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COMMANDERS DIGEST



**Why Defense
Must Sustain
Its Strong Military
Capabilities**

Navy fighter aircraft fly next to a Soviet TU-95 Bear Bomber. In the past decade, the Soviets have pushed forward with their technology and armament production.

A STRONG



By
Gen. George S. Brown, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**National
Security is
Dependent Upon**

DEFENSE



At the University of Notre Dame, in May, President Carter emphasized that U.S. foreign policy can be based on our Nation's fundamental values—that it can be humane, decent, and optimistic. In particular, he outlined five principal areas of emphasis:

- Human rights;
- Strong bonds among the democracies of the world;
- A halt to the strategic arms race;
- Peace in the Middle East, and
- Reducing the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

(Continued on page 5)

DEFENSE NEWS BRIEFS

F-15 Eagles to Netherlands

Air Force is re-equipping the 32nd Tactical Fighter Squadron at Camp New Amsterdam, Netherlands, with the new F-15 air superiority fighter.

The 32nd is currently flying 18 F-4E Phantoms. The change-over will be completed by January 1979 and is mostly in terms of flying equipment. Neither the numbers nor the mission will change.

Air Force also said that personnel transfers will be kept to a minimum, with a large portion of the 32nd's aircrew and maintenance personnel to be cross-trained into the F-15 weapon system.

New Attack Submarine Is "San Francisco"

Navy's newest submarine, named the San Francisco (SSN-711), is a Los Angeles class submarine. It will be the 18th of the class whose lead ship was commissioned last year. Scheduled for launching in spring 1979 and commissioning during summer 1980, the San Francisco is a nuclear-powered attack submarine designed to destroy enemy ships, primarily submarines.

The last ship to bear the name "San Francisco" was a World War II heavy cruiser that won 17 battle stars and a Presidential Unit Citation before being decommissioned in 1946.

Choppers To Nigeria

The Department of Defense has notified Congress of a proposal to sell Nigeria seven model 161 CH-47C helicopters and support equipment at an estimated total value of \$46.5 million.

Army Deployment To Support NATO

Army is permanently deploying to Europe in early 1978 the equivalent of one eight-inch field artillery battalion from Ft. Riley, Kan., and Ft. Sill, Okla.

This is an Army initiative to increase the immediate firepower capability of U.S. Army forces forward-deployed to support NATO.



Army to Close Two ROTC Units

The Department of the Army has disestablished two senior (ROTC) Reserve Officer Training Corps units in Texas and Oklahoma. The reason being the two schools have had less than 17 students enrolled in their third year of military science for five consecutive academic years.

The schools are Tarleton State University at Stephenville, Texas, and Oklahoma Panhandle State University at Goodwell, Okla.

Students currently enrolled in their final year of military science will be allowed to complete their studies.

Army still has 280 senior ROTC units at colleges and universities across the country.

Armed Forces "Efforts" Total 441 "Saves"

Armed Forces life-saving efforts in the first nine months of 1977 amounted to 441 "saves," the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center at Scott AFB, Ill. reports.

The total includes operations by the active duty Armed Forces, Coast Guard, National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and the Civil Air Patrol. Most rescue operations were coordinated efforts with civilian rescue organizations.

Rescues ranged from automobile accident victims to lost aircraft and sailing vessels, to rescue of seamen, mountaineers and downed balloonists.

DoD Proposes to Sell Cobra/TOW to Israel

The Department of Defense has notified Congress of a proposal to sell to Israel \$81.4 million worth of AH-1S Cobra/TOW helicopters, plus support equipment, spare parts and armament.

Notification was made Oct. 12, 1977, in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, which gives Congress 30 days to study the proposal and make its decision.

Trident Missile Test Successful

The eighth flight test of the Navy's new long-range, submarine-launched TRIDENT ballistic missile was successfully test-fired down the Atlantic Ocean range in October. All three stages functioned as intended and the instrument package hit the target area.

Navy plans for the first 20 to 26 TRIDENT flights to be from the launch pad before beginning submarine launches, first with a POSEIDON submarine, and later with the TRIDENT submarine.

(Continued from page 3)

These policies are being pursued in a world that the President's National Security Adviser, Dr. Brzezinski, described before entering the government as "hostile." He also has acknowledged that the policy shifts required to achieve long-range U.S. goals may have some temporary and unsettling side effects.

Actions to implement U.S. government policy in such an environment bear importantly on our national security, and on our defense posture.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown recently described our current national security policy. In that policy statement, several points stand out.

First, in the safer, more peaceful world sought by the Administration, emphasis is to be placed on arms control, and on explicit support for the advancement of human rights and freedom. Thus, basic values that have long distinguished this country are to be stressed.

Second, U.S. policy recognizes that neither peace nor freedom are likely to grow if their protectors are weak. The goals of peace and freedom are best advanced by maintaining sufficient military strength.

Third, while emphases and priorities have changed somewhat, overall U.S. policy shifts to date have been evolutionary. In fact, Secretary Brown reaffirmed the overall continuity between the current policy and that of previous administrations.

Long-Range Goal

The long-range goal of arms reduction is a central policy of our government, and has been for a number of years. President Carter, by his words and deeds, has strongly emphasized this aspect of our security policy.

This search for ways to control the increase in numbers of weapons, their destructiveness, and their proliferation reflects policy continuity. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been staunch supporters of strategic arms limitations. This

support stems from recognition that if agreements are equitable and verifiable, national security interests are served while the national treasury is spared some of the expense of defense.

Mutual and verifiable reduction of strategic nuclear arms is a desirable, and, I believe, an achievable goal. However, we must be cognizant of Soviet actions and the risks they entail. Every policy, every strategy, every action entails some risk. Our task is to insure that the risk remains at a prudent level. We must be watchful that the earnestness of our wish does not blur our vision, or color our judgment.

Another important strategic aspect of arms limitations is the effect that our efforts can have upon our allies. The strategic umbrella we have provided to our allies since World War II is, and continues to be, an essential component of their security—and of stability in the world. If we are to seek a more peaceful and secure world, and if we are to reaffirm our commitment to our allies, we must consider the impact of any arms limitation agreement on them.

As we proceed toward a second Strategic Arms Limitations Talks

Nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines, such as this "Echo I" is an example of how the Soviets have modernized their nuclear force in the past few years.



(SALT) agreement, and possible reductions from current strategic armament levels, the sense of American technological predominance is no longer as valid as it once was. In the past decade, the Soviets have surged forward in technology and production. Their strategic nuclear technology is good, and the number of Soviet weapons has increased dramatically. From rather severe inferiority, they have progressed to a position of rough equivalence. And still they improve.

Secretary Brown has pointed out that the Soviets are deploying 100 to 150 first-class, fourth-generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) a year. When we were deploying ICBMs at that rate about 15 years ago, we thought it quite an achievement. Since then, our strategic forces have not increased in size or quality to any comparable degree. One would have to say that today, the Soviets have the greater momentum in modernizing their strategic nuclear forces.

Moreover, and more ominous, they are developing four new ICBMs, and are continuing to work on other offensive systems.

But this is not all. The Soviets now have an operational capability to destroy certain U.S. satellites in space. This is particularly troublesome because it could interfere with critical wartime operations and communications.

The Soviets recent naval improvements are indeed striking. Here, a Soviet "Kashin" Class destroyer (top left), along with a "Sam Kotlin" Class destroyer and "Elyena" Class tanker take part in an operation. A "Kara" Class guided missile mixed light cruiser (right) is tied up to a Soviet merchant ship.



**WHAT THEY
ARE SAYING . . .**

6 A major advance in the hardware area is the fact that we are entering into an area of computational plenty fostered by the explosion of silicon integrated circuit technology. The commercial world is already exploiting this revolution (e.g., video games, digital watches, and pocket calculators). 9

—Harold F. O'Neil Jr., Cybernetics Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation, House Committee on Science and Technology, Oct. 13, 1977.



Serious Challenge

Without question, Soviet efforts in strategic nuclear weaponry and space portend a serious challenge for the future and is of concern.

There is uncertainty about why the Soviets pursue these efforts. From our viewpoint, their current capabilities go substantially beyond what we would expect for deterrence. Yet still they grow. Further, we are uncertain whether Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance are consonant with our own. Do they now perceive equivalence—or disparity? In which direction? Do they seek equivalence, or are they pursuing a measure of overall superiority?

Secretary Brown put it clearly when he said: "Great caution and careful hedging are essential in the face of these uncertainties." I share that view, as do the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Soviet initiatives and their increasing strength have not been limited to strategic forces. In the past decade, they have increased the size and sophistication of their conventional forces at an impressive rate. Today, they have a growing, strong, high-quality, modern conventional force—a force that has demonstrated increasing offensive capabilities.

In the past, as a counterbalance to massive Soviet conventional forces in Europe, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had strategic nuclear predominance and superior quality of conventional forces. Today, the situation is different. Strategic nuclear

“In addition, and importantly for the United States, warships will be entitled to transit the Canal (Panama Canal) regardless of their propulsion, origin and destination, armament or cargo. Furthermore, U.S. naval vessels are granted rights “expeditiously” to transit the Canal—which we interpret to mean priority in the case of a traffic jam.”

—Graham Claytor Jr., Secretary of the Navy, before the Kiwanis Club of Atlanta and the Navy League Luncheon at Atlanta, Oct. 18, 1977.

“Our Nation, although more capable than most of being economically self-sustaining, has lived by the international sea lanes since its inception. That is why we founded a Navy in 1775, and fought wars to keep the seas open to merchant vessels.”

—Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, at the commissioning ceremonies of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in Norfolk, Va., Oct. 18, 1977.

parity and the much-improved quality of Soviet forces present a different challenge to the United States and its NATO allies.

NATO is a strong partnership. The forces of the NATO nations are of high quality. There are, however, acknowledged deficiencies—but also recognition of a need to address them. Modest increases of three per cent growth in real terms annually in the defense commitments of member nations have been pledged by all.

Yet even with these proposed improvements, there is still cause for concern. Overall, Soviet growth in conventional military power continues to outpace our own and that of our allies. Their increasing capabilities for offensive tactical air operations, their growing strategic airlift capability, and their recent naval improvements are indeed striking. They are also active in civil defense.

These increased capabilities—and the forces and equipment that make them possible—are not the result of recent surges or catch-up actions. They are the product of steady, consistent growth—of clear Soviet vision of their long-range goals, and a national commitment to achieve them. In such a world, we must not lose sight of our own goals—or of Soviet progress toward theirs. Our strategy must consider both.


Joint Chiefs' Role

In our role as military advisers, the Joint Chiefs assess the military considerations of policy alternatives, and develop appropriate recommendations for the Secretary of Defense and the President. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I sit on the principal committees of the National Security Council (NSC) system, and attend NSC meetings as military adviser to the President and the Council. I express the JCS viewpoint, just as representatives of other government agencies express theirs.

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are represented elsewhere in the



The forces of NATO nations are of high quality and form a strong partnership. Belgium soldiers (top left), instruct U.S. troops in anti-tank techniques. During an Operation Reforger exercise (bottom left), a U.S. soldier simulates firing at an enemy target from the turret of an M-163 Vulcan rapid firing air defense gun. British soldiers (right), install an M-2 bridge unit across the Wesser River in Germany during Reforger.



policy-development process. We have a senior officer representative on the SALT delegation, at Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Europe, and at Law of the Sea negotiations. A retired general officer represented the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. And, of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have representatives in major international organizations in which U.S. national security figures prominently—for example, in NATO military committees, as well as the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, and in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are represented in a number of regularly scheduled consultative meetings—with Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and others.

So the military judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are heard in policy councils. Strategic and operational considerations are made known to decisionmakers.

This does not mean that military judgment always prevails. *It does not.* The law says only that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. The law is quiet on acceptance of such advice. It will come as no surprise that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the B-1 go into production. The call went against us.

As the public record of testimony before Congressional committees shows, the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially recommended against withdrawing U.S. ground combat troops from Korea. We expressed our reservations during the decision-making process early in the year, and in the consultations that followed from the President's decision. The withdrawal program now includes three important elements which have satisfied the JCS concerns.

- First, the withdrawal will be accomplished in such a manner as to maintain the military balance on the peninsula;

- Second, we have publicly pledged to uphold our obligations under the mutual security treaty with the Republic of Korea, and

- Third, we have reaffirmed our intent to remain a Pacific power.

If the above conditions are met, the withdrawal will be accomplished with acceptable security risk in Korea.

The first provision—maintaining the military balance—is the key. It cannot be achieved without actions by the Congress to authorize required equipment transfers and Foreign Military Sales credits for the Republic of Korea. Should we fail to obtain favorable Congressional action, our plans must be reassessed.

Another example of military participation in the policy and decision-making process can be found in the Panama Canal treaties. From the beginning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved with the development of the U. S. negotiating position. I have personally worked hard on the Canal issue for nearly four years. Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—myself among them—recognizes and acknowledges the military importance of the Canal; but from the military point of view, it is the use of the Canal, not its ownership, that is important. In our view, ratification of the treaties will represent a plus for national security.

I provide these preceding examples to make two points:

- First, even in matters that have military impact, military judgment is only part of the information and advice on which a Presidential decision must be made.

- Second, the charge has been leveled from some quarters that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are docile—that is, that we will not speak up. The Joint Chiefs are consulted; JCS views are expressed clearly; when we disagree with a point of view, we express that disagreement within the system, as forcefully and as logically as we can.

What we do not do is “go public” with dissenting views once a decision has been made. Every senior military officer understands the rules of play. Give your best; say what you think; advocate a course of action—and when a decision is made, support it. If a decision is unacceptable, and an officer wishes to speak out publicly—fine. He can take off his uniform, leave active service, and express that disagreement.

I would note one special case. When an officer is called before Congress, and is asked his personal or professional views, it is his duty to respond fully and factually. All members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been in this position more than once.



I don't know a single senior officer—on active duty or not—who would disagree that this is the rule. And there is wide agreement that the rule is a good one. It supports the constitutional principle of civilian control and the military principle of chain of command. It reinforces the climate of discipline and loyalty essential to success in any military enterprise.

And we will need that discipline and loyalty in the years ahead.

Growing Concern

Today, I have a growing concern about the adequacy of our national security and defense efforts. As I look to the future, my concern is even greater. The military trend lines for

the Soviet Union appear to be moving sharply upward in many critical areas—as they have been for years. Ours are turning up also in a number of important areas—though not as sharply, and not for such an extended period.


The current FY 78 Defense Budget is larger, in real terms, than last year's. We expect next year's to reflect real growth as well. However, I am uneasy that we still are not doing enough. Some of the cuts made in recent Defense budgets have been made possible by increased efficiency. Others have come from reducing or eliminating marginal programs. These areas—fairly small—are what our critics call "fat." We welcome them, and continually

National Guard forces participate in an exercise which helps prepare them to maintain national security. U.S. Reserve and National Guard forces are an important part of maintaining freedom and peace.





Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard work together to provide national security. These C-130 cargo aircraft crews prepare to airlift supplies.



COVER: Like ruffled feathers, the maintenance access covers on this F-15 Eagle stand open for inspection. The F-15, an air superiority fighter, helps maintain national security.

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seek them out. Other cuts, however, are in muscle, in force modernization and readiness. With these, we must be very careful.

Many improvements have been made in our forces, but more improvement is needed. Force modernization is proceeding apace in some important areas; but it could well be done more quickly in others—that costs money. Readiness, although at its highest level in recent years, is still not as high as we believe it should be. Improvement requires substantially more investment and operating funds. Our Reserve and National Guard forces, and the mobilization programs on which their deployments are based, require more attention. Our war reserves could be improved. In each of these areas, the added risk from not doing more is modest. But in conjunction with a shifting balance of forces, these risks accumulate, and assume far greater importance.

I do not believe we have to match Soviet spending, or Soviet growth in numbers or strength, on a line-for-line basis. I do not believe our force structure, programs, or strategy should be a mirror image of that of the Soviets. And I do not believe numbers and graphs tell the whole story.

Nonetheless, there is no denying that our principal potential adversary,

the Soviet Union, has not slackened its pace for increased military strength and capabilities. Every responsible analyst and commentator agrees that their military growth is real, that the Soviet Union today fields a mighty force. And all recognize that there has not been like increase in our own capacity.

If we are to realize our national security goals; if we are to achieve our long-term objectives of peace, freedom and a better world for humankind, we must pay the price.

We must be able to deter the Soviet Union from actions counter to our fundamental interests.

We must be able to deter strategic nuclear attack on the United States and our allies.

We must be able to deter conventional attack in Europe.

We must be able to prevent hostile actions against our own territory or forces, or against our allies, in the Pacific.

We must be able to prevent adventurism or conflict elsewhere in the world where our interests of freedom of action are challenged.

None of this can we do from weakness. Strength is the only durable guarantor of peace.

To assure that our nation maintains that strength in the future, we must have a continuing momentum in our defense effort—a momentum in real terms as well as psychologically. Only with such sustained effort can the United States hope to meet successfully the challenges that face this Nation today and seem likely to grow in the future.

