

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO 234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

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~~ANNEX~~

INTERROGATION NO. 17  
(Obtain from G-2)

PLACE Tokyo  
DATE 10 Oct. TIME 1400

Division of Origin: Oil & Chemical

SUBJECT: Control of Japan's Chemical Industry

Personnel interrogated and background of each:  
Mr. ISHIKAWA, Ichiro , President of the Chemical Industry Control Assoc.  
Mr. KATSURA, Takashi , Director of CICA and Secretary to Mr. Ishikawa

Where interviewed (office) Room 749, Meiji Building, Tokyo

Interrogator: Lt. Wm. H. Evans, USNR

Interpreter: Lt(jg) H. A. Deane, USNR

Allied Officers Present: Lts. Anthony and Bliss, O-V(S), OIL & CHEM.

Summary: Personal Background of Mr. Ishikawa, history of the government controls over the Chemical Industry, their effects on the war economy and his personal views on Japan's defeat.

~~DISTRIBUTION: G-2~~

~~Note: See reverse side for comments on use of this form.~~



#17

U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY OF JAPAN

INTERROGATION

10 October 45

Persons Interrogated:

Mr. Ichiro Ishikawa, President of the Chemical Industries Control Assoc.  
Mr. Takashi Katsura, Director of CICA and Secretary to Mr. Ishikawa

Interrogation Conducted By:

Lieut. Wm. H. Evans, USNR - ACIO  
Lt(jg) H. A. Deane, USNR - Interpreter

Other Persons Present:

Lt. Anthony, USNR - USSBS  
Lt. Barclay, USNR - USSBS

Object of Interrogation:

Stated briefly, the object of this interrogation was to determine what checks and controls were instituted by the government within the Chemical Industry, the effect of such checks and controls on the ability of the Industry to gear its production to the war effort, and to evaluate the functions of the several agencies responsible for war planning, raw material allocation, priorities and details of finance.

Personal Background:

Mr. Ishikawa graduated from Imperial University, Yokyo in 1909 and immediately went to work for the Kanto Sanso (Eastern Alkali & Acid Co.) of which his father was the head. Mr. Ishikawa is a graduate chemical engineer and returned to Imperial University after two years with Kanto Sanso as Assistant Professor of Chemistry specializing in the production of Sulphuric Acid. He returned again to the Kanto Sanso in 1915 and remained with that organization until 1923 in the capacity of technical engineer when this organization merged with the Dai Nippon Dinzo Hiryo Co., Tokyo (Japan Artificial Fertilizer Co.). This merger was effected through an exchange of stock. Mr. Ishikawa became managing director of the new organization which adopted the name of the latter company. In 1935 a three-way merger placed him in control of an almost completely integrated chemical trust. This transaction involved the Dai Nippon Dinzo Hiryo Co., the Nippon Kagaku Hiryo (Japan Chemical Fertilizer Co.) and the Nissen Kogyo Kigyo. Mr. Ishikawa became president of the amalgamated organization in 1940 which controlled production in many fields among which were: Coal Mining, Copper Smelting, Alkalies, Acids, Superphosphates, Nitrates and Fertilizer. In 1942 he was appointed president of the newly formed Chemical Industries Control Association (Kagaku Kogyo Tosei Kai). Mr. Ishikawa was required to give up his associate directorships in several industries in order to accept this appointment. This was effected with considerable hardship, but he was permitted to retain



his personal interest in a small coal mine in addition to his personal holdings and securities in which he had no active part, ~~in the management.~~

*THE MANAGEMENT OF WHICH*


## 2. Control Associations:

Prior to the formation of the CICA on October 30, 1942 the Chemical Industry in Japan had a trade association but its effectiveness in gearing the production to military requirements was limited by the fact that no all-powerful centralized authority existed which could keep members in line. Members of the Trade Association could, if they did not agree with a motion carried by the executive committee, refuse to be obligated and withdraw from the organization. The Munitions Ministry recognized this weakness in the basic war economy and through the Cabinet issued the Heavy Industries Association Regulation (Juyo Sagyo Dantai Rei). The mechanics of this promulgation was actually an edict of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. At the outset it was intended that the CICA would encompass the Organic Chemicals Industry. The Chemical Section of the Heavy Industries Association Regulation, however, eventually grew horizontally to take in the Cement, Alkali and Acid Industries. In September of 1942 the general order was implemented to set up regulations for the allocation of raw materials, fixing production quotas and exercising the functions of a priorities board. Membership on the CICA Board included one government official, two military members and civilians. The military members were retired Army and Navy officers and did not actively enter into the administration of the CICA. The capacity of the government official was purely one of liaison with the result that the civilian members, representing private industry were given a free hand in performing their duties. According to Mr. Ishikawa, at no time was there any friction between the actions and desires of the CICA and the military elements. Mr. Isikawa explained this situation by stating that there was a decided lack of liaison between the Industry and any activities that the military carried out in munitions, explosives and the production of poisonous gases. The Industry was completely ignorant of the activities of the military in these fields. When questioned about the chemicals which were critical to the Japanese war economy, he listed the following: Carborundum, Alundum (aluminium oxide) and synthetic rubber. He stated that the inability of the Japanese to tool up their aircraft, munitions and heavy industries for an all-out war effort was due to the lack of abrasives in the production of machine tools. Another critical shortage in the chemical raw material category was salt. Before the war, Japan imported all but about 25% of her basic salt, mostly from Formosa and Manchuria. By 1944 the supply had been shut off due to the interdiction of tidewater transportation. When production fell off due to faulty maintenance, bomb damage and obsolescence, the inability of the Industry to obtain priorities for replacement parts, machinery and new equipment resulted in a critical shortage. High pressure pipes and compressors were particularly critical items in this regard. Other shortages which developed were nitric acid, picric acid and T.N.T. This shortage was partially compensated for by converting most of the Artificial Fertilizer Plants to the manufacture of the items. Vegetable oils and tallow fats were also critical items in the manufacture of explosives and their shortage was also due to the lack of shipping.

## 3. Remarks



Mr. Ishikawa was an intelligent, alert individual who appeared extremely cooperative. He offered to prepare a history of the Chemical Industry in Japan as it applied to the war economy. In preparing this report which he promises to have ready in English by October 15 Mr. Ishikawa will follow the general outline attached hereto. He considers that the greatest mistake the Japanese High Command made in the conduct of the war was their failure to take into account the capabilities of the Chemical Industry. They were not, to his knowledge, consulted in any way in the planning of the war effort prior to 1942 and, as a matter of fact, he states that his associates did not consider a war feasible or imminent until 1944. Mr. Ishikawa will be further interrogated on October 15, 1945

  
W. H. Evans, Lt., USNR



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