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AN INTRODUCTION TO, AND EPITOME OF,
THE TEACHING OF HERBERT SPENCER
CONCERNING PERMANENT PEACE
AS THE FIRST CONDITION OF
PROGRESS

By
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" SPENCER'S SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY—WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT "

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PREFACE.

THE aim of this little work is to direct attention to the extent and nature of Herbert Spencer's teaching concerning the social effects of Warfare, and of Peace. Signs of rebarbarization all along the line, signs clearly perceived by Spencer, are daily becoming more and more evident. More important than ever is it, therefore, that the significant fact, scientifically demonstrated, and emphasized over and over again by Spencer—the fact that progress to higher civilization depends wholly upon the cessation of militarism and the growth of industrialism—should be as clearly and generally recognized as possible. In other words it is more important than ever that it should be appreciated that warfare and its accompaniments are the root-evil from which the current wave of retrogression mainly springs.

In the case of this topic, as in the case of other topics, an adequate idea of Spencer's teaching can only be formed by reference to several of his volum-

inous works. It has therefore been thought that a brief outline of Spencer's doctrines, coupled with an epitome of some of the most noteworthy passages occurring in the several works, might have a useful purpose. A list of works to which it is, as to most of them, necessary, and as to all of them, desirable to refer, is given below; and it will in a measure bear out what has been said. These works are—

Social Statics (1850); *The Study of Sociology*; *A System of Synthetic Philosophy* (including *First Principles*, *The Principles of Biology*, *The Principles of Psychology*, *The Principles of Sociology*, and *The Principles of Ethics*); *Social Statics* (Revised Edition); *The Man versus The State*; *Essays* (Vol. III); *Various Fragments*; *Facts and Comments*; *An Autobiography*; and *Life and Letters* (Duncan).

These works contain in all upwards of ten thousand pages.

As a preliminary to an outline of Spencer's conclusions a few words may be appropriate as to the nature of the great works in which these conclusions are stated.

In order to deal scientifically with social phenomena, and in order to be able to set forth sociological principles worthy to be called scientific, it was, of course,

necessary for Spencer to make accumulations of facts. The first step towards placing Sociology upon a scientific basis was therefore, in effect, to compile the *Descriptive Sociology*.

Being unable, unaided, to undertake the gigantic studies and work involved in the compilation of this vast statement of the phenomena of all orders displayed by living and extinct races of men, Spencer had to engage assistance. The *Descriptive Sociology* is a work of stupendous proportions, and of inestimable value—a work which, in fact, is the very basis of Sociology properly so-called. The first eight Nos. of the *Descriptive Sociology* are comprised in four massive volumes (royal folio). These volumes contain upwards of sixty remarkable tables, and upwards of 500 pages (royal folio); each page containing three columns of quotations and abridged abstracts, upon which the tables are based. These volumes contain classified statements of fact relating to more than eighty civilized, semi-civilized, and uncivilized peoples. Especially valuable are these tables in the case of the topic here under consideration; in fact, they contain evidence of supreme importance relative to the effect of peaceful conditions of life upon character; and, conversely, of the effects of militancy upon character.

Spencer left all his small fortune to be devoted to the completion of the *Descriptive Sociology*; and his Trustees are publishing volumes dealing with civilizations other than those described in the volumes referred to above.

The vast accumulations of facts appearing in the *Descriptive Sociology* are, to use Spencer's metaphor, the bricks with which *The Principles of Sociology* was built; and the same may be said as to their relation to all important parts of *The Principles of Ethics*. With this enormous stack of bricks Spencer was able to build *The Principles of Sociology*—a natural history of societies containing an orderly presentation of the phenomena of all classes which they display. The *Sociology* was thus established upon a basis of irrefutable fact. And the concrete argument of the *Sociology*, thus logically established, affords essential support to the argument of *The Principles of Ethics* in so far as the argument of that work is of an abstract nature.

The social effects of warfare, militancy, militarism and of international antagonisms are exhaustively considered in *The Principles of Sociology* and in *The Principles of Ethics*. The theme occupies a large space in the culminating parts of Spencer's *Synthetic*

Philosophy—in fact in the *Ethics* it is one of the most prominent themes. And, conversely, the social effects of peaceful conditions are discussed at length, and from a variety of different standpoints. War and Peace were in fact Spencer's first and last topics; and he regarded the political truths which Sociology establishes in reference to the effects of War and Peace as second in consequence to none. One of Spencer's first literary efforts, written as far back as 1842, was an article on War—it was one of the first series of articles he wrote—a series which was the germ of the *Synthetic Philosophy*. The last words of the *Synthetic Philosophy* (the last words of the work which he dictated) completed fifty-four years later are supremely significant words concerning Peace as the essential condition of higher social life.

The Principles of Sociology is comprised in three volumes containing one hundred and thirty-four chapters and upwards of two thousand pages. In sixty chapters of this great work Spencer sets forth facts of various orders relating to warfare and militancy. In more than half of the seventy chapters of *The Principles of Ethics* and on upwards of one hundred and fifty pages the same theme enters into the argument.

In giving a brief epitome of Spencer's teaching two disadvantages in particular call for mention. Space forbids the inclusion at any appreciable length of the illustrative facts fully set forth by Spencer. A reference to the *Sociology* and to the *Ethics* will, however, dispel any doubt as to the abundance of the facts upon which Spencer bases his conclusions—in fact the criticism of friends is mentioned to the effect that the *Sociology* is overweighted with facts. In the second place, separated as they are from the context, the passages quoted and epitomized are to a great extent deprived of the unique force and authority they possess as forming an important structural element in the argument throughout the *Synthetic Philosophy*. It is as if part of the framework were removed from a wonderfully grand edifice, and exposed to criticism independently of the architecturally perfect massive structure of which it formed part. These facts the reader must therefore take into account; and at the same time anticipate gaps in the argument as appearing in the following pages.

Nothing which follows must be taken in any way to imply that Spencer did not approve of defensive warfare. He fully recognized the need for adequate preparations for national defence, and shows this to

be the first duty of the State. Spencer opposed the Channel Tunnel.

References are given to the various passages quoted and epitomized ; and, to avoid breaking the argument and distracting the reader by the frequent parenthetical insertions of the titles of the works and the numbers of pages, small numbers have been inserted at the end of each extract or epitome of a separate passage. A table of references will be found at the end containing corresponding numbers with the precise reference.

I have to express my thanks to the Trustees of Mr. Spencer's Will, Dr. H. Charlton Bastian and Dr. David Duncan, for permission to publish the extracts and epitomes of passages from Mr. Spencer's works which follow.

A. W. T.

WITTON, NORWICH.

July, 1914.

POSTSCRIPT.

This pamphlet was prepared before there was any question of a European War. It would be beyond its

scope to enter upon a detailed discussion of the war. From condemnation of Germany it is impossible to refrain. Germany has sought to put her foot upon the neck of civilization; and stands convicted of methods which are inhuman, unspeakable and hideous to an extreme which baffles description. The whole German theory of war is an outrage upon civilization. May the immensity of Germany's crime adequately re-act on Militarism; and prove a real turning-point in the history of social evolution.

Numerous illustrations of the truth of Spencer's teaching have been afforded by the war. A moment's reflection will supply these. Injurious effects of all kinds will be too well within the knowledge of all to need specific mention.

In addition, the war will otherwise exemplify the truth of Spencer's doctrines. Notably is this so in reference to the first duty of the State—national defence. Perfect preparation—adequate preparation—is impossible if the law of all organization (the specialization of functions) is disregarded. The more Government undertakes non-essential functions, the less satisfactorily can it attend to essential functions.

No part of the cost of national defence should be

dependent on voluntary contributions. As every citizen profits by it, every citizen should be required to share all expenses attending it, including the care of the wounded.

Great as are the evils of warfare, it is imperative that aggression should be resisted ; and that international agreements and treaties should be respected. Thus, and only thus, can a state of permanent peace be reached. From what is set forth in the following pages it will be evident that Spencer's one hope for the future was that the great nations, by concerted action, would prevent aggressive warfare—a process necessarily implying the employment of such force as is needful.

By experience alone will the vital truths so clearly enunciated by Spencer be forced on men's minds. It is to be hoped that lessons of the present war will be laid to heart.

March, 1915.

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CHAPTER I.

THE ANTI-AGGRESSION LEAGUE AND ANGLO-AMERICAN ARBITRATION.

SPENCER took little part in public movements of any kind, seeing that his function was to *think* rather than to *act*. Of the few movements which he was mainly instrumental in initiating the "Anti-Aggression League" was one.¹ This was the outcome of perceiving the profound antagonism between Militancy and the organization of society under the universal relation of contract—an antagonism which every step in his Sociological inquiries brought into relief, and showed that the re-barbarization that is going on is consequent on the return to militant activities. While writing Part V of *The Principles of Sociology* Spencer had become profoundly impressed with the belief that the possibility of a higher civilization depends *wholly upon the cessation of militancy* and the growth of industrialism.²

Nothing much came of the "Anti-Aggression League"; and Spencer afterwards recognized that it was hopeless to expect any appreciable effect could be produced, stating that while continental nations were bristling with arms, and our own was obliged to increase its defensive forces and simultaneously foster militant sentiments and ideas, it was out of the question that an "Anti-Aggression League" could have any success.³

It may be noted that Spencer saw that the efforts of the Peace Society were paralysed by its identification with the principles of non-resistance—a principle which Spencer, of course, demonstrates is morally wrong.

Whilst welcoming every move in the direction of peace and arbitration, Spencer came more and more to believe that in the prevailing mood of peoples in general nothing very definite could be done beyond diffusing true doctrines, and leaving the rest to work itself out. Higher types of Social organization cannot grow until international antagonisms and consequent wars cease.⁴

When in March 1896 official steps were taken towards the establishment of permanent International Arbitration with the United States, Spencer

sent the following letter which was read at a demonstration held at Queen's Hall:—

“Savage as have been the passions commonly causing war, and great as have been its horrors, it has, throughout the past, achieved certain immense benefits. From it has resulted the predominance and spread of the most powerful races. Beginning with primitive tribes it has welded together small groups into larger groups, and again at later stages has welded these larger groups into still larger, until nations have been formed. At the same time military discipline has habituated wild men to the bearing of restraints, and has initiated that system of graduated subordination under which all social life is carried on. But though, along with detestation of the cruelties and bloodshed and brutalization accompanying war, we must recognize these great incidental benefits bequeathed by it heretofore, we are shown that henceforth there can arise no such ultimate good to be set against its enormous evils. Powerful types of men now possess the world; great aggregates of them have been consolidated; societies have been organized; and throughout the future the conflicts of nations, entailing on larger scales than ever before death, devastation, and

misery, can yield to posterity no compensating advantages. Henceforth social progress is to be achieved, not by systems of education, not by the preaching of this or that religion, not by insistence on a humane creed daily repeated and daily disregarded, but only by cessation from these antagonisms which keep alive the brutal elements of human nature, and by persistence in a peaceful life which gives unchecked play to the sympathies. In sundry places, and in various ways, I have sought to show that advance to higher forms of man and society essentially depends on the decline of militancy and the growth of industrialism. This I hold to be a political truth in comparison with which all other political truths are insignificant.

I need scarcely add that such being my belief, I rejoice over the taking of any step which directly diminishes the probability of war, and indirectly opens the way to further such steps.”⁵

CHAPTER II.

BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

ANY further evolution in the most highly evolved of terrestrial beings, Man, must be of the same nature as evolution in general.¹

Let us consider what particular ways this further evolution, this higher life, this greater co-operation of actions, may be expected to show itself.²

Will it be strength? Probably not to any considerable degree. Mechanical appliances are fast supplanting brute force, and doubtless will continue doing this. Though at present civilized nations largely depend for self-preservation on vigour of limb, and are likely to do so while wars continue; yet that progressive adaptation to the social state which must at last bring wars to an end, will leave the amount of muscular power to adjust itself to the requirements of a peaceful régime.³

Will it be swiftness or agility? Probably not.

Will it in mechanical skill, that is, in the better co-ordination of complex movements? Most likely in some degree.

Will it be in intelligence? Largely no doubt. Our lives are shortened by our ignorance. In attaining complete knowledge of our own natures and of the natures of surrounding things—in ascertaining the conditions of existence to which we must conform, and in discovering the means of conforming to them under all variations of seasons and circumstances; we have abundant scope for intellectual progress.

Will it be in morality? . . . Largely so: perhaps most largely.⁴

Passing from biological to psychological considerations, it may be noted that whilst relatively slow development of sympathy during civilization is due to the inadequacy of intelligence, there is a cause of another order which it is important even to remember.⁵

The human race has ever been, and still is, a predatory race. Offensive and defensive conditions have required the average natures of citizens to continue such that the destructive activities are not

painful to them, but on the whole pleasurable. Whilst internal social activities have demanded sympathy, external activities have tended to maintain an unsympathetic nature. A compromise has had to be established in the moral natures of individuals, in adjustment to these opposite needs.⁶

The compromise is shown in the specialization of the sympathies. Fellow-feeling has been continually repressed in those directions where social safety has involved the disregard of it; while it has been allowed to grow in those directions where it has either positively conduced to the welfare of the society or has not hindered it. Illustrations will prove that such a specialization is in conformity with known biological principles and explain the fact that men may be cruel in some directions and kind in others.⁷

That suppression of sympathy with directly inflicted pain, which throughout civilization has been necessitated by the antagonistic relations of nations to one another, has inevitably affected the relations between members of the same society. Men cannot be kept unsympathetic towards external enemies without being kept unsympathetic towards internal enemies—to all those, that is, who stand to them as opponents.⁸

During social evolution, greater sympathy has been making possible greater sociality, public and domestic, and greater sociality serving further to cultivate sympathy. All along, however, this moral evolution has been restrained by the predatory activities, and chiefly by those necessitated by international antagonisms.⁹

Only when the struggle for existence has ceased to go on under the form of war, can these highest social sentiments attain their full development.¹⁰

CHAPTER III.

“THE EDUCATIONAL BIAS.”

“IT would clear up our ideas about many things, if we distinctly recognized the truth that we have two religions. Primitive humanity has but one. The humanity of the remote future will have but one. The two are opposed ; and we who live midway in the course of civilization have to believe in both.

“These two religions are adapted to two sets of social requirements alien in their natures. The one set is supreme at the beginning, the other set will be supreme at the end ; and a compromise has to be maintained between them during the progress from beginning to end. On the one hand there must be social self-preservation in the face of external enemies. On the other hand there must be co-operation among fellow citizens, which can exist only in proportions as fair dealing creates mutual trust....

In the adjustment of these two conflicting needs, there grow up two conflicting codes of duty which severally acquire supernatural sanctions. And thus we get the two co-existing religions—the religion of enmity and the religion of amity.

“Of course, I do not mean that these are both called religions. Here I am not speaking of names. I am speaking simply of things. Nowadays, men do not pay the same verbal homage to the code which enmity dictates that they do to the code which amity dictates—the last occupies the place of honour. But the real homage is paid in large measure, if not in larger measure, to the code dictated by enmity. The religion of enmity nearly all men actually believe. The religion of amity most of them merely believe they believe.¹

“The religion of amity and the religion of enmity, with the emotions they respectively enlist, are important factors in sociological conclusions; and rational sociological conclusions can be produced only when both sets of factors come into play. . . . We must contemplate the extremes to which men are carried.”²

The religion of unqualified altruism arose to correct by an opposite excess the religion of unqualified

egoism. . . . Consideration shows that the absurdity of unqualified altruism is glaring. The assertion of personal claims is essential. Resistance to aggression is not simply justifiable but imperative. Non-resistance hurts both altruism and egoism.³

Let us now turn to the opposite doctrines, and note the excesses to which they run.

That an over estimate of courage is appropriate to our phase of civilization may be true. During the struggle for existence among nations, it is needful that men should admire extremely the quality without which there can be no success in the struggle. While, among neighbouring nations all males are trained for war—students slash one another's faces in duels about trifles—while citizens have no redress for ill-usage by soldiers—something of a kindred character in appliances, sentiments, and beliefs, has to be maintained among ourselves. When we find another neighbouring nation believing that no motive is so high as the love of glory, and no glory so great as that gained by successful war—when we see that the vital energies of this nation run mainly to teeth and claws, it is needful that we too should keep our teeth and claws in order, and should maintain ideas and feelings adapted to the use of them.⁴

War does not consist with keen sensitiveness, physical or moral. Reluctance to inflict injury, and reluctance to risk injury, would equally render it impossible. Scruples of conscience respecting the rectitude of their cause would paralyse officers and soldiers. So that a certain brutalization has to be maintained during our passing phase of civilization, While national antagonisms continue strong, and national defence a necessity, there is a fitness in this semi-military discipline. And a duty-adapted code of honour has the like defence.

If, however, we are to free ourselves from transitory sentiments and ideas, so as to be capable of framing scientific conceptions, we must ask what warrant there is for this exaltation of the destructive activities and the qualities implied by them.⁵

Those educated in the religion of enmity, those who have become confirmed in the belief that war is virtuous and peace ignoble, are naturally blind to truths of the kind indicated above, which the study of sociology reveals concerning the effects of war, or rather have never turned their eyes in search of such truths.⁶

It is time, not only with a view to right thinking in social science, but with a view to right acting in daily

life, that this acceptance in their unqualified forms of two creeds which contradict one another, should come to an end.⁷

Education has much to do with prejudices of other kinds which are obstacles in the way of Social Science—obstacles such as the bias of patriotism, the class-bias, the political bias, and the theological bias. The title of the chapter, although too comprehensive, is based on the fact that the biases above discussed are most directly traceable to teachings during early life.⁸

CHAPTER IV.

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF WAR—BENEFITS.

WAR has had a large share in improving men's faculties in various ways, developing valuable powers bodily and mentally. It has extirpated races which were the least fitted to survive—feeble tribes—tribes wanting in education, courage, sagacity, and power of co-operation—thus tending to maintain and increase the amounts of life-preserving powers possessed by men. In addition to the average advance thus caused, there has been an average advance caused by the inheritance of developments due to functional activity.¹

War has, too, produced a large effect on the development of the arts; since in responding to the imperative demands of war industry has made important advances and gained much of its skill: and it may be questioned whether in the absence of the exercise of the manipulative faculty which the making of

weapons originally gave, there would ever have been formed the tools for agriculture and manufactures.²

Another important benefit bequeathed by war has been the formation of large societies. This has furthered industrial progress. Hostilities, instead of being perpetual, are broken by intervals of peace; and when they occur, hostilities do not so profoundly derange industrial activities. War, in short, in the slow course of things brings about a social aggregation which furthers that industrial state at variance with war; and yet nothing but war could achieve this social aggregation: These truths are illustrated in all times and places.³

War, the inter-social struggle for existence, has been an indispensable factor in the evolution of nations; but it will not necessarily play in the future a part like that which it has played in the past; and, while recognizing our indebtedness to war, we may hold that, great nations having been produced, the brutality of nature in their units which was necessitated by the process, will disappear.⁴

CHAPTER V.

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF WAR—EVILS.

THOUGH during the earlier days of civilization war furthers the development of valuable powers, during later stages this effect is reversed. So long as all adult males have to bear arms the average result is that those of most strength and quickness survive; but when industrial development has become such that only some of the adult males are drafted into the army, the tendency is to pick out and expose to slaughter the best-grown and healthiest: leaving behind the physically-inferior to propagate the race.¹

The direct effect of war on civilized life is repressive. It necessitates the abstraction of men and materials that would otherwise go to industrial growth; it deranges the producing and distributing agencies; it drafts off much ability which would else have gone to advance commerce and arts. Persistent war is at variance not only with industrial development, but

also with those higher intellectual developments that aid industry.²

While war, by military discipline, cultivates attributes that are essential ; yet it does this at the cost of maintaining and sometimes increasing, attributes intrinsically anti-social. Warlike activities repress sympathy. They do worse—they stimulate aggressiveness to the extent of making it a pleasure to inflict injury. Fellow feeling, habitually deadened by military conflicts, cannot at the same time be active in the social relations. Inevitably therefore in the above and in other ways the civilizing discipline of industrial life is antagonized by the uncivilizing discipline of the life war involves. High societies cannot carry on destructive activities without injurious reactive effects on the moral natures of their members. After the high stage has been reached, the purifying process has to be effected by industrial war—by a competition of societies during which the best, physically, emotionally, and intellectually spread most, and leave the least capable to disappear gradually.³

In addition to the above mentioned effects on the moral nature, there are others which should be specially mentioned. War cultivates *deception*: ambush, manœuvring, feints, and the like, involve acted lies ;

and skilful lying by actions is regarded as a trait of military genius. All the ceremonies which accompany the régime of compulsory co-operation are pervaded by insincerity. The discipline is, too, a discipline of *callousness*. Whatever sympathies exist are seared; and any that tend to grow up are checked. This unsympathetic attitude which war necessitates, is maintained by the coercive social co-operation which it initiates and evolves.⁴

Just as it is incredible that men should be courageous in face of foes and cowardly in face of friends, so is it incredible that the other feelings fostered by perpetual conflicts abroad should not come into play at home. Facts from various places and times prove that in militant communities the claims of life, liberty and property are little regarded.⁵

During warlike phases of social life the sentiment of justice retrogrades, while it advances during peaceful phases, and can reach its full development only in a permanently peaceful state.⁶

CHAPTER VI.

WAR AND GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS.

WAR determines the type of a society and the type of its political institutions. Where there is no war there is no government. On the other hand despotic government invariably accompanies chronic warfare. According to the degree to which a nation is militant or non-militant, its government and institutions are characterized by the régime of compulsory co-operation—or conversely by the régime of voluntary co-operation. In the culminating chapters of *The Principles of Sociology*—"The Militant Type of Society" and "The Industrial Type of Society"—Spencer sums up the facts established by comparative sociology which demonstrate these vitally important truths. Briefly, under the militant type the individual is owned by the State; but "as fast as industrialism qualifies militancy, the citizen acquires increasing possession of himself. Complete possession of himself can be had

by each citizen only in a perfectly peaceful state, and in the absence of all restraints on his power to make contracts.”¹ Fragments of Spencer’s argument may be epitomized as follows.

The possibility of that united action by which war is made successful, depends on the readiness of individuals to subordinate their wills to the will of a commander or ruler. Loyalty is essential; and with the development of the militant type this sentiment becomes permanent.²

Along with loyalty naturally goes faith—the two being scarcely separable. Readiness to obey the commander in war implies belief in his military abilities; and the readiness to obey him during peace implies that his abilities extend to civil affairs also. Unlimited confidence in governmental agency is thus fostered. Generations brought up under a system which controls all affairs, private and public, tacitly assume that affairs can only thus be controlled.

By implication there results repression of individual initiative and consequent lack of private enterprise. The mental state generated is that of passive acceptance and expectancy.³

An example of retrogression towards the militant type of society caused by international conflicts, with

accompanying repressive political arrangements and legislation, is furnished by analyses of the legislation during the long period of peace that commenced in 1815 as contrasted with the period from 1850 to the present time. Along with increased armaments, more frequent conflicts, and revived military sentiment, there has been a spread of compulsory regulations. "While nominally extended by the giving of votes, the freedom of the individual has been in many ways actually diminished; both by restrictions which ever-multiplying officials are appointed to insist on, and by the forcible taking of money to secure for him, or others at his expense, benefits previously left to be secured by each for himself. And undeniably this is a return towards that coercive discipline which pervades the whole social life where the militant type is predominant." ⁴

In other words, governmental arrangements fitted to militancy preclude the State from the performance of its secondary and next most important duty to national defence—the administration of justice. The progress of civilization is thus hindered—justice being the fundamental law of social life. ⁵

CHAPTER VII.

PEACE AND ORGANIC GOODNESS.

DESCRIPTIVE sociology furnishes ethics with the traits of character proper to members of societies occupied exclusively in peaceful pursuits. Certain uncultured peoples whose lives are passed in peaceful occupation, prove to be distinguished by independence, resistance to coercion, honesty, truthfulness, forgivingness, kindness—results of non-militancy. They possess personal qualities akin to those possessed in more advanced industrial communities. It will be well to emphasize the fact as the implications are of great importance. The words “civilized” and “savage” must have meaning given to them differing greatly from those which are current. The broad contrast usually drawn wholly to the advantage of the men who form large nations, and to the disadvantage of the men who form simple groups, a better knowledge obliges us profoundly to qualify.

Characters are to be found among rude peoples which compare well with those among the best of cultivated people. With little knowledge and but rudimentary arts, there in some cases go virtues which might shame those among ourselves whose education and polish are of the highest.¹

Some primitive races in India have natures in which truthfulness seems to be organic. They are superior to Europeans. Their assertions may always be accepted with perfect confidence (which is more than can be said of manufacturers who use false trade-marks, or of diplomatists who intentionally delude). As having this trait may be named the Santals, of whom Hunter says "they were the most truthful set of men I ever met"; and, again, the Sowrahs, of whom Shortt says "a pleasing feature in their character is their complete truthfulness. They do not know how to tell a lie. . . ."

Similarly with respect to honesty. Of the Todas, Harkness says "I never saw a people civilized or uncivilized, who seemed to have a more religious respect for the rights of *meum et tuum*." The Marias, "in common with many other wild races, bear a singular character for truthfulness and honesty." Among the Khonds "the denial of a debt is a breach

of this principle, which is held to be highly sinful. Let a man say they give up all he has to his creditors." The Lepchas "are wonderfully honest, theft being scarcely known among them." And the Bodo and Dhimals are "honest and truthful in deed and word." Colonel Dixon dilates on the "fidelity, truth and honesty" of the Carnatic aborigines who show "an extreme and almost touching devotion when put upon their honour." And Hunter asserts of the Chakmas that "crime is rare among these primitive people. Theft is almost unknown."²

So it is, too, with the general virtues of these and sundry other uncivilized tribes. The Santal "possesses a happy disposition," is "sociable to a fault," and while the "sexes are greatly devoted to each other's society," the women are "extremely chaste."

In like manner, from accounts of certain Malayo Polynesian societies, and certain Papuan societies, may be given instances showing in high degrees sundry traits which we ordinarily associate with civilized life and the teachings of a superior religion.³

Many of these people are monogamic, and along with their monogamy habitually goes a superior sexual morality.⁴

These traits are to be regarded less as the immediate results of industrialism than as the remote results of non-militancy.⁵ These people are one and all free from inter-tribal antagonisms. The people are of various races—in India, some Mongolian, Kolarian, Dravidian; in Malacca, Burmah and in China exist such tribes of other bloods; and in the East Indian Archipelago. In Japan there are others who have no traditions of internecine strife, and in North Mexico exists yet another such people unrelated to the rest.⁶

“No more conclusive proof could be wished than that supplied by these isolated groups of men who, widely remote in locality and differing in race, are alike in the two respects, that circumstances have long exempted them from war and that they are now organically good.

“May we not reasonably infer that the state reached by these small uncultured tribes may be reached by the great cultured nations, when the life of internal amity shall be unqualified by the life of external enmity?”⁷

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ETHICAL ASPECT.

CONDUCT remains imperfectly evolved in proportion as there continue international antagonisms and antagonisms between members of the same society—two traits necessarily associated ; since the nature which prompts international aggression prompts aggression by individuals on one another. Hence the limit of evolution can be reached by conduct only in permanently peaceful societies. That perfect adjustment of acts to ends in maintaining individual life and rearing new individuals, which is effected by each without hindering others from effecting like perfect adjustments, is, in its very definition, shown to constitute a kind of conduct that can be approached only as war decreases and dies out.¹

It needs but to note how, during Social evolution, the ideas and sentiments appropriate to the militant activities carried on by coercive co-operation, have

been at variance with the ideas and sentiments appropriate to the industrial activities, carried on by voluntary co-operation ; to see that there has ever been within each Society, and still continues, a conflict between the two moral natures adjusted to these two unlike modes of life. While there co-exist two ways of life so radically opposed as the militant and the industrial, human nature cannot become properly adapted to either.²

While social antagonisms continue to generate war, it is needful that physical suffering should be thought little of, and that among pleasures recognized as the most worthy should be those which victory brings.

Always and everywhere there arises among men a theory conforming to their practice. Where war is made the business of life by the existence of warlike neighbours, virtues which are required for war come to be regarded as supreme virtues ; while, contrariwise, when industrialism has grown predominant, the violence and the deception which warriors glory in come to be held criminal.³

The welfare of the Society must, as an end, rank above the lives of its units. As fast as the social state establishes itself, the preservation of the society becomes a means of preserving its units.

This subordination of personal to social welfare is, however, contingent; it depends on the presence of antagonistic societies. So long as the existence of a community is endangered by the actions of communities around, it must remain true that the interests of individuals must be sacrificed to the interests of the community, as far as needful for the community's salvation. But, if this is manifest, it is, by implication, manifest, that when social antagonisms cease, the need for the sacrifice of private claims to public claims ceases also. All along, furtherance of individual lives has been the ultimate end.

Consequently, unlike sets of conclusions respecting human conduct emerge, according as we are concerned with a state of habitual or occasional war, or are concerned with a state of permanent and general peace.⁴

“Hate and destroy your fellow man, is now the command; and then the command is, love and aid your fellow man. Use every means to deceive, says the one code of conduct, while the other code says, be truthful in word and deed. Seize what property you can and burn all you cannot take away, an injunction which the religion of enmity countenances; while by the religion of amity, theft and arson

are condemned as crimes. And as conduct has to be made up of parts thus at variance with one another, the theory of conduct remains confused.”⁵

In proportion as societies endanger one another less, the need for subordinating individual lives to the general life decreases; and with the approach to a peaceful state, the general life, having from the beginning had furtherance of individual lives as its ultimate purpose, come to have this as its proximate purpose.⁶

While war continues and injustice is done between Societies, there cannot be anything like complete justice within each society. Militant organization no less than militant action, is irreconcilable with pure equity; and the inequity implied by it inevitably ramifies throughout all social relations.

Social organization is to be considered high in proportion as it subserves individual welfare, because in a society the units are sentient and the aggregate insentient; and the industrial type is the higher because, *in that state of permanent peace to which civilization is tending*, it subserves the individual welfare better than the militant type.⁷

That which has been in course of achievement

in respect of the limited group of beings constituting a family, in the course of the evolution of life, and has now, in the human race, been in a very large measure achieved, has been in course of achievement, and is to a comparatively small extent achieved, with those larger groups constituting societies.⁸

“So far from its being true, as might be supposed from the general incredulity, that though there has arisen a considerable moralization of the human being, as a concomitant of civilization, there will be no comparable increase of such moralization in the future, it is true that the moralization will hereafter go on at a much greater rate, because it will no longer be checked by influence hitherto, and at present, in operation. During all the past, and even still, the egoism of warlike activities has been restraining the altruism which grows up under peaceful activities. The need for maintaining adaptation to the militant life, which implies readiness to sacrifice others, has perpetually held in check the progress of adaptation to the industrial life, which, carried on by exchange of services, does not of necessity entail the sacrifice of others to self. What this moral modification due to the adaptation of human beings to peaceful social life might have

already achieved in civilized societies, had it not been for the moral effects that have accompanied the necessary process of compounding and re-compounding by which great nations have been produced, we may judge by observing the moral state existing in the few simple tribes of men who have been so circumstanced as to carry on peaceful lives.”

“Judge then what might by this time have happened under closer mutual dependence and more complex relations which civilized societies have originated, but for the standing causes which have kept sympathies seared; and then judge what will happen in the future when, by further progress such as has been going on in the past, we reach eventually a state in which the great civilized societies reach a condition of permanent peace, and there continues no such extreme check as has been operating this far.”⁹

“When the pressure of population has been rendered small—proximately by prudential restraints and ultimately by decrease of fertility—and when long-range rifles, big guns, dynamite shells, and other implements for wholesale slaughter which Christian peoples have improved so greatly of late, are to be found only in museums; sympathy will probably

increase to a degree which we can now scarcely conceive. For the process of evolution must inevitably favour all changes of nature which increase life and augment happiness; especially such as do this at small cost." ¹⁰

CHAPTER IX.

A FEDERATION OF THE HIGHEST NATIONS.

As far back as 1850, when writing *Social Statics*, Spencer had reached definite conclusions concerning the first essential of effectual progress. The replacing of war by international arbitration he regarded as a question of time; and even at that time he contemplated "a federation of peoples—a universal society" insisting upon peace through the widest extension of government. That such a federation must long be postponed, Spencer fully recognized, and that it could only exist when adaptation to the social state had become tolerably complete: the stability of so complicated a political organization depending not upon the fitness of one nation but upon the fitness of many. Nevertheless the ideal to be more definitely enunciated later was clearly perceived.¹

Ten years or so later (1860–2) when writing *First Principles* the idea of a federation of the highest nations arose again; but this time in more definite

form: for a federation of the highest nations was shown to be a result which might in the natural course of things be anticipated as an effect of the law of evolution.

“And of the European nations it may further be remarked, that in the tendency to form alliances, in the restraining influences exercised by governments over one another, in the system of settling international arrangements by Congresses, as well as in the weakening of commercial barriers and increasing facilities of communication, we see the beginnings of a European federation—a still larger integration than any now established.”²

Later still (1876–81) when treating of Social growth and Political integration Spencer was able, reinforced by the vast accumulation of facts made and tabulated in the *Descriptive Sociology*, to give striking illustrations, confirming the earlier views concerning future international federation.³

Results which have been achieved by social integration in the past will be found to be strikingly suggestive of results to be achieved by further integration (federation) in the future.

And the argument leads on logically and irresistibly to the final conclusions stated in 1896.

“Social evolution throughout the future, like Social evolution throughout the past, must, while producing, step after step, high Societies, leave outstanding many lower. Varieties of men adapted here to inclement regions, then to regions that are barren, and elsewhere to regions unfitted by ruggedness of surface or insalubrity, for supporting large populations, will, in all probability, continue to form small communities of simple structures. Moreover, during future competitions among the higher races there will probably be left, in the less desirable regions, minor nations formed of men inferior to the highest; at the same time that the highest overspread all the great areas which are desirable in climate and fertility. But while the entire assemblage of societies thus fulfils the law of evolution by increase of heterogeneity—while within each of them contrasts of structure, caused by differences of environments and entailed occupations, cause unlikenesses implying further heterogeneity; we may infer that the primary process of evolution—integration—which up to the present time has been displayed in the formation of larger and larger nations, will eventually reach a still higher stage and bring yet greater benefits.

“As, when small tribes were welded into great tribes,

the head chief stopped inter-tribal warfare ; as, when small feudal governments became subject to a king, feudal wars were prevented by him ; so, in time to come, a federation of the highest nations, exercising supreme authority (already foreshadowed by occasional agreements among ' the Powers '), may, by forbidding wars between any of the constituent nations, put an end to the re-barbarization which is continually undoing civilization.

“ When this peace-maintaining federation has been formed, there may be effectual progress towards that equilibrium between constitution and conditions—between the inner faculties and the outer requirements—implied by the final stage of human evolution. Adaptation to the social state, now perpetually hindered by anti-social conflicts, may then go on unhindered ; and all the great societies, in other respects differing, may become similar in those cardinal traits which result from complete self-ownership of the unit and exercise over him of nothing more than passive influence by the aggregate. . . . Already, small groups of men, shielded by circumstances from external antagonism, have been moulded into forms of moral nature so superior to our own, that, as said of the Let-htas, the account of their goodness

‘almost savours of romance’; and it is reasonable to infer that what has even now happened on a small scale, may, under kindred conditions, eventually happen on a large scale.”⁴

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSION.

THERE is no hope for the future save in the slow modification of human nature under Social discipline. Not teaching, but action, is the requisite cause. To have lived generation after generation a life that is honest and sympathetic is the one indispensable thing. No adequate change of character can be produced in a year, or in a generation, or in a century. All which teaching can do—all which may, perhaps, be done by a wider diffusion of principles of sociology, is the checking of retrograde action. . . .

Any one who wishes to aid social advance should devote all his energies to showing, that no fundamental and permanent progress in social life can be made while the warlike activities and the social organization appropriate to them continue. This Spencer regarded as the most significant of all political truths.

“ It is important to impress on all the great truth, at present but little recognized, that a society’s internal and external policies are so bound together, that there cannot be an essential improvement of the one without an essential improvement of the other. A higher standard of international justice must be habitually acted upon, before there can be conformity to a higher standard of justice in our national arrangements. The conviction that a dependence of this kind exists, could it be diffused among civilized peoples, would greatly check aggressive behaviour towards one another ; and, by doing this, would diminish the coerciveness of their governmental systems while appropriately changing their political theories.”¹

The fact to which it is the aim of the foregoing pages particularly to draw attention may in concluding fitly be emphasized in the following way.

The doctrine that the evolution of higher life depends wholly upon the cessation of militancy and on the maintenance of permanent peace is the last word of the *Synthetic Philosophy*: and it is the last word of each of the massive works comprised in it (the last word in the sense that specific references are made to it on the last pages of these great works). This is so in *First Principles*,² in *The Principles of*

Biology,³ in *The Principles of Psychology*,⁴ in *The Principles of Sociology*,⁵ and in *The Principles of Ethics*.⁶

In the case of *The Principles of Ethics*—(the culminating part of *A System of Synthetic Philosophy*)—not only does this work conclude by indicating that permanent peace is the essential condition, but several Parts of *The Principles of Ethics* similarly in turn terminate with emphasis laid on this most significant political truth. Notably is this so in “*The Data of Ethics*,”⁷ “*The Inductions of Ethics*,”⁸ “*Justice*”⁹ and “*Positive Beneficence*.”¹⁰

And in his last volume *Facts and Comments*, six years after the completion of his life-work, Spencer again and finally returns to the subject—“*Re-barbarization*.”¹¹

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