e. In April a branch manager of the Peking Branch of an influential company was considered by the Central Screening Committee to have held a position of insufficient importance to warrant designation, although a purely technical interpretation would have resulted in his purge. Concurrently the interpretation of "territory occupied by the Japanese Armed Forces" as it affected a branch manager in Formosa was questioned. Individually these cases were not of great importance, but they did open for discussion the entire question of branch managers. Statistics were secured on all the branches of listed companies, the authority vested in the managers of various branches was determined and, after several months during which time ESS was consulted extensively and discussions were held with officials of the government, the following interpretations were approved:

(1) With regard to the branch managers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion, "manager of a branch" will be construed as manager of the sole or controlling branch in 21 listed occupied or colonial territories.

(2) For branch managers of "influential private companies, or other financial organizations" the problem was more complex. No application of this provision was made until the interpretation was evolved in November 1947 that those will be considered who were head of production branches with more than 30% of overall company production or branches with more than 20% of total business of trading concerns or financial institutions; and these will not be considered to fall under the purge if they could show that they did not recommend policy or policy matters, that they were under the direct supervision of a managing or standing director, or if there is evidence to indicate that such manager had authority considerably less than a standing director.

f. In March Civil Communications Section recommended the addition of two communications companies to the list of "influential private companies," subject to the provisions of the Interpretation of Category "G". In April,

after necessary coordination with the Economic and Scientific Section, this addition was approved; and in May the Government added these companies to the list.

6. In April the screening of economic organizations began. To insure that all officers of the listed companies and economic organizations were screened, Government Section obtained lists of these officials. By the middle of May 1947, 156 companies had been screened by the Government and the action taken on 102 of these had been reviewed by SCAP (Government Section). By the middle of July 1947 this phase of the program had progressed almost to completion: 3,150 persons in policy positions in the Japanese economic world had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; 292 persons had been removed or barred from public office. Included in this total were a number of persons screened not because of their positions in economic circles but because they were incumbents or candidates for other public office. There remained only the screening of those persons whose questionnaires, for various reasons, had not yet been obtained and the seeking out of those whose positions were not specifically listed in the purge provisions of the implementing ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised authority and influence commensurate with such listed positions.

The remaining screening task involved the application of two interpretations the evolution of which is described briefly as follows:

(1) A study of the lists of officials of all screenable organizations which were also subject to the provisions of the Interpretation of Category 'G' and the review of numerous cases revealed that there were many companies which had no standing auditors. This became apparent in the latter part of April 1947. It was apparent, too, that in at least a number of these instances,

one or more of the ordinary auditors had held authority or influence commensurate with that of standing auditor. A study was made of the corporate structure of Japanese business organizations in coordination with the Economic and Scientific Section and officials of the Government. As a result, the interpretation with regard to auditors was resolved and announced. This was that persons who were auditors in listed companies during the critical period would be required to show that their activities were not commensurate with those of standing auditors.

(2) In a similar manner it was discovered that a number of the listed companies had no designated managing or standing directors. It was to be presumed, however, that some ordinary director in each company must have exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of a managing or standing director. Research substantiated this and after necessary coordination the Japanese Government ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, directors of companies with no managing or standing directors would be considered, unless they could show proof to the contrary, to have exercised authority or influence commensurate therewith if they met any of the following criteria:

(a) A director who was concurrently in charge of general affairs or business department, or who was a "representative director."

(b) Director who was concurrently an officer (president, vice-president, managing or standing director, or standing auditor) of a subsidiary or affiliate.

(c) A director of the company who had longer affiliation and greater salary than other directors.

(d) A director who was a full-time director and was charged with the responsibility for any (major) part of the company's operations.

(e) A director who owned over 1% of the stock of the organization or related organizations and took an active part in the determination of the company's policies.

At first glance it appears that this ruling was severe, but the manner in which it was applied made it not so. The criteria furnished the basis for individually examining each case and requiring necessary explanatory information. On the basis of this information a special economic subcommittee of the Central Screening Committee made its recommendations. Similar procedure was followed in the cases of the auditors. h. By October 1947 the screening of incumbent officials of economic organizations was substantially completed. A total of 3,488 persons had been screened in 300 companies and associations; a total of 350 persons had been barred or removed from public service by economic criteria. Some screening continued, however, and final results of screening were:

ORGANIZATIONS FOR WHICH SCREENED	NO. SCREENED	REMOVED OR BARRED
Special companies, corporations, special banks, and other companies in which the Government or above organizations is the largest stockholder.	2,855	99
Companies or other organizations to be designated by the Temporary Supply and Demand Adjustment Law (Control Cos.)	843	41
Organizations established under special legislation, organizations subsidized by the Government, and other organizations serving for the public benefit, corresponding to the above.	911	60
Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations (subject to provisions of Interpretation of Category "C").	1,906	405
Other influential companies, financial institutions, etc. (screenable only)	436 6,951	21 626

These figures include the newly appointed officials of these organizations as well as those who were incumbents, but do not include individuals subsequently released on the basis of appeal. Of 78 organizations established under special legislation, only 53 were primarily economic in nature. The total number of 626 shown as removed or barred includes those designated under all categories.

Of a total of approximately 700,000 personsscreened for all public service the following were removed or barred under economic categories as indicated:

CATEGORY OF PURGE PROVISION	REMOVED OR BARRED
Officers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion	42
Officers of influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations (subject to the Interpretation of Category "G").	626
TOTAL	668

VI. PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

1. As screening progressed it became apparent that the intent of the Purge Directive was evaded by persons who had resigned from office to avoid examination. The injunctions against continuity of influence, and provisions for enforcement of these very necessary injunctions, applied only to designees of the screening committees. To block this legal loophole it was necessary to designated by name all persons categorically subject to the purge.

2. Accordingly, on July 2, 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated legislation which provided that "the Prime Minister may, regarding persons whom he deems, based upon sufficient evidence, as coming within the purview of the Memorandum (the Purge Directive), effect provisional designation in

accordance with the decision of the Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, as falling under the Memorandum without collecting questionnaire." Persons so designated were allowed a 30-day period during which they could submit letters of exception accompanied by questionnaire; if such letters were submitted their cases were individually screened in the usual manner. If no letters of exception were submitted the individuals concerned were finally designated at the end of the 30-day period.

3. By this time data was already available on each of the economic organizations whose former officers were affected by this phase of the overall economic purge program. During the month of July 1947 information received from ESS on former officers of these companies, etc., was checked against Japanese Government lists. By August a list of former officers of affected organizations was compiled on the basis of documentary evidence from three sources, information furnished by the Economic and Scientific Section, the organizations' records and the Japanese Government. This list was the basis for the first accurate estimates of the number of provisional designees in those categories applicable to economic posts. It was estimated that:

1,186 persons would be provisionally designated summarily.
188 persons would be provisionally designated upon determination of their addresses.
*635 persons would be individually investigated prior to any action being taken in their case.
220 persons were deceased and would naturally not be designated.
334 persons listed had already been designated as purgees for one reason or another.

*This group included ordinary directors and auditors of organizations which had no managing or standing directors or standing auditors, and also included branch managers.

4. Economic provisional designation began in September 1947 and continued during the succeeding month. By the middle of October the Government reported

that the provisional designation of "latent economic purgees" had been completed except for a very few directors, auditors and branch managers. The legislation affecting branch managers was not enacted until October 13, 1947; however, preliminary individual examination by the Government had been conducted on the basis of the criteria already crystallized. These groups were completed by January 1948, with the following results:

a. Directors of companies having no managing or standing director:

(1) 96 were considered as clearly purgeable.
(2) 15 of these were deceased.
(3) 20 had been previously designated as purgees.
(4) 61 were provisionally designated.

b. Auditors of companies having no standing auditor:

(1) 321 were considered as clearly purgeable.
(2) 59 had been previously designated.
(3) 30 of these were deceased.
(4) 202 were provisionally designated.

c. Branch managers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion: 81 were considered as clearly purgeable and were provisionally designated.

d. Branch managers of influential companies, financial institutions and other organizations falling under the Interpretation of Category "G":

(1) 41 were considered as purgeable.
(2) 4 of these were deceased.
(3) 30 had been previously designated as purgees.
(4) 1 was not yet repatriated and accordingly not designated.
(5) 6 were provisionally designated.

5. Subsequent to the announcement of provisional designation of individuals, a number of letters of exception were received. These set forth reasons for subject's belief that he was not subject to the purge and in some instances supplied documentary evidence to that effect. By the latter part of November 1947, 110 such letters had been submitted to the Japanese Government; 60 had been rejected, 16 approved, and 34 were in the process of examination.

Completion of the final designation in the economic field revealed the following totals:

Provisionally designated in all positions:

Involved in Japanese Expansion	401	
Companies under Interpretation of Category "C"	936	1337

Letters of exception and appeals:

Number received	120	
Number rejected or disapproved	88	
Number released from designation by letter of exception	32	
Number released by Appeal Board	7	
Total number finally designated		39
		1298

VII. SUMMARY AND EFFECT OF OVERALL ECONOMIC PURGE PROGRAM

1. During the administration of the economic phase of the purge numerous miscellaneous matters were considered, some of which though of relatively small importance in themselves fill in and round out the program and are worthy of mention for that reason.

2. A number of requests for temporary retention in office of purged officials of economic organizations were received. In those cases which showed conclusively that the individual was indispensable to the company because of his technical ability and that, in spite of efforts to secure the services of some other qualified person, the subject official was irreplaceable, such retention was granted for the period of necessity. Cases of this nature were coordinated with Economic and Scientific Section personnel familiar with the current status of such organizations, in order to insure that the administration of purge did not seriously delay economic recovery. Temporary retentions were granted for 9 such persons during 1947.

b. The Japanese Government removed several companies from the list of organizations whose wartime (1937-1945) officials were subject to the purge. Additional information concerning activity and connection with large holding companies was learned mainly through appeals submitted by companies and their removal had the approval of Government Section and Economic and Scientific Section, reflecting that intially established criteria were not stubbornly maintained when subversive to just and fair action.

c. Newly formed companies of importance were examined to determine whether the interests of the public demanded screening of their officers. No new private companies proved to be of such public interest. Kodans or government control associations, however, were added automatically by the Government, an example of the Japanese Government's initiative in applying the provisions of the purge. Further, the Japanese Government promulgated on February 9, 1948 legislation which made it illegal for a purgee to become an officer in a direct successor organization to one named in the ordinance. Several persons designated because of positions which they held between 1937 and 1945 in Japan's wartime economy appealed their cases and were subsequently reinstated. These persons generally showed that, although they held positions which normally would have been considered controlling influence, these positions were held solely because of their highly specialized technical ability and that, in fact, they did not have or exercise policy control.

2. The following statistics show the extent of the economic phase of the purge program:

a. Overall Economic Field - Including Quasi-governmental

(1) Number of persons screened as holding or being considered for appointment to important positions in economic organizations (including 25 organizations established by special legislation and not essentially economic in nature).	6,951
(2) Number of the above persons actually removed from office (including those removed for falling under purge provisions other than economic).	453
(3) Number of persons barred, removed or excluded from any public office by reason of the economic purge (including those in financial institutions involved in Japanese expansion)	1,924

b. Private Economic Organizations

(1) Number of persons screened as holding or being considered for appointment to important positions in private organizations	2,342
(2) Number of above persons actually removed from office in private economic organizations (including those removed by purge provisions other than economic)	254
(3) Number of persons screened and barred or removed from any public office by reason of the economic purge (including those involved in Japanese expansion)	465 27/

27/ For a detailed statistical analysis of the effect of the Economic Purge see Appendix B: 5c, General Summary of Purge Statistics.

PART III

THE PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA PHASE

I. BACKGROUND

1. POLICY DIRECTIVES

The public information media phase of the removal and exclusion program was dictated by the words of the Potsdam Declaration which stated that "there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest...." The fulfillment of this provision of the Potsdam Declaration required elimination from leadership of those who by writing and speech had shown themselves to be active exponents of militant nationalism and of those who, by control of the press, radio and the motion picture propagandized the Japanese people until they became willing to support a war of aggression. Consonant with the Potsdam Declaration and the initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, the Supreme Commander in the latter part of August 1945 was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression."

2. VOLUNTARY PURGE OF THE PRESS

Informed Japanese newspaper men who for almost a decade had been forced to remain silent while they watched the nation moving ever nearer to disaster were quick to realize that those who controlled the press during this period bore a heavy responsibility for the war and its resultant ruin. Shortly after the restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press had been lifted by SCAP directive a spontaneous movement aimed at eliminating the old autocratic leadership took place in the newspaper industry.

The ASAHI SHIMBUN, Japan's largest and perhaps most influential newspaper, was the first to accomplish its program of reorganization. On October 21, 1945, policy-making officers down to bureau chiefs resigned their positions en masse. On November 26, 1945 the management of the MAINICHI SHIMBUN bowed to a similar demand from the paper's staff. Matsutaro Shoriki, president of YOMIURI SHIMBUN, third largest newspaper in Japan, stubbornly resisted the newspeper guild's demand for "democratication of the press," received on October 23, 1945. This caused a prolonged labor dispute. Shoriki's apprehension as a war criminal suspect in early December 1945, however, abruptly settled the issue in favor of the guild members and top officials on the YOMIURI resigned from their positions on December 11, 1945.

These and other such incidents in various information media companies were indicative of the fact that a certain section of the Japanese people had come to realize that those who had propagandized the nation into war and conquest were not qualified to serve as heralds of peace or spokesmen for democracy.

II PRELIMINARY STEPS

1. SCAPIN 550

The Public Information Media Purge was based upon Category "G," SCAPIN 550 the broad provisions of which ordered the removal and exclusion of all ultranationalists and militarists not specified under any other categories of the Directive.[28] The Japanese Government's announcement of March 10, 1946 interpreted this category as including writers and artists, owners of publishing enterprises, publishers or editors of any newspaper, magazine or other form of publication who had engaged in activities prescribed by Category "G" of the Directive.

On May 16 the Japanese Government further defined the provisions of Category "G" applying to writers and publishers, and in so doing laid the ground work for the purge of the field of public information which was completed the following year.

28/ Appendix B: 5b, SCAPIN 550, January 4, 1946.

2. CI&E MEMORANDUM

On May 27, 1946 Brigadier General Kenneth Dyke, Chief of Civil Information and Education Section, submitted a memorandum to the Chief of Staff recommending that a directive be issued to the Japanese Government ordering removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from positions of authority and influence in Japanese media of public information.

This memorandum pointed out that "control of Japanese information media by individuals opposed to the aims of the Potsdam Declaration would place in their hands a powerful social instrument which could be utilized at some future date to subvert the aims of the Occupation and mold the minds of the people for new wars of aggression." SCAP has already taken steps to eliminate active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression from the educational system, public office and the political life of Japan. Fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration....requires that such individuals also be eliminated from positions of authority and influence in the information field. It is the opinion of CI&E that until this is accomplished, it will be impossible to create free, vigorous and independent information media. It was further pointed out that under existing SCAP directives, it was still possible for individuals who were barred from public office and the educational system to occupy positions of equal or greater authority and influence in information media.

CI&E recommended that the term public information media be defined to include (a) Newspapers and News Agencies, (b) Radio Broadcasting, (c) Magazines and Books, (d) Motion Pictures and (e) Theaters. The Memorandum listed those positions of authority and influence in public information media concerns from which undesirable personnel must be removed and excluded. Such positions included: President, Managing Director, Partner, Adviser, Member of the Board of Directors, Executive Editor or Producer and Controlling Stockholders.

Although the public information media purge was to be implemented under the provisions of Category "G," SCAPIN 550, instead of by a separate directive, many of the recommendations made by CI&E were incorporated in the final public information media program.

III IMPLEMENTATION

SCAPIN 550 was first implemented under Imperial Ordinance 109 of 1946 which applied only to government officials of Chokunin rank or higher and to a limited number of officials in listed organizations. In November 1946, however, the Government formulated a plan for the extension of the purge not only to local government levels but to certain private industries as well. Among these the Government listed principal newspaper companies, news agencies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication. This extension became law on January 4, 1947 with the promulgation of the new purge ordinances which specified in detail the persons to be screened and the screening procedure.[29]

1. CRITERIA FOR SCREENING

Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 defined the term "public service" as including positions of policy-making level in the various media of public information. Article II of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 stated: "The term, public service, as used in this Ordinance shall mean and include positions of members of National Diet, personnel of the National Government entity, assembly members and personnel of local public organizations and positions of specific personnel of specific companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations...."

Positions and organizations to be screened were specifically listed. Positions were classified as principal public office and ordinary public office. Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President, Vice-President, Director, Standing Auditor, Chief of

29/ Appendix B: 5i; j; k: Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1, 2, of 1947, and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

Compilation Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Chief of Research Bureau, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, News Editor and other commensurate positions were classified as principal public officers. Auditor other than standing auditor, adviser, councilor, departmental chief of compilation bureau and other such officials of comparable level were defined as ordinary public officers. Both were required to be screened; however, no person was held subject to the purge for activity in an ordinary public office. Thirty-six newspaper companies, twenty book and magazine publishers, five motion picture companies and one radio corporation were listed. Companies and organizations to be screened were not limited to those listed in the Ordinance, as provisions were made that all newspaper companies of 20,000 or more circulation, and all other information media organizations of comparable influence were to be screened.

2. CRITERIA FOR REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION

The Japanese Government's interpretation of Category "G," included as a substantive part of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, was amplified to supply the criteria for the public information media purge.

a. Criteria Applied to Propagandists

Its provisions brought under the Ordinance any person "who in the capacity as scholar, journalist, member of a newspaper editorial staff, reviewer or writer for magazine or other publications, or in any other similar capacity," had through writing or speech identified himself as a person who,

> (1) Advocated aggression or militant nationalism, or actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through his political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, New Order in the East Asia or policies of similar nature, or the Manchurian Incident, China Incident or the Pacific War.
>
> (2) Advocated dictatorship or totaliterianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern.

(3) Advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect.

(4) Persecuted or denounced liberals or persons espousing anti-militaristic ideologies.

(5) In any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

b. Criteria Applied to Responsible Officials

The Interpretation of Category "G" also provided that persons who held policy level positions between July 7, 1937 and December 7, 1941 in information media companies and who engaged in the activities listed above or in other proscribed activities listed under Paragraph 1 of SCAPIN 548 were to be removed and excluded. The provisions of SCAPIN 548 apply to persons who advocated:

(1) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in response to directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; or,

(2) Support or justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad; or,

(3) Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples; or,

(4) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions; or,

(5) Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries; or,

(6) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or martial spirit in Japan; or,

(7) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement of justification of a tradition favoring such methods.

Policy-making officials assumed to bear responsibility for the activities of their respective organizations between July 7, 1937 and December 7, 1941 were listed as: President, Vice-President, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, and any other official who exercised authority and influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions.

3. INJUNCTIONS

The Ordinance required that purged holders of public office, principal and ordinary, in public information media companies must be removed from public information work of any kind. It further stipulated that no individual who was purged for any other reason would be permitted to hold "any position in an executive, staff or other capacity" in any media of mass communication.

In defining the critical period as the years from the outbreak of the North China Incident in 1937 to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, both SCAP and the Japanese Government recognized that official control over public information media became so severe after 1941 that it left no alternative but to support the war.

In the interests of justice, therefore, it was determined that the critical period should begin when the apparent success of the invasion of North China caused unprincipled officials of the public information media companies to lend their support to the militarists and their program of aggression. Similarly, the conclusion of the critical period was determined to be the date of Japan's entry into war against the western powers when official censorship and police terror left no room for criticism of national policies.

4. INFORMATION MEDIA INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE

The Ordinance listed by name the screenable positions in public information media companies and defined the purge criteria in detail. There still remained,

however, the determination of which specific public information media companies had carried on such activities as those proscribed by the Japanese Government's interpretation of Category "C." To accomplish this, the Government undertook extensive research into the subject matter of newspapers, periodicals and books which appeared during the critical period. Concurrently a study was made of the organizational structure of the companies under investigation in order to determine which positions in each were on the policy-making level.

a. Membership of the Committees

Since during the critical period there were in existence approximately 850 newspaper companies and 4,500 book and magazine publishers, the task was a formidable one. It was undertaken by the Japanese Government in February 1947 with the establishment of an Information Media Investigation Committee, consisting of:

(1) Shikao Matsushima, a career diplomat who was then chairman of the Central Screening Committee.

(2) Tatsuo Iwabuchi, journalist and political commentator, who was also a member of the Central Screening Committee.

(3) Matsuo Kato, former correspondent for the Domei News Agency in the United States.

(4) Takeshi Ohta, Chief of Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee.

(5) Hisanari Yamada, Chief of Political Affairs Bureau of the Central Liaison Office.

(6) Soichi Shibue, Chief of Personnel Section of the Cabinet Secretariat.

(7) Mitsuo Tanaka, Deputy Chief of Political Affairs Division of the Central Liaison Office.

The committee's assignment was to review all publications which appeared during the critical period, to discover articles which violated the basic provisions of Paragraph 1, SCAPIN 548;[30] and to compile a "blacklist" of public information media organizations which published such articles. More than 300 persons were

30/ Appendix B: 5a, SCAPIN 548, January 4, 1946.

employed by the Japanese Covernment to assist the Committee which conducted the initial research and prepared a preliminary report. But its members, entrusted as they were with other official duties of pressing importance, found themselves unable to devote sufficient time to the work. The original committee was, therefore replaced by a new committee of six experts appointed by the Government on the basis of specialized experience in the public information media field. The members of this committee were:

(1) Naro Okada, Director of the Imperial Library, had served since 1929 as an official of that organization. He was concurrently Secretary of the Education Ministry and a member of the Japan Sociological Association.

(2) Kunio Odaka, Professor of Literature at Tokyo Imperial University, was a graduate of Sociology Division of the same institution and had been a member of the Tokyo Imperial University faculty since 1937.

(3) Ryoichiro Ota, attended School of Economics at Kyoto Imperial University but was imprisoned for violation of Peace Preservation Law during his school days and was forced to leave the University. He was an economist and non-official adviser of the Tientsin Consulate-General from 1938 to 1945.

(4) Taiji Kawashima, Professor of Economics at Hosei University, was a former staff writer of "Diamond," a financial journal. He was also a member of the Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute.

(5) Takeso Kaneko, Professor of Literature at Tokyo Imperial University, had held that position since 1935 and was the author of many philosophical studies.

(6) Toyoo Mori, Professor of Political Science and Theology at Taihoku Imperial University between 1929 and 1942. He had written extensively on political and religious subjects. A Christian, he had dared to criticize the suppression of religious freedom in Germany during the Nazi regime.

b. Activities of the Committee

On April 30, 1947 the new Committee submitted a report of its findings on 36 newspaper companies, 35 book and magazine publishers, 8 motion picture and

theatrical companies and 24 organs of nationalistic organizations. On May 5, 1947 the committee submitted to Government Section a blacklist naming 330 organizations, 302 of which were dissolved nationalistic organizations. On June 9, 1947 the committee submitted reports on 193 newspaper companies, 493 magazine publishers, 215 book publishers, and 8 motion picture and theatrical companies. In the final selection of public information companies and organizations to be placed on the blacklist two factors were considered by the committee. The first of these was the extent of the company's influence, as determined by circulation in the case of newspapers or magazines and the number of productions in the case of theatrical and motion picture companies. The second was the frequency with which a company engaged in the propaganda activities prescribed by SCAPIN 548 and the Interpretation of Category "G."

The committee on June 20, 1947 presented to the Japanese Government a recommended blacklist of public information media organizations naming 117 newspaper companies, 225 book and magazine publishers, 15 theater and motion picture companies, 6 broadcasting corporations and 5 information control agencies. These organizations were subsequently listed in Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 3 of 1947.

5. THE IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE

Paragraph 5 of the Japanese Government's Interpretation of Category "G", while specifically listing various purgeable positions in newspaper companies, did not give a clear definition of such positions in other media of mass communication. Therefore, it was not adequate to guide application of the purge to these other media. On June 13 the committee investigating information media, realizing the need for modification of that part of the ordinance, recommended appropriate changes to the Government. This recommendation was embodied in a Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry Ordinance promulgated on June 30.

On the day that the ordinance was promulgated, the Japanese Government issued an explanatory statement summarizing the work of the Public Information Media Investigation Committee and explained the policy and the method by which the blacklist had been compiled. This statement pointed out that the work had been in accord with "the general policy and outline of the Purge Directive, applicable to the press and publications as indicated by Imperial Ordinance No. 1, 1947, and the so-called 'Interpretation of Category G'. The Government authorities concerned have been, from the time of the former Cabinet, engaged in the studies and investigations of the practical manner of application of the Directive.

"A special investigation committee was established, in order to conduct thorough research and investigation of all publications in the field. The Committee has since then been actively engaged in the investigation of the contents of these publications....investigations have now been completed... on the basis of which the Government has decided upon the scope of the information media companies and organizations, as well as the responsible parties to whom the removal and exclusion clause of the Purge Directive is applicable.

"As the result of examination by the Information Media Investigation Committee companies or organizations having strong nationalistic or militaristic tendencies are recognized as falling under the Purge Directive regardless of the number of circulation or the number of cases falling under SCAPIN 548.

"In the case of other ordinary media of mass communication, generally those newspaper companies and magazine publishers which had a circulation of about ten thousand or more and which published more than ten articles a year violating SCAPIN 548 have been selected; and in the case of books, pamphlets, films and theatrical presentations, those companies, regardless of circulation or of presentation, having more than ten cases of violation, have been recog-

nized as falling under the Purge Directive. However, regardless of circulation or number of cases of violation, due consideration was given to the nature of the violations and other relevant factors."

a. Purge Provisions

Paragraph 5, subparagraph d. of the Interpretation of Category "G" attached to the basic Ordinance was amplified into a twenty-five page document listing by name the affected information media organizations and stating precisely which officers were subject to removal and exclusion. A total of 363 organizations including 117 newspaper companies and news agencies, 225 book and magazine publishers, 15 theatrical and motion picture companies, 6 broadcasting corporations and 5 control associations were listed. Persons who held any of the specified positions during the period between July 7, 1937 and December 7, 1941 in any one of the blacklisted organizations were declared subject to purge scrutiny.

Further, persons who, between July 7 1937 and September 2, 1945, held high positions in governmental agencies charged with the control of public information, including the Board of Information, Home Ministry, Metropolitan Police Board, Education Ministry, Communications Ministry, Justice Ministry and the Planning Board were listed as subject to designation.

All information media organizations listed in Paragraph 9 of Appendix II to Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 were to be screened in accordance with this additional criteria. All persons who had worked in the public information field were by this ordinance made subject to scrutiny, including those who had been screened and passed before the public information purge criteria were determined.

b. Counter-evidence Provisions

Provisions included in Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 3 of 1947 permitted submission of counter-evidence by affected persons prior to final action on individual cases. Counter-evidence was required to be submitted within thirty days from the date of the ordinance.

Two types of counter-evidence could be presented. One was counter-evidence submitted by an information media company to prove that the company should be removed from the blacklist. Counter-evidence of this type was evaluated and accepted or rejected by the Information Media Investigation Committee. The other was counter-evidence submitted by an individual within a blacklisted company showing that he did not himself participate in the proscribed activities of his company. This type of counter-evidence was submitted to the Central Screening Committee at the time of individual screening.

Of the 368 companies placed on the blacklist, 51 newspaper companies, 74 book and magazine publishers and 8 motion picture companies, a total of 134 companies in all, submitted counter-evidence to the Japanese Government. To conduct preliminary investigation of counter-evidence submitted, two subcommittees were established in the Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee: a ten-man subcommittee for books and magazines and a four-man subcommittee for newspapers. On the basis of their findings they were authorized to recommend to the Government acceptance or rejection of such counter-evidence, but the Information Media Investigation Committee reserved the right to make final recommendations on all borderline cases. Since the screening of personnel in information media had already started, this procedure was established to expedite the disposition of counter-evidence cases.

Examination of the 134 counter-evidence cases was completed October 24, 1947. On this date in a Memorandum to General Whitney, Chief of the Government Section, the Japanese Government requested that 38 information media companies be deleted from the blacklist on the basis of acceptable counter-evidence. Upon review of these cases, General Whitney agreed that in all but one case the recommendation was reasonable, while the recommendation concerning a motion picture company was rejected because this company had been active in the distribution of German propaganda films in Japan during the critical period.

c. Amendments to the Ordinance

On November 26, 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 11 amending Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 to remove 37 companies from the blacklist and to add 16 others on which research had been completed. Among the 16 organizations added to the blacklist was the Kodo Kai, or Imperial Way Society, whose official organ, KODO, had been edited and published by Rikisa Hirano.

6. RESULTS OF SCREENING

Paragraph 9 of Appendix I to Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 provides that principal officials of newspaper companies having a circulation of 20,000 or more and those of all other media of mass communication of comparable influence must be screened, a provision which affected about 1,400 persons. The Central Screening Committee began its task in the middle of August 1947 with those persons in blacklisted companies which had not submitted counter-evidence. By the end of August 1947 the Central Screening Committee had screened 430 such persons. By the end of the following month 1010 principal public office holders in important information media companies had been screened, of these 61 persons were judged to fall under the Directive. By the end of October 1947 the figure had increased to 1280 screened and 120 purged.

The screening phase of the information media purge was substantially completed by the end of November 1947. Of 1424 principal office holders screened, 1,259 were passed and 165 were barred. The following statistics show the results of screening for principal types of information media:

	No. of Co. Screened	No. of Persons Screened	Passed	Barred
Newspaper Co.	127	740	658	82
Book and Magazine Publisher	129	581	519	62
Motion Picture Company	7	75	56	19
Broadcasting Corp.	1	28	26	2
Total	264	1,424	1,259	165

These figures, however, do not include persons who held public offices other than those in information companies but were nevertheless brought under the scrutiny of the Central Screening Committee because they had held policy-making positions in blacklisted information media organizations during the critical period. Of 44 such persons who were rescreened as a result of such scrutiny, 23 were purged and 21 passed.

7. PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

The Japanese Government at the time of the promulgation of Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 3 of 1947, estimated that approximately 600 persons would be affected. However, a considerable number of these had resigned rather than submit questionnaires for screening. Furthermore, a substantial number of the companies on the information media blacklist had dissolved prior to the promulgation of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 and their officials had never been subject to screening.

This group of resignees and former officers of dissolved organizations were provisionally designated in accordance with Article VII-II of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. Under the terms of Article VII-III of the same ordinance they were given thirty days in which to present counter-evidence showing cause why they were not subject to the purge.

In July 1947 this project was undertaken by the Japanese Government; it began by collecting all available data on persons who were former officials of government information control agencies and those who had held principal positions in the blacklisted information media organizations.

Provisional designation of officials of government information media control agencies was completed at the end of November 1947. Of 123 persons falling under this category, 61 were finally designated while 3 were exempted on the basis of acceptable counter-evidence.

As for the provisional designation of principal officers in blacklisted information media, the Japanese Government was successful in obtaining relevant data on 212 designated organizations. The provisional designation of these persons began on October 3, 1947. A total of 1,135 persons were examined of whom 494 were provisionally designated. Of these 64 were later cleared on the basis of acceptable counter-evidence.

The purge of publishing-house executives listed had its sequel in the purge of the authors who had actually written the propaganda they published. While conducting research for the purpose of compiling the blacklist, the Information Media Investigation Committee had uncovered much damaging evidence against individual writers. In December 1947 the Government began to list these persons, and by the conclusion of the purge program on May 10, 1948 had designated approximately 300 of them.[31]

31/ For a detailed statistical analysis of the effect of the Public Information Media Purge, see Appendix B: 5c, General Summary of Purge Statistics.

IV CONCLUSION

The Public Information Media Purge removed from positions of power and influence the fourth party in the fateful ruling alliance that drove the Japanese nation to the very brink of destruction. For, while the militarists and their accomplices in the civil government supplied the leadership and while the great industrial combines furnished the arms, it was primarily the masters of press and motion picture who engendered among the people the will toward war. The principles of the Potsdam Declaration demanded that those who so deceived and misled the Japanese people be removed from positions in which they control the thinking and, therefore, the destiny of the nation.

PART IV

THE DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI PHASE

I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF BUTOKUKAI

1. FOUNDING AND PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT

The Dai Nippon Butokukai (Great Japan Military Virtue Association) was first organized in 1895 by certain citizens of Kyoto who wished to reawaken public interest in the ancient and distinctive martial sports of Japan. The so-called "National Sports" which the Association intended to popularize were Judo (Japanese wrestling), Kendo (Japanese fencing), and Kyudo (Japanese archery). The first recorded Butokuden (Hall of Military Virtue) was built during the reign of Emperor Kammu (782-806 A. D.) within the precincts of the Heian Shrine in Kyoto at the time when that city was the capital of Japan. Kyoto was, therefore, the logical site for a society whose purpose was to arouse the martial spirit of the Japanese through the medium of ancient and warlike sports. The first step taken by the organizers of the Butokukai was to build, in the same style and approximate location of the first known Butokuden, a hall in which the sports could be practiced, and in which classes in the spirit of Budo, (better known as Bushido or "way of the warrior") could be conducted. The organizers chose as their first chairman the governor of Kyoto, Viscount Sensho Watanabe. So many Japanese came to regard the society as a convenient medium through which they could readily express their desire for continuance of the feudal samurai code in the face of modern western influence that independent units modeled after the original Kyoto Butokukai were organized throughout Japan under the governors of the prefectures. In 1905 these independent branches were organized into a national organization, drawing its leadership from nationally known political figures. In 1915, however, the national chairman, Baron Kanetake Oura (at that time Home Minister in the Okuma cabinet

and one of the original founders of the Butokukai) was implicated in an election fraud and was forced to retire from politics and resign his position in the association. This incident and the political turmoil which existed in Japan during this period altered the policy of the society which, from that time forward, drew it chairmen from the retired ranks of generals and admirals on the theory that they would be "impartial and (of) high integrity and unrelated to politics." This policy was followed until the ascendancy of Tojo with the successive appointments of Lt. General Baron Maruyuki Miyoshi (1916-18), General Baron Nobuyoshi Asada (1918-23), Admiral Baron Rokuro Yashiro (1923-26), General Baron Furataro Honoda (1926-37), and General Senjuro Hayashi (1937-42).

2. WARTIME ACTIVITIES OF THE DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI

With the gradual ascendancy of the military as the dominant controlling factor in Japanese politics culminating in the appointment of Tojo as Prime Minister in 1941, the Butokukai increasingly became a means of inculcating the militaristic spirit among the masses of Japan. Hitoshi Ashida, who as Welfare Minister in the Yoshida cabinet, was interviewed concerning this Society stated: "With the ascendancy of the Konoye regime in 1939....there was a tendency to amalgamate the society with the Tenno Rule System, but not until after the outbreak of the war did the organization come under the control of the government. Premier Tojo automatically became the National President, who directed the activities. The organization was transformed for military purposes. Juken Jitsu (Bayonet Practice) and Shageki (Rifle Marksmanship) were included in the program." Going further into the wartime activities of the Butokukai, Toshio Watanabe, post-surrender business manager, stated that: "The organization was placed under the influence of five Ministries: Home Affairs, Education, Welfare, Army and Navy. A subsidy was granted by the government to the society for additional operating expenses....Militant nationalism was stressed....The March 1941 statistics revealed a total membership of 3,178,000."

3. POST-SURRENDER ACTIVITIES OF DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI

Following the surrender, officials of the Dai Nippon Butokukai, possibly fearing that the Occupation Authorities would order them to dissolve, reorganized to their pre-1942 status. This step was taken by the society to cover up its wartime record and to continue its activities under the camouflage of democratic reorganization. The reorganization which took place was superficial and designed to replace those officials who had been apprehended as war criminals, or who, having fallen under the Purge Directive, might discredit the Society in the eyes of the Occupation were they to remain at their posts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in recommending dissolution of the organization stated: "The official purpose of the organization has not been changed, so far as its charter reveals, and this is 'to promote military arts and to contribute to the training of the people'." In fact, Hisaku Shimura, prominent Butokukai leader in Ibaragi, said at this time: "We wish to introduce to the general public the real nature of military arts by continuous meetings in various places, and to propagandize the reason why we should absorb the real spirit of military arts in order to rebuild a peaceful Japan. We want to have the people acknowledge that the military arts are obviously not the tools for war, but for peace, and are really the national arts of Japan." The contradiction inherent in such rationalization should have been obvious but the Japanese Government hesitated to add the Butokukai to the list of proscribed organizations since to do so would render its officials subject to the purge.

II. ACTION AGAINST THE SOCIETY

1. DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI ORDERED DISSOLVED

On the basis of such facts as these, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, recommended in a Memorandum to the Chief of Staff that: "Dissolution of Dai Nippon Butokukai by order to the Imperial Japanese Government is recommended in accordance with the provisions of...SCAPIN 548, paragraph I f, on the grounds that this is an or-

ganization 'affording military or quasi-military training' and which provides for the 'perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan'." Paragraph I f of SCAPIN 548 states: "You will prohibit the formation of any political party, association, society, or other organization and any activity on the part of any of them or of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose activity is...affording military or quasi-military training."[32] Pursuant to this memorandum, the Japanese Government was orally instructed to add the Dai Nippon Butokukai to the list of organizations in Appendix "A" of SCAPIN 548 and to dissolve the organization together with all its branches and any organizations which it controlled or with which it was affiliated.

It is interesting to note that in 1949 the Attorney-General's Office of the United States Government listed the branches of the Butokukai existing in America among a group of subversive organizations which also included that notorious arm of politics by terrorism, the Kokuryu Kai or Black Dragon Society.

2. EVOLUTION OF THE BUTOKUKAI PURGE

a. Efforts to Forestall SCAP Action

Prior to November 1, 1946, the date on which the Japanese Government was given verbal instructions to dissolve the organization under the terms of SCAPIN 548, the Butokukai had begun to formulate a plan for self-dissolution. This plan, however, contained the proviso that autonomous organizations would be set up in each sport to continue the activities of the old society, and did not, therefore, represent a sincere attempt to dissolve the Butokukai.

b. Category "G" Invoked Against Leaders

Faced by SCAP's demand for action on the Butokukai, Home Minister Etsujiro Uehara personally presented a petition to General Whitney in which he attempted to maintain that the association was not guilty of furthering militant nationalism among the Japanese people. The petition did, however, admit that "after the

32/ Appendix B: 5a, SCAPIN 548, January 4, 1946.

commencement of the Pacific War, it was inevitable that the various set-ups internally moved to a wartime footing and the Butokukai could claim no exception to this rule...and with the object of coordinating military arts and of the advancement of bayonet drill and shooting, the Ministry of Welfare planned to establish a new Martial Arts Organization...." Thus, he tacitly admitted that the Butokukai afforded military or quasi-military training. In reply to Home Minister Uehara's petition General Whitney stated:

> "I have carefully considered your Memorandum concerning the status of the Great Japan Military Virtue Association (Dai Nippon Butokukai). This Association was dissolved and its funds and other property seized under Home Ministry Ordinance dated November 6, 1946 because during the war the association became an instrument of the militarists.
>
> "I am advising State Minister Kanamori that in the administration of Imperial Ordinance No. 1, dated January 4, 1947, all influential members of this association or any branch thereof within the period December 6, 1941 and September 2, 1945 will be treated as falling within the provisions of Category "G," Appendix "A," SCAPIN 550, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary."

c. Butokukai Purge Criteria Determined

This first formal document to be sent to the Japanese Government concerning the Dai Nippon Butokukai raised several points at issue.

(1) Militaristic Nature Established

The first of these was the question of whether or not the Butokukai had become a device of militarists. This question had been settled by the Japanese Government with the Issuance of Home Ministry Ordinance No. 6 of

1946 dissolving the Dai Nippon Butokukai because "during the war, the association became an instrument of the militarists." The Japanese Government had taken this action to avoid dissolving the Dai Nippon Butokukai under the terms of Paragraph I f, SCAPIN 548.

(2) Dissolution by Special Ordinance

The second point at issue was the effect that the action of the Japanese Government in dissolving the Society under a special ordinance would have upon the purge of Butokukai officials. Had the action been taken under SCAPIN 548, all officers, directors, or influential members of the Butokukai would automatically have been purgeable under the corollary terms of Category "G" of SCAPIN 550 which includes all organizations dissolved under SCAPIN 548. This question was settled by General Whitney's statement that "...all influential members of this association (Dai Nippon Butokukai)...will be treated as falling within the provisions of Category "G" (rather than "C") Appendix "A," SCAPIN 550." Adding the Butokukai to Category "G" rather than to Category "C" fundamentally changed the nature of the examination of Butokukai leaders since it substituted for the blanket removal required by "C," a system whereby each Butokukai official was to be judged on the individual merits of his case.

This change was of great significance. It meant that only "...those influential members within the period December 6, 1941 to September 2, 1945 will be treated as falling within the provision" of the purge, rather than all officers and influential members from 1895 to October 1946. The December 6 date was, after further study, changed by a Memorandum from General Whitney to the Director-General of the Cabinet Secretariat which stated, "persons who held....(listed) offices in the association between <u>March 22, 1942</u> and <u>September 2, 1945</u> will be deemed influential members" of the Dai Nippon Butokukai

and as such will be held purgeable. This change of date was based on the fact that it was in March 1942 that the Butokukai was brought under direct government control. Further amendment to those dates was made in the ordinance setting forth criteria for the purge of former officials of the Dai Nippon Butokukai. Under these criteria, the critical period for officers on the prefectural level began with September 1942 since for the most part the reorganization of the headquarters of the Butokukai in March 1942 antedated that of its prefectural branches by six months.

The question of which officers of Dai Nippon Butokukai should be considered to have held purgeable positions was defined in a later Memorandum by General Whitney to the Director-General of the Cabinet Secretariat. This document stated in part:

"...I am now advising Minister of Justice Suzuki that in the administration of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 dated January 4, 1947, persons who held the following offices in the association...will be deemed influential members thereof:

(a) At the national level: President, Vice President, Chief of the Board of Directors, Directors, Chiefs of Sections.

(b) At the prefectural level and the six principal cities: Chief, Deputy Chief, Chief of the Board of Directors, Directors, Chiefs of Sections.

(c) At the local branch level: Chief..."

This decision was made after an extensive investigation into the actual duties of the officials to determine which of them had held the most responsible positions. Emphasis was placed on the responsibility of those officials

who were most active in the association after its reorganization in 1942. These were primarily Home Ministry bureaucrats and high police officials. In a final attempt to forestall the issuance of the Ordinance effectuating the purge of these "influential members" of the Butokukai, the Japanese Government estimated that, as the criteria stood, 8 governors, 9 vice-governors, 3 members of the Diet and 71 ranking members of the bureaucracy then in office would have to be removed. It later proved that none of the prefectural governors, only 3 of the vice-governors, and none of the Diet members were actually subject to removal; and only 15 of the key bureaucrats were designated.

Prior to issuing the Ordinance implementing the purge of militaristic officials of the Butokukai, it was necessary to outline what would constitute acceptable counter-evidence. After much research and many conferences, the Japanese Government on July 6, 1947 was directed to insure that "...the contrary evidence (concerning the officials questioned because of their affiliation with the Butokukai) be required to be produced by not later than August 15, 1947 in order that this matter of long-pending duration with the former Cabinet can be concluded with reasonable expedition." Main points included in the Ordinance as acceptable counter-evidence were: "With respect to all officers of the Butokukai '(1) Any person who can give proof that he made positive attempts to obstruct the militarization of the association. (2) That his personal record was such as to show that he did not identify himself with any quasi-militaristic or quasi-ultranationalistic activities'" will be favorably considered. The above two provisions affected officers on all levels. Criteria were also included affecting holders of specific positions in the National, Prefectural and Local Levels of the association: (1) That a person who held what he considered a "nominal position" did not concurrently hold an active position such as Section Chief. (2) Differentiation was also made between those officials who held positions prior to the reorganization and those who

same to authority in the Butokukai subsequent to the reorganization. On July 24 this plan was presented to Government Section by Japanese Government representatives. General Whitney then determined that the plan would be acceptable if personal assurances were given by State Minister Suzuki as the responsible Japanese Government official, that the plan would accomplish the examination of Butokukai within the letter and the spirit of SCAPIN 550. Such assurances were given and the plan was accepted.

3. ADMINISTRATION OF THE BUTOKUKAI PURGE

a. Implementing Ordinance Issued

On July 25 the plan for the purge of militaristic officers of the Butokukai was issued by the Cabinet in the form of a draft Cabinet Order and a press announcement of this decision was made. On August 2, Prime Minister's Office and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 6 was issued adding the Dai Nippon Butokukai to the Remarks Appended to Article VII, Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. This ordinance incorporated all of the provisions discussed during the period that the plan for the inclusion of the Butokukai under SCAPIN 550 was under consideration. Namely: (1) That only certain officers would be affected. (2) That the critical period would be from March 22, 1942 to September 2, 1945. (3) That evidence to the contrary would be considered.

b. Screening Schedule Set

On July 15 in reply to a letter from Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama alleging that several hundred key bureaucrats would be removed from public office by the Butokukai Purge, SCAP stated:

"In order that the elimination from public service of those officials of the Great Japan Military Virtue Society who were adjudged to be undesirable may not hinder the execution of your program, there is no objection to phasing the removal

of such personnal by reasonable increasents beginning with those at the highest level in the national government on down."

Therefore, the Central Screening Committee arranged to screen Officers of the Central (National) Office of the Butokukai by August 25, 1947, Chiefs of Prefectural Branches by September 11, 1947, Chief Directors and Vice Chiefs of Prefectural Branches by November 1, 1947, and Local Branch Chiefs by November 14, 1947.

c. Provisional Designation Phase

After the screening of these categories, there still remained the Provisional Designation of former officials of the Dai Nippon Butokukai, and the Screening of Prefectural Directors and Section Chiefs, many of whom had submitted counter-evidence which had to be considered and screened by the screening committee.

d. Conclusion of the Butokukai Purge

During the following three months, the completion of this screening backlog was accomplished and by March 6, 1948 the entire program was completed. On that date, the Japanese Government submitted a final report summarizing the action taken by the various Screening Committees. This report, which marked the completion of the Butokukai phase of the Removal and Exclusion Program, is statistically summarized below.

Result of Screening of Former Officials of the Dai Nippon Butokukai by Categories

	No.	Per Cent
1. NATIONAL OFFICERS		
Passed	5	08.4
Removed	4	06.8
Provisionally Designated & Barred	19	32.1
Previously Designated	21	35.8
Deceased	10	16.9
TOTAL	59	100.0
2. PREFECTURAL OFFICERS		
A. Branch Chiefs		
Passed	3	02.0
Removed	0	00.0
Provisionally Designated & Barred	55	45.0
Previously Designated	62	50.0
Deceased	4	3.0
TOTAL	124	100.0
B. Vice Chiefs and Chief Directors		
Passed	64	26.2
Removed	40	16.3
Provisionally Designated & Barred	127	52.1
Deceased	13	5.4
TOTAL	244	100.0
C. Directors and Section Chiefs		
Passed	169	51.7
Removed	8	2.4
Provisionally Designated & Barred	128	39.4
Deceased	21	6.5
TOTAL	326	100.0
3. SUB-BRANCH CHIEFS		
Passed	416	31.4
Removed	381	29.6
Provisionally Designated & Barred	462	35.9
Previously Designated	5	3.6
Deceased	56	4
TOTAL	1320	100.0

	Passed	Removed	Barred FD'd)	Previously Designated	Deceased	Total
National Headquarters Officials	5	4	19	21	10	59
Prefectural Officials:						
Chiefs	3	-	55	62	4	124
Vice-Chiefs and Chief Directors	64	40	127	--	13	244
Directors and Chiefs of Sections	169	8	128	--	21	326
Chiefs of Sub-Branches	416	381	462	5	56	1320
	657	433	791	88	104	2073

	No.	Per Cent
TOTAL PASSED	657	31.6
TOTAL BARRED & REMOVED . . .	1312	63.3
TOTAL DECEASED	104	5.1
	2073	100.0

PART V

DISSOLUTION OF ULTRANATIONALISTIC SOCIETIES

I. BASIS OF THE ACTION

1. BASIC POLICY PAPERS

A companion directive issued simultaneously with SCAPIN 550 required the dissolution of organizations sharing responsibility for Japan's program of aggression and prohibited the formation of similar groups in the future. This directive, SCAPIN 548, was based largely on the same provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, the U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, and the subsequent basic policy directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on which the Purge was based.

2. REQUIREMENTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Certain additional specifications set forth in the basic Joint Chiefs of Staff directive were:

a. Dissolution of The Political Association of Great Japan, The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, their affiliates and agencies or any successor organizations, and all Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their agencies and affiliates.

b. Dissolution of all military and para-military organizations together with all reservists' and other militaristic associations which might serve to keep alive the military tradition in Japan.

c. Removal of all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people: specifically, abrogation of all legal hindrances to the formation of organizations of employees along democratic lines, subject only to safeguards necessary to prevent the perpetuation of militaristic influence under any guise or the continuation of any group hostile to the objectives and operations of the Occupation Forces.

d. Control of all existing political parties, organisations and societies; encouragement of those whose activities were found to be consistent with the objectives of the Occupation; dissolution of those whose character or activities were inconsistent with those objectives.

e. Impounding of all gold, silver, platimum, currencies, securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers and all other assets of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, their agencies and affiliates or any successor or similar organizations, and all Japanese nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies, agencies and affiliates and their officials, leading members and supporters; extension of the same treatment to all organizations, clubs or other associations prohibited or dissolved by SCAP.

f. All property, real and personal, owned or controlled by any of the organizations referred to above, should be considered public property. If there was any doubt as to the status of any property it was to be considered public property.

II SCAP IMPLEMENTATION

1. PREPARATION OF THE DIRECTIVE

On November 10, 1945, Government Section drafted a memorandum to the Japanese Government designed to carry out the terms of the policy directives.

a. Abolition of Certain Groups Proposed

The explanatory staff study pointed out that not only the basic directives but the "...successful accomplishment of the objectives of the Supreme Commander in Japan, will require an effective dissolution of all

existing societies which have ultra-nationalistic, militaristic or secret purposes, or whose activities irrespective of their declared purposes, support actions or doctrines contrary to the interests of the Occupation forces or to the establishment of a healthy democratic system, or the support of militarism. In order to make this effective it will be necessary to dissolve organizations known to be of the above-mentioned types and also to provide the Japanese with standards for determining whether or not other organizations are ultra-nationalistic, militaristic or secret."

b. Action Against Secret Societies Held Vital

The staff study also noted that, "There is some indication that the leading spirits of organizations already dissolved by the Japanese Government have joined together again under new names and with a statement of new purposes to further activities similar to those which brought the dissolution of their original organization. Effective action in this field will therefore require public declaration of the purpose and membership of newly formed societies in the field of politics, so it may be determined whether or not the organization perpetuates proscribed purposes or embraces such a proportion of members of illegal societies that a continuation of former activities may be presumed."

c. Recommendation of the Government Section

The draft included a preliminary listing of organizations whose purposes were then known to fall within these categories and a definition of the kinds of organizations whose purposes or activities were proscribed. It further recommended that the order should require the Japanese Government to prohibit the activity of organizations which tended to perpetuate the militaristic, ultra-nationalistic or secret purposes of previously dissolved organizations. It was pointed out that in order to insure the effec-

tiveness of the directive, the order should require existing organizations concerned with politics or Japanese foreign relations and new organizations, formed for political purposes, to declare their purposes, officers and membership. Also mentioned was the fact that for practical reasons the declaration of membership was not to be required in the case of trade unions whose activities were confined to matters of wages, hours and working conditions.

d. Issuance of the Directive

Following coordination among the various interested staff sections of General Headquarters and revision of the initial list of organizations to incorporate the recommendations of the other sections, the directive was issued on January 4, 1946, simultaneously with the Purge Directive.

2. THE DIRECTIVE ANALYZED

The directive[33] specified that the Japanese Government should require the dissolution and prohibit the formation or activity of any political party, association, society or other organization and of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose purpose, fell within any of the following categories:

a. Proscribable Aims and Purposes Listed

(1) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in accordance with SCAP directives.

(2) Support or justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad.

(3) Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples.

(4) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or

---

33/ See Appendix B for full text of this directive, SCAPIN 548.

the exercise of their professions.

(5) Opposition to free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries.

(6) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan.

(7) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such methods.

b. Membership Provisions Outlined

More specifically, the Directive ordered the dissolution of any future organization any of whose principal officers were members of organizations abolished in accordance with the directive, former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who served on active duty at any time since 1 January 1930, or persons who served in or with the military police or naval police, or any special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organization. Also banned was any society whose membership included more than twenty-five percent former members of an organization or organizations abolished or prohibited in accordance with the directive.

c. Certain Undesirable Societies Named

The directive listed 27 organizations as examples of the sort deemed undesirable under the provisions enumerated. The organizations listed and other organizations whose purposes or activities were the same or similar were to be immediately dissolved, together with any organizations which they controlled or with which they were affiliated.

d. Confiscation of Property Ordered

The Japanese Government was ordered to take immediate action to

prevent all transactions involving property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any organization dissolved or to be dissolved in accord with the directive. All such property, including all books, files and records of such organizations, was to be seized and held in the government's custody. Complete records of all such property were to be obtained and kept available for inspection as public records. Officials receiving such records were made personally responsible for their safekeeping and use as required by the directive.

Any such property suitable for use in the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life was to be allowed to be exploited as promptly as possible for those purposes.

e. Public Registration Required

In accordance with the policy directing control of all political parties, organizations and societies, the directive specified that they and all groups whose purpose or activity consisted of: Proposing or supporting candidates for public office, influencing the policy of government, or the discussion of the relations between Japan and foreign powers must be publicly registered. This registration was to include the organization's name, its purpose, the address of its headquarters office, the names and addresses of its officers together with a statement as to their military or police service and the names of any associations, societies or parties of which they are or have been members, and a roster of the names and addresses of its membership.

The registration was to be filed in the office of the mayor of the town or city in which the organization had or intended to have its principal office. The registration was to be kept up to date, and made available for public inspection. No fee was to be charged in connection

with its preparation.

f. Freedom of Assembly Safeguarded

In order to provide safeguards against the use of the directive in any manner at all similar to the old repressive registration and control measures used by the Japanese, it was specified that the provisions requiring the filing of a roster of the names and addresses of members would not apply to groups or other organizations of workers or employees who meet for the purpose of discussing questions relating to wages, hours and working conditions or the choice of persons to represent them in negotiations with their employers about such questions.

The directive stated that the purpose of these provisions was to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations in Japan and to prevent the formation of secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic societies and organizations. It was specifically stated that they should not be interpreted nor should they be applied in a manner which would interfere with freedom of assembly, speech or religion except in connection with specified purposes and activities.

The Japanese Government was ordered to enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of the directive and to prevent further activities contrary to its terms.

3. JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION

In the wake of the Cabinet crisis precipitated by the issuance of SCAPINS 548 and 550 representatives of SCAP and of the Japanese Government met to discuss the implementation of the directives. In view of the approaching elections, priority was given to SCAPIN 550, but work on SCAPIN 548 was commenced at the same time.

a. Implementing Ordinance and Home Ministry Orders

As a result of these conferences the Japanese Government on February 28 promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946 which incorporated into Japanese law the terms of the Directive and added specific penalties for violations. Two days later the government issued Home Ministry Orders 19 and 20 of 1946 ordering the application of Imperial Ordinance No. 101 to 121 specifically named organizations. These included the 27 originally listed by SCAP and 94 others which the Japanese authorities themselves regarded as falling under the Directive. In the two years that followed the government issued nine additional orders bringing 26 more organizations under the provisions of the Directive and increasing the total of those listed to 147. Some of the 26 organizations subsequently added were secret, terroristic societies like the Blood Brotherhood (Ketsumei Dan) and the Soldiers of God (Shinpei Tai) which had dissolved themselves when the complete ascendancy of the militeristic clique in Japan and the launching of the Great East Asia war assured them that their purpose had been accomplished. Others like the Japan Principle Society (Genri Nippon Sha) were societies devoted to popularizing ultranationalistic theories and ideas. Many of these existed throughout the war but dissolved themselves after the surrender anticipating dissolution by order of the Occupation authorities. The purpose of listing such organizations under Imperial Ordinance 101 was to bring them under the terms of the directive so that their property could be impounded, their influential members rendered subject to the politial purge and to prevent the formation of successor groups.

b. Postwar Political Group Dissolved

The provisions of SCAPIN 548 were applied not only to wartime and prewar societies but to postwar organizations as well whenever it be-

came obvious that they constituted a menace to the development of democracy in Japan. Thus on December 12, 1947 the Home Ministry ordered the dissolution of the Elite Masses Party (Shinei Taishu To). Originally a gang of racketeers operating in Tokyo's teeming Asakusa Ward, this organization had glorified itself with the title at outward trappings of a political party. Under the leadership of its ambitious chief, Komen Maki, the Elite Masses Party had entered the political scene in a burst of "soshi" violence.*/ In a press announcement explaining the action taken against the Elite Masses Party the Government announced that the stabbing of a union leader and other acts by Maki's criminal henchmen had identified the organization as one which sought "alteration of policy by assassination..." and which encouraged or justified... "a tradition favoring such methods." As such it was subject to dissolution under the terms of Imperial Ordinance No. 101.34/

c. Political Party Registration

Japanese Government compliance with the provisions of SCAPIN 548 requiring the registration of political parties was slow at first. No action was taken until the end of January 1946, when SCAP, determined that this important device for insuring a free election should not be ignored, directed the Home Ministry to secure the required reports. Despite repeated assurances from that agency compliance continued to be unsatisfactory for some time thereafter. Inadequate information, tardily submitted, proved unreliable and it was further discovered that the Japanese Government had failed to prohibit further political activity by those parties which had not filed the required reports.

- -

*/ "Soshi" (hired ruffians) were a feature of Japanese labor conflicts and of Japanese politics. In the prewar era every political party used them and many leading politicians employed a private army of thugs.

34/ Appendix B: 5e, Abolition of Political Parties, Associations, Societies, etc., Imperial Ordinance No. 101, February 28, 1946.

Full compliance was obtained only when the individual Home Ministry officials were called to account.

(1) Police Enforcement Powers Defined

The function of the Japanese police in the enforcement of the directive was defined on July 2, 1946, after complaints had been received that police had made unauthorized house-to-house canvasses to determine the party affiliations of individual Japanese. Home Ministry representatives were told that police could do no more than to remind secretaries of local registered political groups of the need for submitting regular reports. Police were not to take the initiative in seeking to determine personnel who should have been reported as members. Police were to make investigations only when specifically instructed to do so by the responsible bureau. Such investigations when undertaken, were to be limited to the task specifically assigned. In this connection warning was given against the possible reorganization of a secret police under the guise of an information agency required by SCAP.

(2) Application to Labor Unions Clarified

In conference with Home Ministry officials held on July 2, 11, and 18, 1946, Government Section representatives clarified the application of the portions of SCAPIN 548 dealing with the registration of organizations. Complaints had been received indicating that some unions (particularly farmers' unions) had been required to register because officials had ruled that they were political organizations. The Home Ministry representatives voicing the police attitude, argued that some unions were sponsored by political parties, that they actually did engage in political activity by sponsoring demonstrations and engaging in political debates with other purely political organizations.

The Home Ministry representatives argued that, for example, because the Liberal Party concerned itself with unemployment, unemployment was a political issue. Since a union was also concerned with unemployment it was to be regarded as a political association and registered as such. It was explained to the Home Ministry representatives that labor organizations might occasionally support political parties or movements without necessarily becoming political parties, so long as political activity was not their primary purpose. The Home Ministry was instructed that if unions temporarily devoted major attention to national political activity they would have to register, but they would not be required to report membership lists, as were political parties or associations.

d. Control of Property of Dissolved Organizations

The provisions of SCAPIN 548 ordering the Government to take such action as necessary to prevent all transactions involving property of dissolved organizations required the issuance of several Administrative Directives to the Japanese Government. SCAPIN 548 provided for the impounding of all assets of dissolved organizations including the books, records and files pertaining thereto and the utilization of such property for the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life. The Directive required the Japanese Government to submit a program for the execution of its provisions together with any laws, ordinances or orders to be issued for the approval of SCAP.

(1) Survey by Civil Property Custodian

Shortly after its establishment the Civil Property Custodian's Office initiated an extensive investigation to determine the character of the control exercised by the Japanese Government over such properties. This investigation revealed that:

(a) No reports had been available to General Headquarters as to the type and quantity of property involved, its location or its value.

(b) In general, the control exercised by the Japanese Government in the matter of custody of property of dissolved organizations had been such as to have made it extremely difficult to determine whether any actions taken had been in contravention of occupation policy.

(2) CPC Administrative SCAPINS

(a) SCAPIN 1069-A

CPC then recommended that an Administrative SCAPIN designed to rectify some of the difficult situations that had developed be transmitted to the Japanese Government. This Memorandum was based upon SCAPIN 548. It ordered the Japanese to submit, within 60 days, an inventory of each item of property, taken into custody by the Japanese Government, in compliance with SCAPIN 548. The data was to be filed separately for each organization concerned. Another report was to be submitted of all properties, utilized or to be utilized for the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life, including a statement showing the income derived therefrom and the uses to which such income had been devoted. It also forbad the future use of such property for any purpose whatsoever without authority or license issued by SCAP. This directive was issued to the Japanese Government on 22 April 1946 as SCAPIN 1069-A.

(b) SCAPIN 1218-A

On 13 May 1946, CPC issued SCAPIN 1218-A, a supplementary memorandum ordering the application of the above-mentioned directive to the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and all of their affiliates, agencies and successors. In addition to the regular reports this order required a separate account of all property transactions from 7 December 1941 through the dissolution date.

(3) Japanese Administration of Property

(a) Amendments to the Basic Ordinance

In accordance with these directives and the recommendations made from time to time by Government Section the Japanese Government prepared amendments to the initial implementing ordinances. These were discussed with Government Section on 3 June 1946. The draft ordinance incorporating these amendments was intended to clarify the scope of provisions in Imperial Ordinance 101 granting the Home Minister authority to seize properties held by dissolved or prohibited organizations. It was reviewed and approved except for a clause that would have given the Home Minister blanket authority for searches and seizures "..on the occasion of special necessity". The amended ordinances were promulgated on June 12, 1946.

(b) Property of Military Clubs Seized

On August 2, 1946 GPC issued SCAPIN 1889-A, directing the dissolution of the Japanese Army Officers' Club (Kaikosha), and the Navy Officers' Club (Suikosha) as ultranationalistic organizations with the meaning of SCAPIN 548. The Japanese Government was ordered to dissolve them immediately and include any successor organizations. Property transactions were to be separately reported from August 15, 1945 through date of dissolution.

(c) Funds Placed in Custody

On October 29, 1946 GPC directed the Japanese Government to take immediate action to deposit in the Custody Account of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers all cash on hand and all funds held in blocked accounts of all dissolved organizations and their successors that fell under SCAPIN 548. This Directive, SCAPIN 2472-A also

ordered the Government to identify each deposit with the name and branch of the organization from which the funds were derived.

(d) Licensing of Property by SCAP

On August 14, 1947, in reply to a request for information from the War Department, the Civil Property Custodian reported that real properties of dissolved organizations had been licensed by SCAP for use by governmental agencies and private and corporate persons. In cases of use by governmental agencies, no rental had been required in order to alleviate, to some extent, the strained finances of the Japanese Government. In the case of private and corporate persons, rental had been charged in accordance with existing Japanese regulations. In addition, the Japanese Government had been directed to pay out of rental income, such expenses as were considered necessary properly to protect, preserve and maintain the property of the organizations affected. In the case of property that had been used for governmental purposes, the Japanese Government had been responsible for maintenance, care and preservation of the property. Examples of SCAP licensed and controlled business enterprises owned by dissolved organizations were cited as: the operation of the Dowa hospital formerly belonging to the Dojin Kai, the utilization of property formerly belonging to the Great Japan Martial Valor Association (Dai Nippon Butokukai) for a police training school, and the construction of a 80-unit housing project by the Musashino Housing Association, an affiliate of an undesirable organization.

(e) Organizations' Assets Inventoried

Reports of inventory of dissolved organizations which had been received from 38 organizations having 7,112 branches showed assets of ¥112,295,417 following expense payments and disposals of ¥261,937,000.

Other dissolved organizations had reported no assets principally because of voluntary dissolution and disposal of assets prior to the issuance of any directives during the period between August 15, 1945 and January 4, 1946. It was concluded that the studies then made of the expenses and disposals of the 38 organizations that had reported, revealed that a good portion consisted of legitimate liquidation expense; however, considerable intentional dissipation was evident. In addition there was evidence of deliberate concealment particularly of real property. Such activities had been facilitated by the fact that each branch had acted in most cases independently of the central office.

(4) Final Disposition of Assets

On February 17, 1948 representatives of the Government Section, CPC and other interested Staff Sections met to discuss a draft directive to the Japanese Government ordering the final disposal of assets formerly belonging to dissolved organizations. The directive to the Japanese Government which resulted from this conference was issued on March 1, 1948 as SCAPIN 1868, subject: "Disposition of Properties Belonging to Dissolved Organizations."[35/] By its terms two previous administrative SCAPIN's and two CPC memoranda for the Ministry of Home Affairs were rescinded. SCAPIN 1868 transferred to the Japanese Government from SCAP custody all assets, negotiable instruments, accounts and properties once owned by dissolved organizations. It declared null and void any transactions involving sale or transfer of such assets and directed the Government to investigate and recover any excessive liquidation expenses, gifts, loans and investments. This directive also ordered the establishment of an agency to handle the sale of property and specified certain conditions under which such sales would take place. It stated that all funds accruing through these sales would be credited to the Japanese Government's

35/ Appendix B: 6d, SCAPIN 1868, March 1, 1948.

Foreign Trade Yen Account and utilized for the implementation of the Import-Export Program. Provision was made in the Directive for close supervision by SCAP over every phase of the Property Disposal Program from the recovery of dissipated assets to the disbursements made by the Board of Trade out of the Foreign Trade Account.

4. SCAPIN 548 AND THE ECONOMIC PURGE

At a conference held in Government Section on June 3, 1946 Japanese Government representatives inquired whether organizations established purely for profit without any supplementary or subsidiary purpose were affected by the provisions of SCAPIN 548 if the organization's by-laws discriminated in any way against foreign nationals. This question was taken under consideration by Government Section and the Japanese were instructed to provide the names of all organizations which excluded foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce, or the exercise of their professions, so that their nature could be considered in the formulation of a reply.

a. Removal of Undesirable Officials

On June 5 the Japanese Government representatives were given an outline of policy to be applied to economic organizations under SCAPIN 548. They were told that any organization, regardless of its apparent character, which fell under the provisions of Article 1 of the directive should be dissolved.[1] They were also informed that it had been determined that instead

---

[1] - Article 1, Imperial Ordinance 101 of 1946, prohibited the formation of organizations whose purpose of the effect or whose purpose was defined in seven specified categories (see para 2, p. 5 above)

of a blanket exemption for all economic organizations from the effects of SCAPIN 548, certain groups, which would soon be defined, would be screened by the Home Ministry to determine whether Article 5 of the Directive applied to them.*/ If it did the Home Ministry could submit a report to SCAP requesting exemption from dissolution for such organizations if they were bonafide economic organizations, provided that they had dismissed the objectionable personnel that had made them vulnerable. SCAP would then determine whether exemption should be granted or not. If exemption were denied, the Japanese Government would be required to dissolve the organization. Shortly thereafter a detailed statement was given to the Home Ministry representatives. It specified that while no blanket authorization for the exemption of certain classes of organizations from SCAPIN 548 could be given, the principle of creating the least possible disturbance in Japan's legitimate economic life would be observed. To that end the responsibility of the Japanese Government in the application of SCAPIN 548 to non-political organizations would be considered to be limited to the following program:

(1) Whenever any organization was discovered to be of a type specified in Article 1 of SCAPIN 548, no matter what its professed nature, it must be immediately dissolved.

(2) Certain categories of economic or cultural organizations would have to be screened in order to determine whether they were subject to Article 5 of SCAPIN 548. Temporarily, no other bonafide economic or cultural organizations, except as might be specified by SCAP, would have to be considered.

---

*/ - Article 5, Imperial Ordinance 101 of 1946, prohibited the formation of any organization whose principal officials were career military officers or whose membership included more than 25 percent former members of a proscribed organization. (See para 2a, p. 6 above)

(3) Of the screened organizations it was realized that some might be found subject to Article 5. In these cases the Japanese Government might ask exemption after all objectionable personnel who had been dismissed. If SCAP granted the exemption there would be no further action taken against the organization under SCAPIN 548. If the request was refused, the organization would have to be dissolved in accordance with the directive.

b. Screenable Categories

The statement included details of the categories that were to be screened:

(1) Economic enterprises whose assets exceeded in fair market value ten million yen or whose production or gross sales exceeded, for any calendar year since 1937, one million yen, or might in the future exceed those figures.

(2) Financial organizations such as the Bank of Japan, all ordinary and special banks, trust companies, savings banks, insurance companies, security exchanges, and in addition, those credit cooperatives, agricultural associations and loan companies whose assets exceeded fifty million yen.

(3) All Chambers of Commerce, control associations, control companies, control unions, commerce and industry associations and councils, insurance associations, special companies, national policy companies, and other similar companies, associations and organizations associated with the economic life of Japan.

(4) Quasi-governmental enterprises which were not clearly "government service".

(5) Any enterprise or agency which, since July 7, 1937, had engaged in: Exploitation of occupied areas, any system of private monopoly,

the development of a totalitarian economy in Japan or propagandizing for aggressive war.

c. Integration with Economic Purge

Also specified was the order in which the organizations were to be screened. First consideration was given to 16 specified banks, then to munitions companies, national policy companies, special companies, special corporations, control associations, control unions, control companies and agricultural cooperative associations. While the Government was preparing to administer this program it received instructions from SCAP to submit a comprehensive plan for extending the Purge Directive to local government and to economic enterprises. The Government was already preparing to screen incumbents of these positions in order to eliminate undesirable persons and to forestall possible dissolution of these business organizations under SCAPIN 548. The criteria under which the organizations were to be screened in compliance with SCAPIN 548 necessarily corresponded in part with the criteria under which they were to be screened in compliance with SCAPIN 550. Thus the application of SCAPIN 548 to economic entities actually had more to do with the removal of undesirable personnel from the organizations in question than with the dissolution of the organizations themselves. In order to avoid duplication of effort, therefore, the administration of this phase of the Directive was carried out as part of the Economic phase of the implementation of SCAPIN 550.

5. ENFORCEMENT AGENCY ESTABLISHED:

The Special Investigation Bureau operating under the Assistant Attorney-General for Prosecution was established by law on February 15,1948 and was ready to begin operation two months later. The specific mission of this

organization is to observe compliance with SCAPIN 548 and with the Purge Directive, SCAPIN 550. In the accomplishment of this mission the Bureau will insure that ultranationalistic societies and all other organizations banned by Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946 do not attempt to resume their proscribed activities. To this end it will maintain a check on former leaders of dissolved organizations and on the existence of possible successor groups. The Bureau will also observe and if necessary investigate societies which, though formed since the promulgation of the Ordinance, may still be subject to dissolution under its terms because of their activities, membership, aims or purposes. When on the basis of the Bureau's investigation a society is dissolved the Attorney-General is empowered to designate as a purgee "...any person who has at any time been a founder, officer or director of; or occupied any post of authority in, or been an editor of any publication or organ of..." any organization dissolved under the terms of Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946. This power was formerly held exclusively by the Screening Committees which the Government set up to administer the purge program, but was later given to the Attorney-General by amendment to Article VII of Imperial Ordinance No. 101.