



**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14590
(716) 872-4503



**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques



© 1984

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur
- Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagée
- Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque
- Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur
- Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents
- Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion
along interior margin/
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la
distortion le long de la marge intérieure
- Blank leaves added during restoration may
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these
have been omitted from filming/
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées
lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte,
mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont
pas été filmées.
- Additional comments:/
Commentaires supplémentaires:

- Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur
- Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées
- Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- Pages detached/
Pages détachées
- Showthrough/
Transparence
- Quality of print varies/
Qualité inégale de l'impression
- Includes supplementary material/
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- Only edition available/
Seule édition disponible
- Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata
slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to
ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partiellement
obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure,
etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à
obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	14X	18X	22X	26X	30X
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12X	16X	20X	24X	28X	32X

The
to th

The
poss
of th
filmi

Orig
begin
the l
sion,
other
first
sion,
or ill

The l
shall
TINU
whic

Maps
differ
entire
begin
right
requir
metho

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



Douglas Library
Queen's University

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol \rightarrow (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ∇ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Douglas Library
Queen's University

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole \rightarrow signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ∇ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

F1028
1867M9

4

(From the Canadian Journal for January, 1867.)

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY: AN EXPOSITION AND CRITICISM.

BY THE REV. J. CLARK MURRAY,
PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, QUEEN'S COLLEGE, KINGSTON.

I. SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY.

I propose to present in this Journal a series of articles on Sir William Hamilton and his philosophy. Whatever value one may ascribe to the work which Sir William has performed in the world, it cannot be doubted that he is the representative of a very extensive philosophical school at the present day, and that for some time it will be required by friends and foes alike, that that school shall be estimated as it is represented in his writings. The philosophy, of which Hamilton is the most distinguished exponent, he regards as being identical, in its fundamental positions, with that which is known in our histories of philosophy as the *Scottish School*; and it is consequently of importance, if it be not absolutely necessary, in order to the scientific comprehension of Hamilton's philosophy itself, that it should be studied in its relation to the national philosophy of his country, of which it is ostensibly an exposition and defence. I shall

121230

accordingly endeavour to give, in the present article, such an outline of the Scottish philosophy in its history and its most prominent characteristics, as seems requisite for the explanation of Sir William Hamilton's speculations; and in doing so, I must of course limit myself exclusively to the most prominent of the problems on which these speculations touch.

The earliest impulse to philosophical speculation is probably to be traced in Scotland, as in most other countries in modern Europe, to the general intellectual revival which mingled, at one time as cause, at another as effect, with the reformation of the church in the 16th century. A powerful influence must have been exerted in the earlier part of the century by John Mair, especially through his opinions on civil and ecclesiastical polity,* which he had probably thought out when, as a student at the University of Paris, he became acquainted with the claims of the Gallican church, and which, it is equally probable; gave a direction to the lives of his pupils, Knox and Buchanan, as well as to the reform which they were the principal means of introducing. But in those departments of philosophy, in which the Scottish school became afterwards famous, Mair attained no emancipation from the traditional forms of thought whose trammels were beginning to be felt throughout Europe; and accordingly when the last quarter of the century opened, it was still an axiom in St. Andrew's, *Absurdum est dicere errasse Aristotelem*, which could not be questioned without a riot,* and the denial of which by the Principal in the University of Glasgow, was sure to excite, in one of the regents, disrespectful manifestations of ill temper.† The Principal of that University at the time was Andrew Melville. Melville had in earlier life attended the lectures of Ramus at the University of Paris, and not only his immediate assault on the dominant Aristotelianism in the Universities of his native country, but his whole teaching, as far as may be gathered from the text books which he introduced,* seems but the natural issue of the stimulus which he had received from the great leader of the revolt against Aristotelian authority in France. The learning and eloquence and argumentative ability, with which Melville led his successful inroad upon the old routine of thought in

* For these, see McCrie's *Life of Knox*.

* *Autobiography and Diary of Mr. James Melville*, pp. 123-4.

† *Ibid.*, p. 67.

* *Ibid.*, p. 49.

the Scotch Universities, originated a fresh educational power which had begun to attract even foreigners† to the then remote University of Glasgow; and a more intimate acquaintance with the period will only confirm the impression, that for Scotland a brilliant career in letters was being opened up,* such as her Southern sister had then already commenced, and such as she herself entered upon at once, whenever the cause was removed, which soon after this began to operate, and which rendered such a career impossible for her until she had done a century of other work more essential to her own existence, and also, it is believed, to the progress of civilization in the British islands.

It is no part of my task in this place to interpret the development of the Scottish mind in the seventeenth century; but even Mr. Buckle explains the limitation of its range during that period, as arising, not from an inherent impotence, but partly from the compulsory imprisonment of external circumstances, partly from the voluntary concentration of its powers on an unwearying revolt against political and ecclesiastical despotism. That such is the true explanation of the narrow space within which the Scottish mind moved during the century in question, becomes apparent from the results which immediately followed the Revolution of 1688. With the peaceful communication, which by this means was opened, between the north and the south of Britain, began that influence of the two nations on each other, which, after a few years, rendered their legislative union possible and which is now welding them into one. The literature of England thus found its way into Scotland, and the literary language of London soon became that of Edinburgh also. The Scotch, able once more to breathe freely, began to look abroad on what other nations had been doing, while they were absorbed in their long struggle for existence and for what was dearer to them than existence itself. Even in theology a freer range of thought was ventured upon: so conservative a churchman as Wodrow did not shrink from acquainting himself with the writings of Tindal and Collins, while he indicates the change which had come over the spirit of the Scottish.

† Ibid., p. 50. This work, to which I have referred several times, contains some valuable information regarding the condition of the Scottish Universities during the latter part of the 16th century. The author was a nephew of Andrew Melville, and was the first regent in Scotland who lectured on Aristotle's works, not from Latin translations, but from the original (p. 54.)

* See D. Stewart's *Dissertation*, p. 62, note.

Kirk by his alarm at "the notions getting into the heads of young preachers, that moral duties are preferable to positive, &c."* Already in the earlier years of the century there are not wanting indications of the first beginning of those efforts, which at a later period became more decided, to explain what had been deemed the peculiarities of Christianity in accordance with the natural course of mental and material phenomena. In this reawakening of the nation to questions, which it had been precluded from investigating by the circumstances of its history during the previous century, it was natural that the intensely theological bent, which had been already given to it by these circumstances, should direct its efforts still. It may be owing to this, that, as has been noticed by Cousin,† the most eminent guides of the new intellectual movement were connected professionally with the national church and that the speculations of the Scottish school, especially in moral philosophy, have uniformly shewn the high moral influence of the old presbyterianism, or, as Hamilton has expressed it, have been uniformly opposed to all destructive systems.‡

Meanwhile a change took place in the constitution of the Universities, the influence of which in the impulse given to science and philosophy has never, so far as I am aware, been noticed. This was the institution and endowment of professorships, and the consequent abolition of the practice in accordance with which each regent carried his set of pupils through the studies of the entire curriculum in Arts. The change had in fact to some extent been adopted in the University of Glasgow more than a century before, namely in 1576, under the Principalship of Andrew Melville,§ and was subsequently continued, as well as extended; || but its advantages were in a large measure annihilated by the circumstance, that the salaries attached to the several professorships were on a graduated scale, and that when, any of the higher became vacant, the occupants of the less lucrative were advanced.** It was not however till the year 1708 that the old system was abandoned in Edinburgh; †† and the first appointment, under the

*Wodrow's *Correspondence*, Vol. III, p. 470.

†*Philosophie Ecossaise*, pp. 18-19 (3me. ed.)

‡*Lectures on Metaphysics*, Appendix B. (c.)

§*Autobiography and Diary of J. Melville*, p. 54.

||*Reid's Account of the University of Glasgow* in Hamilton's edition of his Works, p. 729.

***Ibid*, p. 730.

††*Bower's History of the University of Edinburgh*, Vol. II., pp. 71-2.

new system, to the chair of Moral Philosophy did not take place till 1729, to that of Logic and Metaphysics not till the following year. In Aberdeen the old system was continued even in 1732, when Dr. Reid was elected Professor of *Philosophy* and in discharge of its duties required to teach Mathematics and Physics, as well as Logic and Ethics.*

The first professor appointed under the new system to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh was Dr. John Stevenson, to whom an honourable place should be assigned among the earlier originators of the philosophical inquiry, which the introduction of that system assisted in advancing. It is not indeed for the contributions which his own speculations have given to the philosophy of Scotland, that he is here brought into prominence; but his influence as a teacher in awakening and unfolding the philosophical spirit in others is spoken of by such pupils as Robertson and Stewart so highly, that one cannot but wish to know more of him than is contained in the slender notices which have come down to us.

In the same year in which Stevenson entered upon his labours in Edinburgh, a man of greater importance both for the results of his speculations, and for his influence as a philosophical teacher, commenced his career as professor of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Francis Hutcheson is rightly regarded by nearly all historians of philosophy as the true originator of the Scottish School. Undoubtedly his claim to this position is founded in a considerable measure on the influence which he exerted in directing inquiry towards mental phenomena in general; but we shall afterwards see how largely the distinctive doctrine of the Scottish school is indebted to the most prominent doctrine of his system,—the theory of internal senses whose affections furnish the mind with ideas as peculiar and indecomposable as those with which we are furnished by the affections of the external or bodily senses.†

We are now to trace the course through which speculation was led to the position it assumed in the Scottish school. From the opening of intercourse with England, the Scotch professors seem to have kept their students abreast of the most recent English specula-

*Stewart's *Account of Reid* in Hamilton's edition of Stewart's Works, Vol. X., p. 253.

†The fullest information about Stevenson that I have met with is in Bower's *History of the University of Edinburgh*, Vol. II., pp. 269-271.

‡See Reid's *Intellectual Powers*, Essay VI., Chap. 2.

tions. The writings of Hobbes and of his immediate antagonists came too soon to produce any appreciable influence in Scotland, or at least their influence was interrupted by that of a work which has created a more prominent epoch in the history of philosophy. It is from Locke's *Essay concerning Human understanding* and the consequences to which its doctrines were reduced by others, that we must trace the most important philosophical systems which have since prevailed in France and Germany, as well as in Britain. During the earlier part of last century the doctrines of the *Essay* formed the basis of the principal philosophical teaching in the Scottish Universities; the abridgement by Bishop Wynne was a favourite text-book, and the *Elements of Logic* by Professor William Duncan of Aberdeen is also a mere summary of Locke.*

But, in the transition from Locke to the speculations of Scotland, we may not omit a philosopher, who has not, indeed, received the same prominent position in our histories of philosophy, because his doctrines are only now exerting their just influence by being only now interpreted correctly, but who appears to me to have at once displayed keener philosophical insight, and attained more nearly the true theory of knowledge, as well as the true theory of existence. In Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision*, which was published in 1709, if it be carefully read, there will be found rising to explicit statement at times an implied theory of perception, not by sight alone, but by all the senses; the theory, in fact, which was more fully explained in the *Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and which received its most perfect form in the *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). The received interpretation of this theory, which became afterwards prevalent in the Scottish school, regards it as a reduction of Locke's theory to partial scepticism—to scepticism concerning the reality of material things. I cannot but maintain that few, who read the bishop's writings afresh in the light of more recent speculations, will rise from their perusal with any such interpretation of their drift. What the drift of his teaching is, it must require considerable time, in the face of such long-established misapprehension, to explain; still, in the few sentences which the brevity of this sketch allows me for such a purpose, I must endeavour to indicate, at least in general, the meaning I attach to his theory.

To interpret the theory, especially in so far as the interpretation of

*Veitch's *Memoir of D. Stewart*, p. 25, note.

it depends on the interpretation of the language in which it is delivered, we must go back upon Locke's *Essay*, which determined the terminology and phraseology of philosophical writings for a long time, both in England and in France. The problem of Locke's work, as its title implies, is a scientific explanation of human understanding; and this problem is reduced to the question, What is the origin of human understanding, or, in other words, of human knowledge? In the solution, which the *Essay* gives, of this problem, human knowledge is explained as originated exclusively by the action of the phenomena which are presented to the mind from the period of birth onwards, none of these phenomena being admitted to have had any prior existence involved in the nature of the mind. Now, the phenomena which are presented in human knowledge, and which, therefore, form the immediate objects of the mind when it knows, Locke named *ideas*.* It will thus be seen how the problem of the *Essay* came to be expressed in the question, What is the origin of our ideas? and this became the form in which the problem of philosophy continued to be studied in the school of Locke. It is not necessary here even to touch upon the detailed analysis of our ideas, into which the *Essay* enters with the view of vindicating its theory regarding their origin; but it is necessary to notice the fact, that ideas, or the immediate objects of knowledge, though, of course, *existing as ideas*, are still regarded as only in some way revealing to us *real existence* which can never itself be known. Now, in the light of this philosophy and its phraseology, the doctrine of Berkeley must be recognised as bearing a very different significance from that which is usually ascribed to it. There are, at least, three points in his doctrine, which I am confident that an examination of the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* will confirm at every page.

1. Berkeley maintained the common belief of men, that sensible things, that is, the things which form the immediate objects of perception, really exist, and are not, as most of philosophers maintain, merely images of a real world, which we do not and cannot perceive.

2. But the question with Berkeley is strictly not whether sensible things really exist, or not; but what is meant by saying that they exist really? Now, according to the common doctrine of philosophers, which Berkeley combats, the real existence, which we ascribe to the material universe, is predicable not of the things which we

* See *Essay*, Book II., chap. 1, sec. 1.

know by the senses, but only of a material substance, which these things represent, though, in itself, it can never be known by the senses or by any other means. These things, however, which we know by the senses, but which merely represent to us real existence, were, as we have already seen, called *ideas* in the philosophy prevalent at Berkeley's time; yet, in spite of this unfortunate fact, it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that, regarding the reality of his opposition to the theory of representative perception, there is not a shadow of the doubt from which Sir William Hamilton acknowledges himself unable to clear the language of Reid. "These ideas, as you call them," his language repeatedly and explicitly insists, "these things which we see and touch, you may call them by whatever name you please, are not mere images; they are not the mere show of a world, but the real material world itself, and the only material world that really exists: for that unknown, and unknowable, and unthinkable world, of which you say the world we know is but a phantasm—it is that world which is a phantasm; the result of your own fantastic speculations, with which you puzzle yourselves and your followers." Berkeley, therefore, does not seek to explain the material world, which we know, by supposing the existence of another world, about which we know and can know nothing.

3. What, then, is the explanation which Berkeley gives of the existence which we attribute to material things? According to him, since a thing exists for us only inasmuch as we know it, its very existence, so far as we are concerned, consists in our knowledge of it. The existence of anything independent on me must, therefore, he concludes, be merely the fact that it is known by some other mind; and, consequently, the material universe, as it does not depend for its existence on human, finite minds, must be known by an Universal and Everlasting Mind.

Berkeley brings us, naturally, to the speculations of the Scottish school, not merely because it was necessary to go back upon him to find the originating influence of these speculations, but also because we must go to Scotland to follow the history of the Berkeleyan philosophy. It is fortunate that Dugald Stewart has preserved to us, on the authority of his teacher, Professor Stevenson, the most valuable evidence we possess of the extent to which the doctrines of Berkeley were studied, and studied sympathisingly, among his younger contemporaries in Scotland. The evidence, to which I refer, is the fact, that a number of young men in Edinburgh had formed a club for the pur-

pose
with
theo
the
gent
else
men
one
men
tion
ister
capi
the
try.

T
fess
Hon
year
thou
Eur
and
mat
Flec
soph
year
Nat
trin
thei
in t
the
hav
visi
latt
mo
I
ma
—
t
D.
t
t

pose of studying Berkeley's writings, that they had corresponded with him in order to obtain further explanations regarding his theory, and that he had spoken of them as evincing a more intelligent comprehension of his argument than he had met with anywhere else.* The only person, whom Stewart mentions as having been a member of the club, is the Rev. Dr. Wallace, who is well-known as one of the earliest writers on the theory of population, and is still remembered, in the church of his native country, for the wise application of his economical studies in the origination of the Scottish Ministers' Widows' and Orphans' Fund. While this was going on in the capital, traces more distinct may be discovered of the influence which the Irish bishop's writings were exerting in other parts of the country.

Two or three years before Hutcheson had begun his career as professor in Glasgow, a younger son in the family of the Humes (or Homes), of Ninewells, in Berwickshire, though scarcely over sixteen years of age,† was schooling himself into habits of speculative thought, by which he was to create a new era in the philosophy of Europe. After abandoning, from disinclination, the study of law, and trying, for a few months, a mercantile life in Bristol, he ultimately retired, for about three years, to Rheims, and afterwards to La Fleche, in Anjou, with the view of devoting himself entirely to philosophical and literary pursuits. While he was still but twenty-six years of age, he returned to London, with the *Treatise of Human Nature* ready to be put into the printer's hands. Though the doctrines of the *Treatise* were afterwards recast and its author objects to their being judged in their earlier form,‡ there can be no doubt it is in this form that they have acquired historical importance and are, therefore, to be considered at present. Moreover, I know none who have not felt disappointment on turning from the *Treatise* to its revision—none who have not found in the former, rather than in the latter, the power which has revolutionised the speculative opinions of modern Europe.

Hume starts with the same question, with which Locke's *Essay* is mainly occupied, "What is the origin of ideas?" § Hume's answer

* Stewart's *Dissertation*, pp. 350-1 (Hamilton's edition).

† See the *Letter to Michael Ramsay*, in Burton's *Life and Correspondence of D. Hume*, Vol. I., pp. 12-16.

‡ See Advertisement to his *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

§ See the *Treatise*, Book I., Chap. I., Sect. 1.; and the *Inquiry*, Sect. 2.

is, also, in the main, identical with that of Locke; but the conclusions which he draws with regard to our most important ideas, as well as with regard to the nature of ideas in general, from his analysis of their origin, diverge as widely as is conceivable from the conclusions of the corresponding analysis in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Setting out with the theory, that all ideas originate in the experience of each human organism from the commencement of its existence, or at least from the commencement of the consciousness associated with it, he refuses to recognise in any idea a single element which cannot be traced to this origin; and there is no belief exalted to so lofty a height in human reverence, that he fears to direct against it the assaults which logically issue from his theory, nor does he weary in piling argument upon argument if he hopes to succeed in dethroning it from the eminence which he believes it to have usurped. There was much in the character of the man who undertook this Titanic task, which qualified him for carrying it out. The retirement of his early life, and the thoughts with which his early studies constantly occupied his mind, combined probably with the peculiarities of his physical temperament* to create in his very boyhood a wish to "fortify himself with reflections against death, and poverty, and shame, and all the other calamities of life;"† and the result of this may be observed in an inability to appreciate the passionate enthusiasm which has carried many to their noblest deeds, as well as in a distaste, if not an incapacity, for those feverish longings and endeavours which trouble the lives of men who are driven into the struggle of human existence by the tyranny of external circumstances or by the equally resistless tyranny of nervous irritability. With all this there was a native kindliness of disposition, a humility under his own speculative convictions regarding the littleness of human reason and its liability to error, which produced in him such an indifference to varieties of opinion, such an absence of pugnacious dogmatism and even such a generosity towards antagonists,‡ as have been reached by few. When such a character was united to an intellect which saw from afar the dim terminations in which all lines of thought inevitably end, which untied with delicate touch the most complicated knots of speculation,

*See the remarkable letter to a physician in Burton's *Life and Correspondence of D. Hume*, Vol. I., pp. 30-38.

† *Ibid.*

‡See his letter to Reid, with Reid's reply, in Burton's *Life and Correspondence of D. Hume*, Vol. II., pp. 153-6.

which
cities
conseq
unfold
human

The
origin
ces of
recogn
imme
among
a you
contat
upon
to see
that
existe
senten
unkno
they
two
conce
the e
mind
and
finish
effort
origin

Th
sever
whic
unsh
have
follow
ideas
acute

• L

†B

‡S

My r

which wrought into luminous language the most intractable eccentricities of scepticism, we can understand how the farthest andallest consequences of the doctrine which traces all ideas to experience were unfolded with a consistency which was deterred by no consideration of human interests, whether esteemed to be petty or lofty alike.

There is of course much in Hume's, as in every creative mind, the origin of which the most elaborate investigation into the circumstances of his life leaves us unable to trace; still it is impossible to avoid recognising the influence of the philosopher who has been mentioned immediately before him and whom we know to have been a power among the thinking young men of Scotland while Hume was still a young man. The evidence, which the *Treatise of Human Nature* contains, of the general "impression that Berkeley's writings left upon Hume," has been noticed by Dugald Stewart;* and we are now to see that the bishop's philosophy furnishes a point of transition to that of the sceptic. The theory of the former, which ascribes real existence to the sensible objects or "ideas" that are immediately presented to the mind, and denies that they represent any unknown and unknowable substance, is adopted likewise by the latter; but whenever they come to define what is implied in *existence*, they diverge into two theories of the universe as hopelessly irreconcilable as could be conceived. For while the bishop maintains that the natural belief in the existence of things, independently of their being perceived by our minds is valid, and explains that as being an existence in the Eternal and Universal Mind who knows all things, one of the most elaborately finished sections† in the whole of the *Treatise* is occupied with an effort to prove that the belief is altogether illusory and to explain the origin of the illusion.

This divergence in the interpretation, which the two speculations severally give to the existence of matter, arose from another difference which reveals more fully the thorough consistency at which Hume unshrinkingly aimed. If *matter* is but a system of "ideas" which have no existence beyond the mind that perceives them, what must follow with regard to *mind*? Is it also "only a system of floating ideas without any substance to support them?" Berkeley was too acute not to see, too honest not to face this question;‡ and his

* *Dissertation*, p. 351 (Hamilton's Edition.)

† Book I, chap. 4, sect 2. Cf., Book I, chap. 2, sect 6.

‡ See the third Dialogue in Wright's edition of his works, Vol. I., pp. 203-4. My references are all to this edition.

answer is well worthy of consideration by those who would comprehend his theory. To Hume the same problem presented itself, but met with a very different solution. According to his theory regarding the origin of mental phenomena, these are all, to use his own language, either *impressions* or *ideas*, or, to use language which he might have adopted if he had not been too timid in departing from that of ordinary literature, *presentations* or *representations*. Still further, according to that theory, our representations can never contain any element which has not been first given in a presentation; and therefore any idea or representation which we form of existence must be derived from some impression or presentation. But there is no presentation of existence as an object of knowledge, uniformly accompanying the presentation of those objects to which we attribute existence; and consequently, "the idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. Any idea, therefore, we please to form is the idea of a being, and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form." Accordingly, "we can never conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared within the narrow compass of our own minds."* But our minds themselves? It is evident that "what we call a *mind* is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity."† I shall not here anticipate a criticism that will more appropriately arise at a subsequent part of these discussions, when we shall find the similarity between the theory of Hume and the latest form of empiricism in their explanation of all known existence as a series of presentations and representations.

When the *Treatise of Human Nature* appeared in 1739, Thomas Reid, who was a year older than Hume, had been already two years a clergyman of the Scotch church in the parish of New Machar in Aberdeenshire. Descended on the father's side from a family, which for some generations had been distinguished in the literature and in the learned professions, especially in the church, of Scotland; on the mother's side, a nephew of David Gregory, the celebrated Savilian professor of Astronomy at Oxford and personal friend of Sir Isaac Newton, Reid continued to follow his ancestral scientific tastes with

* *Treatise*, Book I., Chap. 2, Sec. 6.

† *Ibid.*, Book I., Chap. 4, Sec. 2.

the modesty, with the reverence for traditional modes of thought and life, which one should expect in the character of a conscientious and benevolent country clergyman. This is not the place to attempt a mediation between the opposite extremes in the estimate of Reid, which have been maintained even in recent times by Hamilton and Cousin on the one hand, by Ferrier and Buckle on the other. In his quiet observation of such phenomena as his range of inquiry brought within his reach, in his unpretending classifications of such as he observed, in his timid groping after inferences which his observations seemed to legitimate, there was no danger of falling into those extravagancies in which the flights of genius are doomed to land, often, like that of Icarus, from the very height to which they rise; but he would probably have accepted, as but a dubious compliment, the ascription to him of those sublime anticipations, which direct the labours of subsequent inquirers till they are established in literal accordance with the rules of scientific induction.*

Dr. Reid, in a well known letter to Dr. Gregory, (20th August, 1790), acknowledges that the discovery of the fundamental and distinctive principle of his philosophy was owing more to Berkeley and Hume than to himself.† From the evidence already adduced of the influence which Berkeley's writings had exerted in Scotland while Reid was still a young man, we are not surprised to learn, as we do from the philosopher himself,‡ that he had at one time adopted the whole of the idealist's theory. According to the same account, it was not till the conclusions of Hume's *Treatise*, "which gave him more uneasiness than the want of a material world," were seen to follow inevitably from the principle on which idealism is built, that he was arrested to question whether that principle is not an unfounded hypothesis.§ The principle referred to is that which Reid supposed to be the universal opinion of philosophers, that "the only objects of thought are *ideas* or *images in the mind*;" and he claims for himself nothing that is strictly his own in philosophy, except his having called this hypothesis in question.* We shall have to consider immediately whether Reid was correct in selecting this as the fundamental peculiarity of his philosophy; but there will be seen to be little

*See *Intellectual Powers*, Essay I., Chap. 3.

†Stewart's *Account of Reid*, p. 22, a (Hamilton's edition of Reid's Works.)

‡Works, p. 283.

§See the above mentioned letter to Dr. Gregory.

room for doubt, that he is mistaken in supposing the doctrine selected to be distinctive of his system even among those of which he intended his own to be a critique, or that, except in one aspect, it is distinguishable from the doctrine of Berkeley, against which he believed it to contain a successful polemic.

To explain, it must be observed that the doctrine referred to may be regarded both as a theory of knowledge and as a theory of existence. As a theory of knowledge, it maintains that the immediate objects of perception are not mere "ideas or images in the mind" of objects that exist really or out of the mind, but these really existent objects themselves. The *Three Dialogues* of Berkeley, however, maintain exactly the same theory in the different language enforced by their different point of view. For the idealist denominates the immediate objects of perception by the term current among philosophers; the realist, by the term current among ordinary men, or in the language of *common sense*. But the idealist himself acknowledges the revolt of natural feeling against his theory, arising from the awkwardness enforced by the technical language of philosophers, which obliged him to speak of the immediate objects of perception as *ideas*, and not as *things*; * and the statement, that the immediate objects of perception are not the mere images of an unknown existence, but exist really themselves, would undoubtedly have been accepted by both philosophers, as expressing their theory of knowledge in contradistinction from the theories which they opposed.

Though the doctrine of Berkeley and that of Reid, considered as theories of knowledge, may thus be regarded as coincident, as theories of existence they appear, at first thought, to diverge in widely opposite directions; but it is impossible, on second thought, to say how far this apparent divergence would have been found to be real, if the true meaning of Berkeley had been explained to Reid. For I can find no evidence that Reid had ever clearly proposed to himself the question, in answering which his doctrine seems to diverge from that of Berkeley. His polemic against Berkeley consists mainly in an appeal to the natural and necessary belief of mankind, that the objects which we perceive exist really—that they exist beyond the mind which perceives them; but we have already seen that the credibility of that belief is asserted quite as unmistakably by Berkeley—that he only refuses to accept it without a scientific explanation of its mean-

* Berkeley's Works, Vol. I., p. 206.

ing. His explanation, as we have further seen, is that the belief in the real existence of the objects of perception is only the belief that they are really perceived, and that the belief in their existence beyond our minds, is simply the belief that they are perceived by another mind, or by other minds: their existence, therefore, according to him, consists in the perception of them by some mind; and he is consequently content to speak of them as *ideas*, which have no existence but in a mind. It is difficult to explain the shock which this language created among Berkeley's antagonists, except by supposing that they understood the preposition *in* as expressing some kind of relation in place; it is more difficult to conceive what mental fact they understood it to denote, and most difficult of all to believe that they had paid any attention to his own explanation, in accordance with which *to exist in a mind* and *to be known by a mind* are convertible phrases*. If this explanation had been noticed by Reid, it is scarcely possible to believe that he could have placed himself in the unmitigated antagonism, which he assumed, towards Berkeley; for the faith in a Primordial and Universal Mind involves the admission that nothing exists which is not also known, or, in other words, that everything exists in that Mind. Does the hostility between Berkeley and Reid thus resolve itself wholly into a difference about the meaning of words? There still remains one point at which the two doctrines seem to come into distinct collision; for, while the Scottish philosopher regards the material objects presented to the senses as being the qualities of a substance which is not known by us,† but is, of course, known by the Omniscient, the Irish philosopher protests against the hypothesis of such an unknown substance, as not only unnecessary to explain the phenomena of knowledge, but as contradicting its essential conditions.

I have already hinted the possibility of a doubt whether Reid has hit upon the really fundamental principle of his philosophy, when he elevates to that position his discovery, that the theory of perception by means of *ideas* is without any ground in fact. I believe the historian of philosophy must decide that such a principle should be recognised in Reid's antagonism, not to the "ideal theory," as he calls it, but to the empirical theory regarding the origin of knowledge. Whatever opinion may be formed of his opposition to the latter theory,

* Works, Vol. I. p. 204.

† *Intellectual Powers*, Essay II., chap. 19.

it is that which distinguishes his place in the development of British speculation and gives his philosophy an importance it never could have derived from the principle which he regarded as its distinctive peculiarity. For as the growth of philosophical speculation unfolds into clearer prominence the real meaning of the problems which it has to solve, it will be found that the conclusions of philosophers regarding the principle involved in the "ideal theory" must depend on their conclusions regarding the origin of our knowledge. There is not here space for an explanation and proof of the above statement; but it may be sufficient in the present connection to notice the fact, that in disproving the "ideal theory" Reid himself is obliged to adduce beliefs which he regards as originated by the very constitution of our minds, and as therefore having an origin prior to experience. It is in this connection that the doctrine of Hutcheson, with regard to internal senses, assumes historical importance as having possibly suggested the general name of *common sense* for the source of those beliefs which are common to all mankind and are considered capable of explanation only as original and compulsory issues of intelligence. Moreover the statement I have made regarding the actual fundamental principle of Reid acquires additional confirmation, from the fact that the Scottish philosophy, of which he is regarded as the chief representative, is, when named after its distinctive characteristic, usually designated *the philosophy of common sense*.

While a correct historical estimate of Reid's philosophy thus seems forced to raise into special prominence his assertion, for some of the elements which constitute human knowledge, of an existence independent on experience, it is scarcely possible to avoid surprise at the slender grasp with which he holds this principle and the unskillful manner in which he applies it in his explanation of the mental phenomena. This may indeed be partly accounted for by the fact, already mentioned, that he was ignorant of the prominence due to this doctrine of his system; but it also arose from his never having clearly apprehended any criterion, by which the *a priori* facts in consciousness could be readily recognised. For although Sir William Hamilton gives Reid the credit of having discovered such a criterion of these facts in their *necessity*,* yet not only are Reid's references to this characteristic so incidental as to afford no ground for believing that he recognised it as *the* criterion, but his doctrine of first princi-

* *Reid's Works*, p. 323 a, note; and *Lectures on Metaphysics* Vol II, p. 359.

ples is
differ
useles
Reid.

Acco
reason
truth
must
inferre
others
do not
Self-e
ciples.
what
wheth
are tr
charac
thus p
to be
with t
ration
no me
sages
recolle
459 an
dences
the tw
cause,
marks
that a
fore t
ductio
siderat
as the
not se
princi
necess
two cl

†*Inte*

ples is such as must have led him to deny that necessity is their differentiating attribute. A brief glance at this doctrine may not be useless in enabling us more correctly to interpret the philosophy of Reid.

According to this doctrine,† *first principles* are those which all reasoning in the last appeal implies, inasmuch as the inference of one truth from another cannot have proceeded without a beginning, but must have started from some truth or truths which are not themselves inferred from any prior truth. Such truths, as being prior to all others in human knowledge, are called *first principles*; and since they do not draw their evidence from others, must contain it in themselves. *Self-evidence* is therefore the distinctive characteristic of first principles. There is, however, a difference of opinion among men, as to what truths are self-evident, and accordingly it is necessary to inquire whether there is "no mark or criterion by which first principles that are truly such may be distinguished from those that assume the character without a just title." In answering the question which he thus proposes, we should certainly expect to find what Reid considered to be *the* criterion of first principles; and yet, in the four propositions with their corollaries which form his answer, while there is an enumeration of several tests, some of which are most inapplicable, there is no mention of the criterion which is now recognized. The only passages in which this criterion is explicitly referred to, as far as I can recollect and as far as Sir William Hamilton quotes, are at pp. 455, 459 and 521 in his edition of Reid's works, where, among other evidences, necessity is adduced as proving the non-empirical character of the two principles, that every beginning of existence must have a cause, and that intelligence in the cause may be inferred from the marks of it in the effect. In these passages undoubtedly Reid sees that a proposition, which we know to be true *necessarily*, and therefore true in all places and at all times, cannot be obtained by an induction, however extensive, of our experiences; but waiving the consideration that he here mis-states a subjective necessity of knowledge as the knowledge of an objective necessity, we must notice, what does not seem to be observed by Hamilton, that Reid's classification of first principles is sufficient to shew that he would have refused to constitute necessity the criterion of them all. For he divides truths into the two classes of *contingent* and *necessary*, while he allocates to each of

† *Intellectual Powers*, Essay VI., Chapters 4-7.

these a separate set of first principles.* Among the first principles of the latter, he enumerates the two which have just been mentioned; and it is not because they are first principles, it is because they are not contingent, but necessary truths, that he regards them as transcending experience.

With this doctrine of first principles, it is not to be wondered that Reid has been so unsuccessful in what ought to have been the most prominent excellence of his system. We have probably in this an explanation of the circumstance, that, although he recognises the importance of an accurate system of the facts which are primal in human knowledge, his detail of them, especially when compared with their exhibition in Kant's *Critique*, appears rather an enumeration at random than even an attempt at systematic classification. It is further remarkable, as possibly traceable to the same source, that, although the analysis of the idea of cause in the *Treatise of Human Nature* led him to the theory of its *a priori* character, he failed to see the conclusion which his own principles should have inferred from the analysis in the same work of the ideas of space and time.

In Reid is included all that is distinctive of Scottish metaphysical philosophy previous to Hamilton. We have indeed contributions of various value from others: in the writings of Dugald Stewart, the whole field traversed in the works of Reid, as well as numerous collateral departments of interest and importance, is illustrated with more elaborate fulness, with the elegance of a wider and more refined æsthetic culture, with a superior command of the English language, and an infinitely superior erudition, if not with a more comprehensive grasp of principles, or any bolder originality in their application; but we have no considerable addition to the substance, no new trait in the character of the philosophy.

We are now better prepared for understanding the exact point at which Sir William Hamilton found the philosophy of his country and the nature of the task which was laid before him. In my next article I shall give an exposition of Sir William's own system; and I shall thereafter proceed to estimate his success in solving the problems which he took in hand.

**Intellectual Powers*, Essay VI., Chapters 5-6.

