

QUESTIONS · OF · THE · DAY

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AMERICA AND EUROPE

A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I. THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
BY DAVID A. WELLS

II. THE MONROE DOCTRINE

BY EDWARD J. PHELPS

III. ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

BY CARL SCHURZ



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G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

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THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT
BRITAIN.

THEIR TRUE GOVERNMENTAL AND
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

BY DAVID A. WELLS.

THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.¹

THEIR TRUE GOVERNMENTAL AND COM-
MERCIAL RELATIONS.

BY DAVID A. WELLS.

NOTWITHSTANDING the long-continued and extensive commercial relations between the United States and England (using this term as a synonym for the United Kingdom), far more extensive on the part of the former than with any other nation or people; notwithstanding that the people of the United States and of England are essentially of the same blood, language, religion, and political principles, and that a fair acquaintance with English history and literature is regarded in the United States as an essential to a liberal education, there are some

¹ Reprinted, by permission, from the *North American Review* of April, 1896 with much additional matter.

most important characteristics of England's commercial policy and sovereignty which are not generally recognized in the United States by men claiming to be educated, and which by the masses are so completely ignored as to constitute the occasion for misunderstandings and continual harsh denunciations. If these statements are warranted, it would seem almost necessarily to follow that, if the true relative conditions of the two countries were better understood, it would be conducive to peace and good feeling, and in a high degree influential in respect to a settlement, not only of the present Venezuelan difficulty, but for all possible international estrangements in the future between the two countries.

That there is much of popular prejudice among the masses in the United States against England cannot be doubted ; and the question is most pertinent. To what is such a state of feeling attributable ?

A general answer is, to a variety of causes.

First, to the memory of two wars with the mother country. But in each of these contests, the people of the Anglo-American colonies in the first instance, and the people of the United States in the second, obtained

all for which they contended¹ and the parties and the measures responsible for what happened have long passed into history. And here it may not be uninteresting to call attention to the fact, that the grievance of the colonies which is generally regarded as the prime cause of the American Revolution, namely, that the colonists were taxed by the mother country without representation in Parliament, and had therefore no opportunity of presenting their case, was not in the nature of a special discrimination by the British Government against their transatlantic subjects; inasmuch as historical investigations have since shown, that at the same time not more than one-tenth of the people of England had any vote for, or personal representation in, the British Parliament.

¹ It may be said that the "right of search," the main cause of the war of 1812, was never renounced by England in the subsequent treaty of peace (*i. e.* of Ghent) or in any other treaty with the United States. This may be technically correct, but at the same time England has never since attempted to exercise this right, certainly so far as American vessels are concerned. It was left for the United States to reopen this question on the affirmative side, when Capt. Wilkes, U. S. N., in contravention of a now universally recognized maritime law, that the flag borne by any vessel makes it a part of the country that it represents, forcibly took from the *Trent*, a regular British steamer, the persons of Messrs. Slidell and Mason.

A second cause which has been most influential for prejudice against England, was the policy of the administration of the British Government under Lord Palmerston toward the United States during the period of the civil war. But there is now no question that the masses of the people of England were not in sympathy with their Government in this respect, and that the British working people especially, although brought in large numbers to the verge of starvation, by reason of the inability of their employers to obtain their accustomed supply of cotton from the United States, followed without murmuring the advice of those earnest and constant friends of the Federal Union—Messrs. Cobden and Bright—rather than that of Palmerston and his Ministry. And in illustration of what were the real sentiments of the masses of the United Kingdom during the period when the outlook for the loyal States was most inauspicious, it is well to recall that when Mr. Roebuck, as the representative of Lord Palmerston, advocated and moved in the House of Commons the recognition of the Southern Confederacy, and backed his recommendation with an acknowledged burst of oratory, in

which he said that his only fear of the pending issue of the war was that the South should establish its independence without England's assistance, the House, under the lead and influence of John Bright, voted down Mr. Roebuck and his arguments by such a majority as rendered the adoption of his motion an impossibility.

It is now well known that it was mainly through the influence or intervention of England's Queen that war did not follow when Admiral Wilkes, in contravention of all international law, seized the *Trent*, a British steamer, with Messrs. Slidell and Mason, and in the event of which the perpetuation of the Federal Union would have been all but impossible; a result which the government of every continental state of Europe, with the possible exception of Russia, would have been glad to have occur; while the action of the Government of France, under Louis Napoleon, stopped little short of actual hostilities against the Union, and probably would have been more offensive but for the restraining influence of England.

It is not, therefore, too much to say that when the fate of the Federal Union was

hanging, as it were, in the balance, and it was absolutely in the power of England to determine which side should predominate, her action was in favor of the perpetuation of the Union, and that for this the people of the United States owe her a debt of gratitude which has not as yet been by them fully recognized and appreciated.¹

It should also not be forgotten that after the war Great Britain submitted our claim of damages as a nation against her to arbitration, and promptly paid fifteen millions of dollars in cash into the United States Treasury, a sum which, in the opinion of the arbitrators, covered all the legitimate claims of the United States against her.²

¹ It is historically interesting to note in this connection that the ideas of Lord Palmerston respecting the United States in 1861-62, which have long since ceased to be in any degree potential with the English people, continue to form an ideal with the people of other countries, as to England's policy of unjustifiable aggression.

² Criticism has been made on this award on the ground that it covered "only such direct damages as could be brought home to particular privateers," and did not consider the question of indirect damages resulting from annihilation of the enormous ante-bellum share of the ocean-carrying trade of the United States by reason of the war and Confederate cruisers. But those who make it overlook the fact, that the remarkable decline in the American ocean mercantile marine commenced at a considerable period before the war. Thus the total tonnage of every description built in the United States declined from 583,000 tons in 1855 to 378,807 tons in 1857 and 212,892 tons

With this brief consideration of the causes of prejudice on the part of the people of the United States against England, which, although powerfully operative in the past, ought not to be so now, inasmuch as all the international differences involved have been amicably settled, undeniably to the advantage of the former, and are now only important as matters of history, we come to the consideration of a third cause, which at present is far more potential than the aggregate influence of all other causes, and which is accepted and endorsed as in the nature of a rightful international grievance by nearly every member of our national or state legislatures, and by nearly every newspaper or magazine in the country. And that is the as-

in 1860, a reduction in five years of 68 per cent ; and that in 1861, before the outbreak of the war, there were no ocean steamers away from our own coast, anywhere on the globe, except perhaps those on the route between New York and Havre, which were soon withdrawn. The war helped a decadence which had already commenced by reason of causes that had not even a remote connection with the war ; and this decline has continued, during the quarter of a century and more that has elapsed since the termination of our war, in a greater degree than that experienced during the same period by any other maritime nation. Thus the percentage of the foreign trade of the United States carried in American vessels, which was 35.6 per cent in 1870, was only 11.7 per cent in 1895. See "United States and Great Britain." By Mayo W. Hazeltine, *North American Review*, May, 1896.

sumption that the governmental and commercial policy of England is characterized by no other principle save to monopolize, through arbitrary, selfish, and unjust measures, everything on the earth's surface that can glorify herself and promote the interests of her own insular population, to the detriment of all other nations and peoples ; and that it is the bounden duty of the people and government of the United States, in behalf of popular liberty, civilization, and of Christianity, to put an end to the further continuance of such a policy, even if a resort to war would be necessary to effect it.

Thus, in a recent speech in the Senate of the United States, Senator Cullom, of Illinois, characterized England as having planted its flag "*on all the scattering islands and on nearly every spot on earth where it could monopolize or control the strategic advantages of location for its own interests*"; and that we cannot "*look with indifference*" upon her policy to reach out farther until, if left alone, she will finally dominate Venezuela. And another member of Congress, not to be outdone in this line, publicly expressed the opinion that it was for the interest of the United States to

put an end to what he termed the "grab-all policy of England."

The following additional citations of opinions recently expressed by influential men in the United States are also pertinent to this subject.

In an address at a Loyal Legion banquet at Detroit in May, 1896, Hon. D. M. Dickinson, ex-Postmaster-General, spoke as follows :

"In the present condition, we may indulge in a reciprocity of polite phrasing and post-prandial exuberance, if our alert watchman will meantime keep an eye on our good friends across the Atlantic, especially when, having appropriated Africa, the islands and even the rocks of the sea, and wherever else force or intrigue may gain a footing, they begin to take an interest, not altogether born of curiosity or of a purely christianizing spirit, in this hemisphere. One cannot be so innocent as to believe that the sentiment of relationship or friendship of England to the United States would stand in the way of the settled policy of Great Britain to make Englishmen richer and her power greater, even at our cost. Her unvarying policy is, first and last and always, to advance British interests and retain British

supremacy—to retain and add to British wealth. Her purposes are material. Whoever gets in the way of that is the enemy of England, and will be so treated—whether it be the United States as a great commercial rival who may be intrigued against and encroached upon and even crippled in some time of her distress, or when off guard, or a tribe of black men in Africa in the way of her colonization schemes, who may be safely massacred with machine guns.”

The following is an extract from a speech made in the Senate of the United States April 6, 1895, by Henry Cabot Lodge :

“The gold monometallic policy of Great Britain, now in force among all great civilized nations, is, I believe, the great enemy of good business throughout the world at this moment. Therefore, it seems to me, if there is any way in which we can strike England’s trade or her moneyed interest, it is our clear policy to do it in the interest of silver.”

Extract from a speech of Hon. Joseph Hawley, U. S. S., at the banquet of the alumni of Hamilton College, New York, February, 1896.

“The English people are a very good peo-

ple, but they are not the British Government. That is another thing ; and in every emergency with which the United States has been confronted the British Government has been our enemy. She is pushing us on every side now. She is trying to straddle the Nicaraguan canal and to grab the Alaskan goldfields. Whenever she gets hold of a bit of land, from that time her boundary line is afloat. Look at the map of India, and stop and think. That began with a trading company—English, and British arms and a British warship to help it to its rights. And now India is all a British possession. That is the kind of a nation that we are facing. Look at their fancy drill the other day, when in five days a powerful squadron was gathered at the stated point. Is there no object lesson for America in 'that? I tell you that we must be ready to fight. Either we will float a dead whale on the ocean, or we must say to Great Britain, 'Here is where you stop!''

“ He ” (the British lion) “ is a prowler in search of prey which is land—land anywhere, everywhere—land to convert the present boast of possessing one-third of the earth's surface into one of holding one-half, and then two-

thirds—land, more land, to extend the tribute to be paid the British Crown indefinitely.”—*Correspondent Springfield Republican.*

“There is no power on the face of the earth that we need fear trouble with except England.”—*President Capen, Tuft's College.*

“The growing strength of the British navy is a menace to the rest of the world; it is intended to be, and as such it ought to be crushed.”—*Reported interview with Rear-Admiral George E. Belknap, U. S. N. (Retired).*

Such then are typical examples of the counts in the international indictment which popular sentiment in the United States now prefers against England: and which leading legislators and influential newspapers assume and assert to be correct. But are they correct? Are they warranted by evidence? The only possible honest answer having any regard for truth is, that they are not correct; that they do not contain one element that should commend them to the acceptance and belief of honest and intelligent men; not one count which, if tried before an honest and competent tribunal, would not by them (to employ a legal phrase) be promptly “quashed.”

In elucidation of this subject, and for deter-

mination of the correctness of the above assertions, consideration is first asked of what might fairly be regarded as almost a test case. Thus the leading prejudicial charge preferred against England is, that her governmental and commercial policy and action are always dominated by a desire to create for herself something in the nature of monopolies, which shall inure to her exclusive advantage; and from participation in which foreign nations shall, to the greatest extent possible, be excluded. Accepting now the universal dictionary definition of "monopoly" in the above sense, namely, "to engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of trading in any place, and the sole power of vending any commodity or goods in a particular place or country" (Webster); "a right of exclusive sale—an exclusive privilege to carry on a traffic" (Century), the writer would respectfully request Messrs. Cullom, Dickinson, Hawley, Lodge, or any other person who agrees with them in sentiment, to specify some one thing in respect to which England enjoys and maintains a monopoly (excepting, of course, the monopoly of sovereignty, in default of which there can be no certain government), or that which is

created and exists when a government assumes exclusive control of the production and sale of any article for the purpose of revenue, as when the United States will not permit a gallon of distilled spirits to be removed from the place of its production, or from a bonded warehouse, for use or consumption, without the previous payment of a tax.

A popular and ready answer would probably be *land*. But there is not a square foot of the earth's surface over which the flag of England floats which the citizen of the United States, in common with the people of all other countries, has not a right to enter upon, possess, control, and enjoy on terms as favorable as are *now* ever granted to any Englishman. The only possible exception to this statement is that England, in common with all colonizing nations that establish governments over lands obtained from barbarous people, often finds it necessary to exercise some restraint over the first occupants of such territory, in order that the desired progress in respect to civilization may not be retarded, and possibly defeated.

A most striking and instructive exemplification of the liberal and enlightened policy of

England in this respect is found in the recent history of South Africa. In 1876-77, when the safety of Europeans in South Africa was menaced by a general revolt of the dark-skinned races, England assumed the control of the Government of the "Transvaal," or South African Republic, a name since given to a large section of country northeast of Cape Colony; no other Government coveting the task or expense of so doing. Subsequently, in order to provide for the common safety of the various people who, allured by the diamond fields and other inducements were flocking into the country, some rules of government became necessary; and, accordingly, at a convention of South African representatives, assembled in 1881, at Pretoria, the capital of the country, a code of rules or laws, drafted and presented by the British Colonial Office in London, was adopted. Of this code the most important section or rule, No. XIV., reads as follows:

"All persons other than natives [who were then typical savages] conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (*a*) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the

South African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, shops, and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic."

The following question is here most pertinent to those who consider it the part of true American statesmanship and intelligence, to popularly assert the "unvarying policy" of England to be, first, last, and always, to retain British supremacy, for the purpose of retaining and adding "to British wealth": Can they cite one other single instance in the world's history, where a great and strong government, coming into undisputable possession and control of a great area of the earth's surface, abounding with almost illimitable elements of natural wealth, and consequent vast opportunities for exclusive trade, commerce, and the collection of revenue, has freely said to all the people of all the other nations and governments: Come and share all these advantages equally

with us? We offer them to you subject to no conditions or restraint, except respect and obedience to such laws, in consonance with the above accepted XIV. rule, as the people themselves shall establish. And had the principles of this rule been adhered to by all interested parties, there would have been no trouble in the Transvaal.

But it may be asked, How about trade? Does not England extend privileges to her own subjects, and impose discriminations against the people of the other nations and countries in respect to trade and commerce? And here again we are obliged to return a similar answer, namely: that England grants no privileges to her own people in respect to trade and commerce, which are not equally accorded to the people of all other countries; and that there is no country over which the sovereignty of England extends, where the people of all other countries—white, black, yellow, and red—do not have the right or privilege of trade, in its broadest sense of exporting and importing, buying, selling, or transporting, on the same terms as are enjoyed by her immediate and typical subjects. In dealing with other countries,

England has never been guilty of the brutal incivility of telling any one of them desiring reciprocal trade with her and too feeble to take offence at insult, what the United States told Mexico, in 1866, through its House of Representatives, "that to speak of permanent desirable commercial relations" with her "is without hope of success, or promise of substantial results."

A very common feature of any discussion in the United States of the trade or commercial policy of England in respect to other nations, is the preference of a charge against her, of having, more than a half a century ago, instituted a war "in order to force poor China to take the opium that England was trying to compel her to import, no matter what the great evils resulting." For this charge, which has been popularly regarded as irrefutable, there is no good or sufficient warrant; further than that, complete evidence to the contrary has only within a recent period become popularly accessible through the publication of English state papers; although the would-be American authorities on this subject might, in at least a degree, have become cognizant of the exact truth (as will be presently shown), had

they taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with the published results of an investigation of this subject by one of their own and greatest statesmen, whose opinions have always commanded almost universal respect. A summary of the indisputable facts in the case are as follows :

Previous to the inception of the so-called "opium war" between England and China (*i. e.* in 1840), opium was cultivated in no less than ten of the provinces of China, and its importation was permitted and regularly taxed, the same as any other imports. Opium, the product of India, was imported into China by the East India Company under such circumstances, and without inhibition ; but to an estimated extent of not more than *two* per cent of what would then have been necessary to meet the demand of the whole Chinese population. The charge that England first introduced opium into China has, therefore, not the slightest foundation in facts.

Some time previous to 1840 the Chinese Government, believing the use of this drug to be detrimental to their people, prohibited, not merely its importation but its use for any purpose, and any violation of these enactments

was made a capital offence. As the appetite for opium on the part of the Chinese was not thereby extinguished, and the supply of a consequent continued demand for it becoming exceedingly profitable, the business of smuggling and illicit dealing became very great, and is now known to have been largely participated in by the very Chinese officials whose business it was to enforce the law. The Chinese Government, furthermore, was not more successful in enforcing their law against opium than was the enlightened and christianized Government of the United States in enforcing, in 1867, a tax of \$2.00 per gallon on distilled spirits, when out of an annual product and consumption of at least 50,000,000 gallons it was only able to take cognizance for revenue purposes of less than 7,000,000 gallons. What was then also the policy of the British Government towards China is demonstrated by the fact that Lord Palmerston, then Premier, sent a despatch to the British resident agent in China, to the effect that if any British subject chose to contravene the laws of China in respect to trade in opium, "he must do it at his own risk." On the other hand, the Chinese Government, from the very outset of the opium

trouble, refused to enter into any negotiations with the representatives of the British Government, not so in the interests of the opium trade ; not in the interest of trade at all ; but in order to put the relations of the two governments on a footing that would be tolerable, and induce the Chinese to no longer assume that all foreigners were barbarians, and that barbarians must be kept under control. When Lord Napier was sent as Minister to China in 1834, its Government declined to have anything to do with him, and went out of its way to belittle him by using offensive characters for his name, and in other ways insult him. When Lord Napier, fairly driven out of China by insults, was replaced by Sir Charles Elliot, the Chinese authorities in Canton, for the purpose of deliberate insult to foreigners in general, proposed to make the area in front of the so-called " factories," where British merchants and the citizens of other countries were virtually compelled to reside, a place for the public execution of criminals.

As might have been expected, war followed such a condition of things, though there was no formal declaration of war by either of the participating parties. It was virtually com-

menced by the Chinese, who sent a fleet of fire-ships to burn the English shipping in the harbor of Canton. England succeeded in obtaining from the Chinese Government a promise, (that was not, however, kept,) that the persons and property of the merchants of all nations trading with China should be protected in the future from insult and injury, and that their trade and commerce should be maintained upon a footing common to all foreign civilized countries. And if England had not undertaken the task of teaching the Chinese this initiatory lesson, the Government of the United States would sooner or later have been obliged so to do, if they were to maintain peaceful commercial relations and trade with China.

The so-called "opium war" of 1840, thus brought about, attracted much attention in the United States, as the interests of its merchants prospectively involved, was at that time very considerable. And among those of its citizens who especially considered the subject was ex-President John Quincy Adams, who gave to the American public, in December, 1841, the results of his investigations and study, in the form of a lecture before the Massachusetts

Historical Society, which was subsequently reprinted in the *Chinese Repository*, an American missionary paper published in Canton. After tracing historically what had occurred up to the year 1841, Mr. Adams said: "Do I hear you inquire what is all this to the opium question, or the taking of Canton? These, I answer, are but that movement of mind on this globe of earth of which the war between Great Britain and China is now the leading star—The justice of the cause between the two parties—which has the righteous cause? I answer, Britain has the righteous cause. The opium question is not the cause of the war; but the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China, that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of the relation between lord and vassal."

The assertion that "the gold metallic policy of Great Britain is the great enemy of good business throughout the world," and that "if there is any way in which we (*i. e.*, the people of the United States) can strike England's trade or her moneyed interest, it is our clear policy to do it in the interest of silver," would

seem to be the utterance of an insane person ; or, if not insane, of one who does not know, and despises knowledge. As well expect England, for the furtherance "of good business throughout the world," to substitute crooked sticks for metal plows ; transportation on men's and mules' backs in place of wagons ; wagons in place of railroad cars ; canoes in place of ships, and sails in place of steam, as to expect her to substitute what large experience has proved to be the best money instrumentality for effecting exchanges on the part of the great commercial nations, for one that is best fitted for people and countries that have comparatively small exchanges with the outside world, and are low down in civilization.

A brief word here to avoid misapprehension, and in further illustration of the exceptionally liberal policy of the British (Home) Government. The sovereignty of England is said to cover about one-third of the earth's surface. It includes forty separate so-called colonies, which embrace about one-fourth of the population of the globe. Whenever the population of any of these colonies becomes considerable, and there is a manifest and intelligent desire on the part of its inhabitants to be emanci-

pated from close dependence on the mother country, England grants them a substantially free and independent government. The number of such colonies having an exclusive and responsible representative government is at present nine, and a clear and interesting illustration of their working is afforded in the case of Canada, which has a population of about 5,000,000. England appoints a Governor, whose duties are mainly ceremonial and nominal. The people of Canada elect their own legislators, their ministers, or state administrators; and the concurrence of the Crown is not required in the appointment of any public officer below the Governor. Under a government thus organized, Canada makes its own laws; imposes and collects its own taxes, and determines their expenditure; maintains its own military forces; establishes its own banking and currency system, and its own educational, sanitary, and police provisions. One of the few restraining conditions on the complete independence of Canada and the other self-governing colonies of the British Empire is, that they are not allowed to treat at first hand with foreign Governments, for the evident reason that the smallest as well as the

largest of the British possessions may otherwise involve the Empire in more or less difficult and critical negotiations with foreign powers. The self-governing colonies are not, however, compelled to accept the settlement of any difficulty they may have with a foreign government, which may be recommended to them by their Home Government ; and this has been referred to as the link at which the mooring chains of the larger British colonies to the mother country are most likely (if ever) to snap.

As a rule, the Home Government is reluctant to intervene in the affairs of her self-governing colonies without special invitation, except in respect to the selection and control of strategical positions regarded as important for the defence of the Empire. One, and one only (interesting), exception to the rule, that the British colonies shall not treat directly with foreign powers, has been made, and that in the case of Canada ; which, unquestionably in view of her possible reciprocal trade relations with the United States, is allowed to negotiate directly with foreign nations in respect to her commercial tariff. England does not attempt, and never has attempted, to en-

force her free-trade policy in any of her self-governing colonies. On the other hand, Great Britain will not abandon her own free-trade policy for the purpose of obtaining preferential treatment in her colonies. Thus Canada, as well as other of the British colonies, having adopted the "protective" policy, accordingly imposes duties on her imports which in some instances are very high, and almost prohibitive. But whatever may be the tariff rates established by Canada, or by any of the other British colonies, they are uniform as respects the imports of all nations; and no discriminating rates would be sanctioned by the Imperial Government in any colonial tariff rates unless to meet an equivalent discrimination.¹ The fact also that the tariff rates of Canada are regarded by the mercantile community of England as prejudicial to their interests, and have long been a subject of complaint, has never induced the Home Government to take action on the subject. Another illustration to the same effect is to be found in the fact, that

¹ It is now a rule of the Imperial Government not to include her colonies in any commercial arrangement with foreign countries without their own consent. The law officers of the Crown have also held that under certain recent treaties her colonies are prevented from granting any differential favors to Great Britain.

when the Council of India (the immediate governing power of that country), partly for the purpose of revenue, and partly at the demand of Indian manufacturers for protection, imposed a custom tax on the importation of cotton fabrics into India, the manufacturers of England united in opposition to such an extent that it constituted an important element in the recent election that resulted in the displacement of the Liberal (Rosebery) administration; and yet the Indian duties on the importation of British cotton fabrics have not as yet been abrogated.

The allegation that the British Government exacts tributes of its subjects has not even so much as a shadow of a foundation. The British Government has respected the possessions of the native chiefs of India; and about one-third of the country still nominally remains in the hands of its hereditary rulers. These, in return for their maintenance and protection by the Imperial Government, contribute annually from their resources a comparatively small sum for its support; which appears in the official financial statements under the name of "Tribute," or "Contributions," from "Feudatory States." But the sum thus received is

probably more than paid back in the form of annual pensions to the native princes and their families, and in expenses contingent on the supervision of their governmental administrations. England does not take from any of her citizens or subjects as much as a sixpence which can merit the name of tribute. She expects that such of her colonies as have sought and been accorded the right of self-government will, in the main, defray the expenses of such government. And this they do by such methods of taxation as legislators chosen by them shall determine; subject only to the limitation that the taxes imposed shall be uniform on all persons and on all subjects of trade or commerce. Thus the comparatively small island of Jamaica, with a population in 1891 of 639,431, of which more than two-thirds are negroes, has a legislative assembly, and by its enactment collects a considerable revenue from export duties on rum. But if an Englishman desires to export this commodity from Jamaica he cannot do it under any more favorable terms than are accorded to a citizen of the United States, or of any other country. Even the very small group of West India Islands known as the "Cay-

mans," with a population of less than five thousand, have their own legislative council and enact their own laws.

In all of the thirty-one colonies of England, which are not self-governing, and in which the Crown has an effective control of legislation, and also over the public officers, special attention is given to popular education ; and schools have been established, which, as a rule, are free and non-sectarian, are liberally aided by Government grants, and attendance upon which is often compulsory. Thus, in the island of Jamaica, there were in 1892 nearly nine hundred government schools, besides many private schools. In South Africa—Cape Colony—the British Government makes large annual grants in aid of education in every stage. The number of assisted schools is about one thousand, and in aid of them the Government grants about an equal sum with that raised by free and voluntary effort. Industrial training is also specially provided for boys and girls of the aboriginal population, of whom about fifty thousand at present are reported as attending school. Even in the much criticised little colony of Honduras, in Central America, with a population of

less than 30,000, and the only one of the Central American States south of Mexico that does not habitually revolutionize, the Government aids in the keeping up of denominational schools, as none other probably would be countenanced by the people; but subjects them to regular and close inspection.

During the last quarter of a century the Established Church of England has collected and expended more than \$400,000,000 for foreign and domestic missions, for building and repairing churches, and for other religious objects. In addition it is also estimated, that Englishmen of different creeds and denominations at present contribute for domestic religious purposes about \$50,000,000 annually. As to the extent of the private charity of the people of the United Kingdom, some idea may be formed from the fact that \$25,000,000 is believed to be annually contributed in London alone for such objects.

In fact England leads the way in her efforts, independent of creed or sects, to educate the world's population, and probably accomplishes more in this direction than all the rest of the civilized and christianized nations.

A half century ago England, at the cost of \$100,000,000, and without shedding a drop of blood, abolished slavery. A quarter of a century later the United States effected the same result at a cost of several hundred thousand lives, and over nine thousand millions of money, or property.

Note next what England has further accomplished in this direction. In 1843, she abolished slavery in all her East India possessions, and in one day made 12,000,000 people free. Previous to 1890, the group of islands and a coast strip of about 12,000 square miles, known as Zanzibar, was the headquarters of the slave-traders of eastern Africa, and the greatest slave-market of the world. The influence of the Sultan of Zanzibar, in favor of slavery, was paramount also from the eastern coast of Africa even as far into the interior as the head-waters of the Congo. In 1890, England assumed a protectorate over Zanzibar, and almost contemporaneously that country ceased to be a slave-market, and its wily Arab slave-traders soon learned from bitter experience with a portion of England's navy detailed for their supervision, that any further attempts to import slaves from eastern Africa was attendant

with imminent deadly perils to those prosecuting such business.

Again, one of the most recent results of the British occupation of Egypt has been a practical abolition of human slavery. Under existing regulations (established during the past year, 1895), every slave in Egypt (a former great market for the enslaved people of Africa) may demand his manumission if he chooses ; and if the Soudan be retaken by Egyptian troops under British leadership, it will be equivalent to opening the prison doors to hundreds of thousands of captives.

The general result of this policy of England may be finally summed up by saying, that to-day wherever the British flag floats in sovereignty no man can, under any circumstances, hold any other man as a slave.

The people of the United States naturally and rightfully take pride in the declaration of their ancestors that "all men are created equal," and "endowed by their Creator" with an inalienable right to liberty. But what the descendants of these ancestors have done to exemplify and enforce this great declaration, will when tested by evidence, not be found to compare favorably with what England, without vaunting herself, has practically accomplished.

A reflection is made on England for massacring tribes of black men in Africa with machine guns. But machine guns could never be used for a better purpose than to put a stop at once and forever, as England has done wherever she has sovereignty, to the ancient and horrible savagery of human sacrifices and cannibalism. And when England has once put down savagery, that rendered civilization impossible, her treatment of the subjugated and uncivilized has always been merciful. The conquered Kaffir or Zulu of South Africa has become under English rule a freeman, endowed for the first time with an absolute title to land, and other property the results of his own labor; and if injustice is done him the English court is open to him for redress and protection as speedily and impartially as to any white man.

The British American colonies have never warred with their Indians, and never robbed them of their land, but have always dealt kindly and justly by them. A current proverb in the United States, that the only good Indian is a dead Indian, finds no favor in Canada. England, moreover, is the only nation that has ever established a hospital exclusively for the

care of sick or suffering North American Indians, On the other hand, the treatment of our Indians by the United States has always been notoriously arbitrary and bad. It has sequestered their land ; arbitrarily abrogated its treaties with them ; almost continually provoked them to hostilities, and nearly effected their extermination.

Senator Hawley extends an invitation to the people of the United States to "look at the map of India, and stop and think," for the purpose of understanding "the kind of nation that we are facing": "for now India is all a British possession." This is most excellent advice. Let us accept it. Before England acquired control of India, the mass of her great population was almost as low down in the scale of civilization as it was possible to conceive. From the time of Alexander the Great, and probably for unnumbered centuries before, the experience of the country had been one of constant war and disorder, contingent in great part on foreign invasions, and in part on the bitter antagonism of domestic religious creeds and diversity of races. The Indian ryot (peasant) was practically a slave, with no acknowledged right to the products of his

labor ; and when any one, of either high or low degree, acquired anything in the way of money-wealth, it was almost the universal practice to speedily secrete it under ground, to prevent its arbitrary plunder on the part of rulers ; so that the amount of buried treasure, even to this day, in India is regarded as almost fabulous. There can be no denial that England acquired control of India in the first instance by conquest and arbitrary methods. But in this respect she acted in accordance with the then accepted policy of all other nations ; and as at the time when England mainly acquired possession of India the United States did not exist, and her people were a part of England, and as they did not protest, it is difficult to see how they can now animadvert on the action of England without passing censure on themselves. It is also well to recall that England never did a meaner thing in respect to the acquisition of territory than did the United States in 1848, when, under a claim of higher civilization, she robbed, without justification, and at "one fell swoop," poor Mexico of more than one half of all its territory.

The point of interest in respect to England's

connection with India is not what she did a hundred years and more ago, but what she has done within a comparatively recent period, and what she is doing now. Her work of ameliorating the condition of her Indian subjects virtually commenced in 1843, when slavery (as before stated) was abolished in all of her East Indian possessions. To-day the humblest Indian peasant is secure in the possession and control of his property, and if wronged in any way can appeal to and find protection in the courts which England has established. As one result of this policy the buried treasures of India are beginning to come forth and seek investment in England's interest-bearing securities. Under native and Mogul rulers, the only compulsory contribution from the Indian people, worthy of the name of a tax, was an assessment on land, which averaged about twelve shillings per acre. To-day the land tax of India, which the Government has been obliged to maintain for general revenue purposes, does not average more than \$1.53 per acre. Before England assumed dominion in India the system of exaction of her native rulers was so perfected that they were assured of the very last penny that could be taken from

the farmers and cattle raisers without stripping them of everything ; leaving to the tenant class little other than the privilege of living. To-day the existing system of taxation in India is conceded to be, at least, eminently just. Men of native races constitute a part of the highest Indian judiciary ; and by an act affirmed by the Imperial Government it has been ordained " that no native of the territories of India, or any natural-born subject of Great Britain resident therein, shall, by reason of his religion, birth, descent, color, or any one of them, be disabled from any place, office, or employment under its government." Under native rule, the population of India was kept down by war and local feuds to a great extent ; but under the British rule of peace it has increased to a degree so disproportionate to existing agricultural resources, that famines are often contingent on the deficiency of crops through natural influences. To meet such a lamentable condition of affairs the British Government has reserved from its annual revenues, and so created, a large " famine fund," which is solely applicable to relieving popular distress occasioned by a scarcity of food. Has anything like this ever been done by any other

civilized and Christianized Government? In fact, it is not too much to say that the present population of India would not have found food under any previous government of that country; and that its very existence has been made possible only through the conditions of food production and distribution established by England's government.

How considerately and kindly the British Government has dealt with the people of India under its rule is further demonstrated by the following additional evidence. When Warren Hastings was Governor of Bengal (or in 1772) he laid down a rule that "in all suits regarding marriage, inheritance, and caste, and other religious usages and institutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to Mohammedans, and those of the Shaster with respect to Gentoos (Hindus), should be invariably adhered to." And this regard for native creed and usage is still maintained. On the other hand, the criminal law and the law of civil and criminal procedures throughout all of India has been changed to make it conformable to the English codes; and one recognized effect of this has been to impress on a vast area of humanity, over which brute force formerly reigned, a good

deal of the Anglo-Saxon respect for law. It is also worthy of note in this connection that under English rule not a few old-time immoral customs—as the “suttee,” or the burning of widows, and female infanticide—have been prohibited by law.

Popular education in India is systematically promoted by England; and the number of schools supported or aided by public funds, and controlled by departments of education in every province, is now upwards of 150,000; rising from elementary village schools to high schools and colleges.

Since the Indian mutiny in 1857, the Government has expended a large amount—at present many millions per annum—on works of public utility for the purpose of increasing and cheapening (through roads, canals, and railroads) the means of transportation, for promoting irrigation, and especially for favoring the use of new tools and new methods for cultivating the soil. The result of this policy has been greatly to increase the annual food product of the country and the opportunities for the industrial employment of its people. Thus in 1880 India exported less than 500,000 bushels of wheat, but at the present time her

annual export is not less than 40,000,000 bushels. The expansion of India's commerce has been greater in recent years than that of her population ; and within a decade has increased forty-two per cent. and population only ten per cent.

One blessing which the British occupation of India has given the world should not be overlooked. Formerly all cinchona bark, from which quinine is manufactured, came from the forests of the northwestern states of South America ; and as the cinchona trees were not under any system of cultivation, and as the methods of collecting their bark were destructive of the tree, it was easy to see that, under a continually increasing demand, this most important natural product would soon be exhausted. Moved by such considerations, the Government of England determined to make the attempt to cultivate the cinchona tree in India, and, calling in the aid of the best botanists, finally succeeded in so doing, although a previous effort in the same direction on the part of the Dutch Government had failed in Java. The result has been that the supply of quinine is now practically inexhaustible ; and in place of being formerly worth its weight in

gold, its price is now brought within the means of the poorest people, who most need it. How British Indian quinine has become an instrumentality of war, as well as of peace, is shown by the fact that the French in Madagascar, and the Spaniards in Cuba, have recently deemed an adequate supply of it as essential as that of shot or shell.

In short, there is no government in the world whose administration is more honestly conducted, and which is doing more for the material good of the governed, than the present English Government of India. And the secret of England's success in ruling the vast congeries of people known as India, a fifth of the population of the globe—288,000,000 in 1891,—made up of different races and religions, and with eighty different languages, is mainly due to the fact that in no country, except America and Great Britain, is the individual so little interfered with by the Government. No kind of pressure is put upon the Indian to be anything but what he pleases. He is exempt from military conscription. He may profess what religion he likes; express any opinion; enjoy the right of public meeting; and can criticise the Government freely with-

out fear of consequences. And the attitude of the English Government towards its subjects in later years, not only in India, but in all her other colonies and dependencies, has been always one of help and encouragement.

England however, does not control all of India. The Portuguese, who were the pioneers in Eastern conquest, still retain a dominion over about 1500 square miles on the west coast of the Hindostan, and its native inhabitants are now in revolt. Portugal has sent a military force from Europe to suppress it, and its governor in command has made proclamation to the rebels that, unless they lay down their arms, means will be taken for their extermination, that villages will be burnt or destroyed in succession, and all in arms will be liable to be shot. The people of British India are at peace; and, if the Portuguese rebels are successful, they will probably like nothing better than to come under the sovereignty of England. Since the great rebellion in 1857, the military forces of England have not been employed except to compel the barbarous people on her frontiers—the Afghans and the Chitals—to keep the peace. And the cause of this famous mutiny is now

well known to have been due mainly to an assumption on the part of the Sepoys, not that they were politically oppressed, but that they were obliged to grease their cartridges with the fat of the accursed swine.

Another even more instructive illustration of the treatment and policy of the Government of England in respect to her subjects or dependants, is to be found in the recent experience of Egypt. Previous to the English protectorate, consequent upon the suppression of the rebellion under Arabi-Pasha in 1882, the condition of the country was wretched almost beyond conception. Its revenue system, in accordance with Asiatic ideas, comprehended nearly every form of iniquitous extortion. Under the rule of Ismail-Pasha (the Khedive who built the Suez Canal with the enforced and unpaid labor of his subjects), the revenue annually collected from less than 6,000,000 population was estimated at about £16,000,000 (\$80,000,000); while, apart from this sum, the amount that was wrung from the miserable peasantry, which never found its way into any official ledger, was also very considerable. The first thing an English finance committee of experts effected, was to reduce the annual

taxation of \$80,000,000 to \$50,000,000, which, apart from money terms, included a sum total of vexatious and petty exactions that cannot well be expressed in figures. The results of a continuance of this policy by England has been almost without precedent in the world's fiscal history.

For the first time since the days of the Roman administration, order and prosperity reign in the valley of the Nile.

At no previous period since Egypt began to have a name has the fellah lived under a government so careful to protect his rights. For the first time he is allowed to control the fruits of his labor. To-day, under British domination, every Egyptian peasant knows exactly the amount of taxes he has to pay, and when he has to pay them; and that, when he has once paid the legal amount, no official, big or small, has the power to extort from him one single piastre beyond it. He knows, too, that he cannot at any moment be seized and dragged off as formerly, perhaps to some different part of the country, to work under constant dread of the whip, at any task suggested by the caprice of the Khedive or of some powerful pasha. The use of the lash, the for-

mer invariable accompaniment of compulsory and unpaid labor, is now also absolutely prohibited.

When England first occupied the country the four-per-cent Egyptian debt securities were quoted at about 50, and not long before had been rated as low as 27. To-day their quotation is over 100, with a reduction of their originally stipulated interest.

Under such circumstances Egypt has never, certainly not within a recent period, enjoyed so large a measure of prosperity. Notwithstanding the recent universal decline in price of agricultural staples, the Egyptian products and exports of cotton, sugar, tobacco, wheat, etc., have rapidly increased, and at present are much greater than at any former period. The annual increase in the great staple product of Egyptian agriculture—cotton—from the average of 1884-'89 to that of 1893-'94 was nearly a hundred per cent., whereby the cultivator was not only able to pay his taxes more easily, but have more money left for his own needs.

Fifty years ago the accusations now preferred by Messrs. Cullom, Dickinson, Hawley, Lodge, Chandler, Capen, and others, who assume to be statesmen, wise legislators, and

instructors of the people, against England for greed, "grab-all" and "monopoly" policies, had undoubtedly some foundation. At that time the whole commercial policy of England, and of all other countries claiming to be in any degree civilized, was based on the theory that commerce could benefit one country only to the extent that it injured another; and that it was the part of wisdom always to secure a favorable balance of trade by selling as much and buying as little as possible, and receiving pay for what was sold, not in other useful products, but in gold. And this is the theory that to-day characterizes the commerce and trade policy of all nations—especially the United States—except England. Forty odd years ago England came to the conclusion that her supremacy over the earth could best be attained by supremacy in trade rather than by supremacy of the sword, and that the exclusive trade of any colony or people that has to be fought for costs more than it is all worth. And between 1845 and 1856 she inaugurated this latter policy by substantially removing all restrictions on the trade and commerce of her own immediate people, *i. e.*, of the United Kingdom. And, what is generally over-

looked, she gave also to the 300,000,000 of other people over which her sovereignty extends the privilege of according or refusing reciprocal action. In this respect England stands alone. No other nation that has ever existed, or now exists, has ever adopted a similar policy. The following illustrations exemplify it.

It is alleged that if the United States does not speedily annex the Hawaiian Islands, England or some other European power will grab them. Let us see what certainly would happen if the United States, or any of the great European powers, except England, should grab. The first thing that they would do would be to draw a line about the islands, restricting to a great degree all commercial intercourse between them and other nations. If the policy advocated by Mr. McKinley were to prevail, commercial restriction on the part of the United States would amount almost to prohibition. If France were to grab them, her commercial regulations would probably be patterned after the provisions for conquered Madagascar, which make that great island an almost exclusive French province, and absolutely prohibit the importation of great staple articles from

any other country than France and her colonies. The same prohibition tariff provisions have also been made applicable to the French colonies in Indo-China. The recent imposition by France of adverse and discriminating duties on shoes imported from the United States would also probably be made operative in Hawaii.¹ If Russia should obtain possession of these islands, and establish her home policy over them, none other than a Russian could obtain a freehold title to any land. No importations would be allowed that Russian pro-

¹ England is the only country in Europe open to French produce of all kinds without duty, save only in those cases where there are countervailing excise duties in England itself. What, on the other hand, is the situation of English merchandise which enters into France? All English manufactures, yarns, tissues, iron of all kinds, machinery, implements, clothing, chemical products, in short, everything that is manufactured, and even some raw materials, have imposed upon them duties which, in many cases, amount to fifty per cent. *ad valorem*.

English ships are excluded from the French and American coasting trade. The coasting trade of England is open to all French and American ships, which pay, in English ports, no other local taxes than those which are imposed at the same time upon English vessels.

The French Government and French producers say that since France has made sacrifices to create colonies and protectorates, the markets there ought to be reserved to the national industries.

England has also made sacrifices to found colonies, but she has never proceeded to impose protective duties, and she opens these countries with their nearly 300,000,000 of inhabitants to French commerce, without exacting any other duties than those that are paid by English merchandise.

ducers would like to supply ; no language would be officially tolerated except Russian, and no religion except that of the Greek Church. The Government would be in the highest degree despotic. If Spain grabbed, we know what her policy would be from the experience of Cuba. On the other hand, if the island should pass under the sovereignty of England, restrictions on trade and commerce, foreign and domestic, would be reduced to a minimum ; popular government, in which all nationalities would participate, would be established, with English common law as its basis ; the rights of the natives, as well as of all other citizens, would be guarded ; and, above all, a national sanitary system, copied from that of India, the best in the world, and admirably adapted to the fifteen different races which recent anthropological investigations have shown are now being propagated in the islands, would be speedily introduced.

The annals of history will be searched in vain to find better and more instructive object lessons, touching the influence of governments, for better or worse, on the people governed, than are afforded by the experience and present condition of three of the most naturally

attractive areas, for industrial development and individual prosperity, on the earth's surface, namely: the three great West India Islands, of Hayti, Cuba, and Jamaica. Of the first, the Government, although nominally a Republic, is practically a despotism of the Asiatic type. Its other leading characteristics are: a primitive system of agriculture; an absence of good roads, and no railroads; a ferocious antagonism of races—*i. e.*, blacks and mulattoes; a constitution that prohibits the white races from holding real estate; and a social system that also renders it unsafe for a white man to travel in the country. At a not very remote period the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States sent one of its most respected bishops to Hayti, to consecrate a church and install a suitable minister to conduct its services. The American bishop on his return stated, that on the very day on which he fulfilled the object of his mission, and at but a comparatively short distance removed (*i. e.*, by an intervening mountain ridge of low elevation), there was a reported celebration of "voodoo," or demon-worship, accompanied by human sacrifice.

With the desolation and prospective tem-

porary ruin of the island of Cuba, sometimes called "The Pearl of the Antilles," undeniably the result of bad government, all are familiar. In Jamaica, the third of this group of West India Islands, whose natural conditions are almost identical with those of Hayti, and whose population, as in Hayti, is mainly colored—610,579 negroes and mulattoes and 14,692 whites in 1891,—the situation under England's supervision is entirely different. Peace and order prevail; property is secure; the average death-rate low; taxes on cultivated land, six cents per acre; education of the masses carefully provided; facilities for inland communication and ready access to the markets of the world established; and prospective advantages for the investment of capital, exceedingly promising to American investors. In view of such an exhibit can any intelligent citizen of the United States doubt as to which of the three systems of government involved it is his interest to promote?

The bearing also of the commercial policy of England upon the Venezuelan question, which thus far has hardly attracted the attention of the people of the United States, is really the only point involved that materially

affects their interest, and as such is more worthy of their serious consideration than any other. As is well known, there have been repeated attempts to settle the difficulties between England and Venezuela by arbitration, and all of them have thus far resulted in failure. For what reason? Obviously not from disagreement about the partition of sovereignty over a tract of tropical wilderness, in which no white man would ever care to permanently live, and which there is no probability that Venezuela, with its sparse and mongrel population, would ever attempt to colonize, or properly and peacefully govern. Apart from certain minor considerations, the real reason of disagreement has been that England wants free navigation of the Orinoco, and Venezuela does not. Any doubt on this point ought to be at once removed by reference to an official letter, addressed under date of February 17, 1890, by Señor Paraza, then Venezuelan Minister at Washington, to Mr. Blaine, the then United States Secretary of State, in which he says: *If Great Britain is allowed to control the Orinoco "her vessels would enter the mouth of that river, and would carry to the great centres of population her*

productions, her ideas, and her exclusive interest"; and to prevent such a result, which, according to Señor Paraza, "would render nugatory the efforts that are now being made by the nations of America to draw closer their family bonds and have one and the same destiny," he, therefore, begs Mr. Blaine to request Great Britain to settle her differences with Venezuela.

That, in case of the control of the Orinoco by Great Britain her vessels would enter the mouth of that river, and carry her productions, her ideas, and her interests, cannot be doubted. But Great Britain has never sought any exclusive control of the Orinoco. She has only sought to have it made free to the commerce of all nations; and if she were to obtain control, she would not claim or exercise any exclusive privileges over that river, any more than she claims and exercises exclusive privileges over the St. Lawrence, the Nile, the Ganges, the Indus, or the Irrawaddy, all of which she territorially controls; or would over the Yukon, if the adjustment of territorial lines in Alaska should show the mouth of that river to be within English jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the letter of Señor

Paraza warrants the assumption that Venezuela does not want the Orinoco to be free, but exclusive to herself for the purpose of gain through some form of money exaction on the commerce that desires to use it, and has the expectation that this privilege of exclusive control will at no distant day be accorded to her, mainly through the agency of the United States. In 1866, when she announced her intention of erecting a lighthouse on Point Barima, at the mouth of the Orinoco, the British Government agreed to consent on condition that this measure should not be considered as prejudicing any claim on its part to any territory thus occupied which was in dispute. The Venezuelan Government, however, rejected the proposition, and the lighthouse in consequence has never been built; thus showing that the motive of Venezuela in proposing to build a lighthouse was not with a view of compassing the object for which such structures are erected, namely, to benefit commerce and insure safe navigation, but rather to fortify their claims to an exclusive control of the river for their own advantage. In furtherance of this purpose she has also chartered a purely speculative company—an

American syndicate—looking to a monopoly of the river and its adjacent territory, and of which the President of the country is reported as one of the largest stockholders. This charter involved a grant of 14,400,000 acres, or 23,000 square miles—a territory about as large as New England,—and, according to a statement made in November, 1895, by the secretary of General Blanco, late President of Venezuela, to the *New York Sun*, and published in its columns, “was in its inception a deliberate purpose of Gen. Blanco’s to enlist more warmly the United States in Venezuela’s behalf by establishing in American citizens the title to a large part of the territory claimed by England.”

The real and only issue of importance in this problem of Venezuela to the people of the United States is, will they co-operate with the British Government in securing to all nations the perpetual right to the free commercial use of this mighty river, which constitutes the only available access to the great northern interior of South America; or allow its control to pass to a Government which is one of the most unstable of all countries, whose commerce is little more than barter, which has no banking

system, and whose history is one monotonous record of revolutions accomplished through bloodshed, and a remarkable ferocity on the part of all antagonizing political parties. Peace, extended commercial relations, and consequent enlargement of markets for domestic industrial products are certainly not likely to be assured to the people of the United States by any endorsement on the part of their Government of the latter policy.

It is the old contest again between barbarism and civilization ; with a marked tendency on the part of the United States to favor barbarism and its most certain concomitant of war.¹

¹ " I have visited many British colonies in various parts of the world, and I have had occasion to compare them with near-by Latin-American republics, the successors of three hundred years of Spanish rule, and I can endorse all that Mr. Wells has to say. In 1892, while in command of the United States steamship *Kearsarge*, I ascended the identical river, the Orinoco, which Mr. Wells would see thrown open to navigation,—going as far as Ciudad-Bolivar (formerly Angostura), 240 miles above its mouth,—and I do not hesitate to state that if that great waterway were located in a British possession, its shores, instead of being as they now are for the greater part of the way a howling wilderness, would be lined with prosperous settlements, and the waters of that mighty stream would be carrying a hundred tons of shipping where they now carry one ; that those great civilizers, trade and commerce, and agriculture, backed by law and order, would bring about in the adjacent territory a state of affairs that has never yet entered the head of the average Latin-

In conclusion, the general result of England's governmental and commercial policy may be thus fairly and comprehensively stated.

Wherever her sovereignty has gone, two blades of grass have grown where one grew before. Her flag, wherever it has been advanced, has benefited the country over which it floats; and has carried with it civilization, the Christian religion, order, justice, and prosperity.

England is the only one of the great countries of the world in which crime is diminishing. Recent reports of the British Prison Commissioners for England and Wales show a remarkable decrease in the prison population. In fact England has been found to have too many prisons, and a not inconsiderable number have been closed during the last ten years because they were no longer needed. The actual decline in the number of inmates in the local prisons of England and Wales from 1877 to 1892—a period of fifteen years—

American politician. If England has grabbed territory, she has grabbed it to some purpose, and no people or race, be they civilized or savage, has come under her rule but has been raised in the social scale, benefited and made free, where formerly they were degraded, if not in an actual state of savagery or slavery."—*Capt. A. S. Crowninshield, U. S. N., North American Review, May, 1896.*

was thirty-seven per cent.; and this relative decline would have been much greater if the increase of the general population in the same period had been taken into the account.

England has always treated a conquered race with justice. What under her rule is the law for the white man is the law for his black, red, and yellow brother. And here we have one explanation of the fact that England alone of the nations has been successful in establishing and maintaining colonies; and of the further extraordinary fact, with an accompanying impressiveness of thought, that a comparatively small insular country, containing less than 40,000,000 inhabitants, can successfully preside over the destinies of about 360,000,000 other members of the human race, and exercise a governing influence greater and vastly more beneficent than that of Rome in the zenith of her power.

What an endorsement of the honesty of England and its people is involved in the reported and probable fact, that the Church of Rome makes that non-Catholic country and its much-abused bankers its fiduciary guardian of the fiscal resources necessary for the maintenance of its vast missionary enterprises and

other religious objects, and which experience has shown cannot be intrusted with an equal degree of confidence to any other country. There is authority for the statement that, within a comparatively recent period, every religious order of the Catholic Church in France has transferred all its available means to English banks, and that letters of administration or probate have been taken out in London by their representatives. And a similar action and belief on the part of other foreign purse-holders accounts undoubtedly in a large degree for the low rate of interest on money capital in England (British $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. Consols selling at $112\frac{1}{2}$ in April, 1896), and the great demand for her national securities.

A recent incident, illustrative of how England, in entering upon the occupation of barbarous countries, does not content herself with merely amelioratory present or immediate conditions, but looks forward to future industrial developments, is found in the fact that one of the earliest acts of its administration in Central Africa, was to declare a considerable area of country, Crown property, for the purpose of preventing the rapid and complete extinction by fire, or otherwise, of the remains of a mag-

nificent forest of a rare and extremely valuable species of cedar, which it was the common intent of the world should not be merely preserved, but rather extended locally and by propagation in other countries. Contrast this policy and action of England with the absence of all similar policy and action on the part of the Federal and State Governments of the United States, whereby the famous red-wood forests—the wonder and beauty of California—are rapidly disappearing; and that the time is not far distant when the Sierra Mountains will be swept bare of them, and the country “wake up to the realization of the vandalism that has robbed it of one of its great scenic charms,” and of a species of wood that has no rival for certain architectural uses.

While the people of the United States are experiencing the humiliation of seeing the flag of their mercantile marine vanishing from the ocean, it may not be unprofitable for them to learn what England has recently been doing for the preservation and welfare of her merchant vessels and seamen. In virtue of what has been termed *load-line* legislation, adopted by the United Kingdom about 1881, no ship can leave a British port overladen; and the

owners of British ships coming in overladen, as determined by certain fixed rules, are subject to prosecution. The effect of this enactment, accompanied by certain regulations respecting *deck-loading* and the stowage of grain cargoes, has been truly remarkable. Thus, in 1881, when the legislation referred to began to operate, the annual loss of life in the British mercantile marine was one in 57. In 1883 it had fallen to one in 66, in 1885 to one in 96, and in 1891 to one in 115. The loss of life in the ten years indicated had therefore fallen by one-half. The number of lives lost in 1881 was 2352. In 1892 the number had fallen to 1071. In respect to the effect of the regulations for the stowage of grain, it has been demonstrated that in the three years from 1875 to 1877, 60 vessels with grain cargoes foundered, and 586 lives were lost. In the three years from 1890 to 1892, the number of grain vessels lost was reduced to 13, and the number of lives lost to 230, a very large reduction. In the same way, in respect to the deck-loading of timber ships, the number of lives lost in the three years from 1875 to 1877, was 135, whereas in the three years from 1890 to 1892, the number was

only 44. Very naturally, seafaring men incline to serve in the British mercantile marine rather than in that of any other nation. The representatives of the American people in Congress assembled do not seem to have cared for any such things, but have recently rejoiced greatly in the expenditure of large sums of money, raised by taxation, for the construction of a type of vessels which, by reason of their special adaptations, have been termed "commerce destroyers."

Again, under the policy which England has established for the working of her mines, and which no other government has fully adopted, the occupation of the British miner has been rendered twice as safe as it was at the commencement of her mining enactments.

But here some may ask: How about the wrongs and abuses of Ireland and her people on the part of England? The answer is, that they originated in an old-time theory, once accepted and practised by all nations, that might makes right, and that differences in religious belief warrant individual persecution and a debarment from all participation in government, and it is this policy that has, from a lengthened period, entailed a condition of

affairs in Ireland that has not been easy to remedy. But England now leads the way among the nations in the utter repudiation of this policy, and the day cannot be far distant when the grievances of Ireland will be amicably and satisfactorily settled by her. That real progress has also been made in this direction is proved by the fact, that the present Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Russell of Killowen) is a Catholic Irishman; and that no subject of England in Ireland, or in any other country under English sovereignty, is now debarred from participating in her government by reason of his religious belief; which is more than can be affirmed of the condition of affairs in some other countries claiming to be free, christianized, and civilized.

England, furthermore, no longer maintains, as formerly, an established church in Ireland. Forty years ago a young Catholic Irishman, by reason of the religion in which he was born and bred, was denied admission as an undergraduate to the most liberal of England's great universities—Cambridge. To-day, without swerving in any degree from his former religious belief, he fills, as Lord Acton, one of

its most important professorships—that of Modern History ; and his appointment has been received with universal satisfaction. “Could there be a more signal token of the passing away in England of that old sectarian spirit, which formerly found expression in religious tests ; and of the present nationalization of her great seats of learning !”

If the Englishman is unbending and determined to have his way, such characteristics are due to the Anglo-Saxon element in him ; and which as participated in by the people of the United States has been the main cause of their development and prosperity as a nation.

The reason why England is hated by other nations is because she is feared, and she is feared mainly by reason of the success of her commercial policy, which has not only brought her wealth, but strength. She is envied, too, by unsuccessful rivals in common industrial fields. But the United States as a nation is hated and distrusted in an equal degree. There is not a Government on the American continent, except Canada and Venezuela, that does not both fear and hate her ; and if the United States decides in favor of the free navigation of the Orinoco, the latter will speedily be ac-

counted among her most bitter enemies. All countries save England, and possibly Russia and Japan, would rejoice at the dissolution of the Federal Union.¹

The United States now stands at the parting of the ways. Shall she by antagonism with England bring about for herself a national isolation, with the inevitable result of dwarfing the intellectual and industrial energies of her people; or, by strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship with England, unite the two foremost and most progressive nations of the world for the joint attainment of those results that constitute national greatness? Through what may be termed natural influences, the bonds of interest between the United States and England are already immeasurably greater than with any other country. England buys from us just about as much as all the rest of the world; and all the other countries of the world do not afford, and could not afford, us such a market as she

¹ A recent issue of the leading newspaper in the Argentine Republic—the Buenos Ayres *Herald*—affirms, that the Argentine people “are of a different race, of different language, customs, and interests, having no sympathy with American thought or commerce, and having neither affection nor any special friendship for Americans,” and the sentiments of the people of Brazil, as indicated by the newspapers of that country, are in full agreement with those of the Argentines.

does for our agricultural products, which must long remain the principal things we have to sell abroad. The five million people of the Dominion of Canada buy from the United States a much greater quantity of her goods and merchandise (\$47,787,501 in 1895) than all of the thirty-six million occupying the continent of South America (\$33,248,331 in 1895). If England had not in a great measure abandoned agriculture, and turned to the United States for her supply of food, who could say what would have been the present economic condition of our people at the West and South, or of the people at our manufacturing and financial centres of the North and East, who are dependent upon the prosperity of the West and South. In short, the existing ties of race, language, law, and religion, that bind the two nations together, are so strong, that together they must rise or fall. United, as it would seem to be God's purpose that they should be, there would be little need for either to maintain large armies or navies, for without them they could for all reasonable purposes rule the world, and be impregnable against assault. If it were also certain, as it probably is, that England would continue her present com-

mercial policy, it would be for the true interests of the United States that she "should further extend her sovereignty over the surface of the earth ; for then the people of the United States would have the privilege and profit of unrestricted trade with all the subjects of England without the expense of governing them.

Some years since in a social conversation with one of the ablest men that England ever sent to represent her diplomatically at Washington, the question was put to him, "Do you think that war between the United States and England is ever again likely to occur?" The immediate answer was: "Considering the many ties and common interests that unite the two nations, such an occurrence does not seem possible." Then, hesitating for a moment, he continued: "But when I consider the resources, energy, and skill of your people, the thought sometimes occurs to me, that if the United States were to adopt the commercial policy of England she might so crowd us out of the markets of the world, on which my countrymen so largely depend for industrial employment and support, that England might have to fight for her existence."

If, now, this adventitious supposition on the

part of this wise English diplomat is warranted, it would seem to be wisdom on the part of such of the people of the United States as hate England and desire to humiliate her, to adopt as soon as possible her commercial policy.

It is not pretended, as some have inferred (*London Chronicle*) from a perusal of the above article, as it was originally published in the *North American Review*, that the commercial or colonial policy of England has been primarily designed for the benefit of rival nations, or mankind in general. Any assumption that such an idea was either entertained, or expressed by the author has no warrant. England is pre-eminently a selfish nation, in the same sense as the governments of all other countries and people are, or ought to be,—namely, in preferring and fostering the interests and prosperity of their own people, before any or all others. But there are two kinds of selfishness: one, of the old mediæval type, which holds that whatever gain may accrue to any one in trade must necessarily be accompanied by a corresponding loss on the part of some other person or

party ; and that accordingly in international trade or exchanges it is for the interest of one nation to impair as far as possible the trade and prosperity of its commercial competitors. The other kind of selfishness—which may be termed enlightened selfishness—holds that the parties participating in legitimate trade are mutually benefited. The local retail merchants — “the grocer, the baker, and the candlestick-maker” — perfectly understand and appreciate this latter principle. No one of them desires that his customers shall not be prosperous, for he knows that, if they are not, his sales will be contracted, and his collection of indebtedness will be difficult. Nations, however, have been very slow in recognizing and profiting by this experience. In fact, England is the only nation that has done so, and herein is the secret of her wealth and commercial supremacy ; and her enlightened selfishness will undoubtedly prompt her to continue this policy.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE BROOKLYN INSTITUTE
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

MARCH 30, 1896

BY EDWARD J. PHELPS

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.¹

I HAVE been asked to address you this evening on the subject of the "Monroe doctrine." This phrase, heard by many Americans for the first time, and conveying to most minds a very indefinite idea, has been brought before the country with striking effect within the last three or four months. It has drawn us dangerously near to a war with Great Britain, and nearer perhaps to a war with Spain. It has caused a paralysis upon business and a loss of property in the depreciation of securities that no arithmetic can estimate. For what cause? Upon what provocation? With the countries concerned we are perfectly friendly; we have received no injury from them and have none to fear; with their people we have no quarrel. With one of them we are more closely allied by every tie that can possibly exist between nations, than any independent countries ever were in the history of the world. Suddenly, without warning or pre-

monition, this condition of affairs and its happy presage for the future were threatened with violent disturbance. Twenty-four hours before the announcement, not a man in either country, outside of the American Executive Chamber, could have dreamed of such a rupture, on any score then existing, or capable of being anticipated. But by a message of the President to Congress it was made known to us that an ancient boundary-line controversy of small importance, between Great Britain and Venezuela, which had been dragging along without conclusion or much attempt at it for the best part of the present century, had been taken in hand by the United States Government; that its proposal to the British Government that an arbitration should take place between that country and Venezuela to determine the question, had been assented to in part, but in part declined for special reasons, courteously stated; and that thereupon, without further discussion, the President had decided to ascertain the line by an *ex parte* commission of his own appointment, and to compel Great Britain to accept the result. It was not pointed out, nor was it true, that the United States had the slightest interest, pres-

ent or future, in the settlement of the question, or any special alliance or connection with Venezuela. Nor was it claimed (if that could have made any difference) that Great Britain had taken a step or uttered a word which showed a disposition to encroach upon the rights of Venezuela, or to bring any force to bear upon her in the adjustment of the dispute. Neither was it made to appear, even, that she was in the wrong in her contention as to the true location of the line, since that question was admitted to be involved in such obscurity that a learned commission of jurists and scholars was necessary to discover by laborious investigation whether she was right or not, and if not, wherein she was wrong, an inquiry upon which, after several months' labor, they are still at work. It was simply assumed, that because the boundary in dispute was on this hemisphere, the United States had the right to dictate arbitration between the parties as the proper method of ascertaining its location, and if that was refused, to define the line for herself, and to enforce its adoption. This extraordinary conclusion was asserted for the first time against a friendly nation, not as a proposition open to discussion, to which its

attention and reply were invited, but as an *ultimatum* announced to begin with. And it was addressed, not to that nation itself, through the ordinary channels of diplomatic intercourse, but to a coördinate branch of our own Government, and thence through the newspapers to the world at large. Coming from the President of the United States, in a state paper of the highest importance, and from a President who has hitherto commanded in an unusual degree the public confidence, this conclusion may be usefully considered, since it applies not only to the case which gave rise to it, but to the other and similar cases which in the shifting condition of South American affairs are likely frequently to confront us in the future.

The general rule of international law which precludes intervention by a nation in the disputes of other nations with which it is at peace, and with neither of which it has any treaty of defensive alliance, is universally conceded, and stands upon the most obvious grounds of necessity. Without it the peace of the world would be constantly in danger. When such a dispute has culminated in hostilities, the intervention of a third power against either party is an act of war. To this rule

there are but two exceptions. Where the interference is for the purpose of repressing gross outrages against humanity, like massacre or intolerable cruelty, such as are reported to have taken place in Armenia, or where the nation interposing is compelled to do so for its own protection, in order to prevent a disposition of territory seriously injurious to its permanent interests, or which would constitute a grave menace to them in the future. In this case, as has been already remarked, the United States has no such apprehension. No advocate of the President's proclamation has undertaken to point out how it can affect us, whether the line through the jungle of bushes and water, which makes up most of the territory really in dispute, is drawn a few miles one way or the other. And if we could conceive that we have any possible interest in the question, it would be on the side of Great Britain. So far as that region is capable of civilized occupation, it would be better for us and for the rest of the world that it should be under British jurisdiction, than in the hands of a weak and unstable government, which is little more than a succession of spasmodic and ill-regulated republics diversified by revolu-

tion. Great Britain has no port on any sea that is not wide open to us without restriction for every purpose of commerce, intercourse, or residence; nor any country under her flag where the rights of all Americans who may find their way there upon whatever errand, are not as completely protected as those of Englishmen. We load her exports to us with heavy duties, but she imposes none upon ours in return. On the other hand, United States interests in South American countries have been frequently subject to embarrassment and injustice, requiring the interposition of our Government. That we are not claimed to have any concern in the location of the disputed boundary, is conclusively shown by the willingness of the Administration to have it settled by an arbitration which we have no hand in appointing, to which we are not a party, before which we are not heard, and which is charged with no consideration of any rights of ours. We profess, in short, no other interest in the matter than that it should be determined one way or the other, whether right or wrong, by arbitration: Such being the conditions of the case, and they are not open to dispute, upon what theory is the position of

the United States sought to be justified? The answer offered to an astonished world is, that it is the necessary result of the Monroe doctrine, and is to be charged to that account. Now a proposition that entails such consequences ought to be pretty carefully examined. It behooves us to ascertain what it stands for, what it means, how far it is sound, how far it is going, and what are its limits if it has any.

What then is the "Monroe doctrine?" The phrase is of frequent use lately, but of very infrequent attempts at definition. Expressing nothing, it may be understood to express anything. It is generally supposed to embody a vague idea of some sort of control that may be or ought to be exerted by the United States over the relations between European governments and those of South America. But what control, under what right, for what purposes, and in what cases, we are not informed. The name by which such principle as it is thought to stand for is called, would be immaterial, if it were not that a name often gives currency to an idea that can only exist under an indefinable phrase, because as soon as it is stated in plain language it refutes itself. It is the constant and necessary resort of those who undertake

to maintain an unmaintainable proposition, to find a phraseology that will be accepted as conveying its meaning, without exposing its futility. When such terms are correctly defined, their contents disappear. The uncertainty of what is meant by the Monroe doctrine is made apparent by the efforts of recent writers and orators to define it, for no two of them agree. Some have gone so far that the ground taken by the President has become moderate in comparison. One asserts that it is the right in our Government to forbid any dispute as to a boundary line or other question between a European and a South American government, however immaterial to us, to be settled in any way by the parties to it, without our consent. Another still more advanced writer defines it to be our right, and corresponding duty, to require that every difference that arises between a European nation and one in South America, shall be adjusted by arbitration; a species of voluntary agreement that he conceives we have a divine mission to compel other governments to accept against their will, in matters with which we have no concern. Various other novel incursions into the field of international law find

their only defence against absurdity, under the convenient shelter of the phrase "the Monroe doctrine," which is assumed to be a feature of the American theory of government, inherited by some strange canon of descent from President Monroe, its inventor, and which we are all bound to support whether we understand it or not. And when finally we resort to the diplomatic communications from our Government to that of Great Britain, in order to ascertain if possible what is the precise right we claim in the present case, and why we claim it, we find the answer to those reasonable inquiries to be farther off than ever.

The pretext for annexing the name of Mr. Monroe to these extravagant proposals is found in some language employed in his message to Congress in the year 1823. He said: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." Later in the same message he said: "We owe it therefore

to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those" (Allied) "powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." And again: "We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them" [the independent South American countries], "or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." This is what Mr. Monroe said, and substantially all that he said on the subject. The occasion which called forth this language, and the matter it referred to, was an intention shown by certain European nations combined under what was called the Holy Alliance, to aid Spain in regaining her lost authority over eight provinces in South America, which had achieved their independence and established republican institutions. This was in the infancy of our own Republic, when that form of government was almost unknown, and was still an untried experiment. It might well be contended, that to re-establish a European monarchy by force

over so large a portion of South America, against the will of its people, would have been at that time a serious menace to our political system, against which, on well settled principles, we were justified in protecting ourselves. And this position was heartily concurred in by Great Britain. In respect to the right of colonization on this hemisphere by European countries, more doubt might arise as to the soundness of President Monroe's proposition. It has been opposed by eminent statesmen and writers, and rejected by Congress in former days. Unless there was something in the locality of the proposed colonization that made it a menace to us, it might be difficult to sustain the objection to it. But that point need not here be discussed, since it is altogether foreign to the present subject, nor is it at all likely at this day that the question will ever recur.

It will be seen, therefore, that President Monroe never asserted, nor did the case he was dealing with call for the assertion of any right in this Government that supports or even approaches the proposition now brought forward under the professed sanction of his name. What he did say related to an entirely differ-

ent state of facts from those now before us, and referred to a principle long fundamental in international law and universally admitted, of which he was in no sense the author ; *the right of national self-preservation and defence in every case and under all circumstances that call for its exercise.* That is not only the right, but the first and paramount duty of every independent nation. And it applies as fully to the acquisition of territory by another power, when it seriously endangers the safety or the important interests of a country, as to any other aggression. If this unquestionable right is what is meant by the term "Monroe doctrine," the phrase is capable of being clearly understood and accurately defined, and it will encounter no denial in any quarter. Such is the view of Mr. Monroe's propositions taken by Mr. Webster in his celebrated speech on the Panama mission, in which he warmly defended the message, which had been earnestly attacked. He said : " The general rule of national law is unquestionably against interference in the transactions of other states. There are, however, acknowledged exceptions growing out of circumstances, and founded in those circumstances. . . . The ground of these

exceptions is, as I have already stated, self-preservation. It is not a slight injury to our interests, it is not even a great inconvenience, that makes out a case. There must be danger to our security, or danger, manifest and imminent danger, to our essential rights and our essential interests. . . . Our right to interfere in any such case is but the exercise of the right of reasonable and necessary self-defence. It is a high and delicate exercise of that right ; one not to be made but on grounds of strong and manifest reason, justice, and necessity.”

The limits of this occasion do not admit of sustaining Mr. Webster's views by adducing those of other statesmen and writers to the same effect. Nor is it necessary. The propriety of the proposition he has so lucidly stated is almost self-evident, and has never been denied by any recognized authority. Nor can there be a higher or more truly American authority than his on any question of international right on which he ever had occasion to express himself.

The application of the right of national self-defence to the injurious acquisition by other nations of new territory, finds its chief illustra-

tion in what is called in Europe the balance of power. The right of interference in such cases by the country thus menaced, has long been established. But to justify it, the necessity for it must first clearly appear. It is not in ordinary cases, nor at the mere will or caprice of the nation intervening, nor upon any theory of a constructive, a possible, or an unimportant injury, that it has been permitted by that general concurrence of mankind which constitutes international law. When at the conclusion of the war between Germany and France the former annexed to itself the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, no other country could have justified an interference to prevent it, since it wrought no other country any injury. But had Germany undertaken to annex France by conquest, the right of European nations to protest, by force of arms, if necessary, would not have been open to question. The absorption of Turkey by Russia would be prevented by the nations whose grave interests would be menaced by it. But the adjustment between Russia and Turkey of the obscure boundary of an insignificant province, in no way affecting the outside world, would not warrant intervention. When the United States purchased the prov-

ince of Alaska from Russia, would Great Britain, though proprietor of so vast a territory in that part of the continent, have been justified in undertaking to prevent it? How would such an attempt have been received by the American people? On the other hand, it is easy enough to conceive of new acquisitions by foreign powers in South American countries, that would create a menace to our interests so serious as to authorize and require our resistance. Such was the attempt on the part of France to establish a monarchy in Mexico, against which our Government successfully interposed. Such would be an effort by a European power to obtain control of Nicaragua, destined to be the gate through which a great commerce will pass, and which our plainest interests require should be under our own control, or, at the least, that its neutrality and freedom should be completely guaranteed. Illustrations might be multiplied, were it requisite or useful. The distinction is apparent, between the right to intervene between other nations where it is reasonably necessary to our own protection, and the unfounded claim of such a right where it is in no sense necessary. In the former case the quarrel in which we

interpose is no longer that of the first parties to it, only, for it has become our own. The difference is the justification on which all self-defence depends, whether national or individual,—the necessity for its exercise. The right goes always as far as the necessity, and never goes any farther. He who invokes it must justify it by showing that it was necessary.

Now, till some man can stand forth and inform us how we are to be injured by the adjustment of that Venezuelan boundary line, I shall venture respectfully to assert that it is a controversy we have no right to meddle with.

But some of the advocates of the new "Monroe doctrine," who feel compelled to admit that it cannot be maintained as a right, attempt to uphold it as being what they call "American policy."

This ground is, if possible, still weaker. If we have no right to intervene in a case where we have no interest or concern, then such an intervention would be a grave infraction of the rights of the nation interfered with. Rights are correlative and reciprocal, and where we interfere without right, we do so against the rights we seek to obstruct. Is it to be main-

tained that as a government it is our policy to do to other nations against their will what we have no right to do? Where would such a policy stop? And how should we relish it when applied to ourselves? That it is the true policy of a nation always to assert its own rights is clear, but can it ever be its policy to assail the rights of others? Again, policy means interest. We can have no policy, right or wrong, where we have no interest. The terms are synonymous. What sort of a policy is it, then, which invades the rights of other nations where we have nothing to gain by it? We may have, it is true, an interest in attaining by just means that which we have no right to demand. That may be the case among nations as well as among individuals. But such a policy must be worked out by those peaceable methods through which in the business of this world desirable ends are reached and advantages acquired which cannot be taken by force. If, therefore, we could even see that we have in this case any interest to be attained that is not a right to be enforced, it would afford no justification at all for the attempt to assert it in defiance of the rights of others.

In no view of the case, then, can the course

of the Administration in this affair be justified. It is a plain infraction of those established principles in which all nations concur. They have become international law, because they are international right ; and they are right not only because they are just, but because they are indispensable. International law is international morality and justice, formulated by the general consent of civilized men. That is its basis and its sanction. The claim that Americans are in any respect above or beyond this law of the civilized world, or that we are invested with authority to interfere in the affairs of other nations in which we are in no way concerned, merely because the location of the dispute is in South America, are propositions that will find no favor among just or thoughtful men. We have no protectorate over South American nations, and do not assume any responsibility in their behalf. Our own rights there as elsewhere, it is to be hoped, we shall never fail to maintain. But those rights have their foundation and their limit in the settled law to which we are subject as all other nations are, and which is as necessary to us as to them.

And when we undertake to assert that we are not bound by that law, and care nothing

for the opinion of the world ; that we are Americans and monarchs of all we survey ; and that we are going to control the part of this hemisphere that does not belong to us, regardless of the rights of those to whom it does belong, merely for the sake of doing it, and because we think we are strong enough, we adopt the language and the conduct of the bully, and shall certainly encounter, if that is persisted in, the bully's retribution.

In respect to the merits of the boundary question between Venezuela and Great Britain I say nothing, because I know nothing. Judging from past history in similar cases, I believe it will turn out that there is no line there, and never was, that is capable of being determined. It has been the history almost always of unoccupied regions, that their boundaries were utterly vague. No occasion to define them having arisen, and the world having no use for the territory involved, the monuments and landmarks on paper that were supposed to designate them usually turn out either not to exist, or to be too indefinite and uncertain to be ascertained. By and by, in the progress of the world, the tide of civilization overtakes such regions, they are required for human

occupation, and their resources are brought to light. Then springs up the question of the boundary, and perhaps violent disputes in respect to it, and in due time they have to be settled by a compromise, and by the drawing of an arbitrary line that is agreed on and mutually accepted, not as the old supposed line that cannot be found, but as a new one that is established because just and equitable. Such has been the history of our own boundary lines as they have gradually become important, in Maine, in Oregon, and elsewhere, and by that sort of compromise they have been happily established, after much war talk. And such is precisely the question we have pending to-day with Great Britain, in respect to the boundary between Alaska and British Columbia. By the description given in the old treaty between Great Britain and Russia under which we claim, made long before the foot of a white man had been set upon that region, and long before any civilized occupation of it was anticipated as likely to occur, the boundary can not be drawn, and the designation of it is impossible to be pursued. The two governments are now engaged in surveys, not to find the line that cannot be found, but to

acquire materials for making one that shall be as nearly as possible just and fair. That, I venture to say, will be the way and the only way in which the line between Great Britain and Venezuela can ever be established. And if we desired to interfere in any controversy between other nations, in which we have no interest, such a one as that is the very last in which we could undertake to find out which party is in the right. How should we receive a proposal by Mexico to interfere (if that republic was strong enough) between us and Great Britain, in respect to the Alaskan line, in order to ascertain that line for herself by an *ex parte* commission of her own, and then to compel the United States to accept it? Yet Mexico is as much entitled to a "Monroe doctrine," in respect to disputes arising on this continent in which she has no concern, as we are.

A few words now in reference to our relations with Spain, in which what is called the "Monroe doctrine" again comes to the front. If the general intelligence of the nation will not permit a groundless war with Great Britain, it is proposed in certain quarters that we should fight Spain, in order to help the

rebels in Cuba to wrest that island from the government to which it belongs. And, as before, our only reason is that Cuba is on this side of the Atlantic. Cuba has been a part of Spain for a very long time, the most valuable of her diminished possessions. With Spain we are on terms of absolute friendship, and always have been. Spain! An ancient nation long celebrated in history, once the chief seat of that fine learning which institutes like yours are built to foster, whence and under the patronage of whose enlightened queen, Columbus came to open this continent to our ancestors. And now there has broken out in her province a rebellion, which, so far as I can learn, is a rebellion of banditti; a rebellion of pillage, and arson, and murder, with no attempt at an organized government, no capital, no centre, no recognized head. It has nothing to stand on but crime. And it is proposed that we shall attack Spain since she has become less powerful than we are, and set up that class of people in the independent government of Cuba. Upon what ground is this proposal justified? Again it is the "Monroe doctrine."

Well, let us look at that for a moment. We

had a rebellion of our own thirty years ago, a very serious one, of four years' duration. It was not an insurrection of banditti, robbing and stealing and burning. It was the organization of a good many sovereign states, of a large and intelligent people, with a constitution, a government, a regular army, very distinguished military and civil leaders, and all that was necessary to national independence, except the right of secession. And the existence of that was a matter of opinion. If the South had possessed that right, it would have deserved to succeed, and it would have succeeded. How should we have relished the interference of Spain, or of any other country, on this hemisphere or the other, to assist that rebellion, on the sole plea that the people of the Southern States claimed the right to set up a government for themselves? What a feeling pervaded this country on the mere suggestion that the sympathy of society in England was to a greater or less degree with the Confederate Government! Not that the British Government took a single step to interfere against us, but it was asserted, and with more or less truth, no doubt, that, among a certain class of English people there

was a feeling of sympathy with the South. And when the *Alabama*, built in England, slipped out from her control to become a privateer against the commerce of the Northern States, what was the feeling in this country about that? It was never claimed that there was anything more than neglect on the part of the British Government. It hesitated a little too long over the evidence laid before it as to the character of the vessel, and finally sent down orders to stop her, about twenty-four hours too late. And yet we were almost ready to go to war with Great Britain over the depredations of that ship, and but for the Geneva arbitration a war might have ensued. What do you suppose would have occurred if Great Britain had taken up arms to assist the Southern rebellion?

Now it is proposed that we should do to Spain, in her imminent distress, what in our own similar case we should have justly resented to the very death, if it had been done to us by any nation in the world. Can anything be added by argument against such a proposal, to the refutation which the very statement of it affords? Can it be justified to the sense of any rational man, upon any ground that ever

was known? Here again we encounter the established principle of international law that forbids such an interference, and makes it an act of war, as unjustifiable as it is unnecessary.

Now, my friends, there is no American, I trust, that ever would shrink one hair's breadth from any war, let its calamities and horrors and destruction be what they may, let its cost be what it may, if it should be unhappily necessary to vindicate our national honor, or to protect our national interest. When that time comes, we shall not be found arguing about the meaning of the Monroe doctrine, nor shall we pause to inquire by what name we shall baptize a sentiment that will be irrepressible because it will be just. Is it not best to wait for that emergency? Is it not best to maintain the peace which is indispensable to our prosperity and welfare, until it becomes necessary to break it? And to refuse to intermeddle in the controversies that constantly succeed each other between the different sections of mankind, till the time comes when it can be shown that we have something to do with one of them that requires our interference. Is not that the true definition of the Monroe doctrine, if we choose to call by a name

that does not belong to it, a very early and fundamental principle in the law of nations? That is the ground, as it seems to me, on which Americans should stand, in order to preserve their own peace, and to help preserve that of the world. And notwithstanding the clamor of men who want war for war's sake; war for its contracts, and its plunder, and its offices, and the spoil that can be gathered out of the common calamity; war to further among the ignorant the chances of some party candidate; war to drive the country into the curse and ruin of a dishonest currency, for the benefit of those who have its material to sell; or to give a fictitious value to the bonds of a Cuban government that does not exist, and would be utterly worthless if it did—that is the ground on which, as I believe, the sound good sense of the American people, which comes to the front with irresistible force when the occasion is great enough to demand it, will plant itself, now and always, for the country's sake.

ARBITRATION
IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

BY CARL SCHURZ

ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.¹

BY CARL SCHURZ.

I HAVE been honored with the request that I should address you on the desirableness of arbitration as a method of settling international disputes. To show that arbitration is preferable to war, should be among civilized people as superfluous as to show that to refer disputes between individuals or associations to courts of justice is better than to refer them to single combat or to street fights—in one word, that the ways of civilization are preferable to those of barbarism.¹ Neither is there any doubt as to the practicability of international arbitration. What seemed an idealistic dream in Hugo Grotius's time, is now largely an established practice; no longer an uncertain experiment, but an acknowledged success. In this

¹ Address delivered at the Arbitration Conference in Washington April 22, 1896.

century not less than eighty controversies between civilized powers have been composed by arbitration. And more than that. Every international dispute settled by arbitration has *stayed* settled, while during the same period some of the results of great wars have *not* stayed settled, and others are unceasingly drawn in question, being subject to the shifting preponderance of power. And such wars have cost rivers of blood, countless treasure, and immeasurable misery, while arbitration has cost comparatively nothing. Thus history teaches the indisputable lesson that arbitration is not only the most humane and economical method of settling international differences, but also the most, if not the only, certain method to furnish enduring results.

As to the part war has played and may still have to play in the history of mankind, I do not judge as a blind sentimentalist. I readily admit that, by the side of horrible devastations, barbarous cruelty, great and beneficent things have been accomplished by means of war in forming nations and in spreading and establishing the rule or influence of the capable and progressive. I will not inquire how much of this work still remains to be done and what

place war may have in it. But surely, among the civilized nations of to-day—and these we are considering—the existing conditions of intercourse largely preclude war as an agency for salutary objects. The steamship, the railroad, the telegraph, the postal union, and other international arrangements facilitating transportation and the circulation of intelligence have broken down many of the barriers which formerly enabled nations to lead separate lives, and have made them in those things which constitute the agencies of well-being and of progressive civilization in a very high degree dependent upon each other. And this development of common life-interests and mutual furtherance, mental as well as material, still goes on in continuous growth. Thus a war between civilized nations means *now* a rupture of arteries of common life-blood, a stoppage of the agencies of common well-being and advancement, a waste of energies serviceable to common interests—in one word, a general disaster, infinitely more serious than it did in times gone by; and it is, consequently, now an infinitely more heinous crime against humanity, unless not only the ends it is to serve fully justify the sacrifices it entails, but unless

also all expedients suggested by the genius of peace have been exhausted to avert the armed conflict.

Of those pacific expedients, when ordinary diplomatic negotiation does not avail, arbitration has proved itself most effective. And it is the object of the movement in which we are engaged to make the resort to arbitration, in case of international difficulty, still more easy, more regular, more normal, more habitual, and thereby to render the resort to war more unnatural and more difficult than heretofore.

In this movement the Republic of the United States is the natural leader, and I can conceive for it no nobler or more beneficent mission. The naturalness of this leadership is owing to its peculiar position among the nations of the earth. Look at the powers of the Old World, how each of them is uneasily watching the other; how conflicting interests or ambitions are constantly exciting new anxieties; how they are all armed to the teeth and nervously increase their armaments, lest a hostile neighbor overmatch them; how they are piling expense upon expense and tax upon tax to augment their instruments of destruction; how, as has been said, every workingman

toiling for his daily bread has to carry a full-armed soldier or sailor on his back ; and how, in spite of those bristling armaments, their sleep is unceasingly troubled by dreams of interests threatened, of marches stolen upon them, of combinations hatched against them, and of the danger of some accident breaking the precarious peace and setting those gigantic and exhausting preparations in motion for the work of ravage and ruin.

And then look at this Republic, stronger than any nation in Europe in the number, intelligence, vigor, and patriotism of its people, and in the unparalleled abundance of its barely broached resources ; resting with full security in its magnificent domain ; standing safely aloof from the feuds of the Old World ; substantially unassailable in its great continental stronghold ; no dangerous neighbors threatening its borders ; no outlying and exposed possessions to make it anxious ; the only great power in the world seeing no need of keeping up vast standing armaments on land or sea to maintain its peace or to protect its integrity ; its free institutions making its people the sole master of its destinies ; and its best political traditions pointing to a general policy of peace

and good-will among men. What nation is there better fitted to be the champion of this cause of peace and good-will than this, so strong although unarmed, and so entirely exempt from any imputation of the motive of fear or of selfish advantage? Truly, this Republic, with its power and its opportunities, is the pet of destiny.

As an American citizen, I cannot contemplate this noble peace mission of my country without a thrill of pride. And, I must confess, it touches me like an attack upon the dignity of this Republic when I hear Americans repudiate that peace mission upon the ground of supposed interests of the United States requiring for their protection or furtherance preparation for warlike action and the incitement of a fighting spirit among our people. To judge from the utterances of some men having the public ear, we are constantly threatened by the evil designs of rival or secretly hostile powers that are eagerly watching every chance to humiliate our self-esteem, to insult our flag, to balk our policies, to harass our commerce, and even to threaten our very independence, and putting us in imminent danger of discomfiture of all sorts, unless we stand with sword in

hand in sleepless watch and cover the seas with warships and picket the islands of every ocean with garrisoned outposts, and surround ourselves far and near with impregnable fortresses. What a poor idea those indulging in such talk have of the true position of their country among the nations of the world !

A little calm reflection will convince every unprejudiced mind that there is not a single power, nor even an imaginable combination of powers, on the face of the globe that can wish—I might almost say that can afford—a serious quarrel with the United States. There are very simple reasons for this. A war in our days is not a mere matter of military skill, nor even—as it would certainly not be in our case—a mere matter of preparation for the first onset. It is a matter of material resources, of reserves, of staying power. Now, considering that in all these respects our means are substantially inexhaustible, and that the patriotic spirit and the extraordinary ingenuity of our people would greatly aid their development in the progress of a conflict ; considering that, however grievous the injuries a strong hostile navy might inflict upon us at the beginning of a war, it could not touch a vital

point, as on land we would be immensely superior to any army that could be brought upon our shores ; considering that thus a war with the United States, as a test of endurance, would, so far as our staying power is concerned, be a war of indefinite duration ; considering all these things, I am justified in saying that no European power can engage in such a conflict with us without presenting to its rivals in the Old World the most tempting opportunity for hostile action. And no European power will do this, unless forced by extreme necessity. For the same reason no European power will, even if it were so inclined, insist upon doing anything injurious to our interests that might lead to a war with the United States. We may therefore depend upon it with absolute assurance that, whether we are armed or not, no European power will seek a quarrel with us ; that, on the contrary, they will avoid such a quarrel with the utmost care ; that we cannot have a war with any of them, unless we wantonly and persistently seek such a war ; and that they will respect our rights and comply with all our demands, if just and proper, in the way of friendly agreement.

If anybody doubts this, let him look at a

recent occurrence. The alarmists about the hostility to us of foreign powers usually have Great Britain in their minds. I am very sure President Cleveland, when he wrote his Venezuela message, did not mean to provoke a war with Great Britain. But the language of that message might have been construed as such a provocation by anybody inclined to do so. Had Great Britain wished a quarrel with us, here was a tempting opportunity. Everybody knew that we had but a small navy, an insignificant standing army, and no coast defences; that in fact we were entirely unprepared for a conflict. The public opinion of Europe, too, was against us. What did the British Government do? It did not avail itself of that opportunity. It did not resent the language of the message.

On the contrary, the Queen's speech from the throne gracefully turned that message into an "expression of willingness" on the part of the United States to co-operate with Great Britain in the adjustment of the Venezuela boundary dispute.

It has been said that the conciliatory mildness of this turn was owing to the impression produced in England by the German Em-

peror's congratulatory dispatch to the President of the South African Republic. If the two things were so connected, it would prove what I have said, that even the strongest European government will be deterred from a quarrel with the United States by the opportunities which such a quarrel would open to its rivals. If the two things were not so connected it would prove that even the strongest European power will go to very great lengths in the way of conciliation to remain on friendly terms with this Republic.

In the face of these indisputable facts we hear the hysterical cries of the alarmists who scent behind every rock or bush a foreign foe standing with dagger in hand ready to spring upon us, and to rob us of our valuables, if not to kill us outright—or at least making faces at us and insulting the Stars and Stripes. Is not this constant and eager looking for danger or insult where neither exists, very like that melancholy form of insanity called persecution mania, which is so extremely distressing to the sufferers and their friends? We may heartily commiserate the unfortunate victims of so dreadful an affliction; but surely the American people should not take such morbid hallucina-

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tions as a reason for giving up that inestimable blessing of not being burdened with large armaments, and for embarking upon a policy of warlike preparation and bellicose bluster.

It is a little less absurd in sound, but not in sense, when people say that instead of trusting in our position as the great peace power we must at least have plenty of warships to "show our flag" everywhere, and to impress foreign nations with our strength to the end of protecting and developing our maritime commerce. Granting that we should have a sufficient naval force to do our share of police work on the seas, would a large armament be required on account of our maritime trade? Let us see. Fifty years ago, as the official statistics of "the value of foreign trade carried in American and in foreign vessels" show, nearly 82 per cent. of that trade was carried on in American vessels. Between 1847 and 1861, that percentage fell to 65. Then the civil war came, at the close of which American bottoms carried only 28 per cent. of that trade; and now we carry less than 12 per cent. During the period when this maritime trade rose to its highest development, we had no naval force to be in any degree compared with those of the great

European powers. Nor did we need any for the protection of our maritime commerce, for no foreign power molested that commerce. In fact, since the war of 1812, it has not been molested by anybody so as to require armed protection except during the civil war by Confederate cruisers. The harassment ceased again when the civil war ended, but our merchant shipping on the high seas continued to decline.

That decline was evidently not owing to the superiority of other nations in naval armament. It was coincident with the development of ocean transportation by iron steamships instead of wooden sailing ships. The wooden sailing ships we had in plenty, but of iron steamships we have only few. It appears, therefore, that whatever we may need a large war fleet for, it is certainly not for the development of our maritime commerce. To raise that commerce to its old superiority again, we want *not more warships but more merchant vessels*. To obtain these we need a policy enabling American capital and enterprise to compete in that business with foreign nations. And to make such a policy fruitful, we need, above all things, peace. And we shall have that peace so long

as we abstain from driving some foreign power against its own inclination into a war with the United States.

Can there be any motive, other than the absurd ones mentioned, to induce us to provoke such a war? I have heard it said that a war might be desirable to enliven business again. Would that not be as wise and moral as a proposition to burn down our cities for the purpose of giving the masons and carpenters something to do? Nay, we are even told that there are persons who would have a foreign war on any pretext, no matter with whom, to the end of bringing on a certain change in our monetary policy. But the thought of plotting in cold blood to break the peace of the country and to send thousands of our youths to slaughter and to desolate thousands of American homes for an object of internal policy, whatever it may be, is so abominable, so ghastly, so appalling, that I dismiss it as impossible of belief.

I know, however, from personal experience, of some otherwise honorable and sensible men who wish for a war on sentimental—aye, on high moral grounds. One of them, whom I much esteem, confessed to me that he longed

for a war, if not with England, then with Spain or some other power, as he said, "to lift the American people out of their materialism, and to awaken once more that heroic spirit which moved young Cushing to risk his life in blowing up the Confederate steamer *Albemarle*." This, when I heard it, fairly took my breath away. And yet, we must admit, such fanciful confusion of ideas is not without charm to some of our high-spirited young men. But what a mocking delusion it is! To lift a people out of materialism by war! Has not war always excited the spirit of reckless and unscrupulous speculation, not only while it was going on, but also afterwards, by the economic disorders accompanying and outlasting it? Has it not always stimulated the rapid and often dishonest accumulation of riches on one side, while spreading and intensifying want and misery on the other? Has it not thus always had a tendency to plunge a people still deeper into materialism? Has not every great war left a dark streak of demoralization behind? Has it not thus always proved dangerous to the purity of republican governments? Is not this our own experience? And as to awakening the heroic spirit—does it not, while stirring

noble impulses in some, excite the base passions in others? And do not the young Cushings among us find opportunities for heroism in the life of peace too? Would it be wise in the economy of the universe to bring on a war, with its bloodshed and devastation, its distress and mourning, merely for the purpose of accommodating our young braves with chances for blowing up ships? The old Roman poet tells us that it is sweet and glorious to die for one's country. It is noble, indeed. But to die on the battle-field is not the highest achievement of heroism. To live for a good cause honestly, earnestly, unselfishly, laboriously, is at least as noble and heroic as to die for it, and usually far more difficult.

I have seen war; I have seen it with its glories and its horrors; with its noble emotions and its bestialities; with its exaltations and triumphs and its unspeakable miseries and baneful corruptions; and I say to you, I feel my blood tingle with indignation when I hear the flippant talk of war as if it were only a holiday pastime or an athletic sport. We are often told that there are things worse than war. Yes, but not many. He deserves the curse of mankind who in the exercise of power forgets

that war should be only the very last resort even in contending for a just and beneficent end, after all the resources of peaceful methods are thoroughly exhausted. As an American, proud of his country and anxious that this Republic should prove itself equal to the most glorious of its opportunities, I cannot but denounce as a wretched fatuity that so-called patriotism which will not remember that we are the envy of the whole world for the priceless privilege of being exempt from the oppressive burden of warlike preparations; which, when it sees other nations groaning under that load, tauntingly asks, "Why do you not disarm?" and then insists that the American people too shall put the incubus of heavy armament on their backs; and which would drag this Republic down from its high degree of the championship of peace among nations and degrade it to the vulgar level of the bully ready and eager for a fight.

We hear much of the necessity of an elaborate system of coast fortifications to protect our seaports from assault. How far such a system may be desirable I will not here discuss. But I am confident our strongest, most effective, most trustworthy, and infinitely the cheapest

coast defence will consist in "Fort Justice," "Fort Good Sense," "Fort Self-respect," "Fort Good-will," and if international differences really do arise, "Fort Arbitration."

Let no one accuse me of resorting to the clap-trap of the stump speech in discussing this grave subject. I mean exactly what I say, and am solemnly in earnest. This Republic can have no other armament as effective as the weapons of peace. Its security, its influence, its happiness, and its glory will be the greater the less it thinks of war. Its moral authority will be far more potent than the heavy squadrons and the big guns of others. And this authority will, in its intercourse with foreign nations, be best maintained by that justice which is the duty of all ; by that generous regard not only for the rights, but also the self-respect, of others, which is the distinguishing mark of the true gentleman : and by that patient forbearance which is the most gracious virtue of the strong.

For all these reasons it appears to me this Republic is the natural champion of the great peace measure, for the furtherance of which we are met. The permanent establishment of a general court of arbitration to be composed

of representative jurists of the principal states, and to take cognizance of all international disputes that cannot be settled by ordinary diplomatic negotiation, is no doubt the ideal to be aimed at. If this cannot be reached at once, the conclusion of an arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain may be regarded as a great step in that direction.

I say this not as a so-called Anglo-maniac bowing down before everything English. While I admire the magnificent qualities and achievements of that great nation, I am not blind to its faults. I suppose Englishmen candidly expressing their sentiments speak in a similar strain of us. But I believe that an arbitration agreement between just these two countries would not only be of immense importance to themselves, but also serve as an example to invite imitation in wider circles. In this respect I do not think that the so-called blood-relationship of the two nations, which would make such an arbitration agreement between them appear more natural, furnishes the strongest reason for it. It is indeed true that the ties binding the two peoples sentimentally together would give to a war between them an especially wicked and heinous aspect. But

were their arbitration agreement placed mainly on this ground, it would lose much of its important significance for the world at large.

In truth, however, the common ancestry, the common origin of institutions and laws, the common traditions, the common literature, and so on, have not prevented conflicts between the Americans and the English before, and they would not alone be sufficient to prevent them in the future. Such conflicts may, indeed, be regarded as family feuds; but family feuds are apt to be the bitterest of all. In point of fact, there is by no means such a community or accord of interest or feeling between the two nations as to preclude hot rivalries and jealousies on many fields, which might now and then bring forth an exciting clash. We hear it even said in this country that Great Britain is not the power with whom to have a permanent peace arrangement, because she is so high-handed in her dealings with other nations. I should not wonder if the same thing were said in England about the United States. This of course is not an argument against an arbitration agreement, but rather for it. Such an arrangement between nations of such temper is especially called for to prevent that temper

from running away with calm reason. Between perfect angels from heaven an arbitration treaty would be superfluous.

The institution of a regulated and permanent system of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain would therefore not be a mere sentimental cooing between loving cousins, nor a mere stage show gotten up for the amusement of the public, but a very serious contrivance intended for very serious business. It will set to mankind the example of two very great nations, the greatest rivals in the world, neither of them a mere theorist or sentimental dreamer, both intensely practical, self-willed, and hard-headed, deliberately agreeing to abstain from the barbarous ways of bygone times in adjusting the questions of conflicting interest or ambition that may arise between them, and to resort instead in all cases of difficulty to the peaceable and civilized methods suggested by the enlightenment, the moral sense, and the humane spirit of our age. If these two nations prove that this *can* be done, will not the conclusion gradually force itself upon other civilized nations that by others too it *ought* to be done, and finally that it *must* be done? This is the service to be

rendered, not only to ourselves, but to mankind.

While the practicability of international arbitration by tribunals established in each case has been triumphantly proved, there is some difference of opinion as to whether a permanent tribunal is possible, whether it can be so organized as to be fit for the adjustment of *all* disputes that might come before it, and whether there would be any power behind it to enforce its adjudications in case one party or the other refused to comply. Such doubts should not disturb our purpose. Similar doubts had to be overcome at every step of the progress from the ancient wager of battle to the present organization of courts of justice. I am sanguine enough to believe that as soon as the two governments have once resolved that a fixed system of international arbitration *shall* be established between them, the same ingenuity which has been exerted in discovering difficulties will then be exerted in removing them, and most of them will be found not to exist. The end to be reached in good faith determined upon, a workable machinery will soon be devised, be it a permanent arbitration tribunal, or the adoption of an organic rule for

the appointment of a special tribunal for each case. We may trust to experience to develop the best system.

Neither am I troubled by the objection that there are some international disputes which in their very nature cannot be submitted to arbitration, especially those involving questions of national honor. When the habit of such submission is once well established, it will doubtless be found that most of the questions now thought unfit for it, are entirely capable of composition by methods of reason and equity. And as to so-called questions of honor, it is time for modern civilization to leave behind it those mediæval notions according to which personal honor found its best protection in the duelling pistol, and national honor could be vindicated only by slaughter and devastation. Moreover, was not the great *Alabama* case, which involved points very closely akin to questions of honor, settled by international arbitration, and does not this magnificent achievement form one of the most glorious pages of the common history of America and England? Truly, the two nations that accomplished this, need not be afraid of unadjustable questions of honor in the future.

Indeed, there will be no recognized power behind a Court of Arbitration, like an international sheriff or other executionary force, to compel the acceptance of its decisions by an unwilling party. In this extreme case there would be, as the worst possible result, what there would have been without arbitration—war. But in how many of the fourscore cases of international arbitration we have witnessed in this century has such an enforcing power been needed? In not a single one. In every instance the same spirit which moved the contending parties to accept arbitration, moved them to accept the verdict. Why, then, borrow trouble where experience has shown that there is no danger of mischief? The most trustworthy compelling power will always be the sense of honor of the parties concerned and their respect for the enlightened judgment of civilized mankind which will watch the proceedings.

We may, therefore, confidently expect that a permanent system of arbitration will prove as feasible as it is desirable. Nor is there any reason to doubt that its general purpose is intelligently and warmly favored by the best public sentiment both in England and in the

United States. The memorial of two hundred and thirty-three members of the British House of Commons, which, in 1887, was presented to the President and the Congress of the United States, expressing the wish that all future differences between the two countries be submitted to arbitration, was, in 1890, echoed by a unanimous vote of our Congress requesting the President to open negotiations in this sense with all countries with which we had diplomatic relations. Again this sentiment broke forth in England as well as here on the occasion of the Venezuela excitement in demonstrations of the highest respectability. Indeed, the popular desire as well as the argument seem to be all on one side. I have heard of only one objection that makes the slightest pretence to statesmanship, and it need only be stated to cover its supporters with confusion. It is that we are a young and aspiring people, and that a binding arbitration treaty would hamper us in our freedom of action.

Let the light be turned upon this. What is it that an arbitration treaty contemplates? That in all cases of dispute between this and a certain other country there shall be an impartial tribunal regularly appointed to decide

upon principles of international law, of equity, of reason, what this and what the other country may be justly entitled to. And this arrangement is to be shunned as hampering our freedom of action !

What will you think of a man who tells you that he feels himself intolerably hampered in his freedom of action by the ten commandments or by the criminal code ? What respect and confidence can a nation claim for its character that rejects a trustworthy and well-regulated method of ascertaining and establishing right and justice, avowedly to preserve its freedom of action ? Shame upon those who would have this great Republic play so disreputable a part ! I protest that the American people are an honorable people. Wherever its interests or ambitions may lead this great nation, I am sure it will always preserve that self-respect which will prompt it rather to court the search-light of truth and justice than by skulking on dark and devious paths seek to evade it.

Therefore, I doubt not that the patriotic citizens assembled here to promote the establishment of a permanent system of international arbitration may be confident of having the

warm sympathy of the American people behind them when they knock at the door of the President of the United States and say to him: "In the name of all good Americans we commend this cause to your care. If carried to a successful issue it will hold up this Republic to its noblest ideals. It will illuminate with fresh lustre the close of this great century. It will write the name of the American people foremost upon the roll of the champions of the world's peace and of true civilization."

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