

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

MEMORANDUM

8 April 1947

TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: G. S. Woolworth
SUBJECT: Affidavit of WACHI, Takaji, Witness for Defense

Paragraph 8 of Defense Document No. 869 states that HASHIMOTO, Kingoro had never met ITAGAKI, DOHIHARA, or ISHIHARA, Kanji. At page 48 of Serial 343-6, interrogation of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro dated 22 January 1946, copy of which is attached hereto, it is shown that HASHIMOTO knew ISHIHARA, Kanji and had known him since his military academy days.

In paragraph 8 of Defense Document No. 869, it is further stated by WACHI: "Also there was no occasion at which liaison was established with these people by means of telephone, telegram, or by any other means." This statement is clearly beyond the testimonial knowledge of the witness.

My recollection is that the interrogations of OKAWA, Shumei should further discredit the testimony of WACHI concerning the October Incident and the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

TANAKA, Ryukichi, when questioned by me concerning WACHI, Takaji, stated that he had the reputation of being the most monumental liar in the army, dating from his military academy days.

See also interrogation of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro dated 12 February 1946, inviting attention to the marked paragraphs. (p. 5 & 6)
Also see marked paragraphs of Prosecution Exhibit 2188, attached.

G. S. WOOLWORTH

Attachment

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

against

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent; WACHI, Takeji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

AFFIDAVIT

1. I was Lieutenant General at the time when the war ended.
2. I assumed the post of battalion commander of the 63rd Infantry Regiment at the city of Matsue in August, 1929 (the 4th Year of Showa), became a member of the Staff Office in April, 1931.
3. Colonel HASHIMOTO Kingoro is my senior and is also an intimate friend of mine.
4. After I became a member of the General Staff Office, I occasionally attended meetings held by the society called Sakura-kai (the Cherry-Blossoms Society).
5. Sakura-kai was a discussion meeting concerning the reformation of domestic affairs. Consequently, there was no occasion at which the problems dealing with Manchuria and other countries were studied.
6. Sakura-kai was a gathering of young officers below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and there were no rules as to the regulations or the

membership fees of the society. Also, it was not a secret society.

7. Sakura-kai had no connection whatever with the Manchurian Incident. Neither was there any connection with the Kwantung Army. No one connected with the Kwantung Army enjoyed its membership.

8. Colonel HASHIMOTO Kingoro had never met ITAGI Seishiro, DOIHARA Kenji, ISHIHARA Kanji, etc. of the Kwantung Army at about the time where the Manchurian Incident broke out. Also there was no occasion at which the liaison was established with these people by means of telephone, telegram or by any other means.

9. During that period, I and HASHIMOTO Kingoro were on very intimate terms in both official and private affairs so that I know about these matters very well.

10. I was reprimanded along with HASHIMOTO Kingoro and others on the charge of the October Incident. HASHIMOTO was subjected to heavy disciplinary confinement for 25 days and relegated to the Himeji regiment.

11. The aim of the October Incident was to remove corrupt politicians from the political parties and to recommend Lieutenant General ARAKI, a man of unimpeachable character, to head a new government. However, HASHIMOTO revealed this plan to Lieutenant General ARAKI, Lieutenant General, ARAKI told it to Minister of War MINAMI, and that night Minister of War MINAMI ordered the military police to arrest us so that the further development of the Incident was checked there. Consequently, the concrete and practical method of its execution had not as yet been considered.

See p. 48
Case 343-6

12. Mr. ŌKAWA Shumei had no connection with the October Incident.
For fear that the information might leak out through civilians it was decided not to include any civilians at all in this plan.
HASHIMOTO Kingoro said that the failure of the March Incident was due to the fact that they had included civilians and therefore it was deemed proper not to have any civilians this time.
13. HASHIMOTO Kingoro said that the March Incident was a move which attempted to form a new cabinet under the leadership of General UGAKI Issei and to remove corrupt politicians from the political parties, but it was suspended at the stage of a mere plan.
However, I am not acquainted with its details.
14. The motive of the October Incident was based on the fact that both of the political parties, Seiyukai and Minseito, were absorbed in party interests as well as self-interests and never thought of the hardships of the people. For these reasons, it was a move to exclude Premier WAKATSUKI Reijiro who was a typical example of the corrupt party politicians, and there was no connection whatever with the Manchurian Incident.
15. Captain CHO Isamu was one of my intimate friends. Captain CHO was dispatched to Peking as a study committee at the beginning of August, 1931 (the 6th Year of Showa), and returned to Tokyo at the early part of October of the same year after the Manchurian Incident started. Therefore, he had no connection whatever with the Manchurian Incident at its outbreak.
16. Major General TANAKA Ryukichi had no connection with the Sakura-kai he is a junior of HASHIMOTO Kingoro but HASHIMOTO is not his close friend.

Def Doc No. 060

On this 21st day of March, 1947

At Sugamo Prison

DEPONENT /S/ WACHI, Takazo (seal)

We, HAYASHI, Itsuro KANASE, Kunji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of these witnesses.

On the same date

At Sugamo Prison

Witnesses : /S/ HAYASHI, Itsuro
KANASE, Kunji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ WACHI, Takaji (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Teruo Otsuki, the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Teruo Otsuki

Tokyo, Japan
Date 2 April 1947

WACHI, Takaji

Request by: HASHIMOTO, Kingoro

Address: In Sugamo Prison

He was a Lt. General in the Japanese Army and a member of "Sakura-Kai" or the "Cherry Blossom Society." The witness participated in the October Incident and is thoroughly familiar with the March Incident.

Facts expected to be proved by this witness are that

1. The purpose and activities of "Sakura-Kai", of which defendant was a member, were merely internal reform of the Nation.
2. The purpose of the Oct. and March Incidents were the internal reform of the Japanese Army and other relevant matters.

The testimony of the witness is considered necessary in regard to Counts Nos. 1, 2, 18 and 19, and Appendices A (Sections 1 and 2) and E of the Indictment.

R. H. Larsh

WACHI Takaji

Was arrested by the Military Police on 17 October 1931,
along with the ringleaders of the 5-15 plot. —

SOURCE: "The Brocade Banner"

4 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner

FROM: Lester C. Dunigan

In connection with WACHI, you may want to look at pages 2,188 - 2,192 inclusive of the Record. Exhibit #183, introduced at page 2,188, contains excerpts from a secret record of Japanese renovation movements, August 1938, written for the Section for the Maintenance of Public Peace of the Bureau of Police Affairs of the Home Ministry. It does not add much to what you already have, but does definitely connect HASHIMOTO and Captain CHO with the SAKURA KAI; and since it states that the SAKURA KAI had great influence on the March and October Incidents it, to some extent, connects Captain CHO with the Manchurian Incident. You will recall that WACHI in his affidavit states that CHO had no connection with the Manchurian Incident at its beginning.

Resume by: Lester C. Dunigan

Date: 8 April 1947

WACHI, Takaji

The application for this witness states that he will be able to testify to the true nature and aims of "SAKURA-KAI" and also the facts concerning the March and October Incidents.

Major posts held by WACHI

(See curriculum vitae attached hereto.)

Decorations received

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Class of Decoration</u> | <u>Achievement</u> | <u>Recommending Ministry</u> |
|---------------|--|---------------------|------------------------------|
| 29 April 1934 | Intermediate Gordon of the Order of the Rising Sun | Manchurian Incident | War Ministry |
| 29 April 1940 | Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class | China Incident | War Ministry |
| 29 April 1940 | Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class | China Incident | War Ministry |

File #352, Serial #3, states that WACHI was former Chief of Staff of the 14th Area Army -- was one of the most famous of the general officers in the Philippine Islands. Said to be a favorite of General TOJO.

Alleged to be one of the original members of the General Staff officers of the SAKURA-KAI -- said to be one of the instigators of the March and October Incidents of 1931.

Re SAKURA-KAI

Attached hereto is a report relating to the SAKURA-KAI (Cherry Blossom Society). Attachment is marked "A". The report discusses the organization and purpose of the SAKURA-KAI and lists some of the organizers and leaders thereof.

The following is taken from a report (The Brocade Banner). The report is a story of Japanese nationalism. It was prepared by G-2, Military Intelligence, and is based to some extent upon official court records (concerning 5-15 Incident) and partly from interviews with various persons and unofficial memoranda prepared by various persons.

WACHI, Takaji - continued

Attention is specifically directed to pages 18-37 inclusive of the report (it is suggested that if possible the person cross-examining the witness read the pages mentioned in order to obtain information on the background of the SAKURA-KAI.) The following references to page numbers and subject matter may be helpful.

- Page 19 The diary of Prince SAIONJI states that there was an inner group in the Army interested in politics and foreign affairs; states that the SAKURA-KAI, formed about 1927, was a secret organization which constituted the main force of the plot to seize Manchuria.
- P 21 The report states that the most notorious of the military cliques was the SAKURA-KAI.
- P 21 An unofficial memorandum written in 1932 by Major TANAKA, Kiyoshi, states that the SAKURA-KAI was formed by younger officers of the War Ministry and the General Staff. The originators were Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Lt. Colonel SAKATA, Toshiro of the War Ministry, Lt. Colonel HIGUCHI, Kiichiro of the Defense Headquarters. TANAKA states that he was invited to draw up the regulations and aims of the society. (NOTE: Attention is directed to paragraph 6 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states that there were no rules as to the regulations of the society and that it was not a secret society.)
- P 21 Sets forth the objectives of the club as related by TANAKA, Kiyoshi, in his memorandum.
- P 22 TANAKA says that after his transfer to the War Ministry in August 1928 he joined a study group lead by Major SUZUKI. He then goes on to state that the SAKURA-KAI was formed. (NOTE: Paragraph 5 of WACHI's affidavit states that the SAKURA-KAI was a "discussion meeting." The reference to page 22, above mentioned, leaves a possible inference that the study group formed the basis of, or was merged into, the SAKURA-KAI.)
- P 22 The influence of the SAKURA-KAI induced the Vice Chief of the General Staff to make use of it in the March Incident.
- P 23 TANAKA refers to the SAKURA-KAI and the March Incident stating that he, Lt. Colonel NEMOTO, Hiroshi, Colonel SAKATA, Yoshiro, Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Capt. OHO, Isamu, Capt. TANAKA, Tsutomu, were members of a committee to formulate a plan for the March Incident.
- P 28-29 TANAKA, Kiyoshi, discusses plans for the March Incident.

WACHI, Takaji - continued

- P 31 TANAKA discusses OKAWA and his connection with SAKURA-KAI.
- P 33 TANAKA discusses SAKURA-KAI and its relation to other conspiracies after failure of March Incident.
- P 34 TANAKA discusses part played by GHO, Isamu. (NOTE: This should be considered in connection with paragraph 15 of WACHI's affidavit.)

WACHI, Takaji

Excerpts from the Record

- R 2,012 Referring to conversations with General TATEKAWA, TANAKA said that TATEKAWA told him the Manchurian Incident was planned in advance and that ITAGAKI and ISHIBARA had strongly supported HASHIMOTO and Captain CHO. This might tend to refute paragraph 8 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states that HASHIMOTO had never met ITAGAKI prior to the Manchurian Incident.
- R 2,015 Referring to conversations with Captain CHO in June 1932, TANAKA said that CHO told him the Manchurian Incident had been planned beforehand and that ITAGAKI and other of the Kwantung Army were leading figures. In this connection, reference should again be made to R 2,012 where TANAKA said that TATEKAWA told him that the leaders of the Manchurian Incident in Japan were the SAKURAI KAI under the leadership of HASHIMOTO and CHO. This might tend to refute paragraph 15 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states that CHO had no connection whatever with the Manchurian Incident at its outbreak.
- R 1,980 TANAKA testifies with respect to a conversation with OKAWA in November 1934 after the latter's release from prison because of his involvement in the May 15 Incident, and on R 1,981 TANAKA said OKAWA told him that Colonel HASHIMOTO, Major CHO, and OKAWA planned to carry out the OCTOBER Incident. (NOTE: This will refute paragraph 12 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident.)
- R 1,975 TANAKA testifies to a conversation he had with HASHIMOTO and on R 1,978 TANAKA said HASHIMOTO told him that it was the plan of the SAKURA-KAI and its members and among civilians in collaboration with OKAWA's group to bring about a coup d'etat in Tokyo with which to destroy the government then in power and to rally the support of the entire population toward the settlement of the Manchurian Incident. This, TANAKA said, was the October Incident of 1931. (NOTE: This likewise refutes WACHI's statement that OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident, and together with R 1,981 tends to refute his statement that CHO had no connection with the Manchurian Incident.)
- R 1,978 The above excerpt would tend also to refute paragraph 14 of WACHI's affidavit.

WACHI, Takaji

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Class of Decoration</u> | <u>Achievement</u> | <u>Recommending Ministry</u> |
|-----------------|--|------------------------|------------------------------|
| 29 Apr. 1934 | Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Ris- ing Sun | Manchurian Incident | War Ministry |
| 29 Apr. 1940 | Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class | China In- cident | " |
| 29 Apr. 1940 | Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class | " | " |

WACHI, Takaji

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Confined in Sugamo Prison, but at present believed to have been taken to the Philippines as a witness in War Crimes Trials.

This witness able to testify to the true nature and aims of "Sakura-Kai" and also the facts concerning the March and October Incidents.

(March 10, 1947)

(DEFENSE - Division I, General - MURATA, Direct)

Page

(The witness, YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi, was absent at the opening of the session on March 10th and his further cross-examination and re-direct examination did not take place until after other evidence was introduced.)

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MURATA, Shozo
by Mr. Roberts

18,009

The witness stated that he lived in Tokyo and was previously president of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha Shipping Company. He has been confined in Sugamo since 1945. * He was also president of the Japan Ship Owners' Association and in July 1940 he became Communications Minister and Railway Minister in the second KONOYE Cabinet. He resigned with the third KONOYE Cabinet in 1941 and in February 1942 went to the Philippines as adviser to the War Minister. He remained there and following the granting of independence he was appointed Ambassador and remained there from October 1943 * to July 1944.

18,010

18,011

Since from the first he had no military knowledge or experience, his chief function as adviser was connected first with economics, and then politics. There was no special appointment of him as economic adviser. He was asked by TOJO to go and stay there and after he went there his conduct and action would depend on his personal judgment.

18,012

He was in the Philippines when he heard for the first time by telegraph that a conference of the Greater East Asia nations was to be convened. He discussed the matter with Mr. Laurel, having shown him the telegram, and requested his views. Laurel expressed enthusiastic approval and rejoiced. He stated this had been in his mind for some time and was consistent with his ideas and thoughts, and although he had been president for only one month, he would overcome any obstacle so as to be able personally to attend this assembly. * He expressed nothing in writing at the time of the meeting, but the witness had known Laurel for two years previous, and he knew from his words, books, and addresses that Laurel had entertained these ideas for some time past.

18,013

By provision of the constitution of the Philippines the National Assembly was created and called, and in accordance with other provisions in the constitution Laurel was

Page

18,014 elected president by that National Assembly. After Laurel returned from the conference, he immediately brought up the subject with the witness and stated he was extremely satisfied. * He said he was treated as a head of a state and Philippine independence was fully recognized and that he was overjoyed that autonomy and independence is stipulated in one of the articles of the declaration. He was not only impressed by the speeches made by the other representatives, but was extremely elated over the opportunity to have friendly relations with them, whom he regarded as fine men and leaders.

18,015 The delegates from Manchukuo * and China did not come to Manila, but all others except Prince Wanwai Thayakon of Thailand visited Manila and were welcomed by Laurel. Laurel was a great patriot and man of strong will. He revered the Philippine hero Rizal and was seriously concerned with the
18,017 development of the Philippines. * Before Laurel became president of the Philippines he was Interior Commissioner of the Executive Commission of the Philippines under Vargas. Under the Commonwealth Government of Quezon, Laurel was a justice of the Supreme Court. He was a member of the Nacionalista Party.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Comyns Carr

The witness stated that he remembered being asked questions by Mr. Sutton.

Exhibits 2351, 2352, and 2353, speeches of three of the representatives of the Greater East Asia Conference, were offered and received in evidence.

9 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunigan; Mr. Sutton
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - TOJO

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

MURATA, Shozo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialing and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Shozo MURATA: Japanese Ambassador to puppet Philippine government;
former Cabinet Minister.

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| 1878 Oct. | Born Tokyo. Son of Shozo Murata Senior. Married Tatsu, daughter of Ai Iida. |
| 1900 | Graduated Tokyo Higher Commercial School; entered Osaka Shoshen Kaisha (Osaka Mail Steamship Company). |
| 1920 | Managing Director, Osaka Shoshen Kaisha. |
| 1920 | Attended Labor Conference at Genoa, Italy as advisor to delegates representing employees. |
| 1934-40 | President, Osaka Shoshen Kaisha. Honorary Consul of Argentina at Osaka. Chairman, Board of Directors, Settsu Marine & Fire Insurance Company, Nisshin Kisen (Steamship) Company and South Seas Transport Company. Vice President, Japan-American Society and Japan- British Society in Kansai. Auditor of Sumitomo Chemical Industry Company. Advisor, Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Member House of Peers by Imperial nomination. |
| 1939 | Railways Minister in second Konoye Cabinet. |
| 1940 July-Sept. | |
| 1940 July- 1941 Oct. | Communications Minister second Konoye Cabinet. |
| 1941 July-Oct. | Railways Minister in third Konoye Cabinet. |
| 1941 Feb. | Advisor to Japanese Military Administration in Manila. |
| 1943 Sept. | Appointed Ambassador to puppet Philippine government. |

According to Japanese sources, Murata did a great deal to develop
Philippine natural resources during his year and a half of military
Administration Advisor. (102) Described as a top flight business
executive, particularly in handling steamship line. An official report
of July 1941 stated that he was formerly considered "rather pro-American".
(88)

REPORT BY: Lt. J. Curtis

28 Feb. 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

Subject: MURATA, Shozo

Case file #114 on subject contained in the files of IPS.

No further information contained in the IPS files on the above.

DEF. DOC. #1453

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAFI, Sadao, et al

(Translation)

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: WACHI, Takaji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in
my country I hereby depose as follows.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

1. I was on duty in the Philippines during the time from March 1942 to February 1945. During this period from March 1942 to April 1944 I was Chief of Staff of the 14th Area Army. The army commanders at this time were three Lieutenant Generals, HOMMA, TAIKAKA and KURODA.

Following this, I occupied the post of Vice-Chief of Staff of the Southern Army from May, 1944 to October of the same Year. Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army of the time, Marshall TERAUCHI, was staying in Manila. Finally, during the months from November 1944 to February 1945, I was Chief of Staff of the 35th Army which was under General YAMASHITA, the Commander of the 14th Area Army and took part in the battles of Leyte under the Army Commander, Lieutenant General SUZUKI.

2. I shall give an account concerning our treatment of war prisoners on Bataan.

Our attacks against the Bataan Peninsula were carried on in the spring of 1942 and it was on April 9 when the American-Philippine Forces surrendered.

We had estimated beforehand that war prisoners of the American-Philippine Forces would amount to 40,000 at the most, but in reality there were 70,000 in all. This indeed caused much difficulty on our part in accomodating the prisoners.

DEF. DOC. #1453

rest back to the rear on ambulances. The distance of march we covered a day was within the limits permitted by treaties. I witnessed this march personally and so far as I observed, there was no atrocities committed. The prisoners were sent by train from San-Fernando to O'Donell where they were placed in an internment camp. Later, 20,000 out of 70,000 died from under-nourishment and malaria. Provisions for the prisoners were, in addition to those prepared beforehand, obtained locally or sent from territories like Formosa etc. Thus we did our best in providing the prisoners with food. In the way of medicine, as there was very nearly a sufficient quantity, we gave out as much as was required.

3. Until July, 1942, treatment of prisoners of war and military administration was under the jurisdiction of the General Staff, and the Line of Communications Commander was taking care of the matter. In July, 1942 these affairs were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Minister of War, and Chief of Prisoner of War Internment Camps became appointive. From this time on, the Minister of War became the controlling officer and the Army Commander became the administrator. I know this fact from a standpoint of my duties which was assisting the Army Commander.

4. All the Philippines among the prisoners were released over a period dating from August to October 1942. Volunteers,

Judging from their bravery with which the Americans and Filipinos fought so intensely, we supposed that their physical conditions would be certainly fine. But we found most of the soldiers of the American-Philippine Forces were ill from undernourishment. As was also the case with the Japanese, there were a lot of sufferers of malaria, perhaps, because of the fact that this was a jungly zone. Although we intended and trucks which were captured by us from the enemy were out of commission and only a few were available. As for our side, vehicles were filled to capacity in transportation of arms and ammunition and other military supplies necessary for us to carry out the attack on Corregidor and subjugation campaigns in the various areas. As a result, all the Japanese soldiers, too, were obliged to march on foot. As we had many patients, especially malarial among us, fighting strength of the Japanese Forces dropped for a time to nearly one third of normal. This made it inevitable to postpone the commencement of attacks on Corregidor, which had been scheduled for around April 20 of that year, until May 5. It was on account of these conditions that we were compelled to march on foot from Balanga (TN:phonetic) as far as San-Fernando. As to those prisoners of war who claimed to be sick, we allowed some to recuperate at Bataan and sent the

DEF. DOC. #1453

among whom was Major-General Francisco, were appointed to posts in the constabulary etc. The rest were returned to their homes. The American prisoners numbering about 10,000 were removed to places Cabanatuan where richer resources were obtainable and to Mindanao island where there were more farms than in O'Donell. Some prisoners even went to Japan. Although we opened hospitals locally, the sick were sent to Manila for medical treatment as there were fully equipped hospitals there. Until September 1944, there were no air-raids made against the Islands ~~by American aircraft, so the prisoners~~ spent their days in peace as well as the inhabitants throughout the Philippines.

On this 23day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT WACHI, Takaji (seal)

KIYOSE, Ichiro
I, WACHI, Takaji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

DET. POC. #1453

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

WACHE, Mikaji (seal)

5

see Record
2188

See document also document 1659
1661 Ex 164
List of societies, R 1494
WACHI, Takaji
put in evidence 1636

Resume by: Lester C. Dunigan

Date: 8 April 1947

The application for this witness states that he will be able to testify to the true nature and aims of "SAKURA-KAI" and also the facts concerning the March and October Incidents.

Major posts held by WACHI

(See curriculum vitae attached hereto.)

Decorations received

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Class of Decoration</u> | <u>Achievement</u> | <u>Recommending Ministry</u> |
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Alleged to be one of the original members of the General Staff officers of the SAKURA-KAI -- said to be one of the instigators of the March and October Incidents of 1931.

Re SAKURA-KAI

Attached hereto is a report relating to the SAKURA-KAI (Cherry Blossom Society). Attachment is marked "A". The report discusses the organization and purpose of the SAKURA-KAI and lists some of the organizers and leaders thereof.

The following is taken from a report (The Brocade Banner). The report is a story of Japanese nationalism. It was prepared by G-2, Military Intelligence, and is based to some extent upon official court records (concerning 5-15 Incident) and partly from interviews with various persons and unofficial memoranda prepared by various persons.

WACHI, Takaji - continued

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- P 22 The influence of the SAKURA-KAI induced the Vice Chief of the General Staff to make use of it in the March Incident.
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- P 28-29 TANAKA, Kiyoshi, discusses plans for the March Incident.

WACHI, Takaji - continued

- P 31 TANAKA discusses OKAWA and his connection with SAKURA-KAI.
- P 33 TANAKA discusses SAKURA-KAI and its relation to other
conspiracies after failure of March Incident.
- P 34 TANAKA discusses part played by CHO, Isamu. (NOTE:
This should be considered in connection with paragraph
15 of WACHI's affidavit.)

WACHI, Takaji

Excerpts from the Record

- R 2,012 Referring to conversations with General TATEKAWA, TANAKA said that TATEKAWA told him the Manchurian Incident was planned in advance and that ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA had strongly supported HASHIMOTO and Captain CHO. This might tend to refute paragraph 8 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states that HASHIMOTO had never met ITAGAKI prior to the Manchurian Incident.
- R 2,015 Referring to conversations with Captain CHO in June 1932, TANAKA said that CHO told him the Manchurian Incident had been planned beforehand and that ITAGAKI and other of the Kwantung Army were leading figures. In this connection, reference should again be made to R 2,012 where TANAKA said that TATEKAWA told him that the leaders of the Manchurian Incident in Japan were the SAKURAI KAI under the leadership of HASHIMOTO and CHO. This might tend to refute paragraph 15 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states that CHO had no connection whatever with the Manchurian Incident at its outbreak.
- R 1,980 TANAKA testifies with respect to a conversation with OKAWA in November 1934 after the latter's release from prison because of his involvement in the May 15 Incident, and on R 1,981 TANAKA said OKAWA told him that Colonel HASHIMOTO, Major CHO, and OKAWA planned to carry out the OCTOBER Incident. (NOTE: This will refute paragraph 12 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident.)
- R 1,975 TANAKA testifies to a conversation he had with HASHIMOTO and on R 1,978 TANAKA said HASHIMOTO told him that it was the plan of the SAKURA-KAI and its members and among civilians in collaboration with OKAWA's group to bring about a coup d'etat in Tokyo with which to destroy the government then in power and to rally the support of the entire population toward the settlement of the Manchurian Incident. This, TANAKA said, was the October Incident of 1931. (NOTE: This likewise refutes WACHI's statement that OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident, and together with R 1,981 tends to refute his statement that CHO had no connection with the Manchurian Incident.)
- R 1,978 The above excerpt would tend also to refute paragraph 14 of WACHI's affidavit.

NOTE:

Please return report on Cherry Blossom Society, marked "A", and curriculum vitae to Mr. Dunigan, Room 375.

WACHI, Takaji

C O N T E N T S

Decorations Received -- General Information concerning
SAKURA-KAI, taken from "Brocade Banner"

Read this

Excerpts from the Record

Curriculum Vitae

Report -- SAKURA-KAI (Cherry Blossom Society)

Resume by: Lester C. Dunigan

Date: 8 April 1947

WACHI, Takaji

The application for this witness states that he will be able to testify to the true nature and aims of "SAKURA-KAI" and also the facts concerning the March and October Incidents.

Major posts held by WACHI

(See curriculum vitae attached hereto.)

Decorations received

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Class of Decoration</u> | <u>Achievement</u> | <u>Recommending Ministry</u> |
|---------------|--|---------------------|------------------------------|
| 29 April 1934 | Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun | Manchurian Incident | War Ministry |
| 29 April 1940 | Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class | China Incident | War Ministry |
| 29 April 1940 | Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class | China Incident | War Ministry |

File #352, Serial #3, states that WACHI was former Chief of Staff of the 14th Area Army -- was one of the most famous of the general officers in the Philippine Islands. Said to be a favorite of General TOJO.

Alleged to be one of the original members of the General Staff officers of the SAKURA-KAI -- said to be one of the instigators of the March and October Incidents of 1931.

Re SAKURA-KAI

Attached hereto is a report relating to the SAKURA-KAI (Cherry Blossom Society). Attachment is marked "A". The report discusses the organization and purpose of the SAKURA-KAI and lists some of the organizers and leaders thereof.

* * * * *

The following is taken from a report (The Brocade Banner). The report is a story of Japanese nationalism. It was prepared by G-2, Military Intelligence, and is based to some extent upon official court records (concerning 5-15 Incident) and partly from interviews with various persons and unofficial memoranda prepared by various persons.

WACHI, Takaji - continued

Attention is specifically directed to pages 18-37 inclusive of the report (it is suggested that if possible the person cross-examining the witness read the pages mentioned in order to obtain information on the background of the SAKURA-KAI.) The following references to page numbers and subject matter may be helpful.

- Page 19 The diary of Prince SAIONJI states that there was an inner group in the Army interested in politics and foreign affairs; states that the SAKURA-KAI, formed about 1927, was a secret organization which constituted the main force of the plot to seize Manchuria.
- P 21 The report states that the most notorious of the military cliques was the SAKURA-KAI.
- P 21 An unofficial memorandum written in 1932 by Major TANAKA, Kiyoshi, states that the SAKURA-KAI was formed by younger officers of the War Ministry and the General Staff. The originators were Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Lt. Colonel SAKATA, Toshiro of the War Ministry, Lt. Colonel HIGUCHI, Kiichiro of the Defense Headquarters. TANAKA states that he was invited to draw up the regulations and aims of the society. (NOTE: Attention is directed to paragraph 6 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states that there were no rules as to the regulations of the society and that it was not a secret society.)
- P 21 Sets forth the objectives of the club as related by TANAKA, Kiyoshi, in his memorandum.
- P 22 TANAKA says that after his transfer to the War Ministry in August 1928 he joined a study group lead by Major SUZUKI. He then goes on to state that the SAKURA-KAI was formed. (NOTE: Paragraph 5 of WACHI's affidavit states that the SAKURA-KAI was a "discussion meeting." The reference to page 22, above mentioned, leaves a possible inference that the study group formed the basis of, or was merged into, the SAKURA-KAI.)
- P 22 The influence of the SAKURA-KAI induced the Vice Chief of the General Staff to make use of it in the March Incident.
- P 23 TANAKA refers to the SAKURA-KAI and the March Incident stating that he, Lt. Colonel NEMOTO, Hiroshi, Colonel SAKATA, Yoshiro, Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Capt. CHO, Isamu, Capt. TANAKA, Tsutomu, were members of a committee to formulate a plan for the March Incident.
- P 28-29 TANAKA, Kiyoshi, discusses plans for the March Incident.

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375

WACHI, Takaji - continued

P 31 TANAKA discusses OKAWA and his connection with SAKURA-KAI.

P 33 TANAKA discusses SAKURA-KAI and its relation to other conspiracies after failure of March Incident.

P 34 TANAKA discusses part played by CHO, Isamu. (NOTE: This should be considered in connection with paragraph 15 of WACHI's affidavit.)

WACHI, Takaji

Excerpts from the Record

- R 2,012 Referring to conversations with General TATEKAWA, TANAKA said that TATEKAWA told him the Manchurian Incident was planned in advance and that ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA had strongly supported HASHIMOTO and Captain CHO. This might tend to refute paragraph 8 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states that HASHIMOTO had never met ITAGAKI prior to the Manchurian Incident.
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- R 1,980 TANAKA testifies with respect to a conversation with OKAWA in November 1934 after the latter's release from prison because of his involvement in the May 15 Incident, and on R 1,981 TANAKA said OKAWA told him that Colonel HASHIMOTO, Major CHO, and OKAWA planned to carry out the OCTOBER Incident. (NOTE: This will refute paragraph 12 of WACHI's affidavit wherein he states OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident.)
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- R 1,978 The above excerpt would tend also to refute paragraph 14 of WACHI's affidavit.

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERMANENT RESIDENCE
AND STATUS: HIROSHIMA Prefecture, Warrior Class.

DATE OF BIRTH: 11 February 1893

FULL NAME: WACHI, Takaji

| | | |
|-------------|---|------------------|
| 30 May 1912 | Graduated from the regular course of the Central Military Preparatory School. | |
| 31 May 1912 | Appointed cadet and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Regiment, War Ministry | War Min. |
| 5 Jun 1912 | Enlisted in the 3rd Infantry Regiment. | |
| Same date | Given rank of Superior Private, Infantry. | The 3rd Inf. Reg |
| 1 Aug 1912 | Promoted to rank of Corporal, Infantry. | Same |
| 5 Sep 1912 | Promoted to rank of Sergeant, Infantry. | Same |
| 1 Dec 1912 | Entered the Military Academy. | |
| 28 May 1914 | Graduated from the Military Academy. | |
| Same date | Rejoined his former regiment. | |
| Same date | Promoted to the rank of Sergeant-Major, and appointed a probationary officer | 3rd Inf Reg. |
| 25 Nov 1914 | Passed by the Officer Selection Board in accordance with Art. 12 of the Army Replacement Regulations. | |
| 25 Dec 1914 | Commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry, assigned to the 3rd Infantry Regiment. | Cabinet War Min |
| 1 Mar 1915 | Conferred with the Senior Grade of the 8th Court Rank. | |
| 29 Jul 1918 | Promoted to 1st Lieutenant, Infantry. | Cabinet |
| 30 Sep 1918 | Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank. | |
| 10 Dec 1919 | Ordered to enter the Army Staff College. | |

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERMANENT RESIDENCE
AND STATUS: HIROSHIMA Prefecture, Warrior Class.

DATE OF BIRTH: 11 February 1893

FULL NAME: WACHI, Takaji

| | | |
|-------------|---|-------------------|
| 30 May 1912 | Graduated from the regular course of the Central Military Preparatory School. | |
| 31 May 1912 | Appointed cadet and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Regiment, War Ministry | War Min. |
| 5 Jun 1912 | Enlisted in the 3rd Infantry Regiment. | |
| Same date | Given rank of Superior Private, Infantry. | The 3rd Inf. Reg. |
| 1 Aug 1912 | Promoted to rank of Corporal, Infantry. | Same |
| 5 Sep 1912 | Promoted to rank of Sergeant, Infantry. | Same |
| 1 Dec 1912 | Entered the Military Academy. | |
| 28 May 1914 | Graduated from the Military Academy. | |
| Same date | Rejoined his former regiment. | |
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| 25 Nov 1914 | Passed by the Officer Selection Board in accordance with Art. 12 of the Army Replacement Regulations. | |
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| 29 Jul 1918 | Promoted to 1st Lieutenant, Infantry. | Cabinet |
| 30 Sep 1918 | Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank. | |
| 10 Dec 1919 | Ordered to enter the Army Staff College. | |

| | | |
|-------------|---|----------------------|
| 6 Aug 1923 | Promoted to Captain, Infantry | Cabinet |
| 6 Aug 1923 | Relieved from former duty and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Regiment | War Min |
| 19 Sep 1923 | Relieved from assignment to the 3rd Infantry Regiment and appointed a company commander of the 3rd Infantry Regiment. | War Min |
| 30 Nov 1923 | Conferred with the Senior Grade of the 7th Court Rank. | |
| 1 Dec 1923 | Ordered to serve with the Headquarters of the General Staff. | War Min |
| 29 Jan 1924 | Relieved from former duty and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Regiment. | Same |
| 12 May 1925 | Relieved from assignment to the 3rd Infantry Regiment. Made a member of the Headquarters of the General Staff. | War Min. War Min. |
| 7 Aug 1925 | Relieved from former duty and ordered to serve with the Headquarters of the General Staff. | War Min |
| 18 Jul 1927 | Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 6th Class. | |
| 26 Jul 1927 | Relieved from duty with the Headquarters of the General Staff. Made a member of the Headquarters of the General Staff. | War Min War Min |
| 28 Dec 1928 | Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 6th Court Rank. | |
| 16 Mar 1928 | Promoted to Major, Infantry. | War Min |
| 1 Aug 1929 | Appointed a battalion commander of the 63rd Infantry Regiment. | Same |
| 5 Sep 1929 | Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Dual-Rays of the Rising Sun 560 for service in the China Incident. | |
| 11 Mar 1931 | Made a member of the Headquarters of the General Staff and concurrently Military Instructor in the Army Staff College. | Same |
| 28 Nov 1931 | Appointed a staff officer of the Kwantung Army. | Same |
| 8 Aug 1932 | Ordered to duty with the Headquarters of the General Staff. | War Min |

| | | |
|--------------|---|------------------|
| 1 Sep 1933 | Conferred with the Senior Grade of the 6th Court Rank. | |
| 1 Aug 1933 | Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry. | Cab. |
| 7 Feb 1934 | Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th Class. | |
| 10 Dec 1934 | Made a member of the Headquarters of the General Staff, and concurrently, | |
| 17 Jan 1935 | Military Instructor in the Army Staff College. | War Min |
| 29 Apr 1934 | Decorated with the Medium Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for services in the 1931-34 Incident. | |
| 2 Dec 1935 | Assigned to the Headquarters of the China Garrison. | Same |
| 2 Aug 1937 | Promoted to Colonel, Infantry. Relieved from appointment as Staff Officer of the China Garrison and appointed Commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment. | Cab. War Min. |
| 1 Sep 1937 | Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 5th Court Rank. | |
| 1 Mar 1938 | Assigned to the Headquarters of the Formosan Army | War Min. |
| 9 Mar 1940 | Promoted to Major-General | Cab. |
| 1 Apr 1940 | Conferred with the Senior Grade of the 5th Court Rank. | |
| 4 Nov 1940 | Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class. | |
| 6 Oct 1941 | Appointed a member of the Central Air-Raid Defence Committee in Formosa. | Cab. |
| 12 Dec. 1941 | Appointed a member of the Central Wage Committee in Formosa. | Cab. |
| 24 Jun 1942 | Relieved from membership in the Central Wage Committee in Formosa. | Cab. |
| 10 Jun 1943 | Promoted to Lieutenant-General. | Cab. |
| 1 Jul 1943: | Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 4th Court Rank. | |

(WACHI, Takaji)

29 Apr 1940 Decorated with the Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class, and with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class, for services in the China Incident.

16 Aug 1943 Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 1st Class.

10 Aug 1945 Appointed Commander of the 164 Division.

Cab.

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Report by H. C. Norton
Special Agent, CIC

FILE NO.: 22

RE : CHERRY BLOSSOM SOCIETY

STATUS: Pending

DATE : April 22 1946

In conversation with Confidential Information this Agent obtained the following information. Groups within the military cliques were as follows:

1. Cherry Blossom Society (Sakura Kai) was motivated and stated by the September 1930's London Naval Disarmament Conference. However, it had been planned long before by the military fascists who were for reorganizing the nation and settling the Manchu-Mongolian problems by acquiring political power. (Actually the creation of a protectorate and colony in Manchuria and Mongolia was planned.)

The promoters of this organization were as follows: Artillery Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro from the General Staff Office, Infantry Lt. Colonel SAKADA from the War Ministry and Infantry Lt. Colonel HIGUCHI from Defense Headquarters. The object of this organization was to reorganize the state and if necessary use military force. Active members in service who held the rank of Lt. Colonel or below having an ardent desire for reorganizing the state are listed here:

- Lt Colonel ✓ HASHIMOTO, Kingoro
- Lt Colonel NEMOTO, Hiroshi
- Lt Colonel NAGATA
- Lt Colonel SAKATA
- Lt Colonel ✓ HIGUCHI
- OKAMURA
- ISOTANI
- ✓ ITAGAKI
- INCUB

| | | | | |
|---------|--------|----|---|-----|
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| | | 60 | | 319 |
| | | 61 | | 343 |
| | | 62 | | 383 |

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In the March Incident, namely a revolution (Coup d'Etat), the Sakura Kai acted as the mainspring and in addition to the members there were such high officers who acted as instigators and they are listed as follows:

General UGAKI, Kazushige
General MATSUI, Iwane
General KAWABE, Nobuyuki
General MINAMI, Jiro
General UMEZU
General KOISO, Kuniaki
Lt. General TATEGAWA
Vice Chief of the General Staff NINOMIYA
15th Term Graduates of the Military Officers' School

After the failure of the March Incident the Sakura Kai was divided into two groups. One group was called the legitimate controlled group (Gohoteki Tosee Ha) and the aim of which was to realize the reorganization of the state by legitimate and political measures. The other was the direct action group (Coup d'Etat Ha).

2. The legitimate control group (Gohoteki Tosee Ha) was organized by NAGATA, Tetsuzan. When NAGATA (Chief of the Military Affairs Section) was the military attache to Germany, he studied the total warfare organization by means of Ludden-dorff's general mobilization of the state. He tried to apply this principle for reorganizing the state and settling the Manchu-Mongolian problem. The military intelligence, including NAGATA, felt keenly that the direct action would only incite the ill feeling of the people and would be an unbeneficial method. The membership of this organization is as follows:

Lt. Colonel NAGATA, Tetsuzan
General ISOTANI
General ITAGAKI
General TOJO, Hideki
INOUE, Saburo

INOUE, Saburo acted as a liaison officer for keeping close connection with high personnel in the political circle, aides de camp and peers.

The object was to make Manchuria a colony of Japan by enlarging the Manchurian Incident and to make it a laboratory for trying out the total warfare organization and the establishment of a military fascist nation, at the same time to plan the gradual realization of reorganizing the state by creating and emphasizing the international crisis.

COPY

It was also organized so that they would be in a position to seize lawfully the control of the Army. It planned to deprive opponents of Sakura Kai Group and Kodo Ha Group (Imperial Way), namely General ARAKI, Sadao, General MAZAKI, OBATA, Binshiro from the central controls of the Army and to monopolize the position of the Army Minister by plotting evil conspiracies, such as spreading rumors that the Kodo Ha Group was planning a military dictatorship or propagandizing that "May 15th Affair," "Shimpei Tai Incident," "Aizaira Incident" and "February 26th Affair" were believed to be Kodo Ha's activity. Thus by applying all sorts of evil tricks it had succeeded in expelling Kodo Ha from the Central Army Circle.

It incited radical movements of the Coup d'Etat group, which was formed after the Sakura Kai's dissolution by working behind the scenes and since the May 15th Affair it assisted the continuous outbreaks of fascist terrorizing incidents. However, outwardly it pretended to be anti-fascist by taking vigorous measures on the fascists and at the same time emphasizing both the international and national crises and made every effort to incite the politicians and the people to feel the impossibility of suppressing the fascism and reorganizing the state by the hands of party cabinets or coalition cabinets composed of parties and bureaucracy. Thus it steadily accomplished the interference in politics by military people and strengthened the fascist influence in the military circles.

After the Manchurian Incident this legitimate control group had broken up due to the struggling of powers between HIGATA and TOJO group (Chuo Gumi) and ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA group (Manchu Gumi) but after the provocation of the Chinese problem and about the tie of the China Affair (July 1937) it had been formed into the China and Soviet groups.

3. The China group was composed of the following personalities:

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| In the Central War Office: | General SUGIYAMA General UMEZU General MUTO, Akira Lt General KAGESA |
| In China | : General MINAMI, Jiro General KOISO, Kuniaki General TOJO, Hideki General ITAGAKI General TANAKA, Takashi General <u>WACHI</u> |

COPY

They opposed the curtailing policy of the China Affair and stressed the importance of dominating China by overthrowing Chiang Kai-Shek's Regime.

4. The Soviet group was composed of the following members:

| | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| In the Central War Office | General TADA, Susumu |
| In Manchuria | Lt Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro |
| In Manchuria | Lt Colonel ISHIHARA, Kannai |

These members said that the war with Russia would decide the fate of Japan, therefore Japan should avoid war with China by all means and on the contrary should utilize China for a successful war with Russia.

5. The Coup d'Etat group was the 5th group and the leading members were Lt Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro and Lt Colonel NEMOTO, Hiroshi. The members of this group really took part in the "May 15th Affair" and "February 26th Affair" with the object of acquiring military autocratic government by coup d'etat (revolution) with the help of young military officers of high spirit but their objective ended in failure. They even failed in the act incited by the wise and evil conspiracy of the legitimate control group and met with stern measures finally losing their influence in the military world. However, it developed into a civilian right wing organization.

SOURCE: Confidential Informant.

PENDING.

Page

HASHIMOTO said that the March Incident was a move to form a new cabinet under UGAKI and remove corrupt politicians from political parties, but was suspended at the stage of planning. He was not acquainted with its details.

The motives of the October Incident were based on the fact that both political parties were absorbed in party interests and never thought of the people's hardships. It was a move to exclude WAKATSUKI, who was typical of the corrupt party politicians, and there was no connection with the Manchurian Incident.

19669

Captain CHO * was an intimate friend. He had been sent to Peking in August, 1931, and returned to Tokyo early in October, after the Manchurian Incident, and he had no connection with it. TANAKA, Ryukichi, had no connection with the Sakurakai. He was a junior of HASHIMOTO, but was not his close friend.

CROSS-EXAMINATION By Mr. Tavenner.

19670

* The witness stated that before he was appointed to the General Staff in 1931, he was a battalion commander at Matsue in Shimane Prefecture. His duties did not require his presence in Tokyo. When he was assigned to the general staff in 1931, he was a major and he was employed in the China Section of the Second Division. HASHIMOTO was in the European-American Affairs Section of that division.

19671

* He first met HASHIMOTO when he was attached to the general staff, from the end of 1923 to July, 1925. Between July 1925 and April 1931 he never met HASHIMOTO. He became a member of the Sakurakai in April, 1931. He was not a member at the time of the March Incident. He therefore had no knowledge of its activities with respect to the March Incident directly, but he had heard of it from HASHIMOTO. Anything which he had stated that happened prior * to the March Incident he had heard from HASHIMOTO, including the March Incident.

19672

Page

HASHIMOTO founded the Sakurakai. He had not heard HASHIMOTO tell him that he took part in plotting the March Incident. General NEMOTO was a member of the Sakurakai. He had never heard from HASHIMOTO that NEMOTO was a planner of the March Incident.

19673

* Col. TANAKA, Kiyose, was a member of the SAKURAKAI, but he did not know what part he played in the March Incident. When it was called to his attention that exhibit 183, a report of the Home Ministry, showed that the Sakurakai had great influence on the March and October Incidents, the witness stated he did not know about the March Incident, but the society had relationship to the October Incident.

19674

* With respect to his statement that OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident when he was asked whether he was familiar with the record of OKAWA's trial in 1934 in which OKAWA set forth in detail his participation in the October Incident and stated he received his orders from HASHIMOTO, the witness stated he did not know. When asked on what he based his statement that OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident, the witness stated he was then in Tokyo and was related to the Society and on intimate terms with HASHIMOTO, and could say positively that OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident. * Both

19675

HASHIMOTO and he were arrested for participation in that Incident.

19676

* When asked whether it was not a fact that there would be no civilians in the October Incident except OKAWA's group, he said that was not so. He did not know that TANAKA KIYOSE prepared a memorandum in 1932 stating that OKAWA and his group was the only one utilized in the Incident. He was not familiar with OKAWA's testimony. When asked whether he was familiar with OKAWA's propaganda activities prior to the October Incident, the witness stated that before he went to the General Staff Office he had been in Matsue, and before that

19677

* in China, and he had never heard of OKAWA carrying on propaganda speeches while he served. He had heard of the Kenryuter Inn in Tokyo.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 (April 9, 1947)
 (DEFENSE - Division II - Manchuria)
 WACHI - Cross

Page

He had no recollection of accompanying HASHIMOTO there and meeting OKAWA. He did not recall ever seeing OKAWA there. When he mentioned that HASHIMOTO had never met ITAGAKI, DOIHARA, ISHIHARA, etc., at or about the time of the Manchurian Incident, he did not mean that there were men additional included in this group, but had used a Japanese expression which was used where more than two names were listed.

19678

* When asked whether it was a fact that he did not know of his own knowledge whether HASHIMOTO had met these men prior to April, 1931, the witness stated that he was a very intimate friend of HASHIMOTO and HASHIMOTO would tell him everything. If he met them, he would tell him about it. His testimony is based * on the fact that HASHIMOTO did not tell him whether or not he had met these three.

19679

When asked whether HASHIMOTO told him about the directions he gave OKAWA, the witness stated such directions were never given, and HASHIMOTO pledged that he would never use civilians. When asked how he knew that there was no liaison with ITAGAKI, DOIHARA and ISHIHARA by means of telephone, telegram, or other means, the witness stated that at the time of the October Incident he was arrested and sent to Utsunomiya. There were two other army officers there, and they were held with him for 15 days.

19680

* These men had worked as secretaries to HASHIMOTO. One told him everything about the various subjects about the Incident and matters prior to it, and he stated that he personally had handled all telephone calls, telegrams, and letters sent by HASHIMOTO, and there was no such case as communicating with such people.

April 10, 1947

19682

* When asked why this subject had come up at such a meeting, the witness stated that they were there 15 days, * with ample time on hand, and talked

19683

of various matters from the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident until the time they were at Utsunomiya. They talked of DOIHARA, ISHIHARA, and ITAGAKI, who were well-known figures, and he asked the secretary whether these men had communicated in any way with HASHIMOTO.

Page .

The secretary replied that he was not aware of any contact, and he doubted very much whether the men were in negotiations. He stated there were no communications between HASHIMOTO and the others mentioned. It was the witness himself who had suggested there may have been some communication between HASHIMOTO and the three persons of the Kwantung Army. His question was related only to these three leaders.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Hayashi.

19684

* The witness stated that the Sakurakai as a whole had no connection with the October Incident. However, several persons arrested in connection with the Incident were members of the Sakurakai. In that sense there was relation. At the time of the October Incident, TANAKA, Kiyose, was a captain, and he had no connection with the

19685

October Incident. * He had never heard that he was connected with the March Incident. TANAKA was not an important member of the Sakurakai.

19689

Exhibit No. 2425, Independence Declaration of the new Manchu-Mongolian State, February 18, 1932, by the Administrative Committee of the Northeast, stated * that Ching-hui and others had the honor to be elected as leaders of the provinces. They hoped not to evade responsibility by transferring it to others. When they gathered together, all were unanimous that without a solid organization they would be unable to manage the whole situation, and unless they acted in accordance with the general will of the people, they could not establish their new policy. They therefore established a new organization consisting of the four provinces of the northeast, a special administrative district and other districts, and named it the Administrative Committee of the Northeast. They sent official telegrams to all authorities. These places have now established their independence completely, and separated from the National Party Government. They will endeavor to

19690

plan * administrative reforms. They remember when the war lords misruled the country and extorted the people. Even now the bandits still retain power. They must be completely ready to eradicate them.

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TAKAJI WACHI,
By Mr. Hayashi.

- 19664 * The witness stated he was 54 and lived at Sugamo. He identified exhibit No. 2424 as his affidavit. The affidavit stated * he was a lieutenant general when the war ended. He became a member of the * Staff Office in April, 1931, and Colonel HASHIMOTO was his senior and an intimate friend. After he became a member of the General Staff, he occasionally attended meetings held by the Sakurakai, which was a discussion meeting concerning the reform of domestic affairs. On no occasion were the problems dealing with Manchuria and other countries studied. The Sakurakai was composed of young officers below lieutenant colonel, had no rules or membership fees, and was not secret. It had no connection with the Manchurian Incident or the Kwantung Army, and no one in the Kwantung Army had membership.
- 19665
- 19666
- 19667 HASHIMOTO had never met ITAGAKI, DOIHARA, or ISHIHARA of the Kwantung Army * when the Manchurian Incident broke out, and there was no occasion on which there was liaison with these people by means of telephone, telegram, or otherwise. During the period he and HASHIMOTO were on intimate terms officially and privately, and he knew of these matters. He was reprimanded with HASHIMOTO on the charge of the October Incident. HASHIMOTO was subjected to heavy disciplinary confinement for 25 days.
- The October Incident aimed to remove corrupt politicians from political parties and to recommend ARAKI to head a new government. When HASHIMOTO revealed the plan to ARAKI, ARAKI told it to MINAMI, and MINAMI ordered the military police to arrest them, so further development of the Incident was checked there. The concrete and practical method of execution had not been considered.
- 19668 * OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident. Because of the fear that information might leak out through civilians, it was decided not to include any at all. HASHIMOTO had stated that the failure of the March Incident was due to the fact that it had included civilians.

Def Doc No. 1003

I M T F E

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent : WACHIE, Takaji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly a lieutenant-general in the Japanese Army and am now being confined at Sugamo prison.

2. I was at Tientsin as a senior staff-officer of the Japanese Garrison Army in China from August of 1936 to the end of July 1937. I was in charge of Intelligence.

3. Therefore, personally experiencing and understanding the state of affairs in North China before and at the time of the Lukouchiao Incident which occurred on July 7, 1937, I should like to state the following facts for reference.

4. First, I will give a few facts for information on the situation in North China prior to the Incident. Around August of 1936 when I arrived at Tientsin to take my new post, there were many unemployed soldiers of the Northeast Army (Chang Hsueh-liang's Army) infiltrating into North China. Ma Chan-shan was also in Tientsin. One day I met him at the home of Fan-fu at the English Concession. The fact that many of these unemployed soldiers had joined the Kintung Government Army was also related in the talk by GORO, Araki who was formerly the advisor of Chang Hsueh-liang in Pei-ping. "In order to attack the Communist Army in Northwest China, Chang Hsueh-liang himself and the Northeast Army were dispatched but these officers and men of the Northeast Army communicated with the Communist Army saying that their enemy was Japan and since Japan was also the enemy of the Communist Army, they should not fight each other. For that reason, the subjugation of the Communist Army did not progress. Therefore, in order to encourage the punitive forces, Chang-Kai-shek himself went to Siam Incident occurred", stated Ma Chan-shan to Hsia Menyun, my secretary.

Also, these facts stated above were confirmed by other intelligence reports which I gathered.

5. In the spring of 1937 I met Han Fu-chu at Tsinan. He told me that he received an unofficial notification from the central authority that war would break out between Japan and China in the autumn of that year, and that at that time he had to go to Tsientsin. However, he stated that if he should go to Tientsin, the base of Shantung would be captured during his absence. So, for the reason that the Japanese Army might also land at Tsing-tao, we should advance to Meihsien.

6. From about the spring of 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) the attitude of Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Kichu Political Committee became more and more inclined to be anti-Japanese. There was an instance when I tried to have an interview with him at the Military Officers Club at Tientsin, but he replied that he could not meet me there because that building had been contributed by Yan Ju-keng (who was pro-Japanese). Communist troops began even gradually to join the third division of the 29th Army under Sung Che-yuan's command. Meanwhile, on the side of Japan, Vice-chief of the General Staff, NISHIO, Toshizo, summoned Colonel Kusumoto of Shanghai, Major Obashi of the Kwantung Army and myself of the Japanese Army stationed in North China and instructed us to assume a passive attitude lest we should cause a disturbance in China. The Chief of Military Operations of the General Staff Headquarters at that time was Major General ISHIHARA, Kanji.

I also informed him fully about our cautious attitude in North China.

7. After I returned to my post in Tientsin, I guided the attitude of the Japanese Army stationed in North China according to the purport of the instructions which I received at Tokyo. Shortly after, Lieutenant Colonel OKAMOTO, Kiyofuku came to Tientsin from the Headquarters of the General Staff and, upon his return after inspecting the state of affairs of the Japanese garrison in China, he expressed relief that there were absolutely no signs to indicate that our side was ready to cause any disturbances.

8. The Lukouchiao Incident, as is well known, occurred on 7 July 1937, but at that time Lieutenant General TASHIRO of the Japanese Army in China had been in bed suffering from heart-asthma since several months before and he was absolutely unable to command his army. He was so seriously ill that he died on the 9th of that month. For the purpose of inspection, the main force of the 2nd Infantry Regiment stationed at Tientsin was dispatched to Shanhaikwan. A greater part of the battalion stationed at Peiping was also at Tung-chow. Major General KAWABE, Shozo, the Commander of the Infantry Brigade at Peiping, together with his subordinates had left Peiping on his way to Shanhaikwan on official business. The amount of arms, ammunition and military supplies in storage at Tientsin which was the Japanese Garrison Base, was exceedingly low.

9. I received a report of the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident at midnight on 7 July. I was ordered to proceed to the spot by HASHIKIYO, Gun, Chief Staff Officer, and on the following day I went to Tung-chow by airplane, and from Tung-chow I entered Pei-ping by car. At Pei-ping I participated in the settlement of the incident at the spot where it occurred with Colonel MATSUI, Takuro. This negotiation was settled the following day on the 9th. As to the settlement of the incident at that spot, the conditions were like conditions of infringement, that is, the incident was settled in the morning on the condition that China withdraw her troops to the Lukouchiao Castle and the grounds around the castle and punish the responsible persons.

10. Since the aforementioned agreement was achieved, I returned to Tientsin to my post via Tung-chow, and at Tung-chow I met Yin Ju-king and HASAKI (Adviser of Ki-tung Government).

At this time Yin said that he was going to muster six battalions of his command at Tung-chow. These six battalions later caused the Tung-chow Incident which occurred on the 29th of this month.

11. After returning to my post at Tientsin, I went to Tokyo on official business by order from Tokyo, and I reported the situation at the scene of the incident to the General Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry.

At that time I reported to TANAKA, Shinichi, Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, as follows:

"Under the Japanese North China Army Authorities, the policy of non-expansion and peaceful settlement is being driven home well. For example; due to the stimulus accorded to the Chinese, the railroad between Pei-ping and Tientsin is prohibited to transport of Japanese troops; the railroad between Fengtai and Pei-ping is also not permitting Japanese troops in uniform to ride; all Japanese passing through the Yungting gate are tolerating interrogation by the Chinese Military Police; six thousand Japanese nationals within the Pei-ping Castle are being guarded by merely two or three platoons of our infantry because of the existing condition whereby Chinese machine-guns are trained on the Japanese houses within the Pei-ping Castle; we also refrained from transporting the wounded into the Pei-ping Castle for surgical operations and the corpses of those killed in action are being neglected. Moreover, in regards to the artillery bombardment by the Chinese, a condition exists whereby it would be possible to fight back immediately. But in spite of all these facts, I am complying fully with the orders of the Army Headquarters at Tientsin and submitting myself to complete humiliation and inconvenience. I am strictly prohibiting action which may act as a provocation to the spread of the incident.

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11. After completing the aforementioned report, I returned to North China about noon on July 28. There I was informed by Major General Giga, the Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked our units at Fungtai the day before, on July 27. Today, the 28th, Tientsin was attacked by Chinese troops and consequently communication between the Tientsin air base and the Tientsin Occupation Army was temporarily severed. Then I was able to return to our original headquarters on the 29th of the same month.

12. While I was on official business in Tokyo, Mr. Nakashima (Tetsuzo), the Chief of the General Affairs Department of the General Staff Headquarters, informally ordered me to become the Regimental Commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment (Kochi) because the emergency in North China was almost settled. However, on August 1 there was a formal order issued and I took up my duties as the commander of the aforesaid regiment.

13. About August 10, 1937 I arrived at the place where the 44th Regiment had been stationed. Three days after my appointment, however, I received an urgent mobilization order and was sent to Shanghai. There I served in the field in the battle of Shanghai and after this, in March 1938, I returned to Japan. I was attached to General Staff Headquarters and given a special assignment in China. Consequently I went to Tokyo and, presenting myself at General Staff Headquarters, received my orders. My assignment was to have a talk with the Chiang Government to put an end to the Incident.

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14. In June 1938, I went to Hong Kong. At the same time I tried to negotiate with the Chiang Government through Hsie-Chenying in North China whom I knew. They seemed to be looking forward to the matter being settled before the fall of Hankow. At last we reached a single plan. It was as follows: The Manchurian problem be tabled to the future; terminate fighting in China; the personal elements of the Provisional Government in Peiping and the Restoration Government in Nanking to be embraced into the National Government; and that Chiang Kai-shek temporarily leave the scene, etc. That the Japanese would acquire Chinese territory or monopolize Chinese interests, etc., were not included.

15. I came back to Tokyo around the end of August 1938 and reported the above to War Minister Itagaki and the Vice Chief of the General Staff Tada. I was given approval to negotiate with the above as the basis.

16. I went to Hong Kong during September of the same year and when I reported this to Hsie he also agreed with me. I decided on Fu-Chow of Fuchien Province as the site for negotiations and was about to begin the negotiations when Hankow fell in October of the same year and was not able to realize it.

17. Even after this I continued negotiations actively through Sheng's son, Cheng Li-luan, and other prominent men endeavoring to get relations between Japan and China back to its natural form. I know that there were a great many men besides me who exerted themselves in this effort also.

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On this 3rd day of April, 1947

At I.M.T.F.I.

DEPONENT WACHI, Takaji (seal)

I, Kiyose, Ichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

on the same date

at same place

Witness : (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

WACHI, Takaji (seal)

DDO: NO
Date: 21 Feb 1910
Registrar

→
/

Permanent residence)

~~Prefecture~~ & Status: HIROSHIMA Prefecture,
~~Samurai~~ Warrior Class.

Date of birth: 11. February, 1893

Full name: WACHI, Takaji

30. May. 1912: Graduated ^{from the} regular course of the Central
Military Preparatory School.

31. May. of the same year: Appointed ^{cadet and} ~~ag~~
^{assigned} ~~and placed~~ to the 3rd Infantry Regiment. → War Ministry

5. June, of the same year: Enlisted in the 3rd Infantry Regiment.

" " " " " " Given rank of Superior Private,
~~Private~~ ^{superior} Infantry. → The 3rd Infantry Regiment
~~private~~

1, August, 1912: Promoted ~~to rank of~~ Corporal, Infantry. ~~to rank of~~ same

5. September, Same year: Promoted ~~to rank of~~ Sergeant, Infantry. ~~to rank of~~ same

1. December, Same year: Entered ~~the~~ Military Academy.

28, May, 1914: Graduated from the Military Academy.

" " " : Rejoined his ~~to~~ former regiment.

" " " : Promoted ~~to~~ the rank of Sergeant-Major

and appointed a ~~probationary~~ officer, ~~to~~ 3rd Infantry Regiment

25, November, Same Year: Passed ~~by~~ the Selection Board in ~~the~~ Officer, ~~in~~

accordance with ~~the~~ Art. 12 of the Army Re-
placement Regulations.

25. December: Commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry. ~~to~~ Cabinet

assigned ~~to~~ the 3rd Infantry Regiment. ~~to~~ War ministry

1. March 1915: Conferred ^{with} the Senior Grade of the 8th Court Rank.

29. July 1918: Promoted to 1st Lieutenant, Infantry. ~~Appointed to infantry lieutenant~~ → Cabinet

30. September: Conferred ^{with} the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank.

10. December, 1919: Ordered to enter the ~~Army~~ ^{Army} Staff College.

6. August, 1923: Promoted ~~Appointed~~ to ~~Army~~ ^{Infantry} Captain → Cabinet

6. August, 1923: Relieved from ~~former duty and~~ ~~assignment~~

^{assigned} ~~attached~~ to the 3rd Infantry Regiment → War Ministry


19. September, 1923: Relieved from ~~assignment~~ ~~assignment~~ to the 3rd

Infantry Regiment and appointed ~~to~~

a company commander of the 3rd Infantry

War Ministry

Regiment.



30, November, 1923: Conferred ^{with the} Senior Grade of the 7th Court Rank.

1. December, 1923: Ordered to serve ^{with the Headquarters of} ~~the~~ ~~General Staff~~

War Ministry

~~to~~ the General Staff.

29. January, 1924: Relieved from ^{former duty and assigned} ~~the~~ ~~General Staff~~

~~return~~ to the 3rd Infantry Regiment.

same

12. May, 1925: Relieved from ^{assignment} ~~the~~ ~~General Staff~~ to the 3rd

War Ministry

Infantry Regiment. ^(Made) ~~was appointed~~ a member ^(Headquarters of the) of the General Staff.

War Ministry

7 August, 1925: Relieved from ^{former duty,} ~~assignment~~ and ordered to ~~serve~~

with the Headquarters of the)

~~Imperial~~ General Staff.

same

18. July 1927: Decorated with the ^{Imperial} ~~Imperial~~

~~Imperial~~ Order of the Sacred Treasure, 6th Class.

(duty with the Headquarters of the)

26. July 1927: Relieved from ~~Imperial~~ General

War Ministry

Staff.

Made

(Headquarters of the)

~~Imperial~~ a member of the General Staff.

War Ministry

28. December, 1928: Conferred ^{with} the Junior Grade of the 6th

Court Rank.

16. March, 1929: Promoted to Major, Infantry.

~~Imperial~~ ~~Imperial~~

War Ministry

1. August, 1929: Appointed ~~Imperial~~ a battalion commander of

the 63th Infantry Regiment.

same

5. September: Decorated with the ~~Order of Merit~~
~~and granted the~~ Imperial Order of the Dual-Rays
of the Rising Sun 560 ^{for service in} ~~the~~
the China Incident.

11. March 1931: Made ^(Headquarters of the)
~~Appointed~~ a member of the General
Staff and ^{(concurrently Military Instructor in the Army}
~~professor of strategy at the Military~~

Staff College. → same

28. November 1931: Appointed ~~to~~ a staff officer of
the Kwantung Army. → same

8. August, 1932: Ordered to ^{duty with the Headquarters of the}
~~General~~ General War Ministry
Staff. →

1. September, 1933: Conferred ^{with} the Senior Grade of the 6th

Court Rank.

1. August, 1933: Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry.
~~Ministry of War~~

Cabinet

7. February, 1934: Decorated with the ~~Order of Merit~~
Imperial 4th Class
~~Order of the Sacred Treasure~~

10. December, 1934: Made Headquarters of the
~~Ministry of War~~ a member of the General
Concurrently Military Instructor in the

War Ministry

17. January, 1935: Staff and ~~Ministry of War~~
Army
~~Ministry of War~~ Staff College.

29. April, 1934: Decorated with the ~~Order of Merit~~
~~and granted the~~ Medium Cordon of the

Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for services
~~in the~~

~~in the~~ 1931-34 Incident.

2. December 1935: Assigned to the
~~to be~~

8

Headquarters of the China Garrison.

same

assignment

1. August 1936: Relieved from ~~assignment~~ to the Headquarters

of the China Garrison and appointed a

staff officer of the China Garrison.

same

2. August 1937: Promoted to ~~Staff Officer~~ Colonel (Infantry) → Cabinet.

appointment as

Relieved from ~~the~~ Staff officer of the China

(Commander of)

Garrison and appointed ~~the~~ the 44th Infantry

Regiment.

~~Regiment Commander~~ →

War Ministry

1. September 1937: Conferred ^{with} the Junior Grade of the

5th Court Rank.

assigned

1. March 1938: ~~assigned~~ to be attached to the Headquarters

War Ministry

FORMOSAN Army.

of the ~~headquarters~~

9. March 1940: Promoted ~~Major-General~~ to Major-General. → Cabinet

1. April 1940: Conferred with the Senior Grade of the 5th Court Rank.

4. November 1940: Decorated with ~~the 2nd Order of~~ ~~Hort and~~ ^(Imperial) the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class.

6. October 1941: Appointed ~~as~~ a member of the Central ^(Air-Rail) Defence Committee in Formosa. → Cabinet

12. December 1941: Appointed ~~as~~ a member of the Central Wage Committee in Formosa. → Cabinet

24. June 1942: Relieved from ^(membership in) ~~the~~ the Central Wage Committee in Formosa. → Cabinet

Promoted

10. June 1943: ~~Appointed~~ to Lieutenant-General. → Cabinet

1. July 1943: Conferred ^{with} the Junior Grade of the 4th Court Rank.

29. April. 1940: Decorated with the ^(Imperial Military) ~~Order~~ Order of the Golden Kite, ^(3rd Class) and with the ~~Order~~ ^(Imperial) Order of the Sacred ~~Order~~ 2nd Class, for services in Treasure, ~~in connection with the~~ during the Chinese Incident.

16. August 1943: Decorated with the ~~Order~~ ^(Imperial) Order of the Sacred Treasure, ^{1st Class}

10. August 1945: Appointed ^(Commander of) the 164 Division. ~~Appointed~~ → Cabinet

WACHI, Takaji

Request by Tojo, Hideki

~~Confined~~ Confined in Sugamo prison, but at present believed to have been taken to the Philippines as a witness in war crimes trials.

This witness able to testify to the true nature and aims of "sakura-kai" and also the facts concerning the March and October incidents.

WACHI, Takaji

Request by: HASHIMOTO, Kingoro

Address: In Sugamo Prison

He was a Lt. General in the Japanese Army and a member of "Sakura-Kai" or the "Cherry Blossom Society." The witness participated in the October Incident and is thoroughly familiar with the March Incident.

Facts expected to be proved by this witness are that

1. The purpose and activities of "Sakura-Kai", of which defendant was a member, were merely internal reform of the Nation.
2. The purpose of the Oct. and March Incidents were the internal reform of the Japanese Army and other relevant matters.

The testimony of the witness is considered necessary in regard to Counts Nos. 1, 2, 18 and 19, and Appendices A (Sections 1 and 2) and E of the Indictment.

(←)

WACHI, Takaji

Request by: HASHIMOTO, Kingoro

address: In Sugamo prison.

He was a Lt. general in the Jap. Army and a member of "SAKURAI-KAI" or the "Cherry Blossom Society." This witness participated in the October Incident and is thoroughly familiar with the March Incident.

Facts expected to be proved by this witness are that:

(1) The purpose and activities of "Sakurai-Kai", of which defendant was a member, were merely internal reforms of the Nation

(2) The purpose of the Oct. and March incidents were the internal reform of the Jap. Army, and other relevant matters.

The testimony of this witness is considered necessary in regard to counts Nos. 1, 2, 18 and 19, and Appendices A (sections 1 and 2) and E of the Indictment

R. H. L_or_oh

WACHI Takaji

Was arrested by the Military Police on 17 October 1931
along with the ringleaders of the 5-15 plot.

SOURCE: "The Brocade Banner"

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF WACHI, Takaji
by Mr. Levin

20,575

The witness stated that he lived in Sugamo. He identified Exhibit 2482 as his affidavit and stated with certain minor corrections to be made it was correct. The witness * stated that he was at Tientsin as a senior staff officer of the Japanese Garrison Army in China from August 1936 to July 1937, in charge of intelligence. * Around August 1936, when he arrived in Tientsin, there were many unemployed soldiers of the Northeast Army coming into North China. Ma was also in Tientsin, where the witness met him.

20,576

20,577

The fact that many of these unemployed had joined the Kintung Army was related in the talk by GORO, who was formerly advisor to Chang Hsueh-liang. Chang was sent to attack the Communist Army in Northwest China, but the officers and men of the Northeast Army communicated with the Communist Army, saying that their real enemy was Japan and that the two Chinese armies should, therefore, not fight each other. Therefore, subjugation of the Communist Army did not progress. To encourage the punitive forces, Chang Kai-shek went to Siam. Ma told this to the witness' secretary.

20,578

In the spring * of 1937, the witness met Han Fu-chu at Tsinan, who stated he had received an official notice from the central government that war would break out between Japan and China in the autumn, and he had to go to Tientsin. He felt if he went there the base of Shantung would be captured in his absence. For the reason that the Japanese might also land at Tsingtao, they would advance to Meihsien.

20,579

About the spring of 1937 the attitude of Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Kichu Political Committee, * was more and more anti-Japanese. Communist troops began to join the third division of the 29th Army under his command. In the meantime, ISHIO, vice-chief of the General Staff, summoned officers from Shanghai, the Kwantung Army, and the witness and instructed them to assume a passive attitude less they cause a disturbance in China. General ISHIMARA was then chief of military operations of the General Staff. He informed ISHIMARA about the cautious attitude in North China. After returning to Tientsin, he guided army attitude according to instructions he received at Tokyo.

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20,580 Shortly thereafter Lt. Colonel OKAMOTO came to Tientsin from the General Staff * and expressed relief, after inspection, that there were no signs to indicate that Japan was ready to cause any trouble.

The Marco Polo incident occurred on July 7, 1937. General TASHIRO, then commanding the Japanese Army, had been suffering for several months and was absolutely unable to command his army. He died on July 9. For inspection purposes the main force of the second infantry at Tientsin was sent to Shanhaikwan, and a large part of the battalion at Peiping was at Tung-chow. KAWABE, commander of the Infantry Brigade, and his aides, had gone to Shanhaikwan on official business. The amount of arms, ammunition and supplies at Tientsin was low.

20,581 The witness received a report of the incident at midnight on July 7 and was ordered * to go to the spot by HASHIMOTO, Gun, Chief Staff Officer. The witness then flew to Tung-chow, and then by car to Peiping. He there participated in the settlement of the incident on the spot with Colonel MATSUI on the 9th. The conditions were like those of infringement. The incident was settled on condition that China withdraw her troops to the castle and the grounds around the castle and punish the responsible persons.

20,582 The witness returned to Tientsin via Tung-chow and there met Yin Ju-king and HASAKI, adviser to the Kitung Government. Yin said he was to muster six battalions of his command at Tung-chow. These battalions later caused the Tung-chow incident on July 29.

20,583 After returning to Tientsin the witness went to Tokyo by order from Tokyo and reported to the General Staff in the War Ministry. He then reported to TANAKA, chief of the Army Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, that under the Japanese North China Army authorities the policy of non-expansion and peaceful settlement is being driven home. The railroad between Peiping and Tientsin is prohibited from transporting Japanese troops, as is that between Fengtai and Peiping. All Japanese passing through the Yungting gate * submit to interrogation by the Chinese. Three thousand Japanese nationals within the Peiping Castle are guarded by only a few platoons

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of infantry because Chinese machine guns are trained on the Japanese houses. They had refrained from transporting the wounded into the castle and the corpses of those killed in action were being neglected.

With respect to artillery bombardment by the Chinese, conditions exist whereby it would be possible to fight back immediately. Despite all this, he was complying fully with orders of Army Headquarters and subjecting himself to complete humiliation and inconvenience, strictly prohibiting a provocative action. He then returned to North China on July 28 at noon.

20,584

He was then informed by General GIGA, Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked at Fengtai on the 27th. That on the 28th Tientsin was attacked by Chinese * and communication between the air base and the army was severed. The witness returned to his headquarters on the 29th.

While he was on official business in Tokyo, NAKASHIMA, Chief of General Affairs of the General Staff, informally ordered him to become Regimental Commander of the 44th Infantry since the emergency was almost settled. On August 1 he took up his duties as commander of that regiment. On August 10 he arrived where the regiment was stationed.

Three days after his appointment he received an urgent mobilization order and went to Shanghai, where he served in the field. In March 1938 he returned to Japan and was attached to GHQ and given a special assignment in China. He went to Tokyo and received his orders, which were to have a talk with the Chiang Government to end the incident.

20,585

In June 1938 he went to Hongkong. At the same time he tried to negotiate with Chiang through Hsia-Chenyng in North China. They seemed to look forward to the matter being settled before the fall of Hankow. They arrived at a plan where the Manchurian problem was to be tabled for the future; fighting terminated in China; the personal elements of the provisional government in Peiping and Nanking to be embraced into the national government; and Chiang Kai-shek leave the scene temporarily. There was no provision that Japan should acquire Chinese territory or monopolize Chinese interests.

Page The witness returned in August 1938 to Tokyo and reported to ITAGAKI and General TADA and was given approval to negotiate on this basis. He returned to Hongkong in September and reported this to Hsia who agreed.

20,586 The witness picked Fu-Chow as the site for negotiations and was about to begin them when Hankow fell in October and he was unable to realize this. * Even after this he continued negotiations with Sheng's son and other prominent men to restore the relations. He knew there were many others who had exerted themselves in this effort.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by the President

20,587 With respect to the report mentioned in his affidavit the witness said that the only record that he had of it was in his memory. When the report was made, it was in writing, but it no longer exists.

20,594 Exhibit 2483, note of the French, German, English, Italian and Japanese representatives, July 15, 1902, relative to the return of Tientsin to the Chinese. The five governments sent identical notes acknowledging receipt of the note of Prince Chi'ing, Chinese Plenipotentiary. Each were authorized *
20,595 to consent to the dissolution of the provisional government, provided China signifies its adherence to the following propositions:

20,596 By Article VIII of the final protocol of September 7, 1901, China agreed to have certain forts which interfered with free communication with Peking demolished. Chinese plenipotentiaries have asked to be relieved of the responsibility for carrying out this policy and the work was entrusted to the Tientsin government and has not yet been completed. They therefore asked that at the moment of dissolution of the Tientsin provisional government, the work of demolition be placed in the hands of the G.O.C.'s at Tientsin, the money to be paid out * of the treasury of the provisional government.

It was also provided in Article IX that the powers should have the right to occupy certain points between Peking and the sea, including Tientsin. Foreign troops will continue after dissolution to be stationed in Tientsin in places actually occupied and their goods will be free of taxes. They shall

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have the right to carry on field exercises and rifle practice without informing the Chinese, except in case of feux de guerre.

It is desirable to avoid collisions between foreign troops and those of China and China should, therefore, undertake not to station or march any troops within $6 \frac{2}{3}$ miles of the city or of the troops at Tientsin.

20,597

Furthermore, it was agreed * that the jurisdiction of post commander should extend to a distance of two miles on either side of the railroad and this should be maintained so long as the posts were occupied. They consented that the Viceroy could maintain a personal bodyguard in the city of not more than 300 and an efficient body of river police even within the two mile limit. The demolition of the forts implies an obligation not to reconstruct. The same applies to the walls of Tientsin. They could not consent to China establishing maritime defenses at the mouth of the Peiho at Chingwangtao or at Shanhaikuan.

20,598

* The right of foreign troops to occupy summer quarters must be recognized. The archives of the provisional government should be entrusted to the senior consul, to whom application for consultation may be made. It is believed that the inhabitants of the city should not be dunned for arrears in taxes.

20,601

Exhibit 2484, the note of acceptance of the terms of dissolution of the provisional government of Tientsin, July 18, 1902, stated that * China had received the identical notes. After pointing out with reference to the military posts to be established that it would only refer to offenses against the railroad, * telegraph lines or allied armies and their property, the writer stated he had no objection to make to the remaining articles. He had received the sanction of the throne and had sent acceptances to the treaty powers so they might send the same to the provisional government so it could be abolished in four weeks and Tientsin returned to Chinese administration under the superintendent of the northern ports. In the future, when there is need for consultation, the foreign civil and military authorities * can consult with the superintendent.

20,602

20,603

Exhibit 2485, resolutions adopted by the diplomatic body at Peking on military occupation of the railroad, January 26, 1912, * stated that during the revolution of 1911-12 the

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
April 23, 1947
DEFENSE - Division III - China
WACHI - Direct

Page 3106

Page

20,604

representatives of the powers found it advisable to exercise military control over the Peking-Mukden railway and the troops of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan occupied sections in accordance with certain resolutions of January 26, 1912. The resolutions provided that troops should be placed at important points along the line. Both the Imperial and revolutionary troops could use the railroad for transportation, landing or embarkation. Both parties would be notified to avoid any interference with the railway and to refrain from damaging it. The Imperial Railway * of North China will maintain at Shanhaikuan and Tientsin a repair train. Any attempt to permanently damage the railway will be resisted by the six powers. Sufficient rolling stock will be kept at hand to transport 250 infantry so reinforcements can be dispatched. Telegraphic offices are to be protected and communications maintained. Either side may use it.

20,605

Exhibit 2486, declaration of the President of China with regard to respecting treaties, agreements and vested rights, stated that the President on October 10, 1913 declared that all treaties that had been made between the former government of China or the provisional government of China and the respective foreign governments should be observed, and legitimate contracts concluded with foreign countries or nationals should be observed. Rights, privileges and immunities acquired by foreigners in China under agreement, law and custom, were to be recognized.

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: Wachi, Takaji

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>Partially Completed</u> | <u>Fully Completed</u> |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 3. Examination of case file, if any. | <u>X</u> | _____ |
| 4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division. | <u>X</u> | _____ |
| 6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony. | <u>X</u> | _____ |
| 7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness. | <u>X</u> | _____ |
| 8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you. | _____ | _____ |

Lester C. Surigan
LB

Grants notes

notes

official pointer

1. Location, prior to appointment to the
General Staff in Apr. '31, General duties, Rank.
2. When did you first meet Col. Hashimoto?
3. Were you a member of the Sakura-kai? What
connections did you have with it.
- 4.



11. Do you know that Dr. Okawa was acquainted
with Itagaki, Ishihara, ^{"et cetera"} and others in the Kwang
Army, and

12. Do you know that Dr. Okawa had engaged
in an extensive propaganda campaign throughout
Japan designed to stir up the people on the
Manchurian situation

13. Do you know that he plotted, ^{the Manch Incident} with others
Harkins and others

R 1402
Shimizu
14. Are you acquainted with the place called
Kunryuetsu Inn. Did you attend meetings there
between Harkins, Okawa, Shimizu "et cetera" &

15. Now in view of all these matters as to
which you disclaim any knowledge how
can you state under oath that no liaison
existed between Harkins and persons in
the Kwangtung Army.

16. What position did ^{you} hold between Apr 4
and Oct. 1931. Did you &

Sekura-kai -

1. When was it formed?

Was Hashimoto one of the promoters?

Was Lt. Colonel Kemoto also a promoter?

Was Hayashi a promoter?

2. ~~Name or names~~ When the following members:

of the Sekura-kai: Lt. Col. Tanaka, Kyoshi, ^{Captain} ~~Major~~ Cho
and Col. Sakata

October Incident

Isn't it true that there was no aid
from civilian groups, save one and that
one was Okawa's

the persons who played an important part in this incident.

- 8. How can you state under oath that Harburo had never met persons, ^{in the} ~~under the description~~ in the Kwantung Army in addition to the three you named? Then why did you use the term "et cetera"?
- 9. How can you state under oath that Harburo had never met the three persons named by you, Takaki, Doihara and Ishihara? What was the occasion for your having such an intimate knowledge of Harburo's acquaintances? (You were not in the Gen. Staff during the Manch. Incident and according to your statement you were not acquainted with the details of this incident, so how can you state under oath that Harburo did not have communications with anyone in the Kwantung Army about it,
- 10. ~~How state you see~~ You state you were on very intimate terms ^{with Harburo and personally} with Harburo, so will you tell us whether Harburo knew Dr. Okawa.

1. ~~When you became a member of the staff office
in Apr. 1931~~

1. Prior to your appointment to the General Staff in
Apr. 1931, what was your position and where
was your post of duty?

2. ~~What was the general nature of your~~

2. What were your duties as a General Staff Officer between
Apr. and Oct. 1931?

3. ~~What was your rank did you hold.~~

4. ~~What position did Hashimoto hold at this time
and when was it? When did you first meet
Col. Hashimoto?~~

5. ~~What position did he hold between by was his
official position. Was he your superior officer?~~

6. In par. 8 of your aff., you state Hashimoto ^{had} ~~met~~
~~met~~ ^{not} met Udagaki, Doke, Ishikawa, Ichiyama
et cetera
~~etc~~ before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

To whom do you refer ~~was~~ in using the
words "et cetera"?

7. Do you mean to intend to state that Col. Hash.
had not met any of those ~~connected with~~
who played an important part in the
Manchurian Incident. Who were these

9 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner

FROM: Lester C. Dunigan

In connection with WACHI, you may want to look at pages ~~2,188 - 2,192~~ *JPS Doc. No 12* inclusive of the Record. Exhibit #183, introduced at page 2,188, contains excerpts from a secret record of Japanese renovation movements, August 1938, written for the Section for the Maintenance of Public Peace of the Bureau of Police Affairs of the Home Ministry. It does not add much to what you already have, but does definitely connect HASHIMOTO and Captain CHO with the SAKURA KAI; and since it states that the SAKURA KAI had great influence on the March and October Incidents it, to some extent, connects Captain CHO with the Manchurian Incident. You will recall that WACHI in his affidavit states that CHO had no connection with the Manchurian Incident at its beginning.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

MEMORANDUM

8 April 1947

TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: G. S. Woolworth
SUBJECT: Affidavit of WACHI, Takaji, Witness for Defense

Paragraph 8 of Defense Document No. 869 states that HASHIMOTO, Kingoro had never met ITAGAKI, DOHIMARA, or ISHIHARA, Kanji. At page 48 of Serial 343-6, interrogation of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro dated 22 January 1946, copy of which is attached hereto, it is shown that HASHIMOTO knew ISHIHARA, Kanji and had known him since his military academy days.

In paragraph 8 of Defense Document No. 869, it is further stated by WACHI: "Also there was no occasion at which liaison was established with these people by means of telephone, telegram, or by any other means." This statement is clearly beyond the testimonial knowledge of the witness.

My recollection is that the interrogations of OKAWA, Shumei should further discredit the testimony of WACHI concerning the October Incident and the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

TANAKA, Ryukichi, when questioned by me concerning WACHI, Takaji, stated that he had the reputation of being the most monumental liar in the army, dating from his military academy days. ✓

See also interrogation of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro dated 12 February 1946, inviting attention to the marked paragraphs. (P. 5-6)
Also see marked paragraphs of Prosecution Exhibit 2188, attached.


G. S. WOOLWORTH

Attachments

See news attached
See paper now in Hashimoto file
4-16-47

Hashimoto

See copies of Interrogations

2

7 Feb 46

12

and

7 22 Jan 1941

and

Exhibit 21 88

2 P.S. Doc 1875

copies of Hashimoto interrogations

in Hashimoto file

Did Ishikawa Kenji

re: Wada

Hoshimoto go to school together

graduate high schooling

5.27.1911

Ishikawa graduate

1909

Re: Hoshimoto

Broadsheet
Banner
No. 28-

TANAKA, KIYOSHI
write: "KAI BUN SHO" 1932

re Sanin Kai - its activities in March 1932.

30: Wachs


9 Apr 47

Mr. Sutton

There are two methods of approach to Mil. Academy in Japan, as shown by chart below:

1st: 4 or 5 years in Middle School - followed by 1 yr 10 mos at Military Academy, or

2nd: 3 yrs at Prefectural Mil. School followed by 2 yrs at Military Preparatory School & then by 1 yr 10 mos. at Military Academy.



So Hashimoto may not have known Ichikawa at Military Academy although possible.

JSW

v:

Washburn graduated

with academy

5-27-1911

Washburn graduated

1909

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TAKAJI WACHI,
By Mr. Hayashi.

- 19664 * The witness stated he was 54 and lived at Sugamo. He identified exhibit No. 2424 as his affidavit. The affidavit stated * he was a lieutenant-general when the war ended. He became a member of the * Staff Office in April, 1931, and Colonel HASHIMOTO was his senior and an intimate friend. After he became a member of the General Staff, he occasionally attended meetings held by the Sakurakai, which was a discussion meeting concerning the reform of domestic affairs. On no occasion were the problems dealing with Manchuria and other countries studied. The Sakurakai was composed of young officers below lieutenant colonel, had no rules or membership fees, and was not secret. It had no connection with the Manchurian Incident or the Kwantung Army, and no one in the Kwantung Army had membership.
- 19665
- 19666
- 19667 HASHIMOTO had never met ITAGAKI, DOIHARA, or ISHIHARA of the Kwantung Army * when the Manchurian Incident broke out, and there was no occasion on which there was liaison with these people by means of telephone, telegram, or otherwise. During the period he and HASHIMOTO were on intimate terms officially and privately, and he knew of these matters. He was reprimanded with HASHIMOTO on the charge of the October Incident. HASHIMOTO was subjected to heavy disciplinary confinement for 25 days.
- The October Incident aimed to remove corrupt politicians from political parties and to recommend ARAKI to head a new government. When HASHIMOTO revealed the plan to ARAKI, ARAKI told it to MINAMI, and MINAMI ordered the military police to arrest them, so further development of the Incident was checked there. The concrete and practical method of execution had not been considered.
- 19668 * OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident. Because of the fear that information might leak out through civilians, it was decided not to include any at all. HASHIMOTO had stated that the failure of the March Incident was due to the fact that it had included civilians.

Page

HASHIMOTO said that the March Incident was a move to form a new cabinet under UGAKI and remove corrupt politicians from political parties, but was suspended at the stage of planning. He was not acquainted with its details.

The motives of the October Incident were based on the fact that both political parties were absorbed in party interests and never thought of the people's hardships. It was a move to exclude WAKATSUKI, who was typical of the corrupt party politicians, and there was no connection with the Manchurian Incident.

19669

Captain CHO * was an intimate friend. He had been sent to Peking in August, 1931, and returned to Tokyo early in October, after the Manchurian Incident, and he had no connection with it. TANAKA, Ryukichi, had no connection with the Sakurakai. He was a junior of HASHIMOTO, but was not his close friend.

CROSS-EXAMINATION By Mr. Tavenner.

19670

* The witness stated that before he was appointed to the General Staff in 1931, he was a battalion commander at Matsue in Shimane Prefecture. His duties did not require his presence in Tokyo. When he was assigned to the general staff in 1931, he was a major and he was employed in the China Section of the Second Division. HASHIMOTO was in the European-American Affairs Section of that division.

19671

* He first met HASHIMOTO when he was attached to the general staff, from the end of 1923 to July, 1925. Between July 1925 and April 1931 he never met HASHIMOTO. He became a member of the Sakurakai in April, 1931. He was not a member at the time of the March Incident. He therefore had no knowledge of its activities with respect to the March Incident directly, but he had heard of it from HASHIMOTO. Anything which he had stated that happened prior * to the March Incident he had heard from HASHIMOTO, including the March Incident.

19672

Page

HASHIMOTO founded the Sakurakai. He had not heard HASHIMOTO tell him that he took part in plotting the March Incident. General NEMOTO was a member of the Sakurakai. He had never heard from HASHIMOTO that NEMOTO was a planner of the March Incident.

19673

* Col. TANAKA, Kiyose, was a member of the SAKURAKAI, but he did not know what part he played in the March Incident. When it was called to his attention that exhibit 183, a report of the Home Ministry, showed that the Sakurakai had great influence on the March and October Incidents, the witness stated he did not know about the March Incident, but the society had relationship to the October Incident.

19674

* With respect to his statement that OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident when he was asked whether he was familiar with the record of OKAWA's trial in 1934 in which OKAWA set forth in detail his participation in the October Incident and stated he received his orders from HASHIMOTO, the witness stated he did not know. When asked on what he based his statement that OKAWA had no connection with the October Incident, the witness stated he was then in Tokyo and was related to the Society and on intimate terms with HASHIMOTO, and could say positively that OKAWA had

19675

no connection with the October Incident. * Both HASHIMOTO and he were arrested for participation in that Incident.

19676

* When asked whether it was not a fact that there would be no civilians in the October Incident except OKAWA's group, he said that was not so. He did not know that TANAKA KIYOSE prepared a memorandum in 1932 stating that OKAWA and his group was the only one utilized in the Incident. He was not familiar with OKAWA's testimony. When asked whether he was familiar with OKAWA's propaganda activities prior to the October Incident, the witness stated that before he went to the General Staff Office he had been in Matsue, and before that * in China, and he had never heard of OKAWA carrying on propaganda speeches while he served. He had heard of the Kenryuter Inn in Tokyo.

19677

Page

He had no recollection of accompanying HASHIMOTO there and meeting OKAWA. He did not recall ever seeing OKAWA there. When he mentioned that HASHIMOTO had never met ITAGAKI, DOIHARA, ISHIHARA, etc., at or about the time of the Manchurian Incident, he did not mean that there were men additional included in this group, but had used a Japanese expression which was used where more than two names were listed.

19678

* When asked whether it was a fact that he did not know of his own knowledge whether HASHIMOTO had met these men prior to April, 1931, the witness stated that he was a very intimate friend of HASHIMOTO and HASHIMOTO would tell him everything. If he met them, he would tell him about it. His testimony is based * on the fact that HASHIMOTO did not tell him whether or not he had met these three.

19679

When asked whether HASHIMOTO told him about the directions he gave OKAWA, the witness stated such directions were never given, and HASHIMOTO pledged that he would never use civilians. When asked how he knew that there was no liaison with ITAGAKI, DOIHARA and ISHIHARA by means of telephone, telegram, or other means, the witness stated that at the time of the October Incident he was arrested and sent to Utsunomiya. There were two other army officers there, and they were held with him for 15 days.

19680

* These men had worked as secretaries to HASHIMOTO. One told him everything about the various subjects about the Incident and matters prior to it, and he stated that he personally had handled all telephone calls, telegrams, and letters sent by HASHIMOTO, and there was no such case as communicating with such people.

April 10, 1947

19682

* When asked why this subject had come up at such a meeting, the witness stated that they were there 15 days, * with ample time on hand, and talked of various matters from the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident until the time they were at Utsunomiya. They talked of DOIHARA, ISHIHARA, and ITAGAKI, who were well-known figures, and he asked the secretary whether these men had communicated in any way with HASHIMOTO.

19683

Page

The secretary replied that he was not aware of any contact, and he doubted very much whether the men were in negotiations. He stated there were no communications between HASHIMOTO and the others mentioned. It was the witness himself who had suggested there may have been some communication between HASHIMOTO and the three persons of the Kwantung Army. His question was related only to these three leaders.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Hayashi.

19684 * The witness stated that the Sakurakai as a whole had no connection with the October Incident. However, several persons arrested in connection with the Incident were members of the Sakurakai. In that sense there was relation. At the time of the October Incident, TANAKA, Kiyose, was a captain, and he had no connection with the October Incident. * He had never heard that he was connected with the March Incident. TANAKA was not an important member of the Sakurakai.


19689 Exhibit No. 2425, Independence Declaration of the new Manchu-Mongolian State, February 18, 1932, by the Administrative Committee of the Northeast, stated * that Ching-hui and others had the honor to be elected as leaders of the provinces. They hoped not to evade responsibility by transferring it to others. When they gathered together, all were unanimous that without a solid organization they would be unable to manage the whole situation, and unless they acted in accordance with the general will of the people, they could not establish their new policy. They therefore established a new organization consisting of the four provinces of the northeast, a special administrative district and other districts, and named it the Administrative Committee of the Northeast. They sent official telegrams to all authorities. These places have now established their independence completely, and separated from the National Party Government. They will endeavor to plan * administrative reforms. They remember when the war lords misruled the country and extorted the people. Even now the bandits still retain power. They must be completely ready to eradicate them.

19690

4/8/47

This is complete
with Dungen's
Woodworth's
report

Dungen suggests
that examine also
the Broad Bone



Wachi

5/26
18

1 Kilometer = $\frac{5}{8}$ of a mile

12 1/2 miles

July 3 Sec 1 art 7

Geneva Convention on

P/W 1929

Vol 4 treaties et (U.S.) / 5236

Evacuation of prisoners or foot may normally
be effected only by stages of 20 kilometers a
day unless the necessity of reaching water
& food depots requires longer stages

Translation of Defense Document #1453 (Original in Japanese)

Title Deposition of WACHI, Takaji

31 August, 1947

From Section III

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors **XX**

Following errors are noted:

| Page | Lines | Now reading: | Should read: |
|------|-------|--------------------|--|
| 2 | 7-8 | ...intended and... | ...intended to transport the Prisoners of War by automobile, the automobiles and... /P. 2, lines 1-2/ |

[Handwritten signature]

DEF. DOC. #1453



Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAFI, Sadao, et al

(Translation)

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: WACHI, Takaji

Treatment of POW on Bataan, in Philippines -

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in
my country I hereby depose as follows.

Something omitted on p 2

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

1. I was on duty in the Philippines during the time from March 1942 to February 1945. During this period from March 1942 to April 1944 I was Chief of Staff of the 14th Area Army. The army commanders at this time were three Lieutenant Generals, HOMMA, TANAKA and KURCDA.

Following this, I occupied the post of Vice-Chief of Staff of the Southern Army from May, 1944 to October of the same Year. Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army of the time, Marshall TERAUCHI, was staying in Manila. Finally, during the months from November 1944 to February 1945, I was Chief of Staff of the 5th Army which was under General YAMASHITA, the Commander of the 14th Area Army and took part in the battles of Leyte under the Army Commander, Lieutenant General SUZUKI.

2. I shall give an account concerning our treatment of war prisoners on Bataan.

Our attacks against the Bataan Peninsula were carried on in the spring of 1942 and it was on April 9 when the American-Philippine Forces surrendered.

We had estimated beforehand that war prisoners of the American-Philippine Forces would amount to 40,000 at the most, but in reality there were 70,000 in all. This indeed caused much difficulty on our part in accomodating the prisoners.

DEF. DOC. #1453

rest back to the rear on ambulances. The distance of march we covered a day was within the limits permitted by treaties. I witnessed this march personally and so far as I observed, there was no atrocities committed. The prisoners were sent by train from San-Fernando to O'Donell where they were placed in an internment camp. Later, 20,000 out of 70,000 died from under-nourishment and malaria. Provisions for the prisoners were, in addition to those prepared beforehand, obtained locally or sent from territories like Formosa etc. Thus we did our best in providing the prisoners with food. In the way of medicine, as there was very nearly a sufficient quantity, we gave out as much as was required. |||

Before July 1942
3. Until July, 1942, treatment of prisoners of war and military administration was under the jurisdiction of the General Staff, and the Line of Communications Commander was taking care of the matter. In July, 1942 these affairs were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Minister of War, and Chief of Prisoner of War Internment Camps became appointive.
After July 1942
From this time on, the Minister of War became the controlling officer and the Army Commander became the administrator. I know this fact from a standpoint of my duties which was assisting the Army Commander. // *Important*

4. All the Philippines among the prisoners were released over a period dating from August to October 1942. Volunteers,