




SECRET//NOFORN//20320501

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

1 May 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000112DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdul A Mohammed
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Abd al-Aziz Sad Muhammad Awshan al-Khalidi, Abdul Aziz Bin Saad, Hussam al-Akeeda
- Place of Birth: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: September 1979
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000112DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) with Transfer Language on 31 March 2006.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee fought on the front lines near Kunduz, Afghanistan (AF), was captured by General Dostum's forces, and held at the Qala-i-Jangi Prison. Detainee has familial ties to al-Qaida operatives and Arab extremists, including two deceased individuals that were on the Saudi government's most-wanted list. Detainee's deceased brother was involved in the kidnapping and murder of a US contractor. Another of

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detainee's brothers, Sulayman Saad Muhammad Awshan al-Khalidi, ISN US9SA-000121DP (SA-121), was on a list of detainees whom the Saudi government designated as high priority, and was transferred from JTF-GTMO in December 2006. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value.

c. (U) **Summary of Changes:** There are no significant changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (U) **Prior History:** Detainee was one exam away from finishing his four-year college degree from al-Imam Muhammad Bin Saoud Islamic University (College of Shariah, Islamic studies). Neither detainee nor his brothers ever served in the Saudi military. Detainee was not married and lived with his parents through college. Detainee received a stipend of 800 Saudi riyals (SAR)¹ per month from the Saudi government for attending the university. Since detainee was the only student with a car, he charged people money to take them places. Detainee also received money from his parents. Detainee only traveled to Mecca, SA, for Hajj.²

b. (S//NF) **Recruitment and Travel:** Detainee was still in Saudi Arabia when the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred. Detainee believed the attacks violated Islamic ethics because the Koran states it is wrong to kill innocent people. Detainee was not personally recruited, but heard from friends about *fatawa* (religious decrees) urging young men to fight abroad. Detainee also overheard other Saudis talking about the conflicts in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and read newspaper articles detailing the suffering of Muslims in those countries.³ Detainee read Shaykh Hamoud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi's *fatwa* calling for people to "defend the Muslims and Islamic nations" against the Northern Alliance (NA) troops of

¹ Analyst Note: Eight hundred Saudi riyals equates to approximately \$215 US.

² IIR 6 034 0344 02, Analyst Note: Hajj, a pilgrimage to Mecca, is one of the five pillars of Islam. Hajj is a religious obligation for Muslims to be accomplished at least once in their lifetime.

³ IIR 6 034 0920 04, IIR 6 034 0344 02, 000112 KB 03-FEB-2002

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Massoud and Dostum.⁴ In November 2001, detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to find his brother and to fight the jihad.⁵ Detainee financed his own trip, taking 5,000 to 6,000 SAR⁶ in addition to his airline tickets.⁷ Detainee traveled with Nasser Bin Naji al-Yamani (NFI) from Riyadh to the Afghan border, via Damascus, Syria (SY); followed by Tehran, Mashhad, and Tayyabad, Iran (IR). When the two reached the border of Afghanistan, the border guards instructed a taxi driver to take them to a guesthouse in Herat, AF. The guards also told detainee and Nasser their point of contact in Herat would be Abdel Hannan.⁸ Detainee and his companion stayed one night at a guesthouse in Herat run by Khayr-Allah. They traveled to Kabul, AF, and stayed at an unidentified guesthouse for about a week because "the front lines were full."⁹ Detainee traveled to Kunduz with al-Battar al-Bahri (NFI) and Huzhaifah al-Sharqi (NFI), probably both Saudis, who were veterans of the conflict and familiar with the area.¹⁰

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: After arriving at an unidentified guesthouse in Kunduz,¹¹ Muhammad al-Talib taught detainee how to operate an AK-47.¹² Nasser Bin Naji al-Yamani did not travel to Kunduz with detainee, but followed three or four days later. After Nasser arrived, they remained at a guesthouse for three or four more days. They then traveled to the front line, where Sadar Saib was their commander.¹³ They remained in the fighting position for six days without seeing any combat action since the mountains acted as a buffer between them and the NA.¹⁴

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Six days after arriving on the front lines, Gharib ordered the fighters to evacuate the bunkers.¹⁵ They walked toward Kunduz, where trucks waited to take them the rest of the

⁴ 000112 302 20-MAR-2002, TD-314/29092-02, Analyst Note: A variant of Shaykh Hamoud Bin 'Uqla al-Shuaibi is Shaykh Homoud al-Aqlah. Shaykh Hamoud Bin 'Uqla al-Shuaibi was one of the first to issue a *fatwa* decreeing Muslims to go to Afghanistan for jihad. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, he issued *fatawa* declaring that those supporting the non-believers against Muslims were themselves nonbelievers. Massoud and Dostum are Northern Alliance leaders General Ahmad Shah Massoud and General Abdul Rasheed Dostum.

⁵ 000112 302 14-OCT-2002

⁶ Analyst Note: Approximately equal to \$1,333-\$1,600 US.

⁷ IIR 6 034 0344 02, TD-314/29092-02

⁸ 000112 302 20-MAR-2002

⁹ IIR 6 034 0344 02, Analyst Note: Detainee was probably instructed to wait for the next rotation to the front lines.

¹⁰ 000112 302 20-MAR-2002

¹¹ Analyst Note: Assessed to be the Taliban's Mohafez Aghund Guesthouse. See 000121 302 09-DEC-2002

¹² TD-314/29092-02

¹³ 000112 KB 03-FEB-2002, IIR 6 034 1550 03, Analyst Note: Sadar Saib was a first-line commander of a group of about one hundred fighters.

¹⁴ 000112 302 20-MAR-2002

¹⁵ Analyst Note: Gharib is assessed to be Gharib al-Sanaani, who assumed leadership of the forward line of troops when Abd al-Salaam al-Hadrami was killed.

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way to the Kunduz guesthouse. After a short while, detainee left during the night with a group of others going to Mazar-e-Sharif, AF. Dostum's troops apprehended them and took them to the Qala-i-Jangi Prison. During this time, detainee claimed Dostum's troops grabbed his bag containing his passport. On 25 November 2001, shooting erupted within the walls of the prison, and detainee was shot in his thigh and back. Other prisoners dragged him into the basement of the prison. Dostum's forces pumped gasoline into the basement and ignited it; they later flooded the basement with water. After about one week, the Red Cross arrived and transported all the surviving prisoners to Sheberghan Prison. US forces took detainee from Sheberghan to the Kandahar Detention Facility.¹⁶

b. (S) Property Held:

- Health Card and various pills

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 14 January 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Training and tactics of front line Taliban fighters

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's timeline is consistent with historic events and the timelines of other detainees. Detainee vacillated on his purpose for going to Afghanistan and claimed Dostum's forces took his passport; otherwise, his story is credible. However, detainee was not forthcoming with information concerning his deceased brother, Isa, and may be withholding information on other relatives involved in terrorism.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee has familial ties to al-Qaida operatives and Arab extremists. Detainee's brother and possible cousin were involved in the kidnapping and murder of a US contractor living in Saudi Arabia. Detainee was a mujahid serving on the front lines near Kunduz with UBL's 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee resided in several extremist-associated guesthouses, and his name and alias appear on al-Qaida associated documents.

¹⁶ 000112 302 20-MAR-2002

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- (S//NF) Detainee has familial ties to al-Qaida operatives and Arab extremists. (Analyst Note: Al-Qaida recruitments often occur within family groups. Detainee's close relationships with several al-Qaida members likely exposed him to al-Qaida propaganda, and possibly to direct recruitment. These relationships likely also indicate a high level of loyalty toward al-Qaida.)
 - (S//NF) Shaykh Isa Sad al-Awshan, the deceased leader of a Riyadh al-Qaida cell responsible for the kidnapping and murder of a US contractor, Paul Johnson, Jr., was detainee's brother.¹⁷ Isa was killed in a July 2004 gunfight with Saudi security forces. An arms cache was discovered on Isa's compound and Johnson's severed head was found in Isa's villa. At the time of his death, Isa was number fifteen on the Saudi government's most-wanted list.¹⁸ (Analyst Note: According to the investigators of Johnson's murder, Nayif al-Awshan, detainee's suspected cousin (see below), supplied the ice in which the severed head was stored.¹⁹)
 - (S//NF) Prior to his death, Isa, who had been a prolific author of pro-jihad and anti-Western articles and poetry, wrote a letter to detainee stating, "God will reward you as a martyr and will place you next to other great martyrs where you will meet Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Be patient dear Abdul Aziz you have a date with heaven. Our destiny is a glorious victory."²⁰
 - (S//NF) One of detainee's younger brothers, SA-121, was also a mujahid with the 55th Arab Brigade. SA-121 had already been serving on the front lines when detainee arrived in Afghanistan.²¹
 - (S//NF) SA-121 was on a list of thirty-seven detainees whom the Saudi Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) designated as high priority before a Saudi delegation visit to JTF-GTMO in 2002.²²
 - (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have an uncle named Saud Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Awshan, who is a Saudi-based terrorist financier associated with the Philippines-based Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).²³
 - (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged having an uncle named Saud, but declined to provide any further information about him.²⁴

¹⁷ IIR 6 034 0344 02, IIR 6 034 0344 02(b)¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0188 05, IIR 4 201 0658 05, ((AWSHAN)) ISA AL 10-DEC-2003¹⁹ IIR 4 201 0658 05²⁰ SA-RIY-040721-90076-60223-HT-NVTC, NMEC-2005-650794²¹ 000112 AL AWSHAN FAMILY 15-JUL-2003, 000121 302 12-MAR-2002²² TD-314/27545-02²³ TD-314/08727-06 TD-314/18018-06, Analyst Note: MILF is an NIPF CT Priority 2A target. Priority 2A targets are defined as terrorist/extremist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack US person and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat to US interests around the world than Priority 1B groups or countries; or that have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability.²⁴ 000112 SIR 29-APR-2005.

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- (S//NF) Detainee's cousin, Saleh Abdall al-Oshan aka (Salih Abdallah Abd al-Rahman al-Awshan), ISN US9SA-000248DP (SA-248, transferred),²⁵ stated that Saud was his paternal uncle or great uncle who frequently traveled to the Philippines to spread Islam, though SA-248 denied knowledge of his uncle's involvement in terrorist activities. SA-248 claimed that Saud financially supports his efforts in the Philippines from his personal wealth that he earns from his home appliances and clothing business in Saudi Arabia.²⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee's cousin Muhammad, whose full name is reported to be Muhammad Saud al-Awshan, has been identified working with his father Saud Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Awshan as a terrorist financier in the Philippines.²⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee's possible cousin, Nayif Abd al-Aziz Muhammad al-Awshan al-Khalidi aka (Mansour) aka (Yasir), has been identified as a senior Saudi al-Qaida member. Nayif was listed among the top ten wanted Saudi al-Qaida operatives.²⁸ Nayif was killed by Saudi forces in April 2005.²⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted he served on the front lines under Gharib al-Sanaani in Khwaja Ghar, AF. Detainee was armed with an AK-47, but denied participating in combat.³⁰
 - (S//NF) Detainee's itinerary from Riyadh to Afghanistan took him along a known extremist infiltration route through Damascus, Tehran, Mashhad, Tayyabad, Herat, and Kabul to Kunduz.³¹ (Analyst Note: Detainee traveled after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, suggesting his intent to engage US forces in hostilities.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee's brother SA-121 corroborated detainee's approximate date of arrival at the front lines.³² SA-121 provided conflicting accounts as to why detainee traveled to Afghanistan, first claiming that he did not know, and later stating that detainee came to retrieve SA-121.³³ (Analyst Note: The claim of detainee traveling to retrieve his brother is possibly a cover story to obfuscate detainee's intent and minimize his involvement in jihad.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed at al-Qaida associated guesthouses in Herat, Kabul, and Kunduz, and his name was found on al-Qaida associated documents.
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name and variants were found on multiple documents recovered during raids on al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses in Pakistan. These

²⁵ 000112 AL AWSHAN FAMILY 15-JUL-2003, 000248 302 13-MAR-2002

²⁶ 000248 302 13-MAR-2002, IIR 6 034 0051 02, 000248 MFR 02-JUN-2003, 000248 KB 04-FEB-2002

²⁷ S-UPH-2410-0005-06

²⁸ CIR 316/13230-04, S-4J2-2410-0085-05

²⁹ IIR 4 201 0156 06, FBIS GMP20050506318002

³⁰ IIR 6 034 0701 02, IIR 6 034 0344 02

³¹ TD-314/29092-02

³² 000121 302 12-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: The Qala-I-Jangi uprising occurred on 25 November 2001, suggesting that detainee arrived on the front lines in early November.

³³ 000121 302 12-MAR-2002, 000121 302 09-DEC-2002

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documents listed the contents of detainee's trust account as a Saudi passport, along with the number 17.9.³⁴ (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to training, the front lines, or abroad. The number was probably his trust account number. Trust accounts were simple storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure the individual's personal valuables until completion of training or another activity.)

- (S//NF) When detainee and his traveling companion Nasser reached the border of Afghanistan, the border guards instructed a taxi driver to take them to a guesthouse in Herat, AF. The guards told detainee and Nasser their point of contact in Herat would be Abdel Hannan, probably referring to US9AF-001592DP (AF-1592), a Taliban representative reportedly responsible for meeting new arrivals in Afghanistan. Detainee stayed in this guesthouse for about one week.³⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee traveled to Kabul, where an unidentified Afghan met detainee at the airport and took him to an unidentified guesthouse.³⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee then traveled to Konduz, where he stayed at the Mohafez Aghund Guesthouse. He received training on the AK-47 from Muhammad al-Talib (NFI).³⁷
- (S//NF) A September 2002 raid by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi uncovered an electronic file titled "khas jeddan.doc" (translated as "very private"). The document contained a table with a list of names and an amount of money that had been taken from each individual by orders of al-Qaida member Sayf al-Adel and added to a budget. According to the document, these safety deposit boxes were located in Kabul and were in the possession of al-Qaida member Abu Anas al-Azdi. A variant of detainee's alias, Hussam Aqida, is listed twice on a document, and is associated with \$200 US and 3,000 SAR.³⁸
- (S//NF) In July 2002, a delegation from Saudi Arabia visited JTF-GTMO and interviewed detainee. Detainee was identified as of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US, and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the US or its interests. Furthermore, the Saudi delegation indicated that the Government of Saudi Arabia would be willing to take custody of detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the US determined it no longer wanted to hold him.³⁹

³⁴ TD-314/40693-02, number 125; AFGP-2002-905527 30-JUL-2002, pages 51 and 54 in document

³⁵ 000112 302 20-MAR-2002, IIR 6 034 0344 02, IIR 6 034 0194 02, Abdul Hanan Jamiat-e-Islami ID Card 20-Sep-2004, and 000438 Abdul Hanan Info Sheet as of 23-Mar-2006.

³⁶ TD-314/29092-02

³⁷ TD-314/29092-02

³⁸ TD-314/43327-02

³⁹ TD-314/30789-02

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c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has eight Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 7 March 2007, when he was reported returning a library book with words scribbled out. Detainee has no Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions and camp rules, inciting and participating in a mass disturbance, use of provoking words and gestures, damage to government property, unauthorized communications, and possession of contraband. Detainee had two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and three reports so far in 2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 2 April 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was a fighter in the 55th Arab Brigade and served on the front lines near Kunduz before his capture and imprisonment at Qala-i-Jangi. Although his brother Isa was involved in extremist operations, detainee's access to or knowledge of his brother's activities requires further investigation. Despite Isa's prominence within the Saudi terror network, no reporting indicates detainee himself served in a leadership or operational planning capacity. Given his apparent familial ties to extremists, he is possibly familiar with additional al-Qaida cells in Riyadh. Detainee's relationship with his uncle Saud is unclear and requires further investigation.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is assessed to possess substantial intelligence not yet exploited; however, he has not been forthcoming and often evasive during interrogations. Detainee's brother Isa is already deceased, limiting the value of information on that individual. Detainee is probably withholding additional information on two family members and former JTF-GTMO detainees: his brother SA-121, and his cousin SA-248. While incriminating, such reporting would be dated and probably not tactically or strategically critical. Detainee probably has information regarding the activities and associates of his brother, Muhammad Bin Saad and uncle, Saud, as detainee has been non-cooperative when questioned. Additionally, detainee may be able to provide information on events surrounding the Qala-i-Jangi Prison uprising.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:


- Family members' roles in extremist and terrorist activities
- 55th Arab Brigade

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- Qala-i-Jangi Prison

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 6 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.