

## B. Government of Manchuria (Incident Eight)

1. A request came to ARAKI as War Minister from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army asking that a Government be set up in Manchuria and that it was advisable to set up Henry Pu-Yi as head of the Manchukuo Government.

2. ARAKI stated that he could have disapproved, but he thought that this request would settle the Manchurian matter to the interest of all parties concerned.

3. This request was approved in the Cabinet meeting of March 1932.

4. Plans for civil administration were submitted by provincial governors to the Kwantung Army. ARAKI stated that he sanctioned the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army to the effect that if the incident were settled peaceably there was no need to make reports on minor matters.

5. The Cabinet discussed and did send to Manchuria various governmental Japanese officials who were to help in the organization of Manchuria.

## C. Recognition of Manchuria as Independent. (Incident Seven).

1. After May or June, 1932, the Foreign, War (ARAKI), and Navy Ministers decided to have Manchuria recognized as an Independent Government.

2. This was proposed to the Cabinet in August 1932, and received unanimous approval.

3. At this meeting the Cabinet approved the contents of the treaty to be made between Japan and Manchuria.

4. The treaty later negotiated did not vary in contents from that decided on in the Cabinet meeting in August 1932, giving to the Japanese certain superior rights.

5. Japan recognized the independence of Manchuria.

## D. Shanghai Incident (1932) (Incident Four).

1. On the 2nd or 3rd of February 1932, the Navy Minister came to ARAKI and stated that due to the hard fight the Naval forces in Shanghai might be destroyed and asked ARAKI if Army troops could be sent.

2. General ARAKI conferred with the Cabinet and it was agreed that the Army would send supporting forces quickly.

3. Troops (approximately 15,000 men) were sent the following day.

4. When these troops suffered casualties, another division was sent by ARAKI.

5. The mission of the Army troops was to drive away from Shanghai the Chinese 19th Route Army or disarm them. After this, the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers planned to talk to the Nanking Government as to whether troops should remain in the area of Shanghai or be withdrawn.

6. The battle was concluded and an agreement reached May 15, 1932 (See this agreement).

**E. Withdrawal from the League of Nations (Incident Ten).**

1. At a special meeting of the Cabinet on March 17, 1933, the Cabinet (ARAKI - War Minister) decided that Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations.

2. A special cabinet committee including ARAKI appeared from the cabinet before the Privy Council.

3. At a meeting of the Privy Council, the Cabinet and the Emperor between the 17th and the 27th of March, 1933, it was agreed unanimously that Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations.

4. Japan did withdraw on March 27, 1933.

**III. Member of the Supreme War Council, January 1934 - March 1936.**

A. General ARAKI denies complicity in the February 26th (1936) plot.

B. He resigned as a result of this incident (15 March 1936) at the request of the War Minister.

**IV. Member of the Cabinet Advisory Council (15 October 1937 - 28 March 1938).**

A. ARAKI admits receiving information on the progress of the China Incident, but denies giving any advice although he states that this was the purpose of this council. He asserts that no advice was given due to the opposition from the Cabinet.

- B. He states in a later interrogation that he advised only stopping or settling the China Incident.
- V. Minister of Education under KONOYE and HIUANUMA (26 March 1938 - 30 August 1939).
- A. ARAKI denies that he had any participation in the approbation or responsibility for any incident occurring while a member of this Cabinet, assertedly on the reason that he was just Education Minister and in essence that the important matters were decided by the Prime Minister, War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers.
- B. He stated that he knew nothing of the Occupation of the Hainan Island and Spratley Islands except through the newspapers later.
- VI. President of the General National Mobilization Committee (Cabinet) (28 March 1939).
- VII. Cabinet Advisory Council (December 1939 - August 1940).

RECOMMENDATION.

1. I submit that ARAKI would not make a good witness because he is reluctant to name persons other than himself responsible for certain events and acts. I do submit that he is familiar (because of his position) with the early period of 1931-1934.

2. I submit that ARAKI should be included as a defendant because he conceived, suggested and crystallized a governmental policy resulting in the occupation and completion of occupation of Manchuria during his tenure as War Minister.

3. His responsibility for other acts and events is supporting but of less importance.

4. He seems to symbolize to the writers and people the aggressive element in the Japanese Army in the formative early 1930's.

ARAKI, Sadao

Document File: Case No. 58, Serials 1 and 2

Born: 1877

Graduated Military Academy; later from Staff College.  
President Military Staff College  
Superintendent Military Training Department.

War Minister 1931 to 1933  
Supreme War Councillor 1936  
Advisory Councillor to the Cabinet 1937-1939  
Member of Advisory Council in 1940  
Minister of Education in the Konoye and Hiranuma Cabinets.  
Placed in Sugamo Prison November 26, 1945.

Characterised as "Idol of the Army."  
Further characterised as "Army Firebrand."

Backed the Army mutiny back in 1936. Preached to the Army the doctrine that Japan must conquer and rule the world. Ambassador Grew says, in 1932, "The military are distinctly running the government and no step can be taken without their approval." Quotation from "Ten Years in Japan." In 1932 General Araki was Minister of War.

Higgins

DRAFT "BRIEF"

(References <sup>are</sup> ~~Compus~~ fictitious)

NAME:

ARAKI (General Baron Sadao)

FILE 58

Age 69

Interrogated: Yes

COUNTS OF INDICTMENT:

1. 5. 8.

OUTLINE:

War Minister of INUKAI CABINET which adopted MUKDEN PENETRATION, and of SAITO CABINET which followed

Violent National Propogandist.

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOC-UMENT	INTERRO-GATION.
1929) 1931)		General Commanding 6th Div in China	McMULLIN & Sec W/M		
1931) (May) 1931) (Dec)		Director Military Education Bureau Founded "Young Officers Clique"  By Dec. 1931, "Idol of the Army".		3	
18-9-31	1	(MUKDEN INCIDENT)			
13-12-31		War Minister under INUKAI. Actions adopted penetration of 4 provinces and Jehol.  Secured necessary money to support invading army.  While ARAKI was W/M Incidents 2,3,4 and 5 occurred	(Sec.Cab)		7 Feb P. 7
1934		Continued active Militaristic progoganda  Member Supreme War Council	Mr.X	4	
1936	5	Resigned after Incident 5	Mr.Z	3	

12 March 1946

File No: 58  
Re : ARAKI, Sadao  
Subject: Excerpts from Interrogation of 12 February 1946  
By : Col. Morrow and Mr. Hyder

- Q. The next day after this statement I last read, Mr. Arita was reported to have said this to a member of the American Embassy in Tokyo: "that there prevails a widespread feeling that the Japanese Government has now adopted a new policy -- one of closing the open door in China. There had, in fact, been no change in policy. His several predecessors had on several occasions given assurances to the American, British, and other representatives in Tokyo that Japan would respect the principle of the open door. As a matter of fact, those assurances were not intended to be unconditional, for the reason that the time had passed when Japan could give an unqualified undertaking to respect the open door in China. He was not implying that his predecessors had given the assurances in bad faith; on the contrary he felt certain that they were acting in the best of faith, but what they were attempting to do was to reconcile the principle of the open door with Japan's actual needs and objectives, and that could not be done. As had been previously explained, those objectives are to provide Japan with a market secure against any possible threat of economic sanctions and to acquire safe sources of necessary raw materials; but within those limits Japan was prepared to guarantee equality of opportunity. There would be given full consideration to those enterprises conducted by foreigners other than Japanese which would in no way conflict with or obstruct the carrying out of these primary objectives, and with respect to those enterprises, whether industrial, commercial, or financial, the Japanese Government was fully prepared to give unqualified guarantees. But with regard to other undertakings which overlapped the Japanese economic defense plans, it was no longer possible for Japan to extend any such guarantee." General, that was a statement by Mr. Arita as Japanese Foreign Minister and was taken by the American Government as a denial that Japan would any longer support the open door in China. Did you know anything about that statement as a Cabinet member?
- A. No, I do not. I think it is a fundamental principle that if the policy of the open door interferes with Japan's rights, it would be natural not to recognize the open door policy in its entirety. This would, of course, be a subject for diplomatic discussion.
- Q. Well, you said you don't know anything about this statement.
- A. No, I don't but I just made a few remarks.

- Q. General, I understand that here is Japan involved in a war with a nation of four hundred million, a short time before this Japanese aviators had bombed and sunk an American war ship, and here is a Foreign Minister, according to my record repudiating the Nine Power Treaty which guaranteed the open door, and yet this statement is made, as far as you know, without the concurrence or knowledge of members of the Cabinet like yourself who were neither Prime Minister, nor War Minister, nor Foreign Minister. Was that the situation?
- A. If the Foreign Minister made the statement verbally to a member of the American Embassy, I am sure it was not discussed in the Cabinet, and, therefore, would not come to the knowledge of some of the members. Anyway, the Minister of Education is the most uninfluential member of the Cabinet, and he is the least concerned with matters of diplomacy.
- Q. I understand, then, that as far as this matter was concerned, if America was defied by Japan, it was the act of the Foreign Minister after consultation with the Prime Minister and the War Minister, in your opinion?
- A. I do not know whether the statement emanated from the Foreign Minister, and I do not know if it had been discussed with the Prime Minister and the War and Navy Ministers, but if the others took part at a discussion, the statement could only have been made with their approval. Most people at that time were more concerned with internal affairs than with diplomatic affairs, and the Cabinet was in danger of falling, and perhaps foreign affairs were not given due consideration. To go back to yesterday's interrogation, I now remember that the China Affairs Board later became the Ko-A-in. This could be translated Asia Uplift Board.
- Q. Would a statement such as has been read here by Mr. Arita, the Foreign Minister, be made without the knowledge of the Emperor, repudiating the Nine Power Treaty as it did?
- A. Perhaps he exceeded his authority somewhat in making this statement, but before passing judgment, I would like to relate the Japanese version of this statement.
- Q. I will try to get that, but you haven't answered the question. If the statement was as stated, would the Emperor necessarily have been notified?
- A. The Emperor need not necessarily have been notified of this statement. Anyway, I think this possible. That Article 55 of the Constitution was not strictly adhered to and the Foreign Minister did not properly render his duties to the Emperor.

12 March 1946

File No: 58  
Re : ARAKI, Sadao  
Subject: Excerpts from Interrogation of 5 February 1946  
By : Col. Morrow and Mr. Hyder

- Q. Well, I want to know, if you can tell me, why MASAKI made this statement that KIDO is to blame for the state Japan is in today and why he is so mad at KIDO that he makes this statement. If you know why that is.
- A. I believe MASAKI made this statement because KIDO, as the one closest to the Emperor and the person most able to influence him, fell down on his job.
- Q. How did he fall down on his job?
- A. Judging from Japan's present state, the advice and help which he should have tendered to the Emperor was wrong.
- Q. Have you ever talked to General MASAKI about Marquis KIDO?
- A. I have not seen MASAKI in quite a long while, and have not talked with him about KIDO, but there are many others that blame KIDO as being responsible.
- Q. Who are those others?
- A. OBATA and I think almost any other one that gives the matter any consideration will realize that KIDO is responsible.
- Q. Why do you say that HIROTA and OKADA and HIRANUMA are also responsible for the present state Japan is in?
- A. In addition to the three mentioned, KONOYE and WAKATSUKI, as ex-Premiers, were responsible for recommending to the Emperor the appointment of General TOJO as the new Prime Minister.
- Q. And do I understand that Marquis KIDO also recommended TOJO?
- A. KIDO, being closest to the Emperor and having the power to veto the choice of the ex-Prime Minister mentioned previously, is also responsible.
- Q. And I understand you to mean that they knew or should have known that the appointment of TOJO would mean war with America and England, and that is why they should not have advised his appointment? Is that what you mean?

5 February 1946

A. Prince KONOYE stated that TOJO claimed if he were appointed Prime Minister and War Minister, he would be able to control the militaristic elements. This appointment of TOJO, who was in active service in the army, violates the Constitution and is unprecedented and would not have received the Emperor's approval unless KIDO advised it.

Q. On what evidence or knowledge of yours do you base your statements that these people, KIDO, HIRANUMA, WAKATSUKI, and so forth, are the ones that brought about TOJO's appointment? On what do you base that on?

A. It is usual for ex-Prime Ministers to find and recommend a new person to be appointed as the Prime Minister.

Q. And do you mean that these people should have known that the appointment of TOJO would mean the military would take control of the situation? Is that what you mean?

A. I believe they realized this at the time, but this was done hoping that TOJO would be able to control the younger elements in the army as I stated previously.

Q. Well, this is something else that General MASAKI said: "As that expansion movement developed" - he is talking about Manchuria - "what Army officers would you consider to be the principal leaders in it?" And the answer was "1. TOJO." Do you agree with that?

A. I was out of touch with matters in Tokyo at the time, but I believe that the expansion movement originated in Manchuria and not in Japan.

Q. Well, do you know whether or not TOJO was in favor of expansion and the aggression of the Japanese empire?

A. I am not certain about this. He was my subordinate at one time, but we were never very intimate and I did not know if he favored this expansion, but I believe when he was Chief of Staff in Manchuria on his own responsibility he started operations in Suiyuan in Mongolia.

BY MR. WOODCOCK: Which Mongolia? Outer or inner?

A. Inner Mongolia. Mongolia has always been looked upon as a Japanese lifeline. Even a man of the type of Ozaki YUKIO, in a speech in the newspapers in 1937, stated that this was a life-line for Japan and it would be fatal to return Manchuria to China. This is on record. I do not agree with OZAKI's views, but even a man of his calibre is apt to make childish statements of this nature.

BY COLONEL MORROW: General MASAKI said: "I never spoke to TOJO. He is my enemy, and I never spoke to him." Do you know why General MASAKI would refer to TOJO as his enemy and never speak to him?

Interrogation of Sadae Araki

5 February 1946

- A. This was on account of the differences in ideas generally. I believe MASAKI's feelings were reciprocated by TOJO. I believe TOJO or his clique did their utmost to make MASAKI the scapegoat in the February 26 Incident.