

Rejected
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Def. Doc. No. 2519

Exh. No. _____

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

TODOROKI Sakae



I entered the YOMIURI Press in October 1917 and am now director of The YOMIURI a repatriate relief association juridical person in the press company.

At the time of the Manchurian Incident I was a reporter of the YOMIURI Press and in charge of reporting on the Army. Therefore I was favored with a chance of seeing Minister of War ARAKI often. In my touch with him I learned by his talks and deeds that he was unlike other soldiers, a humanitarian and pacifist. I deeply respected him, and our intercourse has lasted till today.

During my journalist life connected with the Army the affairs that I came in touch with were the March Affair, the Manchurian Incident and the October Incident in 1931, the May 15 Incident in 1932, the SHIMPEITAI Incident in 1933, the AIZAWA Incident in 1935 and the February 26 Incident in 1936.

In the summer of 1931, Mr. ARAKI was transferred from the position of the 6th Division Commander at KUMAMOTO to that of the Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Inspector General of Military Training. His new position, a mere administrative official, in the Inspectorate General of Military Training, had scarcely any relation with the central administration. Therefore we reporters, paid him no attention.

In that autumn, however, the so-called October Incident broke out, when the officers who had participated in it recommended him as a leader of military administration because of his noble character. At once he declined the offer. On the night of the Incident, at the request of Minister of War MINAMI, he went to their meeting place, and asserted at the risk of his life that such a private action should not be allowed in view of the fundamental character of the Imperial Army. He persuaded them with the law of justice to give up the plot. This won the admiration of the Army authorities and sincere civilians. It was then that I for the first time noticed ARAKI who was a great incarnation of anti-Fascism. (The participants of the Incident were arrested by gendarmeries by orders of Minister of War MINAMI. Later they were handled with administrative measures.

It was at a press interview several days after his appointment of the Minister of War that I saw him in person. At that time he explained about three principles. The first; the Manchurian Incident with its hostilities should be settled at the earliest possible

date, lest it should lead to the all-front war between Japan and China. The second; the ideas of soldiers and civilians in the country were in great confusion, for there were still decayed and lethargic people, while others ran to communism or Naziism in their anger at the stagnation of administration and diplomacy. This was all due to lack of knowledge of the true way for Japan to tread. They should be urged to recognize this. A moral principle should be established, which was the path through heaven and earth, as in the Imperial Rescript, was in accordance with humanity, was applicable at present or in the past and realizable abroad and at home. The third; he desired the Foreign Office authorities to make best efforts to have the League of Nations and other countries to recognize the realities of Manchukuo and the Far East.

Thus the newly-appointed Minister of War calmly pointed out the necessity of the earliest possible settlement of the Manchurian Incident, urged self-retrospection and awakening on. The part of the Japanese people and earnestly emphasized international cooperation. That was more than we had expected and we were surprised.

The first thing that Minister of War ARAKI did was a wholesale personnel shifting in the Army. In his opinion the Army should be relied upon with respect by the nation. And yet it was usually eyed with suspicion because of the March, October and other Incidents. In order to do away with this suspicion on the part of the nation, clarifying the personnel administration was the first prerequisite. He said it was necessary to appoint to the central important posts such characters as not likely to be criticised by the nation rather than men of mere ability.

In fact he later realized steadily shifting of leading personnel in the Army. He appointed Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA to Vice-Minister of War, Lt. Gen. YAMAMOTO to Chief of the Board of Military Affairs, and Lt. Gen. MATSUURA to Chief of the Board of Military Personnel Affairs. Thus he appointed to important posts trustworthy men of established reputation, and even as to the positions at the head of sections and bureaus, he replaced chauvinists with moderate men of middle course.

In this way the Minister laid stress on the Imperial Army consciousness, and unified all the Army by making every soldier fulfil his duty as a retainer of the Emperor in strict order. Because of the efforts of his, any young officer did not participate in the May 15 Incident out of prudence. Such officers did not take any active steps except protecting the Japanese residents and maintaining peace and order in Manchuria or in SHANGLAI. They acted in strict order and none of them trespassed the right of self-defence nor committed atrocities.

At the occurrence of the May 15 Incident a rumor had it widely that the Army would enforce martial law. We asked him about it. He replied that there were some civilians who advised him to take this step, but that he opposed the promulgation of it because he anticipated that if it had been enforced it would have given a chance for civilian groups to make use of it and to aggravate the Incident because they had connection with unruly young officers involved in the Incident.

Confused views resulted from the low-webbed administration led to various disgraceful affairs.

Minister of War ARAKI ascribed them to a deep-rooted evil for many years. Unless fundamental counter-measures were taken, such an incident would break out one after another and might develop internationally. Therefore, he said, steps should be taken to make the community bright from its bottom. In the autumn of 1933, he submitted a memorial for a petition of an Imperial amnesty to Premier SAITO. For he thought, before establishing national policies for stabilizing the internal and external situations, that by an Imperial amnesty criminals, especially political and thought criminals, whether they were leftists or rightists would be released and appreciate the Imperial benevolence and would start a new life. While Premier SAITO was deliberating it, Minister of War ARAKI resigned from office. As a result it was not realized. Later he revealed his great regret that fundamental policies could not be established to stabilize the national and international situations.

In autumn when the Manchurian Incident was finally settled by the TANGKU Truce Treaty, Minister of War ARAKI proposed, as one of the above-mentioned stabilizing policies, to hold a Far Eastern peace conference with a view to adjusting Japan's international relations after her withdrawal from the League of Nations, having the world to understand the real aspects of peace restored in the East, and solving impending issues with Russia by diplomatic negotiations. The Foreign Office authorities, however, could not understand ARAKI's ideal and did not actively support it for the reason of impracticability. Moreover, ARAKI's resignation on account of illness made it impossible to realize to a great disappointment of pacifists. But its basic principles were decided in the first Five Ministers Conference and a communique about it was announced by the Government in the next new year. It stated briefly and effectively the necessity of security of peace and national defence and international cooperation. We in the press fully recognized Minister of War ARAKI's efforts toward internal and external peace after concluding the TANGKU Truce Pact.

In January, 1934, just before his resignation, he submitted to Premier SAITO, though he was ill in bed, his basic suggestions of emergency policies, which were a summary of what he had thought to be important national policies. Thus he asked the Government to cope with the situation. The SAITO Cabinet, however, had not sincere intention of its realization. Later such a conference as a Five Ministers talk came to be held no more. The Diet sessions were full of political criminations and recriminations with a result of the downfall of the cabinet. Knowing this, on his return to Tokyo from his recuperation at ATAMI, ARAKI expressed a great regret and anxiety about the future of the East. It happened later that Minister of War HAYASHI was going to resign and that ARAKI was asked to succeed him again. But he declined on the ground that his policies would not be materialized by such an insincere cabinet even if he became a cabinet member again.

The SHIMPEITAI Incident was made up of extreme rightists. They planned to assassinate Minister of War ARAKI together with other cabinet members, because they thought that his Manchurian policies and international

cooperation were not of a positive nature. The plan was detected before realization and all the concerned were arrested. Those who had mistaken ARAKI to be a leader of Facism came to know his true intentions by this incident.

At the time of the February 26 Incident, 1936, after assassinating some chief vassals, chief leaders of the direct action visited Minister of War KAWASHIMA at his official residence. They told him how it had been carried out and how it should be handled. Showing him definite measure of liquidating the Army, they demanded him to execute them. After the settlement of the Incident Gen. KAWASHIMA, Yoshiyuki talked about it, partly as follows.

"I told them that the incident was so serious that I could not handle it for myself. I asked them if I could talk it over with Gen. ARAKI, Supreme War Councillor calling him there. But they declined Gen. ARAKI's presence saying, 'We fear our morale would be deteriorated by listening to Gen. ARAKI preaching on the spirit of the Imperial Army and the Japanese spirit.'"

He added that it was made clear that this was because his sound, unbiased idea and character had been kept at a distance by those young officers of direct action. We also thought so.

Just after the Incident there were some who insisted that all the generals in active service should be released to reserve service assuming responsibility for the confusion in the Army. And six generals took the necessary procedure for it at the same time, but ARAKI opposed to such a step expressing his belief that it was on such an occasion of confusion that he should serve with all his might, and that he should strive for its solution at the sacrifice of his life. By the advice of one of his friends, however, he resigned from the post of the Supreme War Councillor and was transferred to reserve service. Regarding this I heard two different opinions from army officers. Some said that ARAKI was shameless sticking to his post. Others said that though he was moderate his sense of responsibility was keen, considering national affairs more important than praise or blame about his person. The former intended to expel ARAKI from the Army, while the latter wanted him to remain in the Army.

I was strongly impressed with him especially at the time of the SHANGHAI Incident. He had been very anxious about it. But once it was decided by a cabinet conference that the Army should give aid to the Navy, he had a very firm resolution for its earliest settlement, because even by one mismanagement it would be seriously aggravated. He tried hard. At first the situation was beyond his control, but by his last resort the hostilities ceased in three days. Then, after the truce, he decisively evacuated all the military forces from there regardless of some objection.

Later the Chinese made use of it for their habitual propaganda that the Japanese forces were weak. When this propaganda adversely affected the situation in Manchuria, ARAKI complained how unmanageable the Chinese were.

I often saw that movie, "Japan in Emergency." I never felt anything aggressive from the movie. Other reporters said the same. In the movie ARAKI explained his long-cherished KODO (the Imperial Way) and emphasized the fundamental character of the Imperial

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Army. There were scenes of an officer talking with a farmer and of the GINZA street which symbolized the decadent Japan at that time, I remember. We felt he pointed out the crisis Japan was confronted with and asked for retrospection and awakening on the part of the nation through his movie. ARAKI's own noble ideas impressed us deeply, which meant by no means aggression or wilful actions in Manchuria.

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣 審 供 述 書

供述者 等 及 力 榮

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣審ヲ爲シタル上次ノ
如ク供述致シマス

一 私は大正六年十月讀賣新聞社に入社現在同社財団法人讀賣海外引揚同
胞救護會専務理事を致して居ります

二 私は滿洲事變當時讀賣新聞記者として陸軍を擔當してゐた關係から荒
木陸相とは屢々お目にかゝる機會に恵まれました殊に私は彼との交際
中彼が普通の軍人と違つて人道主義者であり平和論者である事を彼の
言動により知り得たので深く彼を尊敬し今日迄彼と交際して居ります
三 私が陸軍擔當記者時代に於て直接見聞した陸軍關係の有名な事件は昭
和六年の三月事件、滿洲事變、十月事件、昭和七年の五一五事件、昭
和八年の神兵隊事件、昭和十年の相澤事件、昭和十一年の二二六事件
等でありました

四 荒木氏は昭和六年の夏教育總監部本部長として熊本第六師團長より轉
任して東京に來られましたが中央政治と無關係な教育總監部の一事務
官たる本部長の仕事の性質上深く我々新聞記者の注意を引く事もあり
ませんでした

五 然るに同年秋の所謂十月事件で荒木が其の人格の高潔なるの理由によ
り事件に關係した將校達から軍政府の首腦に擔がれたのを即座に斥け
且當夜南陸相の要請により彼等の集合所に至り彼れの信念たる皇軍の
本質上其の様な私的行動は許さるべきでない事を一身の危険も顧みず
堂々と主張し大義を説いて遂に彼等を説得中止せしめたと云ふ事が軍
部始め世間の直面目な人達の感激を呼んで居る事を聞いて私は始めて

荒木の偉大なる反ファツシヨ的存在を知りました（此事件参加の人々は南陸相により憲兵隊の保護檢束に附され其後夫れ夫れ行政的處分を受けました）が記事差止めで一般國民には知らされませんでした。

六、私が親しく荒木と會見したのは彼が陸相に就任した數日後の記者會見の席上でありました其時彼は三つの方針に就いて説明しました第一は滿洲事變は日支全面衝突にならないように急速に兵亂を鎮定すべきである事第二は國內的に國民や軍人の思想が依然たる遊墮無自覺の徒と政治や外交の不振に憤激して共產黨に共鳴したりナチにかぶれたりする者として大混亂を呈して居るが之等は何れも日本の行くべき眞の道を知らないからだ之等に對し此自覺を促し御勅語の天地の公道、人倫の常經に合する道、これを古今に通じて謬らず之れを中外に施して悖らざる道義を確立しなければならぬ第三は國際聯盟始め諸外國に對しては極力極東の眞の狀勢と滿洲の現實とを認識して貰ふ様外務當局の奮闘を要望したと云ふ事であつた

七、新陸相は我々記者の予想を裏切つて頗る冷靜に滿洲事變急速處理の必要を説き日本國民に對しては熱心に反省自覺を促がし眞刻に國際協調を力説して我々を驚かした

- 八、荒木陸相は第一着手として人事の大移動を断行した。陸相は軍部は國民から尊敬の念を以て信頼されなければならぬのに三月事件とか十月事件とか色々の事件を起した爲め國民から兎角色眼鏡を以て見らるるに下つた、かうした疑惑を拭ひ去る爲めには先づ人事を明朗にせよ物事をみる態度に於て技術必要も國民から兎角の評を受けない人物を中央の要職に据える必要があると語られたが事實に於て其後着々軍首腦部の人事を刷新し陸軍次官に柳川中將を軍務局長に山岡中將を人事局長に松浦中將と云ふ風に手固い人格者として定評のあつた人達を要職に据其の他の局長級も遂次悲憤慷慨の士を左遷して健康中正の人達と入れ替へた
- 九、陸相は斯くして皇軍意識を強調し一糸亂れず陛下の股肱としての軍人の本分を守るように全陸軍を統一した、其爲めに五一五事件には陸軍の青年將校は自重して一人も参加しなかつた滿洲に於ても上海に於ても居留民保護、治安確保の目的以外には何等積極的態度を執らず中央の意圖通り秩序整然と行行して少しも自衛權の範圍を逸脱したり又は暴行殘虐に出づる者がなかつた
- 十、五一五事件が起ると軍は戒嚴令を布くだらうと噂されたので陸相に訊した所陸相は民間人にもその様な意見を進言して來た者もあるが、今戒嚴令を布いたならば直接行動の青年將校と氣脈を通ずる民間團體に乗ず

る機会を興へる事になり事件を擴大せしめる危険があるから戒嚴令は斷じて布かないと答へられました。

十一、政治の低調に基づく思想の混亂より種々の不祥事件が續發したが、荒木陸相は何れも積年の餘弊で根本的に立直さなければ一時は治つたが後からまた出る事は絶無と言ひ得ないし、それはまた國際的に發展する虞もあるので根本的に世の中を朗にする策を樹てねばならないと言はれて居たが遂に昭和八年の秋内外情勢安定の盟策樹立に先ち左と言はず右と言はず國民の犯罪特に政治思想犯人を大赦の恩典に浴させ、天皇の御仁慈を覺らせ新規播き直しをさせて戴き度いといふ恩赦令奏請の大國策の進言を齋藤總理にされたが齋藤總理は研究を續けられて居る間に陸相は辭任され遂に實施の運びに至らなかつたので陸相は後頗る遺憾とせられ内外安定の根本さへ立てないかと残念の意を洩された。

十二、滿洲事變が塘沽協定に依つて結末を告ぐるや其の秋荒木陸相は前述の如く内外安定策の一として阪東平和會議を提唱して國際聯盟脫退後の外交關係を調整し東洋の平和恢復の實相を世界的に認識して貰ひ殊にソ聯との種々の懸案も外交交渉によつて解決せんと言明した併し之は肝心の外務當局が荒木の理想を理解し得ず實行困難を呈由として積極的に協力する程度に至らなかつた事と荒木の病氣退任の爲め平和主義者達の多大の失望の下

に遂に實現を見るに至らなかつた併し第一の五相會議では方針の要綱が決定されて政府はコムニケを發表した即ち國防安全感と平和確立國際協調等であつた塘浜協定後荒木陸軍大臣の内外の平和策定の努力は私共言論界の認めたる所であつた

十三 荒木は昭和九年一月愈々退任に先つて病床より齋藤總理に之等の彼の考へて居る重大國策を一括して認めたる緊急施策要綱案を提出して善處を要望したのであつたが、齋藤内閣は之れが實行に熱意を缺き其の後五相會議の様なものなくそのまま消えてしまつて議會は泥試合の醜態の限りを盡したそして其の爲め内閣は倒れた熱海の病氣療養から歸京した荒木は實に残念だこれでは東洋の前途が案ぜられると衷心より必配して居た其の後林陸相の辭職問題が起り彼れは再び陸相就任を懇請されたが誠意のない内閣に復歸しても自分の政策の遂行は覺束ないと云つて遂に受諾しなかつた。

十四 昭和八年七月極右の人々によつて準備された神兵隊事件は荒木陸相の對滿政策や國際協調的態度を手緩しとして彼を全閣僚と共に外すべく計畫されたが決行前發覺して關係者は逮捕された。荒木をファツシヨの統領の様に誤解して居た人々も此の事件によつて荒木の眞意を知り感激した人達も澤山あつた。

十五 昭和十一年の二二六事件當時直接行動の幹部はその朝重臣を殺害の後陸相官邸に川島陸相を訪問し直接行動の遷末と之が處理並に陸軍部内の肅正に關する具体案を示し其斷行を要求した事件解決後川島義之大將から直接聽いた談話中に次の事があつた。

自分は事件は極めて重大であるから自分一人で處置しかねるから軍事参謀官荒木大將にも來て貰つて相談し度い旨を述べる。と彼等は「荒木大將の白王軍精神日本精神訓話を聽くと氣勢が鈍るから堪き度くない」と荒木との面會を斷つた。斯くして穩健中正の荒木大將の思想人格が既に彼等直接行動の青年將校達から忌避されて居た事が明にされて居たと語られた。私等も當時其感じは既に持つて居たが此話で事實を確める事が出來た。

十六、又川島陸軍大臣より二六事件直後當時の現役大將は全部軍混亂の責を負ふて現役を退くべしとの意見があり六大將が一度に其手續を執つたが荒木は彼の信念によりかくの如き混亂の場合にこそ御奉公をしななければならぬ現役を去ればそれでよいといふものでないといふと最後迄今一度身を挺して善後處置に努力せよと反對したが友人の勧めにより遂に軍參議官を辭めて豫備役に編入された。此の事に對して私は陸軍將校の二つの異つた批評を耳にした一は荒木は地位に戀々たる恥知らずであるといふのと他は荒木は穩健ではあるが責任觀念旺盛で國の大事は一身の毀譽を意としない人物であると前者は荒木を此機に乗じて陸軍より放逐せんと欲する人達の意見で後者は荒木が陸軍を去る事を惜む人達の意見であつた

一七、特に思ひ起すのは上海事變の時であつた非常に憂慮してゐたが愈々海軍救援の閣議が決すると非常な決意をもつて此事件を急速に終らせねば日支の全面的戦争に發展する虞れがある一步誤れば大變な事にならんとよて其處理に苦心してゐた最初は思ふ様にならなかつたが最後の切札を出すとして三日間で停戦になつた停戦後種々の議論もあつたが荒木は斷乎として全兵力を引上げて世間を驚かしたが後日それが支那一流の日本弱しの悪宣傳の材料となり滿洲に悪影響を及ぼした時は流石の荒木も中國人には困つたものだといふ居た

一八、非常時日本映畫は屢々見た私はこれから侵略などといふ感じを受

ける事は少しもなかつた他の新聞者の人達も同感であつた荒木が持論の皇道を説き皇軍の本質に力を入れて述べた事と映畫では劇の將校と農夫との會話の場面、銀座街頭の當時の日本の頽廢光景が今日尙頭に殘つて居るが彼の映畫を見た感じは日本の難局を訴へて其反省自覺を俟つといふ高尚な荒木獨特の思想が強く胸に迫る丈で他國を侵略したり滿洲で勝手を行動をする等とは凡そ反對の感じを與へたものである

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十二日 於

供述者 等々 力榮

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日於

立會人 蓮岡高明

宣
誓
誓

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘スズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト
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等々
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榮