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VIETNAM REVIEW

SEPTEMBER 1967

WHY WE FIGHT IN VIETNAM


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New Vietnam Series

This is the first in a new series of fact sheets on Vietnam. Forthcoming issues will discuss such subjects as *The Search for Peace in Vietnam*, *Communist-Directed Forces in Vietnam*, and *Viet Cong Terror Tactics in South Vietnam*. Other titles will be added, and publications in the series will be updated from time to time as required by new developments.

Adapted From U.S. Department of State
"Vietnam Information Notes" Series

OFFICE OF INFORMATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE





WHY WE FIGHT IN VIETNAM

THERE WOULD BE NO WAR TODAY IF NORTH VIETNAM HAD KEPT ITS PLEDGE

The paramount fact about the war in Vietnam is this:

If there had been no violation by North Vietnam of article 10 of the Geneva agreement, calling for total cessation of hostilities, there would be no war in Vietnam today.

Hostilities ceased in the North, but they never fully ceased in the South. The Communist North organized, directed, and supplied armed forces operating against the South, forcing the Government of South Vietnam to seek help in taking defensive measures. The Communist North, denying its responsibility for the attacks in the South, despite conclusive proof to the contrary, complained to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICC) that the South's *defensive* measures constituted a violation of the Geneva agreement.

Behind this smokescreen the aggression against the South was rapidly escalated.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FROM 1954

The end of the French colonial era in Indochina came with the signing of the Geneva accords in July 1954. Representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic

Republic of (North) Vietnam, France, Laos, Communist China, the State of (South) Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States met in Geneva and brought the long struggle between the forces of the French Union and the Communist-led Viet Minh and its allies to an end.

Four documents were produced: three agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; and one overall unsigned final declaration of the conference. The three agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed on behalf of the commanders of the military forces opposing each other, the Vice Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam signing in each case for the Communist-led forces.

After the Conference an Exodus from the North

With regard to Vietnam, the Geneva agreement called for an end to all hostilities, provided for provisional division of the country at the 17th parallel, and for the withdrawal of the opposing forces into the two zones thus created, and gave over the civil administration of the two zones to the two parties withdrawing into them.

While the Communists quickly and ruthlessly consolidated their control of the North, the turmoil in the South was compounded by the need to accept a



THE U.S. NAVY SERVES TEA TO VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FLEEING COMMUNIST RULE.

million refugees from the north into the south and by the withdrawal of the military forces of the French. Prime Minister (later President) Ngo Dinh Diem initially had to administer a nation whose economy was ruined, and whose political life was fragmented by rivalries of religious sects and political factions. He was able during the next 9 years to eliminate the entrenched privileges of the U.S. form a small, united national state; to make progress toward reconstruction; to aid, and to protect South Vietnam were greatly reduced when support for the South Vietnamese Government in the form of economic, technical and military assistance had been provided by the United States since 1950. After the Geneva accords, the U.S. Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) became the only outside source of military aid to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. While the armed forces available to protect South Vietnam were greatly reduced when United States earlier the same year at the Geneva conference had agreed to a renewal of aggression in violation of the Geneva accords as a serious threat to international peace and security.

French Union Forces were dismantled following the Geneva conference, the North Vietnamese quickly built their army from several divisions with supplies obtained from Communist China.

The United States, France, Great Britain, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) on September 8, 1954. A protocol to the treaty included Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam under articles III and IV of the treaty which among other things provided for economic and military assistance; the latter in case of armed attack or indirect attack and only on the invitation or with the consent of the Government concerned. The SEATO treaty reinforced the position taken by the United States earlier the same year at the Geneva conference.

U.S. Assistance since 1950

South China Sea

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



THE U.S. NAVY SERVES TEA TO VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FLEEING COMMUNIST RULE.

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U.S. Assistance Since 1950

Support for the South Vietnamese Government in the form of economic, technical, and military assistance had been provided by the United States since 1950. After the Geneva accords, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) became the only outside source of military aid for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. While the armed forces available to protect South Vietnam were greatly reduced when

French Union Forces were dismantled following the Geneva conference, the North Vietnamese quickly built their army from seven to 20 divisions with supplies obtained from Communist powers.

SEATO

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Assistance Program Developments Under Three Administrations

President Eisenhower on October 1, 1954, in a letter to the President of Vietnam, stated that the policy behind U.S. aid was "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

Following 5 years of clandestine preparation and activity, in 1959 Communists in the North came into the open with their calculated program of aggression against the people of the South. The Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi announced that the time had come to "liberate" the South. Over the next few years the aggression developed steadily and in 1962 brought the condemnation of the International Control Commission.

In 1962 *President Kennedy*, at the request of the South Vietnamese Government, established the United States Military Assistance Command, sustained by modern airpower and antiguerrilla special forces.

Two days after death of *President Kennedy*, in 1963, *President Johnson* reaffirmed the U.S. intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against aggression from the North.

U.S. Destroyers Attacked


On August 2 and 4, 1964, U.S. destroyers were attacked in international waters off the Vietnamese coast by North Vietnam torpedo boats. In the same period, intelligence was accumulating which proved the presence of regular North Vietnamese battle units in South Vietnam. The aggression had moved to a new stage of outright military invasion.

In a message to Congress on August 5, 1964, the President asked for a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." In its resolution approved on August 7 by a vote of 88-2 and 416-0 in the Senate and House of Representatives respectively, the Congress declared the United States was "prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."



THE U.S. NAVY DESTROYER MADDOX WAS
ATTACKED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS BY
NORTH VIETNAMESE PT BOATS IN 1964

AN F8 CRUSADER IS LOADED WITH ZUN
ROCKETS BEFORE RETALIATING AGAINST
NORTH VIETNAMESE TORPEDO BOATS



THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINS WHY WE HELP SOUTH VIETNAM: OUR GOAL IS PEACE.



"Why Are We There?"

In the following months it became obvious that a greater U.S. military effort was required if South Vietnam was to be saved. In his State of the Union message on January 5, 1965, President Johnson said:


"Why are we there? We are there, first because a friendly nation asked us for help against Communist aggression. Ten years ago we pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it. . . . Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

The ideological commitment of the United States in South Vietnam, as throughout the world, was expressed by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, in a speech at Harvard University, June 17, 1965:

"The right we seek to defend is the right of people, be it in Korea or South Vietnam, not to have their future decided by violence. I do not believe this right can be secured by retreat. Retreat leads to retreat, just as aggression leads to aggression in this still primitive international community. So the aim of reinforcing the right of peoples, large and small, to determine their own destiny does not seem one that we dare allow to go by default."

BASIS FOR THE U.S. COMMITMENT

The U.S. commitment to fight in South Vietnam was made not for any one reason, but for many reasons; these involved not just Vietnam, but our policies and actions throughout the world. Some of these reasons are summarized below:



U.S. Destroyers Attacked

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A FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) SOLDIER STANDS GUARD AS SOUTH VIETNAMESE FARMERS MOVE INTO THEIR FIELDS TO HARVEST THEIR RICE CROP.

Moral

The promise was made to the people of South Vietnam by three American Presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—that the United States would guarantee their right to seek solutions to their problems in their own way free from outside force. That promise was stated and restated before the entire world. The credibility of a promise from the President of the United States is of vital concern to every nation in the world—Communist and non-Communist alike. Secretary of State Rusk has pointed out, for example, that if the United States fails to keep a promise to the people of South Vietnam, the people of Germany will have a reasonable doubt about our willingness to stand by our commitments in Europe, and the Soviet Union might be led into dangerous miscalculations about our willingness to stand with our friends under pressure. Thus, our moral obligations are not theoretical—they have real impact. It is imperative to world peace and progress that such a promise by the President of the United States be believed.

Strategic

“Containment” is the popular word for U.S. strategy since World War II. It stands for resistance to efforts by militant Communist powers to expand their territory and control by force or threat of force. The strategy of containment was adopted by this country and its allies in recognition of the grim lessons of the 1930’s and the Second World War. It is rooted in the conviction that to tolerate aggression is to invite more and greater violence between nations which ultimately, today, could mean nuclear war.

In Europe, the time we have bought through containment has worked changes on both sides of the Iron Curtain, permitting both sides to edge away from the threat of nuclear war to a more productive course of coexistence and even occasional cooperation.

In Asia, however, communism still acts in the belief that there is more profit in war than in peace. Asian communism still lives by the dogmas of Mao Tse-tung, who said:

“Some people ridicule us as advocates of the omnipotence of war; yes, we are advocates of the omni-

potence of revolutionary war, and this is good, not bad. . . . We can even say that the whole world can be reshaped only with the gun."

This is in contrast with the oft-stated views of the Secretary of State and the President, reaffirmed in October 1966 at Manila in article IV of the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific:

"We must seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia. We do not threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of our neighbors, whatever their ideological alignment. We ask only that this be reciprocated. The quarrels and ambitions of ideology and the painful frictions arising from national fears and grievances should belong to the past. Aggression rooted in them must not succeed. We shall play our full part in creating an environment in which reconciliation becomes possible, for in the modern world, men and nations have no choice but to learn to live together as brothers."

What has been called a strategy of containment is designed to bring about peace and reconciliation in Asia as well as in Europe. In the U.S. view, only if violence is opposed will peace and reconciliation become possible. If aggression succeeds, the Asian Communists will have shown that Mao is right: The world can only be reshaped by the gun.

WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?

President Johnson, speaking from Manila October 27, 1966, summed up the goals of the allied nations fighting to defend South Vietnam:

"Let me repeat it again and again. We seek:

- To be free of aggression.
- To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.
- To build a region of security, order, and progress.
- Reconciliation and peace throughout the area."



A SOUTH VIETNAMESE VILLAGER IS EXAMINED BY AN AMERICAN DOCTOR.

A SOUTH VIETNAMESE GIRL LEARNS TO WRITE, USING AN AMERICAN PEN.



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VIETNAM REVIEW 2

SEPTEMBER 1967

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

SUMMARY

The United States has consistently stated its readiness to negotiate peace in Vietnam on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 on Vietnam and the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos. The ultimate goal of these agreements was the reestablishment of peace in the Indochina area—Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—and the security and territorial integrity of the countries involved.

Although the Government of North Vietnam signed the Agreement of July 20, 1954, on the Cessation of Hostilities and adhered to the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva conference and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, it never accepted the obligations and restrictions imposed by those three international instruments. Hanoi has never paused in its drive to take control of the South, and in 1959 it shifted from subversive terrorist tactics (beheading of village chiefs, murder of relatives of South Vietnamese serving in the army, kidnaping of school administrators, health officials, etc.) to overt military action (the sending of large numbers of battle-equipped guerrilla cadres and troops into South Vietnam to engage in military combat). It has flatly rejected or ridiculed all overtures or initiatives which might have led to a peaceful settlement.

Despite Hanoi's intransigence, President Johnson has pledged that our efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam situation "will continue day and night." The United States has welcomed the numerous proposals and initiatives of other governments of the world to bring the conflict to an end. As this paper demonstrates, there has been a virtual barrage of efforts, all of them futile, to bring Hanoi to the conference table.

THE UNITED NATIONS

A U.N. presence in the area and formal debate in the United Nations have long been urged by the United States. However, North Vietnam and Red China have repeatedly rejected any U.N. role in the area.

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

*In an effort to get peace negotiations underway the United States has engaged in talks with hundreds of world figures, including officials of the Hanoi government.**

In 1965, U.S. officials engaged in some 300 high-level private talks for peace in Vietnam with friends and adversaries throughout the world. In the 2-month period December 1965—January 1966 alone, President Johnson dispatched 5 special envoys—among them Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman—to 34 world capitals to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

The President communicated the American position on Vietnam to many more chiefs of government and to numerous international organizations.

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**The United States made private contact with North Vietnamese officials in one of the 22 capitals with which both countries maintain diplomatic relations. The U.S. message was accepted, but within a week the Hanoi government had issued an official statement calling the peace probe a "trick" and demanding an "unconditional" end of all acts of war against it.*

JOHNSON-HO EXCHANGE

During a pause in the bombing at the time of the Tet holiday in February 1967, *President Johnson sent a letter to President Ho Chi Minh* suggesting direct talks between the United States and North Vietnam "in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity." He offered to cease the bombing of North Vietnam and to freeze U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam if North Vietnam would give assurances that it "had stopped infiltration into South Vietnam by land and sea."

Hanoi did not respond until a day after President Johnson was obliged to order a resumption of the bombing because Hanoi, in effecting a major resupply of its forces during the Tet ceasefire, was preparing for expanded action. President Ho emphasized on February 15 that North Vietnam would "never accept talks under the threat of bombs," and he insisted that talks are out of the question until after the United States stopped unconditionally its bombing raids "and all other acts of war."

The United States again appealed for talks during Secretary Rusk's press conference on February 28. "We will negotiate," he said, "without conditions, or we will negotiate about conditions, or we will discuss a final settlement and we will be prepared to take up any part of this problem such as the deescalation of military activity, or the demilitarization of the demilitarized zone, or the exchange of prisoners, or any part of it which might move us a little step toward peace." He pointed out that "we have indicated many times, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to others, including Hanoi, that we would be prepared to stop the bombing if they would take corresponding military moves on their side, but that we cannot stop *half* the war."

Indicating its reliance on the effect of the peace demonstrations in various countries, Hanoi rejected the idea of talks because the "U.S. aggressors are continuing their escalations, thus defying public opinion and the universal conscience of the peoples." Premier Pham Van Dong told a correspondent of *Agence France-Presse* on March 1 that Hanoi's four-point program remains "the most correct political solution to the Vietnamese problem."



U.S. FOURTEEN POINTS

The United States feels that its 14-point proposal offers the best basis for peace negotiations. *In contacts with the governments of 113 nations, the United States set forth the elements which it believes should be included in a peace settlement in Southeast Asia. They are as follows:*

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or any part thereof:

—We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, which observance was called for in the declaration on Vietnam of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest on July 6, 1966. And we will support a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or an Asia conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.

3. We would welcome “negotiations without pre-conditions” as called for by 17 nonaligned nations* in an appeal delivered to Secretary Rusk on April 1, 1965.

4. We would welcome “unconditional discussions” as called for by President Johnson on April 7, 1965:

—If the other side will not come to a conference, we are prepared to engage in direct discussions or discussions through an intermediary.

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions:

—We have attempted, many times, to engage the other side in a discussion of a mutual deescalation of the level of violence, and we remain prepared to engage in such a mutual deescalation.

—We stand ready to cooperate fully in getting discussions which could lead to a cessation of hostilities started promptly and brought to a successful completion.

6. Hanoi’s four points could be discussed along with other points which others may wish to propose:

—We would be prepared to accept preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points as a basis for negotiations.

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia:

—We are prepared to assist in the conversion of these bases for peaceful uses that will benefit the peoples of the entire area.

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured:

—We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American “presence” of any kind in South Vietnam.

—We have pledged in the Manila Communique that “Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of

*The “Appeal of the Heads of State and Government of Seventeen Non-aligned Countries Concerning Crisis in Vietnam” was handed to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson on April 1, 1965, by a delegation composed of Ambassadors of Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Ghana (the other 13 nations were: Algeria, Cyprus, Ceylon, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nepal, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Zambia, and Uganda). It also was delivered on the same day to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice:

—We support the development of broadly based democratic institutions in South Vietnam.

—We do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision:

—It should not be decided by the use of force.

—We are fully prepared to support the decision of the Vietnamese people.

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option:

—We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement on South Vietnam.

—We support the neutrality policy of the Royal Government of Laos, and we support the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars:

—We support the growing efforts by the nations of the area to cooperate in the achievement of their economic and social goals.

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression. And I would not think that would be an unsurmountable problem at all."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped:

—We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam, the moment we are assured—privately or otherwise—that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate deescalation of the other side.

—We do not seek the unconditional surrender of North Vietnam; what we do seek is to assure for the people of South Vietnam the right to decide their own political destiny, free of force.

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES

The United States has five times suspended the bombing of North Vietnam in the hope of some "response in kind" from the Hanoi government. The response has been negative.

Collectively and individually, nations of the West, of the nonaligned or neutral countries, and some Communist-bloc members, have sought to bring the Vietnam issue to the conference table. World leaders have exerted their influence to persuade Hanoi to discuss rather than fight. All these overtures have been rejected by North Vietnam.

POLICY OF NORTH VIETNAM

The United States is not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past 5 years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. All reports of "peace feelers" upon close investigation have inevitably turned out to be initiatives being taken by third parties. Hanoi itself has categorically denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers."

U.S. EFFORTS CONTINUE

Nonetheless, the United States and its allies continue the search for a just and peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

The United States has agreed to, or originated, some 28 proposals designed to permit the initiation of serious peace negotiations, Secretary Rusk told the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on May 1.

Recalling these items from memory, he added that "there may be more." What is important is that Hanoi has rejected all of them. Nonetheless, as President Johnson has reasserted: "Though the battle has been long and hard, and though our adversary has shown no desire to reduce the level of his aggression and bring the controversy to the negotiating table, we shall persist . . . in our pursuit of an honorable settlement."

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VIETNAM REVIEW 3

SEPTEMBER 1967

COMMUNIST-DIRECTED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Several hundred thousand people in South Vietnam, collectively known as the Viet Cong (Vietnamese for "Vietnamese Communist"), are engaged in a violent effort to overthrow the government of that country. Alongside them are many identified units of the regular North Vietnamese Army, ordered south by Hanoi by the thousands every month.

What was the situation which gave rise to the development of the Viet Cong? Who are its leaders? How do they operate? This paper seeks to answer these and related questions.

THE VIET MINH

From the close of World War II to 1954, Communist-led local forces known as the Viet Minh (Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam) fought to expel France from Vietnam and other parts of Indochina. The Viet Minh, like the present National Liberation Front (NLF), was a front organization including non-Communists; real power, however, always remained with the Communists.

Ho Chi Minh, present ruler of North Vietnam, organized and directed the Viet Minh movement. This veteran Communist was born in 1890 in North Vietnam. In 1921 he was a founding member of the French Communist Party. Fluent in French, English, Russian, and Chinese, he later spent years as an agent of the Communist International (Comintern). From a base in China, Ho organized the Viet Minh movement toward the close of World War II.

Japanese troops in Indochina surrendered to Chinese, British, and American forces at the end of World War II, and shortly thereafter French authorities resumed control. The Viet Minh, and non-Communist nationalists in collaboration with the Viet Minh, fought the French for years. Finally, after the defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu, France conceded independence to Indochina at the Geneva settlement of 1954.

The Geneva agreements divided the Vietnamese portion of Indochina at the 17th parallel. A frankly Communist government, led by Ho Chi Minh, assumed control at Hanoi. Under the armistice provisions some 900,000 Vietnamese fled the North and sought the safety of the South. Roughly 100,000 of the Viet Minh moved from the South to the North, while an undetermined but large number remained behind.

THE TWO REGIMES: 1954-1960

In South Vietnam, non-Communist groups worked to build an effective government. Much of the countryside, however, remained under local Viet Minh control.

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Ngo Dinh Diem was the leading figure in South Vietnam until his death in 1963. First as Prime Minister under Bao Dai, then as President after a 1955 referendum deposed Bao Dai, Diem sought to create a viable national government. His first problems were:

- to eliminate vestiges of both French and Viet Minh control;
- to provide for the 900,000 refugees from the North;
- to cut the strength of three independent armed groups which were fighting for control near Saigon: the Binh Xuyen (gangsters who controlled the Saigon police), the Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao (two extremist religious sects).

Save for reducing the Viet Minh threat, most of this program was completed by 1958.


In North Vietnam, the Communists consolidated control by police-state methods. Almost all of the North Vietnamese area was under Viet Minh control at the time of the Geneva settlement. As the French withdrew and refugees fled south, Ho Chi Minh's government smothered all opposition. There was a broad-scale forced collectivization in 1956, during which an estimated 50,000 to 200,000 people were killed and a large number imprisoned. *Once well entrenched in the North, Hanoi sought to expand its power by taking over the South. Its chief political instrument was the Lao Dong Party, the Communist Party of both North and South Vietnam until 1961.*

ORGANIZING FOR SUBVERSION: 1955-1962

The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)

Hanoi's field headquarters in South Vietnam has the title of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). This strategic site was overrun by U.S. troops in the early part of 1967, and large supplies of documents and military material were captured. The documents included detailed instructions from Hanoi, since COSVN provides the direct link with top Hanoi leaders.

One particularly significant document was the text of an address by North Vietnamese General Nguyen



ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNIST FORCES

GENERAL NGUYEN CHI THANH OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HEADED THE VC UNTIL HIS DEATH IN JULY 1967.

Van Vinh, Chairman of the Lao Dong Party's Reunification Department and the parallel Reunification Commission in the North Vietnamese Government. General Vinh, who is also a Deputy Chief of Staff, came down from Hanoi to COSVN headquarters in April 1966 to deliver his instructions in person.

Another key document was a letter of instructions from Le Duan, the First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi. In addition, captured material included the text of a speech by COSVN commander Nguyen Chi Thanh.

Although COSVN leaders evacuated their headquarters to another location as American troops approached, there is considerable information available about its ranking members. A four-star general in the North Vietnamese Army, General Nguyen Chi Thanh,



was commander of the Viet Cong forces and chief political officer until his death in July 1967. Once a teacher in Hanoi, after World War II he headed the North Vietnamese Youth Federation. He achieved four-star rank in 1959, and became a member of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party Politbureau in 1960. He is believed to have been in South Vietnam since late 1964; the captured photograph shows him in standard Viet Cong garb.

Before his death, General Thanh's deputies in COSVN were two other North Vietnamese Army generals, both alternate members of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. Lt. General Tran Van Tra, a Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army, served as Deputy Commander of the "Liberation Army" and had been in South Vietnam since

1960 or 1961. Major General Tran Do served as Deputy Political Officer, and had been in the South since 1963 or early 1964.

These North Vietnamese generals, under the close supervision of Hanoi, in turn directed the subsidiary elements of the Viet Cong forces discussed below.

The National Liberation Front (NLF)

At the close of 1960, authorities in Hanoi decided to concentrate their efforts on a new front organization to be based in the South, and to be known as the National Liberation Front (NLF). The NLF's program was forecast in a resolution of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party third congress in September, stating that one of the strategic tasks of the Vietnamese revolution was "to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen."

In describing the forthcoming National Liberation Front, the Lao Dong Party resolution stated: "The front must carry out its work in a very flexible manner in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized, and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland."

Hanoi felt it could count on support from a variety of groups in the South. Most important were those entrenched Communists from the Viet Minh who had not gone North after the Geneva agreements. As Communists, they owed special loyalty to Ho Chi Minh. Some of them still controlled some rural areas which resisted government authority. Others had merely gone underground.

Other potential recruits were rural peasants who feared that the new regime in Saigon would bring increased taxes, increased rents, and few benefits. Some members of the shattered Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao groups wished to continue their fight against Diem. Finally, some people who at first had welcomed the increasingly authoritarian Diem regime were turning against it.

Chain of Command

The chain of command from Hanoi to the two types of Communist-directed forces in South Vietnam

is shown on page 2. The chart also shows how COSVN controls the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the National Liberation Front (NLF), and the "Liberation Army." In general, the PRP provides political direction and enforces control; members of the "Liberation Army" conduct terror and military operations; and the NLF serves as a propaganda unit. Appropriately, all significant political and military positions down to platoon leaders and district NLF cadre are occupied by PRP members. Political and military directives flow in a vertical fashion from the PRP and "Liberation Army." The NLF, although nominally the parent organization, has no command structure of its own.

Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, born in 1910, studied law in France and practiced in Saigon. His anti-French activities started in 1947, when he reportedly was captured by the Viet Minh and then joined them. Arrested twice by the French, he was later imprisoned by the South Vietnamese for more than 6 years. Following his release in December 1961, he joined the NLF as Chairman in early 1962.

Secretary General Huynh Tan Phat, born in 1913, also uses the name Tam Chi. With an architect's training, he was a member of the Viet Minh early in the postwar period and was arrested twice by the French. In late 1955 he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Fatherland Front (Hanoi-organized precursor of the NLF). An associate has reported him to be a member of the Communist Party.

THE PATTERN OF SUBVERSION: 1961-1962

With the People's Revolutionary Party tightly in control, the National Liberation Front continued to be reinforced with cadres from the North. Most of the early infiltrators were natives of South Vietnam who had gone to the North after the Geneva agreements for intensive training in Communist methods. In the 3-year period from 1959 through 1961, roughly 10,000 men infiltrated into the South. In 1962 North Vietnam sent an additional 13,000 men across the border.

As these large reinforcements arrived, the violence in South Vietnam increased.

Prime targets were the leaders of local government:

village headmen, village elders, school teachers, medical personnel. Between 1957 and 1959, more than a thousand civilians were murdered or kidnapped. In 1960, terrorists assassinated 1,400 local government officials and kidnapped 700 others. As the Viet Cong infiltration increased, the toll rose: by early 1962 the Viet Cong were killing or kidnapping more than 1,000 South Vietnamese civilians each month.

ORGANIZED WARFARE: 1963-1967

The early Viet Cong effort laid great stress on guerrilla activities, largely in the rural areas. Occasional terror bombings were perpetrated in the cities (e.g., the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1965). Later, as more and more regulars of the North Vietnamese Army were sent south to support the guerrillas, organized units were increasingly committed to conventional military engagements, and on a growing scale.

While the Viet Cong retained the military initiative until some time in 1965, they never gained the political initiative.

The Diem government survived several attempted coups by other anti-Viet Cong groups, but finally fell with Diem's assassination at the end of 1963.

Subsequent governments in Saigon have been overturned, but throughout this period no important political figure shifted allegiance to the Viet Cong or its NLF and PRP components. Thus, while terror has enabled the Viet Cong to disrupt the life of the nation, the Communists have failed to attract new loyalties to their cause.

Viet Cong personnel losses within the past 5 years have been severe. These have in large part been offset, however, by a constant stream of military reinforcements from the North. Losses of arms have been offset both by captured equipment and by massive supply from the North, while food supplies are drawn from controlled areas and from neighboring territory.

Similarly, the brutality of the Viet Cong is demonstrating to more and more Vietnamese outside the cities what a Viet Cong government would mean. The old slogan of unification with the North appears to have lost much of its appeal in South Vietnam, not only for the refugees who have fled the North, but also for the native southerners who have seen Communist terror first-hand in the South.

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VIETNAM REVIEW 4

SEPTEMBER 1967

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

"A large majority of the governments of the free world are sympathetic to our efforts in Southeast Asia and would be alarmed were they to fail," Secretary Rusk has stated. The free nations of Asia are deeply concerned about the security of the area and have been in the forefront of those nations contributing military assistance. In addition, many countries of Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and several countries of Africa and the Middle East, are providing to the Republic of Vietnam substantial economic, technical, and humanitarian assistance.

This paper documents the impressive scope of the genuinely international aid program for the Republic of Vietnam. Aid from the United States will be described in another paper of this series, and is not included here.

MILITARY AID

Understandably, the nations closest to the threat of Communist expansion are making the most substantial contributions in military assistance after that of the United States. Korea has contributed two divisions. Four of the Asia-Pacific SEATO members (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand) have military forces in South Vietnam as well as military advisers, technicians, and supplies. Other Asian countries are contributing their expertise in counterinsurgency operations or psychological warfare by training Vietnamese in these special skills.

The following list indicates the extent of the military assistance being contributed by Asia-Pacific nations:

Australia

- 4,500 combat troops in Vietnam were increased to approximately 6,500 with the addition early in 1967 of Army, Navy, and Air Force units.
- 100 combat advisers (primarily specialists in jungle warfare).
- 73-man Air Force unit with 6 Australian Caribou planes flying daily logistical transport missions in support of Vietnamese military forces.

Korea

- 45,000 troops, including 2 combat divisions, a 130-man Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), 10 military instructors in Korean karate for training Vietnamese military in hand-to-hand combat, and a 2,200-man Task Force Unit.

Malaysia

- 2,000 Vietnamese military and police officers have been trained by Malaysia since 1962. Groups of 30-60 are sent regularly for a month's training in counterinsurgency with the Malaysian Police Special Constabulary. Substantial amounts of counterinsurgency materials, primarily military and police transport such as armored vehicles, have also been provided.

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New Zealand

- 125-man artillery battery of 6 howitzers.
- 25-man army engineer detachment.
- A 210-man infantry company and supporting elements will join these forces in 1967.

Philippines

- 2,000-man military engineering unit with security support personnel, a station hospital, and rural health and civic action teams.

Thailand

- 2,200-2,500-man independent force will be sent this year.
- 200-man Thai naval group manning an LST and PGM patrol craft.
- 35-man Air Force contingent has been flying operational transport missions for the Vietnamese forces.
- Jet training for Vietnamese pilots in Thailand.

ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Asian and Pacific Nations

Australia has contributed nearly \$10 million. This includes:

- 3 surgical teams totaling 37 medical personnel in 3 provincial hospitals. These teams, in addition to performing major operations, have established a blood bank and are providing training for nurses.
- A group of civil engineers working on water supply and road construction projects.
- 3 experts in dairy and crop practices and radio techniques.
- Training of 130 Vietnamese (including nurses and pilots) in Australia at universities and technical institutions.

• In goods and materials—1,125,000 textbooks in Vietnamese for rural schools; 3,300 tons of corrugated roofing for Vietnamese military dependents' housing; 6 large community windmills; 15,750 sets of hand tools; 400 radio sets and 2,400 loudspeakers; 16,000 blankets; 14,000 cases of condensed milk; a 55-kilowatt broadcasting station at Ban Me Thuot.

The Republic of China has provided a variety of nonmilitary aid, including:

- An 80-man agricultural team.



AIRMEN FROM AUSTRALIA



HOSPITAL SHIP FROM WEST GERMANY



MILK FROM AUSTRALIA





TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA



NURSE FROM AUSTRALIA

- A 12-man electrical power mission.
- A 10-man surgical team.
- Training in Taiwan for more than 200 Vietnamese in the fields of agriculture, industry, education, public health and sanitation, transportation, and public administration.
- In goods and services—26 aluminum prefabricated warehouses, agricultural tools, seeds and fertilizers, 500,000 copies of mathematics textbooks, and an electrical power substation.

Japan has contributed more than \$55 million in economic assistance, chiefly through reparations. This includes technical personnel and funds for the construction of a large power dam across the Da Nhim River and an electrical transmission line. Japan has also sent:

- 2 medical teams and considerable quantities of medical goods (4,544 cases).
- 20,000 transistor radios.
- 25 ambulances.

Japan has also agreed to participate in the construction of a bridge over the Mekong River near Vinh Long.

Korea has 7 civilian medical teams totaling 118 doctors, nurses, and support personnel working in provincial health programs. In addition, Korean military medical personnel are providing some medical care to the local population in areas where ROK (Republic of Korea) troops are stationed.

New Zealand has sent an 8-man surgical team and, for the University of Saigon, a professor in English language. That Government presently is training 62 Vietnamese in New Zealand; has provided \$21,000 for equipment for a technical high school and approximately \$600,000 for a science building at the University of Saigon. A second 16-man medical team is being sent to Binh Dinh province.

The Philippines has had approximately 60 Philippine civic action personnel, including military and civilian medical teams, working in Vietnam for several years.

Thailand has provided rice for refugees, cement, and zinc roofing materials. At the Manila Conference (October 1966) Thailand offered South Vietnam a \$20 million rice credit. The Thai Government has announced recently that it will send a medical unit to Vietnam.

Middle East Nations

Greece—\$15,000 in medical supplies.

Iran—1,000 tons of petroleum products, plus sending a 20-man medical team to work in a provincial hospital.

Turkey—medicines and the offer of a substantial quantity of cement.

European Nations

Austria has offered medical supplies, blankets, and tents through the Austrian Red Cross.

Belgium has provided medicines and an ambulance, as well as scholarships for 9 Vietnamese to study in Belgium.

Denmark has provided medical supplies and has offered to train Vietnamese nurses in Denmark.

Germany is providing substantial aid. The Federal Republic has on duty in Vietnam a 3,000 ton, 145-bed hospital ship, the "Helgoland," staffed with 8 doctors and 30 other medical personnel.

There are 7 Germans, a director and 6 instructors, teaching at the new Vietnamese-German Technical High School at Thu Duc near Saigon. At Hué University there are 5 Germans: 3 physicians in the Medical School, a professor of music, and a professor of German language. There is a German forestry expert working at the Department of Rural Affairs, Saigon. Germany also is training 40 Vietnamese, primarily as future instructors in the technical high school, and has agreed to accept 30 more.

In goods and materials, the Federal Republic has provided credits as follows:

(1) \$3.75 million for import of German products, such as machine tools, fertilizers, etc. The piaster funds generated through sales of these products to Vietnamese importers are made available to the National Office of Agricultural Credit to aid farmers, particularly with loans.

(2) \$12.5 million for development of the major industrial complex at An Hoan-Nong Son.

(3) \$5 million for construction of a slaughterhouse at Saigon-Cholon, and 3 coastal vessels.

(4) \$125,000 for equipment at the Vietnamese-German Technical High School at Thu Duc.

Italy has provided a 10-man surgical team and has offered science scholarships to 10 Vietnamese to study in Italy.

Luxembourg has given plasma and blood transfusion equipment.

The Netherlands has undertaken to build 5 tuberculosis centers in Saigon, and sites for 3 have already been selected. In August 1966 the Netherlands announced a contribution of \$355,000 for a 4-year U.N. project in social welfare, part of the \$1 million they have earmarked for U.N. projects in Vietnam.

Spain has provided 800 pounds of medicines, medical equipment, and blankets and has sent a 12-man medical team to South Vietnam.

The United Kingdom has provided 6 civilians for a British Advisory Mission in Saigon and a Professor of English at Hué University. In the United Kingdom 21 Vietnamese are receiving training under Colombo Plan and British Council auspices. A pediatric team of 4 British doctors and 6 nurses went to Vietnam in August 1966.

In goods and materials, the British have provided: laboratory equipment for Saigon University; a type-

setting machine for the Government Printing Office; a cobalt deep-ray therapy unit for the National Cancer Institute; various equipment for the Faculties of Medicine, Science, and Pharmacy at Saigon University, the Meteorological Service and the Agricultural School at Saigon, the Atomic Research Establishment at Dalat, and the Faculty of Education at Hué.

In 1965-66 British economic aid included \$226,800 for roadbuilding equipment, diesel fishing-boat engines, and portable anaesthetic machines.

Western Hemisphere

Canada has provided almost \$6 million in assistance. A Canadian supervisor at Quang Ngai is directing the construction of a small tuberculosis clinic which the Canadians are funding and staffing with 2 doctors and 4 nurses. Canada has provided a professor of orthopedics for Cho Ray Hospital, Saigon, and a teacher for the University of Hué.

Canada is currently training 231 Colombo Plan trainees in Canada. Altogether, it has trained 380 Colombo Plan trainees and 463 trainees under all programs, including those sponsored by other agencies and third countries.

Since 1958, Canada has provided \$850,000 worth of food aid for Vietnam. Funds generated by sales are used for capital construction projects in Vietnam, such as the new \$333,000 science building for the medical faculty at Hué University.

In addition, Canada has agreed to construct an auditorium for the Faculty of Sciences at Hué University which will cost approximately \$215,000.

Argentina sent 5,000 tons of wheat flour; *Brazil*, a substantial quality of medical supplies and coffee; *Ecuador*, medical supplies; *Guatemala*, 15,000 doses of typhoid-paratyphoid serum; *Honduras*, drugs and dry goods for refugees sent via the Honduran Air Force; *Uruguay*, refugee relief supplies and medicines; and *Venezuela*, 500 tons of rice and 2 civilian doctors.

Africa

Two countries of Africa have been contributors to the Republic of Vietnam:

Liberia, which gave \$50,000 for the purchases of hospital equipment and other medical supplies; and

Tunisia, which has recently made available a number of scholarships for the Vietnamese.

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VIETNAM REVIEW 5

NOVEMBER 1967

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VIET CONG TERROR TACTICS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

"The hard-core professional terrorists who dress and look like everybody else are the biggest problem facing us now. The Viet Cong are effective not because the people prefer them, but because of terrorism."

—Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

In South Vietnam the Viet Cong are using systematic and unrelenting terrorism as a principal tactic for winning political power. Its application takes many forms:

- Grenades lobbed into cars stopped for traffic lights;
- Poisoned darts and needles used in dark theaters;
- Doors, drawers, and automobile engines booby-trapped;
- Poisoned or contaminated bamboo and metal slivers (*punji*) planted just under the surface in the rice paddies where barefoot paddy workers—men, women, and children—will step on them;
- Grenades set in the night with tripwires across the common paths where peasants and schoolchildren walk in the morning;
- Village leaders shot or beheaded;
- Village men and boys kidnapped and forced into Viet Cong military service;
- Children taught to roll grenades into restaurants and cafes;
- Villages harassed night after night with sporadic gunfire and loudspeaker taunts and threats;
- Newspapermen assassinated;
- Schools and health stations bombed;
- Busloads of civilians blown up by electrically controlled mines.

HANOI'S DECLARATION OF WAR

On March 13, 1959, in Hanoi, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party brought its aggression against the South into the open. The time had come to begin the task of "liberating the South," it declared, and to "struggle heroically and perseveringly to smash the Southern regime."

South Vietnam was to be smashed by destroying its non-Communist government apparatus and non-Communist leadership—first at the village level, then at the district and provincial levels. Hanoi thus ordered publicly an open assault on South Vietnam. Actually, the attack had begun much earlier. It was to be based consistently on the calculated use of terror.

TARGETS OF TERROR

The primary goal of Communist terror is to break the spirit of the individual villager. It is violence *in his own village*—an assassination, execution, or kidnapping—that best teaches the peasant to fear the Viet Cong.

The priority targets of terror are village government officials, social or natural leaders in the villages, and Americans, in that order. A survey of attacks against village officials in the period January to October 1964

indicated that in almost every case the 429 village and hamlet officials assassinated and the 1,482 officials kidnapped were native to the villages in which they were serving, and generally had been chosen with the consent of the villagers. They were not, as some have it, exclusively Saigon appointees sent in from outside.

The assassination pattern appears to be directed toward the very best and very worst officials—the highly popular and effective, and the most corrupt and oppressive. By striking down officials who are notoriously corrupt, the Viet Cong are able to play the role of champions of the people. By systematically wiping out the popular leaders who work effectively to improve the lives of the villagers, the Viet Cong hope to leave the masses leaderless and demoralized.

VIET CONG TERROR CELLS

The basic weapon in this campaign of terror, and the basic unit of all Viet Cong guerrilla elements, is the three-man cell. There are three types of cells:

- Guerrilla cells for general sabotage and clandestine military operations;
- Special activities cells for assassinations and terror activities generally not involving large amounts of high explosives;
- Sapper cells for specialized work with high explosives.

From the members of such cells are drawn the terrorists for risky city grenade attacks and other suicide missions.

However, there are differing attitudes toward terrorism in National Liberation Front (NLF) ranks. Many NLF members—particularly those recruited locally—have found the use of terror repugnant and unessential to the political struggle. The demoralizing effect on their own ranks of brutality is believed to be an important factor in the high defection rate of the Viet Cong as well as the low level of popular support. In the first quarter of 1967 the defection rate was at a level approaching 40,000 a year.

VILLAGE HARASSMENT A FAVORITE TACTIC OF THE VIET CONG

Harassing villages probably has been the most common form of terror used by the Viet Cong. The most common form of harassment is small-arms fire. This tactic seldom receives much attention in the press or in official reporting because of its apparent inconsequential results.

Periodically guerrillas will approach a village and fire into it half-a-dozen random rifle shots. This alerts the defenders who can never be sure that a full-scale attack is not underway. Word is radioed to the nearby military headquarters whose commander is then obliged to decide whether the action is harassing fire or an attack, and if an attack, whether an ambush is its real purpose or whether it is a feint designed to draw his unit away from the scene of an actual attack elsewhere. Any guess he makes is apt to be the wrong one.

The correct military decision, usually, is to do nothing for the moment and await developments. This causes villagers to doubt that the unit will aid the village if it actually is attacked.

The harassing fire may continue sporadically for weeks, generally accompanied by nocturnal megaphone taunts, threats, and appeals. Sometimes after a few weeks of softening up, a full-scale attack is launched.

Harassing fire is cheap and can be employed even by inexperienced guerrillas. It creates a great sense of anxiety within the village, keeps villagers awake at night, impairing their farming and normal daytime activities. And it builds confidence within guerrilla ranks.

Viet Cong use senseless terror to strike fear into the hearts of villagers like this man mourning his murdered daughter.



TERROR CAN BE SELF-DEFEATING

In the long run, the Viet Cong appear to be hurt by their own terrorism. Most evidence suggests that the gains won through terror in the early stages of the rebellion are increasingly erased by the mounting bitterness of the victimized people.

In every measurable expression of public opinion to date, the South Vietnamese people have overwhelmingly voiced opposition to Viet Cong rule. In spite of their natural desire for peace, the great majority indicate readiness to continue the war until the Communist threat is ended.

Defiance of the Viet Cong has been demonstrated more and more openly during the last year, notably during the 1966 elections for the Constituent Assembly and the 1967 elections for village and hamlet officials. The Viet Cong threatened punishment to all who participated and actually executed some participants. Despite threats and terror, however, more than 80 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls. This figure is about 20 percent higher than the turnout in most American elections.

The Columbia Broadcasting System on March 21, 1967, devoted a special hour-long television program to an independent public opinion survey conducted in South Vietnam for CBS by Opinion Research Cor-

poration, Princeton, New Jersey. Nine out of 10 South Vietnamese, according to this survey, believe they are better off with the existing South Vietnamese Government; 3 percent believe it does not matter who is in charge; 7 percent expressed no opinion; and none believed they would be better off with the Viet Cong.

There can be little doubt that the absence of support for the Viet Cong among the South Vietnamese today results in large part from the people's reaction to a decade of calculated terror. Terror was what respondents most disliked about the Viet Cong in the CBS survey of Vietnamese public opinion early this year and late last year.

In its summary of the Opinion Research Corporation study, the CBS report stated:

"The survey shows that contrary to a widely held belief outside South Vietnam, its people are not so exhausted and numbed by the war that they no longer care which side wins. They do care very much. They want peace, but not at any price."

CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF VIET CONG TERROR

	ASSASSINATED	KIDNAPPED
1958	200	250
1959	200	350
1960	1,500	700
1961	500	1,000
1962	1,700	9,500
1963	2,000	7,000
1964	1,800	9,500
1965	1,800	8,500
1966	1,500	3,000
(Through Oct. 25)	11,200	39,750

Note: None of the above figures is considered entirely accurate. However, inasmuch as the most common error made by local authorities is failure to report many specific acts of terror, the true figure would be higher than those shown here.

SOME CASES OF TERRORISM

There are two main types of acts of terror: selective and nonselective.

Selective terror occurs when specific individuals or members of a particular group are chosen by the Viet Cong to be their victims. If a village headman is taken out on a hillside and shot, for example, this is a selective killing.

A Marine helicopter helps Vietnamese families flee their Viet Cong-controlled village for a safer resettlement area.





Viet Cong terrorists do not discriminate among victims, injuring and killing even women and children.

Nonselective terror is used indiscriminately by the Viet Cong to disrupt civil life, demoralize the people, destroy transport and communications, and generally to create chaos. Anyone may fall victim to nonselective terror—passengers on a crowded bus blasted to bits by a mine in a public road, children on a common pathway who kick a tripwire attached to a grenade, casualties of bombing in a marketplace or a restaurant.

The patterns of terror occasionally shift. In recent months the Viet Cong have made a concerted effort to disrupt the work of the Revolutionary Development teams in South Vietnam by selectively attacking work camps and reconstructed villages.

In 16 weeks, from February to June, 81 Revolutionary Development workers were killed, 99 wounded, and 13 abducted. In the same period the Viet Cong killed 31 *Hoi Chanh* workers, wounded 22, and abducted 10. The *Hoi Chanh* are those who have responded to the Government appeal to defect from the Viet Cong. More than anything else, the Viet Cong appear to fear successful reform programs.

Following are some typical cases illustrative of Viet Cong terror since 1960:

September 24, 1960—A band of armed Viet Cong burned down a school in An Lac Village, Tri Tan District, An Giang Province.

May 15, 1961—Twelve Catholic nuns from La Providence Order, traveled on Highway One toward Saigon. Their bus was stopped by Viet Cong who ransacked their luggage. Sister Theophile protested and was shot dead on the spot. The vehicle

was sprayed with bullets, seriously wounding Sister Phan Thi No. The ambush took place at Tram Van Hamlet, Thanh Phuoc Village, Go Dau Ha District, Tay Ninh Province.

January 2, 1962—Two Vietnamese technicians working in the Government's antimalaria program, Phan Van Hai and Nguyen Van Thach, were killed by Viet Cong with machetes, 12 miles south of Saigon.

September 12, 1963—Miss Vo Thi Lo, 26, a schoolteacher in An Phuoc Village, Kien Hoa Province, was found near the village with her throat cut. She had been kidnapped by the Viet Cong 3 days earlier.

February 16, 1964—Three Americans were killed and 32 injured, most of them women and children, when the Viet Cong bombed the Kinh Do movie theater in Saigon.

December 12, 1965—Two Viet Cong terrorist platoons killed 23 unarmed Vietnamese canal construction workers asleep in a Buddhist pagoda in Tan Huong Village, Dinh Tuong Province, and wounded seven others.

November 16, 1966—The hamlet chief of Hai Xuan, Binh Phuoc District, Long An Province, was assassinated by Viet Cong with carbine fire while he was returning to the hamlet on foot.

June 1, 1967—At 2:30 a.m. a Viet Cong force attacked sleeping Revolutionary Development workers with grenades and automatic weapons. Three Revolutionary Development workers were killed and three were wounded.

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“VIET-NAM INFORMATION NOTES”

VIETNAM REVIEW 6

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NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

If the Government of South Vietnam is to establish itself as a popular, representative government, it must pursue programs which will secure the support of the entire population, including its citizens now fighting in the Viet Cong. To this end, the declaration of “The Purposes of the Government of Vietnam,” issued at the Honolulu conference on February 8, 1966, called upon all citizens of South Vietnam to work together for development of the country:

“We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society in which every man can know that he has a future. . . .

“To those future citizens of a free, democratic South Vietnam now fighting with the Viet Cong, we take this occasion to say come and join in this national revolutionary adventure:

—come safely to join us through the Open Arms Program,

—stop killing your brothers, sisters, their elders and their children,

—come and work through constitutional democracy to build together that life of dignity, freedom and peace those in the North would deny the people of Vietnam.”

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In the long run, the Government’s success in winning Viet Cong sympathizers to peaceful and constructive participation in Vietnamese society will be closely related to the support it receives from the population as a whole. The progress of the government to place political organization of the country on a democratic and constitutional base (*which will*

be discussed in a forthcoming issue of Vietnam Review) is an increasingly important factor in building public support. The Viet Cong effort to prevent and disrupt elections indicates its recognition that effective and representative self-government in South Vietnam is totally incompatible with Communist goals.

Along with implementation of the new Constitution, the Government’s second broad effort to win popular support is the Revolutionary Development program. This was established to initiate the social, economic, and political reforms needed to improve the lot of the rural population, and to strengthen its confidence in the Government and its resistance to the Viet Cong.

The basic unit of this program is the Revolutionary Development team. Each team is composed of 59 men and is armed for self-defense. When a team arrives in a recently secured area, it helps to establish local security, identifies and weeds out any remaining Viet Cong, and initiates the development program.

Among the accomplishments of the program are: holding local elections of hamlet and village officials by secret ballot, creating economic development projects, and the fostering of physical security.

One measure of the importance of this program is the Viet Cong effort to oppose it. Nearly 400 attacks

on Revolutionary Development teams were mounted by the Viet Cong in the first 5 months of 1967, at a cost to the Communists of 506 known killed by Revolutionary Development resistance. (The Revolutionary Development program will be described in a forthcoming *Vietnam Review*.)

In connection with these efforts, the Government has recognized the need to provide clearly understood opportunities for those who have been associated with the Communists to return to the side of the Government. To this end it has instituted two major programs of reconciliation. The first of these is known as the *Chieu Hoi* (Open Arms) program and the second the *Doan Ket* (National Reconciliation) program.

CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) PROGRAM

The *Chieu Hoi* program began as early as 1963. In April of that year President Diem announced an amnesty for those members of the Viet Cong who would return to the side of the Government. This program was initially well received, and more than 5,700 Viet Cong accepted the opportunity to return in the first 4 months of the program (May 1 to August 31, 1963).

The unstable political conditions in the last half of the year, along with Communist military successes, caused the number of returnees to drop sharply. Only 1,400 Viet Cong returned in the last 4 months of 1963. In 1964 fewer than 5,500 were returnees.

With the arrival of large numbers of combat troops from the United States and other allied countries, the failure of the Communists to win the promised quick victory, and the establishment of a stable government in Saigon, the number of defectors again increased. In 1965 more than 11,000 Viet Cong defected to the Government. The number of defectors nearly doubled again in 1966, to more than 20,000. The first 6 months of 1967 show a large increase, with 19,500 returnees as of July 22.

Rehabilitation Under Chieu Hoi

The Government has established reception centers for returnees in each of the 44 mainland provinces, in three autonomous cities, in four regional locations, and in one national center in Saigon. These 52 centers have a yearly capacity of 45,000 returnees based on six 2-month cycles.

When the returnee, known as a *Hoi Chanh*, arrives at a reception center, he is carefully interviewed to

determine his sincerity in coming over to the Government and to develop information about the Viet Cong operations in the area. He is given food, clothing, housing, medical care if needed, and a cash allowance for incidental expenses. If he has brought along weapons or significant documents, he is given a cash reward.

Once he is settled at the camp, the rehabilitation process begins. The *Hoi Chanh* is indoctrinated in the aims and purposes of the Government and the role of the allied forces in the war. The returnee is encouraged to plan for his own future.

Most of the returnees go back to their home villages and resume their old occupations, generally farming. The Government will assist the returnee with food and farming supplies and a resettlement allowance. If he has no home, or if his home is in Viet Cong territory, he may settle in a special *Chieu Hoi* village. Here he will receive a house, some land, and subsistence for 6 months for himself and his family.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM (*Doan Ket*)

To give effect to its new appeal to the Viet Cong, announced at Honolulu, to "join in this national revolutionary adventure," the South Vietnamese Government this year promulgated a National Reconciliation program, known as *Doan Ket*. In a proclamation issued on April 19, 1967, Prime Minister Ky set out the basic points of the program in these terms:

National Community: The blood ties of the Vietnamese people demand tolerance rather than hatred.

National Concord: Disputes will be settled by democratic means.

National Progress: The social revolution being carried out by the Republic will bring social justice and economic progress.

In its proclamation the Government announced expansion of the amnesty program already in effect for members of the Viet Cong, and offered them the opportunity to participate in the reconstruction and development of the country. The three principal points of the offer were:

"First, all those who decide to leave the ranks of the Communists and reintegrate in the national community will be warmly welcomed as *citizens with full rights of citizenship*. . . .

"Second, the citizens who rally to the national cause



Appeals to surrender and safe-conduct passes are dropped over areas where Viet Cong are known to be operating.



Former Viet Cong members head for a collection point, first stop for those who surrender under the *Chieu Hoi* program.



will be employed in accordance with their ability. . . .

“Third, the citizens who rally to the national cause but who have violated the law under Communist coercion or deception, whether they have been convicted or not, will enjoy all the guarantees set forth in the Constitution.”

The *Doan Ket* program is based on the idea that the Government has begun to attract support from individuals working with the Viet Cong by offering reforms which are eliminating valid grievances. The *Doan Ket* program offers more to the middle and upper ranks of the Viet Cong hierarchy than does the *Chieu Hoi* amnesty program which had already been operating for some time. The provision that returnees are to be employed in accordance with their ability, presumably in positions at a level comparable to those they held in the Viet Cong, provides the necessary self-interest consideration for some higher ranking Viet Cong. The returnees, once they have been rehabilitated, have all the rights of citizens, including the right to vote.

The highest ranking Viet Cong who has returned to the Government thus far is a Viet Cong regimental commander now employed by the Ministry of Information in the *Chieu Hoi* program.

WHO DEFECTS AND WHY

Most of the returnees have been lower ranking Viet Cong military and political personnel. Recruits and draftees comprise a large percentage of the returnees. The higher ranking Viet Cong have not begun to defect in significant numbers.

Many reasons have been cited by returnees for defecting. Among the most important are:

Hardship. The guerrilla forces are constantly on the move, and usually short of food and medicine.

Disillusionment. The Viet Cong have been unable to keep their promise of a quick victory, and their methodical use of terrorism against the villagers is repugnant to some of their sympathizers.

Family. The Vietnamese have a particularly strong attachment to their homes and families. They do not like to serve in areas away from their homes. In addition, the Viet Cong are increasingly drafting women and children for military service and forced labor, and these pressures on his family may persuade the father to defect with them.

Military pressure. The Government and allied

forces are growing in strength, and many of the Viet Cong are beginning to realize they cannot win the war.

Most of the defectors have been from the Viet Cong guerrilla units and political cadre. The regular North Vietnamese units have few defections, and the main force Viet Cong units have fewer than the part-time troops. This is attributed to several factors:

Regulars do not have as much opportunity as do guerrillas to defect. It is not difficult for a part-time guerrilla who lives at home to go over to the Government forces.

Regular units are under closer control. It is not easy to reach them with propaganda. These soldiers are not allowed to listen to Government broadcasts or to read information leaflets.

North Vietnamese do not have homes or families to return to in South Vietnam. All regular units tend to develop a camaraderie from long periods of close association and interdependence.

Captured documents have shown that the Viet Cong are worried by the success of the *Chieu Hoi* program. Special sessions are now held for Communist political officers to help them counter the *Chieu Hoi* efforts. In some cases, soldiers have been ordered to beat on pans to drown out loudspeaker broadcasts. And while Viet Cong propaganda derides the returnees as cowards, it does offer to take them back.

U.S. SUPPORTS RECONCILIATION


The United States has assisted the Government of Vietnam in supporting the *Chieu Hoi* program since its inception. The Agency for International Development (AID) initially provided approximately U.S. \$400,000 for construction of the provincial centers. AID also provides the centers with office supplies, instructional materials, surplus food, and building materials.

Each province has an American adviser who assists in administration of the center. The Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) assists the Government in attracting returnees. The information campaigns are often developed with the cooperation of JUSPAO.

The Vietnamese Ministry of Information and *Chieu Hoi* administers the program. The budget for 1967 is U.S. \$11.3 million, of which one-fourth is contributed by AID. The administration of the program



These former Viet Cong fighters enjoy a hearty meal in a *Chieu Hoi* rehabilitation camp in South Vietnam.



Radio repairing is one of the skills taught to *Hoi Chanh*, Viet Cong returnees, at *Chieu Hoi* (Open Arms) training centers.

is entirely Vietnamese, although the United States does support the program with financial and material resources and administrative advisers.

The success of the *Chieu Hoi* program with the lower ranking Viet Cong was one of the reasons for the expansion of the program under *Doan Ket*. The Government is working to expand vocational training programs at reception centers and to improve the system of resettlement allowances.

While the programs laying the basis for national reconciliation in Vietnam will continue to receive substantial U.S. support, their ultimate success will rest on the vigor and wisdom with which they are carried out by the Government of Vietnam.

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VIETNAM REVIEW 10

NOVEMBER 1968

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COMMUNIST "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"

Adapted From U.S. Department of State
"Vietnam Information Notes" Series

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The pattern for Communist "wars of national liberation" was established during World War II when the Communist guerrilla forces in Nazi-occupied countries joined the fight for liberation under the orders of the Soviet Politburo (Political Bureau). Almost all so-called "national liberation wars" since then have been characterized by a similar command relationship between the party political leadership and the military.

By the end of the 1950s it became clear to the Communist world that it could not succeed in the open, direct conquest of other countries. Thus, in January 1961, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev spelled out the new Soviet position on war:

"In modern conditions the following categories of wars should be distinguished: world wars, local wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings. This is necessary to work out the correct tactics with regard to these wars. . . .

"Now a word about national liberation wars . . . Can such wars flare up in the future? They can . . . But these are wars which are national uprisings. In other words, can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one . . . The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles."

Soviet foreign policy has been complicated by the ideological divisions which have developed since the mid-1950s between the U.S.S.R. and Red China. Chinese and Soviet Communists differ substantially in their views as to how communism should be brought to the rest of the world. This difference was spelled out by Communist China's Vice Premier and Defense Minister Lin Piao, in his famous "Manifesto" of September 1965. Lin pointed out that while the Soviet revolution began with armed uprisings in the cities, and then spread to the countryside, the Chinese revolution won nationwide victory through encirclement of the cities from the rural areas and then capture of the cities.

The Chinese insist that victory is impossible without armed insurgency, preferably agrarian in origin. They place great

stress on the importance of the paramilitary and guerrilla apparatus, sometimes at the expense of the political machinery. From the Chinese viewpoint, revolutionary political leadership must emerge from the ranks of the insurgents.

The Russians, on the other hand, place their primary emphasis on political subversion, both in its overt and covert aspects, although by no means to the exclusion of force or the threat of force. The difference is one of emphasis. But it is important, because it means that history has made Soviet strategy concentrate on urban centers and the industrial worker, while the Red Chinese method begins with the rural areas and the peasantry.

Characteristics

"National liberation wars" have these characteristics which distinguish them from conventional military clashes:

- All have been waged to forcibly overthrow a legally established government.
- Elements of the indigenous population have supplied some of the insurgent leadership and combat forces.
- All have involved the use of terror and guerrilla warfare by trained civilians who often wore no distinctive uniforms.
- In every case political goals determined military objectives.

General Vo Nguyen Giap, in his *People's War*, and the Hanoi government in its official history, state five "lessons" in preparing for Communist-inspired "wars of national liberation":

1. Careful preparation in ideology and administrative control (including training of cadres, building up bases of resistance, and the organization of armed forces).
2. Careful timing in seizing the right opportunity.

3. "Launching the revolutionary high tide of the people"—i.e., including in the trained cadres representatives of "all classes, all nationalities, and all religions."

4. Skillful use of all forms of armed struggle combined with all forms of political struggle, shifting emphasis from one to the other often enough to keep the opposition off balance.

5. Full use of the vulnerability in the enemy ranks, and spearheading the forces at the "main enemy."

Immune Aggressors

Although the United Nations is charged with maintaining international peace and security and with taking such measures that may be required to meet its aim, "wars of national liberation" pose special problems. The aggressors do not respect the United Nations' authority to deal in such matters. In addition, the use of the veto power in the Security Council often has prevented the use of peacekeeping machinery.

Any government in power, faced with armed insurrection it cannot control, must therefore appeal for outside help.

The United States has considered it in its national interest to respond to such calls for aid, even though aware that each time this happened, the danger emerged of the conflict flaring into a large war involving the major powers.

Since 1945 there have been at least 14 insurgencies, or "wars of national liberation," . . . all undeclared—a surprisingly large number for a world which by legal definition has been at peace. Chronologically, the principal ones have been as follows:

- The French war in Vietnam (1946–1954).
- The civil war in China (1945–1949).
- The Greek civil war (1946–1949).
- The Huk campaign in the Philippines (1946–1956).
- The Dutch-Indonesian conflict (1947–1949), where the Communist role was not dominant.
- The Malayan insurrection (1949–1959).
- The Korean war (1950–1953), which, while essentially a conventional war, North Korea has tried to portray as a "war of liberation."
- The civil war in Cuba (1954–1959).
- The Algerian war (1954–1962), where direct Communist involvement was small, but where Soviet diplomatic gains proved to be enormous.
- The war in South Vietnam.
- Two civil wars in the Congo (1960 and 1964), where Communist participation was small.
- Major insurgency in Venezuela (1961–1963).
- Insurgency in Guatemala (1964 to present).

U.S. Policy

As the "war of liberation" became increasingly exploited by the Communist forces, it necessarily evoked a corresponding increase in the response from the United States. The contest which has been developing in Vietnam since 1954 became the vortex of the struggle. As the Communist offensive was mounted out of North Vietnam, the issue was accurately described by General Giap as follows:


"South Vietnam is the example for national liberation movements of our times . . . If it proves possible



Laotian soldiers guard North Vietnamese Regular Army troops after capturing them guarding supplies of Chinese weapons.



Filipinos search village wreckage after a Communist-led Hukbalahap guerrilla raid terrorized Manila area in late 1950.



Chinese military markings are plainly visible on these recoilless rifle shells found hidden in South Vietnam caves.

to defeat the 'Special Warfare' tested in South Vietnam by the American imperialists, this will mean that it can be defeated everywhere else as well."

Backing up Giap and expounding on his thesis that encirclement of the cities from the rural areas is applicable on a global basis, Red China's Lin Piao argues in his Manifesto that the "rural areas of the world" today are Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The "cities of the world" are Western Europe and North America . . . The focus today of the Communist revolutionary movement against the United States, according to Lin, is Vietnam.

Should North Vietnam succeed in subverting South Vietnam, other non-Communist countries in the area will undoubtedly come under more direct attack and increased attempts at subversion.

With this in mind, United States policy has developed along two lines:

1. It has been the U.S. position from the time of the Geneva conference of 1954 that the people of South Vietnam (and indeed in all divided countries) have the right to choose freely their type of government. At the Geneva conference the representative of the State of Vietnam . . . declared his government's unwillingness to be bound by any agreement between the other parties concerning the political future of the people of South Vietnam. Tran Van Do, the esteemed statesman then representing the State of Vietnam,

protested that others had arrogated to themselves "the right, without prior agreement from the delegation of the State of Vietnam, to fix the date of the future elections despite the clearly political character of such a provision.

"The delegation of the State of Vietnam has put forward its proposals aimed at obtaining an armistice without partition, even temporary, of Vietnam, by means of the disarmament of all the belligerent forces after their withdrawal into assembly areas as restricted as possible, and by the establishment of temporary control by the United Nations organization over the whole of the territory until such time as the restoration of order and peace permits the Vietnamese people to decide its future by free election," he continued.

"Consequently, the Government of the State of Vietnam demands that it should be put on record that it protests solemnly against the way in which the armistice was concluded and against the conditions of this armistice, which takes no account of the profound aspirations of the Vietnamese people, and that it reserves complete freedom of action for safeguarding the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to territorial unity, independence, and freedom."

As a result of the election impasse, Vietnam remained divided, and the Communists prepared for what they were to call the "war of national liberation" in the South.

2. As an outgrowth of the U.S. stand in favor of self-determination and against the introduction of force by the Communists, it became increasingly imperative for the United States to demonstrate that the "war of liberation" technique, far from being cheap, safe, and disavowable, is costly, dangerous, and must of necessity for free-world security be doomed to failure.

Counterstrategy

To combat the Communist "war of liberation" against the Government in South Vietnam, the United States and its allies have relied on a four-point strategy:

1. *Increasing the effectiveness of ground forces in South Vietnam.*

2. *The use of airpower against North Vietnam.* U.S. bombing tactics have not been aimed at destroying or changing the government in the North, or in conquering it—the bombing is primarily intended to impede and make more costly the operations against the South, and to give Hanoi an incentive for ending these operations altogether.

3. *Nonmilitary activities.* South Vietnam was vulnerable to the "war of national liberation" technique because of political, economic, and social instability. The contest will not be won until these conditions are corrected . . . by the South Vietnamese. An important step forward was taken when the people of South Vietnam elected a constituent assembly, approved a constitution, and chose a new government.

4. *Efforts to initiate a peaceful settlement . . .* President Johnson often has offered talks without preconditions. Hanoi's response until May 3 was to demand preconditions of its own. The U.S. response, in effect, has been: If Hanoi demands such a precondition as a halt to the bombing, ' United States has a right to ask for assurance that Hanoi' not take military advantage of such a halt.

World-wide Assistance

In other parts of the world, the United States has offered a wide range of assistance in counterinsurgency programs to countries facing possible Communist-inspired upheaval. While the military aspects of these counterinsurgency programs gain most of the attention of the press, they are built first and foremost around social and economic reforms of the sort most needed to give progress to the peasants. One of the most difficult aspects of this is that often in its earliest stages, social progress itself can generate social disorder, testing the durability, patience, and convictions of established government. . . . At this most difficult and vulnerable point the Communist apparatus will attempt to destroy public confidence in the existing regime and to divert popular support to the more violent and seemingly more rapid revolutionary changes through the "war of national liberation." This has repeatedly faced non-Communist governments with the extremely difficult task of trying to push evolutionary reform while fighting revolution.

The U.S. view has been consistently that violence impedes needed change and destroys the necessary machinery for progress. Therefore, the United States on the one hand presses for reform and constructive change, and on the other hand resists Communist-inspired terror and violence which capitalize mercilessly on the need for change.

An International Problem

An incisive description of the problem of coping with so-called "wars of national liberation" was given by Adlai Stevenson in one of his last major speeches. Ambassador Stevenson said:

"Almost by definition, the new style of clandestine-aggression—and the new techniques of subverting legitimate protest movements—lead to greater confusion. The aggressor does not blow a bugle to announce his identity. The agents of aggression may lurk in the jungles or perch on the roofs of narrow streets or mix with civilian crowds in the marketplace.

"The government in power may be non-representative or unpopular. The opposition may be partly legitimate and partly conspiratorial and partly the work of outside powers. Yet the world is too volatile to permit the spread of militant violence and the success of clandestine aggression. And until the international community is ready to rescue the victims of clandestine aggression, national power will be called upon to fill the vacuum in peacekeeping capacity. It is the most costly, the most dangerous and the least desirable kind of peacekeeping—and the sooner it becomes unnecessary the better it will be for all of us."

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VIETNAM REVIEW II

DECEMBER 1969

PACIFICATION IN VIETNAM

Adapted from U.S. Department of State Series
"Viet-Nam Information Notes"

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"The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the broad areas in which the revolutionaries can maneuver freely."

Communist Chinese Defense
Minister Lin Piao

More than half of the population of South Vietnam lives in the countryside. It is here that Viet Cong insurgency has taken root. It is here that shadow governments seek to rule over thousands of hamlets, inflicting terror on approximately 3 million peasant inhabitants.

To combat this threat in the countryside and at the same time defeat the enemy in the field, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) has combined military operations and civil nation-building programs into a unified and coordinated process called "pacification." The aim—

- — to liberate the people from Communist control;
- — to assist them in choosing their own government;
- — to help them carry out various projects that will give them a better and more prosperous life.

Throughout the countryside of South Vietnam the daily results of pacification are reflected in a wide variety of activities. These may include such diverse incidents as:

- — the opening of a health station featuring prenatal care;
- — the issuance of a rifle to a young lad, no more than 16, who has volunteered to join the local militia;
- — the installation by a U.S. civilian engineer of a generator which will bring electricity to a hamlet for the first time;
- — a 20-year-old farmer who had defected from the Viet Cong ranks being welcomed home by his family;
- — the nailing to a tree of a poster announcing forthcoming elections.

Hamlets where incidents such as these take place would be in the "relatively secure" category. How they got that way reflects the blending of military and civil operations to achieve the first essential of pacification — security.

HAMLET PROTECTION

Without continuous local security to keep the Viet Cong (VC) away from the farmer, the rest of pacification cannot get underway. The farmer's first desire is for protection so that he can be left alone to tend to his crops in peace. Protection starts when the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and its allies have eliminated from the area any existing VC or North Vietnam (NVA) enemy main force units. Thereafter, the main responsibility for insuring hamlet security rests with the Popular Forces (PF), the People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF), the Regional Forces (RF), and the National Police (NP).

Creating a secure environment is essentially a matter of people participating in their own defense. The hamlets of Vietnam illustrate the point dramatically. Here members of the Popular Forces, all of them volunteers, . . . guard check points, warehouses, government installations, and key provincial buildings. They rarely go far from their own hamlet.

The People's Self Defense Forces are a mixture of young and old, including women. They number 1.2 million, with

about 200,000 armed and only moderately trained. The PSDF are utilized to gather intelligence and to report information to their superiors. More often they serve as a warning alert system.

As distinct from the PF and PSDF, the Regional Force is a . . . more mobile body whose responsibility for security and protection extends beyond hamlet limits. Also better trained and armed, and more highly organized, the RF continually seeks out and engages the Viet Cong in battle until relieved by superior ARVN or allied military forces. The RF is also called upon to support local actions of the popular forces and people's defense units, to serve as a shield for their operations.

The role of these hamlet defense units may be likened to a combined home guard/national guard militia, having the responsibility of dealing with external threats from VC local forces and guerrilla units.

Still, the threat from within is often more dangerous than the threat from without. To the National Police falls the responsibility not only of maintaining public order but of enforcing internal security — dealing with the threat from within. That means rooting out the Viet Cong infra-structure (VCI) — the Communists' shadow government. Together with all civil and military intelligence services, the NP is joined in a campaign to identify and eliminate the hard-core cadres who make up the VCI in the hamlets. The operation is known as *Phoenix*.

OPERATION PHOENIX

VCI members are not soldiers. They are the leadership elements who run the Communist political apparatus, control the guerrilla bands, collect taxes, order assassinations, set up front organizations, draft young men and women as soldiers or laborers, disseminate propaganda, and direct terror campaigns.

Operation Phoenix is not an organization but a program — a systematized method of intelligence-sharing among the already existing services, mainly the National Police elements assigned to the countryside and the numerous Vietnamese military intelligence services. It is a Vietnamese government program to cripple and eventually eliminate the VC political control structure by getting various intelligence and information services to work together.

While the pooling of intelligence is commonplace in arenas of war, it cannot be effective without an intelligence coordinating and operating system. *Phoenix* now has such a system, built around 270 centers scattered throughout the countryside.



Security briefing and weapons training is given hamlet militia by members of Revolutionary Development Team.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

To liberate the countryside from Communist control, to destroy the VCI, and to maintain constant vigil against VC infiltration — these efforts by themselves are not enough. Hand in hand must go vigorous and sustained action to involve the people in creating their own local government and, beyond that, generating economic and social development programs. The name given to this activity is Revolutionary Development (RD).

Although essentially and predominantly a Vietnamese program, the RD effort is supported by the United States and other free world assistance missions. Under the overall coordination of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), American aid and technical advice is funneled through U.S. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) — an inter-agency management group which combines the efforts of the Agency for International Development (AID), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), several U.S. Embassy offices, and the non-combat provincial advisory teams of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Carrying out the goals of the Revolutionary Development programs are the RD Cadre — some 55,000 villagers, trained and organized in 30-man teams, and operating under the



In secure hamlet, farmers and members of Revolutionary Development Team dig drainage ditches along the roads.



Working together, villagers and members of Revolutionary Development Teams are building houses throughout nation.

command of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD) in Saigon.

The point needs to be underscored that RD, like the war itself, is basically a Vietnamese effort. Nothing illustrates the principle more clearly than what the RD program is trying to accomplish in the area of self-help projects. The real objective is not merely to build schools, health stations, and market places in the hamlets and villages but to mobilize the rural population in a community effort under the security provided by the GVN and with the help of GVN-provided resources.

VILLAGE GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT

The village for centuries has been the basic social and political unit of Vietnamese society. It is that today. But never before has village government assumed such expanding authority and taken such long steps toward full representative democracy.

Since the adoption of the Constitution in April 1967, elections have been held in 1,693 villages and in 7,867 hamlets. Before 1969 ends, elections are expected to be held in 130 more villages and another 889 hamlets.

CHIEU HOI

Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) is an amnesty program aimed at causing defections among the VC. Under this program, the Returnees, called *Hoi Chanh*s, are given the opportunity to join the national cause and to become full-fledged citizens. Chieu Hoi is designed to give the insurgents an alternative to continued fighting, to deplete the VC manpower base, to weaken the VC organization, and to cause dissension and distrust among the Viet Cong. It also provides the GVN and free world forces with manpower and intelligence.

The Chieu Hoi program was officially established by the GVN in April 1963. Since then the program has rallied more than 100,000 *Hoi Chanh*s. Chieu Hoi added the equivalent of an additional 13 divisions to the total enemy losses in the war.

Many of the Returnees elect to join the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Many also join the Armed Propaganda Teams which go into VC-held territory to recruit more defectors. Others join the Kit Carson Scouts, who are former VC now serving as lead scouts and guides with U.S. combat troops.



Revolutionary Development Team members not only help to build schools, they also assist in teaching the students.



An advisor of the Agency for International Development goes over plans for village housing with townspeople.

HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM

Is pacification making progress?

A plan for evaluating what is really happening in the countryside, hamlet by hamlet, was introduced in 1967 by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The plan is known as the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Eighteen key factors are subjected to computer analysis for each hamlet.

The data are assembled at regular intervals by MACV District Advisors who live in close contact with the villages and hamlets in their region.

HES is admittedly an imperfect instrument. It cannot determine absolutes. It cannot evaluate such human elements as popular attitudes, social awareness, and the "hearts and minds" of the peasants.

Still, HES provides useful insights into trends of pacification. The direction, with the major exception of the Tet offensive, has been consistently forward as shown in the following table:

4

	No. of Secure Hamlets	% of Population Secure
December 1967	5,340	66.9
March 1968	4,559	61.0
December 1968	6,425	76.3
March 1969	7,212	82.1
April 1969	7,393	83.3

Thus, over a period of months, the HES has indicated improvement in security — the first essential in the pacification of the Vietnam countryside and the prime requisite in the subsequent development of political, social, and economic institutions. The costs in both human and material terms are high. And progress, not to mention ultimate victory, will continue to depend on the energy, the endurance, and the sacrifices which the Vietnamese people are willing to suffer as the price for their freedom.