




# COMMANDER'S DIGEST

VOL. 18, NO. 14, OCTOBER 2, 1975



# WHY DOD NEEDS NEW CALL- UP AUTHORITY



During annual training duty, Air Force Reservists, above, load cargo on a C-141 aircraft at Travis Air Force Base, California. Marine Reservists, below, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, use dry nets to simulate transfer from a troop carrier to a landing craft.



The Selected Reserve Bill (SR 2115) is a legislative proposal of utmost importance in establishing the Reserves as a credible and viable part of our Total Force. The term "Reserves" used here and throughout the text encompasses all Reserve components, including the Army and Air National Guard.

In summary, the proposed Bill would give the President the authority, without a prior declaration of war or national emergency, to order not more than 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for not more than 90 days. It would permit the activation of units of any size and of individuals not assigned to units, thus giving the President the flexibility to respond to a variety of circumstances. Approval by State or Territory Governors would not be required for activation of the National Guard under this authorization.

Present authority for activating large numbers of Selected Reservists is restrictive. Without a declaration of war or national emergency, members of the Selected Reserve can be ordered to active duty for only 15 days annually. When using the National Guard in this context, approval of the appropriate State or Territorial Governor is also

required. Thus, the scope of the current authority is too limited to provide the flexibility to respond appropriately in those situations where a limited augmentation of the active force is needed, but where the declaration of a state of national emergency might be premature or have undesirable international or domestic impact. In such situations, the President must rely upon volunteers to augment the active forces. The volunteer response of Reservists in the past has been heartening, but the risks and limitations of a

## ESTABLISHING the GUARD/ RESERVE as a



The Army ship "Resolve" is used for training Reservists.



North Carolina Guardsmen execute echelon maneuvers from an ADC M-59 during an annual training test.

# CREDIBLE & VIABLE

## PART of the TOTAL FORCE

volunteer concept are all too apparent. This is particularly true when activation of entire units is required, or when special skills are needed.

Many people—including many military people—have the perception that a Reserve mobilization is, by definition, a massive action involving a large-scale commitment of national resources that would be undertaken only under the most extreme circumstances. It is true that prior to and following World War II—in fact, until the early

1960s—the basic Reserve concept did indeed involve large Reserve forces that would provide a base for a general mobilization of the type which occurred during the World War II. Training levels were low, many units were poorly equipped and were manned at 50 per cent or less of wartime strength, and considerable post-mobilization training was required. There was little, if any, integration of the Reserves into the active force structure.

Now this has changed. Our national security policy, which is based on a

by  
William K. Brehm  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

concept of deterrence, requires that we have a force of sufficient size and capability to maintain an effective strategic and conventional balance. To get the most for each manpower dollar—and manpower now consumes more than half of the Defense dollar—we are necessarily increasing our reliance on the Reserve components. Consequently, we have given the Reserves important front-line missions which must be performed in conjunction with the active forces—selectively, and on short notice.

If the requested legislation is passed, it should become clear to all that our options will now include a discrete and selective mobilization capability tailored to meet the requirements of particular situations. This is as

it should be in a modern, fully-integrated Total Force. The Reserves must be trained and equipped to perform their missions promptly, and they must be available for rapid and selective mobilization, regardless of the political situation. We cannot afford to spend \$5.5 billion annually on a force oriented solely toward a lengthy mobilization of the type envisioned in the past.

The integration of active and Reserve component forces has involved the assignment to the Reserves of important strategic and



**Marine Reservists establish a defensive perimeter around a truck during an annual training exercise.**








**Air National Guardsmen in Fargo, North Dakota, install impulse cartridges into the belly of an F-101 Voodoo aircraft.**

tactical missions—missions which require rapid, assured, and selective availability. By the end of FY 1976, for example, 56 per cent of our tactical airlift aircraft and 43 per cent of our strategic airlift crews will be assigned to Guard and Reserve forces.

Over the next few years, 128 KC-135 jet tanker aircraft will be transferred from the active Air Force to the Guard and Reserve, placing them in the strategic offensive mission for the first time. Even now, Selected Reserve units of the Reserve components account for 30 per cent of our forces, and the Selected Reserve together with the individual Ready Reserve comprise nearly 50 per cent of the trained manpower

available for national security emergencies.

Given the traditional role of the Reserves, there has been a natural reluctance on the part of the active forces to depend on them and to transfer important missions to them. We need to change the underlying perception that engenders this reluctance or concern, once and for all, because the role of the Reserves has been changed. The Reserves themselves must perceive that they can and will be called upon when needed. Their morale, training and sense of purpose depend on it.



**Army Reservists perform maintenance work on an engine.**

An Air Force pararescue Reservist trains at Luke AFB, Arizona. The Naval Reserve personnel officer (bottom) is a flight engineer in civilian life.



Given the increased reliance we are placing on our Reserve components, it is also important that our Allies have confidence that they will be available if needed. We have reduced our active forces by over 22 per cent from 1964 levels, the last pre-Vietnam year. Yet, as the Secretary of Defense has said, the world today is not a particularly safer place in which to live than it was then. Rest assured, our Allies are very aware of both these factors.

Finally, our potential adversaries must have no doubt as to the availability of

our Reserve forces. Both strategic and conventional deterrence depend on the perception that an effective balance of strength exists between the opposing sides. Anything short of absolute certainty that our active or Reserve forces will be used when and as the situation dictates places deterrence in jeopardy.

In thinking of examples where the proposed authority might be used, we are obviously unable to say with precision how many Reservists would actually be called in any particular situation. The authority is intended to be used flexibly and in response to the particular needs of a given contingency. The full scope of 50,000 would accommodate an Army division force or, alternatively, all of our Reserve mobility forces. To increase the manning of Army truck and terminal service, companies could require 10,000-20,000. If Reservists were called as sustaining support for an Army corps force, 10,000-15,000 could be required for Navy cargo handling, hauling, and ship control. 2,000-4,000 is the

estimated need. The Air Force would require 8,000-10,000 to augment its strategic airlift capability and 4,000-6,000 for its tactical airlift. Between 3,000 and 5,000 might be required to augment our strategic offensive forces.

In the October 1973 Middle East crisis, 1,850 Reserve volunteers were used to augment our active forces; during the Pueblo incident some 35,280 were used.

The new authority could be used to activate key Reserve units to demonstrate an improved readiness posture in a developing crisis that had the potential of escalating into a full-scale national emergency. Such a step could be particularly useful in light of the reductions we are making under the Nunn Amendment in European support activities; replacement support units-needed early in a Europe reinforcement-could be placed in the Reserve components, brought to active duty in a developing crisis, and held there, or even deployed, all without requiring the President to take the more escalatory step of declaring a national emergency. In short, the range of options would be wider.

**Army Reservists, using live ammunition, fire a light machine gun through the haze of a smoke grenade during a training maneuver.**



The Department of Defense fully intends that the requested authority would be used judiciously. Volunteers would be our first choice for augmenting the active forces. The new authority would not be invoked unless clearly warranted by international events or essential operational

An Air Force Reservist of the 302nd Special Operations Wing at Clinton County Air Force Base, Ohio, teaches a student to overhaul a R-3350 engine.



requirements affecting the national security.

This proposed Bill is in no way inconsistent with the War Powers Resolution. It is not intended to circumvent the Resolution in any manner. If Reserve units were deployed, the reporting requirements of Public Law 93-148 would be met, just as they would under any other type of Reserve mobilization involving deployments.

In summary, the requested authority will help our own forces, our Allies, and our potential adversaries to perceive our Reserve components in their proper light—to accord them the respect that our investment in them, not to mention their

own pride, demands.

Two words, I believe, serve to identify the key motivations for this legislation: options and perceptions.

Options are the key to a rational defense policy. We must have the ability to respond to a provocation with a measured, less-than-all-out response. It is essential that we be able to meet certain contingencies without triggering the international and domestic consequences that declarations of war or national emergency seem to connote.

Perceptions too are vital; full acceptance and support of the Total Force policy by active and Reserve forces alike depend on their belief that the Reserves are a

reliable force that will be available in emergencies.

Finally, if our Total Force has the flexibility to deploy rapidly in a crisis situation, we can reduce the chance of that Force ever being needed for combat, and can assure ourselves of a better outcome if it is.



Vol. 18, No. 14, October 2, 1975  
A publication of the Department of Defense to provide official and professional information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies, programs and interests, and to create better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense.

Published weekly by the American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD (M&RA). Reproduction of content is authorized.

Telephone: (202) OXford 4-5070  
Autovon 224-5070



