, or conception, or notion, etc., of the objects which constitute the elements of the judgment. Mr. Mill says we can, and do. He says we can, and do, whether the things were known long before or not. Certainly it matters very little whether our knowledge was obtained five minutes ago or from the Ptolemies. All that we insist upon is, that we must have the knowledge or conception of what iron is *before* we form the smallest judgment about it; and the same fact is true of water. To tell us that we judge of these things without concepts—without a conception of each, is as like a mockery as anything we can imagine; yet Mr. Mill will have it that the mockery is to say that we cannot judge of things without a knowledge or conception of each thing. There are persons, no doubt, who do judge of things in this way without distinct notions of the different things they profess to judge of, but these are not the persons whose judgment the world has usually found worth adopting.

Mr. Mill says we ought not to call iron or water a thought, a knowledge, etc. Certainly not; no one does so. But we ought to have the sense to see that when we require to compare these two things together, all we can do is to compare our knowledge of the one with our knowledge of the other, and what we think of the one with what we think of the other. It would be a wild-goose chase upon our part to seek to compare these two things, or any two things, without having a knowledge of the one and a knowledge of the other to compare together. Let Mr. Mill remember that when he wishes to have words instead of conceptions adopted as the symbols of things, he does not seem to think it necessary to regard the thing called iron as a word. Why, then, suppose that *we* regard it as a thought?

To give a sample of Mr. Mill's comic efforts in these last two pages (353, 354) of the six, I need only observe, that when he requires, as he often does, to dress up nonsense in the garb of sense, he makes the interesting statement, that if we lived till doomsday we should only be able to know what we should be able to know, by obscurely saying, 'If we lived till doomsday we should never find the proposition that water rusts iron in *our* concepts, 'if we had not first *found* it in the outward phenomena.' He says,

in like manner, that when a thing has once got into our concepts, it *may* get into our concepts; a curious distinction, which he thus expresses:—‘When we have already judged this sequence to exist ‘outside us, we know it, and *once known*, it *may find its way into ‘our concepts.*’ And again, when he wishes to say, We cannot find in our knowledge anything but what we know, or, in brief, we only know what we know, he writes thus:—‘We cannot *elicit out of a concept* any judgment which we have not first *put into it*, which we ‘have not consciously assented to in the act of forming the concept.’ For what grade of readers has he written these queer things?

He next tells us (p. 354) that recollected knowledge is not present knowledge. The latter he calls an ‘artificial mental construction,’ and thinks that the less of it we admit into our judgments the better; but he holds that we cannot judge without the former,—that predicating or judging is comparing one memory with another memory,—our memory of iron with our memory of water. At least he says it is our memory we must consult, and not the facts themselves. This looks like a return to common sense on the part of our ‘philosopher.’ He also says that our ultimate appeal is not to our knowledge (our concepts), but to the sense-presentations themselves. This, too, has a look of common sense and serious writing. It admits that there is an appeal (which is not ultimate) to our knowledge; and when he speaks of an appeal to sense, he means apparently only the verification or augmentation of our knowledge, or, as he delights to call it, of our concepts. The comic element, nevertheless, instantly bursts forth again in the remark, that we judge the Earth to move without having any conception or knowledge of movement or of the Earth, and that if the question of fact depended on knowledge and concepts, the victory would, he fears, have been with Ptolemy, whose concepts on these points were limited, rather than with Copernicus, in whom these concepts abounded!

In a note at p. 352, where little Jack brandishes his ‘Sword of Sharpness’ for a moment in a corner before one of the other Giants of the drama, and in the six pages of text upon which I have been commenting, we find in a condensed form, from our jocular Critic, some of the most senseless twaddle that has ever been written in English under the name of ‘Philosophy;’ yet, even in this section of his work, Mr. John S. Mill’s admirers, not omitting those in the *Westminster Review*, would have us believe that he

is serious! that he is incapable of a practical joke,—a practical joke, they remind us, of such huge proportions, and that a large amount of ignorance and stupidity is more credible than a large amount of jocularly! and this of Mr. Mill!—*Credat Judæus.*

4. *If the quality were regarded as part of the qualified object (the predicate part of the subject), this would ignore the fact that all our judgments are not only essentially Analytic, but attended also with a certain synthesis of thought in the minds of those who are previously unacquainted with the facts stated in the judgments.* Now, not only does the theory of Whole and Part in Logic not ignore this synthetic process, as Mr. Mill supposes it to do, but it insists upon it as excellent illustration of the theory. Mr. Mill gives us here again the hope that he will not imitate the nasty dog any more, or the wallowing sow; and that he will allow it to be an understood thing that we compare our knowledge of one thing with our knowledge of another thing, in order to find out how the one thing may be predicated of the other, and that we do not seek to find this out without knowledge, or comparing knowledge. He grants us, although, apparently, only *argumenti causâ*, that judging is, as he phrases it, 'a notional operation, consisting of the recognition of some relation between concepts,' and limits his present proposition to saying, that when we speak of wisdom or death as a logical Part of Socrates, or swiftness as a logical Part of the swift boat, we are ignoring the important distinction that in learning the relations of things, we combine or synthesize, and that in stating them we analyse. This proposition of his is wide of the fact. We then, more than ever, insist upon this distinction, and read his proposition in utter amazement at the extent to which the writer here supposes his readers ignorant of what is meant by 'Analytic Judgment.' An analytic judgment is an unfolding of what we previously know. It is teaching, or imparting information. Synthesis is combining for ourselves what we do not previously know. It is learning or acquiring information. When we learn, we do not judge. We then synthesize, *i.e.* we believe; we combine things in our mind as we are told to combine them, or as we find by experiment that they are combined in nature. This hiving of facts is all the synthesis of thought we know of. But this is not judging, it is only learning to judge. It is experimenting, and making the guesses of induction. It is not Logic at all. It is at most but appropriating the judgments of others. We cannot judge

of, we cannot predicate, the relations between things until we know them—until we have concepts (conceptions) of the things and concepts of their relations. Synthetic Judgment, as it is called by Mr. Mill, is not, I repeat, strictly speaking, what we term Judgment, or the expression of Knowledge, but only the acquisition of Knowledge,—the qualifying ourselves to form logical Judgments; for analytic judgment, or rather Analysis, which is logical judgment, is stating what we know. Thus, if I say, It is a fine day, to a person unacquainted with the fact, this is to him a synthetic judgment, if it is, as Mr. Mill tells us, to be called a judgment at all; to me who have been out of doors and seen, it is an analytic one. The fineness is, in my case, part of the knowledge or conception which I have of the day. In his case it clearly is not part of the knowledge or conception which he has of the day until he hears it from me, and not even then, unless he believes it upon my authority. If he believes me, he synthesizes. He puts the two things—fineness and this day—together, or, as Mr. Mill calls it, forms a synthetic judgment, of which these are the two terms, without their having been together before for him, and therefore neither of them having been yet known by him to have the other as part of it. In plain English, he learns the fact; and to call what we learn a judgment of our own, is unusual in the extreme. Mr. Mill's account of an Analytic judgment passes muster. But what he says of this Synthetic process, or learning, is idiosyncratic, having the quintessence in it of a style of writing which henceforth we may call 'Mill,'—saying what is rank nonsense, and yet seeming to say something wise and clever. He says that in a Synthetic judgment we attribute something to the subject without having the least knowledge or conception that this attribute is united to the subject, and of course no conception therefore of its being part of the subject, *but only a conception of its being in point of fact united to the subject!* 'Synthetical judgments,' writes Mr. Mill, p. 355, 'affirm of a class (or individual) attributes *which are not in the concept* (of the class or individual), and which we therefore do not and cannot judge to be a part of the concept (of the class or individual), but only to be conjoined in fact with the attributes 'composing the concept' (of the class or individual). Surely such a combination of words as this could hardly be credited without quotation as being Mr. Mill's, and readers will naturally have immediate recourse to the original to see that they are not, or

that I am not, deceived. It would hardly be believed, prior to a minute examination of his writings, how much vagueness of thought, leading to the unsuspecting admission of opposite doctrines in the same breath (*i.e.*, of unsuspecting absurdity), lurks under the specious appearance of philosophical precision which distinguishes him. We admit that the attribute cannot be part of the subject as we conceive the subject, *i.e.*, part of our concept or conception of it, unless it is united to the subject as the part is united to its whole. But what on earth is the meaning of saying that we assign an attribute to a subject (fineness, for instance, to the day) without the least knowledge of its being united to the subject, except merely the knowledge of its being, in point of fact, united to it? All that is said upon the synthetic process, even such nonsense as this, throws a very useful light upon what occurs in the opposite case of an analytic judgment; and nothing can be more groundless than to suppose that our common doctrine of logical analysis, as being the indication of one or more of the component Parts in a Whole, ignores the fact that in a logical synthesis there is nothing of this kind,—ignores the fact that in synthesis the predicate is not previously part of the subject, and that, in it, we have only the process of combining the various qualities which are for the future to be parts of the whole group. How does the theory of Part and Whole in Logic ignore any of these distinctions between analytic judgment and the synthesis? Who but a Giant-killer would 'have blown such a blast?'

But we have as portions of this objection three singular inventions by Mr. Mill, to which I must advert.

a. He is entirely misinformed when he speaks of the difference between learning and teaching as a famous distinction in Metaphysics, or as ever regarded by Hamilton, or by any one else, as of the least importance. There is hardly anywhere any such distinction required or thought of. The *naïveté* is admirable with which Mr. Mill here discloses his ignorance, or, more correctly speaking, as *I* think, the ignorance of those for whom he writes. Hamilton never proposed the term 'ampliative' for the information conveyed in the words, It is a fine day, or in any other similar judgment; nor did any one ever see anything 'psychologically' famous in the distinction between telling this and hearing this; nor does any writer whatever obtrude it upon our attention. Those who are on the look-out for the possible sources of Mr. Mill's 'mistakes' will

probably tell us that he was here confounding Kant's celebrated proposition about an *a priori* synthesis with the common synthetic processes about iron and water, when we first learn the relations of these two objects to one another, and that had Mr. Mill been able to read Kant in the original as Hamilton was, he would have had a more correct 'concept' of what Kant stated on the point than he now exhibits. With all my heart, let it be so. Let Mr. Mill be as great an *ignoramus* as his critics and admirers please. I for my part can believe nothing of the kind. I shall therefore merely remind the reader, that Mr. Mill not only denies that the distinction of things *a priori* has anything very famous about it, but absolutely denies *ab initio* that there could be any such thing at all to distinguish from another thing as a Synthetic Judgment *a priori*. He could not, therefore, look upon it as an objection to the relation of Part and Whole between the predicate and the subject, that this relation should ignore anything *a priori*. Mr. Mill was only speaking of the synthetic processes of reading, hearing, or induction and experiment, which processes, miscalled by him 'judgments,' are none of them *a priori*—none of them famous as distinct from regular analytic judgments—none of them obtruded upon us in this relation by any one—none of them presenting in this relation the smallest difficulty to the Philosopher, or the slightest dissension among Logicians, least of all between Mansel and Hamilton, who also, in spite of what Mr. Mill says, perfectly agree even about the *a priori* synthesis. Every word here written by Mr. Mill in order to carry on this Pantomime exhibits an amount of self-abnegation in the form of affected stupidity and ignorance that is hardly exceeded in any other portion of the book.

(b.) Mr. Mill is entirely 'misinformed,' also, when he states that the term 'Concept' has two meanings. It has not. It has but one. He says that it denotes not only the same as conception, our whole knowledge, notion, or conception of an individual or of a class, but also that it denotes the specific difference, the few essential attributes of a given class, upon which its being a class at all is grounded, *i.e.*, which we regard as constituting the difference between it and the class above it. He thus not only limits the term in one of its significations to a class only, but, singularly enough, to the specific difference of that class; and he tells us, with the utmost gravity, that this latter is the more general import of

the term. Now, the contrary is the fact. This import the word never has at all in any writer. 'Concept' denotes in no writer anything except our whole knowledge or conception of an individual or of a class, just like the original term 'Conception,' or our ordinary term 'Knowledge;' the form 'Concept' having been proposed instead of 'Conception,' merely in order to leave the latter to signify, exclusively, that mental process of conceiving by which we form conceptions. Mr. Mill is entirely astray when he supposes that any writer gives the word an interpretation different from this, and entirely astray when he supposes that Hamilton has altered its import in other writers to give it this one. Jack is here very saucy, and lectures Giants generally upon what is and is not 'lawful' for them to do; but as he has made rather a poor appearance as champion in this part of his evolutions, we must excuse the priggish arrogance so playfully assumed in this and a few other neighbouring passages. We must not, however, allow the reader to overlook the attempt of Mr. Mill to invest the term 'concept' here and everywhere with as much confusion as possible, and his obtrusion upon us, at every turn, of his extreme anxiety to have his own bantling, 'connotation' (never used by any writer in the sense he uses it), substituted in its stead. Hamilton describes the word 'concept' as being exactly synonymous with conception,—our whole conception, notion, or knowledge of a thing, and applies it, Mr. Mill acknowledges, as much to concrete objects as to classes (see p. 338). Neither Hamilton nor any other writer deviates in the smallest particular from this acceptation of the term; nor need I make any further remark upon this point than that all that we are able to say about anything is what we know of it, or, as Mr. Mill says, what we have in our concept, notion, or knowledge of it; that to state this is to *form* analytic judgments; that to be liable to remain alive is no more an essential attribute of the genus man, as Mr. Mill supposes it is, than to be liable to die,—life than death; that the predication of the latter liability is as completely an analytic judgment as the predication of the former is, whether Mr. Mill can find any case in which it is a synthetic 'judgment' or not. And as to speaking (p. 358) of this liability to die, and of the other human attributes, which are the subject of Treatises on human nature, as things of which we know nothing,—things 'not in our concept' or knowledge of man, is this not a mockery? and is it not a mockery, also, to speak of essential attri-

butes,—those attributes of a thing ‘without which it cannot be,’ ‘which it cannot lose without ceasing to be,’ in the text (*ibid.*) as a useful distinction, and in the footnote as an ‘extremely vulgar’ one? Can Mr. Mill be nothing but a *farceur*?

(c.) Mr. Mill supposes that a thing cannot be analysed, to *any extent*, into its component parts, unless it is analysed into all of them; and therefore supposes that when Hamilton describes a definition as an analysis of a concept into its component parts, this must mean into *all* its parts. Now, every reader is here competent to see that this is not the fact. It is clearly incorrect to say, that because the analysis of a conception is described as being into its component parts, this means into *all* its component parts. In such phrases, the words, ‘into its component parts,’ denote ‘into *any* of them that the case requires,’ not necessarily into all of them. If this opposite sense were intended, it would be requisite to insert the word ‘all,’ and speak of ‘*all* its component parts.’ I shall not follow Mr. Mill into the erroneous consequences which he draws from this obvious misrepresentation, but merely remark how necessary it is for us to bear in mind the task he has set himself when we read such an attempt as this is to mislead his readers. It would, I must repeat it, hardly be believed, prior to an examination of his volume, how much care he has bestowed upon concealing the real statements he is making, and upon giving an air of philosophical precision to a mere specious appearance. To say that he is doing so unintentionally, and that he knows no better, seems a judgment unnecessarily severe. Those who know him more intimately it may be permitted to say this. To me—to most of us—it is not permissible.

We thus not only see clearly how little—say rather how completely nothing—these three arguments have done towards making it appear that the predicate’s being Part of its subject ignores the synthetic processes of learning and believing, or ignores the distinction between these processes and analytic judgments; but we see, also, how much additional evidence, had any been needed, the introduction of three such arguments affords, that Mr. Mill was not in earnest when he propounded them, or the proposition they were to support.

This brings us to the end of the four Minor Issues raised in this chapter for the purpose of making it clear to us that, in Logic,

swiftness is not part of the swift boat; and we have seen how childishly groundless they all are.

The only other proposition of Hamilton's here supposed to be disputed is one which, Mr. Mill admits, does not affect the question as to the Whole and Part in Logic. It is this: When we say that A is the father of B, and that B is the son of A, Hamilton says that these are correlative statements; that there is here, really and ultimately, but one meaning, stated in two different ways; that *primâ facie* there appear two meanings, involving one another, in-somuch that if either is true the other is so, *i.e.*, we may reciprocally and necessarily infer them from one another, but that there nevertheless, or rather on this very account, is only one meaning—only one matter of fact and thought; that when we say A is the father of B, our uppermost thought may be to state either that this relation subsists upon A's part towards B, or that it does not exist upon B's part towards A, in which latter case there subsists a totally different relation; but that either statement so necessarily implies the other, that to state the one is to state the other. Hamilton adds, moreover, that we interpret the one correlative term by means of the other,—neither having any meaning at all until so interpreted.

This is the principle (that of correlatives and correlation) which Hamilton has explained at some length with reference to Extension and Comprehension in Logic (see quotation, p. 360, with Mr. Mill's own summary at the top of p. 362), and which we find that Mr. Mill, as usual, affects to dispute. But does he indeed dispute it? He does not. It will be found that he simply echoes every statement which Hamilton made, with one infinitesimal exception, endeavouring, nevertheless, all the time, here as everywhere else, to make it appear that he differs from Hamilton *toto celo*. He says that the one meaning implies the other, just as a figure with three sides implies a figure with three angles; that as far as the meaning, therefore, is concerned, there is no difference; that there being a son as well as a father, or three sides as well as three angles, or a Whole in Comprehension as well as a Whole in Extension, must not lead us to suppose that there are two distinct matters of fact or of thought that we may *infer* from one another; for it is not correct English, according to Mr. Mill, to say that we can, from our having 144 apples, infer that we have what makes 12×12 , or that

we can infer three angles from three sides, or a son from a father, or, in short, anything from the mere existence of that with which it is *a priori* connected. There is, strictly speaking, in such cases no inference; no new fact not already known, or, as Mr. Mill prefers to call it, not already 'in the concept;' the fact of three angles and the fact of three sides being only apparently, and *primâ facie*, two facts, but really and ultimately one and the same fact written in two different ways. That the fact in Extension '*follows*' (p. 362) wherever the fact in Comprehension exists, is a point on which Mr. Mill agrees with Hamilton; and he also agrees with him (p. 363) that the fact in Comprehension exists in every proposition which has a general notion for its predicate. But Mr. Mill's position here against Hamilton is, that this 'following' is not a *following* at all; that the second assertion is not a conclusion from, but a mere repetition of the first; for what is the second statement if we leave out of it all reference to the first? It can then only mean that we have ascertained the one fact without the other. Now, do we assert this? or, would it be true? etc., etc.

We see, then, that there is not a shadow of difference here between Mr. Mill and Hamilton except the minute point as to whether it is or is not correct English to speak of the 'followings' in Geometry as 'inferences' and 'conclusions,'—as 'reciprocally inferrible from one another;' for whatever is in this point correct in Geometry, is correct in Logic also, and in all other *a priori* science. This, it will be admitted, is a curious mode of disputing and disproving Hamilton's statement, that Comprehension and Extension are, in Logic, correlative terms, and have in them, and in their relation to one another, all the peculiarities of such terms. Does not a disproof of this kind look uncommonly like what in his own choice phraseology Mr. Mill would call 'a superfetation' of discontent?

He here, also, obtrudes upon us the four following statements:—(1.) Those who use Conversion in Logic 'have no concern with' the extent or quantity of the Predicate. 'When I say, All men 'are bipeds, what has my assertion to do with the class biped as to 'its Extension? Have I any concern with the remainder of the 'class after man is subtracted from it? Am I necessarily aware 'even whether there is any remainder at all?' (p. 363.) (2.) When two modes of proof are possible in Geometry, Arithmetic, Logic, or

any other *a priori* science, one of them being sufficient for all practical purposes, every attempt to bring the other into notice is to be severely condemned, never taken account of nor alluded to, except under the name of a superfluity, or, as he more elegantly expresses such superfluities,—a superfetation upon the science (a term here apparently ‘obtruded’ as his interpretation of our time-honoured ‘mare’s nest’), which superfluities, however, he admits, *more suo*, to be also, as in this case, ‘*a valuable addition*,’ and not such bad things after all. ‘Sir W. Hamilton’s distinction between ‘Reasoning in Comprehension and Reasoning in Extension will be ‘found, as we shall see hereafter, to be a mere superfetation on ‘Logic’ (p. 364). ‘According to the very different view I myself ‘take of Formal Logic (what is commonly called “Logic”), this ‘doctrine (Sir W. Hamilton’s second mode of Reasoning) might ‘still be a valuable addition to it, . . . an improvement on the ‘common form; and I am not disposed to deny, that for occasional ‘use, and for purposes of illustration, it is so,’ etc., etc. (pp. 438-9).

(3.) Man is quite as essentially a quadruped, or even a centipede, as he is a biped. Mr. Mill warns us of ‘the impropriety of saying ‘that the notion man contains the predicate two-legged, when ‘that attribute is evidently not part of the signification of the ‘word’ (p. 361). And (4.) Although the boundless productive Power employed in Nature determines the number of animal species that are contained under the conception Fish, this boundless productive Power does not determine the number of attributes which are contained in any one individual fish, or in any one species belonging to that general conception. The number of these attributes depends, we are told, on something else, but on what it depends does not emerge (see last paragraph of the chapter, p. 364). Some of these deviations from common sense, these minor peculiarities of doctrine in Mr. Mill’s view of Logic, deserve notice from their connexion with some principal part of our author’s doctrine, others chiefly as throwing light upon the character of his mind. But none of them require to have their waggery exposed.

We have now seen, not only that common sense is entirely against Mr. Mill upon the main issue of this chapter, the predicate in each affirmative judgment being necessarily, in all cases, part of the subject, but that upon each of the four minor issues it is against him also. We have seen that there is no self-contradiction be-

tween Hamilton's two statements of what judgment is—that there is no evil in being obliged to judge of things as we know them, instead of as we do not know them,—*i.e.*, according to our conceptions of them—that we can predicate individuals of one another quite as well as classes, and that the predicate, being part of the subject, does not ignore the synthetic process of acquiring information, or its difference from the analytic process which in Logic is called 'judgment.' We have thus chased Jack from one of these four enchanted castles to another, in each of which, if we believed him, he was killing the Giant. But it is now time to rescue Mr. John S. Mill from the self-degradation entailed upon him by this portion of his Pantomime, and to explain that, in other passages of the self-same chapter, he steps before the scenes, and in a few grave and hurried words, audible only to the few, assures his puzzled friends that it is all fun—that he, as well as every one else, admits that the attributes of things are actually parts of the things, and our conceptions of the attributes actually parts of our conceptions of the things. The following quotations will suffice :—

At p. 343, he says he approves of the statement that in a Judgment there are at least two parts in our concept or mental representation or knowledge of the subject, *viz.*, the predicate itself on the one hand, and the subject, *minus* the predicate, on the other. This is admitting that the predicate is part of the subject. 'To judge is to recognise whether two concepts, two things, or a concept and a thing, are capable of co-existing as parts of the same mental representation.' If both are parts of it, one of them, of course, is part of it.

At p. 346, 'A concept is a part of that mental representation.'

At p. 349, 'Now a concept, that is, a bundle of attributes, may be a part of another concept, and may be part of our mental image of an individual object.'

At p. 352, 'When concepts have been formed, and we subsequently proceed to analyse them, then we form judgments which recognise one concept as a whole of which another is a part.'

At p. 355, 'Analytical judgments unfold the contents (and parts) of a concept, affirming explicitly of a class, attributes which were already part of the corresponding concept.'

At p. 358, 'Instead of saying that the attributes composing the concept of the predicate are part of those which compose the con-

‘cept of the subject, we ought to say, they are either a part or are ‘invariably conjoined with them, not in our conception but in ‘fact.’ The things which compose anything are parts of it, and what is part in fact is part also in our concept of the thing, except when our concept and the thing do not correspond, in which case we do not know what is or is not in fact.

Ibid. ‘Propositions in which the concept of the predicate is part ‘of the concept of the subject, are a kind of Identical propositions ; ‘they convey no information’ (to the person previously acquainted with the facts they state, but to those only who are previously unacquainted with these facts, and who could not therefore ever form these judgments).

I have now shown both that the predicate, in every affirmative judgment, is part—always part—of the subject, and also that Mr. Mill is aware it is so,—and acknowledges that it is so.

SECTION III.

CHAPTER XIX.—REASONING.

MR. MILL announces, in the first page of this chapter, that the proposition which he is now going to controvert is, that 'Reasoning is the comparison of two notions by means of a third.' On the second page, however, he shifts his ground, and announces that the proposition he is about to assail is not this, but that 'Reasoning is a mode of ascertaining that one notion is a part of another.' This real want of philosophical precision is an ordinary defect in his pages.

We must assume that he proposes to dispute both points. He means, that Reasoning is neither of these things—neither two conceptions (of things) compared by means of a third conception, nor one conception ascertained to be a part of another.

He is here canvassing, it would seem unconsciously, again, but on new grounds, the proposition denied also, and afterwards assented to, in his 18th chapter, viz., that the predicate is part of the subject; in other words, that what is true of anything is a logical part of that thing,—that swiftness, for instance, is not conjoined with a swift boat, but is a logical part of it, without which a swift boat could not exist at all. This return to his former blunder, from which he had of himself withdrawn, is all the consistency we need ever expect to find in him, but is here excusable in one not accustomed to these discussions, inasmuch as reasoning or inference is, in point of fact, a kind of judgment, although it is with Reasoning alone that he is nominally occupied in this chapter. Shall we, therefore, call the relapse an oversight? Be it so. In this case I shall make no objection. Yet these relapses are constantly recurring.

The arguments here employed are these:—1. It is not possible that we should need to find out—it is not possible that we should not know intuitively—that one conception is part of another, if it really is so. (This, which is the second point mentioned by Mr.

Mill, he discusses first.) And 2. If we do not so know it, it is not possible that a third conception should teach a learner more about any two conceptions than he previously knew without this third one. From these two supposed impossibilities he would have us infer that, when we describe the principle of Reasoning, as all Logicians do describe it, to be *Nota notæ nota est rei ipsius*, the mark of the mark is the mark of the thing marked, or *Prædicatum prædicati est etiam prædicatum subjecti*, we must not understand this to mean, as we all do, the principle that the part of the part is the part of the whole; but to mean, according to Mr. Mill's words, that that which is conjoined with something that is conjoined with an object, is also itself conjoined with the object; or, as we should prefer to express the same idea, that the appendage of an appendage is the appendage of the object which has the appendage.

The two points now before us may be thus otherwise stated:—The doctrine of all Logicians, and of Hamilton among the rest, is that, in certain cases, we teach or learn, as an inference, not as a fact of which we have intuitive knowledge, that one notion is part of another (*i.e.*, is true of another); and that we, in such cases, teach or learn this previously unknown relation through a comparison of the two notions with a third. Mr. Mill, on the contrary, denies both propositions in all cases. He holds that if we, as learners, have two conceptions to deal with, we cannot fail to see intuitively whether either is a logical part of (*i.e.*, is true of) the other or not; and that if we do fail to see this intuitively, no third conception or increase of knowledge can enable us to learn it, or throw any further light upon the relation for us.

1. Let us take these two objections in the order in which Mr. Mill discusses them. He first objects (p. 366)—How is it possible that one notion should be part of another notion, *i.e.*, be involved in another notion, and we not know it? I answer that this often happens. It happens obviously in the case of every one of us who does not himself possess these conceptions—who does not himself possess all possible human knowledge. How can any individual perceive the relations of two conceptions to one another, when he is unacquainted with the conceptions themselves, or with either of them? How can I know that the conception which symbolizes swiftness is part of the conception which symbolizes another person's boat, if I have neither of these conceptions, or only one of them, in my own mind, however true it may be that there are both these conceptions?

The mere fact that these conceptions exist, does not make them mine. This, I suppose, will be readily granted by Mr. Mill, or rather by the defenders of Mr. Mill's seriousness. The same thing, however, does happen in many cases even where we have but one of the conceptions in the same mind, unless, with Mr. Mill, we hold the quaint theory, that the individual's knowledge of things does not extend beyond the knowledge of which he is at each moment conscious. There are various notions necessarily involved in the notion of a triangle, for instance, which we do not think of or even know of, when we entertain the notion of a triangle; for 'the notion' of a triangle is, of course, not an idiot's notion of it, nor this or that person's notion of it, but the utmost that is known or even knowable to mankind about it. It is frivolous to deny that there are many conceptions here involved in, and parts of, and necessarily conjoined with other parts of, man's knowledge of the triangle—ay, and conceptions of self-evident relations, of which conceptions, when we are conscious of the conception of a triangle, we are wholly unconscious,—whether it be that we do not know them at all, or merely do not think of them; the conception, for instance, that it is always the half of a parallelogram diagonally bisected. But even when we are conscious of both the conceptions to be compared, it frequently happens that the one's being part of the other, *i.e.*, true of the other, is not self-evident, and may even be long unknown. This is clearly the case when one of the notions is in one person's mind, and the other in another person's mind at the same time. Or, when both of the notions are in the same mind at different points of time—one at one time and one at another, it is clearly possible that the one may be true of the other, *i.e.*, be a logical part of it without our being aware of it. The only question, therefore, that remains, or that can arise, is this, How is it possible that one notion should be part of another notion, and we not know it, when they are both present to the same mind at the same, or nearly the same, instant? Now, I here answer that this is perfectly possible, and is a fact familiar to all of us. The notion which is the whole, and the notion which is the part of it—*i.e.*, which is true of the whole—are both of them very frequently in the mind of the same person at the same moment; and the person is, moreover, informed of the fact that the two notions are in this relation to each other, yet he cannot discern that it is so until it is proved to him. To perceive this relation, says Mr. Mill, if it exists, nothing surely can be

necessary but to fix the attention on the two notions. Not at all. Mr. Mill well knows that this is not so (see p. 353). The three angles of a triangle constitute one notion, a logical or metaphysical whole. One of their attributes, and therefore one of their logical or metaphysical parts—one of the things true of them—is the being equal to two right angles. This is here the second notion. But what amount of mere attention bestowed upon these two notions *alone* (the being equal to two right angles, and the being the three angles of a triangle) would ever make us perceive their relation to one another,—would ever make us perceive that the one was a part or attribute of the other, or a mark of the other, or, in Mr. Mill's phrase, something conjoined with the other parts of the other? If we were to stare at the notion of the three angles in a triangle till doomsday, and to stare also till doomsday at our notion of a thing's being equal to two right angles, without our having any other item of thought or conception to compare them with, doomsday would arrive without our discovering that the being equal to two right angles was a part of the three angles in question, or even that it was a mere unessential appendage to them. How is this possible? he asks. How is it possible that the relation of these two notions to each other, as Whole and Part in Logic,—as being one of them true of the other—should not be self-evident, if it really exists? Our notion or knowledge on any subject consists of notions as its parts, and is it not self-evident, he asks, if the thing is true at all, that one of the constituent parts in our knowledge of the three angles belonging to a triangle is that they are equal to two right angles? Indeed, Mr. Mill, it is not. Even when we are told that there is this relation between these notions, it is not self-evident. To perceive that the one conception is part of the other, 'nothing surely can be necessary,' reiterates Mr. Mill, 'but to fix our attention upon them. We cannot surely concentrate our consciousness on two ideas in our own mind without 'knowing with certainty whether one of them as a (logical) Whole 'includes the other as a (logical) Part;' *i.e.*, whether one of them is true of the other (p. 366). Either the relation is not true, we are told, or, if it is, it is self-evident! For what class of readers, I again ask, has Mr. Mill written such stuff as this? If any one can see common sense in it, no self-contradiction and no impossibility in any theory of consciousness need ever stagger him. There is no such thing as a reduction to absurdity if this is not one. *Some*

judgments *are* self-evident. That the whole is greater than its part, is so. That the part of the part is a part of the Whole, is so, both in Physics and Metaphysics. That 2 and 2 are 4, is so. But not, that $12 \times 12 = 144$; not, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; not, that the circumference and diameter of a circle are to one another as 3 and a fraction are to 1. Nobody calls it self-evident that in any of these cases the one conception is true of the other, or a part of the other, or involved in it, or a mark of it, or conjoined with the other parts of it, however simultaneously we may be conscious of the two conceptions. Where did Mr. Mill learn that such things are self-evident? Are we to believe that he was in earnest when he wrote this? and that it would be overrating his understanding to say that he knew better? 'My newly-invented *Introspective Method* is here in its place.' It would be well then, Mr. Mill, if you employed it.

2. His next objection is, that if we have a knowledge, however imperfect and personal, of two totally different facts, and the knowledge of neither is sufficient to show us whether either is true of the other, it is impossible that any further knowledge—that our knowledge of any conceivable third fact, should show us this. Giant-killing gone mad, is what is here suggested to us. Mr. John Mill's words are as follows:—'Moreover, if it were really the case that 'we can compare two notions, and fail to discover whether one of them is a part of the other, it is impossible to understand how we could be enabled to accomplish this by comparing each of them with a third;' *i.e.*, by knowing anything more about them! (p. 366). He thus magnanimously allows us to suppose, *argumenti causâ*, that the relation of Part and Whole between the two conceptions can exist without being self-evident; he allows us to suppose that it is not self-evident that the three angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles; in other words, that the being equal to two right angles is not, in a self-evident manner, part of our knowledge of the three angles of a triangle; and then asks, If this sort of thing is not self-evident, how can a third conception—how can any further knowledge, in any case, help us to see that the one of these conceptions is an attribute, or part of the other? Would not the new relations subsisting between any middle term and the two extremes be necessarily as far from self-evident as the old relation between the extremes themselves? I answer, not necessarily. Do we not, he insists, see the enormous inconsistency of supposing that they

would not? I answer, No. Assuredly they would often be so, and often are so. These relations of the third term very often require proof; as often as not. But what of that? Self-evident propositions, it is true, require no proof,—not even self-evident proof. But propositions not self-evident *always* require proof, and this proof (of one notion being part of another) is sometimes self-evident, and sometimes not. In Euclid's 1st Prop. of the First Book, the proof is entirely self-evident (the very possibility which Mr. Mill here questions). In the 2d, one of the middle term's relations is self-evident, and one proved. In the 5th, both its relations are proved. In many cases, it is not one middle term, but several, whose relations have to be considered, as in the ratio of the circumference to its diameter; and in all cases, if we have not self-evident proof at once, we go back until we find it. So that, as far as all the proofs in Geometry, and all other *a priori* proofs are concerned, we have, for a proposition which is not self-evident, ultimately and really no other proof at all but self-evident proof. Thus, although Mr. Mill seems to limit his assertion to self-evident premisses only, it necessarily extends, without his consent, to all *a priori* premisses; and how does he like its appearance then? Can he mean that a middle or third term (*i.e.*, increased knowledge) never enables us to see that one extreme is part of the other, if we do not see this at once?

There are thus here two cases to be considered of a conclusion not self-evident,—one in which the premisses presented by the third term are self-evident, and one in which they are not. Mr. Mill, however, as I say, seems, useless though it be, to limit his assertion to the former case. He seems to speak only of the *immediate* premisses, and to admit that where these require proof, *i.e.*, are not self-evident, the third term, whose relations they state, is of use, and seems to hold that it is only when the premisses are self-evident that the third term can be of no use. But does he not see that, even if it is of no other use, this third term is then of use to show this fact? It is of use to show that the relations of the Extremes with one and the same third term are self-evident. This additional knowledge, he will admit, cannot possibly be discerned without the aid of the third term. For how could its relations be discerned where itself was not? and the relations of the extremes cannot, *ex hypothesi*, be discerned by themselves. The use, then, of which a third term can be in enabling us to discern that one notion is true

of another notion (or is part of it) is this—It extends our knowledge or notion of each extreme. It exhibits each intuitively, in other relations beside that unknown one, in which they stand to one another; and this extended notion or extended knowledge of the two extremes contains in it the required knowledge, and we thus perceive also intuitively one extreme to be part of (or true of) the other extreme.

Mr. Mill asks, But how is this possible, that the conclusion should not be from the first self-evident, and yet that the premisses should be so? How is it possible that one portion of our knowledge should be self-evident, and another not? 'The one truth must be as much a matter of direct consciousness as the other' (p. 369). Now, where, I again ask, are we to look for a reduction to absurdity if this is not one? Who that accepts such a theory as this need ever be staggered afterwards by any self-contradiction or impossibility that may come in his way, either in a theory of self-consciousness, or in a theory of Reasoning, or in any other sort of theory whatever? 1. *How is it possible that one portion of our knowledge should be self-evident, and another not?* I answer, because our knowledge on any one point may be self-evident to-day, although it was not so yesterday. That alone is enough to break the rule. Besides, would it not be something still more extraordinary that our knowledge should be all self-evident at the same time, or all non-self-evident at the same time, alternately; or that it should be all permanently self-evident, or all permanently requiring proof? 2. *'The one truth must be as much a matter of direct consciousness as the other.'* In one sense this is true. In one sense it is not. In the sense of the foregoing question it is not true. It is not at all necessary that the conclusion that requires proof must also have proof that requires proof. Am I unjust to Mr. Mill in saying that he knows it is not? But if what he intends to express is that self-evident premisses make a self-evident conclusion, I answer, True. But not to those unacquainted with the self-evident premisses; not to each mind until the moment in which each mind perceives the premisses to be self-evident; not until our knowledge has extended to the new relations presented by or created by the third term. This combination with, or necessity for, premisses, or further knowledge of some kind, constitutes the whole difference between a self-evident proposition and one that is not so. The entanglement here contrived by Mr. Mill, for I cannot agree with his admirers that he

is the victim of his own entanglement, consists in his affecting to think that self-evident premisses do nothing for us ; that we know as much without them as we know with them, and this merely because there is no more stated in the conclusion than in the premisses ; a mistake, however, into which Mr. Mill will find it possible to decoy very few of his readers. One is only curious to know for what class of them he supplies the mental pabulum of which this is a specimen.

I re-state the whole matter thus :—The assertion of Logicians upon this point, as opposed by Mr. Mill, he describes as this : ‘ A, B, and C are three concepts, of ‘ which we are supposed to know that ‘ A is a part of B and B of C, but until we put these two propositions together (*i.e.*, until we view them simultaneously), we do ‘ not know that A is a part of C’ (p. 366). In other words, we do not discern that A is a logical part of C until the moment in which we first have the simultaneous knowledge of their relations, in this respect, to B. As soon, however, as we can put the two premisses together, which is at the very instant and by the very act in which we discern the second premiss, several things become at once self-evident, one of which is that A is true of C,—that the one notion is a part of the other. This simultaneous self-evidence of the conclusion and the premisses is a correct statement of what Hamilton and all the rest of the Logical World assert upon this point. It is not self-evident that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. But we can be made to perceive this by an extension of our knowledge,—by any arrangement whatever which makes us perceive intuitively that something else, here B (a middle term), is true of these three angles, and has also, as true of it, the being equal to two right angles,—a compound discovery, simultaneously with which we are enabled to discern the relation in question.

Mr. Mill here asks, How can one know the premisses without at the same time knowing the conclusion ? The answer is, We cannot. No one says we can. Again he asks, How can the premisses be self-evident without this or that person knowing them to be so ? Answer—In several ways. A person may not yet have ever heard of them. His intellect may be incapable of ever understanding them at all, or of understanding them with his present limited knowledge, or at his present early age. But no one denies that, in whatever case the premisses are self-evident, the conclusion is so, or that as soon as they are known to be so, the conclusion is known to be so.

Things are often self-evident without our knowing that they are so,—self-evident to one person without being so to another. Mr. Mill returns to the charge somewhat exasperated. He says, You are supposed to see intuitively that A is a part of B, and also to see intuitively that B is part of C. How on earth then, he continues, could you help seeing equally intuitively from the beginning that A was part of C? The answer to this is, Because we did not see the premisses intuitively from the beginning,—we did not see them at all. If we had, we should have seen intuitively from the beginning that A was part of C. When a person first hears the proposition, he has less knowledge of its extremes than he has after having had his attention directed to the premisses. Is there anything wonderful, therefore, in his finding it self-evident to him in the one case and not in the other?—in his finding that, although the conclusion's being capable of being self-evident does not make it self-evident what the premisses are, yet the premisses' being self-evident makes the conclusion so?

We see that there merely being self-evident premisses is not enough. We must be acquainted with them. We must have our attention drawn to them. We must have heard of them. The mere fact of there being such premisses does not render a proposition self-evident to us until we are acquainted with them. What was previously not self-evident then becomes so. Mr. Mill denies this. He says that the mere fact of there being self-evident premisses is enough, whether we have ever heard of them or not!

If Mr. Mill seeks to evade this self-contradiction, and takes refuge in saying, as some people sometimes do, that he did not mean what he said; that he did not mean we could find the proposition self-evident without a previous knowledge of the self-evident premisses, as his words would lead us to suppose, but merely that, when we know both, we must know the proposition *before* we know the premisses,—we must know that A is part of C before we can possibly know that 'A and something more' is part of C,—even if there is this retreat from the first position, his theory may be still chased from point to point, unable to make a stand any where. If it escapes, it is only out of one self-contradiction into another. There is no 'Before' or 'After' here for him to escape into. The conclusion and the premisses become simultaneously, not successively, self-evident. The only priority here capable of being recognised is priority of attention; and the first fact to which our

attention is called, while we are in the act of grasping the premisses, is the relation we are endeavouring to prove,—not that B must have some other parts, or one other part, or two in it beside A, as Mr. Mill supposes, but that A is part of C.

Mr. Mill explains himself as follows. He thus describes what he regards as the great obstacle to our employing a third term in Logic, or some additional information, for the purpose, as we do, of showing that one portion of our knowledge is part of another portion of it. ‘We have perceived B in C intuitively, by direct comparison. But what is B? By supposition it is, and is perceived to be, A and something more. We have, therefore, by direct intuition, perceived that A and something more is a part of C, without perceiving that A is a part of C. Surely there is here a great psychological difficulty to be got over’ (pp. 366-7). The objection here made to the use of premisses and a third conception, or third term, in Logic, is that, if there are such things, they introduce the absurdity that, while we profess to see the premisses before the conclusion, we really, according to our process, and in spite of ourselves, see the conclusion before the premisses. For we must, he tells us, be able to discern that A is true of C before we can possibly discern that A and something more is so; and this absurdity resulting from it shows our process to be wrong.

Now, to say that we know A and something more to be true of C *before* we know A alone to be so, is to say that the proposition is not instantly self-evident in the two premisses, as Mr. Mill himself admits it to be at page 362; and this is quite as preposterous as the previous statement, that the premisses from the first are self-evident in the conclusion, or that the conclusion, which is not self-evident at a given time, or to a given person, can become self-evident then, and to him, without further knowledge, *i.e.*, without premisses. Thus, even if we here take it for granted, with Mr. Mill, that we perceive B to be A and something more quite as soon as we *can* perceive it to be so—quite as soon as we perceive A itself to be part of B, how can it be said, except in joke, that we can perceive A and something more to be part of C *before* we can perceive A to be so? There is here, as I have said, no priority of self-evidence, but of attention only. As soon as the premisses are discerned, several facts are at once rendered capable of being intuitively perceived. One of these is the proposition for which we are on the look-out, *viz.*, that A is part of C; and another, one of the

premisses, viz., that A is a part of B. But although one of these two facts, viz., the proposition proved, is formally stated after the proof, it is clearly not true to say that it is not so soon perceivable as the other; and if this is true of A's being part of B, *a fortiori* it is true of its converse, not then yet thought of at all, viz., B's being A and something more. Jack is here in the Giant's clutches, writhing and gasping to an extent which makes one glad to know that the whole thing is only a pantomime of Jack's own getting up, and the gasping and writhing all histrionic.

On the point here discussed, I have pointed out the three following principles in contradiction of Mr. Mill:—1. It is not true that self-evident premisses are inconsistent with a non-self-evident conclusion; or, in other words, it is not inconsistent that a proposition which without further knowledge cannot be perceived intuitively, should, with further knowledge, be so perceived. 2. It is not until such time as we become acquainted with the premisses that self-evident premisses necessitate a self-evident conclusion. 3. It is at the same moment, neither before nor after, and by the same act, that the facts of the conclusion and the facts of the premisses become capable of being perceived intuitively by each person, although it is natural that we should speak of, as following and inferred, the proposition, without which we could have known the others, but which, without the others, we never could have known. As Mr. Mill is well aware, there never was such a thing as a Conceptualist School, which he writes so much about, and employs as a bugbear in every chapter for those unacquainted with these subjects; but even if there had been, there is not here the smallest difficulty, 'psychological' or otherwise, for such a school 'to have been blind to.' His must be a thick head, indeed, who finds a puzzle here, or anything strange here; and I decline thus to estimate Mr. Mill's, even at his own instance, however much or justly he may have himself thus estimated the understandings of the Rationalist, *i.e.*, Materialist, School, for whom he has written. We find here one of those numberless propositions in which he states, throughout his book, what he knows is 'psychologically' false, and what he is well aware everybody else knows to be so. Is it to be supposed for an instant that Mr. Mill would do this otherwise than in jest? Surely not. Surely there is, in his having done it at all, a considerable 'psychological' difficulty to be accounted for,—considerable enough, in all conscience, without any necessity for

supposing one still greater,—a difficulty to be accounted for to which critics of the Rationalist School, and, indeed, of other schools also, have been surprisingly blind.

In allusion to the foregoing principles, Mr. Mill says he does not understand what Logicians say in reply to what thus puzzles him. He further owns, in rather a clumsy imitation of Hume's most playful mood, that he does not here try to understand them; that instead of trying to do this, he will imagine what 'they might say,' and reply in sport to their imaginary explanations; acknowledging, it would seem, in an unguarded moment, that what he calls their absurdity is only an 'apparent absurdity' (p. 365). He then suggests two of these imaginary explanations, and tells us that he found it very difficult, indeed, 'to invent' these two, and that even these any blockhead could overthrow. 'It is a great deal easier to refute these arguments than it was to discover them.' We need not follow little Jack through the mazes of the little wood into which he here enters. Suffice it to say, that he endeavours to convince his readers of its being impossible for us to have a knowledge or conception either of a physical or metaphysical Whole without our having a knowledge of every separate part of it; that we have no conception of a circle, for instance, unless one part of that conception represents the important fact that the circumference is to the diameter as 3.14159 is to 1,—nor of a house, unless we have the minutest conception of every room and every plank in it.

In interpreting Mr. John S. Mill's chapters against Logic, the most important, and not always the most practicable requisite, is to remember his former statement upon each subject. It may be well, therefore, to remind his readers, that in the former chapter (p. 359) all judgments, all expressions of knowledge, are described by him as analytic, *i.e.*, as implying either a real or supposed knowledge in the mind of him who frames the judgment; that there can be no judgment without this knowledge; that those who are ignorant of the subject can pronounce no judgment at all about it, but merely pursue, with respect to it, that synthetic process of appropriating knowledge which is by Mr. Mill miscalled Judgment, but which is really only learning, not judging, or, at the very utmost, learning how to judge. The reader is there informed, even by Mr. Mill himself, that every time we state a judgment we unfold knowledge, declaring the predicate to be part of what is true of the subject. Mr. Mill himself owns, in the page referred to, that 'these judgments

are analytical,'—'propositions in which the concept of the predicate is part of the concept of the subject;' that 'they convey no information' to the person himself who frames them, but only to persons unacquainted with the facts, 'and predicate separately the different attributes which the name asserts collectively,' which they could not do if the framer of them had no 'concept' or knowledge of the facts asserted. These are what we all mean by judgments in Logic; whether, with regard to those who are unacquainted with the subject-matter of them,—to whom, as Mr. Mill says, they are new, we may choose to call them also 'synthetical' or not.

Some of these judgments, or unfoldings of knowledge, state contingent truths, as that swiftness is true of, or part of, the boat I am speaking of, whereas others state necessary truths. Of these latter, some are self-evident, as that, when equals are added to equals, the wholes are equal; and some not, as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. When a person acquainted with the latter judgment—*i.e.*, to whom it is no longer matter of synthesis, and who, therefore, as Mr. Mill admits, perceives 'the concept of the predicate to be part of the concept of the subject'—wishes to expound this to a person ignorant of it, he supplies him with a third concept, which is also part of the subject-concept, as Mr. Mill admits, and of which, as Mr. Mill also admits, the predicate-concept is likewise part, *i.e.*, is known to be true by the constructor of the Reasoning. In these Analytic judgments, then, not only is the predicate-notion, even according to Mr. Mill, part of the subject-notion in the conclusion, but it is known, *ab initio*, by the Expositor to be so, just as, and because, the same relation is known by him to subsist in each of the premisses. The learner or man of synthetic operations is in a very different position. He has to discern relations, not to declare them. The strenuous effort to confound these two very different classes of individuals, the expositors and the auditors, seems to be one of Jack's favourite dodges in this contest.

How then, inquires Mr. John S. Mill, affecting to be bewildered by his fresh discernments, but really in pursuance of this very useful stratagem,—how then can we learn in this way 'countless important truths,' since we thus know all, in each case, before we begin our inferences?

It is quite true that Hamilton here speaks of all the *a priori* truths which are not self-evident. But is Mr. Mill quite sure that

he knows what Hamilton means by 'We'? Does Hamilton mean the Expositors or the Auditors, or both? If he means both, does Mr. Mill bear well in mind to what extent, and in what sense, each person can be both at once? There are two ways in which we can use Logic. We can use it to impart knowledge, *i.e.*, to convince others. This is perhaps its more common and original use. It is so that Euclid uses it in his Elements, and Butler in his Analogy, and everybody in ordinary conversation. We can also use it to test knowledge, *i.e.*, to convince ourselves. This latter is the only way in which the learner employs it; and he does so by constituting himself, *hypothetically*, for the time being, his own informant—his own logical Expositor upon any individual point. This, often unconscious, testing of our own knowledge by that analysis or unfolding of thought which we call Logic, and which, in this case, is, of course, only between self and self, may no doubt have led superficial writers to imagine that Reasoning was, and that Judgment was, an expression by us of thoughts unknown to us (as if either word could have ever had such a meaning), instead of denoting solely an expression by us of thoughts known, or at least supposed to be known to us. We thus see clearly with what perfect truth Hamilton has said, that it is alone by the aid of Logic that we discover that countless multitude of *a priori* propositions which, although of extreme importance, are not self-evident. We learn them, by its aid, not only when others teach them to us, but even when we employ it ourselves to test those of them which have been thus taught to us by others. Surely Mr. Mill must be aware, or rather his readers must be aware, that the pronoun 'We' has a generic use as a class-name as well as a singular one; that it then contains under it, as species, both learners and Analysts,—both those who know and those who do not know,—those who judge and those who cannot; that those who employ inferences or reasoning from data are not those who are ignorant of these data, but those only who have discovered them, and who, from their knowledge of them, are able to indicate what inferences are self-evident in them; and that the Analyst or Logical Expositor, who unfolds his knowledge by declaring a predicate to be true of a subject, is not to be confounded with the learner who does not know whether it is so or not. Does Mr. Mill indeed suppose that, because Hamilton said, We are now able, by means of Logic, to discover the countless multitudes of *a priori* truths which are not self-evident,

Hamilton here meant those of us who already know and have already tested the great truths alluded to,—not those of us who are learning them from others by means of the Logic which others use in teaching us, and which we, to some extent, use as a test when we teach ourselves? Is this the jarring we are told to expect?

And as to the principle of adjuncts and appendages which Mr. Mill is so anxious to substitute for the common one of the Logicians, how does he propose to exhibit its superiority? His principle is, that the appendage of the appendage is the appendage of that which has the appendage, or, as he prefers to express it, that which is conjoined to that which is conjoined to an object, is conjoined also to the object; as though he said the tail of the tail is the tail of the animal. We have here two questions to put. In the first place, Is this principle true? In the second place, How does it act?

In the first place, Is it true? Every reader can see that swiftness is part of a swift boat, in the logical sense, just as four is part of twelve, in a physical sense; that as each object consists, in the former sense, of all its attributes combined, each attribute is a part of, *i.e.*, is true of the object; that all that is true of the object is an attribute of it, and, in this sense, part of it; and that the attribute which is part of one of the attributes composing an object, is part of the whole object. But in what imaginable sense is it true that, if there is a swift boat, the swiftness is something superadded to this swift boat?—something over and above all the attributes which constitute the swift thing so called?—something not essential to a swift thing?—something along with it, conjoined with it?—something that might be removed, and the swift boat still remain a swift boat? In like manner, physically speaking, four is part of twelve. In what sense is it true to say that four is something conjoined with twelve, or an appendage or adjunct of it? Is not this rather too rank? The very crown of the self-contradictions sown so thickly throughout Mr. Mill's speculations?

But in the second place, even if this principle of adjuncts and appendages had been true instead of false, what would it have effected? How would the learner, with this principle, get to see that the being equal to two right angles is a part of what is true of the three angles in a triangle, better than he could get to see this upon the ordinary principle? How, in short, can he possibly by this principle get to see the thing at all? Mr. Mill's own explana-

tion of this (pp. 369-70) has almost as much lurking fun in it, under the specious appearance of philosophical precision, as anything else in the book. There is here no vagueness of thought, as so often elsewhere, leading to the unsuspecting admission of opposite doctrines in the same breath. It is all clean-cut waggery. Using the symbols A, B, C, already given, he says that from our observing A at one time conjoined with B, in a series of observations in which we see nothing whatever of C, and C at another time conjoined with B, in another series of observations in which we see nothing whatever of A—in which it is A's turn to be imperceptible, we may safely and confidently infer that C is all the time conjoined with A! 'If any one can believe this,' says Mr. Mill very truly, elsewhere, in words evidently intended for this joke of his, 'no self-contradiction and no impossibility in any theory of consciousness need stagger him. There is no such thing as a reduction to absurdity if this is not one.'

Then comes the question, What is human knowledge? Is it only that which we know and can know, or is it also that which we cannot know? Is it that which only this or that person possesses, or is it the sum-total of all men's knowledge? Is it that which existed in the past, or is it that which will exist hereafter? And a concept, what is it? My conception of this pen—what do we mean by this expression? Our notion of Saturn's ring—what does that mean? Here is a question (for it is all one question) almost as vague as Mr. Mill could wish for, or any other person in similar difficulties. Yet there is nothing vague about it for the mind of one in earnest.

I answer, We speak of that as knowledge which is knowable, as well as which is known,—which will be knowledge to-morrow, although it is not so now, as well as that which, although not so now, was so in former years; also that which is so now, even when we are unconscious of it, unoccupied with it; yes, even when we are ignorant of it. In all such cases we must, in our altercations with Mr. Mill, attend carefully to the import of the pronoun 'We.' It may not be the knowledge of men now living, or of this or that man, but whether in the past or future, it is knowledge. To say that this is not the knowledge of an object—that these are not the conceptions of certain objects—merely because not *my* knowledge or *my* conceptions, or the knowledge of this moment, would be inaccurate in the last degree. After mentioning the ratio of the

circumference to the diameter of a circle, 'Now is there,' Mr. Mill asks, 'any sense consistent with the meaning of the terms, in which it can be said that this recondite property formed part of the concept (or knowledge) of a circle before it had been discovered by mathematicians? . . . It is in nobody's but a mathematician's concept (or knowledge) even now' (p. 371). All Mr. Mill's readers well know that this knowledge was within our reach from the first; that all that is knowable to mankind, all that is relative, is knowledge, and is called knowledge, whether it is known to this generation or not; and that it would not have been possible for the knowledge of a circle not to have *involved* the ratio in question, any more than that the knowledge of the number 144 could have existed without necessarily involving the knowledge, whether discovered or not, of its identity with 12×12 .

Our knowledge of an object, therefore, may mean the least knowledge of it possible to mankind, or the greatest, or any of the intermediate degrees of knowledge. It may mean a child's knowledge of it, or a grown person's knowledge of it, or the utmost knowledge of it possessed by any one individual, or the utmost knowledge of it possessed by all mankind conjointly, or even the utmost knowledge of it knowable, though still unknown. In all which cases the context determines the interpretation, if nothing else does so. And the same is true respecting our *conception* (concept) or *notion* of an object,—terms here entirely synonymous with *knowledge*. Either may comprehend every known attribute of an object—every attribute which individualizes it, or it may comprehend but one, two, or more attributes common to that object with many others. It is called, in this latter case, the concept or conception of a genus or of a class-name. We may therefore have the concept (conception, knowledge, notion) of an individual, or the concept, etc., of the highest genus; also, therefore, that of any of the intermediate species; and we may speak of it as 'my' concept of the object or genus—'our' concept of it—'the' concept of it.

It is necessary to enter into these details, upon a very simple subject, in order to meet Mr. Mill's elaborate attempts to complicate it. According to him, in many of his remarks, we can have no knowledge or conception of any object unless we know everything about it; which is, of course, impossible; nor if we have a conception of an object, can there be, according to him, any conception belonging to it except those which we are at the moment acquainted

with, and of which we are at the moment conscious ; yet in other remarks he will have it that even a child or an idiot can have some conceptions of things, however many of them such individuals may not have ; and admits that these conceptions put together form their conception of one thing. But it is not until he introduces the expositor and the learner in their dealings with these conceptions, that his chaos is complete. Then we are informed that no learner can be made to see how, of two conceptions, one is true of the other, by pointing out to him a third conception in which they are so, and are informed how impossible it is that, of two conceptions in any one given spirit, one should be true of the other, unless that spirit perceives intuitively that it is so. All which he makes out very clearly by a sort of thimblery, in which (without ever being able to say, even when we see it, where it is) we find our knowledge—the pea—sometimes under the learner's thimble, sometimes under that of the teacher, and sometimes, allied to oxygen, calmly floating in the summer air, 'like the wild goose, unclaimed of any man.' I must not omit to mention that he has likewise in this and some other chapters a merry little theory about our knowledge or concept being a sort of little *sac* or bag with 'four corners,' tied round our necks, into which we are constantly putting, and out of which we are constantly taking, all we learn and all we know ; in which little bag originally there is nothing at all, of whose existence also we are for the most part unconscious, but of whose contents we never can be either ignorant, or forgetful, or unconscious.

It is necessary that I should now also advert to Hamilton's use of one of the above terms for human knowledge, which Mr. Mill has sought to invest with as much confusion as possible in connexion with this point. I mean the word 'concept.' That the English writers apply the term 'conception' to our concrete knowledge of the individual, as well as to our abstract knowledge of the class, is too well known to need illustration. Mr. Mill does not seem to deny this. Nor can anything be clearer than that Hamilton so used it also, viz., of the individual, or maximum of Comprehension, as well as of the class. This Mr. Mill affects to deny ; and thereupon accuses Hamilton of inconsistency when he finds him doing so (see pp. 337-8). That Hamilton, however, uses the word to denote our knowledge of both kinds—our knowledge of the individual, which cannot be logically divided, quite as much as of the class which can,—and so explains it, is manifest from his Lectures, whether

it be true or not that he habitually used it, or required to use it, more in the one sense than in the other. By it he means the quality or fasciculus of qualities which constitutes the genus, and by it he means the fasciculus of qualities which constitutes Charles or London,—*i.e.*, by which one individual is sufficiently distinguished from all others. It is quite true that this knowledge of the individual and the concrete is always to some extent abstract. It does not, for instance, give us Charles as either sitting or standing, nor London as either in the daylight or at night. There is, however, no difficulty in seeing that our abstraction does not convert either into a genus, and that when Hamilton speaks of Charles or London as a concept, and only according to that general knowledge of each which distinguishes each in our understanding from all other towns and men, he is not in the slightest degree inconsistent. That Hamilton does so use the term, and professes so to use it, and that his doing so involves no inconsistency, and that Mr. Mill was aware of all this, the latter's readers will see sufficiently from such passages in Hamilton's Lectures as the following:—'The term "conception" means two things. . . . Conception means both the *act* of 'conceiving and the *object* conceived. . . . For the act of conceiving 'the term "conception" should be employed, and that exclusively; 'while, for the object of conception, or that which is conceived, the 'term concept should be used' (iii. p. 41). Can any one suppose that the word 'object' here means a genus or a species only? Again:—' *Concept* or *notion* . . . terms employed as convertible. . . . ' *Conception*, the act of which *concept* is the result, expresses the act 'of comprehending or grasping up into unity the various qualities 'by which an object is characterized' (pp. 119, 120). Is not that, then, to be regarded as a concept which is the maximum of comprehension, as well as that which is the minimum of it? Is not that to be so regarded in which *all* those qualities are 'grasped up into unity,' which distinguish the concrete individual from all others? 'The more distinctive characters the concept contains, the more 'minutely it will distinguish and determine. . . . If it contain a 'plenum of distinctive characters, it must contain the distinctive, 'the determining characters of some individual object. . . . In regard to its comprehension, . . . it is here at its maximum, the concept being a complement of the whole attributes of an individual 'object, which, by these attributes, it thinks and discriminates from 'every other. . . . The maximum of Comprehension and the mini-

‘mum of Extension are found in the concept of an individual’ (pp. 148, 149). ‘When the Extension of a *concept* becomes a minimum ; that is, when it contains no other notions under it, it is called an ‘*individual*’ (p. 146). ‘An individual notion cannot be divided’ (p. 147). ‘As Division is the analysis of a higher or more general ‘concept into others lower and less general, if a *concept be an indivi- dual*, that is, only a bundle of individual qualities, it is indivisible, ‘—is, in fact, not a proper or *abstract concept* at all, but only a concrete representation of Imagination’ (p. 152). Although properly and strictly speaking this is true, yet, as I have already observed, all knowledge of the individual is and must be considered as in some respects, and to a certain extent, abstract,—all that is necessary being that the qualities known should *sufficiently* distinguish the one object from all others, and thus speaking of the known attributes of Socrates, Hamilton says that they ‘distinguish him from all other men, and together make up my *notion or concept of him*’ (p. 78). ‘We must not collate notions abstract and notions concrete’ (p. 155). We see then that, according to Hamilton, there are concrete concepts, as well as abstract ones. ‘From what has been formerly stated, you are aware that the quantity of comprehension, ‘belonging to a notion, is the complement of characters which it ‘contains in it ; and that this quantity is at its maximum in an ‘individual. Thus the notion of the individual Socrates, contains ‘in it,’ etc. (p. 220). But further : Does Mr. Mill mean to say that Hamilton holds it to be impossible to predicate anything of the individual, or the individual of anything, and therefore excludes the individual from the syllogism, when we read in the Lectures (p. 73) that Logic treats only of ‘Concepts, Judgments, and Reasonings’? Does this mean that the individual has no place in Logic? Finally, Hamilton has, in the Discussions, long subsequently to whatever he wrote in his Lectures, elaborately explained to us that the knowledge of the individual, whereby we distinguish it from all others, is as truly a concept as our knowledge of the genus is, and that although all concepts are not images, all images are concepts. ‘The understanding, thought proper, notion, concept, ‘etc., may coincide or not with Imagination, representation proper, ‘image, etc. The two faculties do not coincide in a general notion ; ‘for we cannot represent Man or Horse in an actual image without ‘individualizing the universal ; and thus contradiction emerges. ‘But in the individual, say Socrates or Bucephalus, they do coin-

‘cide ; for I see no valid ground why we should not *think*, in the strict sense of the word, or *conceive* (have concepts of) the individuals which we *represent*. In like manner, there is no mutual contradiction between the image and the concept of the Infinite or Absolute, if these be otherwise possible ; for there is not necessarily involved the incompatibility of the one act of cognition with ‘the other’ (Discuss. xiii., *note*).

It is in spite of these and scores of similar explanations that Mr. Mill represents Hamilton as holding that we cannot have a concept of the individual object, and as never expressing himself as if we could but inconsistently, and by mistake.

Let us now recapitulate what all are agreed upon respecting the import and use of this term ‘concept.’ Doing this will assist the general reader, for whom alone I reply, or need to reply, to this Rationalistic squib of Mr. Mill’s.

1. Concepts are either generic (general, universal, abstract), as when we say, The Horse exists in every quarter of the world ; which remark applies to no one horse ; or they are individual (concrete, singular), as the concept of a given horse, when we say, My horse is in the stable ; which remark applies to one horse, and to one horse only.

2. The generic concept is not an image in the mind, *i.e.*, an idea, but only a general knowledge or notion,—a symbol of an image, not an image,—of the object which would, in each concrete case, be found existing. The individual concept, or concrete concept, is an idea or mental image, called also a mental representation, or representation in imagination, or concrete representation ; and being an image, is not the symbol of one. We have, therefore, image-concepts as well as genus-concepts or class-concepts, the former being of individuals only, the latter of classes or genera.

3. We think about, or of, a generic concept, but cannot figure it to ourselves, or imagine it, or, as Mr. Mill and the Scottish writers generally say, ‘think it.’ Whereas we not only can think about an individual or concrete concept, but we can also ‘think it,’ *i.e.*, figure it or represent it in imagination,—imagine it, give it a definite shape, and thus make an image of it. Since the expression ‘to think a thing’ has been allowed to creep into philosophy, let us be careful to distinguish well between thinking a thing and thinking of a thing, or about a thing.

4. The concept of an object or of a class of objects can either be partial or complete. In most cases, each person's concept of anything, whether generic or individual, is partial; and this is never in Logic what is meant when we say, *The* concept of a thing, or, *Our* concept of it. We then mean nothing partial. The complete concept, of an individual or of a class, means all that is at all known or even knowable and thinkable about it. When, for instance, we speak of the concept attached to the term Hamilton in these pages,—the concept which we have of him, and which we employ as a symbol of him, we do not mean Mr. Mill's concept of him, nor any one other person's concept of him. Every one knows that.

5. The term 'concept' means neither more nor less than what is ordinarily called 'conception,'—when we say, My conception of that horse is different from yours, or, Our conception of the horse is different from our conception of the buffalo; but the term has been adopted by Logicians in order to leave the term 'conception' to denote exclusively the mental act or process so called, and of which the concept is the result. Our English word, 'conceptions,' does not denote only the conceptions of genera.

6. 'Concept' is synonymous with the 'signification' or notion attached to a word. One term means nothing that the others do not, whether it be the signification of a proper name or of the expression, 'My horse,' or of the class-word, 'horse.' Each of these expressions signifies something, and what it signifies is the concept of it, or the signification of it, or the notion of it.

7. The concept of an object is not the object itself. It is only the object as we know it. It is only that knowledge (of the object) which alone we can think of or speak of, except when we have the object itself present, and even then we think more and speak more of the concept than of that merely which is presented to the senses, often perhaps to the eye alone. This concept or knowledge is a *symbol* of the object, just as the name given to the concept is a symbol of the concept, as well as of the object. The concept consists of all that is known and knowable about the object, and serves so completely as a substitute for the object itself in all our thoughts, that what we say or think about that which is known and knowable under any term, is regarded in all respects as said or thought *quite as much* about the object to which that term is applied, and about which this knowledge is. To say that a word is the word

for a horse, for instance, but not for the knowledge which is known and knowable under that name, whether the horse still exists or not, is clearly more than a mere quibble. It is false. If there were any truth in it, it would be true to say that by the term 'horse' we do not mean what we know and may yet know under that name, but what we neither know nor can ever know.

From this digression upon Concepts, rendered necessary by Mr. Mill's persistent efforts at confusion, I return to the main issues of the chapter; and here we see that Logicians are right when they teach that 'Reasoning is the comparison of two notions by means of a third;' that 'Reasoning is a mode of ascertaining that one notion is a part of another;' and that one of its uses is to enable learners to discover 'that countless multitude of (*a priori*) truths which, though of high, of paramount importance, are not self-evident.' All which Mr. Mill affects to deny. It only remains that I should point out how completely Hamilton's 'little foe' backs out of all his burlesque challengings and trumpeting in this chapter, showing his two assertions, as he does, to be mere fun, and declaring himself as in reality agreeing upon both these points with Hamilton and the Logicians.

That one notion can be part of (true of) another whether we know that it is so or not. Mr. Mill not only admits, in the passages already given under the former chapter, that one notion can be part of another, but acknowledges this again here when he says (p. 369) 'that one notion is part of another' in all cases in which we know what we are saying,—always when we are unfolding knowledge, when we are Teachers, Analysts, Logicians, and Expositors. His only quarrel here with the Logicians is as to whether our knowing or not knowing that one notion is part of another, makes any difference as to the fact of its being so. Logicians say it does not; that our knowing a thing is true or not, never makes the least difference as to its truth. Mr. Mill affects to say it does; nay, that it determines the whole question of its truth. He nevertheless admits everywhere the contrary. He admits that the being equal to two right angles is a general notion, and that the three angles of a triangle is another general notion; and that these two notions can be contemplated by a person who has not the least knowledge that the one is true of the other. That one portion of knowledge can be part of, can belong *essentially* to, another portion, and this

or that person not know it, he also acknowledges, when he admits that the notion of swiftness may be part of some men's notion of a certain boat, without this or that man's knowing that it is so. He acknowledges this, likewise, when he admits (p. 371) that the circumference and the diameter, being in the ratio of 3·14159 to 1 (which is a general notion), is part of what was knowable of a circle,—part of mankind's possible conception or possible knowledge of a circle, although for a long time unknown to any one to be so. He acknowledges this, also, when he acknowledges (*ibid.*) that the only difference between these two conceptions (this ratio and a circle), as they exist in the mind of the informed man and of the ignorant man, is that, in the case of the former mind, the relation really subsisting between its two notions is known to the mind which contemplates them, whereas, in the case of the latter mind, this same relation which really subsists between its two notions is not known to the mind contemplating them. Mr. Mill, therefore, *more suo*, admits, as well as denies, that one notion can be true of another whether we know that it is or not; and all who entertain any doubt as to whether he was in earnest or not when he wrote his book, may have their doubts instantly removed if they will only attend to his denial of this very obvious proposition, and to the arguments by which he *seems*, in this chapter, to be defending his denial of it.

That one notion can be shown to be part of (true of) another notion by the aid of a third. This Mr. Mill asserts as fully as any of us when he acknowledges (*passim*) that a learner who has two distinct notions present to his mind, without being able to discern that one is, or even whether one is, true of the other, may be enabled to see that one is true of the other by the Logician or teacher who points out to him a third notion which he can compare with both,—as in the case, for instance, of the two distinct notions, the being equal to two right angles, and the being the three angles of a triangle, or the being in the ratio of 3·14159 to 1, and the being the circumference and diameter of a circle. 'By combining,' says Mr. Mill, 'the two sets of observations (or two portions of knowledge thence derived), we are enabled to discover what was not contained in either of them' for the learner, but what the Logician helping him already knew (p. 370). He also says, 'A judgment which is not intuitively evident, can be arrived at 'through the medium of premisses' (p. 369).

I have written as if Mr. Mill *might* have been serious, and it is true that I could now proceed to explain, with a considerable show of probability, how he *might* have fallen into the most preposterous mistakes upon the most commonplace points of Logic, either notwithstanding, or, indeed (it would seem now-a-days), in consequence of a marked amount of intelligence upon his part. But I shall leave that task for those who like it. To me it would seem a puerile one, and an unnecessarily harsh one. To show, however, that I have not overlooked anything that could be said in favour of this absurd interpretation, which Mr. Mill's playful volume has received from some enlightened critics in their efforts either conscientiously to prevent unguarded readers from being misguided by it, or artfully to give it a greater appearance of having been written as a serious Work on the Logic and Philosophy of these days, I here acknowledge candidly, that in the case of a deficient intellect dabbling in Logic and Metaphysics, any one of the eight following confusions might have arisen, and would of itself alone have led to all the 'blunders' of this and of the two preceding chapters:—

1. Any one who had read Hamilton, or any other writer upon Logic, superficially and carelessly enough to suppose him to understand by 'concept' (whether the concept of a concrete individual or of a class) anything less than mankind's knowledge, conception, or apprehension of it, might easily have made all the blunders.

2. Any one who was unable to see that although all the proof of a geometrical proposition is self-evident (intuitively perceived), it is nevertheless, at least in the first instance, successively so, and not by any means *ab initio* and simultaneously so, would have been plunged into confusion enough to conduct him, without any affectation, into all the puerilities of these chapters.

3. Any one could have made all these blunders who had never made the objectivity and subjectivity of things his study,—any one who was wild enough to suppose that we think of things or reason about them otherwise than as we know them, conceive them, apprehend them; or that our knowledge, concept (conception), or apprehension of objects, is ever held by Logicians to be in any other way related to the objects themselves than as means of considering their relations, an instrument of thought, and mere symbol of the object thought of, *i.e.*, has any other thing to do with the matter, more than is implied in the fact that we cannot reason about objects without this knowledge, without these concepts, without these apprehen-

sions (p. 370), or who cannot see that this relation between conceptions and objects is such that whatever exists in the one has something corresponding to it existing in the other, and that this corresponding point is as true of the conception as it is of the object, and of the object as it is of the conception.

4. If we could think so poorly of Mr. Mill's capacity as to suppose him not to be able to see the difference between a whole in Logic and a whole in Physics, and not to be able to see that it, nevertheless, can be as impossible to recognise intuitively the relation of Whole and Part in Physics, even where it exists, as this can be in Logic, we should, in that miserable case, have key sufficient to all the self-contradictions and statements inconsistent with fact, among which Mr. Mill disports himself throughout these chapters upon Logic.

5. Even if we suppose him not to know that *to be part of a thing*, in the logical sense of that expression, denotes only *to be true of it*,—*to be in some sense predicable of it*,—*to be part of what is true about it*, we need go no further in quest of a principle to account for all that utter bosh, known by the name of 'Mill upon Hamilton,' in matters logical. But who could be so unjust as this to Mr. Mill?

6. Or if we could bring ourselves to believe that by *the* concept (conception), or *the* knowledge of Saturn's ring, Mr. Mill really supposes Hamilton or any of us to mean a village school-boy's conception of it and knowledge of it, and really supposes that the completest concept of it,—the largest amount of knowledge of it, being a thing probably not yet attained, or, if attained, not probably all assembled in any one finite spirit, is therefore to be regarded as something 'conventional,' or, still more singular, as something 'floating in the air' (p. 370) we must see that an intellect of the order here attributed to Mr. Mill, especially enveloped in such a mist, could not have escaped falling into any of the curious quagmires,—the 'mistakes' (as they are called) in which we find him here floundering so good-naturedly and self-denyingly. But who is credulous enough—not to say unjust enough—to believe such a thing as this of such a writer?

7. Or if we can imagine Mr. Mill to have confounded teaching and learning,—the teacher and the learner, from the frequent and often unconscious interchange of these actions when we learn, we may then honestly call every one of his hoaxes a 'mistake,' instead

of a hoax. These all hang more or less upon the hypothesis that a person can form a judgment of what he does not know, as well as of what he knows; that there are certain true judgments which are an unfolding of ignorance, not of knowledge; that Logic is employed with success in both cases; in fact, that it is mainly, if not solely, successful in the unfoldings of ignorance,—in the unfoldings of what we do not know,—in the judgments which are not analytic; that it is, upon each individual point, the learner who has to teach, and the teacher who has to learn. I freely admit, of course, that if there exists in Mr. Mill's mind a capacity for such bamboozlement as this implies, instead of its being merely supposed by him to exist in the minds of his readers,—the enthusiastic, for the most part, it is true, and the less experienced,—we must not, in this case, call his fantastic statements hoaxes, or a Pantomime, but blunders and misconceptions *avec des circonstances atténuantes*.

8. Finally, if we can suppose Mr. Mill not to know the difference between an Adjunct and a Part,—not to see that a Part is not an Adjunct,—we must in this case also suppose him in earnest in all he has here written. If I had only known of him through this so-called 'Examination' of Hamilton's writings, and had never seen either his *Essays on Political Economy*, or his *Principles of Evidence*, misguidingly called 'Logic,' I should have been disposed to join the rest of his critics in regarding the 'Examination' as an earnest effort upon his part to understand what he could not. What now seems broad farce would then have seemed mistake; and in that case, as far as I am myself concerned, I should probably have been tempted to place my finger upon this confusion of a Part and an Adjunct as being, in this case, the origin of Evil. Any one who once entered upon so false a principle as that the part of anything can be regarded not only as an adjunct of the other parts, but as an adjunct also of the whole thing,—any one who had the impression that swiftness was not part of a swift boat, but something conjoined with such a boat, or that the ratio of the diameter to the circumference is not part of the circle, but something superadded to it, or that, in physical affairs, the legs are conjoined with, superadded to, the whole chair, and not, strictly speaking, parts of it—conjoined with the other parts of it; any person, I say, who laboured under this singular hallucination could not well fail to have become entangled and lost in the thick wood of Logic-chopping

and of Logic-juggling in which we here find Mr. Mill bewildered, especially when hounded on by so unscrupulous and irrational a party as the Rationalists of these days. But with Mr. Mill's other works before us, we are compelled to assume that he only affects this extravagant misapprehension about the Part and the Adjunct, and that it was not this, nor anything of this kind, whatever else it was, that brought him into the wood.

From the eight foregoing paragraphs it will, I trust, be seen that the writer of these pages is not behind any one in the discernment of excuses (if they were necessary) for Mr. Mill's being entirely wrong in every one of his statements against Hamilton. But is it, indeed, absurd to say that Mr. Mill is too intelligent and too well informed, even in Philosophy and Logic, the subjects with which he is least familiar, to have fallen into such confusions as I have now mentioned,—confusions, all which his statements against Hamilton would, if serious, oblige us to suppose? or is it absurd to say that he could not have studied Hamilton as carefully as he professes to have done without knowing better upon all these points than he here affects to know? Is it not harsh enough, and sad enough, to have to say that he only supposed certain classes of the community, those who read him and admire him in Logic and Philosophy, to be susceptible of these confusions, and that he only employed the confusions artistically—ay, even with a creditable ingenuity, in this self-imposed, and much to be lamented, character of Jack the Giant-killer?

Be that as it may, one thing most manifest and most gratifying is that, after all these optical illusions of thrust and cut are over, the renowned Logician of the Isles stands forth before us, untouched, even unassailed, in all his magnificence and in all his truth.

To conclude this First Part,—the first Act of our little Drama. It has now been shown against Mr. Mill—(1.) That Hamilton and the Logicians are right in holding and teaching, as they all do, that we think with conceptions of the things we think about, and not without conceptions of them; (2.) That one such conception can be part of another, either self-evidently or not self-evidently; the predicate constituting or not constituting part, in Logic, of the subject, according as the judgment is affirmative or negative; and (3.) That wherever one conception is not self-evidently part of the other, we can ascertain whether it is part or not by extending our knowledge of these two conceptions,—*i.e.*, we can do so by the aid



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of a third conception, and of the two relations in which this third conception stands to the other two conceptions.

It has also been shown that Mr. Mill not only disputes each of these three propositions, but assents to each of them in the very chapter in which he disputes it,—THAT HIS STATEMENT AGAINST HAMILTON IS NOT ONLY EVERYWHERE GROUNDLESS, BUT THAT EVERYWHERE MR. MILL HIMSELF ADMITS IT IS SO.

This is what I undertook to establish respecting the three chapters here under review. I proceed now to the same task respecting the eight succeeding chapters of Mr. Mill's work.

END OF PART I.