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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**PREDICTING THE OUTCOMES OF ASYMMETRIC
WARS**

by

Jihad A. El Khoury and Andres Lapp

June 2018

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Robert E. Burks
Jesse R. Hammond

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PREDICTING THE OUTCOMES OF ASYMMETRIC WARS

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ABSTRACT

In the literature on asymmetric warfare, a great deal of disagreement and contradictory theories have arisen concerning factors affecting the outcomes of war. In an attempt to resolve the discrepancies among these theories, this thesis surveys why there is no single theory that adequately explains which factors affect the outcomes of asymmetric wars. Using logistic regression models and statistical analysis for asymmetric conflicts occurring between 1945 and 2015, the thesis explores the effects of three independent variables: the number of actors offering external support to the non-state actor, the duration of the conflict, the regime type of the strong actor; and two control variables: gross domestic product and population, on the result of the conflicts. The thesis concludes that the number of external supporters to the non-state actor increases their probability of winning; that the increasing duration of the conflict also increases their probability of winning; that the probability of the democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor; and that democratic strong actors have a higher probability of winning against weak actors than do non-democratic actors in asymmetric wars. The approach presented in the thesis provides a new perspective to analyze factors that affect the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts, which may lead to a better general understanding of the outcomes of wars.

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—Jihad el Khoury

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—Andres Lapp

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I. INTRODUCTION

Global conflicts today increasingly fall into the category of small asymmetric conflicts, or small wars. Since 1946, 236 conflicts have been recorded by Uppsala Conflict Data Program Department of Peace and Conflict Research (UCDP).¹ From these 236 conflicts, 45 were conflicts between state actors (19 percent), and 191 were conflicts between state actors and non-state actors (81 percent).² Small wars have distinctive characteristics; according to Gil Merom, small wars are associated with acute military asymmetry—insurgents that use guerrilla warfare and an incumbent, which Merom defines as an “indigenous government that fights on its own or with external participation, or a foreign power that imposes itself on the population,”³ that uses ground forces for counterinsurgency warfare.⁴ Furthermore, according to Andrew Mack, “the relationship between the belligerents is asymmetric,”⁵ particularly when the strong actor poses the threat of occupation and invasion, and insurgents forces do not have those capabilities.⁶

For the purpose of having common understanding about the terms used in our theses, we provide the following definitions. According to UCDP, the state is “an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory.”⁷ A government is “the party controlling the

¹ “Number of Conflicts, 1975–2016,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, <http://ucdp.uu.se/>.

² Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

³ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4.

⁴ Merom, 4.

⁵ Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 181.

⁶ Mack, 181.

⁷ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Number of Conflicts, 1975–2016.”

capital of a state.”⁸ Throughout this thesis, we will consider the government, strong actors, and incumbents as the same as state actors. A non-state actor is “any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility.”⁹ We will consider rebels, weak actors, and insurgents the same as non-state actors.

Merom notes that, “in the twentieth century, and particularly after 1945, [non-state actors] seem to have done rather well in small wars, particularly when their enemies were democratic.”¹⁰ Some scholars like Merom, Desch, Reiter, and Stam attribute the outcome of strong democratic actors in small wars to the relation between their society, politicians, and government.¹¹ Others like Arreguín-Toft and Mack argue that democracy itself is not the cause of failure, but rather the inadequate military doctrine democracies have developed (in other words, because of bad strategy).¹²

This disagreement among scholars reveals that there is not a single theory that explains the outcomes of asymmetric wars; therefore, to make inroads into answering this question, we undertake to test whether specific factors can forecast the outcome in asymmetric conflict. Our believe is that there are factors that can forecast or explain the outcome in asymmetric war, which will lead to a better understanding of the outcome of war between a strong actor (the government) and a weak actor (the non-state actor) in future

⁸ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

¹⁰ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 4. In a footnote to this passage, Merom explains, “Global fluctuation in territory acquisition and loss and the demise of European colonialism and imperialism seem also to support this temporal contention. See David Strang, “Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500–1987,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (1991), 429–54, particularly p.435, figure I. For data on the changing number of independent political units, see also Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975),23; William Eckhardt, *Civilizations, Empires and Wars: A Quantitative History of War* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1992), 147. While the proliferation of independent states was not caused by one factor, it is worthwhile to recall that Western states were the most powerful actors during this period of proliferation.”

¹¹Merom; Michael C. Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton University Press, 2002).

¹²Ivan Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars.”

conflicts. The range of asymmetric war theories raises the following question: which factors allow non-state actors to win against state actors in an asymmetric war?

Because of different factors and the unique behavioral modality of each conflict, this research effort developed a model that uses historical data to determine which factors are significant in explaining the outcomes of wars. Using information from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Department of Peace and Conflict Research (UCDP), World Bank dataset, and Polity IV dataset, we applied a logistic regression to examine a series of variables that affected the outcomes a set of conflicts between 1945 and the current day. Based on the system-level and statistical analysis results of the three independent variables (per year of the conflict)—the number of actors offering external support to the non-state actor; the duration of the conflict; the regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not)—and two control variables (per year of the conflict)—GDP (gross domestic product) of the country; and the population number of the country—we found that, first, as the number of external actors supporting non-state actors increases, the likelihood that strong actors (governments) will win conflicts will decrease; second, as the duration of the conflict grows longer, the probability of the strong actor winning the war will decrease; third, the substantively and statistically significant interaction between conflict duration and democracy of the strong actor proves that, as conflict duration increases, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor; and, fourth, even if the conflict duration increases, the probability of democratic strong actors winning in asymmetric war is higher than the probability of non-democratic strong actors winning.

In order to answer our research question—which factors explain why weak non-state actors win against state actors in an asymmetric war—we will test the following hypotheses:

- As the number of actors providing external support to the non-state actor increases, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease.

- As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong actor winning the war will decrease.
- The likelihood that a democratic strong actor will win the conflict will decrease faster than that of a non-democratic strong actor.
- Even if the conflict duration increases, democratic strong actors have a higher probability of winning asymmetric wars than non-democratic strong actors.

In this thesis, we will proceed as follows: Chapter II lays out how scholars see the implications of each of the independent factors in explaining the outcome of a war; in a separate section, we will discuss and analyze each of these independent variables. Chapter III will examine our four hypotheses related to the independent and control variables. Next, to test these hypotheses, we apply a series of regression models, and we present the results. Chapter IV will examine three case studies that support our findings. In the final chapter, we offer conclusions.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Asymmetric conflicts are those waged between insurgents (non-state actors) and incumbents (state actor). In this chapter, we will examine the prevailing theories concerning which factors appear to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts.

Classic realist theory sees international relations through the spectrum of relative power: as Thucydides describes the war between Athens and Sparta, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”¹³ Indeed, the association between power and conflict outcomes has long been the essence of realist international relations theory. As Kenneth Waltz presented, “In the absence of a supreme authority there is then the constant possibility that conflicts will be solved by force.”¹⁴ According to his theory, more power means more winning; less power means more losing. Defeat or failure in war leads to slavery or even death. Power, say realists, is not the only thing that explains who wins or loses the war—many other things can change the outcome of a war, ranging from strategy, technology, leadership, and even heroism—but power is useful, and it matters most.¹⁵ When the difference in ratio of relative power is very large, Arreguín-Toft argues, if these assertions that power entails winning in war, then weak actors probably would never prevail against stronger actors.¹⁶

Yet the outcomes of many asymmetric wars show that weak actors sometimes do win.¹⁷ According to Arreguín-Toft, the percentage of the strong winning in asymmetric conflicts was 88.2 percent from 1800 until 1849; between 1850 and 1899 this percentage slightly dropped to 79.5 percent; Between 1900 and 1949, the number began to fall significantly to 65.1 percent; and in the period between 1950 and 1999, the percentage of

¹³ Robert B. Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 352.

¹⁴ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 188.

¹⁵ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 2.

¹⁶ Arreguín-Toft, 2.

¹⁷ Arreguín-Toft, 3–5.

the strong winning in asymmetric conflicts was only 48.8 percent.¹⁸ For realist theorists, who emphasize the idea that the main difference between actors is power and who define the referee in international conflict as the one who has the ultimate military power, such victory of weak actors is hardly conceivable.¹⁹ In his book, Merom explains that, some realists “attribute the failure of strong powers in small wars to various malfunctions in the process of converting superior resources into effective military preponderance.”²⁰ In addition, he adds, other realists argue that weak actors win because of motivation—that the balance of will and interest favors them because they are willing to sacrifice more.²¹ For Merom, the balance of power and the underdog’s (non-state actors) motivation is essential in making strong actors lose wars, but he argues that the roles of these factors are secondary. Rather, he believes that “democracies are constraint by their fear that a radical departure from accepted standards of behavior in war ... will cost them dearly in their relations with other democracies.”²² Merom further notes that, “the greater is the intensity, the greater are the chances the battles will be brutal and more lives will be lost by both parties.”²³ The society of strong democratic states cannot tolerate the brutality and the casualties of the conflict, making the wishes of the society the most important determinant of the outcome of small wars.²⁴ Likewise, Andrew Mack warns governments who become committed to asymmetric wars against weak actors about conflict duration, saying that “they have to realize that over time the cost of the war will inevitably generate widespread opposition at home.”²⁵ Mack argues that in every asymmetric war where the strong actor has been forced to withdraw from the conflict, it has been as a consequence of internal political and social disagreement.²⁶ Arreguín-Toft disagrees with Andrew Mack on key

¹⁸ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 4.

¹⁹ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 5.

²⁰ Merom, 7.

²¹ Merom, 11.

²² Merom, 25.

²³ Merom, 26.

²⁴ Merom, 26.

²⁵ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 200.

²⁶ Mack, 200.

points, however, and criticizes two arguments that he describes as decisive in his book *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars*. The first argument that he criticizes is that the survival and interest of the strong actors is not at stake, leading their willingness to sustain cost low. Likewise, Arreguín-Toft rejects the argument that democratic strong actors lose asymmetric wars because they are too sensitive to casualties and too vulnerable to domestic criticism, whereas non-democratic strong actors are more likely to win because they are more ruthless and are isolated from their people's criticism; instead, Arreguín-Toft states that it is the different strategy used by weak actors that makes them win the war, not the regime type of the strong actor (the government) or the external support for the weak one (non-state actor).²⁷

A. REGIME TYPE

One of the most important developments in world politics in the last fifteen years has been the spread of democracy around the world. According to data assembled by political scientist Samuel Huntington, less than 20 percent of the states of the world were democratic in 1942, whereas almost half of the states of the world were democratic by 1990.²⁸ The attention of scholars then moved from the spread of democracy to the consequences of these expansions. The first demonstration of this shift was the debate over what has become known as the “democratic peace.”²⁹ In his system for “Perpetual Peace,” Immanuel Kant claims that the internal organization of states has a crucial influence on a state's external behavior toward other states; moreover, he says that democratic governments are less likely to go to war and are more apt to maintain peace than authoritarian ones.³⁰ Political scientist Michael Doyle adopted Kant's argument based on

²⁷ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 204.

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 26.

²⁹ Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness*, 2.

³⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), xvi.

a survey of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century wars: he concluded that democratic and liberal regimes were very unlikely to fight against each other.³¹

Scholars have attempted to find a relationship between democratic government and military effectiveness and view the regime type of states as a feasible predictor of outcome in conflicts. While some argue that democratic states are more likely to lose than non-democratic states in a long asymmetric war, others reject the idea that a relation exists between regime type and conflict outcome. According to Desch, Thucydides' explanations of why democratic Athens failed in its fight with authoritarian Sparta in the Peloponnesian War is the typical indictment of democracy's inefficiency at fighting wars.³² Some scholars argue that authoritarian states fight wars better than democratic states and that democratic states are less flexible than authoritarian states. Because democracies are ruled by emotion rather than reason, these scholars claim, their governments tend to behave irrationally and inconsistently. Furthermore, the election cycles in democratic states makes their governments have shorter time horizons due to the pressures of their electors. The softness and uncertainty of democracies makes democracies vulnerable to defeat. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, hide the truth and sustain strict control over public information regarding wars they are fighting. Citizens in authoritarian states are often punished by extreme sanctions, such as imprisonment, torture, or even death if they try to oppose the wars their authoritarian regime conducts.

To explain these differences, Arreguín-Toft describes four important implications of regime type for warfighting effectiveness: First, because they control the public's feeling regarding a war's legitimacy, authoritarian states are able to mobilize resources effectively and more rapidly than democratic ones. Second, by threatening to execute its citizens, authoritarian regimes can coerce their troops to fight more than democratic regimes. Third, authoritarian soldiers can commit barbarism against their enemies and are not restrained from committing acts of war upon noncombatants, such as civilians or prisoners of war. Finally, authoritarian regimes may sustain higher combat casualties and longer conflict

³¹ Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness*, 2.

³² Desch, 12.

duration than can democratic regimes.³³ In addition, Gil Merom argues that strong democratic actors often lose in asymmetric wars against weak actors:

My argument is that democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can serve victory. They are restricted by their domestic structure, and in particular by the creed of some of their most articulate citizens and the opportunities their institutional makeup presents such citizens. Other states are not prone to lose small wars, and when they do fail in such wars it is mostly for realist reasons.³⁴

Merom adds that, “Essentially, what prevents modern democracies from winning small wars is disagreement between state and society over expedient and moral issues that concern human life and dignity.”³⁵ Arreguín-Toft affirms Merom’s claim that strong democratic actors lose in small wars, arguing that there is a special relationship between states and their society that makes strong democratic actors too squeamish to win small wars.³⁶

On the other hand, Desch, Reiter, and Stam conclude that democratic governments are *better* equipped to triumph in armed conflict than non-representative and non-democratic governments. Political scientist Michael C. Desch terms this idea “democratic triumphalism.”³⁷ Moreover, according to Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, two arguments explain why democratic states are more likely to win wars: The first argument is that democratic states are essentially more effective at fighting wars because it is easier for them to assemble their societies behind a war struggle (the so called “war fighting explanation”); the second is that democracies win wars because they are more careful and selective about deciding when to conduct war (“selection effect explanation”).³⁸ According to Reiter and Stam, “democracies win wars because of the offshoots of public consent and

³³ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 8–10.

³⁴ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 15.

³⁵ Merom, 19.

³⁶ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 16.

³⁷ Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness*, 13.

³⁸ Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” *The American Political Science Review* 92, no. 2 (June 1, 1998), 377 <https://doi.org/10.2307/2585670>

leaders' accountability to the voters.”³⁹ In order to not be removed from office, leaders in democratic states cannot act against the consent of their voters. This consent, Reiter and Stam contend, offers democratic actors many advantages that enable them to prevail in war.⁴⁰ Reiter and Stam further argue that democratic states are more likely to have higher organizational military efficiency and encourage superior individual soldiering; in other words, democratic states fight with better initiative, better logistics, and superior leadership.⁴¹ Other scholars argue that democracies win wars because they fight on the battlefield with much higher military effectiveness than their opponents. According to Michael Brown, democracies win wars because they have the ability to elect to fight wars that they are able to win and because they can mobilize more resources, make better decisions, and assemble public support for their military campaigns. David Lake claims that even though democratic states rarely fight wars against each other, they are likely succeed in wars.⁴² In addition, because democracies are compelled by their societies and enjoy greater societal policy support, democracies will assign more absolute resources to security and are more likely to win wars.⁴³

B. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

A second important factor with respect to the outcomes of asymmetric wars is the external support for weak actors. Jeffrey Record has highlighted the relation between international intervention and the outcome of wars.⁴⁴ One important factor in asymmetric conflict is external support to the non-state actors: many types of external support to the non-state actors can influence their fighting capacity. Some scholars argue that, even though this support is crucial, it will not alter the outcome of the conflict; other scholars

³⁹ Reiter and Stam. *Democracies at War*, 12.

⁴⁰ Reiter and Stam, 12.

⁴¹ Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (June 1, 1998), 266 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002798042003003>

⁴² David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” *The American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (March 1, 1992), 24. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1964013>

⁴³ Lake, 24.

⁴⁴ Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win*, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 23–66.

demonstrate that non-state actors who receive highly fungible external support (weapons, money) are less likely to see conflict termination than non-state actors who do not benefit from this support. Strong actors rarely receive external support, whereas weak actors often attract some support.⁴⁵ Arreguín-Toft argues that even if external support matters, weak actors are more likely to win if they use a different strategy from their opponents. In other words, the strategy used by weak actors is more important than the effect of any external support they can receive.⁴⁶

By contrast, a defender of the importance of external support, Jeffrey Record, in his study of external support for weak actors, identifies external support as a critical component of successful insurgencies, and strength is in demonstrating that, in many cases, external support matters. Record argues that victories by weaker actors in asymmetric war depend a great deal on external support from third parties. He concludes that insurgent success correlates more with external support than with any other explanation.⁴⁷ In addition, he contradicts Arreguín-Toft and Merom by saying that “the weaker side’s possession of superior will and strategy is hardly a guarantee of success.”⁴⁸ Even though Record recognizes the fact that isolating external support from stronger will and group strategies is difficult, he emphasizes that weak actors with a stronger will might look for external support; on the other hand, external support might encourage weak actors so that they develop a much stronger will.⁴⁹

Other scholars have focused on the relationship between external support and conflict duration. A journal article by Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew Enterline calculates the impact that external support has on the duration of intrastate conflicts; they concluded that external support generally increases conflict duration.⁵⁰ Paul Collier, Anke

⁴⁵ Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 45.

⁴⁶ Arreguín-Toft, 45.

⁴⁷ Record, *Beating Goliath*, 23–66.

⁴⁸ Record, 23–66.

⁴⁹ Record, 57.

⁵⁰ Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline. “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000): 615–42, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00174>

Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom agree on the importance of external support but, contrary to Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, argue that external support can reduce conflict duration: in their statistical research on conflict duration, they found that external support to non-state actors decreased the conflict duration.⁵¹

C. CONFLICT DURATION

Theories of how asymmetric wars end hold that conflict duration and war outcome are firmly related. Scholars have tried to find the relationship between governments and insurgent groups that explains conflict duration and termination. Once a conflict is started, violence and conflict will endure until actors agree to negotiate a settlement or until one side is defeated. Arreguín-Toft recognizes the effect of conflict duration, arguing that “weak actors tend to win protracted war.”⁵² He also argues that if the weak actors use a different strategy from strong actors, this approach will extend the duration of conflict and help the weak to win protracted wars. Other scholars have likewise studied conflict duration and its relation to outcomes, as well as which factors explain the variations in conflict duration. Conflict duration has been linked to a variety of factors: Cunningham finds it to be a function of the amount of non-state organizations and the balance of military capabilities between states and non-state actors—the strength of the conflict as well as the capacity of the actors to control territory.⁵³ Balch-Lindsay and Enterline offer a different explanation, relating conflict duration to the weakness of the state.⁵⁴ Fearon, in his article “Sons of the Soil,” finds a relation between conflict duration and the type of conflicts between natives and migrants.⁵⁵ In their article “Killing Time,” Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew Enterline make different hypotheses on what affects conflict duration, identifying

⁵¹ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom. “On the Duration of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 253–73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043769>

⁵² Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 46.

⁵³ David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. “It Takes Two,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (August 2009): 570–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336458>

⁵⁴ Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Killing Time,” 615–42.

⁵⁵ James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, “Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War,” *World Development* 39, no. 2 (2011): 199–211, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.11.031>

fourteen factors that potentially affect conflict duration. They do not, however, establish any relationship between conflict duration and outcome of the conflict.⁵⁶

D. CONCLUSION

The discrepancies and disagreements among these asymmetric war theories raises the following question: which factors allow weak non-state actors to win against strong actors in an asymmetric war? Based on this literature review, we argue that three factors—the number of actors offering external supports to the non-state actor; the duration of the conflict; the regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not)—affect the outcome of asymmetric wars. In the next chapter, we introduce a model that uses historical data in order to test the relevance of these factors in explaining the outcomes of wars.

⁵⁶ Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Killing Time,” 615–42.

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III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

In order to understand how each of the independent variables relate to the outcome of a war, we introduce a system-level analysis; then we examine four hypotheses related to the independent and control variables. We apply several statistical regression models to test these hypotheses using the three independent variables—the number of actors offering external supports to the non-state actor each year of the conflict; the duration of the conflict; the regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not) per year—and two control variables—GDP (gross domestic product) of the country per year; and the population number of the country each year. We chose these two controlled variables in order to show that the result of our model is not driven by the wealth (GDP) or the population size of the state.

According to Mao Zedong, “The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy.”⁵⁷ Four hypotheses summarize our assumptions about the relationship between these independent variables and the dependent variable of conflict outcome. In order to determine if the number of external supporters play a decisive role in the outcome of asymmetric war, we decided to test the relevance of the number of supporters in correlation with the outcome of the conflict. Furthermore, we decided to test if the increasing number of supporters will decrease the likelihood that the stronger actor wins the conflict. Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 1: As the number of actors providing external support to the non-state actor increases, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease.

The history of conflicts in the last fifty years has shown, most of the conflicts resulting in the success of the weaker actors have taken too much time to finish, as in the French-Algerian war, the Vietnam War, or the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan. On the other hand, other conflicts with shorter duration have led to the stronger actors winning the conflict. Nevertheless, there is disagreement between scholars regarding conflict duration

⁵⁷ Mao Tse-Tung and Samuel B. Griffith, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Dover Publications, 2005), 20.

and the outcome of asymmetric war, and because we sometimes see in history that even long conflicts are sometimes won by strong actors, we wanted to test this second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong actor winning the war will decrease.

In several historical asymmetric warfare cases, stronger actors participating in warfare had different levels of democracy. In some conflicts, strong actors had a high level of democracy, and in other cases, a low level of democracy. For example, in the first Russian-Chechen war, when the Russians were building a democratic state, they lost against the Chechens in a short period of time. Still, as there is no single explanation in the literature concerning whether the regime type of the stronger actor and the conflict duration are interrelated in similar ways in each conflict, we decided to analyze it. Thus, again we decided to test the relationship between regime type and outcome of the conflict. Our third and fourth hypothesis regarding the regime type are as follows:

Hypothesis 3: There is an interaction between conflict duration and the type of government (democracy) of the strong actor as the duration of a conflict increases: namely, the likelihood that a democratic strong actor will win the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor.

Hypothesis 4: Even if the conflict duration increases, the probability of a strong democratic actor's winning the war is higher than the probability of a non-democratic actor's winning the war.

In order to study criteria for success in asymmetric warfare, we focus on the five variables, which we used to build a logistic regression model, represented in Equation 1. The logistic regression is a predictive analysis technique to explain the relationship between a dependent binary variable and one or more independent variables. Using this model, we tested whether or not a strong actor (the government) will win or lose in an asymmetric war against a weak actor (the non-state actor); this outcome is represented by the dependent variable, W , in relationship with the following independent variables:

- The number of actors that have offered external support to a non-state actor each year of the conflict, S ;
- The duration of the conflict, D , in days;
- The regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not) each year, R ;

and the following control variables:

- GDP (gross domestic product) of the country in millions of dollars per year, G ;
- The population number of the country, P , each year.

The model is represented by the following equation:

$$\Pr(W) = \frac{e^{(\eta + \alpha S + \beta D + \gamma R + \delta G + \mu P)}}{1 + e^{(\eta + \alpha S + \beta D + \gamma R + \delta G + \mu P)}} \quad (1)$$

Because the dependent variable, W , is binary, taking the value of either 0 or 1, a logistic regression model is applied: the stronger actor will win if $\Pr(W)$ takes the value of 1 or will lose if $\Pr(W)$ takes a value of 0. The parameters α , β , γ , δ , and μ are coefficients representing the amount of change occurring in each of the variables; the estimate of the error is the parameter η .

A. METHODOLOGY

In order to test our hypothesis, we analyzed the outcomes of conflicts via the following steps. First, based on the literature review discussed in the previous chapter,⁵⁸ we identified various factors to evaluate their importance to war outcome. Because it is important to obtain an unbiased estimate of a causal effect and to make sure that the coefficient does not suffer from omitted variable that may affect the outcome, we included two control variables in the analysis. Third, we noted whether or not war resulted in the

⁵⁸ Merom; Mack; Arreguín-Toft.

weak actor winning against strong state actors in all previous and current conflicts during the last fifty years.

To test our hypotheses, and in order to get the values of our dependent variable, we utilized the following data sets: from Uppsala Conflict Data Program Department of Peace and Conflict Research, we used the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset version 2–2015, which identifies conflict outcomes from 1946 to 2015.⁵⁹ Armed conflict is defined by UCDP as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar-year.”⁶⁰ For our analysis, we considered peace agreements and ceasefire agreements to be the same as winning for the government side. The data set is the “ucdp-term-dyadic-2015” data set, which indicates which actor wins a conflict each year. A conflict episode is defined as “the continuous period of active conflict years in the UCDP-PRIO armed conflict dataset,”⁶¹ and it ends when “an active year is followed by a year in which there are fewer than twenty-five battle related deaths.”⁶² In our analysis, we looked at the outcome of a government win (Outcome=1,2,3). We recorded the outcome as a victory (1) if the conflict resulted in a Peace agreement, Ceasefire agreement or Victory for government side; otherwise, the recorded value was 0.

To gather information on the five variables, we used three additional data sets. The first data set, also downloaded from UCDP, is the “extsup_large” data set, which contains information about the state actors offering external support for the weak actor. In the UCDP definition, the external supporter is “a party providing external support. The external supporter needs not be otherwise involved in any armed conflict, it can be a state government, a diaspora, a non-state rebel group, organization such as an NGO or IGO, a

⁵⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Number of Conflicts, 1975–2016.”

⁶⁰ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

⁶¹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

⁶² Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

political party, a company or a lobby group, or even an individual.”⁶³ Based on the kind of items and materials offered by the external supporter, UCDP differentiates between ten types of external support, “Troops as secondary warring party (literal X), Access to Territory (literal L), Access to military or intelligence infrastructure (literal Y), Weapons (literal W), Materiel/Logistics (literal M), Training/Expertise (literal T), Funding/Economic Support (literal \$), Intelligence material (literal I), Other forms of support (literal O), Unknown support (literal U).”⁶⁴ In this study, we are not going to build our model based on the type of external support but rather on the number of external supporters providing support for the receiver in each year of the conflict.

The second data set, which we used to catalogue the regime type of the strong actor (democratic or non-democratic), is the “p4v2015”⁶⁵ from the National Bureau of Economic Research, which provides us the regime type by country by year. We decided that where the level of polity2 ≤ 6 , there is no democracy (democracy value is 0), while if polity2 > 6 , the regime type of a specific state in a given year is a democracy (democracy value is 1). To calculate the durations of conflicts we used the “ucdp-term-dyadic-2015” dataset. The last data set is “wdi_1960_2015,”⁶⁶ downloaded from the World Bank Databank, which provides us information about countries’ GDP and population.

It is important to note that the variables used in our regression model have some missing values. In certain observations, some missing data for certain variables have caused the elimination of the data for the other variables. This variation in observations, however, did not significantly affect the regression analysis when all the variables were introduced together. Furthermore, in the context of statistical analysis, there were not many conflicts during the period of our analysis, so the number of observations is relatively low: the maximum number of observations is 1,636; when we combine all the variables, the

⁶³ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

⁶⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

⁶⁵ “Polity IV Dataset,” The National Bureau of Economic Research, accessed November 6, 2017, <http://www.nber.org/>.

⁶⁶ “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed November 6, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi>.

number of observations drops to 1,345. The few missing data therefore have only a small effect on the analysis.

B. LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Using the Logistic Regression Model (LGM) to test the effect of these independent and control variables on the outcome of a conflict between a strong actor (the government) in an asymmetric conflict with a weak actor (the non-state actor) produced the following results (Table 1). These results reveal the effects of three independent variables on the likelihood of a strong actor winning or losing the conflict. The regression model is applied to the period 1946 to 2015.

In order to test the consistency of our independent variables, we tested six models presented in Table 1. The first Model (1) is the base regression model having only the external support as independent variable. Model (2) has as independent variables the external support in addition to the conflict duration. Model (3) contains as independent variables, the external support, the conflict duration, in addition to the regime type of the strong actor. In Model (4), in addition to all the independent variables we include an interaction between regime type and conflict duration. In Model (5) we include the two control variables without the interaction. Finally, in Model (6) all the independent variables and the control variables were included, in addition to the interaction.

Table 1. Logistic regression—Conflict outcome from 1945–2015.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	gov_win					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
l_external_support_count	-0.799***	-0.648***	-	-	-	-
	(0.160)	(0.164)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.188)	(0.188)
l_conflict_duration		-0.214***	-	-	-	-
		(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Democracy			-0.206	0.882*	0.531**	1.551***
			(0.213)	(0.452)	(0.262)	(0.509)
l_conflict_duration:democracy				-		-0.188**
				0.202***		(0.081)
Lgdp					-0.169**	-0.151**
					(0.073)	(0.073)
Lpop					-	-
					0.378***	0.383***
					(0.072)	(0.073)
Constant	-1.779***	-0.601***	-	-	6.919***	6.665***
	(0.099)	(0.180)	(0.184)	(0.203)	(1.395)	(1.408)
Observations	1,636	1,636	1,515	1,515	1,345	1,345
Log Likelihood	-535.743	-511.157	-	-	-	-
			490.696	487.109	426.110	423.331
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,075.487	1,028.314	989.392	984.218	864.220	860.662
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

C. ANALYSIS RESULTS

Based on our analysis, the results of the statistical analysis support all four hypotheses.

- (1) Hypothesis 1: The more external support a non-state actor has, the less likely it is that the strong actor can win the conflict.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between these two variables. The number of external supporters is logarithmically represented. As the number of external supporters for the non-state actors increases, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict decreases from 0.09 to 0.03.




Figure 1. Relationship between number of external supporter and strong actor winning.

The negative slope seen in Figure 1 and the statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) coefficient for the external support count (Table 1, Model 5) indicate that the effect of external support is very significant and indicate that strong actor (government) are less likely to win if more external support is offered to the weak actor (non-state actor).

- (2) Hypothesis 2: As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong actor winning the war decreases.

As in the case of hypothesis 1, the analysis results of the relationship between the strong winning the conflict and conflict duration is inversely proportional. The duration of the conflict is logarithmically represented in Figure 2. As the conflict takes a longer time to conclude, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease from 30 percent to 5 percent:




Figure 2. Relationship between conflict duration and strong actor winning.

The negative slope (Figure 2) and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) coefficient for the conflict duration (Table 1, Model 5) mean that the effect of the conflict duration is very significant and indicates that, as the conflict takes more time to finish, strong actors (government) are less likely to win against weak actors (non-state actor).

- (3) Hypothesis 3: As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong democratic actor's winning the war decreases much faster than non-democratic strong actor.

Again, the analysis results of the relationship between the strong winning the conflict and conflict duration is inversely proportional. The conflict duration is logarithmically represented in Figure 3. Moreover, there is an interaction between conflict duration and the regime type (democracy) of the strong actor: as the duration of a conflict grows, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor.




Figure 3. Relationship between conflict duration and regime type.

The negative slope (Figure 3) and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) coefficient for the interaction between democracy and conflict duration (Table 1, Model 6) mean that the effect of the regime type of the strong actor is very significant and indicates that, as the conflict takes more time to finish, the probability of democratic actors (government)

winning against weak actors (non-state actor) decreases much faster than for non-democratic states. When we shift democracy from low to high while holding all other variables constant at their means, it generates a much faster decrease in the probability of the strong actors (government) winning against weak actors (non-state actor).

- (4) Hypothesis 4: Even if the conflict duration increases, the probability of a strong democratic actor's winning the war is higher than the probability of a non-democratic actor's winning the war.

The conflict duration is logarithmically represented. Moreover, there is an interaction between conflict duration and the regime type (democracy) of the strong actor: even when the duration of a conflict grows, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict against weak non-state actors will still be higher than for a non-democratic strong actor.

The negative slope seen in the Figure 3 and the statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) coefficient for the interaction between democracy and conflict duration seen in Table 1, Model 6 mean that the effect of the regime type of the strong actor is very significant and indicates that the probability of democratic actors (government) winning against weak actors (non-state actor) is higher than for non-democratic actors. When we shift democracy from low to high while holding all other variables constant at their means, it generates a much higher probability for the strong actors (government) winning against weak actors (non-state actor).

These results affirm that the four hypotheses tested in our analysis are supported. The independent variables included in our analysis are statistically significant for understanding which factors affect the outcome of conflicts between strong actors and weak actors in an asymmetric war.

To summarily measure the accuracy of our quantitative diagnostic tests, we used the Area Under Curve (AUC). AUC indicates the uncertainty of the estimate: a test with a low accuracy has an AUC of 0.5, while a test with perfect accuracy has an AUC of 1. Figure 4 indicates that all our tests have AUC values between 0.7 and 0.75. Our full model

– including all independent variables plus the interaction – has the strongest model fit, relative to the more basic models.




Figure 4. AUC/ROC curves for models 3 (blue), 4 (red), 5 (green) and 6 (brown).

IV. CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

In comprehensive realistic analysis of war outcomes in general, one will realize that there exist several conditions, which in combination with one another affect the outcome of a specific war. In order to analyze further the results of our statistical approach, and to provide historical evidence for our findings, we use three illustrative case studies. In these case studies, we will focus on three factors that have been the key elements in our study: number of external supporters, duration of the conflict, and regime type of the strong actor. In our analysis, we will show that in each case, one of the factors had affected significantly the outcome of the specific war. In order to support our statistical analyses, we chose to analyze the following cases:

- The more external support a non-state actor has, the less likely it is that the strong actor can win the conflict—Iranian support to Hezbollah.
- As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong actor's winning the war decreases—The French—Algerian War.
- As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong democratic actor's winning the war decreases much faster than non-democratic strong actor—First Chechen War.

B. IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR HEZBOLLAH

Now that we have outlined the variables that play an important role in the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts, we are going to examine and analyze a set of case studies that illustrate the role of these variables. We begin with a case study of Iranian support for Hezbollah, which demonstrates how much external support can help non-state actors to win against strong actors in asymmetric wars and change the outcome of asymmetric conflict. As Merom argues, the fact that democracies have failed in small wars because of their domestic structure does not mean that international and other causes do not also

contribute to such failure.⁶⁷ In this case study, as our model has showed, we will argue that the probability of Israel (strong actor) winning was decreased because Hezbollah (weak actor) had Iran as an external supporter.

Since 1948, when Lebanon joined other Arab nations to fight against the newly formed Jewish state, Lebanon and Israel have remained officially in a state of war. The state of Israel launched three major wars against Lebanon, in 1978, 1982, and 2006, in addition to smaller conflicts in 1993 and 1996. In this section, we are going to analyze the Iranian support to Hezbollah and show how this support played a significant role in the conduct and outcome of the war between Israel and Hezbollah.

Before we discuss the role of Iranian support in these conflicts, it is useful to understand the background that led to these conflicts. In reprisal for repeated Palestinian attacks, and after Operation Deir Yassin, which caused the death of 37 Israelis and the 13 Palestinian combatants who sailed from Tyre in Lebanon to Tel Aviv in Israel, in 1978, Israel launched a major invasion of southern Lebanon, “Operation Litany.”⁶⁸ It took Israel five days to occupy all of southern Lebanon, about 10 percent of the Lebanese territory. After the UN Security Council adopted resolution 425, Israel withdrew from Lebanon and handed over a narrow border strip to its proxy, the South Lebanon Army (mainly a Christian militia), not to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Lebanon has three main religious factions: Twenty seven percent of the population are Muslim Shia, 27 percent Muslim Sunni, and around 40 percent Christians.⁶⁹

In June 1982, Israel took a Palestinian group’s attempt to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to the UK as basis for launching a full-scale invasion of Lebanon.⁷⁰ Ninety thousand men, or six and a half divisions, plus one in reserve, with some 1,300 tanks and

⁶⁷ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 15–18.

⁶⁸ David Hirst, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (New York: Nation Books, 2010), 118.

⁶⁹ “Lebanon - Religious Sects,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/lebanon/religious_sects.htm

⁷⁰ Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, 134.

1,500 armored personnel carriers, crossed the border.⁷¹ In a matter of weeks, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) had destroyed the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) military branch, killed 1,200 Syrian soldiers, took 300 Syrian prisoners, and destroyed more than 300 Syrian tanks.⁷² The Israeli air force took out Syrian SAM missiles in the Beqaa Valley and shot down some 80 aircraft, about a quarter of the Syrian air force, with a loss of only one of its own.⁷³ The Israeli army reached Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, after defeating all the states and the non-state actors.

In the wake of this violence several factors led to the creation of Hezbollah. For one, in the late 1970s, the Shia, the poorest and most oppressed of Lebanon's communities, mainly located in the south and east of Lebanon, had suffered vastly from this Lebanese Israeli war due to their geographic location near the Israeli border. They had first been driven, under Israeli retaliatory raids, from their homes in the South to Beirut; as Hirst describes it, "from the South to Beirut and back, it was an infernal cycle that went on and on."⁷⁴ Furthermore, as Saad-Ghorayeb describes, "the mass destruction wreaked by Israel's 1982 invasion, the brutality of its subsequent occupation of the south and the west's concomitant intervention in Lebanon spawned various Shiite Islamic resistance groups that coalesced to form Hezbollah."⁷⁵ This Islamic resistance, a mainly Shia sectarian, which had as its main objective to repel the Israeli army and free the Lebanese occupied territories, began to rise. During the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, Iran began to help the Shia in Lebanon. Hezbollah, an Islamic resistance against Israeli occupation, was born.

Another factor that contributed to the creation of Hezbollah was the Iranian revolution. Saad-Ghorayeb argues that "the important factor explaining the Shiites non-resistance and the non-materialization of the Islamic resistance during the 1978 invasion

⁷¹ Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, 135.

⁷² Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 394.

⁷³ Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, 135.

⁷⁴ Hirst, 129.

⁷⁵ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah: politics and religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 10.

was that the Islamic revolution in Iran had not yet taken place.”⁷⁶ Thus, the Shia began to use military actions in 1982, after the Iranian revolution in 1979. It follows that the Shia “Islamicisation” was a necessary condition of their resistance to Israel and of the birth of Hezbollah.⁷⁷ Expressed explicitly by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, “if Israel hadn’t invaded Lebanon, I do not know whether something called Hezbollah would have been born. I doubt it.”⁷⁸

Even if Hezbollah is a Lebanese resistance group, its fountainhead is the religious institutions of Najaf in Iraq, where Lebanese Shia studied in the nineteen seventies under the guidance of radical Shia such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Muhammad Baqir al Sadr.⁷⁹ According to Saad-Ghorayeb, it was highly unlikely that the Islamic resistance would have been amplified without Iran’s financial, political, and logistic support: “its military capability would have been greatly retarded, and it would have taken Hezbollah an additional fifty years to attain the same achievements in the absence of Iranian support.”⁸⁰ Furthermore, Saad-Ghorayeb argues that, the 1,500 Revolutionary Guard troops dispatched in the Beqaa valley after the Israel’s 1982 invasion flourished Hezbollah.⁸¹

In 1985, after achieving their goal of expelling the PLO armed forces, and due to the increased number of ambushes by the Lebanese resistance and its own failure to change the political landscape of Lebanon, Israel retreated partially after three years of occupation. Israel continued occupying the south of Lebanon as a security zone. The success of Israel in eliminating the armed Palestinian presence in 1982 permitted other resistance groups to come to the fore, and Hezbollah, the new non-state actor, replaced the PLO and began its resistance against Israel.⁸² These Lebanese militants are described by Hirst as “an intrinsic

⁷⁶ Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah: politics and religion*, 10.

⁷⁷ Saad-Ghorayeb, 10.

⁷⁸ Saad-Ghorayeb, 11.

⁷⁹ Saad-Ghorayeb, 13.

⁸⁰ Saad-Ghorayeb, 14.

⁸¹ Saad-Ghorayeb, 14.

⁸² Saad-Ghorayeb, 10.

part of a much greater movement. By the 1980s, political, fundamentalist Islam had supplanted nationalism as the great new credo and popularly mobilizing force of the Middle East and beyond.”⁸³ But unlike the PLO forces, Hezbollah’s warriors were native and home-grown, which was a source of strength the Palestinians never had. The resistance of Hezbollah against Israel continues.

Iran not only played a role in the origin of Hezbollah but actually supported its activities and operations in all its wars against Israel. To understand how essential Iranian support was to the success of Hezbollah, it is necessary to discuss something important that Hezbollah began to use in the battlefield in 1994: the video camera. Hirst described a particularly important incident that was caught on camera.

Before dawn, a week later, some twenty mujahedeen with rifles, machine guns, rocket-launchers and a video crept up Dabshe’s perilously exposed western slope and, at 8.30 am, in broad daylight, they assaulted the fortress on top, manned by a unit of the elite Givati Regiment and equipped with Merkava tanks, armored cars and sophisticated automatic firing devices. Of the four soldiers on west-side sentry duty, three fled or cowered beneath the ramparts and a fourth, under sniper fire, could do nothing. The other seventy just sat in their bunkers. The assailants walked to the post, hurled grenades into it and hoisted the Hezbollah flag above it.⁸⁴

This extraordinary exploit, recorded by the video camera, became a sensation on Israeli and Arab televisions throughout the region. For the first time in this war, the video camera was used to film real attacks on Israeli defense points. Hezbollah’s camouflaged cameramen accompanied the fighters on the most audacious of operations and got their on-site footage back to Beirut in time for peak-hour news bulletins on Hezbollah’s television station. Al-Manar soon became one of the most popular television stations in an Arab world thrilled and astonished at the spectacle of a little band of freelance fighters inflicting such pain on an Israeli army at whose hands its regular Arab counterparts had suffered little but serial defeat and humiliation.⁸⁵ Since that day, most of the attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli

⁸³ Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, 173.

⁸⁴ Hirst, 252.

⁸⁵ Hirst, 253.

defense forces have been caught on camera and diffused over the Internet or broadcasted on Al-Manar television.

Al-Manar first broadcast on June 3, 1991. With continuous financial support from Iran, “the station has grown from a clandestine, ramshackle operation to a comprehensive satellite station.”⁸⁶ It has become a dominant instrument in what Hezbollah calls its “psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy,” keeping the focus of the Arab world on the Israeli - Palestinian conflict.⁸⁷ The station has reportedly received money from Iran since its foundation. According to Nayef Krayem, previous chairman and general manager of al-Manar’s board, al-Manar’s yearly operating budget was approximately \$15 million, with a vital portion of this amount coming from Iran.⁸⁸ Again, the Iranian support has played a major role in helping Hezbollah in its fight against Israel by helping the organization propagandize its ideology to the Arab countries in order to get their support.

This resistance against Israel continued until 1996, when Israel replied with force. On April 11, 1996, in response to the repeated Hezbollah rocket attacks on the northern region of Israel, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched “Grapes of Wrath,” an intense sixteen-day attack on Lebanon. To achieve its goal, Israel carried out 600 air raids and fired around 25,000 artillery shells into Lebanese territory. One hundred fifty-four Lebanese civilians were killed and 351 injured. Hezbollah fired 639 Katyusha missiles into Israel, but no Israeli civilian casualties were reported.⁸⁹ This attack was a form of pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah and stop its resistance against Israeli occupation of south Lebanon.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Avi Jorisch, “Al-Manar: Hizbullah TV, 24/7,” Last modified winter 2004, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-manar-hizbullah-tv-24-7>

⁸⁷ Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: the new arena, the new challenges* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006),36.

⁸⁸ Al Venter, *Iran’s Nuclear Option: Tehran’s Quest for the Atom Bomb*. (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2005), 400.

⁸⁹ “Israel/Lebanon ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath,’” Human Rights Watch, September 1997, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/isrleb/Isrleb.htm#P81_5005

⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch.

On April 18, 1996, a dramatic turning point in the campaign occurred: just after 2:00 pm local time, thirteen 155-mm antipersonnel howitzer shells fired by the Israelis struck the local UNIFIL compound in Qana, near Tyre. According to the Center for Constitutional Rights, “Thirteen high explosive shells directly hit the compound or detonated over it, eight of which were proximity fuse shells. These shells inflict death or bodily harm rather than material destruction, because they detonate above ground when closest to their targets, rather than exploding upon impact.”⁹¹ As a result of this massacre, 102 people were killed, half of them children. The children were buried in only eighty-three coffins, because nineteen of them had been blown into so many pieces that they could not be put together again.⁹² Soon after the massacre the live coverage of the scene was disseminated all over the world via satellite and Internet.

Tele Liban reporters and cameramen were among the first to arrive in Qana. Their memory and cameras recorded a day that would never be forgotten in the history of humankind. Tele Liban ran exclusively the first footage of the massacre on air, which enabled international TV channels to feed these images from Tele Liban to the world. In all cases the images do not need any commentary.⁹³

After the massacre at Qana, a ceasefire was called; the American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, headed to the region to arrange it. A written but unsigned agreement prohibited the Israelis from attacking civilians and civilian targets in Lebanon.

Although this particular conflict had ended, a new era for Hezbollah had begun. After Grapes of Wrath, Iran began to supply Hezbollah with a whole new category of advanced weaponry, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, Russian-made Saggars, and American TOWs. Hezbollah began its hybrid warfare against Israel using advanced light and heavy weaponry provided by Iran and Syria. Hezbollah soon multiplied the number of its operations, from an average of around two hundred operations per year before 1996 to one

⁹¹ “The Qana Massacre,” Center of Constitutional Rights, <https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/4.9.08%20qana%20massacre%20factsheet%20UPDATED.pdf>

⁹² Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, 258.

⁹³ Zahera Harb, *Channels of resistance in Lebanon: liberation propaganda, Hezbollah and the media* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 143.

thousand a year thereafter, reaching a peak of 1,500 in 2000.⁹⁴ By 1997, after a five or even ten-to-one casualty rate in previous years, it had almost achieved parity: Hezbollah lost 60 men in combat, compared with 39 Israelis, the highest figure ever, and 25 from the south Lebanese army (SLA).⁹⁵ The following year, Hezbollah killed more of its enemies (24 Israelis, 33 SLA) than the 38 it lost.⁹⁶

This hybrid warfare, combined with the support received from Iran, continued for four years, until Israel retreated from Lebanon. In the early hours of May 23, 2000, the last Israeli soldiers left Lebanon and made their dash to the border. No doubt the hybrid warfare strategy used by Hezbollah played a major role in the liberation of Lebanon, but without the external support from Iran this triumph would not have happened. Still, even though Israel has retreated from the Lebanese territories, Israel still occupies some small areas in Lebanon, including Mazareh Chabaa and Tilal Kfarchouba and it did not release its Lebanese prisoners until 2006.

Just after nine o'clock on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah special forces opened fire with heavy machine-gun and anti-tank weapons on two Israeli armored Humvees, killing their three occupants. They wounded two soldiers and pulled out the other two. A tank engaged these forces, crossing the border, and ran over a Hezbollah-laid mine; its four-man crew was killed. The eighth Israeli soldier died in a hail of Hezbollah mortar fire.⁹⁷ Because of these events, Israel's strategy for the destruction of Hezbollah came in two parts. One, exclusively military, was to take it on directly. The other, military in method but essentially political in purpose, was to inflict escalating pain and punishment on the Lebanese state and people, as "Operation Accountability" in 1993 and "Grapes of Wrath" in 1996.⁹⁸ On the battlefield, Hezbollah used defensive hybrid warfare to resist and repel the Israeli

⁹⁴ Ahmad N. Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 89.

⁹⁵ Hirst, *Beware of Small States* 263.

⁹⁶ David Hirst, "South Lebanon: The War that Never Ends," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, no.111 (1999), 11. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538304>.

⁹⁷ Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3–4.

⁹⁸ Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, 333.

attacks. Hezbollah showed high capabilities and tactics well beyond what Israel expected. Hezbollah fully exploited the Lebanese rocky terrain, which is ideal for dismounted movement for armored maneuvers and offers excellent fields of fire. Hezbollah used advanced battlefield tactics by combining heavy weaponry such as mortars, rockets, anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air, and surface-to-ship missiles, all provided by Iran. Hezbollah also mined the roads used by Israeli tanks. Of the four hundred Merkava MK-4 tanks that Israel had deployed, forty were hit by Hezbollah's Iranian anti-tank missiles, twenty were destroyed, and thirty tank crewmen were killed. Although inferior in numbers, Hezbollah units were cohesive, well trained, disciplined, and proficient in how to hold the territory.

Furthermore, due to the complex and reliable communication system provided by Iran, Hezbollah troops were able to maintain contact with their chain of command. With help from Iran, Hezbollah built a complex communication system that allowed it to maintain an effective communication for two or three-man squad operations in dispersed combat.⁹⁹ This Iranian support in building a strong communication system for Hezbollah, made Hezbollah win the electronic war against Israel. Hezbollah successfully used hedgehog defense tactics. Throughout the conflict, as part of its strategic messaging, Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel using concealed launchers. Hezbollah caught Israel by surprise by using this hybrid warfare, and the war did not go very well for Israel. While giving a speech on al-Manar television—which Israel was trying unsuccessfully to silence by hitting its infrastructure—Hassan Nasrallah told the Arab world that, at this moment, Hezbollah was going to hit an Israeli warship. A sophisticated Iranian-made C802 radar-guided missile had been fired on an Israeli warship, hitting it and killing four of its crew.¹⁰⁰ After 33 days of conflict, 119 Israeli soldiers, and more than 40 civilians were killed. On the other hand, more than 1,000 Lebanese died over the course of

⁹⁹ Anthony H Cordesman and George Sullivan. *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war*. (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2007), 139.

¹⁰⁰ Ramit Plushnick-Masti, "Israel: Iran Aided Hezbollah Ship Attack," *The Washington Post*, July 15, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/15/AR2006071500189.html>.

the fighting, most of them civilians.¹⁰¹ But in the end, Israel lost this conflict, making this its first defeat in an Arab Israeli War.

Quickly after the war, Hezbollah made a decision to start paying to the fifteen thousand Lebanese people whose properties were damaged;¹⁰² Hassan Nasrallah said, “we will pay compensation, a certain amount of money for every family to rent for one year, plus buy furniture for those whose homes were totally destroyed.”¹⁰³ Nasrallah also said that Hezbollah would rebuild destroyed businesses and houses, and he promised those concerned that they would “not need to ask anyone for money or wait in queues” to get relief funds because “you are in good hands with Hezbollah.” And that is what Hezbollah did, which cost Iran around \$3 billion to rebuild the damaged houses.¹⁰⁴ The result of the war has showed that Iranian support—military, technologically, and financially—and the hybrid warfare used by Hezbollah had defeated the Israelis and stopped the invasion of south Lebanon.

No one argues that Hezbollah did not play a major role in the liberation of the Lebanese territory, but without the Iranian support, this liberation would not have happened. Even as many strategists argue that the hybrid warfare used by Hezbollah allowed it to win the conflict, this hybrid warfare could not have been executed without the Iranian support.

In conclusion, after showing the effectiveness of Hezbollah in its resistance against Israel, we argue that Hezbollah having Iran as an external supporter lowered the likelihood of Israel the stronger actor to win its wars against Hezbollah the weaker actor. Hezbollah, with its freedom to maneuver, stealthy swarming tactics, and access to Iranian advanced weaponry played a decisive role in defending the Lebanese territory against Israel. Without Iranian support, Hezbollah would not have a powerful TV station that could broadcast the

¹⁰¹ Ellen Knickmeyer, “2006 War Called a ‘Failure’ for Israel,” *Washington Post*, January 31, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html>.

¹⁰² Thomas L. Friedman, “War on Daddy’s Dime,” *New York Times*, August 18, 2006, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/opinion/18friedman.html>.

¹⁰³ Thomas L. Friedman.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas L. Friedman.

atrocities of the crimes committed by Israel during its wars against Lebanon to the Arab world and oblige Israel to stop its war against Lebanon in 1996. Without Iranian technological support and their communication system, Hezbollah would not have been able to maintain communication between its chain of command and its fighters during the 2006 war and win the electronic war against Israel. It can be argued further that, without Iranian financial support, Hezbollah could not gain the trust and confidence of and pay for the Lebanese people whose houses and businesses were destroyed in the 2006 conflict. Because of Iranian support, the superiority of Israeli military forces, which allowed them to win all their wars against all the Arab countries, proved a weakness against Hezbollah. Iranian support had changed the outcome of the war and made Israel, a strong actor, lose its war against Hezbollah, the weaker actor in this asymmetric conflict. In the next case study, we will study the effect of conflict duration in asymmetric wars and show how it affects its outcome.

Figure 1 shows how when the number of external supporters for the non-state actors increases, the probability of the state actor winning the war will decrease. In the case of Hezbollah, our model would have predicted the outcome. According to our model, if Hezbollah did not have external support the probability of Israel winning the conflict would be 8.5 percent. Because Hezbollah receives external support from Iran, our model shows that the probability of Israel winning would decrease to 7 percent. If our model were to include Syria, which also offered external support for Hezbollah, the number of external supporters would be two, and so the probability of Israel winning the war would decrease more to be 5.5 percent. Because Israel is a democratic state, and because the conflict took too much time to finish, our model (Figure 3) also predicted that the likelihood of Israel winning the war will decrease. The result of the statistical analysis in Chapter III and the case study of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah confirm our first hypothesis: As the number of actors providing external support to the non-state actor increases, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease.

In the next chapter, we will examine the French-Algerian and how the duration of the conflict affected the outcome of that war and led the French Army to a strategic failure.

C. FRENCH ALGERIAN WAR

In this case study, we will argue that conflict duration had an impact on the outcome of the asymmetric war between France and Algeria in the French-Algerian war, 1954–1962. In particular, the conflict duration enabled the immoral conduct of warfare by French Army; this prolonged immoral counterinsurgency campaign in turn negatively affected the French people’s support to the French government. Synergy between conflict duration and decreasing support to the government impacted the outcome of the conflict, leading the French Army to strategic failure in the French-Algerian war.

In order to build some background for discussion, we will introduce the strategies and tactics chosen by Algeria and France during the conflict. We will describe the methods and effects of the counterinsurgency campaign conducted by the French Army and analyze the outcomes of the French strategy. To conclude our discussion and support our claim, we will present how the opinion of the French populace concerning the conflict changed over time.

1. Background

In the beginning of the crisis, the French government faced a dilemma: the question was not whether they should fight the war against Algerian resistance forces, but how they should fight.¹⁰⁵ Scholars argue that there was a reason for keeping Algeria under the control of France: by controlling Algeria, Paris had an opportunity to preserve the empire and opportunity to conduct imperial and global affairs.¹⁰⁶ According to Merom,

there were quite a few sound reasons, at least from a Realpolitik point of view, to preserve the empire, and particularly Algeria, under French control. In general, the empire provided human and strategic resources and global bases that gave France an opportunity to be involved in world affairs. Within the empire, Algeria was the “crown jewel.” In fact, it provided its strategic value during World War II as a depository of oil and gas reserves as a nuclear test site during the later years of the Algerian war. Besides, it

¹⁰⁵ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, I.

¹⁰⁶ Merom, 88.

had been part of France for some 130 years, with some one million French settlers.¹⁰⁷

The key question for France in this upcoming fight was how to maintain the balance between effective levels of violence on the battlefield and moral tolerances back home: how to sustain domestic support for government actions and how to choose a comprehensive strategy to counter the irregular threat in Algeria. Before we explain the French tactical success, which arguably caused the later strategic failure, we need to describe the chosen strategies for both sides in the Algerian war.

2. Adapting Strategies

From the Algerian perspective, the resistance against the colonial French had a long and violent history. A remarkable increase in support for separatism in Algeria followed the tragic events in the city of Setif in 1945, when small riots were countered by French forces in an overreaction that culminated in martial law. Estimated casualties for the Algerian nationalist side exceeded over six thousand people. Over the following years, several independence movements developed and expanded in Algeria. Although the French used several countermeasures to decrease the size and capabilities of resistance movements, by 1954, *Front de Liberation Nationale*, the FLN, had gained enough resources and popular support to launch its anti-French resistance campaign.¹⁰⁸

One can conclude that, conceptually, FLN used against France a three-stage insurgency strategy. During the first stage, the FLN eliminated or merged rival independence movements, built up their organizational structure, and focused on recruitment efforts. Their target audience consisted mainly of the poor Arab and Berber populations who were living in rural areas, far from central law enforcement capabilities used by French authorities. The second stage consisted of multiple small-scale “hit and run” attacks against French forces and installations; the main goal for this second stage was to communicate FLN’s capabilities to hit chosen targets effectively. These small-scale

¹⁰⁷ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 88.

¹⁰⁸ Lou DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and ‘Guerre Revolutionnaire’ in the Algerian War,” *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 66, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA485897>.

targeting operations were meant to humiliate French forces and capabilities and to inspire additional followers to join FLN's ranks. In the third stage, the resistance forces were meant to be ready to counter the French Army in conventional warfare in order to secure control over the Algerian territory.¹⁰⁹

In response to the FLN resistance, for the French, the first years of the war were the time when they developed future strategies. Initially, the French side underestimated the magnitude of the upcoming struggle and decided to deal with the situation from a police tactics perspective. By 1956, the French Government had realized the seriousness of the conflict and responded with a large-scale conventional military campaign. According to M. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, "In 1955–56 the French government's initial response to the deteriorating security situation had been a series of major increases in troop level. This began in 1956 with a recall for reservists."¹¹⁰ While at the beginning of the conflict the number of French troops in Algeria was 57,000, by mid-summer 1956, the growth of forces in Algeria had reached 400,000 troops.¹¹¹

After two years of constant struggle, the French realized that they were fighting against a capable resistance force and that just adjusting their troop size would not solve the problem. Besides the remarkable change in force size, the French forces changed their fighting doctrine: they abandoned the conventional warfare approach and launched a broad counterinsurgency campaign. The new tactical-level counterinsurgency approach, "*Guerre Révolutionnaire*," was introduced to the Algerian battleground.¹¹² The new tactics come along with troop increases, which enabled France to bring into the Algerian theater the French forces that had been previously deployed in Indochina. Indeed, the newly implemented tactics were mainly a reflection of recent combat experiences in Indochina. The core idea for the counterinsurgency campaign was that French troops would win the

¹⁰⁹ DiMarco, "Losing the Moral Compass," 66–67.

¹¹⁰ Martin Alexander and John FV Keiger, "France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 2 (2002): 9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390412331302635>

¹¹¹ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 100.

¹¹² Alexander and Keiger, 10.

“hearts and minds” of local people, mainly by providing an alternative ideology for the future. The core problem for this counterinsurgency campaign was that “That ideology was liberal French democratic ideology with strong Christian overtones,”¹¹³ strongly contradictory to the Algerian Muslim population’s views.

Though contradictory at the ideological level, the counterinsurgency tactics implemented by French forces were in general successful and supported the overall campaign plan. These effective tactics consisted of several core components of counterinsurgency, which, according to DiMarco, the were the following: “isolating the insurgency from support; providing local security; executing effective strike operations; establishing French political legitimacy and effective indigenous political and military forces; and establishing a robust intelligence capability.”¹¹⁴

Although all of these elements were essential for tactical-level success, we will elaborate on the role of France’s robust intelligence-gathering capabilities, as they were the most controversial and had the greatest effect on the outcome of the war. Several experts argue that the methods the French used to gather intelligence during the conflict, particularly torture, flipped the initial French tactical success and caused the later strategic failure.¹¹⁵ As Merom puts it, “The wish to balance conflicting battlefield and domestic demands, as well as the nature of the Algerian war, forced the French to emphasize counterinsurgency methods, torture in particular, which were in sharp opposition to the values of a significant portion of French soldiers and citizens.”¹¹⁶ The French Army mainly used the method of torturing in order to support and enable the Army’s targeting operations. During the Algerian war, the following practices were widely used: intelligence components of the system gathered essential information by using torture during interrogations; the gathered data was analyzed and forwarded to quick-reaction forces; and combat elements launched raids on targets and killed or captured targeted enemy personnel.

¹¹³ DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass,” 67.

¹¹⁴ DiMarco, 68; Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 11.

¹¹⁵ Alexander and Keiger, 6–12; DiMarco, 70–72; Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 110–111.

¹¹⁶ Merom, 110.

From a military and tactical perspective, the chosen tactics worked as intended. But one should not forget that the desired end state for French counterinsurgency operations was to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace, not to lose them.

As the method of torture was widely used, one should study how it was justified by democratic France’s soldiers and decision makers.¹¹⁷ The need for such justification became relevant for the army itself, but also for the domestic audience in France. Ideas used to justify the immoral conduct of warfare varied from practical needs to ideological principles: France’s recent defeat in Indochina had shaped the French soldiers’ vision toward the understanding that democratic values are not tough enough for winning irregular wars.¹¹⁸ The ongoing irregular warfare campaign was so different from conventional battle that the French forces were convinced that success in war required alternative tools be used. They saw torture as a controlled method to guarantee tactical success and to avoid greater evil. Some elements of the French Army also perceived the fight in Algeria as ideological battle in a Cold War context and believed that the ends justified the means.¹¹⁹

3. “Losing the Moral Compass” in the Algerian War¹²⁰

While the practice of torture posed some immediate problems for French forces, those problems only worsened as the duration of the conflict grew longer. This increasing normalization of torture influenced the outcome of the conflict in a number of ways.

For one, it resulted in internal fragmentation of the French Army officer corps¹²¹ and as the practice of the torture increased over time the unity in the Army loosened. This fragmentation inside the Army led to less capable decision making, which in turn lowered the government’s trust in to Army. The French Army’s resulting failure to control the

¹¹⁷ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 131; Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 6–12; DiMarco, 67–74.

¹¹⁸ Merom, 131.

¹¹⁹ DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass,” 71.

¹²⁰ DiMarco.

¹²¹ DiMarco, 72.

situation in Algeria then influenced the conflict outcome by forcing the government to look for a political solution. The duration of the conflict enabled the French forces to conduct an immoral counterinsurgency campaign in particular, torture. French tactical success in battle further increased some decision makers' acceptance of torture over time. By 1960, however, the immoral conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign had divided the French officer corps into two segments--those who supported immoral conduct of warfare and those who opposed it. For example: "General Jacques Paris de la Bollardière, serving as prefect of Algiers in 1957, resigned his post over the torture tactics used within the city."¹²² On the other hand, the French Army still included many radical supporters for immoral conduct of warfare in Algeria, and disagreements inside Army culminated with the aborted coup attempt in 1961.¹²³

Another problem created by the escalating practice of torture was the French Army's decreasing "ability to affect the conflict's strategic center of gravity."¹²⁴ The French Army's inability to solve the causes of the struggle further decreased the government's trust in the army and increased the need for political solution as the only feasible outcome of the conflict. The strategic center of gravity for the France was winning the "hearts and minds" of the Algerian people. Although the use of torture enabled tactical-level success, it nullified the positive impacts for center of gravity at strategic-level. By allowing and accepting torture during interrogations, the French side created the prerequisites for even greater moral and legal violations. By using torture and by accepting methods of torture as justified ways to provide security for the Algerian people, the French arguably lost more "hearts and minds" than they won. Both the French and the Algerian

¹²² DiMarco, "Losing the Moral Compass," 73.

¹²³ DiMarco, 74: "The accelerating trend to sanctioned lawlessness within the army culminated in 1961 with an aborted coup attempt involving elements of the French Army. The coup was prompted by the announcement by French President Charles DeGaulle that he would permit a free and open vote in Algeria in which the people could choose independence or could choose to remain part of France. Army leaders knew that the more numerous Muslim population would vote for independence. The government was permitting the democratic process to give the insurgents that which they were unable to achieve by force of arms. Despite the overwhelming popularity of this policy in France, army leaders in Algeria decided to try to overthrow the French government to prevent this from happening."

¹²⁴ DiMarco, 72.

people questioned the French Army's ability to bring a conflict to a peaceful solution with a desired end state for both sides.

The third major problem created by the escalating practice of torture was that the substance of French's immoral conduct of warfare provided information operations opportunities to the FLN.¹²⁵ As the duration of the conflict increased, the number of immoral cases of torture also increased. This eventually led to the circumstances where the FLN's information operations were effective among the Muslim population living in Algeria; besides this success in Algeria, the insurgency information operations were equally effective in the French mainland and in the United Nations.¹²⁶ The failure of French government to launch countermeasures against FLN's international information operations forced the French government to find a political solution to the conflict: because of its recent defeat in Indochina, France's reputation in the international arena was already unfavorable, and the French government was facing the possibility that it might lose more in international relations than it would gain by winning the internal struggle with Algeria.

Conflict duration enabled the acceptance of torture to take root in the French Army's morality and impacted how the French Army perceived success in counterinsurgency warfare. That in turn impacted the French government's decision making. The duration of the conflict increased the sum of negative effects caused by immoral conduct of the warfare in Algeria and impacted the outcome of the conflict, as it forced the French government to find the political solution to the conflict and decreased French public support to the Army and government.

4. French Public Opinion and the Algerian War

In the beginning of the France-Algerian war, the French Government was facing reasonable concerns: how to avoid the collapse of empire and how to preserve public support for government colonial policy. There is considerable evidence that the French government made efforts to keep the mainland populace's opinion supportive. In the

¹²⁵ DiMarco, "Losing the Moral Compass," 72.

¹²⁶ DiMarco, 74.

beginning of the conflict, the French government's official position was that there is no state of war between Algeria and France. The French government enforced several measures in order to keep public opinion supportive: Firstly, the government's claim that a state of war did not exist was aimed at focusing the attention of the populace on less relevant issues. Secondly, from the government's perspective, official silence allowed it to communicate that the crisis in Algeria was just matter of restoring public order. Thirdly, it attempted to deny FLN's attempts to rally possible domestic opposition in the French mainland.¹²⁷

Although the government enforced these measures, still there were changes in French public support: namely, public opinion concerning the government's colonial policy and the situation in Algeria decreased during the war. The long duration of the French–Algerian War gave the French public the opportunity to increase their awareness of and change their opinion on a number of issues, in each case influencing the outcome of the conflict. One such issue was the question of how and when the conflict would end: the longer the war went on, the more aware the French public became of immoral conduct of warfare in Algeria and the more they demanded a political solution.

It is true that in the beginning of the crisis the French public shared the opinion that the crisis must find its optimal solution, and rather sooner than later. As Talbott describes it, "Indeed, as early as July 1957 a majority of the French (53 percent) favored negotiations with the FLN with view toward a ceasefire, a step that settler leadership strenuously opposed."¹²⁸ In May 1959, already half the French population supported not only the ceasefire but also the idea that the French government must elaborate a wider approach concerning the future of Algeria, including political, social, economic solutions. Finding the solution for the crisis became so important for the French public that, by April 1961, just before the beginning of the negotiations between the French government and Algerian revolutionary leaders, 78 percent of French people supported negotiations that might end

¹²⁷ Alexander and Keiger, "France and the Algerian War," 3–4.

¹²⁸ John Talbott, "French Public Opinion and the Algerian War: a Research Note," *French Historical Studies* 9, no. 2 (1975): 358.

the crisis.¹²⁹ In addition the public's dissatisfaction with the impermissible methods on the counterinsurgency camping, this remarkable change was compounded by the French government's decision to use conscripts in large numbers,¹³⁰ which directly impacted conscripts, their families, and their social networks. The crisis became a much more personal matter than state-level anonymous security concerns.

Another issue on which public opinion changed over time, thereby influencing the outcome of the conflict, was the future status of Algeria: as the conflict grew longer, the French public supported the solution of independent Algerian nation-state. This change contributed to the outcome of war by forcing the French government to find a political solution acceptable to the French domestic political audience. The French people were queried on their preferences regarding the future status of Algeria, they provided the following opinion: "Between the outbreak of the insurrection and early 1956 most said that they preferred the maintenance of Algeria's departmental status."¹³¹ In July 1957, only 18 percent of French people preferred that, in the future, Algeria would be independent state. In February 1959, almost half of population were expressing the view that sooner or later Algeria must become an independent country and that the French government must loosen its political ambitions in Algeria. By 1961, on the eve of negotiations 58, percent of the French population expressed the opinion that Algeria must become independent, and only 4 percent of the population were still holding the opinion that colonial Algeria belonged inside the French Imperium.¹³² Again one, can see how French people changed their preferences over time. Change appears in the fundamental question: Should Algeria become an independent state? The majority of French people initially answered that Algeria must stay part of France; eight years later, less than five percent supported the colonial solution. The duration of the conflict and immoral conduct of warfare enabled these changes in society. Those changes in turn forced the French government to find optimal solutions which would be accepted by French populace.

¹²⁹ Talbott, "French Public Opinion and the Algerian War," 358.

¹³⁰ Talbott, 356.

¹³¹ Talbott, 357.

¹³² Talbott, 357.

5. Strategic Failure

Although French Army implemented effective counterinsurgency tactics in its war against the Algerian insurgency, that was not enough to keep Algeria in its former departmental status inside French Imperium. Algeria lost the French-Algerian war on the battlefield, but it won the strategic battle and become an independent nation-state. In this case study, we have showed that the conflict duration was functioning as an enabler for immoral conduct of warfare and that in turn caused changes in society. During the conflict, the French Army escalated its violence to levels that were not acceptable to the French domestic audience and that negatively affected their support to the French government. Thus, the duration of the conflict affected the outcomes of the war between France and Algeria.

As we presented the results of statistical analyses in the third chapter of this thesis, we will confirm that our second hypothesis “as the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong actor’s winning the war decreases,” is supported with historical case study from the French—Algerian war. As the conflict takes a longer time to conclude, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease. The analysis results of the relationship between the strong winning the conflict and conflict duration is inversely proportional. As the conflict takes a longer time to conclude, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease from 30 percent to 5 percent (the duration of the conflict is logarithmically represented).

In the next chapter, we will examine the case of the first Chechen War between Russia and Chechnia and how the regime type of Russia affected the outcome of that war and led the Chechens to win.

D. WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE FUTURE: THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR

In this case study, we will argue that the regime type of the strong actor, Russia, had an impact on the outcome of an asymmetric war between Russia and Chechnya, the First Chechen War (1994-1996). James Hughes argues that the conflict between ethnic Chechens and the Russian Federation has several peculiarities: Firstly, it was the only

violent secessionist conflict from the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, the conflict can be characterized as the longest violent dispute within the Russian Federation.¹³³ And thirdly, the conflict became a true challenge for the newly formed democratic government of the Russian Federation. Chechens are a relatively small ethnic group that historically have lived in the Caucasus. For the last two centuries, this small piece of land in the Caucasus has been like a vicious bee nest for those who have tried to gain control over it, and the history of Russia has seen almost constant fighting over Chechen inhabited territory.¹³⁴ Although the last decade in Chechnya has been relatively peaceful, the outer world perceives tensions in the Caucasus region, not to mention war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and continuous struggle between Caucasus non-state actors and Russian officials.

In the first part of this case study, we will emphasize some pivotal grievances we believe to have played a central role in causing conflict between Chechens and Russians. In the second part, we will give a brief rundown of the conflict itself. In the third part, we will analyze the main variables that ended the first war in Chechen territory, focusing on two main elements: upcoming presidential elections in the Russian Federation and development of the freedom of press. We will argue that, besides the Chechens' excellence in asymmetric warfare, the main factor leading to temporary peace in 1996 was the willingness of the Russian democratic government to negotiate with its opponent. We will thus show that the democratic regime type of Russia had an impact on the outcome of the First Chechen War.

1. Causes for Tensions

What caused the tensions in North Caucasus? A simple but not wrong answer would be that: there are just too many causes of violent struggle in the Caucasus; thus, there is no one single factor that can give us the most relevant cause of the conflicts in the region. James Hughes, in his study about the causes of Chechen conflict, emphasizes several

¹³³ James Hughes, "Chechnya: The Causes of a Protracted Post-Soviet Conflict," *Civil Wars* 4, no. 4 (2001): 11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240108402486>

¹³⁴ John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), 254.

unaddressed grievances; he starts with the theoretical approach: “History demonstrates that there is often as much violence in the exit from empire as there is in empire-building.”¹³⁵ He then argues convincingly for several specific causes—historical, social and ethnic reasons, clash between Islam and the Orthodox Christian world, Chechens’ inter-elite competition for power, Russia’s economic and geographical interests—and concludes his analysis with an explanation of how the question of Chechen secession became a political tool inside Russia’s nomenclature.¹³⁶ To Hughes’s list, we would like to add two additional grievances: the Soviet regime’s war crimes during and after WW II and the acts of violence and harassment against ethnic minorities during compulsory conscription service in Soviet Army. Both of them are well known facts, although in our opinion underestimated as relevant grievances for conflict from the Chechens perspective.

We will first give a brief overview of operation *Chechevitsa (Lentil)* of 1944 as an example to illustrate the scale, cruelty, and thoroughness of Soviet war crimes. Some scholars have even assessed the outcomes of operation *Chechevitsa* as genocidal deportation.¹³⁷ Jeffrey Burds has studied Soviet War Crimes in the Caucasus region during WW II; according to Burds, officially, the Soviets accused the Chechens of cooperation in Wehrmacht. Although it is known that the Germans barely had any collaboration with the Chechens during WW II, this fact did not stop the Soviets from using that claim.¹³⁸ In reality, the Soviets used this opportunity to launch a tactical operation in order to eliminate anti-Soviet resistance elements from the territory of Chechnya.

To accomplish this task, in February 1944, a 120,000-man strong NKVD force launched the deportation operation in Caucasus. In the end, more than 600,000 people, including 400,000 Chechens, were deported, mainly to Kazakhstan. During the deportation process, an estimated 100,000 people died. One example of the cruelty that accompanied the deportations are the actions conducted in Khaibakh village: 700 people were locked in

¹³⁵ Hughes, “Chechnya,” 13.

¹³⁶ Hughes, 16–29.

¹³⁷ Hughes, 20.

¹³⁸ Jeffrey Burds, “The Soviet War against Fifth Columnists’: The Case of Chechnya, 1942-4,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 42, no. 2 (2007): 303, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009407075545>.

a barn and burned alive.¹³⁹ While the majority of ethnic Chechens were deported out of their motherland, at the same time, thousands of Soviet officials were imported into Chechnya, tasked with continuously imposing the concept of Sovietization. In practice, this meant that all the official positions were filled by non-ethnic Chechens. This in turn led to suppression of traditions, culture, and religion. Ethnic Chechens who had managed to avoid deportation had no legal means to rule the country or decide their own way of life. At the same time, their fellow countrymen in exile were living in labor camps, only allowed to return back home after thirteen years abroad.¹⁴⁰ Returning home was not an easy task: all the property formerly owned by deported personnel had been nationalized. They had no fair position in society and needed to start from a scratch. One can only imagine how these events inflamed hate against the oppressors. The ideal of resistance against foreigners was not gone; rather, it was growing through the generations.

The Soviet Union's official policy also forced its ethnic minorities into conscription in the Soviet Army. In the First Chechen war, this practice would hit the Russian Federation like a two-edged sword: firstly, the experience of *dedovshchina*¹⁴¹ gave to ethnic Chechens another perfect reason to hate ethnic Russians. Dale R. Herspring, in his study about the phenomena of "dedovshchina" in the Soviet / Russian army, describes the seriousness of the problem: "It has undermined combat readiness, unit cohesion and led to an increase in suicides and desertions by recruits who cannot stand the kind of humiliation, beatings, rapes and even murders they face on a daily basis."¹⁴² Although one can argue that *dedovshchina* was an inevitable part of army service, it is probable that it created additional tensions between ethnic groups, and active *dedovshchina* in the Soviet Army likely created another set of Chechens who were seeking revenge. Secondly, while part of the former

¹³⁹ Burds, "The Soviet War against Fifth Columnists," 304–305.

¹⁴⁰ Hughes, "Chechnya," 20.

¹⁴¹ Russians define *dedovshchina* as unsanctioned relations, or non-regulation regulations. "As a system of mutual relations between servicemen, based on half-criminal habits of senior draftees against junior ones when the age of the servicemen, when their military rank and responsibility plays a secondary role or does not play a role at all." Dale R. Herspring, "Dedovshchina in the Russian Army: The Problem That Won't Go Away," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 18, no. 4 (2005): 608, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040500356948>.

¹⁴² Herspring, 607.

Soviet Army system, the Chechen field commanders and soldiers had learned almost everything about the former Soviet Army's capabilities. Ethnic Chechens were not only part of compulsory army service; some of them stayed in active duty and served in high ranks. The most prominent examples are air force general Dzhokhar Dudayev and artillery colonel Aslan Maskhadov: after the collapse of Soviet Union, both of them become outstanding military and political leaders for Chechnya.¹⁴³ In principle, the Chechens had knowledge about all the Russian tactics, techniques and procedures. They knew their capabilities and drills. As we see in a later conflict, Chechen commanders were willing to use that knowhow. One can only imagine, the psychological advantage it gave to the Chechens and how it impacted Russian soldiers' morale.

Combining all these unaddressed grievances, at the collapse of Soviet Union, Chechens realized that this was the long-awaited "perfect storm" that would shape the future toward a self-determined nation-state for ethnic Chechens. As Arquilla puts it: "In the last three decades of the Cold War, Chechen nationalism did not die but rather waited its moment, like a tree in the winter waiting for spring."¹⁴⁴

2. Winning the War, Losing the Future

In November 1991, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared its independence.¹⁴⁵ The Russian federation, after separating itself from the Soviet Union, faced uncertain times in domestic political affairs. Prudently, the administration of Russia did not recognize Chechen independence and initially took a soft-power approach in order to deal with the crisis. Russia's initial strategies included economic blockade, the use of Chechen proxies, and attempts to demonize Chechens, both internally and internationally.¹⁴⁶ Chechens at the same time tried to secure their fragile independence within international frames of law. They ran the referendum on independence in November

¹⁴³ Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits*, 255.

¹⁴⁴ Arquilla, 255.

¹⁴⁵ Irina Mukhina, "Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation, or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28, no. 6 (2005): 516, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500236923>

¹⁴⁶ Hughes, "Chechnya," 29–31.

1992 and claimed international recognition.¹⁴⁷ Arquilla describes the tensions between winter 1992 and summer 1994 as an obvious “road to war.”¹⁴⁸ In December 1994, President Yeltsin authorized military operations in Chechnya. The official goal of the First Chechen war, as stated by Yeltsin, was “disarmament of illegal armed forces”¹⁴⁹ and restoration of order in Chechnya.¹⁵⁰ Russians aimed for a quick and resolute campaign. The overall campaign plan foresaw gaining control of Grozny and, if needed, the elimination of resistance in rural areas.

Although the Soviet Army had had its recent instructive experience about irregular warfare in Afghanistan, its successor, the Russian Army, employed its forces and capabilities in the First Chechnya War using all conventional means: they tried to hold territories, implemented maneuver warfare, and presumed artillery success. Chechens answered with irregular tactics and unconventional means. Arquilla and Karasik describe the Chechen way of warfare as follows:

The Chechens fought back with small, mobile teams of light, but nevertheless well-equipped, fighters. Instead of centralized command and control, the Chechens gave great latitude for action to their dispersed but highly interconnected bands, which fought in a nonlinear fashion, enabling them, repeatedly, to “swarm” advancing Russian columns from all directions. Finally, the Chechens engaged in military strikes in Russia, as well as afloat on the Black Sea. Their view of the arena of conflict was expansive, their organizational approach innovative, and their results stunning.¹⁵¹

Nearly two years of violence culminated with the battle of Grozny, in which Russians were forced to face the fact that they were losing the war against a force ten times smaller. In August 1996, Chechens gained control over Grozny. Because of Chechen launched tactical terrorist attacks and loss of control in capital region, Russians were

¹⁴⁷ Hughes, “Chechnya,” 30.

¹⁴⁸ Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits*, 255.

¹⁴⁹ Mukhina, “Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation, or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism,” 517.

¹⁵⁰ John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: a Glimpse of Future Conflict?” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22, no. 3 (1999): 208, <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761099265739>.

¹⁵¹ Arquilla and Karasik, 208.

seeking for ways to settle the conflict.¹⁵² When Russian leadership realized that they might lose the ongoing war with Chechens, they started to look for political solution.

The conflict found its temporary solution in summer 1996 when former Russian army general Aleksandr Lebedev and Chechen representatives Maskhadov and Basayev agreed on a ceasefire, which established that “the final decision on the status of Chechnya was postponed for ‘up to’ five years.”¹⁵³ The parties agreed that “Chechnya would remain part of a ‘common economic space’ with the Russian Federation, and Russia would provide funds for the reconstruction of the war ravaged infrastructure of the republic.”¹⁵⁴ Chechens thus won the war on the operational level but lost the strategic battle for independence. One could argue that Russians lost the war in Chechnya but won a major prize: Chechnya launched terrorist campaign in Russia from 1996 until 1999 and the Second Chechen war in 1999.

3. Political Accommodation and Russian Democracy

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, its people and politics, faced an enormous challenge: how to transform the state from socialism to capitalism, from one-party autocracy to multi-party democracy. One can only imagine the level of confusion, complexity, and anxiety it caused. The Russian Federation declared its sovereignty from the Soviet Union in June 1990; from 1917 till this declaration of sovereignty, Russia had been governed by the communists. In principle, for all those years, the state was governed by one political party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime exploited socialism, and the Communist Party had an exclusive control over political power. The heart of the Soviet political system was the Politburo. For more than seventy years, the Russian people and politics were controlled by handful non-democratic politicians. With the declaration of independence and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian federation faced the great challenge: how to transform the state into

¹⁵² Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “The New Chechen Jihad: Militant Wahhabism as a Radical Movement And A Source Of Suicide Terrorism In Post-War Chechen society,” *Democracy and Security* 2, no. 1 (2006): 109, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419160600625116>.

¹⁵³ Hughes, “Chechnya,” 32.

¹⁵⁴ Hughes, 32.

new political and economic system. Because of the previous one-party system and state-controlled economy, democracy and free-market economy were unknown domains for Russians at all institutional levels. Even though the future seemed hectic for the Russian nation, the people stayed hopeful, and open to changes. One of the authors of this thesis has first-hand experience with life in the former Soviet Union: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people were looking to the future with open minds and hopes for a democratic and free future for all former Soviet nations and nation-states.

When trying to assess the role of democracy in Russian society in 1996, we argue that there is considerable evidence that the overall support for reform was notable. Like other former Soviet nations, Russians supported the ideas of reforms and the concept of democracy. Moreover, these beliefs and values appeared not only in capital regions but all over the nations.¹⁵⁵ Christian W. Haerpfer concludes his study about support for democracy in Russia 1992—2002 with following: “despite frequent pessimistic assumptions in the literature about the bleak future for democracy in Russia, mass public support for democracy as the best form of government at the level of regime principles encompasses a relative majority of Russian citizens. This political support for democracy has grown over time (1996–2000) in Russia.”¹⁵⁶ The Russian society was open to changes and reforms, and not only in economic, social, and local policy domains: the society was willing to reflect on its attitude also concerning foreign policy and defense policy aspects. Democratic changes in Russian society and political system thus had direct impact on the outcome of the asymmetric conflict between Russians and Chechens. Although there were a number of variables involved, there are two main components to our argument, both consisting of elements of democratic development inside the Russian Federation: the upcoming presidential elections and development of freedom of press.

¹⁵⁵ Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, “Support for democracy and political opposition in Russia, 1993–1995,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12, no. 3 (1996): 219, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1060586X.1996.10641423?journalCode=rpsa20>

¹⁵⁶ Christian W. Haerpfer, “Support for Democracy and Autocracy in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1992—2002,” *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 4 (2008): 423, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512108095721>

First, the impending election during the first Chechen war, played a crucial role in the outcome of this war. Russian political leadership had realized that the actual political authority has shifted from handful people in Politburo into hands and minds of Russian citizens. For the first time in Russian history, political leaders were facing the fact that the people had the power to decide who was going form the parliament and who was going to be the next president. For the first time, unsound political actions by acting government might mean that a domestic audience would respond inconveniently during the elections. The times and principles had changed: president and parliament were not appointed by the Politburo anymore; from now on, it was the responsibility of Russian citizens. It was a new and unknown concern for Russian political elite: till the 1990s it was unthinkable that regular citizens might have any impact on ongoing or future political decisions. Political leaders realized the tension in society caused by the war might have an impact on upcoming Presidential elections. Hughes argues that “The policy shift from a strategy of coercion to a strategy of political accommodation was driven by the need to find an exit from a war that Russia was losing, and which was harming Yeltsin’s chances of re-election in the June 1996 presidential election.”¹⁵⁷ Several scholars argue that there were two key components that led the conflict to cease-fire: overall dissatisfaction in society concerning the war between Russia and Chechnya and the impact that societal pressure might have on Presidential elections.¹⁵⁸ As Edward W. Walker puts it: “With presidential elections approaching in the summer of 1996, Yeltsin apparently concluded early that spring that he needed to convince the Russian electorate that an end to the war in Chechnya was in sight.”¹⁵⁹ With these democratically calculated considerations, the Russian-Chechen ceasefire was decided, at least from the Russian perspective: “Just prior to the elections, Yeltsin declared a unilateral cease-fire, pushed for a peace accord, and visited Chechnya as a gesture of conciliation.”¹⁶⁰ The Russian leadership had legitimate concerns about how

¹⁵⁷ Hughes, “Chechnya,” 32.

¹⁵⁸ Juliette R. Shedd, “When Peace Agreements Create Spoilers: the Russo-Chechen Agreement of 1996,” *Civil Wars* 10, no. 2 (2008): 97, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240802062648>; Hughes, 33.

¹⁵⁹ Gary K Bertsch, Cassady B. Craft, Scott A. Jones, and Michael D. Beck. *Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*. New York: Routledge, 2000. 153

¹⁶⁰ Shedd, “When Peace Agreements Create Spoilers,” 97.

people would respond their beliefs and attitudes during upcoming elections, and this reasonable concern impacted Russian leadership's decision making process concerning the war with Chechnya.

However, the upcoming elections were not the only element that had an impact on Russia's decision to sign the peace treaty with the Chechens. The newly formed press system taught Russians a severe lesson in how uncensored journalism can affect relationships between the government and the society. During the Soviet times, the media was under strict and centralized party control. It was unthinkable that journalism could have any negative impact on the political landscape. During the Soviet time, one of the major tasks for journalism was to support government produced propaganda; freedom of press did not exist. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the press system developed in principle toward a free-press model. At the time of the First Chechen War, the freedom of press provided objective reflection of the war. Although the reflection was objective, it was unpleasant and unexpected for a domestic audience: the Russian people had not experienced objectively broadcasted horrors of warfare since WWII. In the First Chechen War, both sides used extreme methods in order to make a psychological impact on adversaries. With the help of the uncensored press, all these acts of horror become part of daily life for Russians. The populace started to argue over the justification and morality of the war, and it did not make any sense to Russians that the powerful Russian Army could not defeat the small and disorganized Chechen force. "From the beginning of the military action in Chechnya, the Russian public had been hesitant about committing to a military solution. The high number of casualties and military losses made this hesitancy worse."¹⁶¹ Uncensored press broadcasts reflected negative domestic support, Russian government was facing sequent challenge. As the Russian government was not able to justify the cause of the war and the Russian forces kept losing on a tactical level, the government was seeking ways to break the vicious circle. The possible loss of domestic political support forced the Russian government to shift its policy from a destruction strategy to a negotiation strategy. The significant role of freedom of press forced Russian leadership to find a solution for the

¹⁶¹ Shedd, "When Peace Agreements Create Spoilers," 97.

war in Chechnya; such an impact would never come under serious concern during the Soviet times. Freedom of press and democratic regime type therefore had an impact on the outcome of asymmetric war between the Russian Federation and Chechnya.

In conclusion, we will argue that democracy as a regime type had an impact on outcomes of asymmetric war between the Russian Federation and Chechnya. The two main elements that forced Russians to shift their strategy were the upcoming presidential elections and the development of freedom of the press. Russian political leadership were impacted by possible loss of domestic electorate support; the political elite were concerned that, without support, they might not be re-elected to govern the Russian federation.

As discussed in our statistical analyses, we will confirm that our third hypothesis – as the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong democratic actor's winning the war decreases much faster than non-democratic strong actor – is supported with historical case study from the First Chechen War. Again, the analysis results of the relationship between the strong winning the conflict and conflict duration is inversely proportional. The conflict duration is logarithmically represented. Moreover, there is an interaction between conflict duration and the regime type (democracy) of the strong actor: as the duration of a conflict grows, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

Humans will continue to fight wars: as Kenneth Waltz sees it, “if one asks whether we can now have peace where in the past there has been war, the answers are most often pessimistic.”¹⁶² Therefore, it will be essential to discover and better understand what affects the outcomes of wars in order to win them. In our study, using logistic regression analysis, we have studied the effect of three independent variables—number of states offering external support to the non-state actor, duration of the conflict, regime type of the strong actor—and two control variables—GDP, and population of the country—on the outcome of an asymmetric conflict between a strong actor (the government) and a weak actor (the non-state actor). Then, based on the relationship between conflict outcome and the predominant system level factors, we introduced an approach for explaining the different conflict outcome results. Based on the system-level analysis and on the statistical analysis results of the independent and control variables, we concluded the following:

First, the very substantively and statistically significant effect of the number of actors providing external support to weak actors (non-state actors) will decrease the likelihood that strong actors (governments) will win conflicts.

Second, as the duration of the conflict grows longer, the probability of the strong actor winning the war will decrease.

Third, the very substantively and statistically significant interaction between conflict duration and regime type of the strong actor proves that, as conflict duration increases, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor.

Fourth, the very substantively and statistically significant interaction between conflict duration and regime type of the strong actor proves that, even if conflict duration increases, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will still be higher than the likelihood of a non-democratic strong actor winning.

¹⁶² Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 1.

Because we are in the era of modern warfare, and because the defense communities are challenged with asymmetric warfare, the wider implications may be studied in future research. Understanding the mechanics of asymmetric warfare is essential for success in war. In principle, from such theoretical knowledge of asymmetric warfare, both sides can benefit: the relatively stronger and relatively weaker one. It might be beneficial for defense planners to apply our theoretical findings on top of the historical case studies and to draw insights for future asymmetric conflicts.

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