

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Mr. Murphy: There is also a statement in this same  
2 piece from the Washington Post by the Associated Press,  
3 not that of the Associated Press writer, but that of a  
4 distinguished gentleman, that the Navy was holding you in-  
5 communicado.

6 Captain Kramer: That statement is incorrect, sir.

7 I have previously indicated that I had a number of  
8 visitors, and I made some phone calls as well.

9 Mr. Murphy: I am referring now to another story from  
10 another issue of the Washington Times Herald, an article  
11 by an able writer, Ted Lewis, in which he quotes another  
12 distinguished gentleman, other than the one who had made  
13 the previous statement, to the effect that there was a  
14 missing winds message of December 6, 1941, which purported-  
15 ly showed that the Japs were committed to immediate attack.

16 You do not know anything about any message of December  
17 6, do you?

18 Captain Kramer: I do not, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: I now quote from the Scranton Times of  
20 Scranton, Pennsylvania, United Press dispatch of November  
21 7:

22 "The Navy today denied Republican charges that a  
23 potential witness in the Pearl Harbor inquiry had been  
24 'broken in mind and body' and was being held incommunicado  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Is what you are telling today and told yesterday under oath different in any respect from what you told them at that time?

Captain Kramer: In no respect whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Murphy: My reason for going into this is if there is one single individual who has approached you in any way, low or high, no matter who he is, in any way to attempt to influence your testimony, I think in fairness to yourself, and the members of this committee, we ought to know about it.

Was there ever any such person?

Captain Kramer: There was never any such person, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, sir, I would like to review with you your testimony before the Hewitt inquiry. You stated at page 128:

"The evaluation was normally done by Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my opinion about it too."

Is that so?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You stated on page 129, that you had seen those two dispatches set forth on pages 154 and 155 of Exhibit 1. That would be circular 2353 and circular



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murph

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Then you were asked if you had seen the dispatch marked Exhibit No. 3 from Aluska, Batavia, and you said, "I do not recall having seen that."

Which one was that? Would that be the one sent to the Pacific, or would that be the so-called Foote dispatch?

Captain Kramer: No, sir, it would be the dispatch from the U. S. Naval Liaison Officer stationed in Batavia.

Mr. Murphy: And distinct from either 2353, 2354, and the so-called dispatch that we received by way of Admiral Hart?

Captain Kramer: That is right, sir.

Mr. Murphy: At page 130, you stated:

"We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic after the thing was set up, which was about the end of November, but traffic did not appear in this system until the 7th of December and the latter part of December, 1941."

I take it at that time you were talking about the hidden word dispatches.

Captain Kramer: Mr. Murphy, until I was shown a photostat of the hidden word message during Admiral Hewitt's hearing, I was still under the impression that the dispatch received



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Sunday morning was a winds message.

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Mr. Murphy: Is it not a fact that from December 7, 1941, down to the time you testified before Admiral Hewitt, you thought the December 7 dispatch was an execute of the winds code?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir that is correct.

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Mr. Murphy: Now, I take you to the bottom of page 130:

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"Captain Kramer: That is correct. That refreshes my memory now. I remember now that you remind me of it, that these reams of plain language traffic that we were getting in, several weeks weeks before Pearl Harbor, were searched for that indicator. That, however, I didn't recall specifically, because I didn't do the searching. It was done by the GY watch officers.

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"Admiral Hewitt: I believe that about the middle of the first week of December, there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that to the best of your recollection?

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"Captain Kramer: I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of thinking it over since



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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that time.

"I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of 1944. However, after being given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 7 December, 1941, I believe about the middle of the week 1 - 7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office, and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him.

"A brief conversation ensued, and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days.

"That is the last I saw of such a message.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 "Admiral Hewitt: Can you recall what the general  
2 subject of the message was?"

3 Now this is important. You speak up above about the  
4 one on December 7 and here, as I understand it, you are de-  
5 scribing the one you saw with Safford.

6 "Admiral Hewitt: Can you recall what the general  
7 subject of the message was?"

8 "Captain Kramer: It was, as I recall it, a 'winds' code  
9 message. The wording of it I do not recall. It may have  
10 been, 'Higashi no kaze ame', specifically referring to the  
11 United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor,  
12 but I am less positive of that now than I believe I was at  
13 that time. The reason for revision in my view on that is  
14 the fact that in thinking it over, I have a rather sharp  
15 recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling  
16 there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the  
17 United States in any of this traffic, which I was seeing  
18 all of and which also was the only source in general of my  
19 information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches  
20 from the Fleet Commanders or going out to them from Operations."

21 Is your memory more clear now than it was then on that  
22 subject, or do you still feel the same way?

23 Captain Kramer: I still feel the same way regarding  
24 the precise wording of that piece of teletype. I, however,  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 am thoroughly convinced from my study of the papers in  
2 the last few days, in the last few weeks, that the United  
3 States did not appear on that thing. That is my current  
4 conviction.

5 At the time I was testifying in previous hearings I  
6 had not thought particularly about this. In fact the first  
7 time that there was occasion to think about it at all was  
8 in preparing my reply to Captain Safford's first letter,  
9 in which there is no mention or reference to what country  
10 was involved.

11 Mr. Murphy: Well, Admiral Hewitt then said to you:

12 "Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall  
13 in view of that, there was no indication --

14 "Captain Kramer: I would like to continue that state-  
15 ment, Admiral, by saying: For that reason, I am now at  
16 least under the impression that the message referred to  
17 England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States,  
18 although it may have referred to the United States, too."

19 Captain Kramer: That is simply because I was unpositive,  
20 and still am unpositive, of the precise wording.

21 Mr. Murphy: Then Admiral Hewitt says:

22 "Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?"

23 "Captain Kramer: I just don't recall."

24 Now Admiral Hewitt said:  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 "Reference to one or more of the messages supplied by  
2 the FCC is in Exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of  
3 those may have been seen by you?"

4 Is it your recollection that you did or did not see  
5 any of those?

6 Captain Kramer: I believe I saw some of those, yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: You said then:

8 "Captain Kramer: This document 1 is not a message and  
9 document 4 is the one of the 8th of December about midnight  
10 GMT. I may have seen these specific messages. I cannot be  
11 certain, however, because we saw a great many messages of  
12 this kind in looking for this particular type of 'winds'  
13 code message. When we started monitoring all Japanese  
14 plain language some weeks before Pearl Harbor, the volume  
15 of material coming in was simply tremendous, swamping. We  
16 had only three linguists at the time for translation purposes,  
17 with a pretty heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the  
18 negotiations. Consequently, we felt the extra burden of  
19 having to scan all this Japanese plain language stuff and  
20 there were many instances of weather occurring in that,  
21 but because of the fact that the particular code thing we  
22 were looking for, we felt it was incumbent on us to examine  
23 it all. The reason I cannot state specifically that these  
24 particular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 same nature as many I did see."

2 Then at the bottom of the page Admiral Hewitt said:

3 "My understanding is that when that was first decoded,  
4 the word "minami", which related to the United States, was  
5 overlooked, so that the translation merely referred to  
6 England. Is that your recollection?

7 "Captain Kramer: Last summer when that question of the  
8 late morning of 7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my  
9 recollection had been that it was a 'winds' message. It  
10 wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon --"  
11 and that would be sometime between May and July of 1945,  
12 would it not?

13 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: Your testimony was on Tuesday, May 22,  
15 1945, so I take it that you saw the message on May 21, the  
16 day before.

17 Captain Kramer: I believe that is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: You said, "It wasn't until I saw these  
19 exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection was re-  
20 freshed to the extent that I thought it was one of these  
21 hidden word messages rather than the 'winds'. I do recall  
22 on that that after my return from the State Department near  
23 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated  
24 a message specifying the time of delivery of the 14 part  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 note from the Japanese Government to the United States.  
2 That item, together with several other minor messages, one  
3 thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the  
4 Embassy Staff and another directing final destruction of  
5 codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place  
6 at 1:00 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a  
7 hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the  
8 course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the  
9 office, I looked at another short plain language message  
10 that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I  
11 recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as  
12 being a code word in this plain language text."

13  
14 Now at that point, do we have here, or is it available,  
15 the plain language text of the Japanese message before  
16 translation?

17 Captain Kramer: Here it is (indicating).

18 Mr. Murphy: Now will you look at that just a minute,  
19 please? The first word was "Koyanagi", was it not?

20 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: And if you will look at page 186 of  
22 Exhibit 1, "Koyanagi" was England, wasn't it?

23 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: Then there are several other words,  
25 "rijivori seirinetugoo, arunituki", and then "hattori", and



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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 "hattori" meant "relations between Japan and (blank country)  
2 are not in accordance with expectation", is that not right?

3 Captain Kramer: That is precisely what it means, sir.  
4 If the committee is interested they, of course, may call  
5 a Japanese expert other than presumably myself, and refer  
6 to a dictionary which I have in front of me.

7 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the way it was set up for  
8 the Navy on page 187 was precisely "relations between Japan  
9 and (blank country) are not in accordance with expectation",  
10 is that not so?

11 Captain Kramer: That is precisely an exact translation,  
12 sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, after "hattori", which was  
14 the general part, the next word is "minami", which means  
15 the U.S.A., is that right?

16 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, at that time you said you  
18 dictated a translation of this particular message. Is that  
19 true?

20 Captain Kramer: That is true, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: And then you apparently, in your hurry,  
22 left with the translation as you thought it was at the time,  
23 having overlooked "minami" or the U.S.A. word.

24 Captain Kramer: I did not overlook it exactly. I  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 overlooked it to the extent of not identifying it as a  
2 code word. The plain text message, which this is, should  
3 be translated, "Please have director Koyanagi send a wire  
4 stating the sum which has been decided to be spent on the  
5 hattori minami memorial library in order that this business  
6 may be wound up", and then the code indicated a stop.

7 Now in translating this message -- the word "minami"  
8 I might explain is a very common word in the Japanese language.  
9 It simply means "south". In a hasty scanning of this message,  
10 without referring to the Japanese code list on this hidden  
11 word set-up, that message could be translated in the same  
12 way I have just read, except that it could also mean, if  
13 it was not immediately apparent that "minami" was a code  
14 word, "Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating  
15 the sum which has been decided to be spent on the hattori  
16 southern memorial library in order that this business may be  
17 wound up."

18 It was for that reason, the fact that that word "minami"  
19 fitted very well into a normal translation, did not stand  
20 out at the moment as a code word, that it was overlooked.  
21 The words "Koyanagi" and "hattori" are proper names in the  
22 Japanese language, which can readily immediately be dis-  
23 tinguished from any ordinary Japanese word.

24 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, upon examination of  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 part 4 of the hidden word code set-up on page 187 you  
2 found that "minami" was a code word meaning "U.S.A."?

3 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you did add in pencil on that  
5 particular paper that correction, did you not?

6 Captain Kramer: On one copy of that particular write-up,  
7 yes, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: And that copy, did it have any more than  
9 just the word "minami", or did it have some of your writing?

10 Captain Kramer: Just an insertion with the word "United  
11 States", and it was done with a view to sending around a  
12 corrected translation, which was not at all an infrequent  
13 occurrence, on the next dissemination of this material.

14 Mr. Murphy: I was wondering if Captain Safford saw  
15 that message with your handwriting in it "United States".

16 Captain Kramer: I doubt if he did, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: I think you will find from the evidence  
18 that he did, or at least he examined it later.

19 Captain Kramer: Normally the copies of this traffic --

20 Mr. Murphy: (Interposing) I do not mean on December  
21 7, but at a subsequent time he saw the message.

22 Captain Kramer: That is what I am referring to.

23 (Continuing) -- were destroyed, except the numerical  
24 file copy for reference, and occasionally one, and at one  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 time during 1941, two other copies which we retained for  
2 cross-references by subjects.

3 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, when you translated this  
4 message which would then say that relations between Japan  
5 and England are not in accordance with expectations on  
6 the 7th of December, you immediately put that into the pouch  
7 and took that to the addressees, did you not, the receivers  
8 of the pouch?

9 Captain Kramer: That first version, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Then subsequently you made a phone call  
11 saying there would be a correction adding the translation  
12 of the word "minami"?

13 Captain Kramer: My memory on that point is not very  
14 clear. That, too, was not an unusual thing to do. I made  
15 frequent phone calls, and in fact every time I started  
16 delivery prior to leaving the office I made a number of phone  
17 calls to locate recipients. There were a number of times  
18 that I specifically recall during 1941 when I made calls  
19 indicating corrections, whether major or minor.

20 My recollection on this thing is that when I first  
21 noted it I did make two or three phone calls indicating that  
22 the United States should be included in that.

23 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the force and effect of it  
24 had been considerably lessened by the delivery of the 1:00  
25 o'clock message to the recipients of the pouch before you



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 had discovered that "minami" was a code word?

2 Captain Kramer: I believe that was my impression at  
3 the time, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now what puzzles me is that here is a  
5 message that is a hidden word message on the 7th, and it  
6 immediately comes to you and it immediately is distributed  
7 to all of the receivers of the pouches, and I am wondering  
8 why the difference was made between that one of the 7th  
9 and why there was this treatment of this other one of the  
10 5th which would go direct to Noyes.

11 Captain Kramer: When this so-called hidden word  
12 system was set up, the first knowledge of which we had, I  
13 believe, in early December, it was so involved by comparison  
14 with the winds system, which was extremely simple in nature  
15 and character, there were so many code words involved, that  
16 no special provision was made to handle it. It would have  
17 required, in view of the complicated character of this  
18 by comparison with the winds thing, processing like our  
19 other coded traffic.

20 Mr. Murphy: Is it not a fact, Captain, that the  
21 cards that were distributed to Noyes and the others had  
22 the code words from the messages of 2353 and 2354?

23 Captain Kramer: That is precisely correct, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: They did not, however, have the code words  
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of --

1 Captain Kramer: (Interposing) They had the translations  
2 of those code words.

3 Mr. Murphy: The translations. They did not have  
4 the word "minami", which meant "U.S.A." or the word "kodama",  
5 which meant "Japan", or the word "Koyanagi", which meant  
6 England, or the word "hattori", which meant "relations between  
7 Japan and (blank country) are not in accordance with expecta-  
8 tion"?

9 Captain Kramer: Absolutely not, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: So then, if they got a message which  
11 purported to be an intercept and it was under the hidden  
12 word code, and they were to make any comparisons at all  
13 they would not know whether it was a real execute under  
14 that code because they did not have that translated?

15 Captain Kramer: I do not see how they could possibly  
16 have gotten anything under this hidden word system in  
17 other than the pouch I delivered to recipients.

18 Mr. Murphy: I do not know that they did. I am just  
19 talking about Noyes.

20 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Now the message that was delivered to  
22 Noyes, is it your recollection that the Japanese words as  
23 such were delivered to him or an English translation of the  
24 words?  
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(8)



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Kramer: I can categorically state, sir, that  
3 no message in the winds system was delivered in any pouch  
4 which I brought to the recipients of this material.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now let me ask you just one final question.  
6 If you will refer, Captain, to Exhibit 1, at page 226 --  
7 do you have a copy of Exhibit 1?

8 Captain Kramer: Yes.

9 Mr. Murphy: There is a message from Tokyo to (Circular)  
10 3 December, 1941, "Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)" --  
11 which means "hidden words", and "INGO DENPO" which means  
12 "hidden words", too, doesn't it?

13 Captain Kramer: "DENPO" means "telegram".

14 Mr. Murphy: That is important, for this reason, that  
15 in setting up the hidden word code on page 186 of Exhibit 1  
16 they refer to "INGO DENPO" as "hidden word" and that would  
17 be the hidden telegram, is that it?

18 Captain Kramer: "IN" means "hidden", "GO" means "word"  
19 and "DENPO" means "telegram".

20 Mr. Murphy: Now on page 226 they speak of "INGO HIKAE".  
21 Would that mean one would be by telegram and the other  
22 would be by voice?

23 Captain Kramer: There is no distinction of that kind  
24 that I am aware of, sir. I am uncertain off-hand as to the  
25 reason for the discrepancy between those two. "HIKAE" might



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1           Captain Kramer: My recollection and understanding is  
2 that the piece of teletype which I saw was taken by Captain  
3 Safford to Admiral Noyes' office.

4           Mr. Murphy: Do you recall my reading from Sadtler's  
5 testimony, that he wanted to know what word was used?

6           Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

7           Mr. Murphy: And I take it from that that he apparently  
8 had certain Jap words such as "kita" and the other words  
9 from the winds code. Do you know whether they were furnished  
10 the Japanese or English?

11           Captain Kramer: I do not know, sir, what Admiral Noyes  
12 phoned to him.

13           Mr. Murphy: At any rate, so far as your testimony  
14 goes, you state that it is your best recollection that you  
15 did not see a message which was a winds intercept referring  
16 to the United States?

17           Captain Kramer: No, sir, I never did.

18           Mr. Murphy: And are you able to state yes or no to  
19 the question as to whether or not, on December 4, 5, --  
20 let me change that -- on December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 you  
21 delivered any message in any pouch which would be a winds  
22 intercept to the White House and the other recipients  
23 showing a break in relations, negotiations, either one of  
24 those two, between Japan and the United States?  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 be an inaccurate recovery of the code group applying to  
2 that, and this circular may have been sent in a quite  
3 different system from the earlier one.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now these two messages then on page 226:

5 "Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those  
6 in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment," and  
7 then the next one from Tokyo to Vancouver, "Please retain  
8 the 'hidden meaning' codes and the codes to be used in con-  
9 junction with radio broadcasts until the last moment", would  
10 that indicate to you the possibility, and the ability of  
11 Tokyo to broadcast to London by the PA-K2 code any message  
12 they wanted to about relations between the two countries  
13 not being in accordance with expectations?

14 Captain Kramer: These two dispatches do not refer  
15 to the so-called PA-K2. That was still another system  
16 which the Japanese referred to, I believe, by the name "O"  
17 or "Oite".

18 Mr. Murphy: Will you get the original, Mr. Masten,  
19 and have it here?

20 You think it is "O", is that right? You think it  
21 would be the code "O", or "Oite"?

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: In that connection, if it is "Oite" I  
24 would like to refer you to page 216, a dispatch from Bern  
25



1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 to Ankara. In that case it says, "Orders have been issued  
3 to our diplomatic officials in North America (including  
4 Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including  
5 Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in  
6 British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands  
7 territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all  
8 their telegraphic codes except one copy of Oite 'L'."

9 So if it is "Oite" they could still get the broadcast  
10 about the break in relations, could not they, on the code  
11 referred to on page 226?

12 Captain Kramer: There are three codes involved, Mr.  
13 Murphy: The Oite, the "L", which we knew as "LA", and the  
14 hidden word code, which had been set up only a few days  
15 previously.

16 Mr. Murphy: Right. Well, do you know of any reason  
17 why, on December 3, 4 and 5, Tokyo could not broadcast to  
18 England, as well as to all other places, a message to the  
19 effect, by international Morse or by what you call Kani  
20 Morse, or by any other system of communication generally used,  
21 the fact that relations were in danger?

22 Captain Kramer: I do not have any first-hand knowledge  
23 of what systems were actually held or burned by the Japanese  
24 Embassy in London. From this dispatch which you have read  
25 on page 216, however, it is apparent to me that Japan



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 could have sent via either of these code systems or via  
3 the hidden words system indications of any disruption in  
4 relations to England.

5 Mr. Murphy: The fact is that on the 7th of December  
6 Japan did send such a message, did it not, referring to  
7 England? I refer you now to page 251, from Tokyo to (Circular  
8 Telegram), 7 December 1941, "(plain Japanese language using  
9 code names) Circular #2494, Relations between Japan and  
10 England are not in accordance with expectation".

11 Captain Kramer: That was a circular telegram which  
12 could very well have included England, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: You mean as a recipient?

14 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, as a recipient.

15 Mr. Murphy: But it did refer to relations between  
16 Japan and England on the 7th of December?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: I have no other questions.

19 The Chairman: Senator Brewster being absent, Congress-  
20 man Gearhart is recognized.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Captain, there are certain respects in  
22 which your testimony coincides completely with that of  
23 Captain Safford, is that not correct?

24 Captain Kramer: I believe that is the case, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Captain Safford testified that on the 4th



1 of December, 1941 you appeared before him at his office  
2 with a yellow teletype paper in your hands and said to him  
3 "This is it". To that extent your testimony is in agreement,  
4 is it not?

5 Captain Kramer: Except for the date in my present  
6 conviction on the matter, yes, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: What is your present conviction?

8 Captain Kramer: That incident occurred on the morning  
9 of 5 December.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Not the 4th?

11 Captain Kramer: No, sir. I explained, I believe, .  
12 yesterday afternoon the reason for the confirmation of my  
13 conviction on that is that was an examination of our  
14 directives to our outposts in the Western Pacific and Asia  
15 on destruction of codes. That showed the dispatches were  
16 drafted, as indicated by the date time group on the dispatch  
17 on the afternoon of 4 December. I specifically have had  
18 my memory refreshed by these things on that point, because  
19 I do have a definite recollection of the fact that those  
20 dispatches were drafted, the first two, I think, by Admiral  
21 Noyes in his office in my presence while he was examining  
22 a folder which included the directive from Japan to the  
23 Western Hemisphere to burn and destroy certain systems.

24 There was nothing "winds" whatsoever connected there-  
25 with.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1           Mr. Gearhart: Is that the only reason why you think  
2 that the date was the 5th instead of the 4th, the fact that  
3 Admiral Noyes was writing these messages directly to our  
4 outlying positions to destroy their codes, code machines  
5 and particular papers, and you do not remember that contempor-  
6 aneously with the preparation of those orders there had been  
7 any discussion of a winds message, is that it?

8           Captain Kramer: Until I saw those dispatches quite  
9 recently and read parts of the so-called Narrative prepared  
10 by Lieutenant Commander Baecher in which there is quoted  
11 some of the Army testimony bearing on this point of the date  
12 I was still uncertain as to the precise date that this  
13 incident occurred.

14           Mr. Gearhart: But you did not indicate in any of  
15 your previous testimony that there was any uncertainty in  
16 your mind until you came here to testify?

17           Captain Kramer: I invariably indicated that there  
18 was uncertainty as regarding the date that incident occurred.  
19 My mind was only refreshed on that point when I saw this  
20 series of our directives, and --

21           Mr. Gearhart: (Interposing) Then the only basis --

22           The Chairman: Let the witness finish his answer, please.

23           Mr. Gearhart: Is there anything further you wanted  
24 to say, Captain?



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1           Captain Kramer: I do not think it is material. I  
2 have given what I was about to say already, sir.

3           Mr. Gearhart: Now is the only basis for your saying  
4 that it was the 5th instead of the 4th that you remember  
5 distinctly the sending out of the code destruction method,  
6 and you remember distinctly that preceding that there was  
7 no discussion of a winds message, is that it?

8           Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

9           Mr. Gearhart: That is the only basis for it?

10          Captain Kramer: That is the only basis. That was  
11 testimony taken from the Army inquiries that fixed positively  
12 the date in my mind, yes, sir.

13          Mr. Gearhart: Then you want us to understand that  
14 your memory five years later is better than it was shortly  
15 after the event, is that correct?

16          Captain Kramer: I do not want to create that impression,  
17 sir. I never have created, or intended to create, that  
18 impression.

19          Mr. Gearhart: Your attention has been called to the  
20 fact that a certain message was sent out by direction of  
21 Admiral Noyes to destroy codes, which had been prepared by  
22 Captain Safford.

23          Captain Kramer: They were prepared in final form I  
24 believe by Captain Safford, yes, sir.  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now for the first time you remember  
2 that those messages were sent out at a date different from  
3 the date upon which there was discussion of the winds message?

4 Captain Kramer: I recall no discussion of any winds  
5 message, sir, except the few words exchanged with Captain  
6 Safford and the GY watch officer, and a few remarks I may  
7 have made on the date the winds message was received in the  
8 process of disseminating the folders of other decrypted  
9 traffic.

10 Mr. Gearhart: And now, after five years, you are  
11 positive that those two subjects were on different days.  
12 Now will you tell me why it was on the 5th that the winds  
13 message was discussed rather than on the 4th?

14 Captain Kramer: I have never been positive of the date,  
15 sir. I stated --

16 Mr. Gearhart: (Interposing) Well, you mean --

17 The Chairman: Let the witness finish his answer.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Go ahead.

19 Captain Kramer: I stated that my memory was refreshed  
20 only in the last few days as to the date, and that is my  
21 current conviction, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: And are you positive today?

23 Captain Kramer: I am positive only to the extent that  
24 these things I have mentioned refresh my memory, sir.  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Mr. Gearhart: Well, there is nothing to refresh your  
2 memory in respect to the date when the winds message was  
3 received. There is no record you have been able to look  
4 at. You simply say it was the 5th because it was not the  
5 4th, is that it?

6 Captain Kramer: That is not quite it, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: All right, name one paper that refreshes  
8 your memory in respect to the discussion of the winds message.  
9 Upon what do you base your conviction of today?

10 Captain Kramer: On the relative times of occurrence  
11 of this incident in Admiral Noyes' office when he drafted  
12 these dispatches and I received this piece of teletype paper  
13 containing the words which might have been the winds message.

14 Mr. Gearhart: All right. I know that you have the  
15 evidence of the messages that were sent forth to destroy  
16 the codes and code machines and secret papers, you have  
17 refreshed your memory on that occurrence, but tell me from  
18 what record do you refresh your memory in respect of the  
19 day when the winds code message was received.

20 Captain Kramer: On the basis of no record whatsoever, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Then you want us to understand that  
22 that is purely memory bestirred after five years of dis-  
23 cussion to the contrary, is that correct?

24 Captain Kramer: My first recollection of this incident  
25

W. D. NOTENIKAW, JAMES S. GRAY

(11)



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 in Admiral Noyes' office was only after I saw those four  
2 dispatches which we sent out directing our destruction of  
3 codes. At that time my memory was refreshed to that extent.  
4

5 I might remark in that regard, sir, that my memory  
6 has been refreshed on a number of other details connected  
7 with this hearing --

8 Mr. Gearhart: (Interposing) I am only asking about  
9 one thing now.

10 The Chairman: Let the witness finish his answer.

11 Captain Kramer: (Continuing) -- concerning events  
12 taking place about the time of Pearl Harbor.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Has anybody pointed out to you that  
14 it might be in corroboration of Captain Safford's testimony  
15 that when they received the winds code they immediately  
16 prepared the code destruction notices and that, therefore,  
17 you better put it on a subsequent day?

18 Captain Kramer: Will you repeat that question?

19 Mr. Gearhart: Has anybody suggested that to you  
20 recently?

21 The Chairman: What was that question?

22 Mr. Gearhart: Read it, Mr. Reporter.

23 (The question was read by the reporter.)

24 Captain Kramer: Mr. Gearhart, no one has pointed out  
25 anything to me at any time concerning the matter you just



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 mentioned. My current conviction, based on refreshing due  
2 to examination of these dispatches, was my own personal  
3 conviction, not due to pointing out or discussions with anyone,  
4 sir.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Now the winds message was being watched  
6 for, wasn't it?

7 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Everybody having to do with the inter-  
9 ception of the messages was on his toes, very alert, looking  
10 for the winds message?

11 Captain Kramer: I believe that was the case, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: And you received a message which related  
13 to the possibility that it was a winds message that came on  
14 the teletype paper and you went in and said to Captain  
15 Safford, "This is it"?

16 Captain Kramer: It was far more than a possibility in  
17 my mind, sir. The fact is it was a conviction in my mind  
18 at that time, that the words appearing on that piece of  
19 teletype paper coincided precisely with what was called for  
20 by this winds system. That could very well be, since it  
21 was very simple Japanese language, which might well be used  
22 in any normal weather broadcast.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: When you were on your toes, alert, looking for this message, and were at the time convinced that it was the message, convinced at the time that it contained the words directly pointing to the United States, how do you explain the fact after five years your conviction today is to the contrary?

Captain Kramer: Mr. Gearhart, I have never been of the positive conviction that that piece of teletype paper referred to the United States. My statement as to the wording of that is hazy. It has always been hazy. My contact with that was only for a few seconds duration. If it had referred to the United States, I am fairly certain that it would have impressed itself on my memory.

Mr. Gearhart: Captain, you had been looking for this paper for a long time. You had it in your own hands. You looked at it, and you said after reading it, "This is it." Do you mean to say that you weren't convinced at that moment that it was it?

Captain Kramer: I certainly was convinced that it was it to the extent of being the first thing that we had seen which was believed by me and by the GY watch officer was something in that hidden word -- rather in that winds system. That, purely, and simply, is what I meant by this expression which I apparently used. I have no positive



h2

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 recollection of using that expression, incidentally.

2 Mr. Gearhart: You have no positive recollection of  
3 having said, "This is it"?

4 Captain Kramer: I have repeatedly so testified.

5 Mr. Gearhart: You have testified in this hearing that  
6 it was the expression you used, haven't you?

7 Captain Kramer: I have stated I may well have said  
8 that. I have no positive recollection of having said it.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Now, will you tell us why, when you  
10 had been waiting for this paper for a long time, when you  
11 read it, and you felt it was a winds message, why you didn't  
12 make out any file for it?

13 Captain Kramer: Of this approximately quarter of a  
14 mile of plain language traffic that we had been receiving  
15 for a week or ten days past, there is no record that I am  
16 aware of that was ever maintained on all that traffic.

17 The only record I kept in my section, Section GZ,  
18 was of broken down messages by the decrypters, or in the  
19 case of plain language papers that were sent in to my section  
20 for translation, every one of those papers were filed.

21 I am fairly certain every one of those papers will  
22 now be found in the files of the Navy Department.

23 Mr. Gearhart: The paper you had been waiting for,  
24 the paper you thought was the paper you had been waiting for,  
25



h3

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 the one you took to Captain Safford, you made no file  
2 out for it?

3 Captain Kramer: Made no file of anything, sir, except  
4 what came in to my section. That did not come into my  
5 section. There were specific provisions made why it should  
6 not have come into my section. I do not believe, sir, that  
7 any record was kept by the GY Section of any of that plain  
8 language traffic coming in either.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Who was this watch officer that brought  
10 it to you?

11 Captain Kramer: To the best of my recollection it  
12 was a Lieutenant Murray, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Was he in your section?

14 Captain Kramer: He was in the adjacent section, GY.

15 Mr. Gearhart: The missing file 7001 is a file that  
16 might have been filled by paper that came in during the  
17 first week in December; is that right?

18 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

19 Mr. Gearhart: What was the last you saw of this tele-  
20 type yellow sheet of paper?

21 Captain Kramer: The last I saw of that piece of tele-  
22 type paper was when I left Captain Safford's office.

23 Mr. Gearhart: It was then in his possession?

24 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h4

1 Mr. Gearhart: At the time, as you have testified,  
2 you considered that message to be the winds execute?

3 Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

4 I might amplify that remark, as I believe I have pre-  
5 viously testified, that that is the first occasion I know  
6 of where I left my office and accompanied a GY watch officer  
7 to Captain Safford's office. It was primarily for the  
8 purpose of confirming with Captain Safford the language  
9 appearing on that piece of teletype paper.

10 The watch officer himself had instructions on how to  
11 handle anything coming in in that particular winds system.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Why did he bring it to you?

13 Captain Kramer: He did not bring it to me, sir. As  
14 he was passing the door of my office, he noted that I was  
15 in and he called me to the door to confirm his interpreta-  
16 tion of what appeared on that piece of teletype.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Then you read it carefully to confirm  
18 his interpretation, and you don't remember anything about  
19 it now?

20 Captain Kramer: I do not sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Well, you weren't too much help to  
22 him in reading it, were you, then?

23 Captain Kramer: I believe I was of some help at the  
24 time, sir. I saw that paper for only a few seconds. All  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h5

1 these other things which my section handled, I saw from  
2 6 or 8 to two or three dozen times. I read and studied  
3 them carefully in order to be familiar with what the  
4 recipients were reading when I was present while they were  
5 reading.

6 Mr. Gearhart: He asked you for the purpose of checking  
7 himself, asked you to read it with care and to see if he  
8 interpreted it correctly.

9 In the days gone by, you remembered that it contained  
10 words referring to the United States, and now you are un-  
11 certain because the paper was in your hands so fleetingly?

12 Captain Kramer: In days gone by, sir, I have never  
13 definitely remembered that piece of teletype as referring  
14 to the United States. I have never recalled and still do  
15 not recall the precise wording of that piece of teletype.

16 Mr. Gearhart: And upon that you are sure and you are  
17 willing to say that you never testified that it did refer  
18 to the United States?

19 Captain Kramer: My first reaction when that question  
20 was first propounded to me during the course of Admiral  
21 Murfin's court of inquiry was having in mind very well the  
22 expressions involved and in view of the fact that we had  
23 been engaged in a serious war for two years with Japan,  
24 that of course it was the United States.  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h6

1 Later on in that hearing, however, I indicated in  
2 reply to another question that the only thing involving  
3 the United States in all this decrypted traffic was the  
4 disclosure at the end of November to Berlin wherein they  
5 used the expression "Anglo-Saxon" which included the United  
6 States, presumably.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Now, a question has been raised as to  
8 whether or not there was any reason behind the winds mes-  
9 sage being sent by directional broadcast to London two or  
10 three days before the actual breaking out of hostilities.

11 Can you think of any reasons why the Japanese would  
12 want London advised in advance of the event and would take  
13 great chances possibly of exposing their hand to advise  
14 London?

15 Captain Kramer: I believe, sir, that it would have  
16 been an illogical thing to do.

17 Mr. Gearhart: A what?

18 Captain Kramer: An illogical thing to do.

19 Mr. Gearhart: You can't think of any reason why London,  
20 that is, the Japanese Embassy in London, would want to know  
21 in advance?

22 Captain Kramer: In view, Mr. Gearhart of the stringent  
23 security measures imposed by the Japanese military on all  
24 their moves connected with the outbreak of war between Japan  
25



h7

and England and the United States, I very much doubt it.

1           Mr. Gearhart: I direct your attention to intercept  
2 No. 1410 which appears on page 234 of Exhibit 1, the message  
3 from Berlin to Tokyo, December 4, 1941, translated December  
4 5, 1941:

5           "In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy  
6 in London --"

7           That would seem to indicate that Berlin was expecting  
8 evacuation and war, wouldn't it?

9           Captain Kramer: Not necessarily war, sir. We ourselves  
10 had evacuated all of our language officers from Tokyo in  
11 August of 1941.

12           Mr. Gearhart: That is possibly another explanation,  
13 isn't it?

14           Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

15           Mr. Gearhart: War is still another possibility, isn't  
16 it?

17           Captain Kramer: That would be a matter of personal  
18 deduction, if you wanted to stretch this thing to that  
19 meaning, sir.

20           Mr. Gearhart: That is no more of a stretch than the  
21 other, is it?

22           Captain Kramer: By that token, you could stretch  
23 our evacuation of our language officers from Tokyo as  
24 meaning we intended to go to war with Japan.  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: It says "evacuation by the members of our Embassy."

That means all, doesn't it?

Captain Kramer: I don't see that it does, sir. We evacuated members of our Embassy, namely, the language officers.

Mr. Gearhart: This doesn't say anything about part of the members, but it says "the members". A fair interpretation of that, even to an Intelligence Officer, is that it would mean all, wouldn't it?

Captain Kramer: You could put that extreme interpretation on it, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, let's go on:

"In the case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others --"

And they are named in the message.

"-- stay here. Please do your best to this end."

That is from Berlin.

Now, there is a possible direct reason, is there not, why London should know before the breaking out of hostilities, because after the breaking out of hostilities there would be no chance to evacuate any members of the Japanese Embassy in London, would there?

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WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Captain Kramer: Presumably not.

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Mr. Gearhart: They would be immediately interned, would they not?

Captain Kramer: That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart: So there is a reason given right here given in the intercept why London should be advised in order to accomplish a purpose before it was too late; is that not true?

Captain Kramer: I would invite your attention, Mr. Gearhart, to the following message.

Mr. Gearhart: That is right, but we are talking about this one first.

In that message we have been discussing, the one I have just read, is contained a possible reason why London should be advised before the outbreak of hostilities, isn't there?

Captain Kramer: Not necessarily hostilities. It might be the breaking of diplomatic relations, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Diplomatic relationship does not mean internment, does it?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, then, they could go on and evacuate their men if it was just a breach of diplomatic relations?

Captain Kramer: Not necessarily. They would be dependent then, presumably, on special arrangements for shipping.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: That is right, unless they had arranged to take their people off the island by the German submarines?

Captain Kramer: That is possible, of course, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Then, in all fairness -- now, I am not asking you to strain your conclusions -- in all fairness, if the Japanese wanted to get some people of the British Isles, and over to Berlin before the outbreak of hostilities, that would be a reason for a directional broadcast of a winds message three days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

Captain Kramer: You could put such a construction on that, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, it has been testified that any directional broadcast from Tokyo to London could be heard on the East Coast of the United States; is that not so?

Captain Kramer: I am not familiar with the technicalities of what could be heard or not heard in various parts of the world.

Mr. Gearhart: You were present in this room when testimony was given that because of atmospheric conditions, natural phenomena, scientific consequences, that a directional broadcast from Tokyo to London could be and would be heard on the Atlantic Coast of the United States?



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Captain Kramer: I heard that testimony, sir, and I am in general familiar with the subject of communications as a line officer in the Navy, and also with the difficulties which we had at various times with our own intercept set and the reallocation of certain monitoring stations to cover certain circuits, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: If that were the consequence of that kind of a directional broadcast, the Japanese would know it, their scientists would know it there just as ours here?

Captain Kramer: Presumably, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: It seems by the next message that Tokyo wanted to get some people out of the United States before hostilities broke out.

The next message reads:

"From: Tokyo

"To: Washington

"5 December, 1941.

"Re your #1245

"Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days."

In that message you see a possible reason why Tokyo wanted the United States to know that relations with the United States were failing and were about to end; isn't that correct? Isn't that a fair conclusion?



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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Captain Kramer: That is a possible conclusion, sir.

2  
3 However, there are many movements of diplomatic offi-  
4 cials disclosed by this traffic to us. In fact, every  
5 transfer of a Japanese diplomatic official was as a re-  
6 sult of instructions of this kind. Referring back to  
7 page 227 of this exhibit, in a message from Washington to  
8 Tokyo dated 3 December, Washington apparently objects to  
9 detaching Secretary Terasaki.

10 The message is incomplete. Apparently badly garbled.  
11 Presumably there had been prior discussion in this traffic  
12 which we had not read because of it not being picked up,  
13 or other reasons, concerning the movement of of the Secre-  
14 tary Terasaki.

15 This one that you have just read, of 5 December,  
16 apparently is a later message bearing on the subject of  
17 evacuation -- not evacuation but the transfer or movement  
18 of Terasaki and certain other people, and the officials.

19 Mr. Gearhart: I was merely asking you the possibility.  
20 I don't care to pursue it any further.

21 The Chairman: Is that all?

22 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

23 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

24 Senator Ferguson: Captain, I am not going to speak to  
25 you about the winds message for a while. We will take a



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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rest on that message.

Captain Kramer: Thank you, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I want to show you a message in Exhibit 1. No. 904, page 245. Are you familiar with that message?

Captain Kramer: I am, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When did you first see that message?

Captain Kramer: I believe on Saturday evening 6 December, 1941, sir. It was translated, as indicated at the bottom on the 6th of December.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Now, was that message delivered to the Secretary of the Navy and the President on the evening of the 6th?

Captain Kramer: I am quite certain, sir, that that was included in the folder delivered that night.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, just read that message, will you. I want to ask you some questions about it.

The Vice Chairman: Read it aloud for the record, Captain.

Captain Kramer: (Reading)

"From: Tokyo

"To: Washington

"December 6, 1941

"#904.



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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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"Re My #902

"There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or other person.

"Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy."

Senator Ferguson: Now, that message, "In re my #902" referred to the long diplomatic reply to Secretary Hulls message of the 26th?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What interpretation did you give this message that they were to use no typist on it, they were to do it personally, themselves, and to "be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy"?

I want you to consider that at the same time you had a pilot message indicating that this 902 was to be delivered when a certain time was given to them here in Washington.

How do you interpret this message?

Captain Kramer: I do not recollect precisely my reaction to this thing, sir. It was included, however, as I told you in the folders delivered that night with the first 13 parts of the note. I believe my reaction at the time was that the note itself was of a much more serious nature than previous notes forwarded to this country.

Senator Ferguson: You had read the 13 parts, had you?



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h15

1 Captain Kramer: I believe I had read part of the  
2 13 parts at the time this came in. I believe this came in  
3 while we were still writing up the 13 parts.

4 Senator Ferguson: Before they went to the White House  
5 had you read the 13 parts?

6 Captain Kramer: Before I went to the White House, I  
7 had, yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you come to the conclusion  
9 that the end had come as far as relations between the United  
10 States and Japan were concerned?

11 Captain Kramer: There was certainly a strong possi-  
12 bility of that, yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Just a possibility?

14 Captain Kramer: Well, perhaps a probability.

15 Senator Ferguson: Didn't this message, that they were  
16 to be sure and not use a typist or any other person on it,  
17 together with the pilot message, indicate to you that the  
18 time had come when negotiations were ended?

19 Captain Kramer: I believe my reaction at the time was,  
20 particularly after reading most of the note, that negotia-  
21 tions which had been going on were ended, yes, sir, but  
22 as regards the interpretation or construction to be put on  
23 this cautionary message, 904, the Japanese Embassy in  
24 Washington had previously in very strong language  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h16

1 been cautioned on security, particularly in the spring of  
2 1941 when quite categorical orders were sent from Tokyo  
3 to the Japanese ambassador in Washington that no one except  
4 himself and his Counsellor of Embassy was to handle a cer-  
5 tain code.

6 Senator Ferguson: Well, at one time the messages indi-  
7 cated that they knew that we were breaking their code; isn't  
8 that true?

9 Captain Kramer: As a result of their investigation  
10 in the spring of 1941, they concluded that we were reading  
11 something. We did not know, and do not know to this date  
12 what they found out at that time.

13 Senator Ferguson: I appreciate that, but you had  
14 indications that they knew that you were breaking the code  
15 and reading messages; isn't that true?

16 Captain Kramer: Breaking some code, yes, sir, because  
17 one of their messages so stated.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right.

19 Now, their method then, to keep you from, or to slow  
20 you down on reading their code, was to change the cipher,  
21 was it not?

22 Captain Kramer: Was to change a cipher they suspected  
23 our reading.

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes.  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

hl7

1 Captain Kramer: In that connection, sir, there were  
2 a number of incidents, not only during 1941, but during  
3 1940, when they cancelled codes arbitrarily as soon as  
4 they had the first inkling or suspicion that we were  
5 reading their code.

6 A code which we designated as AJ-12, in my recollec-  
7 tion, I have not seen the message since those days, I  
8 remember Japan cancelling arbitrarily, because as I recall  
9 that message, they suspected that the British and the Dutch  
10 I believe, were reading that system.

11 In, I think it was May of 1941, one of their systems,  
12 a naval system in this case, was compromised by a search  
13 of narcotic agents in San Francisco. Within 24 hours of  
14 the time that search was made, a report had been made to  
15 Tokyo about this search and Tokyo had issued instructions  
16 to cancel it at once.

17 Senator Ferguson: There is nothing unusual about the  
18 changing of ciphers so that someone can't read your code,  
19 is there?

20 Captain Kramer: Not at all, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: And that saves you at times changing  
22 your code book, isn't that true, by changing your cipher?

23 Captain Kramer: That was the usual practice.

24 Senator Ferguson: Then it takes some time to get back  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

hl8

1 into stride, as it were, to get the cipher, and then you  
2 can decode again, but if they change again on you, you  
3 have the same trouble; isn't that true?

4 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, I notice in reading your testi-  
6 mony of yesterday that you didn't mention this 904 as being  
7 taken to the White House and the Secretary of the Navy the  
8 night before.

9 Captain Kramer: I was not questioned on that point,  
10 sir. That night, however, there were probably five or six  
11 messages in the folders, distributed.

12 Senator Lucas: Will you tell us what five or six  
13 messages were in the folders the night you left the 13-parts  
14 at the White House?

15 Captain Kramer: This is the first time that question  
16 has been propounded, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, I am not going to repeat, if  
18 I can help it.

19 Captain Kramer: I would presume, without having made  
20 a study of this traffic to determine that point, that you  
21 ask, that my file numbers 7142 through 7149 were distributed  
22 that night.

23 Senator Ferguson: What book have you got? You are  
24 reading from another book?

25



h19

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Four one what?

Captain Kramer: I will correct that 7143, which was the note.

Senator Ferguson: That was the 13 parts?

Mr. Murphy: The JG number is at the bottom of the page.

Senator Ferguson: What other numbers -- 7144?

Captain Kramer: Presumably numbers 7143 through 7149, sir. I recall distinctly that one of the messages in that folder was on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit, or vice versa. I have made no study of this file to determine the particular point you are bringing up, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you have a conversation with the aide at the White House?

Captain Kramer: A brief one, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What was said?

Captain Kramer: The general tenor of our conversation was to the effect that there was something of high importance in that pouch, which the President should see as soon as possible.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall who the aide was?

Captain Kramer: I do not recall his name, sir, but it was one of the junior officers which Captain Beardall



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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had on duty in that office he set up.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether it was Schmidt?

Captain Kramer: I cannot be sure, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know a man named Schmidt?

Captain Kramer: I do not recall him now, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was he the same man as you delivered the 14th part and the one o'clock message to the following morning?

Captain Kramer: I again do not know who the man was. The delivery, however, was made to the Situation Room in the White House where these men were on watch.

Senator Ferguson: The Situation Room was merely a map room was it not?

Captain Kramer: A map room and a file of considerable classified material including dispatches from the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson: Wasn't this true, that that was one of the few times that you left a message there? As a rule you waited until it was read, did you not?

Captain Kramer: There were only two occasions, sir, one subsequent to Pearl Harbor, but one occasion prior to Pearl Harbor, when I took material directly into the President, and that occurred in the late summer or early fall of 1941. At other times delivery was made to the Naval



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h21

1  
Aide.

2           There was a short period during the summer when there  
3 was no Naval Aide, and Admiral McIntyre, the Surgeon General  
4 of the Navy, acted in that capacity.

5           Senator Ferguson: Well, now, what was the occasion  
6 that you took it in to the President personally?

7           Captain Kramer: I do not recall just what was in the  
8 dispatches, sir, but it was something bearing on these  
9 negotiations which I might characterize as "hot" and I  
10 felt the President should see at once, and Admiral McIntyre  
11 was not available to take charge of this particular pouch  
12 and I did not entrust it to Mr. Roosevelt's private secre-  
13 tary to take.

14           Senator Ferguson: Being that "hot" you can't recall  
15 it? As you say, it was so "hot" you wanted to take it  
16 in personally?

17           Captain Kramer: My principal purpose, Senator, was to  
18 see that the President got it promptly, and it was of  
19 sufficient importance to see that he did get it promptly.  
20 It probably concerned some negotiations to take place the  
21 following morning. That may have been the "hot" aspect  
22 of it.

23           Senator Ferguson: You didn't consider this 13th part  
24 as "hot" then, because you left that with an assistant;  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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is that true?

Captain Kramer: I believe I left that with an assistant, yes, sir, but I further stated during this brief conversation that I had learned in phoning to Admiral Wilkinson's home, that Admiral Beardall was there, and I stated that undoubtedly Admiral Beardall would check up later in the evening to see whether the President had yet received it, presuming that if he had not, Admiral Beardall himself would then come down to the White House to see that he did see it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you tell the aide that?

Captain Kramer: I did.

Senator Ferguson: So the aide was instructed that if he didn't get it to the President, that Admiral Beardall would check up later in the evening?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Have you ever learned as to whether or not Admiral Beardall did check up with the President as to whether or not he got that 13th part, and this 904?

Captain Kramer: I know, sir, only that I informed Admiral Beardall when I arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's home of the instructions I left with his assistant in the White House. I do not know what further action Admiral Beardall took.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You never learned later?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, there wasn't any doubt that Admiral Beardall was not the appraiser or the evaluator of these messages, the President received these messages and he evaluated them personally, so far as you know.

Captain Kramer: Presumably Admiral Beardall did do evaluating, but undoubtedly the President had evaluations from many other high officials too.

Senator Ferguson: Now, were these delivered to Beardall for the President, or to Beardall for Beardall? Who was getting these messages?

Captain Kramer: They were intended for the President, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Wasn't it your understanding that the President was personally receiving these raw messages to place his own evaluation on?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that was why you told the aide in charge on Saturday night, that he was to give it to him, and it was important and that you would speak to Beardall later about it?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, before you went to the White



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h24

1 House, did you telephone the White House?

2 Captain Kramer: No, sir, I did not. I had prior  
3 to setting up of that Situation Room. After that was set  
4 up, I knew it was manned 24 hours, there was no need to  
5 phone.

6 Senator Ferguson: So you went to the White House  
7 knowing that there would be someone in the map room, or  
8 Situation Room, and would see him without calling.

9 Now, who did you call before you left the Navy Depart-  
10 ment?

11 Captain Kramer: I attempted to call Admiral Stark's  
12 home, Admiral Turner's home. I didn't succeed in reaching  
13 either of those people. I called my own home, requested by  
14 wife to bring the car down to expedite delivery that night.

15 I called Captain McCollum at his home in Alexandria.

16 I called Secretary Knox's apartment at the Wardman  
17 Park Hotel. And after making all these calls, I then  
18 called Admiral Wilkinson to inform him of who I had been  
19 able to contact and what I proposed to do in the way of  
20 delivery.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral Stark, next to the  
22 President, was in charge in the Navy?

23 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: The Commander in Chief, and then  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h25

1

Admiral Stark?

2

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

3

Senator Ferguson: In the line of orders, the Secretary of the Navy came in between --

5

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

6

Senator Ferguson: In a certain way.

7

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

8

Senator Ferguson: But the highest ranking officer was Admiral Stark; is that correct?

10

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

11

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you know that the evaluation of these messages had been turned over to Admiral Turner's office and taken away from the Intelligence Branch? Did you know that?

12

13

14

15

Captain Kramer: I was unfamiliar with that, sir, until these hearings commenced.

17

18

Senator Ferguson: You didn't know it then, when you called Admiral Turner; is that correct?

19

20

Captain Kramer: On that particular point, yes, sir, that was my understanding.

21

22

Senator Ferguson: So, as I understand it, your office was fully alerted to war on the evening of the 6th of December, 1941?

23

24

25

Captain Kramer: I believe it was, sir. It was no



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h26

1 differently alerted, however, that it had been during a  
2 large part of the year of of 1941.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, when did the change in the  
4 kind of alert come in your office?

5 Captain Kramer: When the volume of this traffic,  
6 particularly with reference to the war in Europe and the  
7 negotiations of the United States --

8 Senator Ferguson: Do you include in the war in Europe  
9 the war in the Atlantic that we have heard here from the  
10 witness stand, about the undeclared war that started in  
11 August? Is that what you have reference to?

12 Captain Kramer: By the war in Europe, I refer speci-  
13 fically to the Tokyo-Berlin circuit and anything bearing  
14 on hostile action of the Germans and the Italians. That  
15 would include, of course, the war in the Atlantic, if  
16 anything came up in this traffic.

17 Senator Ferguson: If it came in on this same traffic?

18 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, from  
20 the testimony we have here now, that Admiral Turner's  
21 office had taken over the evaluation of these messages,  
22 his office was apparently not alerted for war on the night  
23 of the 6th, because you couldn't reach him; is that correct?

24 Captain Kramer: I am unfamiliar with that point, sir.  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Well, you couldn't reach him?

Captain Kramer: I could not reach him, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Where did you call?

Captain Kramer: His home.

Senator Ferguson: You had that telephone number?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And Admiral Stark, apparently his office was not alerted, because you couldn't reach him; is that correct?

Captain Kramer: I was unable to reach him, sir; that is all I can say.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You personally tried to call his home and you couldn't reach him?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did the telephone not answer or he was not there, which?

Captain Kramer: My recollection is that the telephone did not answer.

Senator Ferguson: The telephone did not answer. Did it answer at Admiral Turner's?

Captain Kramer: I believe the same thing in the case of Admiral Turner.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you try the Deputy, Ingersoll?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know any reason why you didn't call him? Hadn't it been your custom to deliver to Ingersoll if you couldn't reach Stark?

Captain Kramer: It had not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Had you ever delivered to Ingersoll?

Captain Kramer: On a few occasions when Admiral Stark was absent from his office and his flag secretary, Commander Wellborn, indicated that Admiral Ingersoll would probably want to see that right then, and because the flag secretary was busy at the moment with other paper work. Normally deliveries to Admiral Stark's office were made to Admiral

W. G. HODGKINS, JR., JUAN S. ORAW



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Stark's private secretary, his flag secretary, rather,  
2 Commander Wellborn, who got them to Admiral Stark, as well  
3 as the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll,  
4 as well as many of them to then Captain Schuirmann, head  
5 of the Central Division.

6 Sen. Ferguson: Did you try Admiral Stark's office  
7 that night?

8 Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Did it answer?

10 Captain Kramer: I do not believe it did, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Did you try Turner's office that  
12 night?

13 Captain Kramer: I tried those first before I tried  
14 their homes.

15 Senator Ferguson: And it didn't answer?

16 Captain Kramer: It did not, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: So there were two offices and their  
18 homes that were not alerted to war that evening as far as  
19 telephone communications were concerned?

20 Captain Kramer: On that interpretation of the alerting  
21 for war, sir, I know nothing about it. What provisions  
22 Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner had made in that regard  
23 I am not familiar with, only in a general way in that there  
24 were certain senior captains on duty at night in the Navy  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Department to take care of getting dispatches that might  
2 come into those officers.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you find any of these officers  
4 in charge to get these dispatches to that night?

5 Captain Kramer: Those officers, sir, on the watch list  
6 that I referred to included many captains, I believe certain  
7 admirals as well, who never had access to this decrypted  
8 material, and they were, therefore, never shown it, and  
9 would not be shown on that night.

10 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then as I understand  
11 it now, Opnav, Admiral Stark's office, could not be reached.  
12 His home couldn't be reached. The next in line, the War  
13 Plans, which was Operation at the time, couldn't be reached,  
14 and his home couldn't be reached, and there were no other  
15 officers assigned to which these important messages could  
16 be delivered?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, there were.

18 Senator Ferguson: Who were the officers?

19 Captain Kramer: Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of  
20 Naval Intelligence, whose prime responsibility it was to see  
21 that these things were delivered.

22 Senator Ferguson: All right.

23 Now, do I understand that you were not the man to  
24 deliver these messages but Wilkinson's duty was to make  
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

deliveries?

Captain Kramer: It was my responsibility as a subordinate of Admiral Wilkinson to make such deliveries as I was instructed to make.

Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand you conferred with Wilkinson and that it didn't reach anyone out of his office -- and he didn't have the authority, we have learned here, to evaluate these messages, they were to be delivered to War Plans for evaluation as far as the Navy was concerned, were they not?

Captain Kramer: I have stated I am unaware of what arrangements were made regarding evaluation. My position on that was that in carrying out the general instructions in effect to deliver this traffic to the normal recipients, in case I was unable to reach Admiral Wilkinson first, which was the normal procedure, that that particular night when I informed Admiral Wilkinson of who I had been able to reach and what I proposed to do, and further that later that night when I showed these things to Admiral Wilkinson, that if he decided further efforts should be made in reaching the Chief of Naval Operations that he would so instruct me.

His instructions to me were to have this material ready to deliver promptly early the following morning as soon as the Admiral reached his office.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1           Senator Ferguson: I understand then that you called  
2 Wilkinson before you called Stark and Turner?

3           Captain Kramer: I called Admiral Wilkinson last, sir.

4           Senator Ferguson: Last. Did you call him and tell  
5 him that you couldn't reach these two men or reach anyone  
6 in their offices?

7           Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

8           Senator Ferguson: And did he tell you to bring it out  
9 to his home?

10          Captain Kramer: He approved my proposed distribution  
11 first to the White House and then to Mr. Knox and then to  
12 his home.

13          Senator Ferguson: Now, did he say then that you were not  
14 to deliver to Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that night?  
15 You didn't try them again after that one call, did you?

16          Captain Kramer: No, sir.

17          Senator Ferguson: And what time would you say you  
18 called their homes?

19          Captain Kramer: It was within a few minutes of 9:00  
20 o'clock.

21          Senator Ferguson: Now, let's go to Mr. Knox. Did  
22 you call him on the phone and offer to deliver these messages,  
23 which included the one not to use any typist or any other person?  
24

25          Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, I did call his home.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1

Senator Ferguson: When you went there you found Mr.

2

Knox there?

3

Captain Kramer: I did, yes, sir.

4

Senator Ferguson: Did he read all of the information that was in your folder?

5

Captain Kramer: He did, sir.

6

Senator Ferguson: Did he remark anything, did he make any remarks to you?

7

Captain Kramer: There were some brief remarks and conversation, none that stands out in my mind, however.

8

9

Senator Ferguson: Was there anything said about evaluating these messages? That is, as far as Knox was concerned?

10

11

12

Captain Kramer: My recollection is that he agreed with the construction I had placed on it, that it aimed towards a conclusion of negotiations.

13

14

15

Senator Ferguson: Did you tell him that there was a 14th part yet to come?

16

17

Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

18

Senator Ferguson: And what other conversation had you on this 14th part?

19

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Captain Kramer: After he made his phone calls, apparently to Mr. Hull and Mr. Stimson, he instructed me to appear at the State Department the following morning by 10:00 o'clock,

21

22

23

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 when there would be a conference of the three Secretaries  
2 and to bring at that time the material I had just shown him,  
3 as well as the 14th part, and any other thing of that type  
4 which might have come in during the night up to the time that  
5 delivery was made at 10:00 o'clock.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any discussion with him  
7 that prior to the 14th part, or did you remind him that there  
8 had been a message which indicated it was to be delivered  
9 to the American Government at a certain time and that that  
10 time would come later, did you explain that to Mr. Knox?

11 Captain Kramer: I believe that message was also in the  
12 folder, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: The pilot message then was in the  
14 folder that you were delivering to the White House and to  
15 Knox?

16 Captain Kramer: I am quite certain it was, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, Admiral  
18 Stark didn't have this pilot message on Saturday at all, or  
19 he didn't have any of the 13 parts, or this message about  
20 the typing; is that true?

21 Captain Kramer: No, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: You say it is not true?

23 Captain Kramer: That is true, sir, he did not have it.

24 Senator Ferguson: And Turner had none of these messages?  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: So far as I am aware, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Because they hadn't been delivered, and you were the only one that had the pouches?

Captain Kramer: That was normally the case. However, it is possible that they would get delivery or at least see these things by other means, namely, the Director of Intelligence or Captain McCollum or possibly some officers, senior officers in the War Department.

Senator Ferguson: But as far as delivery was concerned they had not seen them?

Captain Kramer: So far as my delivery was concerned they had not.

Senator Ferguson: And you had no knowledge that they had seen them or had copies or you wouldn't have taken the trouble to deliver to them?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. I will take up later when these messages were received but I want to go along on this.

Did you hear Secretary Knox telephone?

Captain Kramer: I did not hear his phone conversation, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That I assume was in another room?

Captain Kramer: I believe it was in an adjacent room.

Senator Ferguson: In an adjacent room. When he came

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 came back he told you that he had arranged a conference with  
3 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy at the  
4 State Department with the Secretary of State at 10:00 o'clock  
5 on the following morning; is that correct?

6 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, did he tell you to bring the  
8 13-part message, the pilot message, and this typist message  
9 to the State Department at 10:00 o'clock?

10 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir; he told me to bring all the  
11 messages in that folder.

12 Senator Ferguson: And whatever came in that night?

13 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, then, I assume that you drove --  
15 is that all the conversation you had with Secretary Knox?

16 Captain Kramer: That was approximately the sum total  
17 of the sense of our conversations in private. There was  
18 a subsequent conversation for about 10 minutes in which  
19 Mrs. Knox and the business associate of Mr. Knox engaged.

20 Senator Ferguson: Did he ask you what your evaluation--  
21 by the way, you were in the Intelligence Branch of the  
22 Government?

23 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: And part of your job was to know  
25 all of the Intelligence and therefore have an overall view



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 of it to evaluate these things?

2 Captain Kramer: At that time I had a comparatively  
3 limited view, sir. Approximately two years before, when I  
4 was in charge of the Japanese desk in the Far East Branch  
5 of Naval Intelligence I had a much more comprehensive picture  
6 than I did at that time.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right. Who was the man in that  
8 Department or the Intelligence Branch that had the compre-  
9 hensive view and the overall view?

10 Captain Kramer: Captain McCollum, Admiral Wilkinson  
11 and presumably their seniors.

12 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Wilkinson had only been there,  
13 had never been in Intelligence before, he only came there  
14 October 15; isn't that true?

15 Captain Kramer: That is true as far as his arrival is  
16 concerned, sir. Just what his Intelligence background was  
17 I was and am unfamiliar with.

18 Senator Ferguson: Are you just assuming that he had  
19 the overall view of this?

20 Captain Kramer: It is my presumption that a Director  
21 of Naval Intelligence would have a much more comprehensive  
22 view than I had.

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes, even though he had only been  
24 there a month and a half?



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

2

Senator Ferguson: Now, you went down to Wilkinson's  
home, did you not?

3

4

Captain Kramer: Admiral Wilkinson's home, yes, sir.

5

Senator Ferguson: And you found there what officers?

6

7

Captain Kramer: The Naval Aide to the President, Beardall,  
Admiral Wilkinson, and, as my memory has been recently re-  
freshed, General Miles, the head of Military Intelligence.

8

9

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you really had Intelligence  
in one office, didn't you?

10

11

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir; one room.

12

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Senator Ferguson: One room. You had the top man in  
the Army, you had the top man in the Navy, and you had the  
top man in the White House, as far as Intelligence was con-  
cerned; isn't that true?

14

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Captain Kramer: I can say that is approximately true.

17

18

Senator Ferguson: That Army and Navy Intelligence for  
one time in one room; isn't that correct?

19

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

21

22

Senator Ferguson: And you had in a bag, in a brief case,  
a pilot message for delivery of a 14-part message, and you  
knew of the message between Tokyo and Berlin telling us  
that there was going to be war sooner than they would think  
between the Anglo-Saxons, meaning America and Britain, you

23

24

25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 had the 13th part of this message, and you have described  
2 what you thought of it, and you had this typist part and  
3 these other messages; is that correct?

4 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: You gentlemen took them out there  
6 and read them; is that correct?

7 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: I will ask you now, what was the  
9 conclusion of the Army and the Navy Intelligence after they  
10 read these various messages?

11 Captain Kramer: I cannot state what their conclusions  
12 were, what the conclusions they reached in their minds were,  
13 sir. There was some conversation --

14 Senator Ferguson: That is what I want, the conversation,  
15 and that will tell me what the attitude of mind was.

16 Captain Kramer: There were some conversations during  
17 that period in Admiral Wilkinson's home that I took part in.  
18 The general tenor of the conversations in which I took part  
19 was approximately as I have described in the case of  
20 Secretary Knox. There were other conversations at the side  
21 of the room one or two times, while I left that room to go  
22 out to my car where my wife was waiting, that I did not  
23 engage in.

24 Senator Ferguson: Well, let's keep to the part that  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 you were in. How long were you in this room with these  
2 gentlemen?

3 Captain Kramer: I should say approximately one-half  
4 hour before we all left that room and went to another room  
5 where a number of Admiral Wilkinson's dinner guests were.

6 Senator Ferguson: I assume that nothing was discussed  
7 there in relation to the message?

8 Captain Kramer: No, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: All right.

10 Now, I assume, and is it correct, that you told them  
11 that the Secretary of the Navy was the only man in the Navy  
12 outside of the President that you had been able to reach  
13 on these messages?

14 Captain Kramer: Except for the fact that I informed  
15 Admiral Wilkinson that I had phoned Captain McCollum about  
16 them.

17 Senator Ferguson: I will come back to get Captain  
18 McCollum's conversation with you later.

19 Now, did you tell them that Secretary Knox had arranged  
20 a meeting for the following morning at 10:00 o'clock with  
21 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State?

22 Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: And what was their reply and who  
24 replied to it?  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Captain Kramer: I do not recall the precise wording  
2 of their reply. Admiral Wilkinson, I believe, told me to  
3 be sure to be there on time, or something to that effect.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did he tell you that it would not  
5 be necessary for you to try later to get Stark?

6 Captain Kramer: My recollection is that I asked him  
7 about that point and I was not so instructed.

8 Senator Ferguson: What did he tell you?

9 Captain Kramer: He told me specifically to be sure  
10 to have those things ready for delivery to Admiral Stark  
11 as soon as he arrived in the office the following morning.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did he tell you not to bother him  
13 that night, it was late, and therefore you could give it  
14 to him the next morning?

15 Captain Kramer: I don't recall that he put it in so  
16 many words, sir, but that was the general effect of what  
17 he told me.

18 Senator Ferguson: Prior to that time did you know that  
19 Admiral Stark had not visited his office on Sunday?

20 Captain Kramer: I am uncertain of what Sundays Admiral  
21 Stark visited his office. He was there on some Sundays during  
22 1941. Other Sundays I know he was not because I made  
23 delivery to him at his home.

24 Senator Ferguson: What I am getting at is, you couldn't  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 reach him on the phone at night, and you had no knowledge  
2 that Wilkinson had reached him on the phone?  
3

4 Captain Kramer: I was under the impression that  
5 Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark that night, but that  
6 was only an impression.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right.

8 Now, he phoned him, and when he came back he said,  
9 "Deliver him the information tomorrow morning, he will come  
10 down to the office to get it?"

11 Captain Kramer: Admiral Wilkinson left that room on  
12 several occasions during the approximately half-hour while  
13 these officers were reading this material. I simply  
14 presumed that he may have made phone calls similarly to  
15 those made by Secretary Knox.

16 In any case, he instructed me to be sure that Admiral  
17 Stark saw them the first thing in the morning.

18 Hook  
19 follows



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Somehow Wilkinson knew that night and told you to deliver this to Admiral Stark the next morning at his office?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that is the reason that you paid no more attention to delivering it that night, and didn't try to deliver it that night?

Captain Kramer: That is not quite accurate, sir, in that the impression I had from the instructions and the conversations with Admiral Wilkinson were that no efforts to reach those officers that night were called for.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Then we come to the conclusion that one of the Intelligence officers, the top -- you told us Wilkinson was the top of the Evaluation Section because you didn't know that that had been taken away by Admiral Turner?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: He told you that these messages were not so important that they should receive attention that night? That was the substance of what he told you. It would be perfectly all right the next morning?

Captain Kramer: That is the substance, yes, sir. There was no evaluation or construction of that kind put on. I am referring in what I am saying simply to when I



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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was instructed to get them to Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson: You drew that conclusion from what he said after he read them?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: By the way, how did they read them? You had enough copies for all, and they sat there and read them, or did one read it aloud?

Captain Kramer: I believe I had two copies with me. I may have had three when I went to Admiral Wilkinson's home. I am sure I had two, and those three officers read them between them.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did each one sit and read them, or did someone read them aloud so they could all hear?

Captain Kramer: There was no reading aloud.

Senator Ferguson: So it was necessary that each one take them and read them?

Captain Kramer: I believe two of those individuals were reading one copy at certain parts of that half hour.

Senator Ferguson: Well, do I understand now that that wasn't of such importance that a man would sit and really read it, but that he would just look over the other man's shoulder and read part of it?

Captain Kramer: I believe all three of those officers



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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read every word appearing in that folder.

Senator Ferguson: All of the words in the folder?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did General Miles tell you anything about or comment in any way about these messages?

Captain Kramer: I have no recollection of anything General Miles may have stated. I could very well have informed Admiral Wilkinson at that time -- I believe I did inform him that all this traffic, specifically the note which we had been writing up, had been sent to the Army by nine o'clock.

I believed that Colonel Bratton knew about it. I presumed that as he always did in the past, that he was making his usual prompt deliveries of that material.

Senator Ferguson: And therefore you would assume that Colonel Bratton had delivered them the same as you were delivering them?

Captain Kramer: That was my presumption, yes, sir.

I have a distinct impression that Colonel Bratton knew about it that night. In fact, I even may have called him as I did on a number of occasions in the past to make sure that he had gotten something.

Senator Ferguson: Your best recollection is that you didn't want to scoop him on this delivery, that you called



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: There was no question of scooping,  
sir. Normally delivery was made about the same time  
by both Colonel Bratton and myself.5  
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Senator Ferguson: And you wanted that to continue  
so that they would be able to be delivered at the same  
time?8  
9  
Captain Kramer: Colonel Bratton had responsibility  
for delivering to different officials than I did, yes, sir.10  
11  
12  
Senator Ferguson: But you wanted to see that he could  
deliver them at the same time so there would be no change  
in time, one wouldn't get it before the other?13  
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Captain Kramer: I intended to make no reference or  
presumption to the time of delivery. My reference is  
simply to the fact that it is my distinct impression and  
was at that time that Colonel Bratton knew about it that  
night, and my presumption merely is that he was making his  
usual delivery.19  
20  
Senator Ferguson: Now, did you tell him that you  
were going to deliver that night?21  
22  
Captain Kramer: I may have said that if I phoned  
him, yes, sir.23  
24  
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Senator Ferguson: Now, I take it, because you were  
delivering at night, you were quite concerned with the



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 importance of these messages?

2 Captain Kramer: Of course I was concerned, yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: But that concern was not present  
4 with these three men at Wilkinson's home, because they  
5 then said, "Well, deliver them tomorrow morning. Be sure  
6 and be at the State Department at ten o'clock and see that  
7 Admiral Stark gets his in the morning;" is that correct?

8 Captain Kramer: I have another impression that point.

9 Senator Ferguson: Give it to us.

10 Captain Kramer: Concerning Admiral Wilkinson's re-  
11 action when I first phoned him, he was concerned that the  
12 President and Secretary Knox got it promptly.

13 Senator Ferguson: He was concerned that those two  
14 gentlemen get it promptly, but he wasn't so concerned about  
15 Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner getting it promptly?

16 Captain Kramer: What his concern was in that respect,  
17 I don't know, except as I can deduce.

18 Senator Ferguson: Would your deductbn be along that  
19 same line?

20 Captain Kramer: It would be that Admiral Wilkinson  
21 did not feel sufficiently concerned to instruct me to  
22 attempt further delivery to Admiral Stark that night, yes,  
23 sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: What did Admiral Wilkinson say to  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1 you about delivery to Admiral Turner?

2 Captain Kramer: The same thing applies to Admiral  
3 Turner as to Admiral Stark.

4 Senator Ferguson: He told you that?

5 Captain Kramer: That is my distinct recollection  
6 of the impression I had.

7 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether he tried to  
8 call Admiral Turner that night?

9 Captain Kramer: I do not know that he did, sir. It  
10 was my impression at the timethat he did make some phone  
11 calls.

12 I presume that a phone call would be made to Admiral  
13 Turner.

14 Senator Ferguson: The next morning did you deliver to  
15 Admiral Turner?

16 Captain Kramer: I don't believe that Admiral Turner  
17 first saw the material when I delivered it. I think Captain  
18 McCollum got it to him that morning.

19 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, you didn't follow out  
20 the instructions of Admiral Wilkinson to deliver to Admiral  
21 Turner immediately?

22 Captain Kramer: I was not instructed regarding Admiral  
23 Turner.

24 Senator Ferguson: I misunderstood you then.  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, that night Admiral Wilkinson did not tell you to deliver to Admiral Turner the next morning?

Captain Kramer: I have no recollection of any such instructions, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then the only one you were to deliver to was Admiral Stark?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir. However, I, of course, would continue efforts as soon as I arrived at the office the following morning to make delivery to Admiral Turner.

Senator Ferguson: Now, the next morning, as I understand it, you arrived at 7:30 in the morning?

Captain Kramer: Thereabouts, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And immediately, I assume, you got in touch with Admiral Stark's office?

Captain Kramer: I believe I phoned it shortly after that, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Who did you reach?

Captain Kramer: I don't recall reaching anyone, although I may have. In any case, Admiral Stark was not there on my first phone call, nor his Flag Secretary, with whom I could leave a pouch for Admiral Stark.







Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1

Senator Ferguson: And you therefore do not know the hour it was actually delivered?

2

3

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

4

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Senator Ferguson: But it would include all of these messages, pilot and the other 13-parts and the typist and the other messages?

6

7

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

8

9

Senator Ferguson: Then did you leave a copy for Admiral Turner?

10

11

Captain Kramer: I do not recollect that particular point, sir. I don't believe I left a copy for Admiral Turner with Captain McCollum. However, he could make use of one of the copies I did leave.

12

13

14

Senator Ferguson: Now, as I understand it, the so-called one o'clock message came in at 5 o'clock in the morning.

15

16

That is on page 248. I wish you would refer to that.

17

18

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

19

20

Senator Ferguson: Now, when we get a message from Tokyo to Washington and there is a date, is that the Tokyo date?

21

22

Captain McCollum: That is the Tokyo date, presumably, of its drafting, but certain the date of the cipher used to encode or encipher the message.

23

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Senator Ferguson; Yes.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Now, look at that message at the top of the page.  
 It says "To be handled in Government code." It  
 is No. 907.

"Re my #902."

So you could tell immediately it was in relation to  
 the 14 part message?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Shof fls  
3:25

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time."

So that made it so that there was to be a delivery to the United States, to the Secretary of State, on a Sunday at one o'clock.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: There wasn't any doubt about that.

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now I want you to look at page 249, the top message, from Tokyo to Washington December the 7th, 1941, "Extremely urgent." The other one was listed, 907, "Urgent, very important," but this is "Extremely urgent" and I will read it:

"After deciphering part 14 of my #902<sup>a</sup> and also #907<sup>b</sup>, 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine" --

you will notice it says, "the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents."

Now, I will ask you when that message was received and decoded?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Captain Kramer: I cannot state, sir, from first hand  
3 knowledge when it was received and when it was decoded. I do  
4 know that it was not received, or at least seen by me until  
5 about the middle of Sunday morning.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, what hour would that be?

7 Captain Kramer: I believe that this particular one, 910,  
8 which you read was seen by me first when I returned from my  
9 appointment at the State Department.

10 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand that it was seen at the  
11 same time as the one o'clock message?

12 Captain Kramer: That is my recollection, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, I have information here  
14 that a 910 and 907 -- 907, - there are two short messages I  
15 have just read, - was filed in Tokyo on 4:18 A.M. on the 7th  
16 of December. That is exhibit 41. It is page 248 of exhibit  
17 1. And it was intercepted in Japanese code by the Navy sta-  
18 tion at Bainbridge Island, Washington, at 4:35 A.M.

19 Captain Kramer: It says "4:37".

20 Senator Ferguson: And it appears in the testimony that  
21 it was in your possession at 5 o'clock in the morning. Now,  
22 going over to the next page;

23 "Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy" -- blank.

24 "Decoded by Navy" -- blank.

25 "Sent by Navy to Army SIS" -- blank.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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"Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy  
recode - December 7th."

How do you account for the fact that that very vital mes-  
sage that had an investigation by the Roberts Commission im-  
mediately following, that you could not get the time when that  
message was recoded so that it would be part of the files of  
the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer: I know nothing about the records kept on  
those times, sir. It was entirely outside the province of  
my section. Certain files in that regard were kept by the  
GY watch officers with which I have only a general acquaint-  
ance; certain other times I believe that time stamps were  
used by the Signal Intelligence section which I have no  
first-hand knowledge of.

Senator Ferguson: Whose duty was it to get that information  
and see that the time stamps were used on this kind of mater-  
ial?

Captain Kramer: I am not sure that the Navy ever used a  
time stamp. I know that the SIS did on certain things. The  
question of the keeping of a log on these incoming messages  
was, I presume, on Captain Safford's office orders or in-  
structions, the duty of Section GY and its watch officers.

Senator Ferguson: It was their duty to get that in-  
formation and put it there?



1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Captain Kramer: I am unfamiliar with what instructions  
3 were in effect in that regard.

4 Senator Ferguson: You don't know, all right.

5 Now, let us get to 910, this message about:

6 "Please destroy at once" -- "After deciphering part  
7 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please de-  
8 stroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine  
9 codes," and so forth.

10 Then after that is code destruction. That describes that  
11 message, doesn't it, on page 249 of exhibit 1?

12 "Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p.m. 7 December Tokyo  
13 time (N & A)."

14 What does that stand for?

15 Captain Kramer: What page are you on now?

16 Senator Ferguson: I am looking at -- I don't know whether  
17 you have got a copy of it. This has been furnished by the  
18 Navy.

19 Captain Kramer: (Reading) "Filed by the Japanese 6:44  
20 P.M." That is under No. 910, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes, No. 910.

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: What is the "N & A"?

24 Mr. Kaufman: "N" is Navy files and "A" is Army files.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, the next is 4:47 on the 7th. In



1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 other words, it came in at 4:44 and the one o'clock message  
3 came in at 4:18. (Reading)

4 "Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S  
5 (Bainbridge" -- that is the same one that intercepted  
6 907 -- "at 5:07 A.M. 7 December", and the other  
7 one was 4:37, so it is just thirty minutes apart.  
8 Then it says:

9 "Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)" -- blank.

10 "Decoded by Navy (A)" -- blank.

11 "Sent by Navy to Army SIS" -- blank.

12 "Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy  
13 decode (A) 7 December".

14 Now, your answer would be the same in relation to that?

15 Captain Kramer: Precisely, yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, you had a teletype to Bainbridge?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Therefore, these two messages -- and I  
19 assume that you alerted Bainbridge that you were looking for  
20 valuable information because you were looking for the four-  
21 teenth part, you were looking for the time of delivery; you  
22 had alerted them to that effect, had you not?

23 Captain Kramer: Any alerting that might have been done  
24 I am entirely unfamiliar with, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: And we have information here that it



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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was in the office at five o'clock. How do you account for the fact, if this office was alerted to war or near war, that those two messages were not immediately decoded and translated in the morning at five o'clock?

Captain Kramer: I cannot account for anything in that connection, sir. I would like to state, however, that these messages in general were handled far more promptly than was the normal course throughout early months and years. In the usual routine of handling messages for which we already had broken the cipher or code it was quite normal for a period of anywhere from four to six hours to several days to elapse before such message was processed, translated and disseminated. These particular messages were handled, in my opinion, extremely promptly by all hands. As regarding a precise time schedule on which piece of paper moved where, I am unfamiliar with that aspect of it.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what code those two messages were in? Were they in the same code?

Captain Kramer: I believe all these were in the so-called purple machine, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, it has been testified here that you found the key immediately, or at least you found the key on the sixth for this particular fourteenth part message and this code had a different key to it as far as



1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 ciphering was concerned and you had the code. Now, how long  
3 would it take you, the department, to decode those messages  
4 that contained three lines?

5 Captain Kramer: It probably would not take very long  
6 but there are a number of reasons why it might not be de-  
7 coded promptly. The machines we were using were constructed  
8 from a variety of manufactured parts. Our own machine in the  
9 Navy Department, - we had only one in the Navy -- broke  
10 down at various times and --

11 Senator Ferguson: Was it broken down this morning?

12 her--  
13 Shack  
14 fls

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: Not that I am aware of, sir. There were occasions when a particular key which we presumed we had recovered was inaccurate in some respects, maybe three or four letters in the whole key, were inaccurate, and therefore throughout the text of a message coming out of that machine there would be what appeared to be garbles appearing every three or four or six or eight letters, or oftener.

All of those aspects of it were purely within the province of GY.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Now, did you translate these two messages?

Captain Kramer: I am certain I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You are certain that you did not?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Can you give us any information as to how long it would take to translate those messages after they were decoded?

Captain Kramer: Messages of this length in Japanese text, provided there were no bad garbles in them, should not take more than a very few minutes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Fifteen minutes apiece?

Captain Kramer: Less than that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Less than that.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Now, if you were trying to find out in that department in connection with the receipt of these messages, if you wanted to find out just when they were received, how long it took to decode them, what the delay was, if any, and the time for deciphering them and translating them, whom would you call to this witness stand, if you wanted to get that information?

Captain Kramer: On those technicalities, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. They are not technicalities. It is information I am asking about.

Captain Kramer: I think Captain Safford would be fully competent on that point.

Senator Ferguson: And if he was not there that morning whom would you call?

Captain Kramer: I think further that any of the GY watch officers would be fully competent to give you full information in that respect, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I understand also that the watch officers that were on at that time -- that record is not in existence. Do you know anything about that?

Captain Kramer: I am entirely unfamiliar with that record, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know who was on that morning, whom we can call? That is what I am trying to get at.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1           Captain Kramer: I cannot recall the names of the  
2 watch officers that were on that Sunday morning. My  
3 impression is there was not only the regular one on, but  
4 there was another one.

5           Senator Ferguson: Who was the regular one?

6           Captain Kramer: I do not recollect who the particular  
7 one who was on that morning. Evidence has been presented  
8 here that Brotherhood was there. I have no first-hand  
9 recollecting on that point.

10          Senator Ferguson: Is he a decoder, or translator?

11          Captain Kramer: He was one of the watch officers,  
12 and was primarily a cryptanalyst, or decoder. He, however,  
13 had some familiarity with simple Japanese, particularly the  
14 Japanese appearing in these dispatches.

15          Senator Ferguson: Then he may have translated these  
16 two?

17          Captain Kramer: That is extremely doubtful, sir.  
18 His knowledge of Japanese would not have extended that  
19 far.

20          Mr. Murphy: Will, the Senator yield?

21          Senator Ferguson: Yes.

22          Mr. Murphy: I think you will find in the record he  
23 said around five in the morning he knew what was in it,  
24 but he was not positive. Then it waited in the Navy from  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1 then until morning, then it was sent from the Navy to  
2 the Army and then translated by the Army and then sent  
3 back to the Navy.

4 Senator Ferguson: It is possible, if we would get  
5 a sergeant in the Army or a yeoman in the Navy, we would  
6 get answers to some of these questions.

7 Captain Kramer: Senator, may I further possibly  
8 enlighten you on certain aspects of that? I do not know  
9 whether it has been brought out fully in previous testimony,  
10 at least I am unfamiliar with it.

11 I have indicated, already, I believe, the translator  
12 situation in effect that particular night, and the follow-  
13 ing morning in the Navy.

14 I would like to make further this point, however,  
15 that on the evening of 6 December, the Army Signal Intelli-  
16 gence Section instituted an overnight watch for the first  
17 time of translators. My distinct impression is that there  
18 were no Army translators there from the end of working  
19 hours shortly after Saturday noon, until around 6 that  
20 evening when that watch was to start. I am uncertain of  
21 the time, but in any case, there were translators on duty  
22 in the Army Signal Intelligence Section that night, a  
23 newly instituted watch. I was aware of that point, sir.

24  
25 I left instructions as I had frequently done, so in



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

1 the past with my watch officers to call me down if any-  
2 thing important came in which required the efforts of a  
3 translator.

4           Apparently -- this is purely my presumption -- the  
5 GY watch officer exercised some discretion on Sunday  
6 morning in not calling me, as he was instructed to, but  
7 sent certain of these dispatches over to the Army to be  
8 translated rather than calling me up, probably in view  
9 of the fact that I had been up quite late the night before  
10 and he knew I would be in quite early the following  
11 morning.

12           Senator Ferguson: I did not want this to be intended  
13 in any way as criticism of your actions.

14           Captain Kramer: No, sir. I was intending by my last  
15 statement to amplify some point that may not have been  
16 brought out here.

17           Senator Ferguson: You were one man that was apparently  
18 alert, as you worked until after midnight and you were in  
19 the next morning at 7:30.

20           Captain Kramer: I do not wish to create the impression  
21 I was any more alert than any other officers in those depart-  
22 ments.

23           Senator Ferguson: But you tell us this, that the Army  
24 was closed from noon until six o'clock on this important  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1 day of Saturday, the 6th of December, 1941, as far as  
2 interceptors, decoders, or translators, were concerned.

3 Captain Kramer: That is not correct, sir. I was  
4 referring purely to translators.

5 Senator Ferguson: Then I got the wrong impression.

6 Captain Kramer: That is simply my impression.

7 Senator Ferguson: The translators went home at noon?

8 Captain Kramer: I am not certain on that point, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: You stated that, did you not?

10 Captain Kramer: That was my impression.

11 Senator Ferguson: How many translators had they in  
12 the Army?

13 Captain Kramer: I do not know, sir. I think they  
14 had at least as many as we did.

15 Senator Ferguson: How many did you have?

16 Captain Kramer: I had six, three of which were highly  
17 competent, and three others of which were much less com-  
18 petent as regards the work of our office.

19 One was a top notch expert in Japanese, but was in  
20 training as far as the work of our office was concerned.

21 The other two were what I might term our weakest  
22 translators.

23 Senator Ferguson: We had 12 translators between the  
24 Army and Navy. How many decrypters and decoders were there  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

1 in your department in the Navy?

2 Captain Kramer: I have only a general knowledge  
3 of that, sir, nothing first hand. There are other officers  
4 who can give you precise information in that respect.

5 Senator Ferguson: Haven't you any idea how many we  
6 had?

7 Captain Kramer: My impression is that we had probably  
8 a dozen quite competent cryptanalysts on duty, and several  
9 dozen others of various degrees of competency, and in  
10 various states of training.

11 Senator Ferguson: And how many had the Army, if you  
12 know?

13 Captain Kramer: My general impression is that the  
14 Army establishment was approximately our size.

15 Senator Ferguson: That would be 24 or 25 decrypters,  
16 and so forth?

17 Captain Kramer: Cryptanalysts, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: And a dozen translators. I want you  
19 to tell me why they were not all on duty that night when  
20 you had these 13 parts and these other messages coming in,  
21 so that they would get them early in the morning.

22 Captain Kramer: Senator, the reason I did not specifi-  
23 cally order any of my translators -- in that connection I  
24 might point out too, that these translators were all  
25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 civil service personnel. There was no overtime pay in  
2 those days. Any extended hours which they worked was  
3 in effect a gift to the Government. Those translators,  
4 particular certain ones, worked a great many hours over-  
5 time on some occasions quite late into the night. I  
6 wanted to be certain that on Sunday we had competent  
7 translators available who had not worked all night the  
8 night before. That is the reason that I did not institute  
9 an overnight watch that night myself.

10 However, I, as I had frequently done in the past,  
11 left instructions I was to be called. I considered myself  
12 as an available translator who could arrive at the Navy  
13 Department within not over 10 minutes, probably less than  
14 that, of the time I received a phone call.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, that is the explanation of  
16 not having people work that night on this important occasion?

17 Captain Kramer: That is the explanation of why I had  
18 no Navy translator in my office all night that night, yes,  
19 sir.

20 In that connection, too, I might point out, Senator,  
21 there is one other aspect of that.

22 An institution of a 24-hour watch, with only three  
23 highly competent translators, meant that the talents of  
24 these highly competent individuals would be wasted for many  
25



h9

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 hours during periods of time when no traffic was coming  
3 in.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you know this, that  
5 on Saturday evening, when you had the 13 parts, and the  
6 14th part did not come in in the same intervals as the  
7 other parts, that they were greatly concerned about it?  
8 Did you know that?

9 Captain Kramer: I believe all recipients I delivered  
10 it to that night were greatly concerned, at least greatly  
11 interested in seeing that 14th part, yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: So the President of the United  
13 States, the Secretary of the Navy, the top of the Army  
14 and Navy being together, Wilkinson and Miles, were all  
15 greatly concerned about this 14-part message coming in  
16 and getting it immediately.

17 Now, we find that it came in intercepted in Japanese  
18 code by the Navy, Station S -- and, by the way, Station S  
19 had a teletype in it, and the teletype works in minutes,  
20 doesn't it?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. It takes time, however,  
22 to cut the ribbon for transmission.

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes. It came in from 3:05 to  
24 3:10 a.m. on December 7?

25 Captain Kramer: Which one?



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: That important message came in to the Navy. It was intercepted at that time, and again we come to the point that the time that it was teletyped from Japanese code in the Navy was blank. How do you account for that?

Captain Kramer: I cannot account for that. I have no first hand knowledge whatsoever of the details of filing and traffic logs kept by those GY and Signal Intelligence sections.

Senator Ferguson: As I understand it now, we had no one in the Navy Department as a translator from 12 o'clock at night until 7:30 when you got there?

Captain Kramer: Not actually present, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Not actually present.

Do you know of any decoders or decryptors present from 12 o'clock until you got there Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer: I know there was a 24-hour watch on, as there had been for many months in the Navy, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then it could have been decrypted but not decoded?

Captain Kramer: Decrypted.

Senator Ferguson: And not translated?

Captain Kramer: And decoded if it were in code, but not translated.



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h11

1

Senator Ferguson: All right.

2

Now, as I understand it, this message was in English.

3

Captain Kramer: Which message do you refer to?

4

Senator Ferguson: The 14-parts I am talking about,

5

902.

6

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, that is correct.

7

Senator Ferguson: But it did have to be decoded,

8

did it not?

9

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

10

Senator Ferguson: And decrypted?

11

Captain Kramer: I do not believe there was any coding.

12

It was purely a cipher; in other words, decrypted.

13

Senator Ferguson: When you broke the cipher, you had the English words, and they were in order?

15

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

16

Senator Ferguson: So that took less time, and you had the machine set up, as I understand it, so you had the key to these 13 parts, so you could get immediately the 14th part, isn't that right?

20

Captain Kramer: I believe they had those keys predicted, yes, sir.

22

Senator Ferguson: All right.

23

Now, there was no one there to translate, and in fact you did not need a translator for the 14th part, isn't

25



Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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that correct?

Captain Kramer: Not quite correct, sir.

There were introductory instructions. Probably the first three lines would have instructions in Japanese, but the main text of the 14th part of the note was in English, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was in English.

So the minute it was deciphered, it could be sent off to the White House and to the various departments; isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer: Not quite correct, sir.

AL  
fls

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