

Doc. 2887 Evid.

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2887

17 Jan 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Extracts from Interrogation of
MajGen SATO, Kenryo

Date: 27-29 Apr 1946 Original Copy Language:
English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SATO, Kenryo

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Analyst: W.H. WAGNER

Doc. No. 2887

Doc 2387

~~SATO, Kenryo~~
SATO, Kenryo

File No. 176, Serial 50.

Extracts from Interrogation of

SATO, Kenryo.

2887

27 April 1946, Page 2.

A. In 1937 I was promoted to Lt. Col. still serving in the War Service Bureau. In August of 1938 I was promoted to Col. and served as the Army spokesman. This duty included the making of news releases. In December 1938 I became Professor in the Army Air Corps School at Hamatsu. In May of 1939 I became a Staff Officer for the South China Expeditionary Force.

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In March of 1941 I returned to the War Department, becoming Chief of the War Service Section of the War Service Bureau being promoted to the rank of Major General in October of the same year. In April of 1942 I became Chief of the War Service Bureau. In December of 1944 I became Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force. The Chiefs of Staff were: 1. MATSUI, Takuro, Lt. Gen; 2. KOBAYASHI, Asasaburo, Lt. Gen. The Commander of the Force was OKAMURA, Neiji, Gen.

In March of 1945 I was promoted to Lt. Gen; and in April of 1945 I became Commander of the 57th Division stationed in Indo China. The division subsequently was ordered to Thailand, where I remained until the end of the war.

Q. How long have you known General TOJO?

A. I first met TOJO when I was a student in the Army War College and TOJO became a professor (Lt. Col.). I studied war history under TOJO for one year. Then later I again met TOJO when he was Vice Minister of War and worked around him for a period of five months while I was the Army Spokesman. I have known him quite well. I have judged him to be a very sincere person, which I first realized when I was sent abroad as language officer. TOJO took good care of my family during that period.

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Q. Did General TOJO appoint you to the position in the War Ministry as head of the Military Affairs Bureau? (Q. by Interpreter: Of the Bureau or the Section? A. by Interrogator: Bureau.)

A. Yes, inasmuch as the War Minister makes the appointments, TOJO appointed me.

Doc 2807

2

File No. 176, Serial 50.

Extracts from Interrogation of

SATO, Kenryo.

27 April 1946, Pages 4, 5.

- Q. Under an ordinance, your Bureau made the plans for all Prisoner of War Camps in Japan, the construction of buildings, etc., did they not?
- A. The policies regarding prisoners of war were determined in the Prisoners of War Section. The actual design of the camps and budget concerns came through my Bureau. The administration was handled by another Bureau.
- Q. The correspondence from protecting powers, for example, from the Swiss, in connection with United States prisoners of war held by Japan passed through your Bureau, did it not?
- A. They, after obtaining permission from the Foreign Office, dealt only with the Prisoners of War Section, Prisoners of War Information. Only where it concerned me did they have to contact our office.
- Q. I understood you to say that your Bureau handled matters involving foreign affairs. Is that true?
- A. Yes, our Bureau did handle foreign affairs where they concerned the Army directly. For example, when negotiations were under way with the United States, any replies from the United States came through the Foreign Office to the War Minister, and inasmuch as any decisions would affect the Army we were notified. In cases of prisoners of war, this matter was specifically set aside for the Prisoners of War Section. Such things as removal of fortifications came to us, although they also went to the Heimukyoku (Military Service Bureau). For instance, when the Red Cross wanted to speak to us about the prisoners of war, they went through the Prisoners of War Section, and where it concerned medicine from there were referred to the Medical Bureau.
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File No. 176, Serial 50.

Extracts from Interrogation of
SATO, Kenryo.

29 April 1946, Pages 6, 7.

- Q. Well, you would say, would you not, that the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau is probably the third most important member of the military establishment. There is the Minister of War, the Chief of Staff, and then comes the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau - that is conceded, is it not?
- A. First I would like to explain that according to the Japanese Constitution, the War Ministry and the General Staff are completely independent and subservient to the Emperor. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Chief of Operations in the General Staff are equivalent in their respective fields.
- Q. Do you recall who was Chief of Staff at the time the determination was made to try by court martial the Doolittle flyers who were apprehended?
- A. SUGIYAMA was the Chief of Staff.
- Q. Who made the determination that the Doolittle flyers who were apprehended were to be tried by court martial?
- A. It was decided, I believe, by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War in conference. However, I do not remember very clearly.

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Extracts from Interrogation of

SATO, Kenryo.

29 April 1946, Pages 7, 8, 9, 10.

- Q. It is true, is it not, General, that the rules in connection with the treatment of prisoners of war were drawn up in conference between the General Staff and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau? (Q. by Gen. SATO: Are you applying that directly to the Doolittle flyers? A. by Interrogator: No, just in general.)
- A. As I said the other day, matters pertaining to the prisoners of war came to the various Bureaus concerned; a matter such as something affecting the budget would come through my office, things involving medical matters would go through the Medical Affairs Bureau, and so on.
- Q. That does not answer my question. (Question repeated.)
- A. The rules were drawn up between the General Staff and the War Ministry, under the War Ministry. The individual rules were drawn up by the various Bureaus.
- Q. And the Military Affairs Bureau had their part in the drafting of those rules, did they not?
- A. Yes, they were involved in a part of those rules.
- Q. As a matter of fact, you made the recommendation, did you not, as Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, to the War Minister as to what the rules should be?
- A. Yes, matters concerning my office. There were also others which were passed as an order from the War Minister.
- Q. General TOJO on the 26th of March this year stated that the rules regarding the treatment of prisoners of war were the result of conferences between the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and the General Staff. Is that statement true or false?
- A. That is not true. He must have been mistaken, inasmuch as positions of equal level would meet directly. The Chief of Staff would not meet with the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, but with the War Minister. A Chief of Section in the General Staff could meet with a Chief of Section in the War Ministry.
- Q. I did not say that the Chief of Bureau of Military Affairs met with the Chief of Staff. That was not the statement General TOJO made. The statement that he made was that the rules regarding treatment of prisoners of war were the result of conferences between the General Staff and the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau. Now is that true?
- A. That is possible.

- Q. When did you serve, General, in Indo China?
A. From April 1945 until the end of the war.
- Q. Had you ever served in that territory before in any capacity?
A. In the summer of 1940 I went to Indo China as Staff Officer of the China Expeditionary Forces.
- Q. You were Assistant Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Forces, were you?
A. Yes, Assistant Chief of Staff.
- Q. What did you have to do with a bill known as the National Total Mobilization Act?
A. At that time I was a member of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry. My connection with that came about in the following manner. The general mobilization law first was a matter of the Cabinet; on the side of the military it was the job of a Mobilization Plans Bureau. When the time came for the bill to be presented to the Diet, it became a matter of the Military Affairs Bureau.
- Q. You made a report on the bill in behalf of the War Ministry to the Diet, did you not?
A. The actual report was made by the Premier. My capacity was to explain the bill to the Diet. There are three different positions which are involved in the presentation of a bill to the Diet, of which the person giving the explanation is the third in rank.
- Q. You had some disagreement at that time with a man named MIYAWAKI, Chochiki, did you not?
A. Yes.
- Q. And in the course of your talk in explanation of the bill you told him to "shut up" did you not?
A. Yes.
- Q. They called you "Shut up SATO" after that, did they not?
A. There are a lot of mistakes on that thing, so I would like to give an explanation if you have time.
- Q. Go ahead.
A. The General Mobilization Law was presented in February 1938 to the KONOYE Cabinet. At that time the Diet planned to take the following three measures: 1. Forced resignation of the Cabinet; 2. stop passage of an electric power generation law which was disliked very much by the public; 3. eliminate all existing political parties and

Doc. 2887

File No. 176, Serial 50.

3.

6

establish new parties. Although the objectives of the three movements were different, the backers of the movements were united in their expectation of a collision between the Diet and the government. The Diet members were in hopes that this collision could first be obtained through the General Mobilization Law.

At that time Japan was in the midst of the China Incident. In December 1937 Japan attempted to obtain peace with Chiang Kai-shek through the German Ambassador, and in January of 1938 it was realized that there was no hope of a quick settlement. Thus it became obvious that the General Mobilization Law was a necessity. However, the three movements mentioned before were causing undue opposition by the government to the General Mobilization Law. I was worried over this situation in the Diet, due to the conflict. We were using enormous quantities of material however, we couldn't replace it. The capitalists opposed necessary increase in production facilities, the reason being that the capitalists were expecting a short war. Thus, at the conclusion of the war any investments in increased facilities would be a complete loss. In the last world war there was considerable loss incurred on the part of capital, as they had made enormous increases in production facilities. I do not blame the capitalists for their stand. However, they put the Army in a difficult position. The enterprisers, who are dependent on capital, would have built plants based on orders from the Army, but at the conclusion of the war, with the lack of orders all the investments would have been a total loss. It was, therefore, necessary to protect the enterprisers from such danger. Under the General Mobilization Law the government would administer all such war industries, and in case of the sudden cessation of hostilities the government would also take the responsibility of reimbursing any enterpriser who would thus be caught short. Therefore, the General Mobilization Law was a necessity, not only for the sake of the Army, but also for the capitalists.

The Diet would not look at the General Mobilization Law in this light and, due to the previously mentioned three movements, put up unnecessary objections to the law. Because of this opposition I felt very sad. The government was unable to explain this satisfactorily to the Diet and of those present before the Diet I was the only person capable of explaining the implication of the law. Therefore, I was hoping to be given an adequate chance to explain the bill before the Diet. However, since I was only the "explainer" I did not have the power to go ahead on my own initiative, and finally on about the 24th of February I was told by the Diet that I could present my

Doc 2887

7

File No. 176, Serial 50.

4.

explanation as the "explainer". It was at this point that I stood up to give my explanation. Of the explanations given up to that time I feel sincerely that mine was the most powerful one given.

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Extracts from Interrogation of

SATO, Kenryo.

29 April 1946, Pages 11, 12.

- Q. In 1940 after TOJO became Minister of War he recalled you from South China, did he not, and you were made Chief of the Military Affairs Section?
- A. I became the Chief of the Military Affairs Section in March of 1941.
- Q. That was immediately after your recall from South Indo China?
- A. Yes, I was there as I frequently had to go down to Indo China on my duties from South China. During my stay with the South China Expeditionary Forces I went to Indo China three or four times, remaining only a week or ten days at a time.
- Q. As Chief of the Military Affairs Section and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, you were in accord with the policies of the Minister of War, were you not?
- A. Yes, I was in agreement with the policy of the Minister of War.
- Q. When was it that the Japanese troops invaded Indo China?
- A. The first entry was made into North Indo China in September or October of 1940. At that time I was a Staff Officer with the South China Expeditionary Forces. The second invasion was made into South Indo China in July of 1941. At that time I was the Chief of the Military Affairs Section.
- Q. Did you consider that invasion of South Indo China necessary?
- A. I don't think it could be helped, the reason being that Japan was undergoing hardships in regard to the supply of rubber.
- Q. You were familiar with the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Non-Aggression Pact, were you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You realize that such invasion was in violation of the provisions of both the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, do you not?
- A. Inasmuch as the occupation of Indo China was made by the Vichy-Japanese Government Agreement, I do not consider it as a war.

Doc. 2887

9

File No. 176, Serial 50.

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Q. During the time you served in the War Ministry under General TOJO you frequently consulted with him, did you not?

A. Yes, after I became Chief of the Bureau; while Chief of the Section I dealt with the Chief of the Bureau.

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Q. Who was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau before you succeeded to that position?

A. MUTO.

Q. And you and MUTO were in accord on your policies, were you not?

A. Yes and no.

Q. Can you say "yes" or "no"?

A. MUTO felt that the nominations for candidates for the Diet were proper. However, I disagreed with him on that point.

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Doc 2887

10

File No. 176, Serial 50.

Extracts from Interrogation of

SATO, Kenryo.

29 April 1946, Pages 14, 15.

Q. I am going to read you a statement here and ask you if it is true:

"The rules and regulations regarding prisoners of war were assembled by the Military Affairs Bureau in Conference with the Prisoners Information Bureau and Chiefs of Staff and then presented to the War Minister for approval. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the main figure in the promulgation of these rules and regulations. The policy for the handling of prisoners of war emanated from the Military Affairs Bureau and the actual handling of the prisoners of war was performed by the Prisoners Information Bureau on down through to the Field Commanders. Although the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau participated in the making of the policies for the handling of war prisoners, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the higher authority as exemplified by the fact that if the Chief of the Information Bureau came to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau with a plan and it was disapproved by the latter the normal procedure would be to forget the plan there and then because of the position maintained in the Army by the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau plus the fact that he was always in close connection with the War Minister. However, under such circumstances if the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau was insistent that his plan, disapproved by the Military Affairs Chief, be carried through then both parties would present the matter to the War Minister for determination."

A. The statement is in part true, but Chiefs of various other Bureaus concerned are omitted from this record and they actually took part in the conferences depending on the point under discussion. As to the reference of a main figure in the promulgation of rules and regulations, I believe the statement is wrong. The main figure depends only on the matter concerned. You may go through the War Ministry records and notice the signatures. At times the Prisoners Administration Bureau was the main figure, at times the Military Affairs Bureau. However, this all depends on the matter under consideration. I disagree with the statement that the Military Affairs Bureau Chief was a higher authority. The mention that the normal procedure was to forget the plan was only if the Chief of the Information Bureau was in accord finally with the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Also the reference that the Chiefs of both

Bureaus would present the matter to the War Minister is incorrect. The Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau had free access to the War Minister and could see him without the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Final determination rested with the War Minister.

- Q. It is true, is it not, General, that the actual promulgation of the rules regarding prisoners of war, the publication of them, was done by the Military Affairs Bureau?
- A. The promulgation is done by the Vice Minister of War.
- Q. It is further stated, General, that when a complaint was received as to the mistreatment of prisoners of war from the International Red Cross the following procedure was in force: The complaint was received in the Foreign Office and referred to the Military Affairs Section, a division of the Military Affairs Bureau. The head of the Military Affairs Section then took the complaint up with the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau and as a result of this conference a plan was drawn up to meet the alleged complaint. This plan was presented to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and if approved by him in turn taken to the War Minister for approval. The Military Affairs Section was the door through which all outside complaints came to the War Minister. The International Red Cross, however, would have the right to go directly to the Chief of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau with a complaint, but in such an instance the Information Bureau Chief would confer with the head of the Military Affairs Section and the procedure which I have just outlined would be followed.
- A. First, I am not quite sure, but I had been under the impression that complaints regarding prisoners first went through the Prisoners Information Bureau. However, the statement may be correct. Any plans which have been drawn up between the Prisoners Information Bureau and the Military Affairs Section could go back to the Minister directly from the Prisoners of War Bureau or the Military Affairs Bureau. It merely depended on the nature of the plan which was drawn up to meet the complaint. I think that when a plan had to be approved by the War Minister it must have gone through the Prisoners of War Administrative Bureau, inasmuch as I have never had to take anything to the War Minister.
- Q. Do you mean in connection with prisoners of war, or at any time?
- A. Yes, in reference to prisoners and complaints by the Red Cross.
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2887

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

SATO, Kenryo
176-50-1158

From 1938 to March 1941 the subject worked as a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate in London. In March 1941 he was transferred to the Japanese Consulate in Washington, D.C. He worked there until the end of the war in August 1945. He was then interned at the War Relocation Authority camp at Tule Lake, California. He was released from the camp in September 1945. He returned to Japan in December 1945. He worked for the Japanese Consulate in London until the end of the war in August 1945. He was then interned at the War Relocation Authority camp at Tule Lake, California. He was released from the camp in September 1945. He returned to Japan in December 1945.

INTERROGATION OF
SATO, Kenryo

Kenryo Sato was interviewed on 27 April 1946. He was interviewed again on 29 April 1946. He was interviewed on 27 April 1946. He was interviewed again on 29 April 1946. He was interviewed on 27 April 1946. He was interviewed again on 29 April 1946.

DATE: 27 April 1946
29 April 1946

INTERROGATOR: [illegible]
Mr. G. S. Woolworth

The subject was interviewed at the War Relocation Authority camp at Tule Lake, California. He was interviewed on 27 April 1946. He was interviewed again on 29 April 1946.

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176-50

SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION OF

SATO, Kenryo (Lt General)

27 and 29 April 1946

Page No.

From May 1938 to March 1941 the subject served as Deputy Chief of Staff for the South China Expeditionary Force. In March 1941 he became Chief of the War Service Section of the War Service Bureau (otherwise known as Military Affairs Bureau). In April of 1942 he was appointed by TOJO as Chief of the same Bureau. He became Major General in October 1942. In December 1944 he became Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force. In March 1945 he became Lt Gen and in April 1945 became Commander of the 37th Division in Indo China, the Division moving later to Thailand where it remained until the end of the war. 2

Admits consulting with ABE and HAYASHI, Senjuro, elder statesmen, at the direction of TOJO in October 1941 after KONOYE resigned, but denies that he had any influence on TOJO's selection as Premier. 3

Subject drew a chart showing the relation of the various Bureaus of the War Ministry (marked "Exhibit 1"). The Military Affairs Bureau handled the policies of the following: Organization, budget, system, regulations, national defense, military administration of occupied territories, and finally domestic and foreign affairs which concerned the Army. 4

The actual design of Prisoner of War Camps and budget concerns of the same were responsibilities of the Military Affairs Bureau. 4

All sections of the War Ministry were concerned in the regulation permitting the use of prisoners of war for labor. 5

The determination that the Doolittle flyers were to be tried by court martial was made by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War in conference. 7

The Military Affairs Bureau had their part in the drafting of the Prisoner of War Regulations. 8

It is possible that the rules regarding treatment of prisoners of war were the result of conferences between the General Staff and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. 8

SUMMARY INTERROGATION of SATO, Kenryo, 27 & 29 Apr 46

Page No.

In the summer of 1940 the subject was in Indo China as Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces.

8

Subject was before the Diet in connection with the General Mobilization Law to explain the bill to the Diet in 1938.

9

In August 1938 the subject was Director of the Press Bureau while TOJO was Vice Minister of War.

10

Subject was in Indo China three or four times during his stay with the South China Expeditionary Forces.

11

Subject was in agreement with the policy of TOJO while he served as Chief of the Military Affairs Section and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

11

The first invasion by Japanese troops of Indo China was made into North Indo China in September of 1940 while subject was a Staff Officer with the South China Expeditionary Forces. The second invasion was made into South Indo China in July 1941 while subject was Chief of the Military Affairs Section.

11

Subject does not think the invasion of South Indo China could be helped, because Japan was undergoing hardships in regard to the supply of rubber.

12

Does not consider the invasion of Indo China a violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact or Nine Power Treaty.

12

While MUFO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and the subject was Chief of the Military Affairs Section, he was in accord with MUFO's policies except as to nominations for candidates for the Diet.

12

Subject was a Secretary to the Supreme War Council at one time.

13

The statement as to the Military Affairs Bureau's part in connection with the rules and regulations regarding prisoners of war, appearing on page 14, is in part true.

14

The statement appearing on page 15 as to the course of complaints on mistreatments of prisoners of war may be correct.

15

SUMMARY BY: G.S. Woolworth

INTERROGATION OF

SATO, Kenryo

Date and Time: 27 April 1946, 1015-1145 hours

Place: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present: SATO, Kenryo (General)
Mr. Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
2d Lt Paul S. Fujii, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Mr. Woolworth:

Mr. Woolworth: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you in this proceeding?

Lt Fujii: I do.

Questions by Mr. Woolworth.

- Q. General, will you briefly recapitulate your military service, giving me the date of your birth, time you graduated from military academy and were commissioned in service, down to date?
- A. I was born on the 1st of June 1896, graduated from the Military Academy in 1917, and was commissioned 2d Lt in December of that year. I was then assigned to the 1st Regiment, 1st Division (Tokyo) in the Field Artillery. In 1920 I became 1st Lt, still attached to the same unit. In 1922 I became a student in the Army War College, graduating in 1925; then I returned to my original unit. In August of 1925 I was promoted to Captain. In 1926 I entered the War Ministry in Ordnance and Supplies* (Tokyo).

In May of 1930 I went abroad to the United States as a Language Officer, returning to Japan via Europe in August of 1932. Upon my return I was promoted to Major and became Battalion Commander of the Regiment of the Heavy Field Artillery (Tokyo). In August of 1933 I returned to the War Ministry, Ordnance and Supplies.* In August of 1935 I became Professor in the Army War College. The following year, in August, I entered the War Service Section of the War Service Bureau.

**Interpreter's Note: "Ordnance and Supplies" should be "Maintenance".

FILE NO.

SATO, Kenryo, 27 April 1946

- A. In 1937 I was promoted to Lt Col, still serving in the War Service Bureau. In August of 1938 I was promoted to Col and served as the Army spokesman. This duty included the making of news releases. In December 1938 I became Professor in the Army Air Corps School at Hamatsu. In May of 1938 I became a Staff Officer for the South China Expeditionary Force. The Chiefs of Staff under whom I served were: 1. TANAKA, Kyuichi, Major General; 2. TSUCHIHASHI, Yuetsu, Major General; 3. NEMOTO, Haku, Major General. The Commanders were: 1. ANDO, Hikoichi, Lt Gen; 2. USHIROKU, Jun, Lt Gen.

In March of 1941 I returned to the War Department, becoming Chief of the War Service Section of the War Service Bureau, being promoted to the rank of Major General in October of the same year. In April of 1942 I became Chief of the War Service Bureau. In December of 1944 I became Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force. The Chiefs of Staff were: 1. MATSUI, Takuro, Lt Gen; 2. KOBAYASHI, Asasaburo, Lt Gen. The Commander of the Force was OKAMURA, Heiji, Gen.

In March of 1945 I was promoted to Lt Gen; and in April of 1945 I became Commander of the 37th Division stationed in Indo China. The division subsequently was ordered to Thailand, where I remained until the end of the war.

- Q. How long have you known General TOJO?
A. I first met TOJO when I was a student in the Army War College and TOJO became a professor (Lt Col). I studied war history under TOJO for one year. Then later I again met TOJO when he was Vice Minister of War and worked around him for a period of five months while I was the Army Spokesman. I have known him quite well. I have judged him to be a very sincere person, which I first realized when I was sent abroad as language officer. TOJO took good care of my family during that period.

At one time I was not very close to him, this being the period when I was a professor at the War College, until I became spokesman, the reason being that Maj Gen OBATA, who was the head of the college, was not very close to TOJO and, being a member of his staff, I also became the same way.

- Q. Did General TOJO appoint you to the position in the War Ministry as head of the Military Affairs Bureau? (Q. by Interpreter: Of the Bureau or the Section? A. by Interrogator: Bureau.)
A. Yes, inasmuch as the War Minister makes the appointments, TOJO appointed me.

SATO, Kenryo, 27 April 1946

Q. Did you use your influence to have Gen TOJO made Premier?

A. No, that is a mistake. There was nothing like that.

Q. Did you ever talk with senior statesman ABE about his appointment? Or with HAYASHI, Senjuro? (Q. by Interpreter: Is he also a senior statesman? A. by Interrogator: They are both senior statesmen.)

A. No, however there is something I would like to explain with regard to that.

Q. Certainly, go ahead.

A. The Japanese politicians believe that I influenced ABE and HAYASHI in the appointment of TOJO. However, that is not the truth. The explanation is this: In October of 1941 Premier KONOYE resigned just at the time when the United States and Japanese negotiations were critical. This left the Army in a difficult position. In order to stabilize the political situation, TOJO had thought that some person like Prince HIGASHIRUMI would be the logical successor. However, since the appointment of a Prince to that position is not the usual thing, TOJO felt that his appointment would create more difficulty than even the international situation. I was sent by TOJO to see ABE and HAYASHI to explain this problem. Following my visit, which the news reporters know of, there was a meeting of the senior statesmen and the next day the appointment of TOJO to the position of Premier was announced. It was in this way that the public believed that I had influenced TOJO's selection. Unfortunately ABE and HAYASHI are from the same Prefecture as myself.

Accepting the story as the truth, I would like to add the following: When the newspapermen came to me telling me of the Imperial Decree for TOJO to form a new Cabinet, I had not known of it nor did I believe it. I told the newsmen that they must be mistaken.

Q. General, will you please take a sheet of paper and draw a graph showing the relation of the Military Affairs Bureau to the War Ministry and to the other Bureaus of the War Ministry -- just a graph or a diagram?

A. (General SATO drew a chart "Draft of Organization of War Ministry" which is attached as Exhibit 1.)

Q. Have you shown on the chart the Prisoners of War Information Bureau and the Prisoners of War Management Bureau?

A. (General SATO made additions to the chart.)

Q. Did all of the other Bureaus here deal directly with the Vice Minister of War, or did their matters go through your Bureau?

A. They were all able to go directly to the Vice Minister or Minister. How-

SATO, Kenryo, 27 April 1946

SATO, Kenryo, 27 April 1946

- ever, when the matter concerned some other Bureau they maintained liaison with that Bureau concerned.
- Q. That is, your Bureau was the policy making Bureau of the Ministry? Wasn't that true?
- A. Generally speaking, our department handled the policies of the following: Organization, budget, system, regulations, national defense, the military administration of occupied territories, and finally domestic and foreign affairs which concerned the Army.
- Q. Under an ordinance, your Bureau made the plans for all Prisoner of War Camps in Japan, the construction of buildings, etc., did they not?
- A. The policies regarding prisoners of war were determined in the Prisoners of War Section. The actual design of the camps and budget concerns came through my Bureau. The administration was handled by another Bureau.
- Q. The correspondence from protesting powers, for example, from the Swiss, in connection with United States prisoners of war held by Japan passed through your Bureau, did it not?
- A. They, after obtaining permission from the Foreign Office, dealt only with the Prisoners of War Section, Prisoners of War Information. Only where it concerned me did they have to contact our office.
- Q. I understood you to say that your Bureau handled matters involving foreign affairs. Is that true?
- A. Yes, our Bureau did handle foreign affairs where they concerned the Army directly. For example, when negotiations were under way with the United States, any replies from the United States came through the Foreign Office to the War Minister, and inasmuch as any decisions would affect the Army we were notified. In cases of prisoners of war, this matter was specifically set aside for the Prisoners of War Section. Such things as removal of fortifications came to us, although they also went to the Heimukyoku (Military Service Bureau). For instance, when the Red Cross wanted to speak to us about the prisoners of war, they went through the Prisoners of War Section, and where it concerned medicine from there were referred to the Medical Bureau.
- Q. Do you recall a conference held in May 1942, at which UEMURA, then head of the Prisoners of War Bureau, and General TOJO and yourself were present -- when the question arose as to the enforcing of compulsory labor of prisoners of war? (Gen SATO questioned the name of "UEMURA.")
- A. UEMURA (believe his name was) was first head of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau.
- A. UEMURA. I do not remember any such meeting.

SATO, Kenryo, 27 April 1946

- Q. Your Bureau, as a matter of fact, drafted the ordinance which had to do with the employment of prisoners of war and the regulations regarding their care and treatment, did it not?
- A. The regulations regarding the use of prisoners of war for labor, I believe would come out of Production Section. All departments concerned drew up their own particular parts of any regulations. We handled the budget and any construction for prisoners of war. I believe the regulation permitting the use of labor was mainly from the Prisoners of War Section; however, all sections would be concerned in this matter.
- Q. You recall, do you not, that UEMURA objected to forcing compulsory labor on prisoners of war, for the reason that it was in violation of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention -- and that he was over-ruled by Gen TOJO? Do you recall that?
- A. I do not remember TOJO's ever having proposed a regulation which would break any of the Prisoner of War Regulations presented in the Geneva Convention. I don't believe that he would have done any such thing.

CLOSED AT 1145 HOURS

INTERROGATION OF

SATO, Kenryo

Date and Time: 29 April 1946, 0930-1145 hours

Place: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present: SATO, Kenryo (General)
Mr. Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
2d Lt Paul S. Fujii, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Mr. Woolworth:

Mr. Woolworth: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you in this proceeding?

Lt. Fujii: I do.

Questions by: Mr. Woolworth.

Q. General, did you know a man by the name of YOSHISUMI, Masao?
A. Yes.

Q. When he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in 1945, about March, was there any change made in the duties of the Chief?
A. Yes, at that time I was overseas, hence the details are unknown to me, but to my knowledge the Mobilization Plans Bureau was taken into the Military Affairs Bureau. It was at this time that YOSHISUMI became the Chief of the Bureau.

Q. Aside from that, you know of no change in the functioning of the Military Affairs Bureau after you left it?
A. I do not know the details, but I have heard that the Military Affairs Bureau assumed some of the work of the General Staff.

Q. Well, you would say, would you not, that the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau is probably the third most important member of the military establishment. There is the Minister of War, the Chief of Staff, and then comes the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau -- that is conceded, is it not?

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

- A. First I would like to explain that according to the Japanese Constitution, the War Ministry and the General Staff are completely independent and subservient to the Emperor. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Chief of Operations in the General Staff are equivalent in their respective fields.
- Q. Do you recall who was Chief of Staff at the time the determination was made to try by court martial the Doolittle flyers who were apprehended?
- A. SUGIYAMA was the Chief of Staff.
- Q. Who made the determination that the Doolittle flyers who were apprehended were to be tried by court martial?
- A. It was decided, I believe, by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War in conference. However, I do not remember very clearly.
- Q. Weren't you in on the conference at which that matter was decided?
- A. No, I was not there.
- Q. Were you consulted about the matter?
- A. No.
- Q. And yet it was an administrative matter, was it not, which ordinarily would come to your Bureau?
- A. Inasmuch as the flyers came down within an area under the jurisdiction of the China Expeditionary Force, this Force having direct access to the Emperor, it was decided by the Chief of Staff and the War Minister to return the flyers to the China Expeditionary Force for whatever court martial the China Expeditionary Forces wished to carry out.
- Q. We have correspondence from the Commander of the China Expeditionary Force to the War Minister, asking for advice concerning the disposition of these flyers.
- A. You have the correspondence?
- Q. Yes, I have seen the correspondence and the direction came from the War Ministry.
- A. I am not familiar with the directive. I do not know through what channels that directive had been presented. As far as I can remember, it did not come through me.
- Q. It is true, is it not, General, that the rules in connection with the treatment of prisoners of war were drawn up in conference between the General Staff and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau? (Q. by Gen SATO: Are you applying that directly to the Doolittle flyers? A. by Interrogator: No, just in general.)
- A. As I said the other day, matters pertaining to the prisoners of war case

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

to the various Bureaus concerned; a matter such as something affecting the budget would come through my office, things involving medical matters would go through the Medical Affairs Bureau, and so on.

- Q. That does not answer my question. (Question repeated.)
- A. The rules were drawn up between the General Staff and the War Ministry, under the War Ministry. The individual rules were drawn up by the various Bureaus.
- Q. And the Military Affairs Bureau had their part in the drafting of those rules, did they not?
- A. Yes, they were involved in a part of those rules.
- Q. As a matter of fact, you made the recommendation, did you not, as Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, to the War Minister as to what the rules should be?
- A. Yes, matters concerning my office. There were also others which were passed as an order from the War Minister.
- Q. General TOJO on the 28th of March this year stated that the rules regarding the treatment of prisoners of war were the result of conferences between the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and the General Staff. Is that statement true or false?
- A. That is not true. He must have been mistaken, inasmuch as positions of equal level would meet directly. The Chief of Staff would not meet with the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, but with the War Minister. A Chief of Section in the General Staff could meet with a Chief of Section in the War Ministry.
- Q. I did not say that the Chief of Bureau of Military Affairs met with the Chief of Staff. That was not the statement General TOJO made. The statement that he made was that the rules regarding treatment of prisoners of war were the result of conferences between the General Staff and the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau. Now is that true?
- A. That is possible.
- Q. When did you serve, General, in Indo China?
- A. From April 1945 until the end of the war.
- Q. Had you ever served in that territory before in any capacity?
- A. In the summer of 1940 I went to Indo China as Staff Officer of the China Expeditionary Forces.
- Q. You were Assistant Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Forces, were you?
- A. Yes, Assistant Chief of Staff.

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

Q. What did you have to do with a bill known as the National Total Mobilization Act?

A. At that time I was a member of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry. My connection with that came about in the following manner. The general mobilization law first was a matter of the Cabinet; on the side of the military it was the job of a Mobilization Plans Bureau. When the time came for the bill to be presented to the Diet, it became a matter of the Military Affairs Bureau.

Q. You made a report on the bill in behalf of the War Ministry to the Diet, did you not?

A. The actual report was made by the Premier. My capacity was to explain the bill to the Diet. There are three different positions which are involved in the presentation of a bill to the Diet, of which the person giving the explanation is the third in rank.

Q. You had some disagreement at that time with a man named NIYAWAKI, Chochiki, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the course of your talk in explanation of the bill, you told him to "shut up" did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. They called you "Shut up SATO" after that, did they not?

A. There are a lot of mistakes on that thing, so I would like to give an explanation if you have time.

Q. Go ahead.

A. The General Mobilization Law was presented in February 1938 to the KONOYE Cabinet. At that time the Diet planned to take the following three measures: 1. forced resignation of the Cabinet; 2. stop passage of an electric power generation law which was disliked very much by the public; 3. to eliminate all existing political parties and establish new parties. Although the objectives of the three movements were different, the backers of the movements were united in their expectation of a collision between the Diet and the government. The Diet members were in hopes that this collision could first be obtained through the General Mobilization Law.

At that time Japan was in the midst of the China Incident. In December of 1937 Japan attempted to obtain peace with Chiang Kai-shek through the German Ambassador, and in January of 1938 it was realized that there was no hope of a quick settlement. Thus it became obvious that the General Mobilization Law was a necessity. However, the three movements mentioned

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

before were causing undue opposition by the government to the General Mobilization Law. I was worried over this situation in the Diet, due to the conflict. We were using enormous quantities of materiel, however, we couldn't replace it. The capitalists opposed necessary increase in production facilities, the reason being that the capitalists were expecting a short war. Thus, at the conclusion of the war any investments in increased facilities would be a complete loss. In the last world war there was considerable loss incurred on the part of capital, as they had made enormous increases in production facilities. I do not blame the capitalists for their stand. However, they put the Army in a difficult position. The enterprisers, who are dependent on capital, would have built plants based on orders from the Army, but at the conclusion of the war, with the lack of orders all the investments would have been a total loss. It was, therefore, necessary to protect the enterprisers from such danger. Under the General Mobilization Law the government would administer all such war industries, and in case of the sudden cessation of hostilities the government would also take the responsibility of reimbursing any enterpriser who would thus be caught short. Therefore, the General Mobilization Law was a necessity, not only for the sake of the Army, but also for the capitalists.

The Diet would not look at the General Mobilization Law in this light and, due to the previously mentioned three movements, put up unnecessary objections to the law. Because of this opposition I felt very sad. The government was unable to explain this satisfactorily to the Diet and of those present before the Diet I was the only person capable of explaining the implication of the law. Therefore, I was hoping to be given an adequate chance to explain the bill before the Diet. However, since I was only the "explainer" I did not have the power to go ahead on my own initiative, and finally on about the 24th of February I was told by the Diet that I could present my explanation as the "explainer". It was at this point that I stood up to give my explanation. Of the explanations given up to that time I feel sincerely that mine was the most powerful one given.

Diet member MIYAWAKI was a former Army man and personally disliked me. He made all efforts to interrupt or interfere with the explanation. At that point I ceased my explanation and asked the Diet whether they wished a continuation of the explanation or not. The leader of the Diet and also the members expressed a desire to hear the rest of the explanation and, therefore, I continued. At that time MIYAWAKI put forth more efforts to interrupt me and I told him to "shut up".

- Q. You at that time were Director of the Press Bureau and TOJO was Vice Minister of War, was he not?
- A. That came later, I believe it was August.

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

- Q. In July, I guess, TOJO became Vice Minister of War?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And do you recall a speech that TOJO made in Army Hall sometime in 1938.
- A. I can't recall TOJO's having made a speech -- can you give me details?
- Q. It was a speech in which he said that it was necessary to settle the China Incident even if it involved a general war.
- A. I can't remember a speech like that.
- Q. It was after that speech in Army Hall and toward the end of October that IFAGAKI, who was Minister of War, removed TOJO, was it not?
- A. There may have been such a speech, but I can't remember.
- Q. In all events, TOJO was removed as Vice Minister of War about October 1938, was he not?
- A. I was forced to resign as Director of the Press Bureau in December, and it was following my resignation that TOJO went out, which would make it sometime in December or January.
- Q. You were then assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff in the South China Expeditionary Force?
- A. No, I went to the Hamatsu Air School, and in March I went to the South China Expeditionary Force.
- Q. In 1940 after TOJO became Minister of War he recalled you from South China, did he not, and you were made Chief of the Military Affairs Section?
- A. I became the Chief of the Military Affairs Section in March of 1941.
- Q. That was immediately after your recall from South Indo China?
- A. Yes, I was there as I frequently had to go down to Indo China on my duties from South China. During my stay with the South China Expeditionary Forces I went to Indo China three or four times, remaining only a week or ten days at a time.
- Q. As Chief of the Military Affairs Section and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, you were in accord with the policies of the Minister of War, were you not?
- A. Yes, I was in agreement with the policy of the Minister of War.
- Q. When was it that the Japanese troops invaded Indo China?
- A. The first entry was made into North Indo China in September or October of 1940. At that time I was a Staff Officer with the South China Expeditionary Forces. The second invasion was made into South Indo China in July

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

of 1941. At that time I was the Chief of the Military Affairs Section.

- Q. Did you consider that invasion of South Indo China necessary?
A. I don't think it could be helped, the reason being that Japan was undergoing hardships in regard to the supply of rubber.
- Q. You were familiar with the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Non-Aggression Pact, were you not?
A. Yes.
- Q. You realize that such invasion was in violation of the provisions of both the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, do you not?
A. Inasmuch as the occupation of Indo China was made by the Vichy-Japanese Government Agreement, I do not consider it as a war.
- Q. During the time you served in the War Ministry under General TOJO you frequently consulted with him, did you not?
A. Yes, after I became Chief of the Bureau; while Chief of the Section I dealt with the Chief of the Bureau.
- Q. Were you aware of the Imperial Conference which was held on the 6th day of September 1941?
A. I do not recall if there was one on that date, inasmuch as I did not attend them, but there may have been.
- Q. Who was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau before you succeeded to that position?
A. MUTO.
- Q. And you and MUTO were in accord on your policies, were you not?
A. Yes and no.
- Q. Can you say "yes" or "no"?
A. MUTO felt that the nominations for candidates for the Diet were proper. However, I disagreed with him on that point.
- Q. Were you ever a member of the Supreme War Council?
A. I was not a member, however I was something like a Staff Secretary.
- Q. Do you know HASHIMOTO, Kingoro?
A. I know his face, but I am not intimately associated with him.
- Q. Do you know Admiral HAGANO, Osami?
A. Yes, I know him by sight.

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

- Q. You felt, did you not, during the fall of 1941 that war with the United States was inevitable?
- A. No.
- Q. Didn't you so advise General TOJO?
- A. No, I have never told him that. I was always in opposition to becoming involved in any other war before settling the China affair. I was in earnest about finishing the China affair.
- Q. General, YOSHISUMI, Masao succeeded you as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, did he not?
- A. No, Maj Gen SANADA; YOSHISUMI followed him.
- Q. It has been said by one high in the military command in Japan that the determination to try the Doolittle flyers as a matter of policy would be made by the War Minister, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Is that true as a matter of policy?
- A. That is wrong. If my memory serves me correctly, TOJO was War Minister and the Chief of Staff, SUGIYAMA, conferred on the death sentence passed by the court martial, at which time TOJO demanded commutation; and I believe the sentence on about half the flyers was commuted.
- Q. You were well acquainted with HOSHINO, Naoki, were you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was his official position?
- A. Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.
- Q. And he was also on very friendly terms with MUTO, Akira, was he not?
- A. They were on friendly terms, but I wouldn't say "very friendly".
- Q. Are you acquainted with General KIMURA?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was his official position?
- A. Vice Minister of War.
- Q. Do you know where he is at present?
- A. I heard while I was in Singapore that he was to come in here. He may have arrived, but I do not know. He was Commander of the Japanese forces in Burma.
- Q. You were right young, General, weren't you when you were promoted to be Lt Gen?
- A. Not so young. I was forty-six at that time, so it was not so young.

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

Q. I am going to read you a statement here and ask you if it is true:

"The rules and regulations regarding prisoners of war were assembled by the Military Affairs Bureau in Conference with the Prisoners Information Bureau and Chiefs of Staff and then presented to the War Minister for approval. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the main figure in the promulgation of these rules and regulations. The policy for the handling of prisoners of war emanated from the Military Affairs Bureau and the actual handling of the prisoners of war was performed by the Prisoners Information Bureau on down through to the Field Commanders. Although the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau participated in the making of the policies for the handling of war prisoners, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the higher authority as exemplified by the fact that if the Chief of the Information Bureau came to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau with a plan and it was disapproved by the latter the normal procedure would be to forget the plan there and then because of the position maintained in the Army by the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau plus the fact that he was always in close connection with the War Minister. However, under such circumstances if the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau was insistent that his plan, disapproved by the Military Affairs Chief, be carried through then both parties would present the matter to the War Minister for determination."

A. The statement is in part true, but Chiefs of various other Bureaus concerned are omitted from this record and they actually took part in the conferences depending on the point under discussion. As to the reference of a main figure in the promulgation of rules and regulations, I believe the statement is wrong. The main figure depends only on the matter concerned. You may go through the War Ministry records and notice the signatures. At times the Prisoners Administration Bureau was the main figure, at times the Military Affairs Bureau. However, this all depends on the matter under consideration. I disagree with the statement that the Military Affairs Bureau Chief was a higher authority. The mention that the normal procedure was to forget the plan was only if the Chief of the Information Bureau was in accord finally with the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Also the reference that the Chiefs of both Bureaus would present the matter to the War Minister is incorrect. The Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau had free access to the War Minister and could see him without the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Final determination rested with the War Minister.

Q. It is true, is it not, General, that the actual promulgation of the rules regarding prisoners of war, the publication of them, was done by the Military Affairs Bureau?


A. The promulgation is done by the Vice Minister of War.

SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

- Q. It is further stated, General, that when a complaint was received as to the mistreatment of prisoners of war from the International Red Cross the following procedure was in force: The complaint was received in the Foreign Office and referred to the Military Affairs Section, a division of the Military Affairs Bureau. The head of the Military Affairs Section then took the complaint up with the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau and as a result of this conference a plan was drawn up to meet the alleged complaint. This plan was presented to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and if approved by him in turn taken to the War Minister for approval. The Military Affairs Section was the door through which all outside complaints came to the War Minister. The International Red Cross, however, would have the right to go directly to the Chief of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau with a complaint, but in such an instance the Information Bureau Chief would confer with the head of the Military Affairs Section and the procedure which I have just outlined would be followed.
- A. First, I am not quite sure, but I had been under the impression that complaints regarding prisoners first went through the Prisoners Information Bureau. However, the statement may be correct. Any plans which have been drawn up between the Prisoners Information Bureau and the Military Affairs Section could go back to the Minister directly from the Prisoners of War Bureau or the Military Affairs Bureau. It merely depended on the nature of the plan which was drawn up to meet the complaint. I think that when a plan had to be approved by the War Minister it must have gone through the Prisoners of War Administrative Bureau, inasmuch as I have never had to take anything to the War Minister.
- Q. Do you mean in connection with prisoners of war, or at any time?
- A. Yes, in reference to prisoners and complaints by the Red Cross.
- Q. It is further stated that normally it was not the duty of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to order other Bureau Chiefs, but technically the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the superior officer to the Chiefs of Bureaus such as the Prisoners of War Information Bureau.
- A. No, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau could never order any other Bureau.
- Q. What were your duties, General, as Manager of the Greater East Asia Construction Committee?
- A. I was the Assistant Manager.
- Q. What were your duties?
- A. They were similar to those of a Secretary.
- Q. Then in November of 1942 you became a member of the Liaison Committee of Greater East Asia Department?
- A. I believe it may have been so. Inasmuch as I was a member of about thirty or forty committees, it is difficult to keep track of them.

DRAFT OF ORGANIZATION OF WAR MINISTRY

(EXHIBIT I)



SATO, Kenryo, 29 April 1946

Q. Was there another person in the government in 1945 by the same name as yours -- SATO?

A. I don't know, I was overseas at the time -- there may have been.

Q. Did you ever have any conference with Molotov -- Soviet Russia?

A. No.

Q. Do you know General MASAKI, Jinsaburo?

A. Yes.

Q. He was Vice Chief of Staff, 1932 to 1934, I believe. Prince HAN-IN was Chief of Staff and MASAKI was Vice Chief.

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you ever have any official dealings with him, or personal contacts?

A. No.

Q. What were your duties as Counsellor of the Manchurian Affairs Board?

(Q. by Interpreter: Apparently he was not an adviser -- do you have the approximate year? A. by Interrogator: 1942, May 13.

A. I do not remember anything.

Q. Do you recall having any duties as a member of Enemy Property Controlling Committee in 1942?

A. Yes I remember being connected with that.

Q. What were your duties with that?

A. I was a committee member.

Q. To whom was the committee responsible -- to the Cabinet?

A. I am not clear on this, but I believe it was through the Finance Ministry. I believe the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry were most concerned with this committee.

CLOSED AT 1130 HOURS