

NOTES
ON THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE






NOTES

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.



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The publication of these War Notes is not to be understood as an indorsement by the Navy Department of any statement contained therein, but simply as a presentation of the author's observations and opinions. In a few instances footnotes have been added, but the intention has been to avoid interference with the narrative of the writer.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES No. I.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

BATTLES AND CAPITULATION

OF

SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

BY

LIEUTENANT JOSÉ MÜLLER Y TEJEIRO,
SECOND IN COMMAND OF NAVAL FORCES OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH.



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

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INTRODUCTORY.

The publication by this office of the partial translation of "Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba," by Lieutenant Müller y Tejeiro, was received with so much interest both in and out of the service that the small edition of 1,000 copies was soon exhausted. The chapters there omitted were:

- I. Some Historical Antecedents.
- II. The United States and the *Maine*.
- III. The First Shots.
- IV. The Scene of Events.
- V. Forces of the Jurisdiction (Santiago).
- VI. Works of Defense.
- VII. Artillery Set Up.
- VIII. The Cruiser *Reina Mercedes*.
- XIV. The Volunteers.
- XXX. Escario's Column (being a description of General Escario's march across the country from Manzanillo to Santiago).
- XXXIII. Suspension of Hostilities.
- XXXVII. Traders, not the Spanish People (responsible for the Cuban trouble).
- XXXVIII. Gerona and Santiago de Cuba (comparison of the two battles).

These have since been translated, and are given in this edition, excepting Chapters I, II, and III, which are again omitted, as they contain no original or new matter, and have no connection with the subject of the book.

Among the newly translated chapters, the one giving the diary of General Escario's march, with 3,752 men, from Manzanillo to Santiago, a distance of 52 leagues through the enemy's country, is one of great interest. Considering the nature of the country, which forced them generally to march single file, the heavy rains, and the continual harassment by the Cubans, the effectiveness of which is shown by the large number of killed and wounded on both sides, it may be classed as one of the most noticeable military feats of the war. It shows what the Cubans did toward the fall of Santiago, and a study of the situation will be interesting, considering what would have been the temporary effect if Escario's march had been unopposed, and he had arrived at Santiago with his force unimpaired a day or two before that critical period—July 2—just previous to the departure and destruction of Cervera's fleet.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,
Chief Intelligence Officer.

December 31, 1898.

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P R E F A C E.

On the 18th of May, the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro of Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date, for the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day.

On the following day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely necessary to replenish.

It did not require great power of penetration to understand that, owing to the scant resources available at this harbor, it would take more days to get the necessary fuel on board than it would take Admiral Sampson, Commander of the United States fleet, to find out that circumstance, and that consequently the Spanish fleet would be blockaded, as indeed it was; and as a natural and logical inference, that the enemy's objective would be the city and harbor of Santiago, where the only battle ships that Spain had in the Antilles, or at least in the Greater Antilla, had taken refuge.

Thus, the arrival of the fleet gave this city a military importance which without that event it would never have acquired, and changed it to the principal—not to say, the only—scene of operations in the island, the dénouement of which would necessarily be of great interest and of powerful influence on the result of the campaign and the war. Subsequent events have shown the truth of my assumption, which was also the assumption of everybody else in the city.

From that time on, I have kept an exact diary, from day to day, from hour to hour, from minute to minute even—and when I say this I am not exaggerating, for it is still in existence and may be seen—of everything I saw, or that came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official capacity, or that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy.

When some official duty prevented me, I was ably replaced by my friend, Mr. Dario Laguna, aid of the captaincy of the port (*ayudante de la capitania de puerto*), who gladly rendered the service I asked of him, in spite of his constant and manifold obligations.

If truth is a merit, these "Notes" (begging pardon for my want of modesty) possess it, though it may be their only merit. Whatever they contain has actually happened, and those who have returned from Santiago will testify to it. Not a single fact, no matter how insignificant, herein related, is doubtful or hypothetical. Wherever I did not know the outcome of any event, or where its objects or consequences have remained a mystery, I have openly acknowledged it, without circumlocution, as any one may see who reads these notes. There is in them nothing of my own invention, and my imagination has had nothing to do with them, fortunately, for I do not possess the gift of invention, which I admire so much in others. My work has been confined to gathering data and obtaining as much information as possible, my only care having been to see that everything was correct, and I have made sure of this by comparing the data collected with the information obtained.

Feeling sure that the events which have taken place from May 18 to July 17—hence the true situation in which were Santiago de Cuba and the forces defending it—can not be known in Spain in detail, but only in general, I am desirous of making them known in their whole truth, so that the country, to whom I think that we who were intrusted with defending its honor and interests at a distance of fifteen hundred leagues, owe the strictest account, may be able, with a complete knowledge of the facts, to call us to account, if it thinks that we have incurred any responsibility.

Such has been my object, and I trust that my comrades of Santiago de Cuba, both in the Army and in the Navy, will approve of it.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *August 10, 1898.*

IV.

THE SCENE OF EVENTS.

In order to be able to form at least an approximate idea of the events which are taking place here, and of which no one knows as yet when and how they will end, it is indispensable to know the location of the places where they are occurring, and for that reason I will describe them as briefly as possible, referring the reader to the sketch at the end of this book and the explanations concerning the different places.

Santiago de Cuba, the capital of the province of the same name, occupying the eastern part of the island, contained at the beginning of the present insurrection about 45,000 inhabitants; but the population has been reduced to about three-fourths of that, owing to emigrations and epidemics. The city is built on very hilly ground, at the head of a bay which is almost entirely closed in and very safe, so that, when seen from the city, it looks more like a lake than an arm of the sea. The distance to the mouth of the harbor in a straight line is about 4 miles.

This mouth, which is extremely narrow, is bounded on the east by the heights of the Morro and on the west by those of the Socapa, both of which are very steep toward the south, that is, where they border on the sea.

At Punta Morrillo, the western extremity of the Morro heights, which latter rise about 65 meters above the level of the sea, is situated Morro Castle, which was at one time a very good fort, well built, but in these days of modern artillery it is not only useless, but even dangerous on account of the target which it presents, and this was the opinion of the junta of defense when they decided that whatever artillery was to be installed there should be erected on the plateau of the Morro and not inside of the castle. On this plateau are also situated the houses of the governor, the adjutant of the fort, the engineers and gunners, the lookout and the light-house keepers, also the light-house itself, which is a white light, fixed, flashing every two minutes, and visible 16 miles. Since May 18, in consequence of the events of that day, it has not been lighted.

The heights of the Socapa, whose elevation is about the same as that of the Morro heights, bound on the west, as already stated, the mouth of the harbor, and contain no fortification nor defense of any kind.

Ships wanting to enter Santiago Harbor must follow the Morro shore, which is bold and comparatively clear, while on the Socapa shore is Diamante Bank, consisting of rocks, leaving a channel whose depth varies between 6 and 11 meters. Between the place where Diamante buoy is anchored (in 30 feet of water) and Estrella Cove the channel is not over 50 fathoms wide. At the head of this cove, which only small boats can enter, is the hut of the English cable.

The course to be taken in order to enter the harbor is NE. 5° N. (true), until coming close to Estrella battery, an old fort which, like the Morro, was good in its time, but is now useless. From this point to Punta Soldado, which is on the eastern shore of the bay and which, with Punta Churruca, forms the entrance of Nispero Bay, the course is north, leaving to starboard Santa Catalina battery, which is abandoned and in ruins.

From Punta Soldado the course is NNW. until coming close to Cay Smith, which is to be left to port; from there the course must be shaped so as to avoid the Punta Gorda Bank, whose beacon, marking 18 feet, is to be left to starboard.

Cay Smith is a small island, or rather a large rock of small surface and great elevation, on the top of which is a small stone hermitage of modern construction; on its southern slope are 111 houses and cottages belonging to pilots, fishermen, and private citizens, who have built them for the purpose of spending the hottest season there. In the northern part there are no buildings whatever, the ground being inaccessible.

After passing Punta Gorda, the course is to be shaped for Punta Jutias, leaving to port Colorado Shoals, containing a beacon, and Cay Ratones. The latter is a small low island devoid of all vegetation. In the extreme north is a powder magazine, and in the south the guardroom of the same.

From Punta Jutias, the course is NNE. until reaching the general anchoring place, which is 8 meters deep (oozy bottom).

Santiago de Cuba has, besides many minor piers for boats and small craft, the Royal Pier and the piers of Luz and San José, all built of wood; only ships of less than 14 feet draft can go alongside of these. Between the city and Punta Jutias, at a place called Las Cruces, is the pier of the same name, built of iron with stone abutments, belonging to the American company of the Jurgua iron mines; it has a watering place, the water coming from Aguadores in pipes. Ships of large draft can go alongside of this pier. A narrow-gauge railroad from the mines, passing over 26 kilometres of ground, goes to the extreme end of the pier.

Santiago is an open city, with not a vestige of fortification in its precinct (I am speaking of the beginning of the present war), and

only at Punta Blanca, situated just south of it, is a battery of the same name, with a small powder magazine, intended only for saluting purposes and to answer salutes of war ships casting anchor in the harbor.

From the above it will be seen that the mouth of Santiago Harbor is defended by nature in such a manner that nothing is easier than to render it truly impregnable in a short time by installing modern artillery in batteries erected where it would be most necessary and convenient. The heights of the Morro and Socapa have a full view of the sea, and being difficult of access by land, they are easy to defend. Punta Gorda, owing to its admirable location and being high above the level of the sea, has entire control of the channel, and any ship trying to enter would necessarily be exposed to its fire and present her bow and port for at least twenty minutes. The very narrow entrance is well adapted for laying lines of torpedoes which could be easily protected by rapid-fire artillery erected on the western shore, preventing them from being dragged or blown up. Moreover, no matter how large a fleet might attempt to force the harbor, as but one vessel can pass through the channel at a time, and that only with the greatest care and precautions if it is over 80 meters long, nothing is easier than to sink it; and in that event, the channel would be completely obstructed and the harbor closed, until the submerged vessel is blown up.

It is evident, and almost superfluous for me to mention it, that with the same ease that a fleet trying to force the harbor can be prevented from entering, another fleet can be prevented from leaving it. But since Spain, in spite of all that was being done in the United States, never for a moment believed that war would come, it has not occurred to her to fortify this harbor. There were no guns; but on the other hand, plenty of good plans and designs which the military authorities in Santiago have never been able to have carried into effect, for the simple reason that the Government never got around to ordering that it be done.

Three miles west of the entrance of the Morro is the small harbor of Cabañas, which, while accessible only for small vessels, is very safe and well suited for landing purposes. It has 6 feet of water at the bar and 5 fathoms inside. The distance by land from Cabañas to Cabañitas on Santiago Bay is about a league.

Six miles farther west, or 9 miles from Santiago, is Punta Cabrera, the headland extending farthest south and the last one which can be seen. It is a high cone-shaped mountain. As the coast is very accessible, vessels of great draft can approach it. At the small cove of Guaicabon, east of said point, boats can land and communicate with the shore, which, in fact, is being done at

this time by a steam yacht of the American fleet, which is probably receiving confidential information from the insurgents. Guai-cabon is about 2 leagues from Santiago by land and the road is good.

Three miles east of the Morro is Aguadores Bay; it is crossed by a high bridge, over which passes the railroad of the Juragua mines. Boats can enter the river which empties into this bay; it is an excellent place for landing.

A quarter of a mile farther east is the roadstead of Sardinero, with a river emptying into it.

Three-fourths of a mile from there is Jutici, a small roadstead with a watering place.

Ten miles farther on is Juragua Beach, with a river that boats can enter.

Fifteen miles from there is Daiquiri Bay, with a river and watering place. Boats can enter here. Daiquiri Bay has a very fine stone and iron pier, also a small one for minor craft. Ashore, a short distance from the pier, are the offices of the employees of the mines and railroad for the transportation of the mineral from the mines to the pier, about 6 miles long. Large vessels can go alongside the iron pier.

Finally, 20 miles farther east is Punta Berracos, the last point which can be distinguished from the Morro, and the one projecting farthest south. Although it is possible to land here, with a great deal of work, it is not advisable to do so, there being no watering place and no road.

In all these places, east as well as west of Santiago, vessels can not remain with strong south or southeast winds, but must necessarily put to sea.

Aguadores and Santiago are connected by the Juragua railroad. The road along the coast is bad; it is a little over a league long.

From Sardinero to Santiago there are 2 leagues of good road.

The road leading from Juraguacito to Santiago is the Guásimas road, which is good, beginning at El Caney. It is 4 leagues long.

From Juragua to Santiago is the Sevilla road, which also leads to El Caney. This road and the former meet at a place called Dos Caminos. It is a good road, and about 4 leagues long. Moreover, as has been stated, there is a narrow-gauge railroad from the mines, which passes through Aguadores and terminates at Las Cruces Pier.

At Berracos there are no roads whatever, only paths, over which it is not possible to transport artillery.

The railroad to San Luis, 32,460 meters long, starts from Santiago and passes through the following points: Santiago, Cuavitas (station), Boniato, San Vicente, Dos Bocas (station), Cristo, Moron, Dos Caminos, and San Luis.

From Cristo a branch line of 10,300 meters goes to Songo. Trains are now running as far as Socorro.

These are the different places which form the scene of the events now claiming the attention of the island of Cuba, and probably also of the Peninsula; and these events, whatever may be their outcome, will be of great importance and powerful influence on the result of the war.

V.

FORCES OF THE JURISDICTION.

The present insurrection broke out on February 24, 1895, in the eastern provinces, but it soon invaded the western provinces and spread over the whole island from Cape San Antonio to Cape Maisí.

In order to check it, or at least reduce it to narrower limits, General Weyler conceived and carried out the plan of moving his forces from west to east, building trochas to prevent the insurgents from again invading the pacified provinces, or to inclose them between two lines of soldiers more or less difficult to force.

Consequently the greater part of the forces of the army of Cuba occupied the provinces of Pinar del Río, Havana, Matanzas, and Las Villas, for the purpose of carrying on active operations there, leaving a very small number at Camaguey, and still less in the eastern provinces. These latter provinces, therefore, could do nothing more than defend the country and the cities and towns and prevent the enemy from entering them. Hence, when the war with the United States broke out, the division of Santiago, consisting of two brigades, had to cover the districts of Santiago, Guantánamo, Baracoa, and Sagua; and it is only necessary to cast a glance at the map in order to understand how difficult it would be to control such an immense territory with such scant forces, which had to garrison many cities, towns, forts, and redoubts, cover four railway lines (from Santiago to Sabanillo and Maroto, to Juragua, to Daiquiri, and from Caimanera to Guantánamo), act as convoys, protect the mineral regions, and provide also for the formation of more or less numerous flying columns to harass the enemy incessantly. Fortunately this division was in command of General Linares, whose energy and zeal can never be sufficiently praised, and whose well-deserved promotion to lieutenant general was learned here by cable about the middle of May.

As the events which I propose to relate are only those directly concerning Santiago de Cuba and its jurisdiction, where they have taken place and which I have had a chance to witness, they will be the only ones that I shall refer to.

The first brigade of the division consisted of the following forces:

Chief of division, Lieut. Gen. Arsenio Linares Pombo;

Chief of staff, Lieut. Col. Ventura Fontán;

Military governor of Santiago and chief of the forces of that division, General of Division José Toral;

Chief of staff, Luis Irlés;

Chief of the San Luis brigade, General of Brigade Joaquín Vara del Rey;

Chief of staff, Captain Juan Ramos.

It will be seen from the above that the brigade was really divided into two divisions, one under the orders of General Toral, and the other under the orders of General Vara del Rey. The forces composing both divisions were as follows:

Twelve companies of mobilized troops;

Two squads of the regiment of royal cavalry (less than 200 horse);

Two battalions of the regiment of Santiago infantry;

One Asiatic battalion;

One provincial battalion of Puerto Rico, No. 1;

One battalion of San Fernando;

One battalion "Constitucion;"

Also half a battery of artillery and a small force of the civil guard and engineers.

To these forces must be added the battalion of Talavera, which General Linares ordered from Baracoa as soon as the present war was declared and in anticipation of coming events.

These forces form at most a total of 8,000 men.

General of Brigade Antero Rubín was under orders of General Linares.

Colonel of Engineers Florencio Caula was commander of engineers of the city, and Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar commander of artillery; the latter turned his command over to Colonel Ordóñez on April 29 upon being appointed superintendent of the artillery park.

Administrative chief, First-class Commissary Julio Cuevas.

Chief of the civil guard, Col. Francisco Oliveros.

Superintendent of the military hospital, Sub-inspector Pedro Martín García.

Governor of Morro Castle, Commander of Infantry Antonio Ros.

When the first insurrection broke out in the Island of Cuba in 1868, bodies of volunteers were formed which have rendered good services as garrisons of the fortified places. At Santiago, according to official statements, there were the following:

	Men.
First battalion: Col. Manuel Barrueco.....	630
Second battalion: Lieut. Col. José Marimón.....	485
Firemen: Col. Emilio Aguerrizábal.....	324
Company of guides: Capt. Federico Bosch.....	200
Company of veterans: Capt. José Prat.....	130
Squad of cavalry.....	100
Total	1,869

Santiago de Cuba is the capital of the maritime comandancia of the same name, bounded on the south by Junco Creek and on the north by Sagua de Tánamo, and divided into four districts: Manzanillo, Santiago de Cuba, Guantánamo, and Baracoa. The commander of this maritime comandancia was Capt. Pelayo Pedemonte, of the navy.

The prelate of the archdiocese was Francisco Sáenz de Urturi.
Governor of the province, Leonardo Ros.

President of the audiencia territorial, Rafael Nacarino Brabo.
Mayor, Gabriel Ferrer.

The consular corps was represented by the following gentlemen:
Frederick W. Ramsden, England;

Hermann Michaelsen, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium,
Italy;

E. Hippean, France;

Pablo Bory, Mexico;

Juan E. Rabelo, Santo Domingo;

Temístocles Rabelo, Paraguay;

Juan Rey, Hayti.

The vice-consuls were:

Jacobo Bravo, United States of Colombia;

Isidoro Agustini, Sweden and Norway;

Leonardo Ros, Netherlands;

Modesto Ros, Portugal;

Eduardo Miranda, Venezuela;

Robert Mason, China;

José J. Hernández, Argentine Republic.

The United States consul left on April 7 in an English steamer bound for Jamaica, having turned over the archives of his consulate to the British consul.

VI.

WORKS OF DEFENSE.

The governments of Spain have thought more than once of fortifying the coasts of the Island of Cuba, and for that purpose committees have been appointed who have studied the matter and submitted many good, even excellent, plans, which have been approved, but never carried into effect.

There was at Santiago a junta of land and marine defenses of the city, composed of the following persons:

President, the military governor of the city, General of Division José Toral; voting members, the commander of marine, Capt. Pelayo Pedemonte; the commander of engineers of the city, Col. Florencio Caula; the commander of artillery of the city, Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar; and the chief of submarine defenses, First Lieut. José Müller, of the navy.

The latter officer, whose regular office was that of second commander of marine, was only temporarily chief of submarine defenses, in the absence of torpedo officers, he not being one.

This junta held meetings whenever it was deemed necessary, until April 8, when a cablegram from the captain general of the island ordered that it become permanent, and that the commander of marine give his opinion as to the suitability of laying torpedoes. The junta, taking into account the grave situation, the imminence of war, and the scarcity of artillery material and appliances and resources of every kind, expressed the unanimous opinion that the only defense that could be counted on for the harbor were the torpedoes, for which the material was at hand, and consequently that they should be given preference, and everything within human power done to protect them and prevent their being dragged or blown up; in a word, that the torpedoes should be placed as the only veritable defense and everything else subordinated to them.

As early as the second day of the same month (April) the commander of submarine defenses, in compliance with orders received, had already commenced to charge the Latiner-Clark torpedoes, transferring them to Cay Ratones, where the powder magazine was located that contained the gun-cotton, also to place the buoys for the first row of torpedoes, and to carry out other operations in connection therewith.

The junta of defense, in view of the poor condition of Morro Castle and Estrella and Catalina batteries and of the information which the American consul would probably give his Government, decided to remove the torpedo-firing and converging stations from said forts where they were and erect them at places on the bay where they would be protected and sheltered from the hostile fire, and this was done.

On April 14 the second commander of marine turned over the submarine defenses to a torpedo officer, Lieut. Mauricio Arauco, commander of the gunboat *Alvarado*, who continued the work of laying the torpedoes; the first row, consisting of seven, with their firing stations at the Estrella and Socapa, was finished by April 21, and the second row, consisting of six, with stations at the Socapa and Cay Smith, on the 27th.

By orders of the commander general of marine (Havana), the second commander of marine of the province, together with Colonel of Engineers Angel Rosell and Captain of Artillery Ballenilla, left for Guantánamo on April 21, for the purpose of selecting the most suitable site for planting Bustamante torpedoes in that harbor so as to prevent ships from reaching Caimanera, returning to Santiago on the 25th after finishing the investigation. The torpedoes were subsequently placed by First Lieut. Julián García Durán at the site selected.

On the 23d, the gunboat *Sandoval* left for Guantánamo, where her crew was to plant the Bustamante torpedoes. She has since remained at that harbor.

Two days before, on the 21st, orders were received from Havana to remove from the interior of the harbor all light buoys and beacons, which orders were promptly complied with.

It was also agreed by the junta of defense to establish at Punta Gorda a battery composed of two 15-cm. Mata howitzers and two 9-cm. Krupp guns, and the corps of engineers at once proceeded to clear the plateau of the mountain, build the road, and do other work preparatory to erecting such battery. By the 26th, the two howitzers were ready to fire, and the two guns by the 27th, all of them being breechloaders. This battery, which, as will be seen later, had two 16-cm. Hontoria guns, is the best of all the batteries erected, because it was done with less haste, and perhaps also because the ground was particularly well adapted. It was placed in command of Captain of Artillery Seijas, who had previously had command of the Morro battery.

On April 18 there arrived from Havana three 21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzers, and a few days later, in the steamer *Reina de los Angeles*, three more from the same city.

A cablegram from Havana stated that, according to information received, the steamer *Margrave* would try to cut the cable at Santiago, thereby cutting off our communications, and it was therefore ordered to erect on the esplanade of the Morro two old 16-cm. guns, more for the purpose of making signals than to attack the enemy. They were both taken up there; one of them was mounted on a wooden carriage and the other was not mounted.

On April 21, two short 8-cm. Plasencia guns (breech-loading) were mounted at Estrella Cove.

At the Estrella battery there had been installed some time ago an old 21-cm. rifled howitzer, and another partly installed. In view of the unfavorable location of the battery, it was decided to abandon both; but after the 28th, the second was mounted, also the two Plasencia guns that had previously been erected at Estrella Cove, together with two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns. Not a single one of these pieces was fired. The battery was in command of Lieutenant of Artillery Sánchez of the reserve forces; he was subsequently assigned to the artillery of the precinct.

By May 28, five 16-cm. rifled muzzle-loading bronze guns had been mounted on the esplanade of the Morro.

On June 21, a 21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzer was erected at the same place, and another on the 25th.

On the high battery of the Socapa were mounted: on June 13, a 21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzer; another on the 16th; another on the 17th.

RÉSUMÉ.

Punta Gorda battery, in command of Captain of Artillery Seijas:

Two 15-cm. Mata howitzers;

Two 9-cm. breech-loading Krupp guns.

Estrella battery, in command of Lieutenant Sánchez:

Two 21-cm. old howitzers;

Two 8-cm. modern Plasencia guns;

Two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns (old).

None of these were fired.

Morro battery, first in command of Captain Seijas, later of Lieutenant León:

Five old 16-cm. guns;

Two old 21-cm. howitzers.

High battery of the Socapa:

Three old 21-cm. howitzers.

It will be seen that this whole artillery includes only six breech-loading guns, four erected at Punta Gorda and two Plasencia guns at Estrella, which latter two, owing to the location of said battery, could not be fired. All the others were old guns, and it is

well known that it takes a long time to load them and that their fire is very uncertain.

The dates when these different guns were erected and ready to fire should be kept in mind, so as to know which could answer hostile attacks and which not on the different days when the enemy bombarded the mouth of the harbor and the bay.

VII.

ARTILLERY SET UP.

It will be sufficient to remember what has been said in the preceding chapter to understand that, in spite of the fact that Santiago has a harbor which is so easy to defend and the possession of which it was so imperative to maintain, in spite of its being the capital of the eastern half of the island and at such a long distance from Havana, there were at Santiago at the time the present war broke out not more than six modern breech-loading guns, namely, two 15-cm. Mata howitzers, two 9-cm. Krupp guns, and two 8-cm. Plasencia guns. That was all the artillery worthy of the name, and even these guns, owing to their small calibers, were useless, or almost so, against armorclads and cruisers.

The others, as has been seen, were old bronze and even iron muzzle-loaders which could not fire more than one shot to every twenty fired from one of the enemy's guns, and all they sent us from Havana were six 21-cm. howitzers, likewise old muzzle-loaders, this being all the material received here to oppose a powerful modern fleet. These facts might appear exaggerated if there were not others that appear still more so, but which are shown in official statements and statistics of forces available, and these can not be doubted. For the service of all the guns, including those set up in the precinct, there were only 79 gunners; of course, it became necessary to complete the indispensable number with soldiers of the infantry.

To mount this artillery, which was defective if not entirely useless, but which was nevertheless set up at the Morro, Punta Gorda, and the Socapa, endless difficulties had to be overcome and work done which only the intelligence, energy, and perseverance of the chiefs and officers and the subordination and good will of the soldiers could accomplish, when resources and aids of every kind were absolutely lacking.

By simply looking at the esplanade of the Morro, one would realize the work it must have required to take guns up there weighing three or four thousand kilos, by a road which, I believe, has not been repaired once since the castle was first built.

To install the guns at Punta Gorda everything had to be done from building the pier, where the guns were landed, to clearing the summit of the mountain, where they were set up, and opening a zigzag road by which they were taken there.

To mount the howitzers at the Socapa was truly a piece of work worthy of Romans, and of the six received only three could be set up.

But where the corps of engineers never rested for a moment, and accomplished the most difficult work with the smallest force, was around the city in a line about 14 kilometers long.

Closer to the city three lines of defenses were built, with trenches, breastworks, inclosures, wire fences, and whatever other obstacles the configuration of the ground might suggest; the so-called forts, already in existence, were improved and new ones built; in a word, an open city, which had no fortifications of any kind to oppose to the enemy, was, in the short space of a few days, placed in condition of resistance with chances of success.

From the moment that our fleet entered Santiago Harbor, it was not difficult to surmise that it would become the enemy's objective, upon which all his efforts would be concentrated, and it was for that reason, always expecting the landing which was finally effected, that the work above described was carried out, and the rest of the artillery of the city, likewise old, mounted in the following positions:

June 12—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, at Fort San Antonio;
 One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Santa Inés;
 Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at Fort San Antonio.

June 13—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, and
 One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at the entrance to El Caney.

June 14—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun;
 One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun, and
 Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at El Sueño.

June 16—One 16-cm. gun, and
 Two short 8-cm. guns at Santa Ursula.

June 17—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun at Cañadas.

June 25—One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Horno;
 One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Nuevo.

After the battle of July 1 the following were mounted:

At Santa Ursula—Two long 12-cm. rifled bronze guns.

At entrance of El Caney—Two guns of same type as above.

At Santa Inés—One long 8-cm. bronze gun (old). The breech pieces of this latter gun were missing.

With General Escario's column two 8-cm. Plasencia guns arrived from Manzanilo; but, like all those mounted since July 1, they did not get a chance of being fired, the battles having ceased by that time.

Hence the only modern artillery existing in the precinct of the city, namely, one 9-cm. Honteria, two 75-mm. Maxim, and two 8-cm. Plascencia guns, was not fired.

All the 8-cm. guns had been pronounced useless by the central junta of Havana, and, far from being effective, they were even dangerous.

The 12-cm. guns were mounted in carriages of other guns, and were therefore useless in themselves, without being disabled by the enemy.

VIII.

THE CRUISER "REINA MERCEDES."

It does not require a deep knowledge of artillery to understand that the batteries erected at the Morro and Socapa, and even at Punta Gorda, were powerless, or almost so, against armored and protected ships. As to the Estrella battery, I even refrain from mentioning it, because owing to its location it was not fired at all. Of the only modern artillery, at Punta Gorda, the guns were of small caliber, and the howitzers, owing to their indirect fire, are very uncertain against ships which occupy comparatively very little space. As to the guns of the Morro and Socapa, when I say that they were old howitzers I think I have said enough. Having had no other artillery, it may well be supposed that we, who witnessed and sustained the blockade of Santiago, feel satisfaction and pride in being able to say that we kept the American fleet, notwithstanding its power and the number of its guns, for seventy days, namely, from May 18 to July 17, in front of the mouth of the harbor, on the sea, and at a respectable distance from our batteries, which they were unable to silence, and not daring to force the entrance.

It is only just to say, and I take pleasure in doing so, that this result is due, in the first place, to the cruiser *Reina Mercedes*, under the command of Captain Rafael Micón, and in the second place, to our fleet anchored in the bay, and which the enemy would have had to fight after forcing the harbor, provided they had succeeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have thought of it.

Owing to the very bad condition of the boilers of the *Reina Mercedes*, it was impossible for her to proceed to Havana, as most of the vessels cruising in these waters did sooner or later, and it was taken for granted that, in view of her condition, she would play but a very secondary part during the events here; it did not occur to anyone that the *Mercedes* might become, if not the salvation, yet the providence, so to speak, of Santiago Harbor, and that she was to be of such great assistance to the heroic defense made by the batteries.

Her crew had been considerably reduced by detachments and sickness, but it was well disciplined and enthusiastic, and commanded by chiefs and officers as intelligent as they were energetic and indefatigable. The vessel cast anchor at the Socapa on March

23 and proceeded to send down her yards and topmasts and protect her starboard side (the one she presented to the mouth of the harbor) with her light cables, thereby protecting the torpedo magazine as much as possible from the hostile fire.

On the 26th, in obedience to superior orders, she had to undo everything that had been done and again anchor in the bay, returning to the Socapa a few days later, when she went to work once more sending down the masts, protecting her side, etc.

At the same time one of her steam launches, with a crew from the *Mercedes*, rendered service at the comandancia de marina, where she became indispensable, and the other steam launch and the boats assisted in laying the torpedoes, towing launches, and did a thousand other things, some of them not properly belonging to vessels, but all equally indispensable.

On May 7 work was commenced on dismounting four of the 16-cm. Hontoria guns, under the direction of Boatswain Antonio Rodríguez Díaz, a derrick having been erected for that purpose, which removed the guns with their mounts from the vessel. The latter now had only the two bow guns left to defend the mouth of the harbor and rows of torpedoes.

All of the four guns were taken up to the Socapa by fifty sailors of the *Mercedes* and forty of Captain Mateu's guerrillas. One was mounted and ready to fire by the evening of the 18th, the other by the 28th, the engineers having previously finished the trenches and cement foundations for setting them up.

The third gun was mounted at Punta Gorda by a crew from the vessel by June 2, and by the 17th the fourth and last one had been mounted. These two 16-cm. Hontoria guns, erected on the western slope of Punta Gorda, were placed in charge of Ensign Vial, under the command of Captain of Artillery Seijas.

The two Hontoria guns at the Socapa were placed in charge of Ensigns Nardiz and Bruquetas respectively.

The erection of the last gun mounted at Punta Gorda was superintended by Boatswain Ricardo Rodríguez Paz, Boatswain Rodríguez who had superintended the others having been wounded.

These four guns were mounted for the purpose of directly attacking the hostile fleet.

The crew of the *Mercedes*, besides defending the torpedó lines and preventing the approach of small craft that might attempt to disable them, also mounted at the lower battery of the Socapa, west of the channel of the harbor, the following guns:

One 57-mm. Nordenfeldt gun;

Four 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns;

One 25-mm. Nordenfeldt machine gun.

The latter belonged to the submarine defenses, the others to the *Mercedes*. Lieutenant Camino was placed in command of this battery.

It seems almost superfluous to state that all the artillery from the *Mercedes* set up ashore was served by men and commanded by officers from the crew of the vessel and that the same difficulties were encountered in this work as in the land defenses, there being the same obstacles and the same lack of resources and appliances; moreover, two of the torpedo firing stations were manned by officers from the *Mercedes*; they actually seemed to multiply themselves to be able to render all these services. Words fail me to do justice to the officers and men for the work accomplished, especially while the guns were being mounted in the batteries.

Although it may be anticipating events, I can not help but say that some ships, like some men, seem preordained to be martyrs. When long afterwards the *Mercedes* returned to the bay, having left the anchoring place at the Socapa on account of the many casualties which she had suffered *passively*, if I may be permitted the expression, the American ships, by a singular coincidence, threw their projectiles at the very spot where she was at anchor, as though an invisible hand had been guiding them.

Finally, when she had nothing left her but her hull to offer in sacrifice, she went down in the channel of the harbor, in order to oppose to the very last moment, and even after death, an enemy whom she had so fiercely fought during her life-time. Peace to her remains!

IX.

THE TWO FLEETS.

When the war between Spain and the United States became a fact, it is hard to tell how much was said and written about the Spanish fleet, or rather, fleets; everybody knows of the thousands of items which appeared in the newspapers concerning the purchase of ships, to such an extent that, if all could have been believed, our navy would have been vastly superior to that of the United States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the least optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered best informed as belonging to the profession and who knew to a certain extent what we could expect, counted on not less than eight battle ships leaving the Peninsula, to say nothing of the transports, torpedo boats, destroyers, etc. How much we were mistaken!

On the 19th of May, at 5.50 o'clock a. m., the look-out signaled five steamers to the south; shortly after it was signaled that the five steamers were five warships, and a little later that they were Spanish. So the much wished-for fleet had arrived, which, according to the newspapers, was under the command of Vice Admiral Butler.

At 7.15, the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, hoisting the rear admiral's flag, was sighted from the captaincy of the port; a few minutes later, she cast anchor in the bay, some distance from the royal pier, her draught not permitting her to go nearer. Then the *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, and *Cristóbal Colón* anchored one after the other, the last named with the flag of the second-in-command (brigadier); then the destroyer *Plutón* entered, went out again without anchoring, and returned an hour later with the *Furor*, of the same class, and both anchored at a convenient place.

The day when the fleet entered Santiago harbor was one of those beautiful mornings that are so frequent in tropical countries; not the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, not the least cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwithstanding all that the local papers have said, very few were the people who came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the exception of the official element and a small number of Peninsulars, the arrival of our warships inspired no interest, nor even curiosity.

And I say this and want it understood, because it is the best proof of the sympathies which the country professes for us and of which it gives us constantly unquestionable proofs whenever opportunity offers.

The fleet was under the command of the eminent Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, who, as already stated, had hoisted his flag on the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, Captain Joaquin Bustamente being chief of the general staff. The second in command was Captain José de Paredes, who had hoisted his flag on the *Cristóbal Colón*.

The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, built at the Nervión shipyards, is a ship of 103.63 metres length, 19.81 beam, and 7,000 tons displacement, with a draught of 6.55 metres. Her engines develop 13,700 I. H. P., giving her a speed of 20.25 miles. Her armament consists of two 28-cm. Hontoria guns (mounted in turrets, one forward and one aft); ten 14-cm. Hontoria guns; eight 57-mm. Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns; eight 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns, and two 11-mm. machine guns. She was commanded by Captain Victor Concas.

The *Vizcaya*, commanded by Captain Antonio Eulate, and the *Oquendo*, commanded by Captain Juan B. Lagaza, are exactly like the *Maria Teresa* and built at the same yards.

The *Cristóbal Colón*, under the command of Captain Emilio Diaz Moren, was acquired in Genoa from the firm of Ansaldo. She is 100 metres long by 18.20 beam; her displacement is 6,840 tons and her draught 7.75 metres; her speed is 20 miles and her engines develop 13,000 I. H. P. Her armament consists of two 25.4-cm. Armstrong guns (in turrets); ten 13.2-cm. guns; six 12-cm. guns; ten 57-mm. Nordenfeldt guns; ten 37-mm. and two machine guns.

Important note: The last-named ship, her 25.4-cm. or large calibre guns mounted in turrets not being ready, had to go without them.

The destroyer *Plutón* was commanded by Lieutenant Pedro Vázquez, and the *Furor*, of the same class, by Lieutenant Diego Carlier; both of them were under the command of Captain Fernando Villaamil.

The arrival of these six ships produced real enthusiasm among the better peninsular element in Santiago, especially as nobody wanted to believe that they were the only ones that Spain was going to send, since they were called the "first division," and at least two more divisions were expected. The only ones who had no illusions, who knew what to expect, who were acquainted with the true condition of affairs, were those who had arrived in the ships: From the admiral down to the last midshipman, they

knew perfectly well that there were no more fleets, no more divisions, no more vessels, and that those six ships (if the destroyers may be counted as such) were all that could be counted on to oppose the American fleet, which consists of the following ships, not including those in construction, and taking into account only armored and protected ships—that is, those of the first and second classes:

Iowa, 11,340 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 18 guns.

Indiana, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns.

Massachusetts, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns.

Oregon, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns.

Brooklyn, 9,215 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 20 guns.

New York, 9,200 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 18 guns.

Columbia, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.

Minneapolis, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.

Texas, 6,315 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 8 guns.

Puritan, 6,060 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 10 guns.

Olympia, 5,870 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 14 guns.

Chicago, 4,500 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 18 guns.

Baltimore, 4,413 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 10 guns.

Philadelphia, 4,324 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns.

Monterey, 4,084 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser (with turrets), 4 guns.

Newark, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns.

San Francisco, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns.

Charleston, 3,730 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 8 guns.

Miantonomoh, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns.

Amphitrite, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns.

Monadnock, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns.

Terror, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns.

Cincinnati, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.

Raleigh, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.

Note: Before war was declared, they bought of Brazil the *Amazonas*, a magnificent protected cruiser of more than 6,000 tons, with perfect armament. She was one of the ships that blockaded this port.

It is to be noted that in the first eleven ships enumerated, the number of guns stated is only that of the large-calibre guns, that

is, from 16-cm. upward, without including rapid-fire, revolving, machine guns, etc.

The first four, namely, the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon*, have four 32-cm. guns each, that is to say, larger guns than the medium-calibre ones of the *Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Viscaya*, each of which had but two 28-cm. guns. The *Cristóbal Colón*, as has already been stated, did not have her large guns mounted.

Shortly after the fleet had anchored, the civil and military authorities went on board to pay their respects to Admiral Cervera.

It will be remembered that these ships had been assembled at the Cape Verde Islands and that many notes were exchanged on that subject between the Governments of Spain and the United States, until finally the Spanish Government gave definite orders for the ships to proceed to the Island of Cuba.

They arrived at Martinique, where they left the destroyer *Terror*, commanded by Lieut. Francisco de la Rocha, for the reason that the vessel had sustained injuries to her boiler and was no longer able to follow the fleet. From Martinique, the ships proceeded to Curaçao, where only two ships could take a small quantity of coal, as the laws of that Dutch colony did not allow any more to enter the harbor. Finally, as stated above, the fleet reached this harbor, without having met Admiral Sampson's fleet, whether accidentally, or whether Admiral Cervera went by way of Curaçao on purpose to mislead the American admiral, I do not know.

X.

PROVISIONS OF THE CITY.

So far my task has been, if not easy, at least pleasant, for in honor of the truth and deference to justice, I will say that all persons who have so far figured, directly or indirectly, in the events under discussion, deserve praise and congratulations. Unfortunately, I can not say as much regarding the question of provisions, which is of such great importance, and has had so much to do with the capitulation of this city.

It is far from me to want to mention or censure any person or persons in particular. I am citing facts which everyone knows, and I believe it to be a duty which I must not shun to set forth everything with perfect impartiality. I am making history, and with that I have said everything.

The city of Santiago de Cuba has never been very well supplied and provisions have never been abundant there.

It is only just to state that the whole military element of the province and also the hospitals were nine or ten months in arrears in the payment of consignments. They had been living on credit for some time, and the firms furnishing the supplies, not being able to order new ones and meet their obligations, had allowed their stores to run very low. We were passing through one of those crises which were so frequent in our last war, and which, unfortunately, are being repeated in this, owing to the parsimony of the Treasury.

But now, under the circumstances in which Santiago de Cuba was, the problem assumed more serious shape, for living became almost impossible. Everything was lacking: articles of food, prospects, money; our credit and purchasing resources were exhausted. And this was the case not only at the capital, but extended to the whole division. What happened at Santiago, also happened at Manzanillo, Holguin, Puerto Príncipe, Ciego de Avila, Morón, Espíritu, and other places of the island, namely, the cities supplied the people of the surrounding country and the latter had no provisions or stores to furnish in return.

Moreover, the merchants of this city, little given to great enterprises and risky speculations, did not have on hand any more than

what they felt sure they could sell in a short time. And, therefore, I repeat it, provisions, even those of first necessity, were certainly not abundant, and everybody knew that when the hostile ships should arrive to blockade the city, as must happen sooner or later, these would soon give out. A few families understood it and laid in supplies in anticipation of what was to come, and they certainly did not regret it, for their fears were realized, although, be it said in honor of the truth, there was no motive or reason to justify such a condition of affairs.

War was officially declared on April 21, and until the 18th of May not a single hostile ship appeared in sight of the harbor. There were in it five Spanish merchant vessels, which were prevented from leaving by the breaking out of hostilities, the *Méjico*, *Mortera*, *San Juan*, *Reina de los Angeles*, and *Tomas Brooks*. Jamaica is only 80 miles from Santiago, and yet not a single sack of flour entered the city since before the 21st of April, when a small English sailing schooner came from there with a cargo of butter, potatoes, onions, and corn meal, which she sold for a good price without landing it at the custom-house. The example was not followed; everybody saw the possibility of the conflict, which had to come, without trying to prevent it.

Had it not been for the arrival of the German steamer *Polaria*, which, fortunately, left at Santiago 1,700 sacks of rice intended for Havana, there would have been an absolute lack of provisions, as neither the merchants nor anyone else attempted to import them.

The last provisions entering the trading houses were brought by the steamer *Mortera* on the 25th of April, consisting of 150 head of cattle, 180,000 rations of flour, 149,000 of peas, 197,000 of rice, 79,000 of beans, and 96,000 of wine. Now, without including the forces of Guantánamo, Baracoa, and Sagua de Tánamo, the needs of the troops of Santiago de Cuba amounted to 360,000 rations a month. Thus it will be seen that the provisions on hand in the trading houses the last days of April were hardly sufficient for half a month.

And this is not the worst; but the merchants, far from contributing to the welfare of the army, which in reality was defending their interests, hid whatever they could and raised the prices in a manner which I do not wish to qualify, taking advantage of the sad stress to which the blockade had reduced the city.

An example will show this better than anything I may say on the subject. The man who had the contract of furnishing water at the bay, relying on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the ships of the fleet for the water which they were getting at Las Cruces pier, this water being the property of the American company of the Juragua mines, for which the Spanish Government

could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board by means of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry's column. Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, which, at 4 pesetas a pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. The contractor in question, whose name I do not wish to remember, is from the Peninsula, a captain of volunteers, and, as he says himself, "a better Spaniard than Pelayo."

I do not know what news may have reached the Peninsula about the conditions at Santiago de Cuba. It is possible that people believe there that only certain articles of food were lacking; if that is the case, they are greatly mistaken. People here have suffered from actual hunger, and many persons have starved to death, although the population had been greatly decreased, since whole families had left prior to the 21st day of April. I, myself, saw a man who had died of hunger in the entrance of the Brooks House opposite the captaincy of the port—died because he had nothing to eat.

Horses, dogs, and other animals were dying from hunger in the streets and public places and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I also saw—this is significant on account of the fatal consequences that might follow—I saw, I repeat, a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. The water from the aqueduct had been cut off, as will be seen, and the city was exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad, and we should have had that calamity to add to the many that were weighing upon us. But why go on? What I have said is more than sufficient to show the immense responsibility incurred by those who might have supplied the city with provisions, and who neglected and eluded so sacred a duty.

There were orders and decrees published regulating the price of articles of first necessity, but the merchants paid no attention to them, as though they did not concern them, and the raising of prices was the more unjustifiable and inexcusable, as everything that was in the city had been there prior to the declaration of war, and had cost no more freight or duty than in normal times.

If there had been flour and bacon, the soldiers might not have become weakened and sick, and yet they fought as the Spanish soldier always has fought. What a contrast between him and the merchant of this city! But there are things which it is better not to air and this is one of them.

XI.

COALING.

The fleet which left the Cape Verde Islands, which took no coal at Martinique where it touched, and which at Curaçao took on only a few tons in two of the ships, arrived here, as was natural, with the bunkers almost empty. Admiral Cervera prepared to replenish them, and it may be easily imagined how imperative it was to hasten an operation without which the ships were unable to execute a single maneuver, even though their very salvation might depend on it.

Unfortunately, the harbor of Santiago, where there is little movement of shipping, has but very scant means and resources, especially since the breaking out of the present insurrection.

There were only four steamers—the *Alcyon*, *Juraguá*, *Esmeralda*, and *Colón*. The first two do not possess the necessary requirements for towing launches; the *Esmeralda* does very well when the sea is calm and there is not much head wind; the only one that has all the necessary requirements is the *Colón*, but the *Colón* was having her boiler overhauled and it required a week to finish the work, which was indispensable. Unfortunately, the gunboat *Alvarado*, which might have rendered good services, was in dock renewing her bottom planks, and the work was very slow.

The army, in its turn, also had a great deal of work on hand which it could not possibly leave, such as taking supplies to the Morro, water to Punta Gorda, and war material and ammunition to both of these places and to the Socapa, and the chiefs and officers were needed for directing all the work undertaken.

The only launches and lighters in the harbor were those of Messrs. Ros, some of them useless, others in bad repair, and a few only in condition to be used; besides these there were those of the Juraguá Company, which were good but few in number, and, as they belong to American subjects, it was not easy for the Government to get them. With such small resources and with so much that had to be done, it will be understood how difficult it was, not to say impossible, to accomplish everything.

To give even an imperfect idea of the lack of appliances of every description, I will mention that the contractor of water, which

latter is very bad and for which he charges exorbitant prices, had, for the purpose of supplying the ships, only two small rudder boats, each with two pipes (about four hogsheads), and there were four ships requiring 1,500 pipes each, without counting the destroyers.

Naturally all the demands, requests, and complaints, everything the fleet needed, wanted or desired, went to the comandancia de marina, the personnel of which consisted of the commander, the second in command, the aide, the paymaster, three enlisted seamen (cabos de matrícula), one of whom had charge of the provision stores, and two orderlies, and with this personnel everything had to be done that was asked for and everything furnished that was wanted.

The army wanted a tug, the military government wanted a tug and launches, and the fleet wanted launches and a tug, and all wanted them badly, and all the services were important and urgent, and at the captaincy of the port we constantly had to solve problems that had no solution, and furnish launches that did not exist and tugs that were not to be found.

The coaling, which went on day and night, progressed very slowly, in spite of everything; for at the two piers where the coal was there was very little water, and at the end of each pier only one lighter could be accommodated without danger of running aground, in which case it would have been necessary to wait for high water to float it again.

There is no end to the time and work which it took to put the Cardiff coal of the navy dépôt on board the ships, and though laborers were hired for the Cumberland coal of the Juraguá mines, the ships, which never stopped coaling as long as they stayed at Santiago, never succeeded in filling their bunkers. One detail will show the lack of means available at the port. Although every store in the town was visited and any price offered for baskets, only a very limited number could be found for carrying the coal; it had to be put in as best it could.

There is some work that can neither be understood nor appreciated, that passes by unnoticed and of which people do not even have an idea, because it does not constitute actions of war, more or less brilliant, and which yet can not be kept up nor stood for any length of time. We who belonged to the captaincy of the port finally dined, breakfasted, and slept there—or rather, did not sleep there, for there never was a night when it was not necessary to transmit to the admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other cablegrams, at all hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute and did not give us any rest. Still it was not the work that made

the situation unbearable; what soldier or sailor did not work desperately at Santiago de Cuba? No, the sad, the lamentable thing was that, being so anxious to please all, we were unable to satisfy anybody.

The coal belonging to the navy, consisting of 2,300 tons of Cardiff, was taken on at the piers of Bellavista, situated in the western part of the bay. Besides this, General Linares placed at Admiral Cervera's disposal about 600 tons of Cumberland coal from the Juraguá mines and 600 tons from the Sabanilla railway.

The water had to be gotten by the boats of the fleet in bulk at the piers of Las Cruces and at the faucet near the Royal Pier. Some of the ships got their own water by going alongside the first-named pier.

XII.

OPINIONS AS TO WHY THE FLEET DID NOT GO OUT.

In narrating the events of Santiago, it was not my intention to make remarks of any kind on them, nor to permit myself comments thereon, as I consider that I have neither the authority, nor the ability (and this I do not say from false modesty), nor the right to do so. My object has been to give a simple account of what I witnessed, what I saw, and what I heard from trustworthy sources, and of the authenticity of which I am certain, feeling sure that in Spain, though the facts are known as a whole, they are not known there in detail; but in the presence of certain insinuations and certain doubts I can not remain silent and indifferent.

Great was the joy caused by the arrival of the fleet among the peninsular element generally and some of the sons of Cuba who truly love us. But after a few days, a number of intelligent and prominent people, or at least recognized as such, showed great impatience and surprise that the ships should remain in port, and never got tired asking what the fleet was doing there and why it did not go out.

It is easy to answer that question.

If Admiral Cervera can be accused of anything, it is an excess of courage. One need only read his record of service to be convinced of that, and the third day of July proved it only too well. Admiral Cervera received many cablegrams and official letters; no one knew better than he did what was going on in Spain and in Cuba, and what was being ordered and required of him, and that Admiral Cervera acted as he should have done admits of no discussion. My only object is to answer the question which so many were asking in Santiago: "What was the fleet doing there?" What was it doing? Well, a great deal.

It is not always great battles or great fights that decide the outcome of a campaign. Napoleon I, by an admirable maneuver, closed in on the Austrian General Marck at Ulm, and the latter had to surrender with his whole army without having fired a single shot.

When Admiral Villeneuve, who unfortunately commanded the allied fleets of France and Spain, learned that Admiral Rosilly, appointed to relieve him, was at Madrid, he preferred to fight with Nelson rather than present himself before Napoleon. So he decided to leave Cadiz, and he called together the commanders of both fleets on the ship *Bucentaure*. The Spanish objected, on the grounds that, in order to leave Cadiz, they needed time and a favorable wind, that the ships were in need of repairs, had to replenish their provisions and ammunition and complete their crews, that the season was far advanced, and that, if the English were compelled to blockade them in winter, it would be equivalent for them to the loss of a naval battle; that was the opinion of men like Gravina, Churruca, and Galiano.

They added that, moreover, the barometer was very low and that a storm was imminent, whereupon Rear Admiral Magón replied "that what was low was the courage in some hearts." At this insult, the Spanish, losing all prudence and calm, decided to go out in search of the enemy to prove that they still retained their courage. That was all that the French admiral wanted. The combined fleets went out, and what happened at Cape Trafalgar is well known.

Now, then, the question is answered already: the ships were compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade of Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While our ships were in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, using hardly any coal, not exhausting their engines, and waiting for a favorable opportunity to maneuver, when and as best they could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise on the coast day and night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea service, which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting their engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the blockade in case of a storm from the south or east, still more if the season of cyclones should come.

It is certainly true that a victory can be achieved without the necessity of giving battle, so much so that, if it had been possible for us, besides the ships that were at Santiago, to have two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitás, which ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their narrow entrances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who, outside of the ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their whole fleet to the island of Cuba, would have had to blockade those three ports with forces superior to ours and to keep watch at Key West if they did not want to expose themselves to a serious disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby exposing themselves to a hecatomb; and we only need think of

the number of their ships to understand that they could not successfully threaten so many points; though they only had to deal with Santiago and had almost all the ships of the fleet in front of it, they would have found it necessary to desist from taking the offensive.

The foregoing shows that ships do not necessarily have to give battle in order to obtain results. Those in Santiago harbor succeeded for forty-six days in keeping before the mouth of the harbor a vastly superior fleet, which performed no special acts of prowess except to throw a hail of projectiles which comparatively did very little damage. One could not obtain better results with less work; and if provisions had not been wanting in Santiago, God knows, if our fleet had remained there, to what extremes impatience and despair might not have carried Admiral Sampson!

XIII.

THE BLOCKADE.

As I have already given a description, though very deficient, of the sites and places that were the scene of these events (IV: Scene of Events), and of the miserable resources we had for their defense, it will be easy to understand what follows by remembering and fixing the attention on what has been said.

I have already stated that on the 18th of May, the *Saint Louis*, equipped for war, and a gunboat whose name could not be ascertained, fired about 80 shots, which were answered by Punta Gorda, the only battery that was then in condition to answer the attack. If it had happened a few hours later, one of the 16-cm. Hontoria guns of the Socapa could have been fired, but as stated, it was not mounted until the night of the 18th. The hostile ships disappeared to the east. The next day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, coming from Curaçao, entered the harbor and commenced to coal on the 20th.

21st.—This day, a ship coming from the south came close to the mouth of the harbor, then shaping her course westward. At 10.30 p. m. the Morro telephone gave notice that two ships had been firing on Punta Cabrera for 15 minutes, ten shots in all. Probably they were firing at Colonel Aldea's forces, which covered that part of the coast.

22d.—At 7 a. m. the look-out signaled a steamer to the east and another half an hour later. We learned from the Morro that one of them appeared to be the same that had been sighted the day before; the other was a three-master. Both of them were thought to be hostile vessels because they were going very slowly and reconnoitering the coast. The new one had three smokestacks.

At 11.30 the vessels were south of the Morro (that is, in front of it), proceeding very slowly westward, where they disappeared at half-past four.

23d.—At 5.45 a vessel was signaled to the south and an hour later two to the east. At 9 the Morro said that one of the three vessels had three smokestacks, the same that had been sighted the day before, and one was a battle ship, and that flag signals were being made.

At 11.30 a vessel was signaled to the west; at 12.30 the Morro said that the vessel just arrived had three masts and three smokestacks.

At 4.10 we learned by telephone that one of the four vessels had disappeared to the south and the others were coming closer to the mouth of the harbor.

At 7 the three ships disappeared, one to the east and two to the south.

24th.—At 2 o'clock the lookout signaled two steamers to the south. The sky was clouded and nothing could be distinguished beyond a certain distance.

At 11.45 the destroyer *Plutón* went out.

At 12.30 four hostile vessels were distinguished, though with difficulty, owing to the cloudy weather, to the east of the mouth of the harbor.

When seeing the *Plutón* go out, one of them shaped her course to the westward and passed close to the destroyer without being able to attack her, then proceeded westward. The others started in the same direction, also in pursuit of her, but without success, as the *Plutón* had naturally eluded meeting them.

The four vessels disappeared to the westward.

At 2 o'clock, the Spanish flagship (*Infanta Maria Teresa*) started up and went alongside the Las Cruces Pier for water.

At 5.30 two vessels were signaled to the south; they disappeared in that direction after dark.

25th.—At 6 o'clock two steamers were signaled, one to the south and one to the west.

At 7.30 the *Cristóbal Colón* started up and shortly after cast anchor again.

At the same hour, the Morro reported that one of the two vessels signaled was apparently heading toward the harbor at full speed, and the other seemed to be chasing her. Three-quarters of an hour later it was reported that the vessel appeared to have been captured at quite a distance from the mouth of Santiago harbor, and that both were going south, the captured vessel ahead and the other following.

The *Infanta Maria Teresa* sheered off from Las Cruces Pier at 1 o'clock p. m., and the *Oquendo* then went alongside, also to take water; the former anchored again in the bay.

At 2 o'clock the *Vizcaya* cast anchor south of Cay Ratones, near Cajuma Bay. The *Cristóbal Colón* anchored south of Punta Gorda.

26th.—At 2 o'clock p. m. the *Oquendo* left Las Cruces Pier and anchored again in the bay.

The position of the fleet was as follows: The *Cristóbal Colón* was at anchor south of Punta Gorda, close to it, presenting her broadside to the mouth of the harbor, in line with the channel to which

she presented her guns, so as to be able to attack the enemy in case he should try to force it.

The *Vizcaya* close to Cajumas Bay, facing the same as the *Colón* so as to unite their fire in case the enemy should succeed in passing Punta Soldado.

The *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo* south of Cay Ratones, so as to defend the channel of Punta Gorda as well as the general anchoring place and the city. During the day three ships were sighted to the south, and disappeared shortly after in the same direction.

27th.—At 6 the lookout signaled two vessels to the south.

At 11.30 it signaled five more ships. There were now seven in sight.

At 12.15 General Linares went to the Morro in the steamboat of the captaincy of the port.

At 12.30 four more ships were sighted; total, eleven ships.

Of the eleven ships in sight, four are battle ships.

At 2.30 p. m. another ship arrived.

At nightfall General Linares returned from the Morro. The ships disappeared to the south.

28th.—At 6.15 the lookout signaled a vessel within 5 miles of the Morro, and at noon she disappeared to the south.

At 4.30 p. m. six large ships were signaled, disappearing to the south at nightfall.

29th.—At daybreak the destroyers *Plutón* and *Furor* went out to reconnoiter, returning at 8.

During the day they anchored in the bay; at night they cast anchor at the Socapa and at Nispero Bay in order to guard the entrance of the harbor.

General Linares went to the Morro in the tug *Alcyon*.

At 7, seven hostile ships were sighted reconnoitering the coast, at a distance of about 8 miles; they withdrew to the south before dark.

30th.—At 5.30 the hostile fleet was signaled approaching to within 9 miles of the harbor. It consisted of seven ships.

At noon three others arrived from the south and joined the former.

31st.—At 5.45 the lookout signaled eleven ships to the south.

At 2 p. m. gun fire was heard. The lookout reported that the coast was being fired on.

At 2.40 Punta Gorda battery opened fire, ceasing again shortly after.

The ships of the Spanish fleet hoisted their battle flags and fired up their boilers.

At 2.30 the firing was quite lively.

By 3 it became slower and ceased at 3.30.

The enemy had been firing on the Morro and Socapa batteries, without any casualty in either.

The ships disappeared, as usual, to the south before dark.

Thus end the events of the month of May, insignificant on the whole and only a prologue to those that were to follow.

During the days of May 20th to 22d, the insurgent chief Calixto Garcia, with a numerous contingent of troops and artillery, attacked the village of Palma Soriano on the Cauto river. General Vara de Rey, at the head of 1,000 men and two guns, repulsed the hostile forces, routing them and killing a great many. On our side we had 16 wounded. This operation of the soldier hero, simulating a surrounding movement by crossing the Cauto at three or four fords, and pursuing the rebels 2 miles beyond Palma Soriano, was due to the skillful distribution of the scant forces of the line of observation. This line, as will be readily understood from the chart at the end of the book, was weak, very weak, in almost its whole extent. It was, indeed, work that deserves praise, to guard, patrol, and sustain strategic points, cultivated land, coasts, roads, and railroads, with such a small and weak contingent of troops. And the forces that we were expecting from Havana, and the arrival of which had been announced, did not appear.

As a collier was being expected, it was supposed that the vessel captured on the 25th was the one. It is possible; but, on the other hand, it may not have been. In any event, there was much surprise expressed at Santiago that, since the hostile fleet was not in sight, but only one or two vessels, Admiral Cervera had not prevented the capture, or at least recovered the prize.

The reason why he did not is very simple. Our fleet had taken on board all the Cardiff coal that was at the navy depot, without succeeding, as has been seen, in filling its bunkers, and there remained only the 1,100 tons of Cumberland coal of which Gen. Linares could dispose; this latter coal is inferior to the former, and I believe it is hardly necessary for me to point out how important it is that a fleet should have good fuel; it may be its salvation at a given moment; consequently the fleet, which had the prospect of having extremely difficult maneuvers of the highest importance to execute, could not afford to waste even a single piece of coal to no purpose.

The capture took place a long distance from the mouth of the harbor; before a ship could weigh anchor, clear the channel, get up full steam and traverse that distance, at least three hours must elapse, and where would have been the captor and the prize by that time? And even granting that the former could not bring the latter in safety, would he allow it to fall into our hands? Certainly not. Two gunshots would have sunk her very quickly, especially

if, as was believed, she had a heavy cargo; and the *Colón*, or any other ship that had gone out on that errand, would have consumed, probably to no purpose, a quantity of coal which it was imperative to keep for much more important and less hazardous operations than pursuing merchant steamers equipped for war and taking or recapturing prizes. Moreover, from the 22d to the 28th, the swell of the sea prevented the ships from going out; the pilots of the harbor were not willing to take them out, saying that in view of the state of the sea, they might touch bottom, especially the *Cristóbal Colón*.

XIV.

THE VOLUNTEERS.

Although the comparison may perhaps not be considered very apt, I might say that the month of May was the paradise of the blockade, while the month of June was its purgatory, and the month of July its hell.

The appearance of the first hostile ships before the Morro of Santiago, as the natural result of the war decided upon by the Government of the United States and accepted by ours, and the noise of the first gunshots caused both consternation and curiosity among the inhabitants of the city; but as man becomes accustomed to everything, so the situation, which at that time was, if not dangerous, yet certainly very unpleasant and disagreeable, was finally looked upon with indifference.

The boats of the fleet were constantly going back and forth between the ships and the piers to supply the innumerable wants of the former, and gave to the marina an aspect of animation which it never wore in normal times. The Alameda, where the music of the Santiago regiment played, as usual, on Sunday evenings, by order of the the military authorities who were desirous of raising the spirit of the inhabitants as much as possible, and the Plaza de Armas, where the drums continued to beat the tattoo every Thursday and Sunday, were always full of people, although so many had left the city. People fond of giving sensational news, especially those who took pleasure in inventing it, had a wide field and plenty material to satisfy their desire; and anyone having patience and curiosity enough to collect the news floating through the city might have written a very original and amusing book.

The children were playing war, pelting each other with stones inside and around the city, divided into parties in command of a Cervera of ten summers or a Sampson of twelve Aprils.

The different corps of volunteers were considerably increased by the many men who came to swell their ranks, especially chiefs and officers; the city was full of sabers, machetes, stars, and galloons, and I believe not even in Berlin, the capital of the most military nation of Europe, are as many uniforms seen as we saw in this city, usually so quiet. Even the clerks of the guardhouse and employees of the civil guard armed themselves with carbines and machetes.

And while I am talking of the volunteers I will finish their history to the end, which is not without interest.

After sunset and during the first hours of the night the volunteers would gather at the Alameda, which they filled completely, divided into more or less numerous platoons, which officers of the regular army, or their own officers, undertook to drill, and at the first gun or the first blast of the bugle, they reported promptly, especially the chiefs and officers, at the posts which had been assigned to them beforehand.

Every night a guard of twenty-five men, commanded by an officer, occupied the large shed of the Alameda and placed its sentinels, and from that time until dawn the noise of musket butts striking on the wooden floor was constantly heard, and by many people mistaken for gunshots, and the "Who goes there?" addressed to every moving object was an evident proof of the extreme vigilance observed, and showed that it would not be easy to surprise them.

The firemen were always on hand whenever they were needed at the pier to take the wounded from the Morro and Socapa to the hospital on their stretchers, and their energy, good will, and zeal can not be sufficiently praised.

On the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July, as will be seen later, a large number of volunteers hurried to the trenches of the third line, where they fought the enemy like brave men, and where some of them were wounded.

Unfortunately, after that day, with a few honorable exceptions, the spirit animating them underwent a complete change; their enthusiasm became indifference, their valor prudence; they left the trenches to which they never returned, and exchanged the uniform for civilians' clothes and the gun or machete for the measuring-stick or weighing scales.

Why this change? There is an explanation for it. It is an error to suppose that the soldier is braver than the volunteer; there is no reason why he should be; they are both Spanish. But the soldier has military habits and discipline which the volunteer lacks; he has chiefs and officers whom he must needs respect and obey, the volunteer has not; and that is the whole explanation.

As long as the enemy was making attacks which it was necessary to repel the volunteers fought with energy and enthusiasm; but when the battle and excitement were over, when the period of trenches arrived, with the hot sun in daytime and dampness at night, with rains, sickness, privations, and want, in a word, the hour of suffering in silence and with resignation, the hour of subordination, of sacrifice and duty, then, one after another, under

this pretext or that, they returned to the city, determined not to go back.

The circle narrowed more and more, the probabilities of capitulation and death increased as those of triumph and success diminished, and then it was that they remembered their families, their own interests, and themselves, that they took off their uniforms, which, in their opinion, might cause them trouble, and, not considering themselves safe in the city, they went to hide at Cinco Reales, Las Cruces, and on board of merchant steamers, or any other place where they thought themselves safe from projectiles, and there were even those who emigrated to El Caney and Cuabitas, occupied by the Americans and the insurgents respectively.

What I relate I do not know from hearsay; I saw it myself at Cinco Reales, upon my return from the cruiser *Reina Mercedes*, sunk in the entrance of the harbor, where I had gone by orders of the commander of marine in order to report to him on the exact position then occupied by the vessel. At Cinco Reales I found many in hiding, in civilians' clothes, some with their families and others alone.

But while men who had carried the gun did such things, others who had girded the sword, with a show of doing great things, did even worse.

XV.

WAITING.

The events of the month of May, although they are not, or rather do not appear to be, of great importance in themselves, because there were no special movements on the part of the enemy and no casualties of any kind on ours, are in reality of great importance, and their consequences have had great influence and weight on the result of the war, which has been decided, so to speak, in the waters of Santiago de Cuba and in front of the trenches in this precinct.

If we take into consideration the position of Santiago de Cuba, situated at the southern extremity of the island, and therefore at a comparative distance from the United States and Key West, the base of operations of the Yankees; the topography of its harbor, difficult in itself to force; the absence of military importance of the city, which is not a stronghold or even a military city, and the scarcity of roads and railways so that it is almost cut off from communication with any important or strategic point, it is not too much to assume that the Americans had no idea of making great demonstrations or operations, but thought that it would be sufficient to blockade it, and throw in a few projectiles as they had done at other cities on the coast, and a proof of this is that, until the 18th of May, that is, nearly a month after the declaration of war, not a single hostile vessel was seen, and the two that appeared then were a merchant vessel equipped for war and a small gunboat, which, after reconnoitering, disappeared to the east.

But the arrival of the Spanish fleet, though composed of only four battleships, but these the only ones of that class which we had in the island, and therefore the only ones that could inspire any fear, the absolute necessity of replenishing them with coal, which took a number of days, because, in view of the scarcity of facilities of any kind it could not be done in less time, compelled the enemy to make the city, and especially the harbor where the fleet was at anchor, their objective, although they had not taken much thought of it at first; to concentrate upon this objective all their forces on sea and on land, and to take for the scene of the war one which was least adapted for their plans and which they had least thought of choosing.

When did they learn that our ships had anchored in the harbor? I do not know; nor do I believe that anybody in Santiago knows it. If the *St. Louis* and the gunboat which has been mentioned several times returned from Guantánamo on the 19th, where they went presumably to continue the blockade when they left these waters, there is no doubt but that they could see our ships and some people think that they at once notified their admiral, but I doubt it, because it was not until the 27th that ships appeared in such numbers as would make it possible to check or defeat ours.

It might be said in answer to this that the hostile fleet may have had a thousand reasons, which we could not know, for this delay in assembling and appearing at the harbor. It is possible, but in that case, if the enemy knew ever since the 19th, what had happened, why did they continue to appear in small numbers before the mouth of the harbor, exposing themselves to serious trouble? I do not believe that the enemy received any information on the subject, or at least complete evidence, until the 24th, when the vessels which were cruising in Santiago waters, saw the *Plutón* come out and go back again, for they knew that she accompanied the fleet and formed part of it. It was three days later, the 27th, that eleven ships appeared, four of them, at least, battle ships. This interval of time was necessary, of course, to advise the hostile fleet, which was perhaps between Cape San Antonio and Havana, or Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos.

In any event, the operations of the month of May assumed great importance, for the harbor remained closed, where since before the declaration of war no provisions of any kind had entered, if we except those which the small English schooner already mentioned brought from Jamaica, and which are hardly worth taking into consideration.

Another problem: Why did the hostile ships which remained all day long in front of the mouth of the harbor disappear at dark instead of continuing to watch it during the night? I do not know that either. The whole coast is accessible and the ground so high that it can be distinguished perfectly even in stormy weather, so that there was no danger in remaining there in calm weather such as we have had all this year (for even in that Providence had favored them), and what I say is true, as shown by the fact that afterwards they never left the mouth of the harbor for a single moment, day or night, as will be seen.

Was it perhaps because they had become convinced of the difficulty of forcing the harbor, especially with a fleet inside, and wanted, by opening a passage, give the fleet a chance to come out in order to take refuge in another harbor less difficult of access? But such tactics might have had fatal results, because if our ships

should reach Havana harbor, a few hours from Key West, under the protection of its 300 guns, and united with the other warships that were there, the situation would have become materially changed, and the Americans might have had a chance to regret such tactics. That they should have made such a mistake is not to be thought of; besides, if that had been their intention, they would not have maintained such vigilance during the day. Were they simulating a retreat to return at night to the harbor, without lights, so as not to be seen? That is not probable; in order to see the mouth of the harbor they must have been seen themselves from the heights of the Morro or Socapa, where the strictest watch was also exercised. I suppose, for I can not think of anything else, that, not having been able as yet to unite all their naval forces, they did not want to run the risk of a battle at night with a fleet that had destroyers, the number of which they probably did not know, and did not learn until later, through the secret information which they probably received from the insurgents.

But all this is only supposition and hypothesis, perhaps entirely erroneous. The incontrovertible, undeniable fact is that, on the 27th, the enemy appeared with forces much superior to ours and remained all day long opposite the Morro, retreating at night, or simulating retreat. Thus ended the month of May.

XVI.

THE MERRIMAC.

June 1st.—At 6 o'clock the look-out signaled the hostile fleet in sight, consisting of thirteen ships; five battle ships and eight merchant and warships, among them one torpedo boat.

At 7 o'clock gunshots were heard.

At 12.30 the fleet started up, moving away from the harbor from which it was about 6 miles distant; half an hour later it reversed its course and came again closer.

At night the Spanish fleet changed its anchoring place.

The *Maria Teresa* and *Vizcaya* anchored south of, and with their broadsides toward Cay Ratones and were forming the first line for the defense of the harbor. The *Colón* and *Oquendo* anchored north of the same Cay and were forming the second line.

2nd.—At 5.30 nineteen ships appeared at the mouth of the harbor, at a distance of about 5 miles.

At 7 the Morro reported that they were going to fire a few shots to discharge some of the guns.

3rd.—At 3.30 gunshots were being heard toward the mouth of the harbor and the firing became very lively.

At 4 o'clock it was learned at the comandancia de marina that a merchant vessel had come very close to the mouth of the channel; that the batteries had fired at her and she had not answered; and at that moment she was already inside; shortly after she passed by the bow of the *Reina Mercedes*, which, it will be remembered, was moored between the Socapa and Cay Smith, with her bow towards the channel which she was defending with her two 16-cm. Hontoria guns and Whitehead torpedoes.

By 4.20 the firing, which had been very violent, ceased.

At 4.30 it was learned that the hostile ship had gone down in the mouth of the channel, close to Punta Soldado, but without obstructing it.

At 5.30, it now being daylight, very slow firing was again heard and ceased at 6.

At 5.30 the commandant of marine went to the mouth of the harbor in the steam launch.

When he returned, we learned that one of the merchant vessels forming part of the American fleet, called the *Merrimac*, with two masts and one smokestack, larger than the *Méjico*, had forced the entrance at 5.30; that she had been sunk in the channel close to Punta Soldado, by the guns of the *Mercedes* and the rapid-fire guns of the battery below the Socapa, and was lying in the direction of the Socapa, without obstructing the entrance or preventing our ships from going out, and that one lieutenant and seven sailors forming her crew had been captured and were on board the *Mercedes*.

Besides the firing on the vessel from the guns, the *Plutón* launched two torpedoes and the *Mercedes* two more. Two submarine mines were discharged from the first line and one from the second.

During the events related above, General Linares was at the Morro, where he had repaired by land on receipt of the first news. At daybreak, General Toral, military governor of Santiago, came to assist the navy with a force of regulars and volunteers.

At 7 a company went to reenforce the forces at the Socapa and the Morro.

At 7.30 the forces that had come to assist the navy withdrew.

At 11 p. m. firing was heard at a great distance in a southeasterly direction; it ceased at 12.15. The fire was extremely slow.

As may have been noticed, on June 1 the enemy appeared before the Morro with thirteen ships, five of them battle ships and eight merchant and war vessels; that is to say, with forces superior to ours, in number as well as caliber of armament, and also from the fact that they were better protected than ours, as may be seen from the report of the United States Navy, and as unfortunately we found out ourselves later. From that time on the hostile ships, which were afterwards increased in number, established day and night a constant watch, without withdrawing at nightfall, as they used to do. Probably they suspected—for they never lacked advices and secret information—that our fleet, for want of provisions, would before very long be compelled to go out, and that is what they were waiting for.

On the 2d, nineteen ships were present.

At daybreak of the 3d, the *Merrimac* forced the entrance of the harbor, at 3.30, with the result above set forth.

In spite of the time that has elapsed, we, at Santiago, have not succeeded in ascertaining definitely—though it is probably known in Spain from American newspapers that are in the habit of publishing everything—what was the real object that the *Merrimac* had in view.

She had guns and did not fire; she had torpedoes, though imperfect and primitive, if I may be permitted the expression, or rudimentary, which she did not use; if she was trying to explode our mines, she did not accomplish her design; and, finally, she had 2,000 tons of coal on board. The lieutenant who commanded her refused to state the object of his maneuver, saying only that it was made by order of Admiral Sampson; later, he said to Mr. Ramsden, British consul, that if the vessel were examined, it would be found that she carried torpedoes, as indeed was the case. Therefore, it may be reasonably supposed that the object was to sink the vessel across the channel, so as to obstruct it and prevent our ships from going out; and having made sure of that, to use part of their ships in other operations; and if the vessel did not come to lie across the channel and did not obstruct it, it was because she lost control of her movements, her rudder having been disabled by some projectile, so that she went down where it suited her least.

There is another fact in this connection which may and should arrest the attention of experts in that subject: The *Plutón* launched two torpedoes, the *Mercedes* two more, all of them Whitehead; two mines were discharged from the first line and one from the second; and yet the vessel was not blown up and passed both lines in safety, which shows that the effect of torpedoes is moral rather than material, and that it is not easy to discharge them at the right moment. To do so requires a degree of experience, a range of sight, and a presence of mind not easily found united in a single man. The occurrence to which I have reference demonstrates this very clearly.

During the day the officer and seven men of the *Merrimac*, who had first been taken on board the *Mercedes*, were temporarily transferred to the Morro.

From 11 to 12.30 in the night, the hostile ships were firing, though slowly, outside of the harbor and towards the southeast. The object of this has never been ascertained.

I have several times spoken with General Ros, governor of the Morro, and he has always repeated these and similar words: "From the beginning of the hostilities to the end I have remained in the castle, from where, as you know, everything can be seen and observed. Sooner or later I have always learned the object of everything the enemy has done and the reason for it; but the firing of that night, though I saw and heard it myself, I have never understood. I believe they were firing on some ship they saw, or thought they saw; but it may be that they were firing on the land; but I believe in that case the object and result of the firing would have become known sooner or later."

That same day Captain (General) Paredes, second in command of the fleet, disembarked from the *Cristóbal Colón* and embarked temporarily on the *Mercedes*, where he remained until the 21st, taking command of all the defenses at the mouth of the harbor.

XVII.

THE BLOCKADE CONTINUES.

June 4th.—There were to be seen at the mouth of the harbor seventeen ships: Six battle ships, five war ships, and six merchant vessels.

At 11.30 a. m., the second commander of the local naval forces (being the writer of this book), as judge, accompanied by the aid of the captaincy of the port, Mr. Leguina, as secretary, and the Government interpreter, Mr. Isidoro Agostini, went to the Morro in the steam launch of the captaincy of the port, for the purpose of taking the depositions of the lieutenant and seven men who had been taken prisoners.

The former, Mr. Hobson, 27 years old, born in the State of Alabama, is a lieutenant in the corps of naval constructors, who, in the United States, study in the naval college, and those first promoted are assigned to that corps; I state this so that it may not seem strange that he commanded the *Merrimac*, for, as they are officers of the Navy, they can both build and command ships.

Upon learning the object of the visit, the prisoner, from whose room a great extent of the sea and part of the blockading fleet could be seen, asked why the British Consul, who was in charge of the United States Consulate, was not present when his deposition was to be taken, and he wanted to know whether I belonged to the army or the navy; what might be the consequences of his statements; by whose authority he was being examined; and he stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by Admiral Cervera himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understanding that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera or some one delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very best form and with a thousand protestations of his respect and deference for me, it did not prevent our positions from being reversed, and far from my asking the prisoner questions, it was he, on the contrary, who asked them of me. I told him so, asking him through the interpreter to state categorically whether he was disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the questions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which

he deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I at once asked him one question which I knew beforehand he would refuse to answer, namely, by whose order and for what purpose he entered the harbor; he replied: "By order of Admiral Sampson; the second part I can not answer." I then deemed my mission at an end and had the fact set down.

A few days later, this officer was transferred to quarters on the *Reina Mercedes* that had been prepared for him, and the seven men to others on the vessel, where they remained until they were released.

As I left the Morro and stood on the esplanade in front of it, I had an opportunity for the first time to admire the spectacle that presented itself to my eyes; I say "admire," for the picture was truly worthy of admiration.

The evening was most beautiful; the sea was as smooth as a lake, there was hardly any wind and the sky was perfectly clear.

At a distance of about five miles, seventeen ships could be seen: eleven war ships, among them seven battle ships and one torpedo boat, and the other six merchant vessels, the nearest one about six miles from the harbor, formed a large arc, one extremity of which was at Aguadores and the other at Punta Cabrera. The largest and most powerful ships were in the center. Among them were the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Brooklyn*, and *New York*; the latter two may be easily recognized by their three smokestacks. The fifth was presumably the *Massachusetts*; and finally the *Texas* and *Amazonas*. The *New York* and *Brooklyn*, taking advantage of the state of the sea, had a merchant steamer alongside and were coaling. All of them had their engines stopped and their bows in different directions according to the current. From time to time, one of them would move a short distance forward and then return again to her place. Among the merchant vessels were specially noticeable the *Saint Louis* (the first vessel that had been seen at Santiago), a huge transatlantic steamer of over 10,000 tons, which looked larger than any of the other ships, including the armorclads, and a steam yacht of great speed, very small, on the contrary, and which looked like a ship's boat. This is the yacht that was in constant communication with Punta Cabrera. There also was a torpedo boat or destroyer. A few days later, I saw the same spectacle from the high battery of the Socapa, and I shall never forget it.

Before I continue, I will state that on May 26, the cable had been cut at Cape Cruz, so that communication with Manzanillo was interrupted until June 17, when the connection was reestablished.

5th.—The American fleet could be seen at the mouth of the harbor, being the same ships we had seen the night before.

General Linares returned from the Morro at 8 o'clock p. m. and ordered the launches and a tug to be gotten ready to take 150 men to the mouth of the harbor.

At 10.30, a chief, two officers, and 120 soldiers embarked and went out in a launch towed by the *Colón*, assisted by the *Alcyon*; the tugs returned at 1 o'clock at night.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, through the fault of a collier coaling near the hut of the English cable at Las Cruces, said hut was burned; it was an accident, but none the less deplorable.

XVIII.

THE BOMBARDMENT INCREASES.

June 6th.—Eighteen ships were visible at the mouth of the harbor. At 7.30 the lookout reported that the ships were starting up and approaching.

At 8.30 ten ships—the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Brooklyn*, *New York*, *Texas*, *Amazonas*, *Minneapolis*, and two other warships—forming two divisions, opened fire, the first division, on the Morro and Aguadores, the second on the Socapa; one ship was detached from the latter division to bombard Mazamorra and adjoining points on the coast, where the column of Colonel Aldea (Asiatic battalion) had detachments and was operating.

When the American fleet opened fire, it was so intense and the shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be compared with the crackling of small arms.

By 9 o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching again the same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10.15, and again becoming terribly intense at 10.30.

At 11.2 it ceased.

Punta Gorda battery fired only 7 shots.

At 12.15 intense firing was heard again in the distance to the east; it ceased at 1.45.

At 2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the *Reina Mercedes*, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, bringing three seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the military hospital. This officer reported the death of Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, second in command of the cruiser, and of five sailors; also, that Ensign Molins, one boatswain, and several other sailors had been wounded; their names could not be ascertained owing to the condition of the ship, nor could even the exact number of wounded be stated, as it had been necessary to extinguish two fires on board.

At 2.45 a private boat arrived at the pier, carrying a sergeant and a wounded soldier from the Mazamorra detachment. They were also taken to the military hospital.

There were no more remarkable events during the night.

Ten warships, eight of them battle ships, divided into two divisions, opened fire shortly after 8 a. m., on the batteries at the mouth, and by elevation on the bay. During the first moments, the firing was so intense that it resembled one prolonged thunder. In fact, I had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of those ten ships. Much has been said of the bombardments of Sebastopol and Alexandria, but I do not believe that they could have been as terrible as the bombardment we suffered that 6th day of June—a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will never forget. I might write pages about it, and even then would probably not give the faintest idea of what it really was.

The hostile ships (see list of ships and armaments) had at least 120 large guns, that is to say, of 14, 20 and 32-cm. calibers, and about 80 small-caliber guns, that is to say, of 57 and 42-mm., or a total of 192 guns, for they fired with guns of all sizes; and as I am far from wanting to exaggerate and since the guns of the two sides of a ship can not be fired at the same time (those mounted in turrets forward and aft can), I will say that 91 guns were firing upon four 16-cm. *muzzle-loading* guns at the Morro and two 16-cm. breech-loading Hontoria guns of the Socapa battery.

I do not count the guns of Punta Gorda battery, which fired only seven shots; for the Americans, in spite of their enormous superiority, still had the — prudence of avoiding it and not engaging it so as to keep outside of its range. Before the eloquence of numbers, anything else that I might say becomes unnecessary.

How did it happen that the Morro was not razed to the ground and that its guns and those of the Socapa were not dismantled? How did it happen that those who served these guns were not buried under the ruins? I do not know; that is all I can say; and those who were in those forts may be sure that, since they were not killed that day, they will die of old age.

Captain Concas, who is very clever at computations of a certain nature, counted at different times the number of shots fired in a minute, and his deduction is that about 8,000 projectiles were fired; though this figure may appear exaggerated at first sight, it is not so in reality; the firing lasted 175 minutes, which would give an average of 45 shots per minute. I believe, if anything, the computation falls below the truth.

I have always believed that the hostile fleet, which, by means of the yacht referred to, communicated with the insurgents on the coast by way of Punta Cabrera, knew everything that was going on in Santiago as well as in the harbor and the position of our ships. But if I had had any doubts on that subject, they would have been dispelled that 6th day of June when I saw the aim of

their projectiles. Most of them dropped in the bay in the direction of the *Maria Teresa* and *Vizcaya*, which were covering the first line, and it was a miracle that both of them were not seriously damaged; for the large-caliber shells fell all around them; there were moments when it seemed as though some had hit them, especially the *Vizcaya*.

They were also perfectly acquainted with the position of the *Mercedes*, which is proved by the fact that the ships to the east, being the division which bombarded the Morro, were firing their projectiles right at the cruiser, and though protected by the hill of the Socapa, she received in her hull and rigging 35 shells, causing two fires, one of them quite extensive, being in the paint locker forward.

Commander Emilio Acosta y Eyeremann was directing the extinguishing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut off his right leg at the hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. But he lived for half an hour after that and kept on looking after the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz, who was close to him in those critical moments. I do not like to think of it; he had been a fellow-student of mine at college and our old friendship had always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the ship, his body was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast; five soldiers who had been killed the same day were also carried there, and all of them were covered with the flag which they had been defending and for which they had died. May he rest in peace, this first chief of the navy killed in this war.

The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, causing a tremendous noise which only those who heard it can understand; some fell on the opposite coast (to the westward), raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust and smoke; others could not be seen falling, which proves that they must have dropped in the hills at a great distance. This shows that they did not only reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond.

Toward evening, the ships also fired twice on Daiquiri, probably at the forts and the detachments in the mineral region and at Firmeza, but without any effect worth mentioning. The high battery of the Socapa (two 16-cm. Hontoria guns) fired 47 shots; that was all they could fire, because during the bombardment the ships were hidden most of the time through the smoke.

The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern part, which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the waist; if they had not gone there most of them would have been killed, for nearly all the dwellings which were located on the southern slope suffered from the effects of the shells. The following day the Cay was abandoned and the inhabitants transferred to the city.

Lieutenant Julián Garcia Durán was appointed second in command of the cruiser *Reina Mercedes*; he had arrived a short time before in command of the merchant steamer *Méjico*, with torpedo supplies, which he landed at the port of Guantanamo.

Later, after the *Mercedes* sank, this same officer was placed in command of the naval forces that occupied the Socapa; and finally, of the whole navy encampment, until they were embarked and taken back to Spain.

XIX.

THE FIRING CONTINUES.

June 7th.—At daybreak nineteen ships in front of the mouth.

At 9.15 the body of Commander Emilio Acosta was brought on shore.

At 9.30 the funeral procession started, headed by Admiral Cervera and Generals Toral and Rubin, and including, in spite of the rain, the civil and military authorities of the city, delegations from all the different divisions, and a great many private citizens. On both sides of the body walked the battalion of volunteers and the company of guides, the only forces that were in the city, with the music of the Santiago regiment.

At 6.30 p. m. the ships increased the distance that separated them from the coast.

The French cable had been cut, and we were not in communication with Guantanamo.

8th.—Nineteen ships were in sight at daybreak, about 6 miles from the mouth.

During the night the fleet had constantly thrown its searchlights on the coast.

9th.—At daybreak eighteen ships, at a distance of about 7 miles.

The steamer *Tomas Brooks* delivered 25 planks at the mouth of the harbor, which were attached to a steel cable stretched from Cay Smith to Punta Soldado, the object of the planks being to keep it at the surface of the water; the cable was laid to prevent the passage of any torpedoes which the enemy might attempt to send into the harbor with the entering tide.

10th.—At daybreak the eighteen ships of the preceding day were to be seen about 10 miles distant. At 7 o'clock another one, a merchant vessel, arrived from the south.

The *Plutón* and *Furor* went alongside the steamer *Méjico*, one at each side, to rest from the service of the night.

At 11 the lookout made a signal, taking it down shortly after, that fire was being opened. Nothing was heard in the city.

The Morro said that the enemy had fired upon Punta Berracos, but had stopped very soon.

During the night the American fleet continued to examine the coast by means of the searchlights.

11th.—Seventeen ships, some 6 miles distant, others 10.

12th.—The same seventeen ships, from 5 to 6 miles distant from the Morro.

13th.—Fifteen ships, 6 miles from the harbor.

14th.—At 5.15 the enemy opened fire on the mouth of the harbor; it ceased at 6.50.

The projectiles fell toward Cajuma Bay, close to the *Vizcaya*.

Only one ship kept up the fire on the Morro and Socapa, both batteries answering it.

At the latter battery Ensign Bruquetas and two sailors were slightly wounded.

At 10 General Linares went to the Socapa and the Morro, returning at 12.30.

The enemy continued the fire during the night, aiming his projectiles upon the coast, especially above the mouth of the harbor.

15th.—At daybreak seventeen hostile ships in sight, among them the *Vesuvius*, this being her first appearance before the harbor.

The *Vesuvius* is a vessel of 900 tons displacement and of peculiar construction, being very long, narrow, and low. She is the only one of her class in the world, and throws, by means of guns or pneumatic tubes, dynamite bombs or projectiles a distance of about 2 miles; they are probably provided with a screw; nobody knows them exactly. I do not believe this vessel, though it may cause serious destruction, would be able to sustain a fight with another, even though smaller, for the reason that the range of her projectiles is very short and she has no protection.

From the 7th to the 15th the hostile fleet hardly threatened the batteries which defended the harbor, nor the coast either, contenting themselves with watching it incessantly day and night.

In the city nothing appeared to have changed, and yet the situation was very far from being what it was a month ago.

In the stores many articles were wanting, and those that could be had brought fabulous prices. Unfortunately, one of the first articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be baked. Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could pay for it; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick and for babies. The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice and rice boiled in water, which weakened them very much; and though they were not suffering actual hunger, everybody knew that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for no provisions could be expected, either by land or sea.

Fortunately, the sailors of the ships and defenses, thanks to the foresight of the general commandant of the naval station, were

still receiving full rations and had them for some time to come, thanks also to the interest taken in this matter by the Commandant of Marine.

The music continued to play at the Alameda and in the market place, but the people, who had nothing to eat, had no desire to go walking, and the market place and Alameda were deserted.

Horses and dogs were dying before our eyes. Carriages stopped going about for want of horses, which the scavenger carried off at night, and gradually the city acquired that stamp of sadness and absence of life which is seen in places into which cholera and plagues carry sorrow and death. The situation became more serious every day, and the discouragement was general, for everyone knew that if the blockade should continue, the ruin of the city was imminent.

I must state that while the ships of the hostile fleet were firing on Punta Cabrera and Mazamorra on the 7th, 9th, and days following, insurgent bands, commanded by their principal chiefs, sustained a continued musket fire on land. In these attacks they were repulsed with great losses.

XX.

THE LANDING EXPEDITION APPEARS.

June 16th.—Eighteen ships in sight.

At 5.45 the hostile fleet opened fire.

At 6.15 Punta Gorda commenced firing, but stopped shortly after.

The greater part of the projectiles dropped close to the Spanish fleet.

At 6.30 the fire became more intense.

At 6.35 smoke was seen for a few minutes issuing from the *Infanta Maria Teresa*. It was learned afterwards that a fragment of shell had caused a slight injury in the starboard gallery.

At 6.40 Punta Gorda again opened fire; ten shots.

At 7 the firing ceased.

At 7.15 the *Furor* and *Plutón*, which had their steam up during the firing, went alongside the steamer *Méjico*.

It was reported from the Morro that the ships which had been firing were eight in number; that the fire had been directed against the castle and the Socapa, both of them answering; that at the Morro battery a gunner had been killed and an officer and five soldiers (all belonging to the artillery) wounded; that at the Socapa two sailors had been killed and four sailors and Ensign Bruquetas wounded, the latter for the second time; and that one of the Hontoria guns had been put out of action by débris obstructing it, but that the enemy had not succeeded in dismounting a single gun.

At 11.45 the four sailors who had been wounded at the Socapa arrived in a boat at the royal pier and were taken to the military hospital, one of them, who was seriously wounded, on a stretcher from the firemen's headquarters, the other three in carriages.

At 12 a second lieutenant and a gunner arrived from the Morro and were also taken to the hospital.

During the night the ships continued to illuminate the coast with their search lights.

The débris was removed from the Hontoria gun, which was again made ready for firing.

17th.—At 5.30 steady gun fire commenced in the distance to the west. It was learned that one ship was firing on Punta Cabrera. A few minutes later another opened fire on the Socapa.

Thirteen ships in sight.

The ship firing on Punta Cabrera was also firing on Mazamorra. At 7.30 the firing ceased.

There was nothing further of importance during the day and the following night.

18th.—Fourteen ships in sight at daybreak. The *Iowa* left and the *Massachusetts*, which had been absent for several days, took her place.

At 7.45 p. m. gun fire was heard.

It was learned that it was from the Socapa firing at a ship which had passed within a short distance and had answered. About 20 shots were exchanged.

19th.—Fifteen vessels in sight.

At 7 two battle ships arrived from the south; total, 17.

At 2.30 p. m. General Linares went to the mouth of the harbor, returning at 7 p.m.

During the night the ships were again running their search lights along the coast and the entrance of the harbor.

20th.—At daybreak there were 21 vessels in sight, 7 of them battle ships.

The *Oquendo* changed her anchoring place and went farther to the north.

At 12 the Morro reported that 39 hostile vessels had arrived; shortly after 3 more came, so that, with the 21 that were already opposite the Morro, there was a total of 63.

At 12.05 a loud detonation was heard and a great deal of smoke was seen at the piers of Luz and San José; it came from the schooner *Trafalgar*, where a shell had exploded while being fired, killing a sailor of the steamer *San Juan* and wounding three of the *Mortera*, one of whom died a few minutes later. The schooner had to be run ashore to prevent her going down.

Orders were received for the formation of the fourth army corps, in command of General Linares, composed of the division of Santiago, which was already under his command, and the division of Manzanillo.

Another cable was stretched between the Socapa and Cay Smith, like the one stretched between Cay Smith and Punta Soldado, and twelve Bustamante torpedoes were planted, half of them between Cay Smith and the *Merrimac*, and the other six between the latter and Punta Soldado.

21st.—It was learned that the 42 vessels that had arrived the previous day had proceeded in an easterly direction during the night, leaving only the former 21, most of them war ships.

At 2.30 p. m. the Morro stated that the 42 vessels were again returning from the south.

The cruiser *Reina Mercedes* left her anchoring place at the Socapa and cast anchor in the bay, west of the captaincy of the port.

On the 16th the American fleet had again opened fire on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, and although it could not be compared with that of the 6th, either in intensity or duration, yet it had caused us two deaths at the Socapa, and two officers and several sailors and soldiers had been wounded there and at the Morro. A 32-cm. shell, which exploded at the former of said batteries, raised such a quantity of earth that it partly buried one of the Hontoria guns, making it useless for the time being, and came near burying also the men serving it. During the night the earth covering the gun was removed, so that it was again ready for service.

The names of the Morro and Socapa have been repeated many times, and it has been shown that these two poor batteries were the main objective of the hostile fleet and had to withstand the fire of over 90 guns, most of them of large caliber, which they always answered; yet, I can not help but speak once more of the heroism, truly worthy of admiration, displayed by those who served them, constantly exposing their lives and having to watch after fighting, without a moment's rest or sleep; for the enemy was always on the lookout for the least remission in watchfulness in order to surprise them and attempt a coup de main on the harbor.

Each one of them, and the governor of the castle first of all, earned the gratitude of the country every day for two months. Their self-denial and valor kept a powerful fleet in check for seventy days. The resistance which the Morro and the Socapa offered under the prevailing circumstances is a true feat of heroism.

On the 17th the ships reconnoitered along Punta Cabrera and Mazamorra, firing on the detachments of the Asiatic column.

On the 20th, the day when the 42 vessels of the convoy appeared with the landing expedition, a shell exploded in the hold of the schooner *Trafalgar*, causing several deaths and injuring the hull of the schooner, which had to be run ashore in order to prevent her from sinking.

I shall not speak at length of a matter which is of no importance, but will mention it briefly, because it gives an idea of the craze reigning at Santiago, to which the frequent bombardments, which must have cost at least a million dollars, gave rise.

Whether by reason of the type of their fuzes, or because many of the shells did not have the requisite powder charge (I have discharged a 57-mm. shell myself, which had only one-eighth of it), certain it is that many did not explode and remained intact as though they had not been discharged; as they were being thrown

in such large numbers, many people wanted to keep one as a curiosity or as a souvenir of an event which does not happen often in a lifetime. Some wanted them of small, others of large caliber; others wanted to make a collection of all sizes. I have a friend who called on me one evening to show me a 20-cm. shell which had been discharged and had not suffered the least deformation. The fad had cost him 20 pesos, and he was as happy over it as a child over a new toy. But I was thoughtless enough to tell him that there were 32-cm. ones, and he was inconsolable. It will be understood from the above that the fad was being paid for dearly; and as capital is always made out of everything, many people made a business of gathering up and discharging projectiles and selling them. That was the cause of the unfortunate occurrence on board the *Trafalgar*; a shell had been discharged without the necessary care, and what happened was but the natural consequence.

Another monomania of this period: As the Americans kept up the bombardments all through the month of June, so that there hardly was a day when gunshots were not heard at a greater or less distance, people were hearing them all the time; the falling of a chair, the closing of a door or window, the noise of carriage wheels in the distance, the crying of a child—everything was taken for gunshots, and gunshots was all that was being talked about. When they finally ceased, Santiago had become so identified with them that people almost missed them and were surprised to hear them no longer.

XXI.

LINE OF OBSERVATION.

We have now reached a period when the events acquire the greatest interest and assume exceptional importance. So far it was only the fleet that had been antagonizing us; and numerous and powerful though it was, it had threatened only one point, which experience showed us it did not dare attack or force. Henceforth we shall find ourselves menaced also on land by an army equipped with numerous modern artillery, which, supported by the ships that had control of the sea and could therefore, without trouble, communicate with their dépôts and base of operations, and further supported by the insurgents who had control of the field, was constantly receiving reinforcements of men and material and had at its disposal everything which we, unfortunately, were lacking.

From this time on the events are precipitated, so to speak, and lead with dizzy rapidity to a dénouement which it is not difficult to foresee. In view of the exceptional location of the island of Cuba, we can not hope for help either from within or without; we can not hope for provisions nor ammunition, and without these the soldier can not be fed and can not fight—a sad and desperate situation for men who ask for nothing else and whom fate seems to pursue.

When speaking of military operations and movements of troops, it is not always possible to give a full account of them as they happen; there is danger that some of the occurrences, the situation of the forces, and the points they defend or attack, may not be known. In order to obviate this, and to give the reader a better understanding of the events that took place later, I will give an outline, though perhaps incomplete, of the distribution which General Linares made of the forces he had at his disposal.

It has already been stated that on the 20th the Fourth Army Corps was organized, consisting of the Santiago division and the Manzanillo division. General Linares was made commander in chief, and Lieutenant Colonel Ventura Fontán, who had been chief of staff of the latter division, retained the same position relative to the corps.

General Toral, though in command of the division of Santiago, remained at the head of the military government of the city, with the same chief of staff. It may, therefore, be said that nothing was changed.

From telegrams received, the enemy's plans could be, if not accurately known, at least surmised, and as it was supposed that they might effect a landing at a point on the coast more or less close to the city, General Linares ordered the concentration of his forces so that they might be assigned to convenient positions. First of all, orders were sent from Havana to Manzanillo, by telegraph, for General Escario to proceed with all the forces available, and with the least possible delay, to Santiago de Cuba. Said general left Manzanillo on the 22d with 3,300 infantry, 250 cavalry, two Plascencia guns and 60 transport mules. The infantry was composed of the battalions of Alcántara, Andalusia, Puerto Rico chasseurs and two battalions of the Isabel la Católica regiment. These 3,300 men who, from the time they left Manzanillo, had encounters every day with the insurgents, who killed and wounded 97 of them, could not arrive here, in spite of forced marches, until the evening of July 3; this should not be lost sight of.

At another place I have spoken of the scarcity of provisions in the city. The authorities, in order not to diminish the chances of assistance which they might obtain from the region under cultivation, for the men as well as the horses and mules, combined the operations and position of the troops with the object of attempting to preserve that region and looking out for the enemy in all directions.

With this object in view, a line of observation was established, as follows: To the north, from Palma Soriano through San Luis, El Cristo, and Socorro; to the west, from Punta Cabrera through Monte Real and El Cobre, on the roads which lead to the city on that side, and to the east, from Daiquiri through Vinent and Firmeza to the harbor of Escandell.

On the 22d the first companies of the Spanish fleet disembarked, with a force of about 130 men each, under orders of the third commanders of the ships respectively; two companies were stationed at San Miguel de Paradas, to guard the coast west of the bay and assist the Socapa or the city; the third company at the Socapa, to reenforce that point, and the fourth and last company at Las Cruces, to assist the Morro, Aguadores, or the city.

At night of the same day, the second companies disembarked, including men from the *Mercedes* and the destroyers, a total of 450, who, under command of Capt. Joaquín Bustamante, went the following day to occupy the line from Dos Caminos del Cobre to the Plaza de Toros; that is, south and southwest of the precinct.

The only forces in the Santiago district prior to the declaration of the present war were nine companies of mobilized troops and two of the Santiago Regiment, to garrison the city and the forts of the precinct, besides a small number of the Civil Guard and a few artillerymen, and as much cavalry as was indispensable for convoy and other services properly belonging to the cavalry.

When war was declared, six more companies of the Santiago regiment came for the purpose of commencing the fortification works of the precinct of the city, under the directions of the chiefs and officers of the corps of engineers; another company was occupying the position of Ermitaño (east of the city) and another was at Socorro.

I believe I have already stated that by orders of General Linares the Talavera battalion had come from Baracoa and was stationed, with three companies of mobilized troops, along the coast to watch the same, occupying Daiquiri, Siboney, the railroads, and the forts.

The Asiatic battalion, in command of Colonel Aldea, took up its position of observation west of Santiago: Four companies, with the colonel at Punta Cabrera, covering the coast road; another, with one mobilized company, occupying Mazamorra, both to be ready to reenforce the former four or the forces at the Socapa, if necessary, and to prevent in due time a landing at Cabañas; another occupied the camp at Monte Real, and finally another, with one mobilized company, garrisoned El Cobre. With these forces all the roads leading to Santiago from the west had to be covered.

Gradually, as information was being received concerning the enemy's plans, the available forces of the San Luis brigade, in command of General Vara del Rey, were concentrated in the district.

First, four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico (No. 1) arrived, one company remaining at El Cristo and one at Songo, both of them occupying also the forts on the railroad of both towns. Later came three companies of the San Fernando battalion, one remaining at El Cristo and two at Palma Soriano. Finally, General Vara del Rey, with three companies of the twenty-ninth regiment (Constitución), one company of guerrillas on foot, and two Plasencia guns, occupied El Caney, where there were only 40 men of the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, leaving three companies of the twenty-ninth regiment at the towns of San Luis, Dos Caminos, and Morón. Two squads of cavalry were distributed in said three towns.

It is only necessary to cast a glance at the chart, without much study, to understand that the line which our troops occupied was too extensive to be solidly covered and effectively defended by such small forces.

Why did General Linares not limit it and occupy positions closer to the precinct and more susceptible of effective defense? For a reason which outweighs all others. He could not do so without condemning its defenders from the outset to an inevitable disaster.

I will repeat once more—for to this must be attributed the reverses we suffered—that there was nothing left in Santiago except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the regular supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for although there were many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are of the Remington, Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of calibers differing from those of the Spanish Mauser, which is the weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of course, 150 cartridges are used up very rapidly. It was the scarcity of provisions, confined almost entirely to rice, which, more than anything else, compelled General Linares to defend the line which, beginning at Ermitaño and passing through El Caney, San Miguel de Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La Caridad and Veguita, would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Morón and the aqueduct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the cultivated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in water, which the soldiers could not stand and which made them unfit for the active operations necessary in war.

The Morro and the Socapa had to be not only occupied, but well protected; they were the key to the harbor. If the enemy had taken possession of them, it would have been easy to remove the torpedoes and force the bay, and then the city and its defenders would necessarily have had to surrender.

It was equally necessary to occupy Daiquiri, Siboney, and Aguadores, so as not to allow the enemy to make a landing at any of them with impunity (as they did after all, supported by the war ships, at the first-named place) and gain possession of the railroad. For the same reasons also, it was necessary to cover the landing places of Cabañas and Guaicabón (near Punta Cabrera), as also the west coast of the bay, and preserve the railroads leading to the city.

All this proves that it was not only desirable, but absolutely necessary to defend said line. To give it up would have meant to be resigned from the outset to perish from hunger, and perhaps from thirst, which is worse.

If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we should not have lost our communications with the cultivated region, nor would the aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy enough to understand how much these two things had to do with

later events, and how different the situation would have been without them. Unfortunately the small number of our forces made it impossible to save these positions.

The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and ruin, but there would have been water and more provisions, and the army would have been able to maintain itself and fight, at least until the last cartridge was gone.

Unfortunately the insurgents, firing from ambush, as usual, on General (then Colonel) Escario's column, succeeded in delaying its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the 1st of July. Fate is not always just.

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XXII.

EVENTS OF JUNE 22^D TO 27TH.

The reader being acquainted with the number of our troops, the positions they occupied and the sites they covered and their object, it will not be difficult to understand and appreciate the operations carried on and the events taking place here.

On the evening of the 21st it was learned, as has been stated, that the enemy was effecting a landing at Punta Berracos.

June 22d.—At 6.30, the usual ships were opposite the mouth of the harbor; in Agnadores Bay there were two yachts and one monitor; at Punta Berracos, the 42 vessels of the convoy, among them the *Saint Louis*, with the *Indiana*. A steamer, with tugs, could also be seen. We therefore knew that the landing was being effected. We also saw the house on fire that the English had on San Juan river.

At 8 the enemy opened fire and Punta Gorda answered.

At the same time, one ship fired upon Agnadores.

The *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, and *Texas* were firing on the Morro and Socapa, and the batteries were answering.

At noon the firing ceased in the mouth of the harbor.

Punta Gorda only fired five shots.

The firing continued on the coast toward the east.

During the day the first companies of the Spanish fleet (4 companies, about 520 men) disembarked. At midnight the second companies (about 450 men) disembarked. It has already been stated what part of the ground they were to cover.

At 11 o'clock p. m. two shots were heard and a loud detonation, followed by a noise resembling that of a screw revolving in the air. Shortly after, another similar detonation was heard.

23d.—Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about 6 miles from it, 8 battle ships, 2 destroyers, the *Vesuvius*, and 8 merchant vessels. The rest, as many as 63, continued the landing on the coast, protected by some of the war ships.

At 2.30 a yacht, with a white flag, left the fleet and approached the Morro. The tug *Colón* went out to speak with her. At this time there were 24 ships opposite the harbor.

During the night the enemy examined the coast again by means of search lights.

24th.—Eight battle ships, 2 destroyers, the *Vesuvius* (which, at 11 o'clock on the previous night, had thrown two dynamite bombs

on the port, fortunately without doing any harm) and 12 merchant vessels, are guarding the mouth of the harbor, stretched out from Aguadores to Punta Cabrera. The others, as many as 63, among them six war ships protecting them, continued the landing at Daiquiri.

The yacht that came up yesterday with a flag of truce was sent by Admiral Sampson, who inquired whether the lieutenant who had been made prisoner was being kept in the Morro. Mr. Concas, who was delegated to parley, answered evasively, as was natural, that the prisoner was in a safe place.

At 11.55 the *Brooklyn* opened a slow fire on Daiquiri and adjoining points on the coast.

At 1.30 the firing ceased.

At 1.55 it was again heard in the same direction, ceasing at 2.30.

At night the hostile fleet used the projectors again.

25th.—At 4 a. m. 14 shots were heard in the direction of Daiquiri. It was presumed that they were firing on General Rubin's column.

At daybreak there were at the mouth of the harbor 8 battle ships and 12 merchant vessels.

From 12.30 to 2 o'clock the hostile fleet kept up a slow fire on the coast from Aguadores to Daiquiri.

It was noticed that the vessels landing troops or material were going back and forth, so we felt sure that new reinforcements were constantly arriving from the United States.

26th.—At daybreak the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Vesuvius*, 1 monitor, and 6 merchant vessels were in front of the harbor. To the east, in the direction of Berracos, 11 steamers could be seen, and 8 at Daiquiri, inside of the roadstead.

The *Vesuvius* had discharged two bombs the preceding night, one completely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of the *Mercedes* and a soldier of the garrison.

27th.—The same ships blockading the harbor as the preceding day.

During the night the *Vesuvius* threw 3 dynamite bombs, doing no damage, as they fell in the water, although inside of the harbor.

The search lights were going again during the night.

On the evening of the 21st the enemy had commenced to effect the disembarkation of the landing expedition (which according to New York newspapers consisted of 50,000 men), and in order to do so in perfect security, even though they had in all 63 vessels, counting both merchant and war ships, they landed them at Punta Berracos, 20 miles from Santiago, in spite of there being no water and

no roads, because our troops, few in number, could not cover such an extensive region.

To assist the landing, the ships were firing on the whole coast from Berracos, east of Santiago, to Punta Cabrera, 27 miles west. How could we cover so many threatened points and occupy so extensive a territory? Impossible, even if we had had much superior forces than we did.

The battle ships, always in imposing numbers, remained in front of the harbor so as to keep our fleet in. The war ships were protecting the landing, and as they controlled the sea it was impossible for soldiers with small arms to prevent it.

How many men did the Americans disembark?

As Santiago was cut off from the rest of the world, or almost so, it was not easy to ascertain the exact number, nor was it necessary. The vessels of the convoy, as soon as they had landed men and material, returned to the United States and came back with fresh contingents. But it may be safely stated that the first expedition consisted of at least 15,000 men, with more or less war material.

I base this estimate on the fact that forty-three vessels arrived, including six war ships apparently conveying them, and although the latter can, and generally do transport troops, I do not count them, nor do I count five small tugs; hence there remain thirty-two of all sizes, and modern steamers can surely carry on an average not less than 1,000 men each, especially in view of the short distance from Key West to Santiago and the fine weather prevailing. But taking into consideration the circumstance that they had to carry war material as well, I will reduce the figure to one-half, namely, 500 men to each steamer, and there would still be 16,000. There can be no doubt, as everybody will admit, that, if I err in my calculation, my figures are below rather than above the actual number. Moreover, as I have said, this matter is not of great importance, for new contingents kept constantly arriving, and the Americans also knew that the insurgents, who were awaiting their arrival, would swell their forces.

Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 2), the *Vesuvius* threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, with the greatest humanity possible, for it will be remembered that such was the pretext of this war. For that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by another ship, usually a battle ship—for the mission of the *Vesuvius* is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities—and as soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge three tubes at regular intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of

one of these projectiles to understand them. Fortunately, they do not appear to be very sure, either in range or in aim.

On the sea, matters continued in the same condition. Let us now see the operations carried out on land by the Army forces during this period, the latter events taking place at diametrically opposed points.

On the 22d Daiquiri and Siboney were bombarded by the ships. At the same time the enemy appeared at the former place. As the force guarding it could not cope with the ships, it retreated by way of Vinent to Firmeza, gathering up all the detachments from the forts.

General Rubín, with three companies of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, and two artillery guns (Plasencia), proceeded to Siboney. There he received orders to proceed with his column and with the whole force in the mineral region to the heights of Sevilla before daybreak, where they were to take position in three echelons, the foremost one under Commander Alcañiz, formed of the three companies of Puerto Rico and one mobilized company.

On the 23d this echelon alone checked the enemy's advance in the morning, and again in the evening, the echelon having been reenforced by one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and two guns. When the battle was over the forces withdrew to their former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site.

At daybreak on the 24th the echelon was reenforced by two companies from Talavera, and not only resisted a strong attack of the enemy, but also forced the latter to retreat.

In spite of this advantage they received orders to withdraw because the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, and as there were not forces enough to oppose him, it would have been surrounded. In compliance with the order received the column withdrew to the city.

The official report of this battle is as follows:

“General Rubín's column, under orders of the commander in chief of the Fourth Army Corps, was attacked yesterday at noon and in the evening.

“This morning considerable forces with artillery guns made a resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men.

“On our side we had in the two days seven dead; José Lancés, captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, and Zenón Borregón, second lieutenant of the same battalion, seriously wounded; Francisco las Tortas, first lieutenant of the regiment of Royal Artillery, slightly wounded; two privates seriously wounded, two slightly wounded. Various contusions.”

Later on it was learned that the forces which attacked General Rubín's column, or rather the echelon of the same, under Commander Alcañiz, were as follows:

The seventh, twelfth, and seventeenth regiments of United States infantry, the second Massachusetts, the seventy-first New York, and 16 dismounted squadrons.

On the 26th the following was published:

"General order of the Fourth Army Corps, dated June 26, at Santiago de Cuba:

"Soldiers: We left the mineral region because I did not wish to sacrifice your lives in vain in unequal battle, with musket fire, against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modern and powerful guns.

"The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of Santiago.

"The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal conditions.

"Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee of success.

"Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels.

"The nation and the army look to us.

"More than a thousand sailors, disembarked from the fleet, will assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain.

"The other division of this army corps is hastening toward us to reenforce us.

"I make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will vie in the defense of their posts with firmness and resolve; but I will say that those assigned to any position, be it in the precincts of the city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost, without vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only of saving the honor of our arms.

"I shall comply with my duties, and, in conclusion, I say with all, Long live Spain!

"LINARES.

"The foregoing was published to-day, by order of His Excellency, for the information of all.

"VENTURA FONTÁN,

"*Lieutenant Colonel, chief of staff.*"

In order to convey a better understanding of the foregoing operations of General Rubín's column, I will give below a copy of the instructions and orders which said general received from General

Linares, all of which were drawn up in camp and written with lead pencil.

They are as follows:

“POZO, *June 23, 1898.*”

“Civilians have handed to me the paper which you wrote to me, and we have heard firing since a quarter to five, and afterwards gun fire.

“I have impressed upon Colonel Borry to guard well the path or road to the Redonda, where he is encamped, so that the troops of the line, if they should find Sardinero occupied, can take that road to the Redonda.

“I have sent to Santiago for all the transport mules and ten carts, which will be at your camp by 7.30 or 8 o'clock. You will have the sick ready, and also the ammunition, so that they may at once be taken to Santiago, with the same convoy that will go with the mules.

“Make arrangements to have the first mess of the morning taken there and then you will receive further orders.

“LINARES.

“TO GENERAL ANTERO RUBÍN.”

(Seal: “Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps—General Staff.”)

“After eating the first mess you will march with the whole column to Santiago, effecting a retreat from that point by echelons as carefully and slowly as may be necessary, so as to be in good condition to repulse any attack of the enemy.

“The Talavera Battalion will go to Sueño and will there meet the chief of the town, who will indicate to it the points to be occupied.

“The Puerto Rico Battalion, with the two mobilized companies from the mineral region, will proceed to Cañadas and will there receive orders concerning the points it is to occupy, and the San Fernando Battalion is to proceed to Central Benéfico, and will also receive instructions. The section of artillery will go to the quarters at Dolores. The section of engineers will proceed to Cruces, taking quarters in the offices of the mineral company.

“LINARES.

“POZO, *June 24, 1898.*”

“NOTE: The captain of engineers is to return to Santiago with the convoy of sick and to report to Colonel Caula.

“TO GENERAL ANTERO DEL RUBÍN.”

(Seal: "Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps—General Staff.")

"You have already received orders to retreat, which is to be done when the convoy of sick has started under the protection of two mobilized companies and one Talavera company.

"The whole train will retreat first, and upon arriving at Santiago, they will go to the points designated, and with the three echelons of Puerto Rico, San Fernando, and Talavera, you will make the retreat, alternating by echelons in such manner that when the forward echelon leaves a position the other two will be in position, until arriving at Santiago. There I shall await you.

"LINARES.

"TO GENERAL RUBÍN."

XXIII.

END OF THE MONTH OF JUNE.

June 28th.—The Morro said that the *Massachusetts*, which had been gone, had returned; that the *Iowa* had left instead, and that at 7 a. m. a merchant vessel was embarking the sick of the fleet, estimated at about 50, judging from what could be made out with the help of glasses; that to the east, at a distance, the ships were firing slowly.

During the night they continued to watch with search lights.

29th.—The *Iowa* returned.

In the evening, firing on Daiquiri was heard.

30th.—The same ships are blockading the harbor.

The Morro said that at 3 p. m. a steamer was sighted to the south; that, when she saw the American fleet, she shaped her course eastward at full speed; that a yacht and a battleship went out to chase her; that the latter returned with the steamer which, with the American flag hoisted, joined the convoy at Daiquiri.

At 8 p. m. a few musket shots were heard in the direction of Campo de Marte (east of the city).

Later the sound came from the Plaza de Toros (northeast).

At 9 firing was again heard at the cemetery (to the north).

Nothing further occurred.

The last three days of the month of June are devoid of interest and we enjoyed unusual quiet. So much had the people of Santiago become accustomed to the sound of gunshots that they almost missed them.

But how true it is that when a calm comes after a storm, it is often only the precursor of another storm. The enemy was preparing to begin the month of July in a manner that Santiago de Cuba will remember many a day.

The hostile fleet continued to antagonize the coast as usual. But without neglecting their main objective and their constant care, that of watching our fleet, which, being short of provisions, would sooner or later be compelled to take some decisive action, they were gathering at the entrance of the harbor a large number of their most powerful ships, and the army, no doubt intrenching itself at Daiquiri, so as to have another shelter besides that of the

ships, and a safe base of operations, was preparing to attack the city, supported by the insurgents who had joined them in large numbers under their leaders Calixto García, Demetrio Castillo, Cebrecos, and others less known.

This is proved by the musket fire which was heard a short distance from the city, to the northeast, on the night of the 30th.

From the news we had received from the Morro it might have been inferred that about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the hostile fleet had captured a merchant vessel, which, after the American flag had been hoisted upon her, joined the convoy; but this is not probable. Aside from the fact that the flag of a ship is not changed as easily as that, the truth would have become known sooner or later. It is more probable that it was a vessel that was not expected and they went out to reconnoitre. That is my opinion about this incident, which, in reality, is not of much importance.

A few words more about the *Vesuvius* that gave us so much trouble for a few nights—that time, it seems, suiting her best to carry out her exploits. This ship is the only one of her class; her projectiles and the apparatus throwing them are not known, and she has made her *début* here. One of the projectiles which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a distance of about 20 metres. From a certain distance, as I could see the day I went to the *Mercedes*, it looked as though a road had been opened across the mountain.

Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, made an excavation, not very deep, but very wide; I was told that it would hold twenty horses. This would seem to indicate that the screw with which they are provided keeps on revolving even on solid ground.*

Still another dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroyers, which was violently shaken, as also the *Mercedes*, anchored at a short distance. I heard this from the commander of the former and the officers of the latter.

The forces of the army which, as has been stated, abandoned the mineral region, not being able to maintain it, concentrated in the city, preserving, as was indispensable, the line from Aguadores to Cruces, after destroying the bridge at the former point. The line (4 kilometers) was covered by six companies of the Santiago regiment and two of mobilized troops, a total contingent of about 800 men.

*The reference to the "screw" in this paragraph probably refers to the vanes or feathers on the rear end of these shells. They are for the purpose of giving the shell rotation in its flight, and being fixed to the shell they have no independent motion.—O. N. I.

The advance post of El Caney (a league and a half, about 6 miles, from the city), in command of General Vara del Rey, was defended by three companies of the battalion "Constitución" (the 29th), one company of guerrillas on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, being a total of 520 men.

The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos Caminos del Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, to the east, on the seashore, was defended by the following forces:

Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies)	458
Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico.....	450
Talavera Battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular)	850
Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11.....	440
<hr/>	
Total, army.....	2,198
Three companies of mobilized troops.....	330
Volunteers	440
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Total	2,968

Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient number to serve the guns installed, the number and place of which has been mentioned. It may therefore be said that there were, in round numbers, 3,000 men.

This was the fighting force. Within the city was the cavalry force (for which the ground, being hilly and cut up by trenches, was not adapted), and a small force of the civil guard assigned to duty in the city, and the firemen with their engines in readiness.

This line is divided into sections in command of colonels.

Of the 3,000 men defending it, two companies, one of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico and the other of the Talavera Battalion, defended the advance position at San Juan, one being assigned to the right, the other to the left side of the road.

Finally, at the Socapa, that is, at points in an opposite direction from that line, there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at Punta Gorda. It must be remembered that these three positions overlook the entrance of the harbor, and are its key, and must for that reason be maintained at any cost; and these forces were indispensable there, as the enemy might attack them, as indeed he did attack them the next day.

The same day, the 30th, the following telegram, addressed to the aid of marine (ayudante de marina) of that district, was received at the comandancia de marina from Manzanillo:

"COMMANDER MARINE, *Santiago*:

"Last evening, for about an hour, we sustained in the waters of this harbor a battle against three hostile vessels of medium tonnage, which passed, at a distance of about a mile from the head of the piers, in a northeasterly direction, under low steam.

“The following took part: Gunboats *Guantánamo*, *Estrella*, and *Delgado-Parejo*, under my command, and a group of vessels that were disabled, consisting of the pontoon *María* and gunboats *Cuba Española* and *Guardián*. With the former three we arrived in time at the other group, as the enemy passed by, who, finding himself attacked, stopped his progress only a short time on account of an injury which our vessels had inflicted on the second of theirs, which made it necessary for the third one to tow her to windward, and then, with slow speed, though keeping up a steady fire during the retreat, they doubled the headland northeast of the Manzanillo Cays, heading north, and soon disappeared from sight. The city cooperated efficiently with the few guns it has. We had two dead, two slightly wounded, and one bruised, on the *Delgado-Parejo*; two slightly wounded and two contusions on the other ships; in the city, a few wounded; injuries to all the ships, but not material.

“BARREDA.”

XXIV.

BATTLES OF EL CANEY AND SAN JUAN.

July 1st.—At 7 gun and musket fire were being heard in the direction of the Plaza de Marte (east of the city).

According to the Morro the *Minneapolis* arrived to reinforce the hostile fleet.

At the commandancia de marina we could hear a slow gun and steady musket fire in the direction of Campo de Marte.

The enemy had a captive balloon, from which he observed our positions; from the *Reina Mercedes* headquarters (converted into a hospital) it could be plainly seen. It was in the direction of Sevilla.

The American fleet is firing from Aguadores, the greater part of the projectiles passing over the city. Others fall inside, some exploding and some not. Many have already fallen in the houses, among others a 20-cm. shell, which fell in the house of the chief pilot of the port, but did not explode. The ships firing from Aguadores are the *New York* and the *Oregon*.

The streets of the city are almost deserted; only soldiers and volunteers are seen as they go to their posts. As usual, many projectiles are falling in the bay near our fleet.

The firing from the ships ceased at 11.

At 2 intense musket-fire was heard in the direction of El Caney; at 2:30 also gun-fire.

By 3 o'clock the musket-fire became steadier; constant volleys were being heard; at 4 it became less intense.

At 10 p. m. General Cervera left his ship, returning at 12.

On July 1st, at 6 a. m., the nucleus of the hostile army under command of General Shafter, and which must have consisted of at least 15,000 men, with many modern guns, without including the insurgent parties, attacked the lines of the precinct east and east-northeast of the city, that is El Caney, defended by General Vara del Rey with 520 men and two Plasencia guns, and the position of San Juan, occupied by two companies comprising 250 soldiers.

The attack which the Americans made with 12,000 men, as stated by themselves, was commanded by General Wheeler, second in command of the army.

A brigade of 3,500 men, also under the orders of said General Wheeler, and supported by another, directed its efforts upon El Caney, while Colonel Chaffee with 2,000 men attacked the hill and fort of San Juan.

The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while one company after another, without any protection, rushed with veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that expression for want of a better) rather than men; but they met heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bullets by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had been converted into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impossible to go near it.

Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost without having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased for some time, and General Vara del Rey took advantage of this circumstance to have his soldiers re-form the lines and again get ready for the battle.

General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position of San Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly congratulated the handful of lions in these words: "When the American army attacked El Caney they had not counted on a general of Vara del Rey's stamp and on troops as fiery and inured to warfare as those he had under his command."

The fight commenced once more and the enemy attacked again and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle was no longer possible under these circumstances. The General was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two musket balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. The greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two relatives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead and those 520 men having been reduced to less than 100 and most of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get any reinforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy

occupied the position on which he, in his turn, had made such a bold attack.

Of the 520 defenders of El Caney only 80 returned, most of them crippled and bruised. The Americans acknowledged that they had 900 casualties.

As has been stated, 2,000 men under the command of Colonel Chaffee, well protected, attacked in the morning the position of San Juan with the same spirit and enthusiasm with which Wheeler's men made the attack on El Caney.

Our headquarters were situated in an excellent position, at the crossing of the roads to El Caney and Pozo. General Linares had no available reserves; he therefore formed the echelon close to the positions of San Juan where he could observe the movements of the enemy and assist personally at points where his presence might be necessary.

With him was General Ordoñez with two rapid-fire guns.

In the foremost echelon at San Juan was Colonel José Baquero, of the Simancas regiment of infantry, who had come from Guan-tánamo with a message, and could not return on account of the blockade. This echelon was two companies strong, and before the Americans opened fire, it was reenforced by another company. It is here that Colonel Ordoñez was, with the rapid-fire division; the position being defended by 300 infantry and two guns.

The echelon nearest San Juan consisted of three companies of Talavera, one company with General Linares to the right of the Pozo road, forming an angle, in order to prevent a surrounding movement on the part of the enemy from the right of San Juan; another at the angle of the two roads referred to, and a third at Veguita toward El Caney, crossing their fire with that of the forces at Sueño.

In view of the small numbers of our forces and the ever increasing numbers of those of the Americans and their war material, we reenforced our positions by some trenches, under shelter of which we might be able to prolong the fight for a longer time.

The cavalry formed the third line at the fort of Canosa, protected by a small hill.

After the cannonade of the morning, in which our guns with accurate aim succeeded in causing the enemy many casualties and silencing the fire of one of his batteries erected at Pozo, and when the Americans had brought together considerable forces of infantry, they attacked about noon with cannon, machine-gun, and musket fire.

The situation of the line commanded by Baquero was critical. Colonel Ordoñez and the commander of the Puerto Rico battalion, Mr. Lamadrid, had been wounded. One-half of the officers had

also fallen under the action of the lead that was pouring down upon the line. The enemy was advancing in large and compact masses, firmly resolved to take the positions, but Baquero, the brave soldier, who had distinguished himself so highly in the campaign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the troops, almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated by the clouds of bullets and grapeshot.

At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rapidly in order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero's forces and save the artillery if possible. Lieutenant Colonel Sierra hastened to carry out the order, as Commander Arraiz had done before him at San Juan.

The line which General Linares commanded personally now formed the vanguard. With his assistance the General's aids and his chief of staff had to organize the remnants of the first line.

It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its loss would give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave men of the first line were retreating. Colonel Baquero had disappeared, killed, no doubt, when he led that retreat under the hail of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was advancing in compact masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line. Fortunately the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Americans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San Juan. At that moment General Linares and the brave commander of infantry, Arraiz, fell wounded; the latter officer, who had already shed his blood at Cacarajícara, was one of the most beautiful examples of the army.

While these cruel battles of El Caney and San Juan were carried on the enemy sent forces against our whole line, for the purpose, no doubt, of harassing us and making the attack more general.

The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. Others came to their assistance, among them the company of marines which had been stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Captain Bustamante; but the enemy was already strongly occupying the position, our forces were scant, and success was impossible. Our artillery was steadily firing at many points of the line, loading the guns (old ones, as has been stated) without any protection, but the fire was extremely slow and therefore of little efficacy.

At 3.30 p. m. I went toward the Campo de Marte, impatient to learn what had happened. At the Plaza de Dolores I met General Linares. His arm, which had been seriously wounded in the first trenches, as stated, had been dressed at the military hospital and he was now being taken to his house on a stretcher, escorted by a few horsemen.

When I arrived at the end of Enramadas street and was only a few feet from a trench of the third line, covered by a section of volunteers, I saw a part of the battlefield. The musket fire was very slow, and although Santa Ursula fort, situated to the right and somewhat in the rear of the trenches referred to, was firing as rapidly as its muzzle-loading guns permitted, it will be easily understood that there was no new attack that day.

I then went to the headquarters of the cavalry, at the entrance of El Caney road, where a section of the cavalrymen were ready to hasten wherever they might be ordered.

It may be said that the battle was at an end and many commanders and officers were arriving, all tired out and almost dying from thirst. Among others, I saw Commander Irlés, of the general staff, who had had either one or two horses killed under him, and there I learned that the number of commanders and officers wounded had been comparatively very large. Mr. Molina, lieutenant colonel of the civil guard, arrived and said that Commander Bustamante of the navy had been seriously wounded and was being carried on a stretcher. My consternation may be imagined. I hurried out to meet him and found him a few minutes later. In spite of the heat, he had been wearing his blue-cloth suit in the fight, by which he could be easily distinguished from all others. He was covered with blood, pale and disfigured, his eyes closed, and without his saber and revolver. I learned that before he was wounded his horse was killed under him and his hat shot through. I accompanied him to the military hospital. In spite of his insignias of a commander, nobody paid much attention to him. This can be readily understood, for that day, in a short time, over 300 wounded had been received, and they were still coming. It was difficult to find beds and the attendant personnel, although increasing, was not sufficient to look after all.

I succeeded in finding Antonio Cañaz, the surgeon of marine, whom I know, and in whom I have unlimited confidence, and thanks to him, the wounded man was placed on a bed and his clothes taken off. They had to be cut with scissors. The wound was in the right side of the abdomen; his legs were covered with blood. The position of the bullet, the aspect of the wounded man, and above all the look with which Dr. Cañaz answered mine, left me no doubt. I knew that he had only a few moments to live and I left the hospital deeply affected.

I will add that, as the hospital was situated in the sector attacked by the enemy and near the trenches, being outside the city, musket balls were falling in great quantities in the court and on the roof; later on, shells were flying over it in all directions.

As has been seen, two battle ships from Aguadores were throwing projectiles upon the city and the bay, causing victims among the inhabitants and damages to the buildings. As I went to the captaincy of the port in the morning when the firing commenced, I saw at the ambulance improvised at the Bottino pharmacy, a woman who was having her head dressed, which had been struck by a fragment of shell. The wound, although not deep, was wide, and looked as though made with a razor.

At nightfall the firing ceased along the whole line.

Such were the battles of that day, so serious by reason of the blood that had been shed, as well as by their results.

With the loss of El Caney, we lost the line which it had been so imperative for us to keep, and also the aqueduct and the region under cultivation—that is, provisions and water. We had to confine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full well that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer, there was no possibility of avoiding it.

Our casualties were as follows:

Killed: Brigadier General Joaquin Vara del Rey, 3 commanders, 12 officers, and 78 men.

Missing: Colonel of Infantry José Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. The colonel was probably killed, but this could not be verified.

Prisoners: Two officers.

Wounded: Lieutenant General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 commanders, 30 officers, and 339 men.

(Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula and Colonel of Artillery Ordoñez.)

TOTAL CASUALTIES.

Generals	2
Commanders.....	10
Officers	48
Men	533
Total	593

Almost one-fifth of the combatants covering the whole line, and the whole line was not even attacked, but only a sector of it; consequently not all of them fought.

The casualties of the enemy, as acknowledged by themselves, were:

In the attack on El Caney	900
In the attack on San Juan.....	432
At other points of attack.....	328
Total.....	1,760*

* This is the figure of the original Spanish but is probably intended for 1,660.—O. N. I.

In these cruel battles the army inspired the enemy with respect and true admiration, perhaps because he had supposed that they fought in the same manner as the insurgents. The foregoing is my firm conviction, because I have seen and observed the events which I narrate and have dwelt much upon them.

On the 1st day of July the Americans fought, as I have stated, without protection and with truly admirable courage, but they did not fight again as they did that day. They entrenched themselves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did not again come out from behind their fortifications. Did they think on that first day that all they had to do was to attack our soldiers en masse to put them to flight? God knows.

It was difficult to convince them that only 520 men had been defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no longer possible their admiration had no limits. When they entered Santiago de Cuba, the American soldiers and ours looked upon each other without any prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they knew that both had fought like brave men, and whenever the Americans saw one of our men of the twenty-ninth (the number of the battalion "Constitución," which had defended the city, and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, look at him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering perhaps, how so simple a soldier could do such great things.

The men of the twenty-ninth, known to have done something worth doing, were loved and feasted by everyone and spent whole hours with the Americans, who did not understand them, but applauded everything they said, on the assumption, perhaps, that he who is brave must also be bright.

Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and they have made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be mistaken, but I do not believe it, because I have also noticed that the Yankees treat the insurgents, although they are their allies, very differently. Besides, I am only citing facts, and anyone can construe them to his own satisfaction.

From the foregoing, it is reasonable to believe that when 520 men maintained themselves at El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San Juan for four hours, if Escario could have been there that day, so that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines, neither El Caney nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by almost the whole hostile army.

General Linares surrendered the command to General Toral.

In the battle of July 1, General Rubín, who commanded the forces of San Juan and Portillo del Caney, had his horse killed under him at the latter place at 5 o'clock p. m.

XXV.

ACTIONS OF THE 2^D AND 3^D.

July 2d.—At 5 o'clock gun and musket fire commenced, well sustained in the direction of the land.

At 6 the hostile fleet opened fire on the Morro and the Socapa. The greater part of the projectiles fell in the bay and on our fleet.

The firing ceased at 8.30.

Punta Gorda, which also opened fire, discharged 8 shots.

The musket fire was intense.

At 8.15 Punta Gorda again opened fire. At the same time the *Plutón* started up toward the mouth of the harbor. The musket fire ceased.

At 9.30 the military governor said by telephone: "I ask your excellency to send a boat, so that by going as close to the coast as possible, the enemy may be checked at San Antonio and Plaza de Toros." At this time the enemy opened musket fire in the same direction. It ceased shortly after.

The companies of the fleet embarked again. A pilot was sent to each one of the ships.

The body of sailors that disembarked was protected in a line of trenches by Colonel Aldea's column (Asiatic battalion), which withdrew from the coast to the city.

At 8 o'clock four wounded from the Socapa were brought to the pier. A shell which exploded on one of the guns killed three men and wounded six, completely disabling the mount of the Hontoria gun, which could no longer be used. Among the wounded was Ensign Fernandez Piña, who was in command of the battery.

At 1.30 a slow gun fire was heard in the distance.

The French consul, on horseback, with a flag of his nation on a very long pole, left for Cuabitas, followed by many people.

During the firing several projectiles of all calibers fell on the city.

At 3.15 musket and gun fire was being heard in the direction of Campo de Marte. The line of fire was very extensive and the musket fire intense.

At 4 o'clock the musket fire ceased, only the gun fire being heard now.

At 4.40 musket fire was again opened; volleys could be heard at intervals.

At 6 the firing ceased.

At 7 musket fire broke out again; ceasing at 7.30.

At 8.30 two blazes could be seen at the top of Monte Real to the west.

At 9.45 the enemy opened a violent musket and gun fire from the Plaza de Toros to the Campo de Marte (from east to east-north-east). To the left (Plaza de Toros) frequent volleys could be heard.

At 10.30 the musket and gun fire ceased.

The night was extremely dark. From 10 to 11.30 the ships of our fleet spoke by means of the Ardois (light signals).

The enemy, during the night of the battle of El Caney, and after burying the dead, not without paying due honors to General Vara del Rey, commenced work on the trenches, which they never left again, continued to surround our lines with the new reinforcements constantly arriving, and installed modern artillery and machine guns on the heights. The insurgents were covering Cuabitas and adjoining points, although in second line. We were decidedly surrounded and all our communications by land cut off, as they had been by sea for over a month and a half. Each hour that elapsed the enemy fortified the circle that inclosed us.

During the night the enemy kept up most incessantly a violent musket and terrific gun fire which we hardly answered, so as not to waste the little ammunition that we had left, which was, no doubt, what the enemy intended.

The Asiatic column (Colonel Aldea) arrived from the coast and occupied in line the post vacated by the companies of the fleet, situated on the road to El Caney (in the entrance).

In the meantime the fleet was once more bombarding the Morro and the Socapa, where, after killing several men, they finally succeeded in dismounting one of the two Hontoria guns, which they had been constantly antagonizing since the 18th of May. At the same time they were bombarding the city from Aguadores, wounding several persons and ruining several houses.

The cruiser *Reina Mercedes* changed her anchoring place and remained at the head of the bay as much as possible, awaiting orders to open fire on Quintero Hill to check the enemy if he should appear there.

The French consul was the first to leave the city, which was abandoned by almost the whole population a few days late-

A little before 10 a. m. the enemy, who no doubt intended to surprise us, furiously attacked our lines, and was repulsed with great loss.

The events of the second of July may be summed up as follows:

Lively bombardment by sea and land, killing several men and disabling one of the only two guns with which we could attack the enemy from the mouth of the harbor; bombarding with impunity the defenseless city; a battle from trenches, the fire of which we hardly answered, and finally a night surprise that resulted in failure.

The companies of the fleet embarked rapidly in spite of the prevailing conditions. A pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which latter took in their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring on their cables, and the gunboat *Alvarado*, which had come out of the slip and was afloat, raised at night the six Bustamante torpedoes that were obstructing the channel to the west. Everything indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet was about to go out; but when and how?

It occurred to me (and nobody could have dissuaded me from it) that a fleet from the Peninsula was on its way to Santiago; that it would pass in sight of the semaphore of Puerto Rico; that consequently Admiral Cervera would know, given the distance and the speed of the former and allowing for the difference in time, when it would reach Santiago; and when fire was opened on the enemy it would leave the mouth free, he would go out and the two fleets combined would defeat the enemy. I remembered everything I had read in newspapers about the purchase of ships, and the date when those building had been launched. Everything became clear to me. We had ships and they were coming. No doubt they were quite near, or perhaps only a few miles distant, but where had the ships come from? I do not know—from heaven, from earth, from the air, from nothing at all—I do not know. But everything appeared possible to me, except that our fleet should go out alone to fight the ships that were assembled at the Morro.

The aid of marine, Mr. Dario Leguinia, even more optimistic than I (and that is saying a great deal), could not rest a minute. I shall never forget how during that night of the 2d we were sitting on the doorsteps of the captaincy of the port, making calculations as to the number of ships that might arrive and the probabilities of success that we could count on. Our ships communicating by means of the Ardois were another proof of this. The event announced was near, and we were to see great things happening. At times we even thought we heard firing out there on the sea at a great distance and in a southeasterly direction. How much desire and imagination can do!

At 1 o'clock at night there was nothing special to be seen, and so, feeling sure that important events were to take place the following day, I retired, not without repeatedly impressing upon the seaman (*cabo de matrícula*) to notify me at once at the first movement of the fleet, or the first gun shot. It would not have been necessary. My impatience and anxiety would have taken care of that much better than the *cabo*.

The next day it was learned that the blazes we had seen on the Monte Real were from the burning of the forts and the heliograph, which the detachment there had abandoned to hasten to Santiago, in order not to be cut off and surrounded. During the march, which was full of hardships, it became necessary to kill a horse for food.

XXVI.

SORTIE OF THE FLEET

If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never should I forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it. The day dawned beautifully. One of those summer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the leaves of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was wonderfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a great distance.

Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet; motionless on the quiet waters of the bay, that reflected their hulls, though inverted, with wonderful accuracy, they looked as though they ought not to leave an anchoring place where they could remain in such perfect safety.

It was 8.30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and taking advantage of the chance of getting a horse, for the distance was great, I went to the military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bustamante, whom I found a different man, as the saying is. His voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed. He moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in doing so. I was agreeably surprised.

Why does one remember things that are really not of great importance? Is it perhaps because they are connected with others that are? I cannot explain it. I only know that I remember, word for word, the conversation that took place between us. It was as follows:

“Is the fleet not going out?” he asked, without giving me a chance to say anything.

“Not just now, I believe, though it is ready to go out. Is it known when the other fleet will arrive?” I said.

“What other fleet?”

“The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably know at about what time it may be expected at the mouth of the harbor.”

“Don't be simple.” (I don't remember whether he called me simple, or innocent, or a fool.) “There is no other fleet; the ships

are going out and that is all there is to it. I have a letter from Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in which he tells me so."

I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I know Admiral Cervera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know that he does not say, and still less write, what he does not intend to do.

"Do you think he will go out to-day?" I said.

"I thought he was going even now."

I could not answer. A gunshot which, judging from the direction, could only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless.

Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing which I believed impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Bustamante like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word. I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave, I went out, got on my horse and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that had been such a protection to us, and which now prevented us from seeing what was going on outside, we should have liked to grind to powder.

The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and valleys echoed was truly infernal and comparable to nothing. An idea may be gained of what it was when it is remembered that over 250 guns, most of them of large caliber and all breech-loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled, and very soon Punta Gorda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the frightful concert, adding the thunder of their guns to the noise of those of the two fleets.

But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I thought, taking into account the number and class of hostile ships and of our own, that the catastrophe of the latter must necessarily take place in the very channel of the harbor, which is such a difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than those which formed our fleet, under normal conditions; how much more, then, when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course ahead of time, an injury to the rudder or the engine, even though slight and momentary, the least carelessness, in a word, might run a ship aground, and such a disaster would cause also the

destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which would have collided with the first; the hostile ships might sink the first right there and then; for the same reasons, the disaster of the others became inevitable.

To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the circumstances Admiral Cervera did, and as confirmed by the commanders of the ships of the fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to go out to certain death, not only with fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must be completely master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the horror which I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but I knew perfectly well the dangers of the enterprise, which, in my opinion, was impossible.

The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect. Therefore, the smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line. When the first moments of excitement were over and we had somewhat cooled down, we could see perfectly that the smoke from the firing formed four groups more or less distant from each other, but what group did our fleet form? If the one farthest to the west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea before it, and this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it formed the second or third, then it was between two fires.

Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance and decreased in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were moving farther to the west. Had they succeeded in escaping and outwitting the hostile fleet? For the present one thing was certain: Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of the harbor, nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the greatest danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro advised us by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing formation and that the enemy did not have the range. Evidently the age of miracles is not over. I will not try to describe what we felt that day—we, at Santiago, who have the honor of belonging to the navy.

I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the anxiety in which I had left Mr. Bustamante and his delicate state of health, I hastened to bring him the news, which I thought would do him a great deal of good. When I arrived, he knew it already, as everyone else did in Santiago. It had spread all over the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction.

I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing, for, as will be seen later when I relate the events of that day, it was believed that our ships had accomplished their object, although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of which was

already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant that it surpassed all reasonable expectations.

How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o'clock in the evening, I saw the pilot Miguel López arrive, his appearance changed and his clothing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain, with the news that he had at his house at Cinco Reales five shipwrecked from the *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo*, worn out and weak; that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close to each other west of Punta Cabrera and about 8 miles from the harbor of Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired, were on the road.

The *Teresa* and *Oquendo* lost, besides the *Plutón* and *Furor*! What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the morning I had believed the ships safe and was already thinking of a telegram from Havana announcing their arrival at that port. At night the news of the catastrophe, the full extent of which I did not know even then!

But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had happened, I will give the news as it was received in the course of the day at the captaincy of the port. It will explain why, for eight hours, we believed at Santiago de Cuba that the Spanish fleet was in safety.

XXVII.

NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

July 3d.—The hostile fleet in sight, about 5 miles distant.

At 9.45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent bombardment was heard.

At 10.40 the Morro said: "The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing formation at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range and it seems as though they would succeed in escaping. The American fleet is composed of the *Brooklyn*, *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and one yacht. The ships from Aguadores have come to assist in the battle."

At 11.15 no more firing was heard.

At 12.30 the Morro said: "When the fleet went out it did so slowly. After the four large ships had gone out the destroyers went, and all of the American ships fell upon them. Our fleet opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried to join them, but near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore. The other continued to fire and when she saw herself lost she lowered two boats filled with men; one reached the coast, the other was captured. On leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran aground burning."

So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one of the ships, apparently the *Teresa*, went close to the shore and a great deal of smoke was seen. The *Iowa* and *New York* were pursuing her and the others followed them. By this time the hostile ships from Aguadores were already taking part in the fight.

At 2 an English warship was signaled to the south.

At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were 24 in all; 15 warships, armored and unarmored; the others merchant vessels equipped for war.

At 6.30 the pilot, Miguel López, said that at his house at Cinco Reales, he had five shipwrecked from the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*, and they said there must be others at Cabañitas.

The tug *Esmeralda*, with the second commander of Marine and Ensign Nardiz, with the pilot, López, and ten armed sailors, went out to gather them up. Forces of the army also went out in the

steamer *Colón* to protect those who might be returning by roads and paths along the coast.

At nightfall Colonel Escario's column arrived from Manzanillo.

My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested in naval matters, and has a good understanding of everything concerning them, witnessed the battle from the Vigía del Medio, which is the highest mountain in the bay and overlooks a great part of it. But we must take into account that, as it is quite distant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it can not be seen. As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had seen it, and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following is what I heard from his own lips, word for word, without changing anything in this interesting account:

"The *Teresa* went out first, then the *Vizcaya* and *Colón*; after a somewhat longer interval, the *Oquendo*, then the destroyers. The Admiral passed the Morro at 9.45. A little to windward of the Morro (west) was the *Brooklyn*. Opposite the Morro another ship, apparently the *Massachusetts*, and I could distinguish no other war ships from the Vigía. When the Admiral passed the Morro the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent fire simultaneously; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that were at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After passing the Morro, the Admiral went west and was lost from sight on account of the Socapa. The *Vizcaya* followed, and then the other two. In the meantime the destroyers remained in the bay. The Spanish ships were now visible again, the *Vizcaya* in the lead, the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Maria Teresa* in line ahead at a certain distance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly, the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the Spanish ships, but often of the American ships on account of the smoke. In the meantime the American war ships and two yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa, and when the destroyers came out it seemed impossible that they should be able to escape. The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight, but they appeared again, firing from their stern guns. As long as the ships could be distinguished it could not be estimated whether they had received injuries of any kind. When they disappeared from sight, at 10.30, we could see no injuries in the masts or smokestacks, or anything special. At this time we saw all the American ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the *New York*, which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed westward. When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground nor on fire, either Spanish or American."

Before I continue, in order to give a better understanding, I will recall the fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera, a stretch of about 6 miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situated Cabañas and Guaicabón; that Punta Cabrera projects south and is very high land, consequently the ships which are west of it and close to the coast can not be seen. It is absolutely necessary to remember this in order to understand why it was that the final result of the battle was not seen.

At 9.30 the Spanish fleet started up; first the *Maria Teresa*, Admiral Cervera's flagship, the *Vizcaya*, then the *Cristóbal Colón*, and *Oquendo*. Behind these the *Plutón* and *Furor*. This was the order of sortie as I learned from the pilots, López and Núñez.

The *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The others arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with their engines going and under steam. One of the last ones to arrive was the *New York*, which, the same as the *Brooklyn*, has a 20-mile speed.

The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line-ahead, received, as each went out, the fire of all the American ships, which they could not answer until they had passed the bank of Diamante, because they could not present the broadside, consequently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as long as they were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire.

Nevertheless they came out without serious injuries and reached the open sea.

The *Vizcaya*, which was the fastest ship, but had not had her bottom cleaned, was making only 13 miles, and the other ships had to regulate their speed by hers in order to preserve the line.

I suppose from what happened and taking into account the order of the sortie that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat of the *Vizcaya*, accompanied by the *Colón* (which did not have her turret guns mounted), with the *Oquendo* and *Maria Teresa*, and then have the latter, by putting on forced draft, rejoin the former, but both were set on fire by the stern, which they presented to the hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one immense blaze and went aground on the coast, the *Teresa* about 7 miles from Santiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the *Oquendo*. These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had arrived. The fate of the *Vizcaya* and *Cristóbal Colón* I will anticipate, in order to complete the account of what happened to the whole fleet as it was told me by an officer of the Austrian cruiser *Maria Teresa* (same name as ours) the next day.

When the *Oquendo* and *Teresa* had been lost, two or three American ships remained there to consummate the surrender and

gather up the shipwrecked and wounded and take the others prisoners. The other ships continued to pursue the *Vizcaya* and the *Colón*. The first of the two also took fire at the stern and stranded at a distance of about 20 miles (toward Aserradero); the second did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged and she ran up on the coast about 60 miles distant (off Turquino).

Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of our ill-fated fleet, and I do not believe that history records another like it. Not a single ship was saved from the catastrophe. The commanders and officers of all the ships knew well what was going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite of everything and ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other and of their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to the fleet.

A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an event like the one which I have in vain tried to describe, must necessarily be of interest, even though of little prominence and education. For that reason I have had the pilots Miguel López and Apolonio Núñez, who took out the *Teresa* and *Oquendo* respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen. I shall not copy everything they said; that would be too much of a task, but only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea of that veritable hell, for that is what the mouth of Santiago harbor was for fifteen minutes.

Miguel López, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as on the sea, said to me about as follows:

“I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at anchor and in his own cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships and only said these words:

“‘Pilot, when can we shift the helm?’ He had reference to turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said:

“‘Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.’

“‘I will advise you, Admiral,’ I answered.

“A few moments later I said: ‘Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.’

“In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, as calm as usual, said: ‘To starboard,’ and the next minute, ‘Fire!’ At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the *Indiana*. I thought the ship was sinking. I can not tell you, Don José, all that passed. By this time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of

the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The Admiral said to me:

“‘Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because you have earned it well.’ And he continued to give orders.”

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel López spoke to me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.

Apolonio Nuñez, who took out the *Oquendo*, is very different from López, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were his impressions:

“When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which can not be compared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me:

“‘You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on perhaps you will not be able to go.’ I thanked him and should have gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine, Don José, what would have happened. I remained on board, and when we had passed the bank I said to him: ‘Commander, you can shift the helm.’

“‘Go, pilot, go,’ he said, and then he commanded to put to starboard and shouted, ‘Fire!’ The noise caused by the big forward gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than the fire of the Yankees. I thought the *Oquendo* had been cut in two. I do not even want to remember it. I was lowered in a boat and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel López had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which was now outside of the harbor.”

These two accounts, which perhaps, do not inspire the interest which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie which had such fatal consequences.

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Nevertheless, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it. By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that

they really accomplished the most difficult part, and there is no doubt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a speed of even 18 miles they would have run the blockade.

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy, although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from the hostile fire much longer, because she "died" later than the others, was not burned; she had a different fate, but not that. I believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been protected like the *Colón*, they would have eluded the enemy's pursuit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of Santiago, they would have met no one to prevent them and the situation would have been very different.

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug *Colón* and were embarked by order of the commander of marine in the cruiser *Reina Mercedes*.

The tug *Esmeralda*, with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors, and the pilot López, went to Cabañitas Cove to gather up shipwrecked; but, although they made a careful search, they found none.

At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the same thing, viz, that they saw our ships run the blockade and disappear past Punta Cabrera.

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it. Lieutenants Bustamante and Caballero, second in command of the destroyers *Furor* and *Plutón*, respectively, who escaped by a miracle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts follow:

Mr. CABALLERO: "The last ships were already outside of the harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the *Furor*, which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go east, but when she discovered the *Gloucester* and other ships which were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the *Gloucester* which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And

the *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, and *Texas*, which we had passed in the order named on the port hand, continued to fire very rapidly, which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns. After we had passed Cabañas we commenced to gain on the *Furor*, and when we came up with her and were about 50 meters to starboard, she listed rapidly on that side, her rudder having been disabled, and passed astern of us at a distance of 1 meter, and sank by the stern, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a moment later, before reaching Punta Cabrera.

“As we (the *Plutón*) were making a great deal of water we continued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 32-centimeter projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole deck and cutting off communication between the two ends. She then veered to starboard and struck on the headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. The shock threw her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the water and reached the shore.

“I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I met—about 20 or 25—and with them I went around a small hill for the purpose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext that the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an easterly direction—some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed—for two hours, resting now and then, and trying to keep close to the coast. When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant Bustamante with a group of shipwrecked from the *Furor* (his ship) and some from the *Maria Teresa*. We saw a yacht with the English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of Punta Cabrera, as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We made signals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding ourselves as much as possible.

“About 3.30 we reached the harbor of Cabañas, which we had to cross swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o'clock at night, we reached the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we could rest for the night, with the assistance of some guerrillas, who supplied us with what they could.”

MR. BUSTAMANTE: “When we (the *Furor*) reached the mouth of the harbor and saw the Spanish fleet, we thought that by shaping our course westward we could seek the protection of the Spanish

fleet, which was already at some distance, and we maneuvered accordingly. One of the projectiles struck one of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boatswain Dueñas, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller-ropes, interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither proceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after shell room, exploding and destroying it.

Our torpedoes had their war-heads on and were ready to be used, but we did not launch them because we were never at a convenient distance from the enemy. Under these circumstances the commander of the destroyers, Captain Fernando Villaamil, gave orders to abandon the ship, and I with part of the crew jumped into the water, about 3 miles from the coast. In the water, one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a bullet in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship in the mean time, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the land we went in an easterly direction towards Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieutenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following the same road and the same fortunes; as they are identical, I will not here relate them."

To what has been said it is useless to add another word.

XXVIII.

CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Words fail me to describe the painful impression produced upon me by the disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under Admiral Cervera's command, and by what I may call the hecatomb of their crews, which was not complete for the only reason that the battle had taken place so near the shore, where the ships, all on fire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the enemy. In less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not strange. I am surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk in the channel.

The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all its commanders, with whom I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so to speak, as soon as the order was received at the Cape Verde Islands to start for Cuba, and the admiral who was in command advised the Government to that effect several times; these official communications are still in existence. But it seems that public opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the presence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very sensible and logical reasons advanced by the admiral, the Government decided in favor of the former, and the fleet departed, shaping its course to the west. From that moment the loss of the fleet became inevitable, and it was only a question of time, as will be easily understood from what follows.

The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was in the bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used up during the voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. The three destroyers, *Plutón*, *Furor*, and *Terror* accompanied it and had to be convoyed and supplied with coal, which involved difficulties and delays.

At Martinique (where the *Terror* was left, being no longer able to follow the fleet) the ships could not coal; and at Curaçao, in spite of the government's promise that they were to find a ship there with fuel, which did not put in an appearance, only two of the ships could get a small number of tons.

The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there; what could they do under such circumstances? The only natural and logical thing: go to the harbor that was nearest and for that reason offered the least dangers, go to Santiago de Cuba; which Admiral Cervera believed well defended, as the harbor is suited for that purpose, and supplied with provisions. How great was his surprise when he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its entrance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as ammunition and everything else.

I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those days of May, before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior to ours (that is, from the 20th to the 27th) the ships could not go out, not only because they did not have coal enough, but also because there was considerable swell in the sea, which prevented them from going out, as was stated by all the pilots of the locality, who said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially the *Colón*, which drew more water than the others.

We must take into account, for it means everything for a fleet, that they had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their speed was therefore far from what it should have been; the *Vizcaya*, above all, was not able to make 13 miles, and later, after being in Santiago harbor for 46 days, her speed was reduced to even less.

But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the south and the ships could have gone out, where would they have gone? To Havana by the shortest route? They would have met Sampson's fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew only too well, and that was just what he wished to avoid. Perhaps he might have succeeded by taking a course which he would have been least expected to take, through Providence Channel, for instance; and this did occur to Admiral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that he did not have fuel enough for so many days of navigation.

Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody there, as well as in the Peninsula, believed it safe and congratulated its commander on his success and his clever maneuver; and when I say "everybody" I do not mean the common people only, but the official element. Could there be a better proof that Admiral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Government?

The fleet received definite order from the Captain General of the Island of Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated, in spite of Admiral Cervera's remonstrances. After that, what was to be done? Only one thing: go out, as indeed they did, resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes; for all those who went out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew, deserve that name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in

so narrow and dangerous a channel, without any of them running aground, which can happen so easily even under ordinary circumstances, when it is not necessary to oppose the fire of a hostile fleet, and with ships of less draught and length. The sortie from that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships effected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor, fearlessness, skill, intelligence and practical experience in seamanship that can be conceived. This was stated repeatedly and with great admiration by the commanders and officers of the English corvette *Alert* and the Austrian cruiser *Maria Teresa*, who, it may be said, witnessed the battle.

The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of the harbor, and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their nature and the kind of armament they mounted, was given in one of the first chapters, from statistics of the American Navy. This alone is more than sufficient to demonstrate that, in view of the inferiority of ours in quantity and quality, it was impossible to sustain the battle.

But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain what happened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater part of which is not known by the people in Spain.

I have already stated that the *Colón*, the only really protected ship of the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret guns. Of the 14-cm. guns of the *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, which are the ones that do most of the firing in a battle, six had been declared useless; and while the *Teresa* could change hers, the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* could not do so, and had to fight, the former with one, the latter with two useless guns, as I have stated.

Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was inadequate, and the *Teresa* had 70 useless charges. The greater part of the primers were no good, and consequently the guns did not go off. The breech-plugs were imperfect, so that after the second or third shot they no longer closed. The firing-pins blew out, and from many of the survivors of the *Oquendo* and *Teresa* I have learned that a number of the men serving the guns were wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing were not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships were like the "carbine of Ambrosius," which went off at the breech; that is, that far from injuring the enemy, they were a danger to those who had charge of firing them.

The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required diameter, and on the *Maria Teresa* it happened that seven had to be discarded before one good one could be found. Under these conditions, it will be readily understood that the armament, which was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery, was instead

converted into artillery—I do not know what to call it, but it was certainly entirely useless.

After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of Santiago be wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may appear strange is that, under such conditions, a fleet should have been sent to the scene of war.

It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from the difficult harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers who, convinced that they would all perish, contented themselves with saying farewell to the comrades who remained on shore and whom they never expected to see again.

We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on account of the heroism which our navy showed on that occasion, when they placed honor above everything else, though our ships were buried in the sea. The battle of Santiago de Cuba is much more glorious even than that of 1805. In this latter battle, thirty-two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-eight English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore, were almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very well have been won, it was because our fleet was commanded by Villeneuve, and the hostile fleet by Nelson. In the battle of Santiago, six ships (if the *Plutón* and *Furor* may be called such), had to fight against twenty-four* that were better protected and armed. After these figures, anything else that might be added would appear to be useless.

I have never been able to understand the reason why there was sent to the Island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner able to cope with that of the United States and which therefore could in no wise prevent the ships of the latter from blockading our ports and controlling the sea; but since it *was* sent, without its arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost, as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was accepted, owing to the conditions prevailing there, then it should have been prevented from being destroyed, as it was, without resulting in any advantage whatever.

The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my opinion, taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were

* The writer makes a strange error in the number of the American ships engaged in this fight. He has evidently counted all those enumerated in Chapter IX. Those ships, however, were scattered among the fleets at Manila, Havana, Key West, and Santiago. Those actually engaged were as follows: *Brooklyn* (flag), *Oregon*, *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and yachts *Gloucester* and *Vixen*. The flagship *New York*, with the torpedo boat *Ericsson*, took part toward the latter end of the engagement, the battle being practically fought by the six ships first named. Counting only numbers of ships, therefore, the Americans had five fighting against the Spanish four, with two armed yachts against the two Spanish 10-boat destroyers.—O. N. I.

in Cuba, to send a few ships of great speed, more or less well armed, to the commercial ports of the United States and bombard them, even though not very effectively. It is probable that public opinion, especially of those who did not participate in the war, would have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would have been avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the same time, the ports of the island, freed from the blockade, could have supplied themselves with provisions; and although the final result would probably have been the same, it would not have been so immediate.

But all this is nothing more than hypothesis and supposition, and not timely; besides, it was not my object in writing this book. I have told how Admiral Cervera's fleet started from the Cape Verde Islands, how it arrived at Santiago, and how it went out to fight with Admiral Sampson's fleet, convinced that the greater part of the people living in Spain are ignorant of what I have set forth, and also convinced that, when the facts are known, the results will be judged differently.

XXIX.

SINKING OF THE MERCEDES.

July 4th.—Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Minneapolis*, *Vesuvius*, one yacht, and seventeen merchant vessels.

At 7 an English corvette arrived and asked for a pilot.

At 9 the Austrian cruiser *Maria Teresa* arrived.

The boats of both ships entered the harbor.

At 4 they departed with subjects of their respective nations.

At 8 p. m. the cruiser *Reina Mercedes* started up.

At 11.30 two gunshots were heard in the entrance at the foot of the Morro; afterwards many more.

At 12.45 the fire ceased. It was answered by the Socapa.

There was hardly a day when the hostile fleet and the Morro and Socapa did not exchange shots, or when some information was not received of injuries to one or more of the hostile ships, even of their having been burned and sunk, but as this has never been proved I have said nothing on the subject, being resolved to say nothing except what has been positively proved and what everybody knew who remained at Santiago during the time when the events that are the object of these notes occurred. It is natural that the ships which sustained the fire so many times (the opposite would be improbable) should have suffered some damages and casualties, although they were stationed at a considerable distance, but there is no doubt that they were not serious; if so, they would have been clearly seen.

On the day of the battle of the two fleets I was assured by sailors from the Socapa and by those shipwrecked that they had seen such and such a ship sunk, or such other one on fire, and such and such a tug had taken off some other ship. It seemed probable, but nothing of the kind happened. The next day the ships that had fought with ours were all at Daiquiri, at Aguadores, or opposite the mouth of the harbor; that is the reason why I have never spoken of the damages done to the blockading ships.

The English corvette *Alert* and the Austrian cruiser *Maria Teresa* could, of course, not enter the harbor, because we had

planted Bustamante torpedoes (although only a part of them) and stretched wires across. The tug *Colón* went out with a flag of truce to notify them to that effect, and they sent in their boats, towed by steam launches.

From the Austrian officers it was learned at the commandancia de marina what had happened to the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* in the battle of the preceding day, for they had arrived just in time to hear the gunshots and to see the ships stranded and lost on the coast. All agreed, of course, that our fleet had fought admirably, and, above all, that the sortie of the ships from the harbor under the circumstances under which they executed it, showed a courage, skill, and practical seamanship truly admirable. It is always a comfort to see that justice is being done, and that comfort I had at that time.

As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet, as the Bustamante torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided—General Toral also being of his opinion—to sink the *Mercedes* (the only ship that was suitable for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel; consequently, the commander of the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet were transferred to the steamer *Méjico*, which had been converted into a hospital and hoisted the flag of the Red Cross. Important papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and the most necessary things, were taken off the *Mercedes*, and at 8 p. m., with her commander, Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the necessary sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nuñez and Miguel López, started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring on the cable ready.

At 11.30, as soon as the enemy, who was watching with search lights, sighted her, he opened a continuous fire on the ship. In spite of this the ship was sunk at the intended place, a very difficult operation under any circumstances and especially under fire, as will be readily understood. Unfortunately the ship did not come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed. Yet it was not entirely useless, since the enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can ever again be used.

And since so much has been said of this ship, I will give an account of all the victims of her crew, some on board, some at the Socapa, Punta Gorda, and the Morro, from the beginning to the end of the war.

Commander Emilio Acosta, second in command, was killed. (Here follow the names of the killed and wounded. The list includes 5 dead, 11 seriously wounded—two of them fatally—16 slightly wounded.)

The enemy cut off the aqueduct so that there was no water left in the city, except in the wells and cisterns.

The shipwrecked, who have arrived from the fleet, are Lieutenants Bustamante and Caballero, second in command of the destroyers, respectively; Midshipman Navia; several engineers and about 150 sailors.

Many were murdered by the insurgents with guns and machetes. I say murdered, because I believe there is no other name for killing with guns and machetes men who were not only disarmed, but almost naked, sick, and many of them wounded. I realize the seriousness of such an accusation, but it is the statement of all who have succeeded in escaping.

XXX.

ESCARIO'S COLUMN.

As the column which the commander in chief had ordered by telegraph from Manzanillo took such an active part in the military events from the time of its arrival at Santiago on July 3, it seems proper that I should give an account of its difficult and laborious march, covering a distance of 52 leagues over territory which had been abandoned two months ago and was in the hands of the enemy and where no help or support could be looked for anywhere.

In order to give an idea of this march, which reflects great honor on the general at the head of the column, the chiefs and officers accompanying it, and the patient soldiers, I will state that of the 52 leagues the only distance where the column could march two abreast was from Almirante to Santa Rita; all the rest of the distance they had to march single file, opening the road with machetes as they went along, as everything was overgrown with manigua. In order that the reader may better understand this march, I will copy the diary of operations of the column.

This diary is as follows:

FROM MANZANILLO TO SANTIAGO DE CUBA BY LAND.

[Diary of the operations of campaign of the forces of the Manzanillo division from June 22 to July 3, 1898.]

“FROM MANZANILLO TO BAYAMO.

“In compliance with orders from the lieutenant general, commander in chief of the fourth army corps, in his cablegram of the 20th instant, ordering that the forces of the Manzanillo division should proceed to Santiago de Cuba, Colonel Federico Escario, for the time being commanding general of said division, having made the necessary preparations for such a long journey, properly equipped the troops and rationed them for six days, commenced the march on the 22d at the head of a column composed of the first and second battalions of the Isabel la Católica regiment of infantry, No. 75; the first battalion of the Andalusia regiment, No. 52; the Alcántara Peninsular battalion, No. 3; the battalion of Puerto Rico chasseurs, No. 19; the second section of the first battery of the fifth mountain regiment; part of the eighth company of the first regiment of sappers; mounted guerillas from Calicito, Bayamo, and Manzanillo; five medical officers and thirty men of the

medical department destined for the Santiago hospitals, and the tenth company of the transportation column in charge of 13,000 rations of hardtack (*galleta*), and 15,000 extra rations loaded on 148 mules, and 50 private beasts of burden properly loaded.

“This column, comprising a total of 3,752 men, left Manzanillo at 5 o'clock p. m., and at nightfall reached Palmas Altas, where its commander gave orders to encamp for the night, which, however, did not afford the soldiers the rest that it was intended it should, owing to a steady downpour, so that only a few could lie down.

“The 23d dawned more brightly than the preceding day; the camp was struck, the column reorganized, and the difficult march continued at 5.30; high weeds had to be cut down to open a road on the left bank of the Yara River, which route the commander chose in order to obviate passing through towns which might be occupied by the enemy, thereby complying with the order to avoid encounters, contained in the cablegram of the 20th, above referred to.

“The column passed through the Don Pedro plain and arrived at dark at the ford of the Yara River, near the town of the same name. Orders were given to encamp here. The column had been harassed all day, especially while preparing to occupy the camp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which lasted ten minutes, killing one of our men and wounding three. The fire was answered by the vanguard of the column. The usual reconnoissance having been made by the mounted force, which reported that the enemy had withdrawn, the column encamped and the night was spent without further events and under more favorable conditions than the previous night, for a clear sky and a dense grove allowed our soldiers comparative rest until daybreak of the 24th, when the column, rising at the sound of the reveille, and after drinking coffee, was again formed and organized by 6 o'clock, when it continued its march through Arroyo Pavon, Ana López, and Sabana la Loma, sustaining slight skirmishes, in which the column had one man killed and one wounded. The column encamped on the banks of the Canabacoa River.

“On the 25th, at the usual hour, the camp of the preceding day was struck and the column reorganized while heavy showers were falling; the march was continued through Las Peladas, Palmarito, and across the Buey and Yao rivers. The camp was pitched at Babatuaba. The same as yesterday, the column was harassed all day, always repulsing and dispersing the enemy. One man was killed during the skirmishes.

“The night passed quietly, and at 6.30 a. m. of the 26th the march was recommenced. The day was eventful and of excellent

moral and material results for the Spanish cause, as will be seen from the fact that our forces entered the city of Bayamo after a long march and pursued and scattered hostile detachments through the heights of San Francisco, Peralejo, across the Mabay River, and at Almirante, where the camp was pitched, not without some resistance from the enemy, who was severely punished by the accurate fire of the column, without causing us the least damage.

“The diary of those days would not be complete without an account of the entrance into Bayamo above referred to. This maneuver was undertaken, contrary to the orders to avoid encounters contained in said cablegram of the 20th from the commander in chief of the fourth army corps, for the reason that the commander of the column thought it would be discouraging to the soldiers to be so near said city without entering it, and that their spirits would rise, on the other hand, if they were allowed to do so and show the enemy and the ungrateful people of Bayamo that there were still Spaniards left in Cuba, and to disperse the enemy, for which purposes there was strength and time enough left that day. The commander therefore decided to explain these reasons to the commander in chief and ordered that Colonel Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, should occupy the city with the cavalry and 600 infantry, the latter to be divided into two columns and the cavalry to form the third. Interpreting faithfully the wishes and orders of Colonel Escario, Colonel Ruiz left the camp at Almirante at 3 o'clock p. m., after the troops had taken their first mess, and divided his forces into the three groups mentioned, himself taking command of one of the groups of infantry, placing the other in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón, first commander of the Alcántara battalion, and the mounted force in charge of Luis Torrecilla, commander of the first battalion of the Isabel la Católica regiment. These three columns of attack, advancing steadily on three different points, succeeded in approaching the city without disturbance or interruption. Evidently the enemy was desirous of saving his fire, for alarm signals were heard and groups were seen running from one place to another of the precinct, leaving no doubt that the enemy was near.

“The columns in the meantime continued to advance rapidly and in silence, deployed in perfect order of battle, and thus they arrived at the banks of the Bayamo River, where hostile forces tried to check them by a steady musket fire from the city. But this attempt became futile when the signal of attack was given, at the sound of which our soldiers, arms in hand and without firing a single shot, crossed the river at a run; with only one casualty and without further resistance, they triumphantly entered the stronghold of the enemies of Spain. In disorderly and precipitate

flight that savage tribe retreated. Our forces went to occupy the forts and principal avenues, and in separate groups they reconnoitered the whole city, gathering up at the military commandancia of the insurgents several packages of their records and correspondence, and the station and part of the telegraph line which the rebels had established with Jiguaní and Santa Rita were wrecked.

“No information concerning the enemy could be obtained from the people of Bayamo, who, as usual, kept silent; a few only opened their doors from sheer curiosity, plainly showing in their faces the disgust they felt at the presence of Spanish soldiers on that soil where it had been believed that they would never again set foot.

“Our forces then returned to the camp at Almirante. The result of that day’s work was not known at first, but it was afterwards learned that the enemy had 19 casualties, 10 killed and 9 wounded. The night at Almirante passed without further incidents, and thus ended the first part of what may well be called the glorious march from Manzanillo to Santiago.

“FROM BAYAMO TO BAIRE.

“At daybreak of the 27th the camp at Almirante was struck and the column continued its march across the plain of Guanábano, through Chapala and across the Cautillo River, destroying on their way the enemy’s telegraph line from Bayamo to Santa Rita, where the camp was pitched for the night, which was spent without any further incidents.

“At 6 a. m. of the 28th the march was resumed, the column proceeding to Baire via Cruz Alta, Jiguaní River, Upper Jiguaní, Piedro de Oro, Granizo, Cruz del Yarey, and Salada. The enemy, in greater number than on preceding days and in control of the heights which overlook the ford of the Jiguaní River, tried to prevent our forces from crossing; but their intention was foiled by timely flank attacks ordered by the commander of the column, protected by accurate artillery fire. After the river had been forded, the march was continued without interruption to Cruz del Yarey, where the rebels appeared again, offering less resistance, and we defeated them once more. They seemed inclined, however, to continue to impede the march, which was apparent upon the arrival of our column at the ruins of what was formerly the town of Baire; they were waiting there, and as soon as they espied the column they opened a galling musket fire, which was silenced by the rapid advance of our vanguard, who compelled them to retreat in shameful and precipitate flight. In this encounter Colonel Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, was wounded and his horse killed under him; four soldiers were killed and five wounded. The column encamped and spent the night at Baire.

“The high weeds which during almost all those days completely covered the soldiers and hampered their progress, causing at the same time a suffocating heat, which made it almost impossible to breathe, and cutting off the road, which had to be opened by dint of hard work, rendering the march extremely laborious and often making it necessary to proceed in single file; the frequent rains, which not only soaked the clothing, but also the ground, making it slippery and difficult to walk on for such large numbers; the sickness caused by the inclement weather and the hard work of these operations; the ever-increasing convoy of stretchers; the consideration that one-half of the journey had been accomplished, and the further very important consideration that the column had arrived at a place where it would be easy to throw the enemy off the track, as they would not know what direction our forces might take, there being three roads leading from here to Santiago; all these were reasons which the commander of the column took into consideration when he decided to suspend the march and rest during the day of the 29th. It was so ordered owing to fatigue; but the enemy kept harassing us and we had three more wounded.

“LA MANTONIA.

“At daybreak of the 30th the camp at Baire was struck and the column proceeded to Palma Soriano, where the wounded and dead were left, and continued its march via Ratonera, Doncella Creek, and the Contramaestre River to La Mantonia, where the camp was pitched and the night spent.

“Before the column was deployed on the road to Ratonera, the enemy from intrenched positions opened fire, which was answered and silenced by the first forces leaving the camp. The commander of the column foresaw that such attack would be repeated, and in order to obviate casualties, thus further complying with the order of the aforesaid cablegram from the commander in chief of the fourth army corps, he changed the route, and our forces, thus eluding the ambuscades, arrived at the slopes of Doncella Creek, the ford of which was reached by a narrow pass and difficult ravine. The rebels occupied positions here; our vanguard brought them out without answering their fire. When the column had been reconcentrated after fording the Doncella, they prepared to ford the Contramaestre River, where the enemy was awaiting us, which fact they had announced themselves by written challenges and threats which they had left along the road. Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón, of the Alcántara battalion, who since Colonel Ruiz was wounded had been in command of one-half of the vanguard brigade, deployed his forces in perfect order of battle and advanced resolutely. Commanding positions overlooked

the clear and unobstructed road which the column had to follow after coming out of the mountains through the narrow valley of the Contramaestre, and moreover they had to scale the steep and tortuous ascent of the opposite bank. Without other shelter than the high weeds which, as usual, impeded the march, without other trenches than their own hearts, these brave soldiers, with their commander at their head, advanced calmly and in perfect order, accepting the challenge which had been addressed to them. The enemy had told the truth; there they were in large numbers occupying those favorable positions which would have been impregnable if they had been held by any one who knew how to defend them; but not expecting that we would accept the challenge, they allowed themselves to be surprised by a lively musket fire and effective artillery discharges, which demoralized and dispersed them, and the rapid advance of our forces rushing upon them arms in hand did not give them a chance to rally. The enemy, being unable to do much firing, retreated with little resistance and having suffered a number of casualties, leaving the field and their positions to those who, understanding the sacred duty imposed by honor, had known how to pick up the glove that had been thrown to them, and regardless of danger and without measuring their strength had marched on unflinchingly in search of the death with which they had been threatened. Having crossed the Contramaestre and passed through extensive pastures, the column arrived at a farm (*finca*) known as La Mantonia, where a number of huts of all sizes and many recent tracks indicated the proximity of a large hostile force. And indeed, soon after the first forces of the vanguard had entered that large encampment, the enemy tried to check our advance by a galling fire from the slope of a mountain where they were intrenched, controlling a line of 1,200 meters, through which it was necessary for us to pass unprotected, as the high weeds made any deployment of the column and advance of cavalry impossible. By order of Lieutenant Colonel Barbón, the two companies of the vanguard of the Alcántara battalion, in command of Francisco Gonzáles, who rendered himself an exact account of the hostile position, advanced steadily and without answering the fire, following the only passable trail, and engaged the hostile position on the left flank, compelling the enemy by repeated discharges crossed with the few that the column was able to fire, to abandon the trenches, leaving us a great deal of ammunition, mostly of the Remington type.

“In the fierce battles of that day Captain Jenaro Ramiro, of the Alcántara battalion, and 9 privates were wounded and 5 killed.

" AGUACATE.

" At daybreak of July 1 the column resumed the march and reached the ford of the Guarinao River, after passing through Las Lajas, where the enemy held advantageous positions from which our vanguard routed them without much resistance. After crossing the Guarinao, small detachments sent out surprised two ambuscades; the column sustained insignificant skirmishes with outposts and small reconnoitering parties, which indicated that large hostile forces were not far off. Subsequent events showed that this theory was correct. When the column arrived at a rugged place dominated by steep heights forming an amphitheatre, they discovered in its center a camp of recent construction, sufficiently large to accommodate 2,000 men. A rapid glance convinced us that the site was specially adapted for an ambush. Colonel Escario, realizing this and taking precautions accordingly, gave orders for the column to proceed in its advance and for the artillery to take positions. The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at once from Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched line. Our soldiers maneuvered as though on drill, and advancing steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle, and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to make them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery, and skillfully guided by their chiefs, and with the cry "Long live Spain!" and charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took those heights which were so difficult and dangerous to scale, beating the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather up their dead and wounded. Seventeen dead were left on the field, also ammunition of various modern types. There were moments during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy and the order with which they fought gave the impression that they might belong to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached Colonel Escario's ears, who, fearing that this might really be the case, gave orders to suspend the fire, and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But this precaution was useless, and the commander becoming convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile positions to be taken. To do the enemy justice it must be stated that they defended these well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and that they rose to unusual heights that day, making this the fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago and one of the most remarkable ones of the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead and 1 lieutenant and 42 privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battlefield

showed the severe chastisement which the enemy had suffered at our hands. When the column had been reorganized, the march was continued to Arroyo Blanco, where the night was spent.

“FROM ARROYO BLANCO TO SANTIAGO.

“From Arroyo Blanco, where the column had camped during the night, it proceeded to Palma Soriano, fighting the enemy all along the road, on both sides of which the latter occupied good positions and endeavored to detain the column at any price. Engaging the enemy in front and on the flank, a passage was forced and the column reached Palma Soriano at 3 o'clock p. m. The battle of that day caused us 4 dead and 6 wounded.

“From Palma Soriano the commander of the column, by heliogram sent to San Luis, announced his arrival to the commander in chief of the fourth army corps at Santiago, and in reply he was notified that large United States forces had landed and were surrounding a part of the city, and that it was, therefore, of urgent necessity to reenforce the place, the defenders of which were few, and to force the march as much as possible. Desirous of complying with this order, Colonel Escario, who realized that the soldiers must be prepared to accomplish the rest of the journey with the greatest possible speed, had the following order of the column, dated at Palma Soriano, July 2, 1898, read to the companies:

“‘Soldiers: We left Manzanillo because the enemy was threatening Santiago de Cuba. We must hasten to the assistance of our comrades; our honor, which is the honor of our fathers, calls us there.

“‘I, who am proud of having been able to be with you in these days when our country requires of us twofold energy and courage, address these few words to you in order to tell you that I am highly pleased with your behavior and to point out to you the necessity of making a supreme effort to save the honor of our beloved country, as we have done so far.

“‘Then say with me, ‘Long live Spain!’ and let us go in search of those who are desirous of finding out what each one of you is worth. The victory is ours.

“‘Your Colonel,

ESCARIO.’

“After a plentiful and nourishing meal the troops were ordered to rest. At 2 o'clock in the night the reveille was sounded, and the column, organizing immediately, resumed its march, which the soldiers tried to hasten as much as possible, with no other stimulus than that imposed by duty, of which they were constantly reminded by the cannonades that could be heard in the distance in the direction of Santiago. With slight skirmishes, and without eating nor

resting, these brave soldiers reached the pass of Bayamo, where they had the first view of the city of Santiago. Here it was learned that on the same day our fleet, forcing the entrance of the channel, which was blockaded by the American ships, had gone out in search of death, which is the fate reserved for heroes.

“It was now between 10 and 11 o'clock in the morning of the 3d, and when Colonel Escario noted the intense cannonade in the direction of the city, he organized a flying column which was to march as fast as possible, leaving the rest of the column with the train, in command of Colonel Ruiz Rañoy, to follow at once.

“The flying column was formed of the first battalion of the Isabel la Católica regiment, in command of Commander Torrecilla, with 30 of the strongest men of each company, the whole cavalry, and the two artillery pieces. The command of this column was placed in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón of the Alcántara battalion.

“This column advanced toward Puerto Bayamo, from which point Colonel Escario proceeded to the city with a section of cavalry, arriving there at 3 o'clock p. m. The rest of the flying column reached Santiago between 4 and 4.30, and the nucleus of the column with the train between 9 and 10 o'clock p. m.

“Those worthy chiefs, officers, and long-suffering soldiers, that handful of brave men, constantly defeating the enemy who persistently tried to check them, rising superior to the inclement weather, to sickness and fatigue, had arrived at the post of honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight of the city, they took off their hats, and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unanimous shout of ‘Long live Spain!’ which rose spontaneously from those noble hearts.

“The casualties during the whole march were 1 colonel, 2 officers, and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy Mauser cartridges had been used and 38 rounds of artillery fired.

“At 10 o'clock the last rear guard entered the city of Santiago de Cuba, and the battalions at once repaired to the different trenches assigned to them by the chief of staff, and from that time on they formed part of the forces defending the city.

“SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 3, 1898.*”

The column went to occupy the following positions:

Canosa: Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbón at the most advanced point; the Alcántara battalion which relieved the Asiatic battalion.

Match factory: The Isabel la Católica regiment, under Commander Luis Torrecilla.

Campo de Marte: The other battalion, under Commander Eugenio Briceño.

Dos Caminos del Cobre: The Puerto Rico chasseurs, under Lieutenant Colonel Arana.

Plaza de Toros: The Andalusia battalion, under Commander Julián Llorens.

9th.—The Alcántara battalion was relieved from the difficult position it occupied by six companies of the Isabel la Católica regiment, one of the Asiatic regiment, one company of guerrillas, all under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Barbón. On the morning of the 10th this line was reenforced by two companies of the Alcántara battalion.

10th.—The Puerto Rico chasseurs receded to the city.

XXXI.

IN THE CITY AND IN THE BAY.

July 5th.—The usual ships blockading the harbor.

The greater part of the population has left the city, fleeing from the bombardment.

The merchant steamers are firing up.

The Morro says that there are 28 merchant and war vessels in sight. The *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* are missing.

In the city the streets are deserted and nearly all the houses locked up.

6th.—The two 9-cm. Krupp guns at Punta Gorda were taken down to be installed in the precinct of the city.

A German war ship was signaled to the south.

Mr. Mason, with a flag of truce, went out in the tug *Colón* to communicate with her. When he arrived at the mouth of the harbor the ship had already left.

At 5 General Toral was advised by General Shafter that the suspension of hostilities was at an end.

Lieutenant Hobson, of the *Merrimac*, and the seven men were exchanged.

In the American fleet there are 1,100 Spanish prisoners, among them over 300 wounded.

7th.—It was learned that the prisoners of our fleet are being sent to the United States.

The two 42-centimeter guns of the *Méjico* were disembarked for the purpose of being erected in the precinct of the city. Forty Mauser rifles were also taken off the ship. The former could not be set up.

8th.—The hostile fleet continues the blockade.

Orders were given by the commandancia de marina to the captains of the merchant steamers to sink their ships.

A private house was prepared to receive the sick and wounded of the fleet. The convalescents were sent to the quarters of the firemen.

9th.—The hostile fleet in sight as usual.

Order of General Toral to have the merchant vessels refill their bunkers at the piers of Las Cruces and the Railway.

The wounded and sick of the fleet were transferred from the *Méjico* to the house fitted out for a hospital by the Navy.

On the 4th General Shafter notified the consuls that the city would be bombarded, so that all those might leave who did not form part of the garrison. At their request for more time in order to take away their families, the term was prolonged twenty-four hours.

The panic became general, and at daybreak of the 5th the population almost en masse left in the direction of El Caney, so as to avoid a bombardment which all supposed would be horrible and not leave one stone upon the other.

The steamers, full of people, were ready to proceed to Las Cruces, Cinco Reales, and all the coves on the eastern coast of the bay, where they thought they would be better protected and safer.

All along the coast regular camps were established within the shelter of the mountains. It may be safely said that there were not 5,000 inhabitants left in the city. All the windows and doors were closed, and Santiago presented the same aspect that Pompeii and Herculaneum must have offered. Not a single store was open, not even the drug stores. The desertion and solitude were complete.

A few horses were running through the city, pulling up the grass growing along the sidewalks. Many dogs are staying at the entrances of the houses, which their masters have abandoned, without having anything to eat, nor anything to drink, which is worse. At night they bark incessantly, which makes the scene still more impressive. I have several times gone from the captaincy of the port to the military hospital, that is, across the city from one end to the other, without seeing a single door open or meeting a single person in the streets or public places, except a guerrilla or one or two couples of the civil guard. The solitude and the silence were absolute.

At night the city was truly impressive. The streets, the lamps not being lit, were as dark as wolves' dens, and it was not possible to cross them without being in constant danger of stumbling. A few guerrillas, taking advantage of the circumstances, were breaking into abandoned stores and houses, which they ransacked; for instance, the house of my friend, Commander Ros, governor of the Morro, situated in San Tadeo street, which I saw with my own eyes. They left nothing whole, and him only with the clothing he wore and 20 pesos which he had with him. The criminals, who were caught in the act, were four guerrillas. I speak with a perfect knowledge of what happened, and, as will be seen, I cite examples of well-known persons.

There is no excuse for such actions, and I shall not try to extenuate them; but it is also just to say, in honor of the truth, that the soldiers, who had hardly anything to eat and little water to drink, and who spent day and night in the trenches, were not to be found in the city, and when on rare occasions one would go there to see whether he could not get a glass of water or buy a box of sardines or a piece of hardtack, which the merchants were hiding, the latter asked him six times what it was worth, and fleeced him (I find no other word for it) without shame or compassion.

I must also add that such abuses, which were repressed as soon as they were commenced—thanks to the civil guard and patrols, who walked through the city day and night—were not committed by the troops, except in isolated cases, as in that of Mr. Ros. They were committed by citizens, although they were imputed to those who knew how to enter the houses without forcing the principal door. I might cite a thousand examples which would convince the most incredulous and which I omit for the sake of brevity. Thanks to the energy displayed by General Toral, the street lamps were finally lighted, so that it became possible to venture into the streets at night. As a proof of the proportions which this plundering reached, I will copy a decree which the General found it necessary to promulgate. The decree was as follows:

“I, José Toral y Velazquez, General of Division, Commander General of the Division of Santiago de Cuba, and Military Governor of the City and Province,

“In view of the frequent robberies which are being committed in this city, by reason of the peculiar circumstances in which it finds itself, in order to repress them, and by virtue of the authority vested in me under Article 670 of the Campaign Regulations, issue the following:

“DECREE.

“Article 1. All soldiers who, in disobedience of this decree, shall destroy or set on fire buildings or property, or commit any acts of violence on persons, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, after previous degradation, in conformity with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice.

“The penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or persons employing soldiers for this purpose.

“Criminals caught in the act of committing these offenses shall be summarily judged in conformity with Article 649 of the Code of Military Justice.

“Article 2. Civilians who shall commit the same offenses shall be adjudged in conformity with the Civil Code in force in this island, and the law shall be applied in its whole rigor by the respective Council of War.

“Article 3. Anyone surprised in the act, who shall not give himself up at the first intimation, shall be fired upon.

“JOSÉ TORAL.

“SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 16, 1898.*”

As it is my object to relate everything that happened at Santiago de Cuba, without omitting even the most insignificant events, so that an exact idea may be formed of everything, I must also state that, as I was told by Mr. Romero, captain of the civil guard, who was wounded at El Caney on the evening of the 1st, where he had arrived in the morning to take charge of the military commandancia of that place, and taken prisoner by the Americans, he was nursed, attended, and treated with all the attention due to his rank and condition, as also others who were in the same case. This proves that only the Government of the United States and the jingoes are the authors of the unjust war that is being carried on, but not the people in general, and still less the Army, which, as its own officers and soldiers have assured me, is desirous of having it terminated as soon as possible.

XXXII.

BATTLES AND BOMBARDMENTS OF THE 10th AND 11th.

July 10th.—The usual ships opposite the harbor. The general staff of the fourth army corps has asked for a statement as to the personnel and armament of the navy, which was forwarded to him.

General Shafter gave notice that hostilities had again broken out since 4 in the afternoon.

At 3 the hamlet of Dos Caminos was burned.

At 5 a gunshot was heard which had been fired by the fleet; immediately after a sustained musket fire, which became very intense. The artillery on land is firing, ours is answering.

At 5.15 the fleet opened fire on the coast.

At 6.30 the firing ceased by sea and by land.

The enemy has abandoned two trenches.

11th.—The fleet is guarding the harbor and Aguadores.

At 6 a slow musket fire commenced on land; a few volleys are heard.

At 8.30 two ships opened fire on the city from Aguadores. A few projectiles fall at the head of the bay, where the *Alvarado* is at anchor.

During yesterday 46 wounded were received at the military hospital. There were seven dead.

At 2 p. m. the bombardment ceased.

At 2.30 firing ceased in the precinct.

At 5 the enemy hoisted a flag of truce on the Fort San Juan.

At night many fires were seen on the heights near the cemetery and at the head of the bay (to the northwest).

The gunboat *Alvarado* asked for permission to fire; it was denied on account of the truce.

On the 10th the enemy, already in the trenches and being in possession of all the adjoining heights where he has installed numerous modern guns, opened a lively musket and gun fire, at 5 p. m., upon a great extent of our line. The artillery answered firmly, but there was hardly any musket fire, because orders had been given and complied with to economize ammunition at any cost.

Two hours previously, our advance forces had withdrawn to the city, abandoning the foremost position at Dos Caminos del Cobre, first setting it on fire.

The fleet at the same time opened fire on Aguadores and surrounding points on the coast, and on our lines. The battle was limited to firing from the trenches. Nevertheless, as the enemy was very numerous and his lines only a few meters from ours, we had 7 dead and 47 wounded. During the engagement the Americans abandoned two trenches which they could not hold because they were flanked by ours.

At 8.30 the following day the fleet bombarded the city from Aguadores, having given notice to that effect as early as the 4th. As I said, the ships of the fleet, taking turns two by two, fired rather slowly, and only until 2.30 p. m., but notwithstanding, there were 59 houses that suffered considerable damage. One shell went through a foundation in San Basilio street, where it dropped and exploded, and a shell cut an iron column of a provision store in two, penetrating into a house in Marina street, after piercing the wall. Another shell penetrated at No. 9 Santa Lucia High street, destroying the hall and one room. In the provision store of Messrs. Brauet, in Fundicion street, two 20-cm. shells (nearly all were of this calibre, or of 16 centimeters) fell; one only exploded, causing great havoc. The most remarkable case of all was Mr. Marcané's house, in Santo Tomas Place. A single shell ruined it completely. It is hard to understand how a single projectile can do what that one did.

Between the garden of the Alameda and the railway station, being a distance of about 800 meters, 23 projectiles fell. Many of them did not explode. One of them went through a tree, as though it had been a gimlet. At the ice factory two fell, and three at the railway station. A great many fell near the piers, and still more near the place where the gunboat *Alvarado* was at anchor.

As the city was almost abandoned, there was no loss of life.

In the meantime the enemy continued to antagonize our lines in order to compel the soldiers to consume the scant ammunition that remained, but orders had been given not to answer the fire, and so there was hardly any musket fire. Gun fire only answered very slowly, as is necessary with antiquated guns. The enemy, on the other hand, was constantly receiving modern guns and setting them up rapidly. We were within a circle of fire, and although that phrase has been somewhat abused, I find no other that better describes the situation.

At 5 p. m. the enemy hoisted a white flag on Fort San Juan and a spokesman was received.

Though this may not be the right moment, I want to make an observation. It has been asked many times why Admiral Cervera's fleet, whose object was to run the blockade and elude the hostile fleet, did not go out at night.

Of course, the Admiral did not tell me his reasons, but it is easy to understand them.

The hostile fleet was constantly watching the entrance of the harbor with its search lights, making it as light as though it were day. There the ships would probably have been seen just the same. On the other hand, the sortie, which even in daytime is extremely difficult, would have been short of impossible at night, when blinded by the search lights, and would necessarily have resulted in a catastrophe. The sortie at night was impracticable. It was absolutely necessary to effect it in daytime; at least, if the enemy saw us, we also saw him, and the chances for not running aground in the channel were much better. From the foregoing I believe that anyone, even though not acquainted with naval matters, will understand why Admiral Cervera did not go out at night.

As a proof of this, I will say that on the night when the cruiser *Reina Mercedes* was sunk the hostile ships fired upon her with the same accuracy as though it had been daytime.

For a better understanding of the events and engagements of the 10th and 11th of July, I will copy below the official report of Lieutenant Colonel Barbón and that of Lieutenant of Artillery Moreno to General Escario, as also a statement of the shots which our guns fired during those days. One need only glance at the statement referred to to see at once that on the first day 167 shots could be fired, and the next day, being the 11th, only 35, because the enemy had dismounted and disabled some of our guns. A simple calculation is sufficient to understand that the following day not a single gun could probably have been fired. Before such proofs, comments are unnecessary.

“Having been placed in charge of the forces on the right hand of the plantation called El Sueño, on the heights and in the glens which border on the avenues of El Caney and Canosa, and the roads of Pozo and San Juan, composed of six companies of the Isabel la Católica Regiment, two of the Alcántara Battalion, one of the Asiatic Battalion, and one of guerrillas as stretcher-men, I have the honor to report to you that at 4.30 a. m. yesterday the enemy opened machine-gun and musket fire on our positions, without daring to make any forward movement; such prudence being founded, no doubt, on the respect inspired by our sepulchral silence before the thunderous noise of their many guns, for only 10 marksmen, in convenient positions, had orders to fire on a trench which they attacked on the flank and dislodged at the end of 15 minutes. At nightfall, 7.30 p. m., the enemy ceased firing.

“To-day, at 6.30 a. m., the enemy again opened fire, while our side did not waste a single cartridge, the enemy continuing with the same activity as yesterday, without coming out of his trenches, until 4.30 p. m., when he ceased firing and asked for suspension.

“The casualties on our side were, on the 10th, 6 dead and 29 wounded, and to-day, one dead, 5 wounded, and one bruised; total casualties during the two days, 42.

“You will see from the above that I have exactly complied with your orders not to fire until the enemy should come out of his trenches to attack.

“I only need add that all the forces without exception did their duty as brave men, full of enthusiasm, and I had to recommend repeatedly that they should conceal in order to avoid needless casualties, which seemed difficult, and there is nothing strange about it, as our men, for the first time in three years of campaign, were enclosed in trenches and on the defensive.

(Here follow special recommendations for bravery of three officers, being 1 commander and 2 lieutenants.)

(Signed) “BALDOMERO BARBÓN.”

“SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *August 11, 1898.*”

Copy of the report made by the first lieutenant in charge of the artillery of the sector:

“ARTILLERY, CITY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA,

SECTOR FROM THE PORTILLO DEL CANEY TO SAN ANTONIO.

“HONORED SIR: Fire was opened by the enemy yesterday at 4.45 p. m., and the batteries of this sector made it their business to silence it, or at least diminish it as much as possible, given the limited effectiveness of the guns which formed them—most of them muzzle-loading—and the reduced caliber of the only four which are of modern types, and can therefore keep up an accurate and rapid fire. The enemy’s batteries, as has been observed on previous days by means of glasses, and as we have experienced practically to-day, are quite numerous, very well installed without leaving any space uncovered, and occupy positions overlooking ours, and are for that latter reason well adapted to train successfully, and to be of great moral effect on our troops, who are harassed almost vertically by the grapeshot (shrapnel?) inside the trenches. The guns of these batteries are of small and medium caliber, as may be seen from the size of their projectiles, and the shape of the latter shows that they are breech-loading guns, and for that reason alone, of the greatest advantage over ours. A few fire dynamite projectiles, but it was noticed that they are of little accuracy, although very effective when they explode. At the same moment when the musket and machine-gun fire was opened,

which was hardly answered from the city, gun fire also commenced, and as the effect of the shells began to be felt at the first shots, it became necessary for us to do what we could to decrease the cannonade. Firing was commenced on the whole sector at the same time and with such rapidity as each gun permitted, except the Plasencia guns, for if we had continued to fire them with the same rapidity as the gunners, anxious to injure the enemy, had commenced, we should have consumed the whole of the ammunition in two hours. All the shots were made under the action of a constant musket and machine-gun fire, aimed particularly at the batteries, for the apparent purpose of not allowing us to come out of the trenches to load and train our guns. In view of the sustained artillery fire from the city the enemy moderated his somewhat, especially in the sector between Nispero and San Antonio, and by 6 p. m. the only guns that were doing any firing worthy of mention were those installed opposite the Portillo del Caney. This circumstance was very favorable for us. The ostentatious artillery fire which we did during the first moments checked the enemy's rapid fire along the greater part of the line, and if this had not been the case we should have been compelled to keep silent before his batteries, for of the 12 guns of different calibers of the batteries of Nispero, Sueño, Santo Inés, and San Antonio, we had left at the hour mentioned only three 8-cm. and two 16-cm. guns; the others had been put out of action, the carriages of most of them having been disabled. The batteries of Portillo del Caney continued to answer the fire, which was aimed at them particularly without a moment's cessation, and in one of them I was an eye witness of an incident worthy of mention. A training gunner of one of the 8-cm. Plasencia guns, whose captain had been previously wounded, was shot through one arm, and he continued to train, for fear that there would be no one to relieve him, until, a relief having been effected, he was obliged to go to the nearest hospital. At the same moment an artillerist came out with a mule and ran in the direction of the headquarters at Concha, passing through the musket and machine-gun fire, shouting, 'Long live Spain!' through the streets. He was on his way to get another supply of common shells for the gun, its supply having been consumed during the first shots. These incidents, and similar ones which no doubt occurred all along the line and in the trenches, show, honored General, that while the enemy had succeeded, owing to the superior position of his batteries, in acquiring greater accuracy of fire, he had not been able to quell the courage of our soldiers, always cool-headed before the greatest danger, even to the very last moment.

“At 7 p. m. the firing ceased, leaving us in bad condition for to-day, because, as I have already stated, only two 16-cm. and three 8-cm. guns, and two 8-cm. Plasencia, and two rapid-fire Krupp guns, are all that are available for the defense, and the majority of the mounts for the old ones are somewhat defective. * * *

“At 5.30 a. m. to-day fire was opened by a few musket shots, and a few minutes after the artillery battle commenced. The batteries with which the enemy fired yesterday are not the only ones he has; he also has large-caliber guns, or perhaps howitzers, which, being installed at a considerable distance from the city and covered by the hills, keep up a constant fire upon us, which we are not able to answer. Yesterday we could distinguish the flashing from the batteries erected between the Portillo del Caney and San Antonio, and to-day we can see only three opposite the said Portillo; the others were firing completely under cover, and we were not even able to disturb the composure with which they were trained. It is known that we did them some damage yesterday, and that is perhaps the reason why they have taken this position to-day. Only two shots were fired in the morning at Santa Inés and two more at San Antonio. And the rest of the day we have been able to fire only from the 8-cm. Plasencia battery and the 7.5-cm. rapid-fire Krupp battery, erected at the Portillo del Caney and Palomar, respectively, which had opposite them three 9-cm. batteries of the enemy at a distance of 1,100 meters from the former and 1,600 meters from the latter. From the first moment it could be seen that the enemy's objective was to bombard the city, and his fire was aimed entirely at that target. Yesterday they took the exact distance from their batteries to the principal points of the city, and to-day, making use of yesterday's notes, they put the shells just where they wanted, and the trajectories of those from the same battery were almost identical. I repeat that there were only three in sight, and upon these three we opened fire at 6 a. m. with the rapid-fire guns. When the first shot was discharged the enemy partly changed his objective, and soon the battery mentioned and one of the hidden ones aimed their fire at Palomar, but were not able to hit the rapid-fire guns until 10 a. m., because these guns, being of reduced dimensions, in sunken battery, and with hardly any smoke from the discharge, were hardly visible to the enemy. For four hours we fired without knowing where we were, but very slowly, because the number of ordinary shells and grapeshot for the guns referred to is already very small. After these first four hours were over, the enemy answered each shot with 8 or 10 of his, which, with almost mathematical precision, were aimed at the battery. About the same thing, but on a greater scale owing to the proximity of the opposing batteries and the good target formed by the smoke which

developed at each shot, happened at the Plasencia guns. Since 8 o'clock in the morning, when the fire was opened, until 3 in the afternoon, the places where the guns were erected were veritable centers of impact, since we had only two batteries and the enemy a great many. And when a shot was fired, all concentrated their fire on the one that had discharged. In order to fire at all, it was necessary to make the enemy believe, by using artificial means, that the gun had been put out of action. When this did not succeed, the gun fire aimed at the battery was incessant, and made it impossible for us to load and train. As I have stated, at 3 p. m. the firing ceased, and yesterday as well as to-day I noticed the greatest order among the officers and men in charge of the different batteries. At the Plasencia guns, the second gunner, Antonio Escriba Escriba, belonging to the 2d section of the 1st battery of the 5th Mountain Regiment, was wounded. The total number of shots fired yesterday and to-day is as follows: 16, with the rapid-fire guns; 33, with the 8-cm. Plasencia guns; 29, with the 8-cm. guns; 63, with the 8-cm. short breech-loaders; 10, with the 16-cm. and 10 with the 12-cm. bronze guns.

“May God guard your excellency for many years.

“JUAN MORENO,

“*First lieutenant,*

Commander of artillery of the sector.

“SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 11, 1898.*”

The guns which the Americans had in the batteries of the circle, were all of modern type, with calibers of 8, 9, 7, and 7.5 cm. They fired mostly grapeshot (shrapnel?) with 10 per cent ordinary shells. They also made use of dynamite shells, but the number of these projectiles did not exceed 5 per cent of the total number thrown upon the city.

The batteries that were most persistent in firing on the 10th were those erected in the vicinity of the Caney road, and they fired only about 150 shots, with an average rapidity of 14 or 16 shots per hour and battery. The others, which ceased firing an hour earlier, discharged about 100 shots.

On the 11th the gun fire was more sustained, but slower. All the batteries fired about alike and discharged in all about 700 shots.

BATTERIES OF THE PRECINCT OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Batteries and guns.	No. of shots.	
	10th.	11th.
Fuerte Nuevo:		
One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	1	-----
Cañadas:		
One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	2	-----
Santa Ursula:		
Battery No. 1: Two 8-cm. muzzle-loading bronze guns.....	10	-----
Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns.....	8	-----
Battery No. 3: Two 9-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns.....	16	6
Portillo Caney:		
Battery No. 1: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns (Plasencia system).....	25	10
Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns.....	24	-----
Nispero:		
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	1	-----
Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	2	-----
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns.....	30	-----
Sueño:		
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	3	-----
Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	2	-----
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loaders.....	25	-----
Santa Inés:		
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	2	2
Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	4	-----
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading guns.....	10	-----
San Antonio:		
One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.....	2	1
Palomar:		
Two 7.5-cm. short breech-loading rapid-fire Krupp guns.....	-----	16

During the firing on the 10th, the following guns were put out of action: The gun of the battery of Fuerte Nuevo; one of each of the Santa Ursula batteries; the two of battery No. 2 of the Portillo del Caney; those of the Nispero batteries Nos. 2 and 3; those of batteries Nos. 1 and 2 and one of battery No. 3 of Sueño; and that of Battery No. 2 and one of Battery No. 3 of Santa Inés.

To sum up, there were disabled: four 12-cm., one 16-cm., eight 8-cm. guns, old systems, and one 9-cm. breechloader.

The 9-cm. gun was disabled by the enemy, as also one of the 12-cm. guns of Sueño, the cause being that the 12-cm. guns were mounted on "skeleton" carriages that did not belong to them, and broke at the first or second shot, and that the 8-cm. old guns, although mounted in their own carriages, these being of wood and in bad repair, they had the same fate as soon as a few shots were fired. The 16-cm. gun was disabled by the cartridge sticking in the chamber.

XXXIII.

SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES.

July 12th.—The hostile fleet is still in sight.

The archbishop, escorted by a detachment of the mounted civil guard, left the city, returning soon after.

General Linares has forwarded to the commander in chief and to the minister of war the following cablegram, which I copy literally:

“OFFICIAL CABLEGRAM, JULY 12.

“To the commander in chief and the minister of war:

“Though confined to my bed by great weakness and sharp pains, I am so much worried over the situation of these long-suffering troops that I deem it my duty to address your excellency and the minister of war for the purpose of setting forth the true state of affairs.

“Hostile positions very close to precinct of city, favored by nature of ground; ours spread out over 14 kilometers; troops attenuated; large number sick; not sent to hospitals because necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules without food and shelter; rain has been pouring into the trenches incessantly for twenty hours. Soldiers without permanent shelter; rice the only food; can not change or wash clothes. Many casualties; chiefs and officers killed; forces without proper command in critical moments. Under these circumstances, impossible to open passage, because one-third of the men of our contingent would be unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces still further; result would be great disaster without accomplishing the salvation of eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired by your excellency. In order to go out under protection of Holguin division, it would be necessary for the latter to break through the hostile line, and then with combined forces to break through another part of the same line. This would mean an eight days' journey for Holguin division, bringing with them a number of rations which they are unable to transport. The situation is fatal; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the agony; the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation without our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by

the fleet, which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical accuracy.

“Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a city inclosed by walls, on the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her own sons, by old men, women, and children without distinction, who encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their lives, impelled by the sacred idea of independence, while awaiting aid which they received. Here solitude, the total emigration of the population, insular as well as peninsular, including public officials, with a few exceptions. Only the clergy remains, and they intend to leave to-day headed by their prelate.

“These defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of enthusiasm and energy; they have been fighting for three years with the climate, privations, and fatigue; and now that the most critical time has arrived their courage and physical strength are exhausted, and there are no means for building them up again. The ideal is lacking; they are defending the property of people who have abandoned it in their very presence, and of their own foes, the allies of the American forces.

“There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the Government and the whole nation; for these long-suffering troops have saved that honor many times since the 18th day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment.

“If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the *dénouement* anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender, for my humble reputation is worth very little when it comes to a question of national interests.

“LINARES.”

13th.—The ships are still blockading the harbor.

By order of the commander of marine, I went to the cruiser *Reina Mercedes* in order to ascertain her exact position.

In crossing the channel we saw two hostile ships, but at a great distance.

The cruiser which I visited is aground on the Morro shore. The port side is completely under water, the starboard side above water; here the effects of the hostile shells may be observed. She lies in the line of the channel, and therefore does not interfere with the entering or going out of ships. I do not believe that the enemy will be able to use her; besides the injuries caused by the shells, the sea has commenced to destroy the bottom.

Upon returning I saw and spoke to many volunteer officers who have taken refuge there, dressed in civilians' clothes.

The conferences with the enemy have come to nothing, and it was decided that the suspension of hostilities and the armistice should cease and the bombardment be continued.

The sailors from the fleet, 98 in number, who were at the firemen's headquarters, have gone, under the command of Ensign Gómez, to protect the match factory near the gasometer.

There was a suspension of hostilities during the days of the 12th and 13th, and conferences were held with the enemy, which evidently have come to nothing, and from General Linares's eloquent cablegram, setting forth so graphically and accurately the true state of affairs in this unfortified city and the situation of its defenders, it may be inferred that the capitulation was objected to, although it was absolutely necessary and further resistance impossible.

14th.—The chief pilot of this harbor, Apolonio Núñez, was taken prisoner by the insurgents at Renté, situated west of the bay. The commander of marine at once notified General Toral, and as the suspension of hostilities had been extended, the latter, in his turn, advised General Shafter, commander in chief of the American forces operating at Santiago.

15th.—Pilot Núñez was delivered up and escorted to the city by American soldiers.

At night the chiefs of the army assembled in the apartments occupied by the staff of the division, and as a result of the meeting the following memorandum was drawn up:

“On the 15th day of July, 1898, in the city of Santiago de Cuba, the following-named persons assembled, previous notice having been given of such meeting: General of Division José Toral y Velázquez, for the time being commander in chief of the fourth army corps, as president; General of Brigade Federico Escario; Colonel Francisco Oliveros Jiménez, of the civil guard; the following lieutenant colonels of the different battalions: José Cotrina Gelabert, of the Asiatic battalion; Juan Puñet, of the battalion ‘Constitución;’ Pedro Rodríguez, of the Talavera battalion; Ventura Fontán, of the staff; Baldomero Barbón, of the Alcántara battalion; Segundo Pérez, of the San Fernando battalion; José Escudero, of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico No. 1; Luis Melgar, of the artillery; and Ramón Arana, of the Puerto Rico chasseurs; Julio Cuevas, commissary of war; Pedro Martín, sub-inspector of the medical department of the army, and Juan Díaz Muelas, captain of engineers, all as voting members, and the last named as secretary.

“The president stated that although he did not consider Santiago de Cuba a stronghold of war, and though he was in direct communication with the commander in chief, from whom he received precise instructions, so that it was not necessary to proceed to the convocation of the council of defense referred to in Article 683 of the Regulation of Campaign, he desired nevertheless to learn the opinion of said council, constituted in accordance with the provisions of the regulation referred to, and of the lieutenant colonels of the battalions, as to whether, in view of the condition of the forces defending the city, it would be advisable to prolong the defense, or, on the contrary, to capitulate on the most favorable terms obtainable.

“The junta, considering that Santiago has no other works of defense of a permanent nature than a castle without artillery at the mouth of the harbor and a few forts in the precinct, none of them substantial, so that its only real defense consists in the trenches which have been dug in suitable positions in the circuit of the city, and other earthworks in said circuit and in more advanced positions, all effected hurriedly and with scant resources;

“Considering further that for the defense of this line of trenches, about 14 kilometers long, not continuous, there are available only about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom have been doing constant service in the trenches, with hardly any troops to support them and without any reserves of any kind, the rest of the forces (the total forces consisting of about 11,500 men), belonging to other arms and garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of Socapa and Punta Gorda, or being assigned to other services, such as supplying all the posts with water, patrolling the city, etc., which services would have been rendered by the inhabitants if the city had remained loyal, but which must now be performed by the army, the inhabitants having abandoned the city;

“Considering further that, in view of the great extent of the line referred to, the position of the forces on the same, the difficulty of communication and the proximity of the hostile positions to ours, it is difficult for the troops stationed at one part of the line to render prompt assistance to those stationed at another part which might be more seriously threatened;

“Considering further that at the present time the only available artillery of the precinct consists of four 16-cm. rifled bronze guns, one 12-cm., one 9-cm. bronze gun, two long 8-cm. rifled bronze guns, four short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm. Plasencia and two 75-mm. Krupp guns; that the 12 and 16-cm. guns, according to reliable information, are about to give out and will admit of only a few more shots, and that the 75-mm. Krupp guns have hardly any ammunition, and that the above is all the artillery we have to oppose to the enemy's numerous modern guns;

“Considering further that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges, being the total available, counting those at the artillery park and the spare cartridges of the troops, will be used up in two or three attacks made by the enemy; that the Argentine Mauser cartridges can hardly be used, and the Remington only by the irregular forces;

“Considering further that, owing to the failure of the commercial element to lay in supplies prior to the blockade which had long been foreseen, there is a great scarcity of meat and of all other articles of food for the troops, it being necessary to reserve for the military hospital the few heads of cattle now on hand, so that the only available food for the soldiers consists of rice, salt, oil, coffee, sugar, and whisky, and this only for about ten days longer;

“Considering further that, if the food of the 1,700 sick at the hospital is inadequate, the food furnished the soldiers is still more so, and yet they have to spend night and day in the trenches, after three years of campaign, the last three months without meat except on rare days, and for some time past reduced to the rations above enumerated;

“Considering further that with such inadequate rations the soldiers, whose physical strength is already considerably shaken, far from being able to repair their strength, must necessarily become weaker every minute, especially since, in spite of their poor nourishment, the greatest fatigues are required of them;

“Considering further that there is an ever-growing contingent of soldiers among the troops who, though not in hospitals, are sick and who are enabled to remain at their posts only by their superior courage, which circumstances, however, can not fail to weaken the resistance of the only line of defense we have;

“Considering further that, since the cutting of the aqueduct, great difficulties are experienced by the small forces available for furnishing water to the majority of the forces in the trenches of the precinct, especially those near the coast, which difficulties must naturally increase when the city is bombarded by sea and by land, so that there is well-founded fear that the soldiers who are unable to leave the trenches may find themselves without the water of which they are so much in need;

“Considering further that, in view of the location of the hostile positions, mostly in the immediate vicinity of ours, completely surrounding the city and in control of all the avenues, there is no possibility of abandoning the city without a fierce battle under the most unfavorable circumstances for us, owing to the impoverished condition of the soldiers and the fact that it would be necessary to effect the concentration of the forces in sight of the enemy;

“Considering further the great superiority of the enemy who, besides a contingent of men said to exceed 40,000, possesses 70 pieces of modern artillery and a powerful fleet;

“Considering further that no supplies can reach the city except by sea, and that there is no prospect of receiving any as long as a powerful hostile fleet completely closes the entrance of the harbor;

“Considering further that, under these circumstances, to continue so unequal a fight would lead to nothing except the sacrifice of a large number of lives;

“And considering, finally, that the honor of our arms has been completely vindicated by these troops who have fought so nobly and whose behavior has been lauded by our own and other nations, and that by an immediate capitulation terms could be obtained which it would not be possible to obtain after hostilities have again broken out:

“The junta is of unanimous opinion that the necessity for capitulation has arrived. In witness thereof they sign these proceedings.”

(Signatures of members.)

XXXIV.

CAPITULATION.

July 16th.—The people have returned from El Caney.

Negotiations for the capitulation having been opened, we think it proper to give the following important document:

“NEUTRAL CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO DE CÚBA,
UNDER THE FLAG OF TRUCE, *July 14th, 1898.*”

“Recognizing the nobleness, valor, and bravery of Generals Linares and Toral and of the Spanish troops who took part in the actions that have recently occurred in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, as shown in said battles, we, the undersigned, officers of the United States Army, who had the honor of taking part in the actions referred to, and who now constitute a committee, duly authorized, treating with a similar committee of officers of the Spanish Army for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unanimously join in asking the proper authorities that these brave and gallant soldiers may be granted the privilege of returning to their country carrying the arms which they have so nobly defended.

(Signed)

“JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major General U. S. V.

“W. H. LAWTON,
Major General U. S. V.

“J. D. MILEY,
First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, Aide.”

Under a giant cotton tree the following capitulation was signed:

“1st. The hostilities between the Spanish and American forces shall cease absolutely and finally.

“2d. The capitulation shall include all the forces and war material in said territory (territory of the division of Santiago).

“3d. The United States agree to transport all the Spanish forces in said territory to the Kingdom of Spain with the least delay possible, the troops to be embarked, as early as can be done, at the nearest ports they occupy.

“4th. The officers of the Spanish army shall be permitted to carry their arms with them, and officers as well as men shall retain their private property.

“5th. The Spanish authorities agree to raise, or assist the American Navy in raising, all the mines and other obstructions to navigation now existing in the bay of Santiago de Cuba and its entrance.

“6th. The commander of the Spanish forces shall deliver, without delay, to the commander of the American forces, a complete inventory of the arms and munitions of war in the district above referred to, as also a statement of the number of troops in the same.

“7th. The commander of the Spanish forces, upon leaving said district, shall be authorized to take with him all the military archives and documents belonging to the Spanish army now in said district.

“8th. All that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, mobilized troops, and guerrillas who may desire to remain in the Island of Cuba shall be allowed to do so, on condition that they will deliver up their arms and give their word of honor not again to take up arms against the United States during the continuation of the present war with Spain.

“9th. The Spanish forces shall leave Santiago de Cuba with honors of war, afterwards depositing their arms at a place mutually agreed upon, to await the disposition which the Government of the United States shall make of them, it being understood that the United States Commissioners shall recommend that the Spanish soldiers be permitted to return to Spain with the arms which they have so gallantly defended.

“10th. The clauses of the foregoing document shall go into effect immediately after having been signed.

“Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned commissioners, acting under instructions of their respective commanders in chief, and with the approval of their respective governments.

“JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major General U. S. V.

“FEDERICO ESCARIO,
Brigadier General.

“W. H. LAWTON,
Major General U. S. V.

“VENTURA FONTÁN,
Lieutenant Colonel,

“J. D. MILEY,
First Lieutenant,
Second Artillery.

General Staff.

“ROBERT MASON,
Interpreter.”

The reason why the archbishop went out of the city on the 12th was to ask General Shafter to permit him and thirty priests to leave Santiago. The American general refused to grant this request as long as the negotiations were pending.

XXXV.

THE EMIGRATION TO EL CANEY.

I will here speak of a matter which, though not directly related to the military operations, nor the movements of troops, nor the attack or defense of positions, is yet so graphic and typical and so remarkable and far-reaching in the consequences which it entailed and still entails, that to omit it would be to omit one of the most important episodes of this eventful period, an episode that has been much commented upon and discussed. I have reference to what may well be called the emigration to El Caney.

At daybreak of July 5, a compact crowd, composed for the greater part of old men, women, and children, though strong, robust men—some of them volunteers, now in civilians' clothes—were not wanting, started from the city toward El Caney, about a league and a half distant, where they were going on foot, there being no carriages, nor wagons, nor vehicles of any kind, nor even horses, which the enemy, moreover, would not have allowed to pass. All these people were crossing the ditches and trenches by which the whole road was cut and obstructed, all anxious to escape from the dangers of a bombardment of which notice had been given to the consuls.

Many of those who emigrated were people of wealth, women not accustomed to such fatigues and hardships, which fear and terror alone enabled them to bear.

Being convinced, though I do not know why they should have been, that their absence would not be for more than sixty or seventy hours at most, the majority of them had nothing with them but the clothes on their backs and a little underclothing, and no provisions except what they could carry themselves.

I have been told, not by one person alone, but by many who were there and with whom I have talked, that there were no less than eighty people in any one house, and in some of them as many as two hundred. As in the cemetery, each person had no more space than he or she occupied; and thus they were housed together, men and women, children and old people, white persons and black

The provisions which were calculated for three days at most were naturally soon exhausted, and this is probably the only instance in the nineteenth century when money was looked upon with disdain and when gold was of no value. Trading was going on, it is true, but it was exchanging rice for coffee, hardtack for beans, or sugar for codfish.

The bodies of those who had been killed on the 1st of July had only partly been buried, and the houses in that portion of the town which had been shelled were riddled with bullets and therefore leaking everywhere. Carcasses of horses and other animals, even corpses of persons, were thrown into the river, and people washed their dirty clothes and bathed in the water, which was all there was to drink. Most of the people lived on mangoes and mamoncillos, and it is no wonder that malaria, fevers, and dysentery broke out and assumed alarming proportions.

The houses had no sanitary provisions of any kind, and as the doors were kept closed in order to prevent new invasions, the atmosphere was terrible. The children, sick from lack of nourishment or from taking food which they could not digest, were crying day and night, and quiet or rest became impossible.

The faces of those who died were covered with a sheet or handkerchief, and the living remained by the side of the dead bodies, knowing that, if they should leave their places, others would come to occupy them.

Why go on? I might write a hundred chapters and still not give an idea of the suffering during those days; suffice it to say that El Caney, which was a town of 200 houses, was invaded by 20,000 people, who had counted on being there two days and who remained eleven, namely, until the 16th.

Those eleven days at El Caney have caused more victims in Santiago than the three years of war; for the epidemic that broke out still continues. When the inhabitants of the city numbered 45,000 there were, on an average, not over five deaths a day; and now, that the number of inhabitants is reduced to 30,000, there are not less than fifty a day. The house that does not contain one or more sick is an exception, and people who are well and hearty one day are buried a day or two later. The physicians can not attend all the sick, and the dead are carried to the cemeteries by members of their own families. The city wears that stamp of sadness and absence of life which is the mark of great calamities, and we hear nothing but wailing and sobbing.

A bombardment, of course, inspires women with the greatest horror, and yet, they preferred its dangers and consequences to the sadness and miseries of El Caney and asked, as the greatest

of blessings, to be allowed to return to Santiago, and to that end they signed a petition drawn up by the British consul, Mr. Frederick Ramsden, a literal translation of which follows:

“We, the undersigned women, in the name and at the request of all the women and children who are staying in this town without food or shelter, set forth to your excellency as follows:

“At 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the 3d instant, the consuls of Santiago de Cuba were notified that your excellency intended to bombard the city the following day at 10 o’clock in the morning, unless the Spanish army should surrender by that time, and that your excellency had ordered that the women and children should leave the city prior to that hour.

“The same evening, at the request of the consular committee, your excellency consented to defer the bombardment until noon of the 5th, and it was agreed upon that the noncombatants should proceed to El Caney, Cuabitas, and other places on the line of railway.

“In conformity therewith, the civil governor of Santiago de Cuba issued a decree permitting all noncombatants to leave the following morning, between the hours of 5 and 9, on foot, and without vehicles or beasts of burden. Consequently, old and young, rich and poor, sick and invalid, went out in confusion, without extra clothing and with only the food they could carry themselves, fleeing from certain death, and firmly convinced that the city would be bombarded that same day, and that in two days they would be able to return to what might be left of their homes. Far from this being the case, it is now ten days since they came here; many are without a roof over their heads and the others housed together like hogs, without even having room enough to lie down on the floor, which is all the bed they have; the scant supply of food is exhausted and no more can be had at any price. The praiseworthy efforts of the army and of the Society of the Red Cross are inadequate to better the situation; they are perishing themselves of hunger; the old and the sick are dying for want of care and medicines and as a result of so much suffering. And still the city has not yet been taken or bombarded, except a partial bombardment last Sunday and Monday, by which no result appears to have been attained, nor does there seem to be any probability of a change in the horrible situation for the near future.

“They now invoke that same *humanity* which has been the *motive* of this war, to ask that something be done as soon as possible to put an end to this terrible state of affairs, or that arrangements be made with the Spanish authorities permitting us to return

to the city, where we would rather die from the shells or be buried under the ruins of our homes than perish slowly from hunger and disease, and the privations we are suffering.

(Here follow signatures.)

“CANEY, *July 14, 1898.*

“To His Excellency GENERAL SHAFTER.

Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army.”

This document, remarkable under all aspects, describes the situation better than anything that I might say.

XXXVI.

SURRENDER OF THE CITY.

July 17th.—In conformity with the terms of the capitulation, the surrender of the city to the American army took place to-day.

At 9 a. m. the Spanish flag was hoisted on Punta Blanca Fort and saluted by 21 guns; shortly after it was lowered.

At 9.30 Generals Toral and Shafter, commanders in chief of the Spanish and American forces, respectively, the latter accompanied by his staff and many of the commanders and officers of the American fleet, witnessed the marching by, under arms, of a company of the former, representing all the Spanish forces, as it was difficult to assemble them. The American forces presented arms and beat a march.

The heights of Conosa were the theater of this sad scene. The morning was very beautiful, and the clearness of the sky formed a singular contrast with the gloom that enwrapped the spirit of our troops.

When the march was ended, the American forces remained at their posts, while ours left the trenches and proceeded to the city for the purpose of depositing their arms.

The forces of the Socapa and Punta Gorda were taken by sea, in the steamer *Reina de Los Angeles*, to Las Cruces pier, and from there they marched to the Artillery Park, where they delivered arms and ammunition. Without them, they proceeded to the camp outside of the city, where all the forces were to assemble until the arrival of the vessels which, as agreed upon, were to convey them to Spanish soil. The other troops did the same thing, after depositing their arms at the points designated beforehand.

The troops having evacuated the city, 1,000 men of the United States Army entered it, hoisting the flag of that nation at the Palace and Morro Castle. It is the only flag that has been raised in the city. No insurgent forces, nor individuals belonging to the same, have entered the city with arms. The situation remained the same till the day when the army embarked for Spain.

As the operations at the Park lasted several hours, it was curious to see the avidity with which the Americans were looking for numbers worn by the 29th battalion (Constitución), sabres, buttons, and

decorations of our officers and soldiers. It was noticed with what satisfaction they kept whatever articles and arms they could gather. Some of them put on the crosses, covered with dirt and blood, that had adorned the breasts of the Spanish. There were so many incidents on the same order that it would really be tedious to enumerate them. They showed the high conception which the American forces had of the valor of our army.

One incident, in conclusion, relative to this matter: When a Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession of the Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the fort. "There they are," said the governor, pointing to the land batteries and old guns. The American officers did not believe him; personally they went all over the place in search of guns and more important works of fortification. And when they had convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they exclaimed: "That fleet" (pointing to Admiral Sampson's) "has no excuse for not having gained possession of the harbor and defeated the city and its defenses in so many days."*

The Commander in Chief of the American Army is General Miles. (Here follow the names of the different commanders in chief of the United States Army and Navy.)

At 10 a. m., an officer of the American Army, delegated for that purpose, took possession of the comandancia de marina and captaincy of the port, which were surrendered to him, after we had gathered up such documents and communications as should be preserved, and destroyed the others, or made them useless.

The forces are still depositing arms and ammunition, preserving excellent order, which has not been disturbed for a moment. Then they march to the camp outside the city. The arms were all deposited at the park, and not surrendered to the enemy. In order to form an idea, though only approximately, of the number of the forces defending the city, I give below a statement which gives the number at the hospitals, several having been fitted up.

On the 17th of July there were—

In the military hospital	800 sick and wounded.
At the Concha headquarters	500 sick and wounded.
At the Mercedes hospital	500 sick and wounded.
At Barracones	300 sick and wounded.
<hr/>	
Total	2,100 sick and wounded.

*On July 2, Admiral Sampson wrote General Shafter: "It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes."—O. N. I.

NOTE 2: At the hospital, only the seriously wounded and sick were admitted; those who could stand on their feet were refused and sent back to the trenches. If this had not been the case, there would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor physicians to attend them. Therefore, the number of sick was in reality much greater than shown by the statement furnished by the hospital.

The soldiers had but little to eat, and that little was bad, and not enough water. The latter was scarce, and means were lacking for transporting it to all the points on the extensive line they covered and which it was indispensable to maintain.

The horses of the cavalry, as well as the animals of the artillery and military administration, had had no corn to eat for a long time, and the hay, their only food, was very difficult to get and caused sickness, which was worse.

In conclusion, I will give a statement of the stock on hand which the artillery park turned over to the American officer commissioned to receive it:

ARTILLERY PARK OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Statement of stock on hand, in arms and ammunition, of which the officer of the American Army, commissioned to receive it, takes charge.

Kind.	Number of arms.	Rounds of ammunition.
Mauser rifles, Spanish model, 7-mm., No. 1893.....	7,902	1,500,000
Mauser rifles, Argentine model, 7.65-mm., No. 1891.....	872	1,471,000
Mauser rifles, Turkish model, 7.65-mm., No. 1892.....		
Remington rifles, 11-mm., No. 71.....	6,118	345,000
Remington rifles, 11-mm., No. 7189.....		
Mauser carbines, Spanish model.....	833	1,200
Mauser carbines, Argentine model.....	84	
Remington carbines.....	330	
Revolvers.....	84	
Sabers.....	267	
Machetes.....	692	

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July —, 1898.

LUIS MELGAR,
Lieut. Col., Commander of Artillery.

Found correct by the officer commissioned. Errors and omissions excepted.

A. D. BORUP,
Lieut. Col., U. S. V., Chief Ord. Officer.

It will be seen that nearly the whole armament with which the Spanish army was equipped consisted of Mauser rifles, Spanish model (the Remington was that of the volunteers and a few mobilized companies); hence the ammunition for those was all that could be used and should be counted; the rest was useless.

Therefore, the number of cartridges on hand and surrendered was 1,500,000, and the number of rifles 7,902. Hence there were 191 cartridges for each soldier. Every army man will know the time it takes to use them up.

Here end the events and military operations that took place at Santiago de Cuba, and which are the subject of these notes. I should therefore stop here, but I do not wish to do so without venturing a few ideas suggested to me by certain scenes of which I was an unwilling witness (for I have naturally avoided sights in which there could be nothing pleasant), and without making a comparison between two sieges, upon one of which judgment has already been passed and which has become a matter of history known to every one, and upon the other of which judgment can not yet be passed because we are not as yet in possession of the necessary data and information which would make a just and impartial sentence possible.

I give below the official statement of all the casualties sustained by the forces of Santiago de Cuba in the different bombardments and battles from the 18th of May to the date of the signing of the capitulation. Those caused by sickness are not included.

CASUALTIES IN THE BOMBARDMENTS AND ATTACKS ON THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.

DATE.	KILLED.				WOUNDED.				PRISONERS AND MISSING.		
	Generals.	Commanders.	Officers.	Men.	Generals.	Commanders.	Officers.	Men.	Commanders.	Officers.	Men.
June 6—Morro				2		1	4	25			
Estrella				1							
Cay Smith								2			
Socapa								8			
Mazamorra								11			
Cruiser <i>Reina Mercedes</i>		1		5		1	1	10			
June 14—Socapa							1	6			
June 16—Morro				1			1	10			
Socapa				2			1	6			
June 21—Morro								3			
June 22—Socapa							1				
Aguadores							1	6			
Daiquiri				1				5			
June 23 and 24—Sevilla				9			3	24			
June 25—Aguadores							2	1			
June 26—Morro								8			
July 2—Morro				1			1	31			
July 1, 2, 3—Caney and Santiago.	1	3	12	78	1	6	30	339	1	6	116
July 10—Santiago				6		1	2	45			
July 11—Santiago				1			1	16			
Total	1	4	12	107	1	9	49	556	1	6	116

RECAPITULATION.

	Generals.	Com- manders.	Officers.	Men.
Killed -----	1	4	12	107
Wounded -----	1	9	49	556
Prisoners and missing -----		1	6	116
General total -----	2	14	67	779

XXXVII.

TRADERS, NOT THE SPANISH PEOPLE.

I was sent to the Island of Cuba for the first time in 1868 and have remained there, if not constantly, yet quite long enough to understand, even though I am but a poor observer, that one of the most important causes which have led to the deep aversion which the sons of Cuba generally show for the mother country is the conduct of a certain number of people who come from the Peninsula with no other object in view than to accumulate a fortune in more or less of a hurry, the majority of them having no education or knowledge of any kind.

In order to better attain their desires and ambitions, they incessantly boast of everything Spanish, whereby they must necessarily come into conflict with the Cubans, whose feelings and dignity they hurt and offend. When they have acquired money, they aspire to lucrative and important offices, which they obtain because they are Spanish, to the prejudice of others, who by their intelligence and ability are better fitted to hold them; and the aversion is intensified into hatred, which, always latent, though concealed, was only waiting for an opportunity to break out openly. This opportunity presented itself for the first time in 1868, and the battle cry of Yara became the signal of vengeance and extermination, to which these Peninsulars responded by organizing the corps of volunteers.

To deny that they have since rendered important and constant services to the cause of Spain, would be both unjust and useless; but it must also be acknowledged that they have committed many serious errors, often becoming overbearing and having compelled more than one captain general to resign his command—a fatal example which hurt us in our country and impaired our reputation in other countries.

The first Cuban insurrection and all those which we have had to fight since have acquired that stamp of cruelty and extermination which is a characteristic of savage people, but not of civilized nations, and the war has given an opportunity to satisfy vengeance, which have given rise to reprisals and furnished the Government of the United States with a pretext—both unjust and hypocritical, as I know only too well, but still a pretext—for deciding on armed intervention, in the name of humanity, or which is the same, on war, which could not help but be its natural outcome.

If all those errors and offenses which have been attributed to Spain and the country had really been committed by them, such intervention would have been justified and even worthy of commendation. But events have shown very plainly that to them (the Peninsulars referred to) the nation was but a pretext and that the object was quite a different one, namely, the attainment of their aspirations and the realization of their desires. And this is further evidenced by the fact, previously mentioned, that, taking advantage of the scarcity of provisions, the natural consequence of the blockade, they hid such provisions as they had on hand or asked exorbitant prices for them, without any reason to justify such proceeding, after taking good care to place their funds abroad, in anticipation of what might happen. I need hardly state again that those who were so enthusiastic and loyal in normal times were the first to strip off the uniform and hide where they believed themselves safest. Finally, when they became convinced that the sun in whose light they had been living, and in whose rays they had thrived, was yielding his place to another sun, larger in size, but not in luster, they sought its protection and benefits, without remembering any longer the one which their eyes had seen when they opened them for the first time. "The King is dead—long live the King!"

They advertised their merchandise in "The Times," of Santiago de Cuba, a newspaper of recent publication, printed in Spanish for the information of the Cubans, the hatred of whom does not prevent their fleecing them, and in English for the purpose of doing the same thing with their new masters, whom they did not hesitate in recognizing. And so great is their love and affection for Spain, of which they were so proud, that where they ask one dollar of American silver they require two in Spanish coin of the same metal. They consider the latter worth one-half of the former. Perhaps this may seem exaggerated, the same as many other truths contained in my "Notes;" but a letter signed by a Peninsular, published in number 7 of said "Times," of Santiago de Cuba, of August 8, will convince the most incredulous. The following is a literal copy of the letter:

"EMIGRATION AT PRESENT IS FOLLY.

"Your southern race has many vices, but it also possesses great virtues. Its weak point is that it is extremely impressionable. Any orator speaking to you carries you completely away, and with childlike weakness you accept everything just as it is painted and described to you.

"During the six months last past the Spanish race at Santiago de Cuba has lived in this fictitious atmosphere; I say 'fictitious'

because the bitter reality has not realized our patriotic and enthusiastic aspirations.

“How many useless sacrifices! How many illusions destroyed! But that should not discourage us, because history, when dealing with the events and the suffering of this poor people, will take good care to transmit them to posterity with impartial rudeness.

“At present, as long as we are acquainted only with the occurrences that have taken place in this province alone and know absolutely nothing of what is going on in the rest of the world, including our mother country, why do we not wait until the black clouds hanging over us have passed away and until the horizon has cleared up so that we may be able to judge of our true situation and decide what is to be done? Be calm, very calm, peninsular residents of this city; let us condemn right here the voluntary desertion which prejudices your sacred interests, and whose current you have followed without considering whether it would lead to your happiness or to your ruin. However much you may think about the extremes which I have just pointed out to you, it will still be little enough.

“Let us suppose for a moment that the dismemberment of our poor Spain becomes a fact, a thing which we do not know. What painful scenes are you going to witness? What business will you resort to to recover from the ruin of your interests? Unfortunately none, for your long absence will keep you in ignorance of everything, and the radical change of climate, when winter is almost at hand, will affect your health and that of your families.

“If you remain here, in this locality which is occupied by soldiers of a strong nation, until we shall learn definitely what has happened, you will lose nothing either in your business or your independence.

“The noble and farsighted chiefs who are at present ruling the destinies of this country have shown you plainly that all they wish is that peace and order may reign in all the branches of our public administration;

“That they have called upon you as well as the industrious Cubans to cooperate in the work of progress and social reconstruction;

“That they have neglected nothing in order that the inhabitants may have cheap and wholesome food;

“That they have established banks for the development of our agriculture and commerce.

“They have also shown us, and have so far proved it, that they have not come here in the interest of any faction or political party, but are desirous only of promoting the progress of this island and the well-being of its inhabitants.

“Since the situation which I have just described to you is the undeniable truth, why should you want to join this insensate and shortsighted emigration which can cause you nothing but expense?

“Do you not understand that by remaining here where you are well known by the people and the local trade, you have an ample field for rebuilding your deteriorated business and provide for your families and secure for them a bright future?

“Whatever may be the final fate which Providence reserves for this country, whether we remain Spanish or pass over to foreigners, our hard-working and honorable race will always remain deserving. There are instances in the Spanish-American Republics of fellow-countrymen of ours who are holding the most prominent places in those nations and who have been honored by their governments.

“If all that I have set forth is tangible truth, why should you abandon the field, why flee from this beautiful country where you have spent the years of your youth, raised families and acquired a good standing? If you consider my disinterested advice you can not help but become convinced that, as matters now stand, your voluntary emigration is an absurdity.

“A PENINSULAR.”

I have copied the letter literally, and it must be admitted that it is remarkable in every respect for diction, aspiration, and intention. I believe this example is quite sufficient, so I will refrain from citing others.

Those who to-day call and sign themselves Peninsulars, who have always called themselves Spaniards, what will they call themselves to-morrow?

XXXVIII.

GERONA AND SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

When sieges are spoken of in Spain, those of Numancia and Sagunto, Saragossa, and Gerona are always mentioned specially as instances worthy of imitation.

As twenty centuries have elapsed since the first two took place and I do not know what happened there, and am not sufficiently acquainted with the facts to venture on a comparison, I will leave them entirely out of the question; for since the customs and usages of warfare, as well as international law, and the rights of the people were, and could not help but be, very different from those of our days, there is nothing remarkable in the fact that, as capitulations were not respected, people should have preferred to die like lions rather than be butchered like sheep.

Therefore I shall refer only to the siege of Gerona (no doubt quite as glorious as that of Saragosa) of which all Spaniards, myself included, are justly proud; and judging from General Linares's telegram, somebody had evidently had that siege in mind as a pattern or model to be followed here at Santiago de Cuba.

Everybody is acquainted with the circumstances of the siege of Gerona, but probably no one in the Peninsula with those of the siege of Santiago. All that I am going to say concerning it is pure truth, as can be testified by the 30,000 inhabitants of the city and the 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents who laid siege to it.

It is true that Gerona in 1809 was far from being a Metz or a Sebastopol; but after all, it was a city surrounded by walls, with forts and redoubts on the outside communicating with the main precinct by open roads. For that reason the city could not be entered by surprise, but had to be regularly besieged, which made it necessary to construct parallel lines, set up batteries, cut off communications with the outside to prevent assistance from reaching the city, open a breach, or determine upon the assault, all of which costs time and lives.

Great was the anger caused in Spain by the invasion of Napoleon the First, and especially by the means which he employed to effect it. The Spanish believed their religion and independence threatened, and like one man they rose up in arms with an enthusiasm and energy not often paralleled in history.

Thus it was that the garrison of Gerona, which at the beginning of the siege consisted of about 6,000 men, enthusiastic as well as being Spanish, was not the only garrison that did the fighting. For all its inhabitants fought as well; the young and the strong with arms, the old and the weak by carrying cartridges and ammunition, the women by gathering up and caring for the sick and wounded, the clergy by absolving the dying, burying the dead, and stimulating the zeal of all. There everybody fought, everybody toiled, all were heroes, because it was their own property they were defending, their own hearths, their families, the soil where their forefathers were buried, their religion, their independence—in a word, their native country, and that is saying everything. They well earned their country's gratitude, from Mariano Alvarez de Castro to the last woman, the last child.

The troops which surrounded the city under Verdier and the Saint-Cyr troops protecting them and occupying the roads which lead to the city did not exceed in all 30,000, and although their artillery was more numerous and better manned, Gerona had artillery of the same caliber and the same range; that is to say—and this should be well borne in mind—that the Spanish projectiles carried as far as the French projectiles.

The firearms of that time are well known; the small arms were loaded in eleven movements, and I do not know how many it took to load the guns; the effect of the bombshells was moral rather than material, for it will be remembered that, in order to avoid them as much as possible, men were stationed in church steeples and other high places where they indicated the direction of such bombshells by prearranged signals. Besides it was easy to elude them in caves and cellars. If the powder gave out, the supply could always be renewed by burning a few doors and windows to obtain charcoal and mix it with a little saltpeter that could be found in any damp place, and a little sulphur. Any blacksmith could make cannon balls, and so on. Such were the firearms at the beginning of this century and their effects were accordingly.

Moreover, Gerona was aware that all Spain looked upon her with admiration and compassion; that each month, each week, each day that the resistance was prolonged and the French were kept outside the walls of the city, armies were being organized, regiments improvised, and armed bodies raised, and that there was but one idea and one desire in Catalonia, namely, that of helping Gerona, as, indeed, it had been helped once by getting in a convoy with provisions and over 3,000 men, and a second was ready. The city also knew that all assistance which it could get did really help to prolong the resistance, and the garrison was well aware that, if it should go out en masse and break through the

hostile circle at any time, they would be safe and free, on their own soil, where they would have found all the resources and supplies they could wish for.

When they were not fighting, and did not have to be at the breach to repulse the columns of attack, or at the walls to force back an assault, they stationed their sentinels, guards, and patrols to keep watch, while the others could go where they were under shelter from the sun, the rain, and the dampness; in a word, they could take turns about in the service, and although they did not have much to eat, they could at least rest when the enemy permitted. Finally, Gerona preserved the remembrance and the pride of two former sieges which those same French forces had been obliged to give up, and there was well-founded hope of similar success if they received reinforcements, which was not at all improbable.

At the end of a six months' siege Gerona had to capitulate owing to starvation, but capitulate after all; and that capitulation, far from causing us to blush or be ashamed, is one of the most brilliant pages in our history, of which we are justly proud.

Those were the conditions of Gerona during that famous siege; now let us see the conditions of Santiago de Cuba.

Santiago de Cuba, as has been seen, is an open city, without forts, redoubts, or walls—in a word, without defenses of any kind. At the time the present conflict was declared the precinct of the city was surrounded by a wire inclosure which had been deemed sufficient, and indeed had proved so, to check the insurgents; but anyone not acquainted with Santiago and the kind of warfare we had been sustaining, would have laughed at it, and with good reason.

Then the war with the United States broke out. I will not again mention the work effected for the protection of the precinct by the corps of engineers, without resources and appliances and with a scant personnel, which, though both enthusiastic and intelligent, had to confine itself to constructing trenches and protecting by earthworks the forts surrounding the precinct (if the name of forts can be given to a few blockhouses, built with a view to resisting musket fire, but surely not gun fire), erecting palisades and obstructions of every nature, for which purpose all the sinuosities and windings of the ground were utilized with remarkable skill. But all these works were only works of campaign, and left the soldiers exposed to the rays of the July sun of the Island of Cuba, to almost daily torrents of rain, and at night to heavy dew; anyone acquainted with the island would know that, if these conditions had continued for a month, not a single soldier could have remained in the trenches.

Here at Santiago, as well as in the rest of the island, the soldiers, poorly clothed and still more poorly fed, had been sustaining for three years a fierce and thankless war, fighting with the enemy, the climate, with sun and dampness, with sickness, with the roads (or rather for want of them), with rains and drouth, with the mountains and plains—in a word, with everything, for here in Cuba everything is hostile to the army. Besides, there was more than eight months' pay due the soldiers, and I believe is still due them.

Before the destruction of our fleet, and still more so after it, the enemy had complete control of the sea, and from Daiquiri, where the landing was made, to Punta Cabrera, the American fleet, consisting of over seventy vessels, including both war and merchant vessels (many of the latter armed with guns), did not permit us to even think of receiving reenforcements or help of any kind, unless it were from the interior of the island.

After the arrival of General Escario, who might perhaps have checked the progress of the enemy for a little while longer if he had reached here prior to July 1, though he could not have changed the final result, provisions and ammunition, already scarce, became still more so, because there were twice the number of mouths to be fed and twice the number of muskets to be supplied.

Eight or nine thousand men, many suffering with fever and all of them tired and exhausted, who had been day and night in the trenches, which they could not leave for the simple reason that they were far from the city, with water reaching up to their waists whenever it rained, who for only food had rice bread and rice boiled in water, and for only artillery a few muzzle-loading guns, had to resist 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents, with machine guns, also intrenched, and 68 breech-loading guns in advantageous positions and well manned.

The inhabitants, far from helping the soldiers or encouraging them, had left the city as soon as notice of an intended bombardment had been given, and the few who remained closed their doors and windows, even at the drug stores. The merchants, far from furnishing provisions to the army, or even to the hospitals, which stood so much in need of them, hid them carefully and official searches had to be made, the result of which was as I have stated above.

The situation of Santiago de Cuba from a military standpoint is probably unique in history.

Without any prospect of receiving help by sea, which was in control of a powerful fleet, the city was surrounded on land by an army five times as large as ours in number, with excellent artillery, which was increased every day and was constantly receiving provisions and war supplies.




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Some may say that there was one last recourse left: to force a passage through the hostile lines and march to Holguin. That is more easily said than done.

One can not break through lines and walk over armies equipped with modern muskets and guns. Metz and Sedan have proved that, and it must be admitted that the French did fierce fighting at these places. We had to reconcentrate at a given point all our forces, scattered along an extensive line, and how could that be done without the enemy, whose lines were only a few meters from ours, seeing it all?

But I will concede even more: I will concede that it had been possible to accomplish the reconcentration; that the cavalry had been able to make a successful charge, which I do not believe would have been possible, for the horses were starving; I will grant, for the sake of argument, that the mules, which were in the same condition as the horses, had been able to transport the spare ammunition, provided there was any left, and the supplies of rice required for the march. Let us suppose that, after leaving two or three thousand dead and wounded on the field, the others had opened a road to Holguin; how could soldiers who were weak and sick accomplish the forced march which would have been absolutely necessary in order to escape the enemy's pursuit? It was an impossibility. The insurgents would have harassed us on the march, fighting for every inch of the ground, and would have wounded a more or less considerable number of our men, thereby delaying a march which it was so imperative to hasten, and the Americans, who would no doubt have followed our tracks, would thereby have gained time to overtake us with overwhelming numbers, and we should have been compelled to surrender to them at their pleasure for want of ammunition, or to perish to the last man, and such a sacrifice would have profited Spain no more than had the sacrifice of the fleet, and would have deprived the nation of 8,000 soldiers who by three years of fighting had become inured to war.

If the hostile fleet had bombarded the city, as it doubtless would have done, it would have reduced it to ruins and ashes in a short space of time, and while, from a military standpoint, such a consideration should not influence a general and impel him to capitulate on that account alone, in this case the ruin of the city meant also that of its defenders; for if it was difficult to supply enough water in normal times it would have become altogether impossible under such circumstances; the soldiers, exposed to the sun all day, would have been without anything to drink, which is worse even than being without anything to eat.

Finally, what and whom were we defending in Santiago? The Cubans, after three years of fighting, preferred to become Yankees rather than remain Spaniards, and the Peninsulars, far from assisting the soldiers who were defending them, took advantage of the situation to raise in the most outrageous manner the price of all articles, even those of first necessity, or hide them, giving the impression that they had been confiscated, and when the time of danger arrived they left the city, taking off the uniform of volunteers, in which they had always taken good care to shine at reviews and in processions, and went to hide at El Caney, in merchant steamers, and at Cinco Reales.

Such were the situation and circumstances which, at Santiago, led to the signing of the capitulation, by virtue of which we Spaniards, who happen to be here, are to return to Spain.

I do not wish to make comparisons, nor express my opinion on events in which I have taken a more or less direct and active part, as such opinion might appear impassioned or dictated by interest or egotism. I have stated what happened at Gerona and what happened here, like Bertrand du Guesclin, without omitting or adding anything. Now, let the country, knowing the circumstances, judge us. With a calm mind and a clear conscience I await its sentence.

WASHINGTON :
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,
1899.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN.

MAIN FEATURES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

ON THE

GERMAN NAVY.

REAR-ADMIRAL PLÜDDEMANN,

OF

COMMENTS

INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

WAR NOTES No. II.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

Our forces, being without these latter, have no longer even the pleasure or comfort of fighting, for the enemy knows their situation better than they do themselves; knows that they have no food left but rice, and but very little ammunition, which they dare not use up for fear of becoming entirely disarmed and placing themselves completely at the mercy of the victor; knows that they can not expose themselves to another fight like that of July 1, which they remember with fear and terror; that they will be compelled to capitulate, and that it is only a question of days. Knowing all this, the hostile forces intrench themselves, train their artillery on the city, and also prepare to bombard it with their ships, which, from Aguadores, more than 4 miles from here, will soon reduce it to ashes and ruin, hurling upon it a hail of 16, 20, and 32 cm. shells, the effects of which will be seen only too well, even though we may not be able to see where the projectiles come from that are causing the ruin.

The enemy, as has been stated, had cut the aqueduct, thus depriving the city of water. There were a few wells and a number of cisterns, it is true, but the transportation of the water to the Socapa, Punta Gorda, and especially the blockhouses on the line from Las Cruces to Aguadores (4 kilometers), was not only extremely laborious and difficult, but quite inadequate.

But what makes this siege an exceptional one more than anything else is the fact that the reinforcements which could only have come by land would have had the opposite effect of what they were intended to have, as I will demonstrate.

Where could such reinforcements come from? From Holguin, Manzanillo, Guantánamo, or Havana. Holguin could have furnished five or six thousand men under Colonel Luque, but with only rations enough for the march, for there were no more at Holguin, nor means for transporting them. From Manzanillo all those who could come had already arrived in command of General Escario. From Guantánamo none could come for lack of provisions. That left only those from Havana.

But I will go even further: I will suppose that all the reinforcements, including those from Havana under General Pando or any other general, had arrived, and that there had been forces enough at Santiago to rout the enemy, which is the most that could be conceded. What would have happened then? The enemy would have receded as far as the coast in less than an hour and their armorclads and other war ships would have checked the progress of our army and would have made its victory and efforts useless, leaving it in worse condition than before the arrival of such reinforcements, since there would be many more men to feed; and everybody knows that the fields of Santiago have produced nothing during these last three years of warfare.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES No. II.
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COMMENTS

OF

REAR-ADMIRAL PLÜDDEMANN,

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INTRODUCTORY.

This able analysis of the main features of the Spanish-American war by M. Plüddemann, Rear-Admiral, German navy, presents in a comprehensive form many of the technical deductions of the late war. He comments on the high quality and endurance of our navy ordnance and on the defective results from the navy fuse now in use.

As regards the question of the importance of the Navy controlling the transport service, his reference to the landing of the army at Daiquiri is instructive. Referring to the want of control and discipline on board the merchant steamers chartered as transports for service under the Quartermaster's Department of the Army—that control and discipline at sea which foreign military authorities have long since by experience recognized can only be obtained through the navy—he states:

Under these circumstances it is not strange that the landing of the provisions, guns, and ammunition, and the entire equipment, all of which were so much needed in this locality, which offered no resources, was effected with such slowness that the troops were reduced from the outset to the meager rations which each man carried with him.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,
Chief Intelligence Officer.

DECEMBER 21, 1898.



MAIN FEATURES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

By M. PLÜDDEMANN, Rear-Admiral, German Navy.

[Translated from the *Marine-Rundschau*, November, 1898.]

While the events of the war just ended show nothing which might lead to a radical revolution of present ideas as to rational warfare and the use of modern war material, and while no essentially new appliances have been made use of which might cause us to anticipate a change in the floating material or the weapons of the sea powers, still the war has enriched former experiences. But, on the other hand, it might lead to erroneous conclusions, as many good devices did not have a chance to be tested, the weakness of the adversary making them superfluous, and others not good did not have bad results, because they were counterbalanced by the defects and mistakes on the part of the enemy or by other favorable circumstances.

The following is a discussion of the points which are of special interest to the naval officer:

I. BATTLES OF THE FLEET.

Aside from the moral qualities of the personnel, which constitute the prerequisite of success, there are five main factors on which the result of a battle depends—the construction and equipment of the ships, the artillery, the torpedo, the ram, and speed.

The torpedo and the ram have not been used in the late war, for the reason that the hostile ships have never come close enough to each other. It is claimed, it is true, that two Spanish torpedo boats attempted an attack at Cavite on May 1. But these two vessels were so entirely covered by the rapid-fire artillery of the *Olympia*, even at a distance of 2,000 meters, that they could only save their crews by running ashore as fast as possible. It is doubtful whether they were really torpedo boats. If so, the attack could only have been made owing to entire inexperience with torpedo-boat attacks and complete ignorance of modern rapid-fire guns.

The other two factors, artillery and speed, have proved to be of much more essential and indeed of a very powerful effect. The superiority of the American artillery as to number, caliber, and kind of guns is well known. The general opinion is also that the shooting of the Americans was very good, while that of the Spanish was miser-

able. This was the more essential for the Americans at Cavite, owing to the fact that a large number of their shells did not explode. If nevertheless they achieved such a complete success and caused such destructive fires, it was because of the comparatively large number of hits; there were still quite a considerable number of shells that did explode. Even as early as at the bombardment of San Juan it was discovered that many of the shells did not explode; but this fact was most noticeable at the naval battle of Cavite. It is true that at the end of the battle all the Spanish vessels were under water to the upper deck, so that the really mortal injuries could not be verified; the parts above water showed a number of hits, and there is no reason for the assumption that the ratio of exploded shells to that of unexploded ones was essentially different in the lower parts.

The *Reina Cristina* showed ten shots that had gone entirely through the vessel; the after smokestack had been torn down by the falling of the mainmast; no explosive effect could be noticed. However, the whole ship had been burned out, which made accurate observation difficult.

The *Castilla* showed considerable explosive effects. The smokestacks and metal bulkheads of the upper deck were pierced in different places by fragments and splinters. The conning bridge and superstructure deck were completely destroyed and torn down.

On the *Don Antonio de Ulloa* the masts were pierced in several places; a 5.7-centimeter shot had gone clear through a 12-centimeter gun shield; the chart house and the starboard side aft showed two hits each, in which there had been failure to explode.

The *Don Juan de Austria* was burned out; effects of firing could not be observed.

On the *Marquis del Duero* the tube of the 12-centimeter starboard gun was bent upward; the cause of this could not be ascertained. Two shots had pierced the ship's side. The upper edge of the smokestack had been indented by a projectile. No splinter effects were noticeable.

On the *General Lezo* the demolition of the smokestack was apparently due to an explosion.

The *Isla de Cuba* showed no injuries.

On the *Isla de Luzon* the 12-centimeter forward gun, with its whole pivot and shield, had fallen over backward in firing. Two shots (presumably 4-centimeter) had gone through the bow; one of the masts had been grazed by a small-caliber shot. The engine telegraph and superstructures had been demolished; the helm upturned by splinters.

On the *Argos* nothing could be observed.

The *Velasco* had the foremast pierced and slightly burned, the mainmast torn down, and the anchor stock shot off.

When the American fleet advanced for the attack it was fired upon by a battery at Manila. The *Olympia* answered with two shots; both

shells were afterwards found unexploded near Luneta. The governor's house at Cavite also showed a shot without explosive effect.

In this respect better results appear to have been achieved at Santiago. This may be gathered from the details known, although the reports refer only in a few instances to the explosive effects attained; but even here a number of cases of nonexplosion have been noticed on the Spanish ships, as well as the fortifications.

The following table gives some data concerning the hits in the naval battle of Santiago:

AMERICAN GUNS.

	American designation.							Total.
	1-pounder.	6-pounder.	4-inch.	5-inch.	8-inch.	12-inch.	13-inch.	
Caliber, in centimeters.....	3.7	5.7	10	12.7	20	30	33	-----
Number of guns on board.	22	84	6	12	32	6	8	170

HITS.

<i>Maria Teresa</i>	1	17	1	4	3	2	-----	28
<i>Almirante Oquendo</i>	-----	46	6	3	7	-----	-----	62
<i>Vizcaya</i>	-----	11	4	6	45	-----	-----	66
<i>Cristóbal Colon</i>	-----	5	-----	2	-----	-----	-----	7
Total.....	1	79	11	15	55	2	-----	163

This is not quite 1 hit per gun, or, leaving out the 1-pounders, which have only a short range of fire, 9 hits to 8 guns.

The *Iowa* is the only ship that has 10-centimeter guns, the *Brooklyn* the only one having 12.7-centimeter guns. These data can not lay claim to absolute accuracy, owing to the extent of the destruction. The calibers of the hits also admit of some margin.

Special mention should be made of the following points: The fallen foremast of the *Maria Teresa* showed 2 hits; 10 hits from 3 ships went into the smokestacks.

On the *Almirante Oquendo* a 20-centimeter shell went through the forward turret roof, exploding, and killing the whole crew in the turret. If the turret had had no roof the shell would have passed over it.

The superstructures on the deck of the *Vizcaya* had been almost completely destroyed by the end of the battle. Whether the torpedo which lay ready for firing in a bow launching tube was detonated by a hostile projectile could not be definitely established. It has also been said that the forward ammunition magazine had exploded.

A 20-centimeter shell hit the protective shield of the second 14-centimeter gun of the *Maria Teresa*, exploded in the rear of it, and killed and mutilated everyone in the vicinity, as did also another shell of the same kind which struck the battery deck aft. Still farther aft two 30-centimeter shells struck so close together that their shot holes were merged into one. Explosive fragments from them had torn a hole 4 feet square in the ship on the opposite side (starboard).

The *Cristobal Colon*, although having received but seven shots, gave up the game, seeing that there was no possibility of escape, as even the *Oregon* and *Texas* had caught up with her after a three hours' chase.

In no case has an armor belt been pierced. The greatest destruction comparatively was wrought by the 5.7-centimeter projectiles, while the efficacy of the 3.7-centimeter projectiles was very small, their range not exceeding 2,000 meters. They are therefore to be done away with, perhaps a little overhastily, since they were constructed primarily as against torpedo boats and for use at comparatively short distances.

In connection with the hits, a few figures as to the consumption of ammunition may be of interest, while the total consumption of ammunition is not yet known. Smith, a seaman on board the *Iowa*, fired 135 aimed shots from a 10-centimeter rapid-fire gun in fifty minutes. During the same period of time two 5.7-centimeter guns of the same ship fired 440 shots. The *Oregon* used in all 1,775 shells, but 1,670 of this number were used for the twenty 5.7-centimeter guns alone (or perhaps only for the ten of one side of the ship), while the four 30-centimeter guns fired 31 shots.

The American material has demonstrated not only its efficacy but also its durability, as only four guns were in need of repairs at the end of the war, in all of which projectiles had burst in the bore. This fact, taken in connection with other frequent failures of fuses, shows that the construction of the fuse in America is still far from perfect.

It is well known that the extensive fires on board the Spanish ships were due principally to the fact that the Spanish had not sufficiently considered modern experiences and principles by removing everything combustible from the ships. One circumstance should be mentioned in this connection which has perhaps not been fully appreciated, namely, the danger of wooden decks with pitch in the seams. The danger of these decks was still further increased in the Spanish ships by the circumstance that the planks were not even resting on an iron deck. An iron lining excluding the air and being a conductor of heat naturally decreases the danger of a fire spreading, though it does not obviate it, as the splinters of exploding projectiles pierce the deck, thereby causing drafts of air from below. On the *Maria Teresa*, *Almirante Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya* the upper decks and all the woodwork were completely burned, other decks partially.

The Americans had avoided all combustible material in the construction and equipment of their ships; and moreover, special orders were given at the beginning of the war that all the ships should be examined and everything combustible that might have been left or accumulated on board through carelessness should be removed. Besides, the Spanish appear to have relied entirely on their steam

pumps and water mains for extinguishing fires. When these had been destroyed or injured by hostile projectiles, they had no other means to fall back on. Even the most primitive means for fighting fires, such as fire buckets and tubs filled with water, are indispensable in connection with our modern fire-extinguishing equipment which is very effective indeed, but also very complicated.

The thick powder smoke sometimes suffocated the Americans and almost blinded them. They sought to remedy this by tying wet cloths over their heads with small holes cut into them for the eyes. Smokeless powder would probably have had still more troublesome effects.

The range-finders, to which the good firing results of the Americans were often attributed in the beginning, were not of much use. Owing to their delicate construction, their usefulness was soon impaired. The distances were then estimated from the height of the masts of the hostile ships.

While the Spanish were inferior in every other respect, they might have averted the whole sad catastrophe of Santiago by preserving and taking advantage of their greater speed, which they had shown, at least, at the trial trips of their ships. In this respect the Americans were at a great disadvantage from the outset.

The speed of the two armored cruisers, *New York* and *Brooklyn*, was superior by 1 knot to that of the Spanish cruisers, but these were the only ones; the speed of all the other vessels was inferior by from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 miles. The American ships, aside from previous services required of them—the *Oregon*, for instance, had not reached Key West on her return from San Francisco until May 26—had been blockading Santiago for five weeks. Their boilers were in constant use and could not be properly cleaned; the bottoms of the ships were badly fouled. It is claimed that in order to make 11 knots an hour the ships had to use as much coal as they required to make 16 knots, when in good condition, and even then they could not attain their original speed. The Spanish, on the other hand, had a good opportunity during their six-weeks' stay in Santiago harbor to put their boilers and engines in first-class condition and to clean the bottoms of the ships.

Here, again, the moral qualities of the personnel are of the greatest importance. Technical perfection is but an auxiliary in warfare—a 0 which acquires value only by the figure placed before it, namely, the mental qualities of the warrior. It is doubtful, however, whether the Spanish ships ever actually possessed the speed officially claimed for them. At trial trips it is easy enough to use means by which the efficiency attained appears greater on paper than it is in reality, especially if the personnel accepting the ship is not of the highest moral and technical standing. In any event, the Spanish engine personnel was not equal to its task.

It did not need this war to establish the value of an efficient engine personnel for success in war; but the immensity of the catastrophes

must make it plain even to the most superficial mind that it would be very wrong to deny the importance of the services of the men who give life and motion to the ship by the most arduous kind of work simply because they do not handle shell and lanyard, but coal shovel and fire hook. The very best of human material, strong in body and mind, is the only kind suitable for this work, and a navy should spare neither trouble nor expense to secure it.

On the subject of the efficiency of monitors opinions in United States naval circles were much divided at the beginning of the war. The North Americans are the only ones who still continue to build this type of ship. Little has been heard of their services during the war. Two of them went from San Francisco to the Philippines, the greater part of the way in tow of their colliers. The *Monterey*, accompanied by the collier *Brutus*, left San Diego, Cal., on June 11 and arrived at Manila on August 4. The distance is 7,600 miles, 3,725 miles of which she was towed. Twice she had to touch at anchoring places, namely, at Hawaii and Guam. She was towed from the 8th to the 23d of June, 712 miles; from the 5th to the 22d of July, 2,541 miles, and from the 25th to the 28th of July, 472 miles; average speed while in tow, 6.76 knots. The weather was fine during the whole time, with the exception of a slight storm on July 31. The voyage took in all two months less seven days. The *Monadnock* took exactly the same length of time, having left San Francisco on June 23 and arrived at Manila on August 16.

These voyages are quite remarkable as far as sea efficiency is concerned, but when it comes to war efficiency they had better not be relied upon. The confidence in the efficiency of the monitor for war purposes has been considerably shaken. Captain Mahan, who used to argue in favor of a defensive navy composed of monitors, has recently expressed the opinion that the inefficiency of the monitors had now been proved; that they had been a constant impediment to the fleet owing to their lack of speed, limited coal capacity, and unstable platforms, which completely excluded effective firing in a bombardment. For harbor defenses also he prefers land fortifications to monitors.

II. BOMBARDMENTS.

What might be the results of a serious battle between armor clads and coast forts the war has not demonstrated. The Americans in these instances have never gone close enough to make it possible to note decisive results on either side of the belligerents. They should not be blamed for this. If they could obtain their object without taking greater risks, it would have been a mistake to take such risks, and they certainly did attain their object. The great injuries, however, which the Americans claimed to have inflicted at different times have subsequently proved to be exaggerations and delusions. Even at target practice we believe only reluctantly the statements of "too

short" or "too far" made by an observer favorably stationed. The claims that the forts had been silenced, which would presuppose that the guns had been dismantled, were also founded on delusion.

There is no doubt that the Americans had better guns than the Spanish in their land batteries and could fire at distances which the Spanish guns could not reach. When this was recognized ashore and the firing stopped, the ships thought they had silenced the batteries. It has therefore been demonstrated that the ships were unable to seriously injure the land fortifications at great distances. After all the bombardments of Santiago there was but one gun dismantled in each of the batteries at the Morro and the Socapa. It has not been demonstrated whether with equal armaments and skill in firing on the part of the Spanish the ships would not have seriously suffered. Still less has it been demonstrated what the relative situation of the belligerent parties would have been if shorter distances had been chosen.

The employment of torpedo boats for bombardments, as at Cardenas, must be designated as entirely unsuitable. Torpedo boats are expensive and delicate vessels, equipped for launching torpedoes and for great speed. Their guns are intended to be used only in extreme cases. When the torpedo weapons can not be used their other principal quality, speed, in connection with the circumstance that they draw little water, may be utilized for the transmission of orders and information; but bombardments, even in narrow and shallow waters, had better be left to the most primitive gunboats, etc.; they can do better work and are less expensive, but can never take the place of a disabled torpedo boat.

The so-called dynamite cruiser, *Vesuvius*, was a failure. Her projectiles can be fired only at medium and short distances, and can not be aimed. The terrible effects claimed for hits can not be considered as counterbalancing this. It is true that an accidental hit may cause great havoc, but in this age of accurate firearms we should no longer reckon with such uncertain factors. The Americans have utilized the vessel accordingly. They used to send her at night against the coast defenses, counting on accidental hits, while the vessel, protected by the darkness, did not betray her presence by any flash at the discharge nor by smoke or detonation. Nothing has been heard of any particular result. No attempt was made to carry out the idea, so much talked of at first, of destroying the mine obstructions by systematic bombardments of the harbor entrance. In order to do this it would have been necessary for the vessel to approach the shore in daytime, when she would have been exposed to the very dangerous fire of the coast forts, and a systematic bombardment could hardly be spoken of in view of the uncertainty of fire.

The Americans consider this vessel a failure, as also the ram *Katahdin*, which, aside from four rapid-fire guns, has no other weapons but her ram.

III. COAST DEFENSE.

Some obstructions by means of vessels and mines were laid out by both belligerents, but have not come into play. The Spanish had attempted to close the entrance of San Juan Harbor in Porto Rico and that of the Pasig River at Manila by sunken vessels. In the latter case it was the opinion of German officers that it did not constitute a military obstruction, although it interfered considerably with the movements of shipping.

The two mines which were blown up in front of the *Olympia* at the beginning of the battle of Cavite were not intended as a regular obstruction of the channel, but represented only a small mine field for vessels that might accidentally pass over them. They were fired prematurely.

In the entrance of Guantanamo Bay the Americans found quite a number of mines. These might have caused considerable damage if they had operated, for the Americans entered the bay without any precautionary measures, and the screws of the *Marblehead* tore two of the mines loose from their anchorages so that they rose to the surface of the water. Then the whole bay was systematically searched for mines. This was done on June 21 by the boats of the *Marblehead* and *Newark*. Four steam launches, under the fire of Spanish infantry hiding on the shore, fished up thirteen mines on the first day with light chains they were towing. The ships, of course, fired on the hostile position, which was soon abandoned. During the next few days thirty-five more mines were found and taken ashore. These proved to be charged with 120 pounds of gun cotton each. Many of them showed evidences of having been in contact with ships' bottoms or screws, but the firing mechanism was not capable of operating. The fuses showed such grave defects that it was quite evident that the work of constructing them had not been done under the supervision of a superior.

The mines raised in Santiago Harbor after the surrender of the place proved on the whole to be in better condition. Still, the outer row containing contact mines was of doubtful value. One mine was found, for instance, in which half of the gun cotton had been burned, leaving no doubt that it had been in contact with some object—probably the *Merrimac*—and that the fuse had acted, but that the gun-cotton charge had become spoiled.

The second row of mines (electric) was in pretty good condition and might easily have destroyed one or more ships if an attempt had been made to force the entrance. These latter mines contained a charge of 200 pounds of gun cotton each. All the mines in Guantanamo as well as Santiago Bay were thickly overgrown with barnacles and seaweeds.

As a curiosity, it may be mentioned that lightning struck an American mine in the lower Mississippi and exploded it, and that several

mines in the Potomac were exploded by lightning at a few seconds' interval without causing any disturbance in the rest of the mine system. They blew up exactly as it was intended that they should be blown up in war.

IV. BLOCKADES AND CRUISER WARFARE.

Both of these were applied by the belligerents in the mildest possible form. Spain can hardly be considered in this connection. She could do no blockading, and it is somewhat doubtful whether it was quite voluntarily that she abstained from capturing hostile merchantmen. The Americans were enabled to maintain quite an effective blockade on the coasts, which they designated as blockaded, by means of the large number of yachts and other steamers which they had incorporated into their Navy as auxiliary vessels, while their large ships were giving their attention to the hostile naval forces.

It can hardly be said that the Americans carried on systematically any destructive warfare as against Spanish merchantmen. Those they did capture almost ran into their hands, so to speak. This was especially the case at the beginning of the war, mostly with vessels which, owing to the usual Spanish carelessness, had received no warning of the fact that hostilities were about to break out. This was even the case with the Spanish gunboat *Callao* in the Philippines. Still a few prizes may be mentioned which were captured while making a direct attempt to run the blockade, also a few cases where vessels were chased till they ran ashore, while a few fast Spanish vessels succeeded in running the blockade. But neither the successful nor the unsuccessful attempts at running the blockade were of much importance.

A number of neutral vessels were also captured, but nearly all of them were released again, for the American Government, in adjudicating their cases, showed a liberality which was quite unheard of in former naval wars and which probably had a political background. About thirty vessels in all were considered good prizes.

As the United States as well as Spain have refrained from privateering, although they were the very countries which reserved that right at the time of the Paris declaration, it may be assumed that privateering is definitely at an end.

During the blockade of Santiago the harbor entrance was at night kept constantly under the light of the projector of some ship designated for the duty and boats were stationed at intervals between the other vessels and the shore, so that any attempt of the Spanish ships to go out might at once be perceived. It has been commented upon that the ship so illuminating the harbor entrance was hardly ever fired upon by the fortification works. It would seem as though telegraphically connected observation stations at the Morro and Socapa could have ascertained the exact distance of the troublesome watcher and made her work, if not entirely impossible, yet extremely difficult by firing upon her.

V. LANDINGS.

The landing of the Americans at Daiquiri is the largest landing effected since that of the western powers at Balaklava in the Crimean war. Yet the total forces landed did not exceed 15,000 men, embarked in fifty-three steamers. It took a long time before the troops were ready to start, for everything required for an army and a landing had first to be procured. When the expedition finally did start it was found that a great deal had been overlooked or was incomplete, or had been lost in the chaos, or could not be secured. For instance, no cavalry horses—except for one troop—could be taken along because there had not been time to fit out the vessels for the reception of horses. The voyage and the landing were effected in the most beautiful weather; the Americans had good luck, as they always did. The forces were landed unmolested.

The disembarkation was effected almost entirely at a small landing bridge where but two boats could go alongside at a time. Attempts to have boats run ashore on the small sandy beach, at one end of which was the bridge, had to be abandoned after the loss of several boats, which were wrecked in the surf on the projecting rocks and stones. The report that the United States war ships had first fired on the open strip of land back of the landing place and routed the Spanish should not be taken literally. No such open strip of land exists there. The rocks reach close to the sea, offering hundreds of sheltered places from which the bridge might have been fired upon. Authorities in military matters state that 300 men, though they might not have been able to prevent the landing entirely, could have caused great losses. But on this occasion, as on so many others, the Spanish showed that they had no appreciation of military situations, and as soon as the bombardment commenced they retreated. They need not have paid much attention to the Cubans. The Spanish ought to have known that now that the Americans had arrived the Cubans would avoid danger even more than before.

With the landing of the army all operations on the part of the Americans ceased for a while. In spite of the most exhaustive use of all the boats and auxiliaries of the warships, including the armor-clads guarding the entrance to Santiago Harbor, it took several days before the field guns and luggage could be brought ashore, to say nothing of the siege guns. It was found that there ought to have been many more lighters, especially such as are equipped with lifting apparatus. There was only one of these—a second one had disappeared during the voyage. There were no devices for landing horses and mules which were intended for drawing the guns. The animals were hoisted overboard, and it was taken for granted that they would swim ashore. But in a number of instances this did not happen. Many of the frightened and bewildered animals swam out to sea and

were drowned. As all the boats were being used in the landing and were crowding each other for hours at the landing place, there was none available to go after the mules and lead them in the right direction. The few men in charge of landing the animals had all they could do to get those that swam ashore out of the surf and in safety. About 50 animals perished.

There was lack of management generally. No one in authority had been appointed commander of the landing place. The commander in chief, General Shafter, did not trouble himself about the landing. Admiral Sampson had only made arrangements as far as the war ships and their boats were concerned. The only landing bridge was but partly covered with loose boards. No material nor tools were at hand to build other bridges, and little attention was given to the one bridge in existence, as is evidenced by the fact that three weeks later the loose boards were still loose.

The conditions at Siboney, where part of the troops and supplies were landed a little later, were quite similar, except that there was no bridge at all. But in calm weather a few boats could be run ashore side by side. No bridge was built here for the landing of the voluminous luggage.

The relations between the military authorities and the officers of the transport steamers had not been regulated. The latter had only their own advantage and that of the ships' owners in view, and did not pay the least attention to the wishes and plans of the officers of the troops. The greater part of the time they kept at a distance of from 3 to 20 miles from the shore, to make sure not to go too near or to get into collision with other vessels, and if at times they did assist in unloading their cargoes, they would return to the sea as fast as possible as soon as fire was opened ashore, often taking with them the most indispensable articles of the army equipment. An American reporter even calls them insolent, un-American, mutinous cowards. The army authorities were unprepared and powerless before such conduct on the part of the officers of the transports. Under these circumstances it is not strange that the landing of the provisions, guns, and ammunition, and the entire equipment, all of which were so much needed in this locality, which offered no resources, was effected with such slowness that the troops were reduced from the outset to the meager rations which each man carried with him, and where these had been thrown away, as had been done in many instances in order to lighten the weight, the soldiers suffered hunger.

VI. COALING.

The late war will give a new impulse to the important question of supplying coal. Ships and fleets carrying on war in a region where they do not have available bases of supplies and coal depots in their immediate vicinity, or whenever they are not certain that there may

not be occasion for their having to leave such region temporarily, should have their own colliers along. The colliers should have the same speed as the squadron. The ships should not be compelled to rely on rendezvous or the uncertainty of colliers sent after them. But not only should care be taken to have a sufficient supply of coal, but also to provide appliances for taking coal on board under all circumstances in the shortest possible time. The lack of such appliances has contributed not a little to the disasters of the Spanish. The coaling of Admiral Camara's ships at Port Said was nothing but a comedy. Admiral Cervera intended to coal rapidly at Santiago and proceed. But the appliances for that purpose proved so defective that the United States fleet had shut him up in the harbor before he could finish coaling, which operation took several days. At present not many ships are being built with that end in view, nor are they being equipped with appliances for coaling in the shortest possible time. This will be absolutely necessary in future, so that the ships may be enabled to take on coal or other fuel either from a wharf or from a lighter or collier at sea.

VII. AUXILIARY WAR SHIPS.

What can be done with money and a practical mind in the matter of securing naval war material the Americans have done since the war cloud first appeared on the horizon. It is true that the purchase of foreign war ships before the beginning of the war proved almost a failure. The United States bought the following Brazilian war ships: The protected cruiser *Amazonas*, of 3,450 tons, afterwards called the *New Orleans*; the protected cruiser *Almirante Abreu*, same size, afterwards called the *Albany*, and the cruiser *Nietheroy*, of 7,080 tons, afterwards called the *Buffalo*, which, aside from her good rapid-fire armament, had a 38-centimeter dynamite gun; from other sources, the cruiser *Diogenes*, of 1,800 tons, renamed the *Topeka*, and a torpedo boat purchased in Germany, called the *Somers*. The only ones of these that were assigned to the active fleet were the *Topeka* and the *New Orleans*. The *Albany* and the torpedo boat *Somers*, which were still in England after the breaking out of the war, were not allowed to leave there on account of England's neutrality. The *Buffalo* did not leave the navy-yard during the war. The United States had better luck with the merchant steamers they purchased and converted into auxiliary cruisers and gunboats.

They bought 60 yachts and other steamers as auxiliary gunboats and scouts, 4 large fast ocean steamers as auxiliary cruisers, 11 tugs, subsequently armed. The following were chartered: Four large ocean steamers as auxiliary cruisers. Placed in commission: Fourteen revenue cutters as auxiliary gunboats and scouts. In all, 93 steamers for warlike actions, more or less armed and fitted out for that purpose.

There were also purchased as adjuncts of the fleet 20 transport

vessels, 9 colliers, 1 repair ship, 2 water-distilling ships, 2 ice-manufacturing ships, 3 hospital ships; in all, 37. This does not include the temporarily chartered steamers for the larger troop transports.

The large auxiliary cruisers were also occasionally utilized for the rapid transportation of troops. The auxiliary gunboats were indispensable for the blockade of the extensive stretch of the coast. The names of several of these, even of tugs, have been specially mentioned in several of the battles. A few of the auxiliary vessels, as, for instance, the *St. Louis* and the *Zafiro*, were equipped with special devices for dragging for cables, which they have used with good success.

As for the adjuncts of the fleet, the distilling ships were intended especially to furnish fresh water to the blockading auxiliary vessels and the transports of the landing army. As most of these vessels had inadequate distilling apparatus, some of them none at all, this was necessary, so that they might not be compelled to leave the blockade for the purpose of renewing their water supply. The repair ship *Fulcan* was also equipped with a powerful distilling apparatus.

The ice-manufacturing ships supplied the vessels not equipped with ice machines, also the hospitals of the invading army of Cuba. The object of the other adjuncts of the fleet is self-evident.

The repair ship *Fulcan* has proved extremely useful, even indispensable for the blockading fleet at Santiago. She supplied 31 vessels with extra engine parts, material, and tools. Twenty-six vessels were repaired, and a number of repairs were also made on guns and their equipments. The *Fulcan* also rendered important services in connection with the raising of the *Maria Teresa* and is now doing the greater part of the work in temporarily repairing said ship for the purpose of transferring her to one of the United States navy-yards.

How important it is to own transports specially fitted out for the transportation of troops and war material has been demonstrated in this war, though principally by the lack of vessels equipped for such service. Of the transports purchased during the war, the Navy Department intends to retain 16, which are to be refitted for service as regular marine transports, namely, the *Panama*, *Port Victor*, *Rita*, *Mohawk*, *Mobile*, *Massachusetts*, *Manitoba*, *Minnewaska*, *Mississippi*, *Michigan*, *Roumania*, *Obdam*, *Berlin*, *Chester*, and *Britannia*, employed on the Atlantic Ocean, and one on the Pacific coast. During the war they were used not only for the transportation of troops, but also for supplying provisions and material.

It would have been very desirable to have had even more of these. The blockading fleet, for instance, complained of the very defective mail service, as also of the fact that, although it was comparatively but a short distance to the United States ports, so few fresh provisions were received, which circumstance impaired the health of the troops.

Vessels built for special purposes are in times of peace, at manœuvres, stepchildren of the Navy; they are considered expensive and troublesome adjuncts which have to be taken into consideration in manœuvres and impede their rapid execution; and yet how useful they are and how much relief they are able to furnish in actual war! Whenever mobilizations show that there is not a sufficient number of suitable merchant steamers which would be unquestionably at the disposal of the Navy at the beginning of a war, provision should be made to have vessels set apart which can be easily equipped for such purposes, and, if necessary, to own and keep in constant readiness a number of such special vessels even in time of peace.



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES No. III.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

SKETCHES

FROM THE

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

BY

COMMANDER J.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN.



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:
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INTRODUCTORY.

During the recent war the German protected cruiser *Geier*, Commander Jacobsen, was stationed in the West Indies, in the vicinity of Cuba, and was permitted to pass in and out of the blockaded ports. There has lately appeared in the *Marine-Rundschau*, of Berlin, an official publication, a series of "Sketches from the Spanish-American War, by Commander J" Their translation complete is given in this number of the War Notes.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,
Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *January 16, 1899.*

Approved:

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

By Commander J

[Translated from the *Marine-Rundschau*, October, November, and December, 1898.]

The following considerations constitute the opinions of the author as acquired by him on the scene of war. He wishes to call special attention to the fact that until authentic data are available as to the strength of the two opponents in the different battles, the tactical situations and intentions, and the losses in personnel and material, the reports can be but incomplete. Nevertheless it will be desirable, even without awaiting official statements, which may not be published for years by the two belligerent parties, to sift the confused mass of material which has come to us through the newspapers and to try and describe the most important operations, at least approximately, as they have taken place. To that end I have partly made use of reports of Germans who were eye witnesses of the events. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that the author has observed the strictest impartiality in his estimates of the situation. He has the same high regard for Spanish and Americans.

I. THE CAUSE OF THE WAR.

1. Much has been said and written about the cause of the war; but, even at the risk of offering nothing new, I believe I ought not to avoid entering into this question, in order to make the sketch complete.

As early as 1890 Mahan's sharp eye discerned what course the policies of his country ought to follow, and in vigorous language he pointed out that course to his nation, from a military standpoint, in his essay entitled "The United States looking Outward," and in 1893 in "The Isthmus and Sea Power." But not only strategic interests, commercial interests also, play a powerful part in this historical drama. Almost nine-tenths of all the sugar from Cuba is already going to the American market. If America succeeds in getting Cuba into her hands, either by autonomy or by annexation, it will insure an immense advantage to the American market and drive all other kinds of sugar (Germany is interested to the extent of many million marks) entirely out of America. Moreover, only a small part of Cuba is as yet being cultivated, and there are good prospects for harvesting from this beautiful country immense wealth in sugar and tobacco. Upon calm consideration it is therefore not astonishing

that the Government of the United States, pressed by the wishes of the people and by speculators having only their own interests in view, should finally have yielded and resolved to lay aside the peaceable attributes of commerce and industry and take the sword in hand. It should further be mentioned that the *Maine* affair threw the last spark into the powder barrel, and that the conduct of American officials at Havana toward the Spanish officials subsequently added further fuel to the flame.

The United States of America has done what other nations in its place might perhaps have accomplished long ago. According to the old adage that a war arises out of the needs of nations, the Union has taken advantage of the opportunity to secure for herself the first place in the West Indies.

2. Very different from the United States, the power of the Spanish Empire, which at one time ruled the world, has been gradually undermined. The flourishing colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, etc., have suffered severely during the last few years from fanatic conflicts between the inhabitants and Government troops as a result of the injudicious policy followed in the government and treatment of the former. Owing to the corruptibility of the officials, fostered by the merchants, the actual revenues from the colonies never reached the hands of the Spanish Government. The principle of the Spanish to compensate themselves first of all out of the rich profits of the country has brought about the catastrophe. It was precipitated by the fact that repeated changes in the highest positions were approved by the Government at Madrid, which necessitated not only a change in the majority of the lower officials, but entailed an entirely new system of oppression and systematic robbing of the inhabitants. When the Government at last realized the true state of affairs it was already too late. Blanco, the last Captain-General and governor of Cuba, as well as Martinez Campos, are well known as men of unimpeachable character. But although General Blanco had an intimate knowledge of Cuban conditions and enjoyed great popularity, he did not succeed in stopping the rolling ball. Steadily it was approaching the abyss, and even the autonomy proclaimed by the Government could not save it from the catastrophe. That catastrophe was the war with the United States. The Spanish, it is true, consider it an entirely unwarranted interference with rights that have been theirs for centuries and an act of violence on the part of a neighboring nation. But that is a characteristic of the Spanish nature and will serve to explain subsequent situations during the war. Even up to the very last day Spain thought it utterly impossible that war could break out with the United States. This is proved by the conditions in Cuba immediately after the sending of the ultimatum by the United States and the rejection of the same by the Spanish Government.

If the Spanish had not been so blinded, and had had eyes for what was going on in their immediate vicinity and in the country of their powerful neighbors during the last few years, they could not have hesitated to set aside their pride, and even to give up their right to the colonies. The United States would have paid Spain a handsome sum for the Atlantic colonies. The Spanish army, which had been fighting for years with great valor and under endless privations, would have honorably returned home, the Spanish merchants would have continued their business under safe protection, and the purchase price would have helped the mother country in her financial troubles. That would have been practical. But fate and the obstinacy, or rather the pride, of the Spanish willed differently. The ball keeps on rolling, and nothing will stop it until the Spanish power is deprived of its colonies and, utterly broken, without any prospect for the future, retires to its exhausted mother country. But that will not prevent the people from proudly raising their heads and exclaiming: "We have defended our honor and have fought trusting in our just cause. Ours is the glory!"

3. Thus the struggle for existence is ever the same, even as between modern nations. And each country which, by reason of its commerce and industry, is entitled to a voice in the politics of the world, should learn a serious lesson from this struggle between capital and antiquated heroism. Germany, above all, should never forget that nothing but a naval force will keep her safe from adversaries—a naval force strong enough to guarantee, or at least not to preclude, success under all possible circumstances.

II. THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES.

4. I will not go into particulars as to the formation and strength of the belligerent parties, as this work is not intended to discuss the course of the whole war, but merely to select a few important and interesting events. Besides, the reader will have an opportunity of gaining information on these points by many other discussions on the subject. There has lately appeared in the *Marine-Rundschau* a review on the events of the Spanish-American war, giving the strength of both parties, together with a discussion by Rear-Admiral Plüddemann, which is especially well adapted for that purpose. I shall take the liberty, however, of inserting a few remarks as to my personal observations while on the scene of war.

5. As the United States of North America does not constitute a military nation and has troubled itself very little about the organization of militia and volunteers, it would not be proper to make the same requirements of American soldiers that we are in the habit of making of our soldiers in Europe. Preparatory training need not be looked for, except in the case of regular troops, and even

there such training in time of peace is very defective. The companies of militia and volunteers are drilled for a short time; officers and men become acquainted with each other, and as soon as an officer is able to lead his company or division and the men have learned to handle their guns, which is at most four weeks, the troops are considered ready for war.

This system naturally precludes the exercising together of large bodies consisting of several regiments. First of all, trained officers are lacking for that purpose, and besides, it is not deemed necessary. These troops do not fight, like European armies, in close ranks, but rather on the order of guerrilla warfare. It will be readily understood that under such circumstances there can be no question of great discipline under fire or in camp on the part of the men, nor of high tactical conceptions and corresponding leadership on the part of the officers. It is very praiseworthy, therefore, that with such primitive means such great results were attained as evidenced, for instance, by the capitulation of Santiago. As for the individual qualities of the American soldier, he is brave, too impetuous perhaps, and as long as there is fighting to be done and the hardships are not too great he is easily guided. A few volunteer regiments fought with considerable valor. But not in that respect alone have they shown military efficiency, but also in the manner in which they have endured fatigues in the extremely unfavorable climate. I am probably not mistaken in the assumption that the good results attained by some of the volunteer regiments are partly due to the circumstance that outdoor sport is carried on with great zeal in the United States. Polo, football, athletic exercises in running, walking, and jumping, tennis, bicycling, rowing, etc., are excellent preparations for military service, because they harden the body and strengthen self-confidence. And if the volunteers further know how to handle their guns and are good marksmen, which is also included among the sports, they have very nearly all the qualities which the Americans require of their soldiers.

6. The United States Navy has been diligently at work ever since the war of the rebellion, 1861 to 1865, and has put to profit the lessons derived therefrom. That the American naval officers are intelligent and energetic as well as brave and self-possessed leaders, and the American sailors cool-headed and good marksmen, was demonstrated by many examples during the above-mentioned war. The naval battle between the *Kearsarge* and *Alabama*, such deeds as Farragut's at Mobile, will never be forgotten and go to prove that the first foundation for a warlike and efficient navy—an able personnel inured to the sea—was in existence. Nor does the Union need fear a comparison with other nations as far as matériel is concerned. Since the year 1888 it has been the endeavor of the Navy Department to take the construction of ships, armor plate, and ordnance into its own hands,

so as to render itself entirely independent of other countries in that respect. The increase of the fleet has kept pace with such efforts. The battle ships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, and *Texas* possess all the requirements of modern ships. Their heavy artillery is unusually strong, and the medium and light artillery consists of rapid-fire guns in larger numbers. The new armored cruisers *New York* and *Brooklyn* are fast and powerful ships, entirely on a level with the same class of cruisers in England and France. It can not be denied that a certain weakness regarding the personnel lies in the fact that so many different nationalities are represented on board; but I believe this circumstance is not of very great weight. Europeans are too much inclined to see everything only with their own eyes and judge matters according to their own usages. On board of a ship, where very strict laws prevail, especially in time of war, it can not be difficult, even among mixed nationalities, to maintain the necessary discipline as long as the officers have a correct understanding of how to handle the crews, and that faculty the American naval officers do possess, as has already been stated. Moreover, the reports of the Naval War College at Newport show that it is the endeavor of the Navy Department to have the officers gain also the necessary knowledge of tactical and strategic questions. During the last few years fleet maneuvers have taken place, the training of the crews has been carried on in a systematic manner, and, finally, target practice has been given the importance which is absolutely necessary for the attainment of the final end, namely, the annihilation of the enemy in war. I do not want to be misunderstood and do not mean to give the impression that the American Navy is above all censure and should be taken as a model in every respect. Not at all. Many weaknesses have come to light everywhere. I will only call to mind the taking off of the armor plates of the *Iowa*, several faulty gun constructions, which are withheld for publication. And the boilers were probably not free from objections either. But in what navy are such defects not found? It is therefore deserving of sincere praise that the Navy, immediately after the breaking out of hostilities, was ready for service with all the ships in commission and has continued such service successfully for several months. Furthermore, the vessels of the merchant marine which were required for the blockade were fitted out and armed with rapid-fire guns in a very short space of time. This latter circumstance especially might well serve as an example to several other navies.

7. As compared with the United States, Spain has a large regular army. But when we remember that so many colonies have to be defended and that the struggles with the insurgents, which have been going on for years, and the hardships connected therewith, have claimed many victims, the importance of this army shrinks considerably. It should further be remembered that the troops in Cuba and

Puerto Rico are distributed along the coasts for protection and that communications between them and concentration of these troops by railway are possible only in few places. Hence it can hardly be said that the Spanish troops are superior to the American fighting forces as far as strength is concerned. As to their military qualities, the Spanish soldiers are highly thought of everywhere. They are very brave, of great power of endurance, always sober, and extremely frugal. The officers present a good military appearance, but their education is said to be superficial. Their patriotism and readiness to sacrifice themselves can not be questioned. Moreover, officers and men have become inured to warfare through their fights with the insurgents and are acquainted with the difficult topography of the country. Outside of the regular army volunteer regiments have been organized everywhere. To see those people of all conditions and ages devote themselves indefatigably to the duties of their new calling, after their regular day's work is done, can not fail to arouse a feeling of admiration. But, on the other hand, it is questionable whether the volunteers, when it comes to actual fighting, will prove efficient. In the first place, their equipments are very defective, and, besides, their training is not sufficient to fit them for war. It may be stated as a general thing—and this applies to the regular troops as well—that the training is not adapted to war purposes. I witnessed, for instance, a drill of coast artillery where the movements of loading and firing were practiced. Projectiles, cartridges, etc., were lacking at the drill. The guns were not aimed, there was no sighting. That was one day before an actual bombardment occurred at that place. It is very evident that such gun crews can not do very efficient work. In only a few of the coast towns did target practice take place, and then only to a very limited extent. The reason was, as I was told, that ammunition was scarce, as the service ammunition had to be reserved for the enemy. That may be true, but this should have been thought of in time of peace, and this most important preparation for war should not have been deferred to the last minute or omitted altogether.

8. The Spanish navy has never recovered since the beginning of the century, when it was completely annihilated. To illustrate, I will quote Nelson's words after a visit to Cadiz in 1793: "The Dons may know how to build beautiful ships, but they do not know how to procure men. At Cadiz they have in commission four battle ships of the first rank, very beautiful ships, but miserably manned. I am quite certain if the crews of our six boats, who are picked men, had boarded one of these ships, they could have taken it." Mahan, in his work on *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1783 to 1812*, Chapter II, has cited a number of other proofs to show the lack of seamanship on the part of the Spanish. The above-mentioned words of Nelson's are still true. A few handsome ships like the *Almirante Oquendo*, *Vizcaya*, and *Infanta Maria Teresa* have been incorporated into the

Spanish navy, but next to nothing has been done for the training of the personnel. Maneuvers of several fleets together were unknown, and the individual training of officers and men was limited to what is absolutely necessary. Especially as relates to target practice much has been left undone. The same thing applies to the torpedo-boat destroyers which the Spanish have secured during the last few years. The vessels were very beautiful, but no thought was taken of the manner in which they should be handled by their commanders, nor the training in tactics and torpedo launching. As to the condition of the ships generally, I will state, among other things, that the boilers of three cruisers of the same class, the *Reina Mercedes*, *Alfonso XII*, and *Reina Cristina*, were in such bad condition as to completely disable the vessels, so that they could be utilized only for harbor defense. There are several other points which also show carelessness in the training of the personnel as well as equipment of the ships, and to which I will again refer in the course of this work.

III. BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN DE PUERTO RICO.

9. It was on May 9, 1898, that I had an opportunity for the first time of visiting the scene of war; that was at San Juan de Puerto Rico. The first thing that caught my eye was a proclamation by the Governor-General Macias. As this proclamation shows the enthusiasm and patriotism of which the Spaniard is capable to such a high degree, I give below a translation of the same:

SAN JUAN, April 23, 1898.

INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO:

The day of trial, the hour of great decisions and great deeds of heroism has arrived. The Republic of the United States, trusting in her powerful resources and relying on the impunity with which she has so far been able to foster the insurrection of the Cubans, has resolved in her Congress upon armed intervention in the island of Cuba. The Republic has opened hostilities and has trampled under foot the rights of Spain and the moral sentiment of the whole civilized world. This is a declaration of war, and in the same manner that the hostile squadrons have commenced their actions against the island of Cuba they will also direct them against Puerto Rico; but here they will surely be shattered against the loyalty and valor of the inhabitants, who would a thousand times rather die than surrender to the usurpers.

Do not think that the mother country has abandoned us. With enthusiasm she is following our movements and will come to our rescue. The squadrons are ready for the fight. All the troops have been armed, and the same waters over which Columbus sailed with his famous ships will witness our victories. Providence will not permit that in these countries which were discovered by the Spanish nation the echo of our language should ever cease to be heard, nor that our flag should disappear from before the eye.

Inhabitants of Puerto Rico, the time for heroic deeds has come. Fight and stand firm in the consciousness of your right and of justice. On to the war!

Long live Puerto Rico, always Spanish! Long live Spain!

MACIAS.

It seems to me that more beautiful and more eloquent words could hardly be found to speak to the hearts of the people. And unless

the actions and deeds of the leaders fall far short of their words, the American invasion may be prepared to meet with strong resistance.

10. The city of San Juan is located on an island, and presents from the sea a very pretty picture with her ancient castle of Morro on one side and San Cristobal Castle on the other. The forts are powerful masonry structures. Between them rise many stately buildings, mostly barracks, hospitals, etc. The Spanish flag is waving from all the buildings, and lends a picturesque charm to the whole scene in the wonderfully bright light, with chains of mountains as a background.

Besides the old forts there are a number of new fortifications, east of Cristobal Castle as well as in the entrance of the harbor itself. The latter, which is difficult to pass even in time of peace, is closed by mines. After passing through the harbor entrance one enters a large basin close behind the city, adapted to receive a large number of ships. There is also a second bay with sufficiently deep water. With the necessary funds the harbor might be greatly improved by dredging, especially by the removal of at least a part of the shoals at Punta Larga. There are quite a number of piers offering good facilities for loading and unloading ships.

11. In consequence of the breaking out of the war with the United States commerce was, of course, at a standstill. Yet as the harbor had not been declared blockaded there were a few German and English steamers that were unloading their cargoes. A Spanish steamer also had been brought in from St. Thomas by the auxiliary cruiser *Alfonso XIII*. The only vessel that behaved in a suspicious manner, having apparently passed around the whole island several times and repeatedly appeared in front of San Juan, was a large ocean steamer with three smokepipes. The general opinion was that it was a United States auxiliary cruiser. The Spanish gunboats tried several times to go close up to this vessel but did not succeed, owing to her superior speed. Nothing else in the city reminded one of war. Every one was pursuing his accustomed occupations as far as this was possible under the circumstances. Almost every evening after the close of business at 5 o'clock the volunteer companies marched through the streets to the place where they were drilled. There was not much done in that line, however, at least nothing of great importance, such as target practice, instruction in topography, or field service. Usually the troops were required to take their positions in the line of defense, and soon after they would march off again. On the whole, the volunteers made a good appearance and seemed to devote themselves with great zeal to their tasks. The large number of young men among the volunteers was striking. On one occasion the Governor-General made a general inspection of the whole fortification, and at that time exercises took place with several batteries. But the exercises were carried out in a careless manner and without system. Target practice with guns, which would have been necessary above all in order to place the fortification in condition for war and to drill the person-



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This fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date.

nel, was held neither in peace nor after the breaking out of the war. In the evening the whole population would usually repair to the plaza; several times during the week there was music there. The theater also remained open and enjoyed pretty good audiences.

12. This peaceful situation was suddenly changed when, on May 12, 1898, a part of the fleet commanded by Admiral Sampson appeared at 5 o'clock in the morning in front of San Juan, and without any further notification opened the bombardment. The Spanish complained bitterly of this surprise, which did not give them a chance to remove the sick and the women and children to places of safety, and did not give foreign representatives and warships time to leave the city or the harbor. "There are no international agreements, it is true, as to previous notice of a bombardment," says the Puerto Rico Gazette, "but in practice the custom prevails among all civilized nations to give notice of the bombardment of a city or fortification. For no Christian soldier, no civilized nation, will want to take the terrible responsibility of butchering defenseless women and children. The soldier fights against those who carry weapons, but not against the weak and the sick." The Spanish are not entirely wrong in this. A real surprise could have been of advantage to Admiral Sampson only in case it had been his intention to force the harbor. If it was simply a question of reconnoissance, he might have granted a delay of two or three hours without in any manner prejudicing the result of the bombardment. As it was, the inhabitants were rudely awakened from their sleep. The troops and volunteers at once hurried to their posts; but old men, women, and children sought their safety in the fields and roads outside of the city. A veritable emigration of fleeing people was moving along the road to Cangrejos, but all were quiet and orderly. Meanwhile the American projectiles were steadily falling upon the city and its vicinity; some passed over the city and fell into the bay.

13. The American squadron was composed of nine larger ships and two torpedo-boat destroyers. Fire was opened immediately after 5 o'clock and continued until about 8.30. Four of the American ships were about two cable lengths (370 meters) north of the island of Cabras (see accompanying chart), and at equal distances from each other they were describing circles. In order to safely avoid the shallow places near the island, which they passed at a short distance, a boat had been anchored in the center of the circle. They came to within 1,500 meters of the Morro, and as each ship passed the castle she fired a broadside. Five of the American ships were fighting farther north with Cristobal Castle and the eastern batteries of Morro Castle. These ships often changed their positions. Two more ships could be discerned northeast of Santiago. Several of the American ships succeeded in passing so close to the fortifications that the nearest batteries could not fire upon them. The distance was probably 800 or 900 meters. The Spanish infantry took advantage of the opportunity to join in the battle with musket fire. This musket fire,

in connection with the fire of a battery at a greater distance, caused the American ships to withdraw. It is said that the Americans fired in all from 800 to 1,000 shots from their heavy and medium caliber guns.


14. The Spanish fortification artillery is said to have behaved well; but the batteries were unable to answer the lively fire of the American ships in the same manner. This was due to the fact, aside from the defective service of the guns, that many of them could not reach the American ships at all. On the Spanish side about 400 projectiles were fired in all. It is stated that the Spanish shots hit in several instances; but they can have done no great damage on board of the American ships, which has been confirmed by United States official statements. The guns in the fortifications are all of medium caliber, and their piercing power is not such that a single hit could be expected to cause serious injury to a modern ship. The losses on the American side were one dead and seven wounded. The number of American projectiles fired is out of proportion to the material damage caused by them. A large number of shells are said not to have exploded. Of course the fortification works were injured to some extent, but not one of the guns was put out of action. A few of the buildings visible at a great distance, like the barracks, the jail, the Hotel Inglaterra, and a few private residences, suffered from the bombardment. A large number of projectiles fell into the harbor. Some of them even reached the little town of Cataño, on the other side of the harbor. The French cruiser *Amiral Rigault de Genouilly*, which was lying in the harbor at the time, as also three small Spanish gunboats, received a shot in the rigging and smokepipe. The Spanish casualties were 20 dead (among them several civilians) and 20 wounded.

15. If we inquire into the advantages which Admiral Sampson expected from a bombardment of San Juan, we are probably not mistaken in the assumption that it was merely a question of reconnoissance. The batteries were to be brought out; Admiral Sampson wanted to ascertain their strength and efficiency and be guided thereby in determining the forces it would require for a serious bombardment of San Juan and the taking of the city by sea. It does not appear to have been the object of the American ships to systematically bombard the city and silence the batteries. Probably the forts served as a general target, and the number of shots that went beyond speak in favor of the assumption that it was also intended to reach the Spanish war ships which were supposed to be in the harbor. There will be other opportunities to treat of bombardments by American ships. I will therefore refrain from further remarks at this time, and only state it as my opinion that a reconnoissance of the place—and there can be no question of anything else, since the American fleet withdrew—could have been made with a much smaller expenditure of ammunition.



Sketch of the Land Fortifications of Santiago

Scale (approx.)
0 1 2 km.



IV. EVENTS AT AND NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

I will not attempt to give a connected account of all the happenings at and near Santiago and to set forth the reasons which inevitably led to the surrender of that place, but will confine myself to the relation of some circumstances which are not generally known, and which have come under my own observation.

1. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the reasons why the garrisons of Guantanamo, Baracoa, etc., were included in the capitulation of Santiago. The following note of the Spanish chief of the general staff will serve to explain this matter. He says, among other things:

The garrison of Guantanamo, consisting of 7,000 men, had been on half rations since June 15 and since July 1 they had received no rations at all, and had been living on green corn and horse meat. The garrisons of Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo, as well as of the smaller places of Palma Soriano, San Luis, Dos Caminos, Morón, Cristo, and Songo would have been cut off and unable to retreat, and would therefore have been left to the mercy of the enemy, for the nearest place on which they could have fallen back was at least a seven days' march distant. That is the reason why these garrisons were included in the capitulation, and that of Guantanamo was included on account of the absolute lack of provisions. Hence about 10,000 men capitulated without having been at the front at all, simply owing to the peculiar circumstances.

2. In order to give a clear idea of the land fortifications of Santiago, which were considerably exaggerated in the first reports of the battles near the city, I annex a sketch of the same.

There was a line of ordinary trenches about 9 kilometers long from Dos Caminos del Cobre to Punta Blanca. I also noticed two batteries, but they were in such unfavorable positions that they could not take part in the battles of July 1 and 3. There were also wire fences and other obstructions in some places, as well as blockhouses, etc. The following data will show how few were the guns and of how inferior quality the material which the Spanish had at their disposal for the defense of the city. There were available—

Six 16-centimeter muzzle-loading guns, two of which became disabled after the first few shots, two more on July 12. It was known beforehand that these guns would not be able to fire more than a few rounds, owing to their defective mounts.

Five 12-centimeter muzzle-loading guns mounted on old carriages. On July 12 four of these were disabled, and the fifth was good for only two or three more rounds, although the charge had been reduced by one-half.

Twelve 8-centimeter muzzle-loaders, six of which were unserviceable.

Two 9-centimeter Krupp guns, one of which was dismantled and consequently disabled on July 2.

Two 7.5-centimeter Krupp guns.

Besides these, the fleet had furnished two 9-centimeter Hontoria steel guns with a few rounds, which were not fired, and two 7.5-centimeter Maxim guns, which could not be mounted, because the breech mechanism had remained on board of the ships.

Therefore, aside from the muzzle-loaders, which were of very doubtful value, the Spanish had only two 7.5-centimeter and two 9-centimeter Krupp guns. Whether the former were given a chance to be fired at all is doubtful; probably the two 9-centimeter guns were the only ones that took part in the battles of July 1 and 3. It is evident that with such defective artillery for the defense on land there was no chance in a fight with the American siege artillery, which by July 10, according to statements of American officers, consisted of 34 guns that had been installed.

3. As to the strength of the Spanish troops in the line of attack, we have the following data:

On July 1 there were in the trenches 500 sailors from the fleet; 450 men of four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico, No. 1; 850 of the Talavera Battalion, No. 4; 440 of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11; 350 of three mobilized companies; 350 volunteers. In all—Sailors, 500; regulars, 1,740; irregulars, 350; volunteers, 350; total, 2,940.

These were the fighting forces. Besides, there were in the city some cavalry of the Civil Guard and some soldiers who had been assigned to other duties. Of these troops, two companies, one of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico and one of the Talavera Battalion, in all not over 250 men, were defending the fortified position of San Juan. At the Socapa there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at Punta Gorda battery. Finally, for the defense of the line from Las Cruces to Aguadores, about 4 kilometers, there were six companies of the Cuba regiment of infantry and two companies of irregulars, in all about 550 men.

4. The battles of July 1 and 3 at El Caney and San Juan are the only ones of importance in the campaign against Santiago. The above figures show that those two positions had very inadequate forces for their defense. It is incomprehensible why the Spanish commander in chief, after the American troops had arrived and their plan of attack was known, did not at least have the troops from Morro Castle and the Socapa, where they were of no use whatever, cooperate in the defense of the threatened positions in the main line. To hold El Caney and San Juan as against the vastly superior American forces was an impossibility, although the positions were particularly well chosen and the ground very difficult for the assailants. With the same daring with which the American troops made the last assault on these positions, the Spanish defended them firmly and with coolness, firing one volley after another. On the spot they were to

defend, officers and men fell in great numbers, with that courage which has ever distinguished the Spanish soldiers. When the Americans finally succeeded in the assault, they found the trenches of San Juan filled with dead, and they buried the brave Spanish soldiers where they had fallen by simply filling up the trenches with earth. The total losses of the Spanish during the defense of El Caney and the attack on the city were:

Killed—Brig. Gen. Vara del Rey, 3 staff officers, 12 officers, and 68 men. Missing—Col. Jose Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. Prisoners—2 officers. Wounded—Lieutenant-General Linares, 6 staff officers, 30 officers, and 339 men.

On July 4 Colonel Escario succeeded in reaching Santiago with 3,000 men. But these troops were exhausted from the march, and the city had no provisions for them. It was therefore no wonder that the power of resistance of the garrison was not strengthened by their arrival, and that the Spanish, in view of the bombardment which they could not answer, had no recourse left but to capitulate honorably.

5. An unlucky star was hovering over Santiago. No one had expected an attack on this city, and the events there are another proof that in war it is the unexpected and surprising operations, if well planned and somewhat favored by luck, that usually promise success. The Spanish troops were surely not wanting in bravery and good behavior. The cause of the defeat must therefore be sought elsewhere, and in my opinion it can be explained as follows:

(a) No thought had been taken of supplying the large cities with provisions. If not sooner, at least immediately after the breaking out of the war, the commander in chief ought to have assisted these places in the most energetic manner in laying in supplies, and where no blockade had been declared it could have been done.

(b) It was the plan of the Spanish commander to defend the whole coast, even the smaller harbors. This necessitated a scattering of the troops. If it was not deemed expedient to concentrate all the troops at Havana, the one truly fortified place, which maneuver would have completely changed the character of the war in Cuba, a concentration of the troops should have been effected at least within the eastern province as well as the western province. Why was it that Guantanamo was garrisoned by about 7,000 men, Santiago de Cuba by 5,000, and Manzanillo by 5,000, and that at a time when Cervera's fleet had already entered Santiago Harbor? On May 28 at the latest, when the fleet had been closed in and there could no longer be any doubt as to the American plans, the troops should have been concentrated at Santiago, bringing with them all available provisions. The Americans might have taken Guantanamo and Manzanillo. That would have been of little importance from a technical point of view. The American troops would have met with energetic resistance upon

landing and in their attack upon Santiago, and it is questionable whether they would have been able to break such resistance with 17,000 men.

(c) The Spanish troops had no field artillery, and their siege artillery was utterly unserviceable. It is due to this lack of artillery that the Americans were enabled to line up their forces without opposition from the Spanish: that they showed themselves superior to the Spanish, not in number only, in the fights against the fortified positions at El Caney and San Juan: and finally, that they were able to place their siege artillery in position without being harassed by the Spanish.

6. It now remains to speak of the manner in which the navy and army of both belligerent parties cooperated in joint operations, and finally, to examine minutely into the bombardments of the batteries of Morro Castle, the Socapa, and Punta Gorda. The destruction of Cervera's fleet will be treated in a separate chapter. Of course, in expeditions of this nature it is always the navy that furnishes the basis. If the control of the sea has been gained, but can not be preserved, the transport and landing of troops are dangerous enterprises, which a wise commander will always avoid. Success is also dependent on a strong and well-equipped transport and war fleet. This should be borne in mind by all nations that are engaged in colonial politics and are in possession of colonies, in order to secure new markets for the surplus production of men and merchandise. Of course the army, as the organ which is to execute the work, should be equal to the requirements made of it in a foreign country. But there is still another factor which plays an important part in such expeditions, and which should not be underestimated, and that is the cooperation of the navy and army. This factor has been lacking, not only on the American but also on the Spanish side. On the American side there was at least some agreement on important tactical questions and the navy placed itself willingly at the service of the army. But on the Spanish side the conditions were so peculiar that a cooperation of navy and army can hardly be spoken of, except in so far as marine troops took part in the battles at Santiago. Was Admiral Cervera under orders of General Linares or General Toral, or under Captain-General Blanco, or directly under the ministry of marine at Madrid? The first does not appear to have been the case, but it seems that Admiral Cervera received orders both from General Blanco and from the ministry of marine. Another example: The general de marina at San Juan de Puerto Rico was in command of the flotilla at that place; he was not under orders of Governor-General Macias, however, but under those of Admiral Manterola, at Havana. I believe this question, which has hitherto been given little attention, had an essential share in sealing Admiral Cervera's fate. The cooperation of the navy and army is of the greatest importance, and at the great maneuvers in time of peace it should receive the same attention that other problems do.

7. The American fleet has in every respect performed its tasks in front of Santiago. The transport fleet was conveyed to the places chosen by war ships, and the landings were effected under the same protection. A systematic blockade had been established, and in this connection the main object, namely, the destruction of Cervera's fleet, was never lost sight of. Thanks to the intelligent dispositions of the commander in chief of the fleet and the skill of the American officers and crews, this object was attained with complete success. Incidentally the batteries of the Morro, Socapa, and Punta Gorda were bombarded by the American fleet, and these bombardments offer so much that is of interest and so many points of discussion for naval officers that I shall have to speak of them somewhat more at length. How much has been said of these bombardments! How many times have the batteries of the Morro and Socapa been placed out of action, the guns dismantled, the fortifications leveled to the ground! Batteries which did not even exist, as, for instance, Morro Castle proper and Estrella Battery, were said to have returned the galling fire, the latter completely destroyed, the former nothing but a heap of ruins! Such were the newspaper reports, of the inaccuracy of which I had an opportunity of convincing myself personally on the scene of events. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to state which of the American ships did the firing, nor how many projectiles were discharged in the different bombardments, nor the kind of projectiles and the results as to hits. But on the other hand I can give from personal observation accurate statements as to the condition of the Spanish batteries after the surrender of Santiago, and as my own observations have been supplemented by reliable information from others who were also on the scene, I am enabled to furnish sufficient material to permit an estimate of the actual conditions.

8. On the different days when the bombardments took place the following guns were available in the different batteries of the Morro, Socapa, and Punta Gorda:

Bombardment.	Date.	Morro.	Socapa.	Punta Gorda.
No. 1.....	May 18	One 16 cm. muzzle-loader mounted on a wooden carriage; could fire only 3 shots.	Two 8 cm. muzzle-loaders.	Two 15 cm. Hontoria howitzers, muzzle-loaders.
No. 2.....	May 31	Same and four 16 cm. muzzle-loaders mounted on carriages.	One 16 cm. Hontoria naval gun not yet ready for service.	Do.
No. 3.....	June 3do.....	One 16 cm. Hontoria...	Do.
No. 4.....	June 6do.....	Same and one 16 cm. Hontoria naval gun.	Same and one 16 cm. Hontoria naval gun.
No. 5.....	June 14do.....do.....	Do.
No. 6.....	June 16do.....do.....	Same and one 16 cm. Hontoria naval gun.
No. 7.....	June 18do.....	Same and two 21 cm. muzzle-loading howitzers.	Do.
No. 8.....	July 2	Same and two 21 cm. muzzle-loading howitzers.	Same and one 21 cm. muzzle-loading howitzer.	Do.

Hence, on July 2 there were in all—

In the Morro battery: Five rifled 16-centimeter muzzle-loading bronze guns, only one of which was dismantled, and two 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers which were fired on that day only.

At the Socapa battery: Two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns from the *Reina Mercedes*. Only one of these was dismantled. Further, three 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers. East of this battery, on the extreme edge of the shore, there were for the defense of the first row of mines, one 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-firing gun, four 3.7-centimeter Hotchkiss revolving guns, and one 1.1-centimeter Nordenfeldt machine gun, all taken from the *Reina Mercedes*.

At Punta Gorda: Two 9-centimeter bronze Krupp guns, two 15-centimeter howitzers, and two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns from the *Reina Mercedes*.


9. About three weeks after the surrender of Santiago, I visited these batteries and made the following observations:

MORRO.

(a) Morro Castle proper, an old fort, consisting of heavy masonry standing close to the water's edge east of the harbor entrance, was not armed at all. It was used as barracks for the Spanish garrison. The outside walls had suffered considerably from the bombardments, the upper story had been completely destroyed, and in different places pieces had been shot away. The inner walls showed large and small shot-holes made by shells of different calibers, the largest of 30 centimeters.


(b) From the houses between the castle and the light-house, about 200 meters distant, nothing had been removed. Some of them had been completely destroyed, others more or less damaged. The houses situated a little farther back and lower down had suffered no injuries. The light-house, built of iron plates about 2.5 centimeters thick, had been pierced at the front by several small-caliber shells, the largest being of 15 centimeters. The rear wall had been blown out entirely.

(c) About 100 meters east of the light-house is the new battery, situated about 63 meters above the level of the sea. The following is a ground plan of this battery:



The guns are standing on concrete foundations built into the ground and fire over a wall erected for protection in front of them, consisting

of wooden boxes filled with cement. This protection is further strengthened by sandbags placed in front of it. Between each two guns wooden barrels filled with cement have been placed on top of the wall. The spaces between them are partly filled with cement or sand. The cross section between two foundations is about as follows:



a, Cement boxes; b, barrels filled with cement; c, sandbags.

The distance between each two guns is about 6 meters.

(d) Parallel with the front of the battery, at a distance of about 10 meters, a trench 1.5 meters deep and 60 centimeters wide has been dug. A smaller trench leads in zigzag line from each gun to this trench. For the two 21-centimeter howitzers, which were located farthest east and separated by a larger space from the 16-centimeter muzzle-loaders, there was a hole about 1.5 meters deep and 4 meters square, intended as a shelter. These shelters are said to have been frequently used by the Spanish.

(e) The five 16-centimeter muzzle-loaders are bronze guns dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One of these bore the dates 1668, 1718, 1769. About the middle of the present century these guns were adapted for centering by means of studs. The two 21-centimeter howitzers farthest east were rifled iron muzzle-loaders.

(f) All of these seven guns were mounted on iron sliding carriages with front pivots, turning on rails built into the concrete. As recoil checks, small iron plates were used which, at the rear of the top carriage, were pressed firmly against the compressor bars by means of an ordinary pivot screw. For indirect elevation of the guns there was an ordinary graduated disk with a hand. There was no sight scale on the graduated arc of the carriage. All the guns were adapted to be trained directly. When the Americans took possession of the battery they did not find any tangent scales, but the American chief of the battery stated that they had been there.

(g) Near some of the guns cartridges were lying about. A few feet west of the right-wing gun and a little to the rear was an uncovered pile of projectiles for the 16-centimeter guns. They were iron projectiles, with centering studs. The point, which was spherical in shape, contained a perforation for the fuse which had been stopped up with cotton waste. The fuses themselves could not be found. Near this pile of projectiles stood several cartridge boxes. Judging from the cartridge-bag material lying about and the powder scattered around it may be assumed that the cartridges were being made right there.

(h) In the battery itself only minor injuries could be noted. The right-wing gun had been upset by a shell, but none of the other guns nor the cement protection had received any injuries. A few projectiles had struck into the ground in front of the sand bags and destroyed a few of them. Back of the battery was lying an American 20-centimeter shell, which had not been exploded. The base fuse had been removed.

SOCAPA.

(i) The new battery erected here is located, like that at the Morro, on the highest point of the ridge, about 400 meters west of the entrance.

(k) The five guns installed here are in a straight line—the three 21-centimeter howitzers in the left wing and the two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns in the right wing. The composition of the battery is about the same as that at the Morro, except that there are no barrels on top of the cement boxes at the 16-centimeter guns, probably so as not to restrict the arc of fire of these guns and because they are protected by a 3-centimeter shield. Immediately back of the guns is a trench of little depth connecting the gun positions with each other. The 16-centimeter guns are separated from the howitzers by a broad traverse.

(l) The 21-centimeter howitzers are like those at the Morro. The two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns were taken from the *Reina Mercedes*. They are long guns of modern construction on central pivot mounts, but not rapid-fire guns. The pivot sockets are built into the concrete foundation. These guns could probably not be fired oftener than once in two minutes.

(m) About 20 meters back of the guns was a frame house with sheet-iron roof, built partly into the ground, and protected toward the sea by a small embankment of earth. This was an ammunition magazine for the battery. It still contained a number of 16-centimeter projectiles with the necessary cartridges and powder boxes. The place was little suitable for an ammunition magazine, and it is a wonder that it was not hit.

(n) Evidently the Americans fired more sharply at this battery than at the Morro battery, probably because it contained the only modern guns whose effects were to be feared.

One of the howitzers had received a hit of small caliber in the left side of the top carriage, but without placing the gun out of action. The shield of one of the 16-centimeter guns had been pierced from below by a 15-centimeter projectile, and the carriage had also been injured, so that the gun became unserviceable. No other damages are noticeable in the guns, but at different places shots had passed immediately in front of the guns and hit the gun protections and sandbags.

PUNTA GORDA BATTERY.

(o) This battery was not fired upon by the Americans, although it took part in the firing on several occasions.

10. According to the above, the final result of the numerous bombardments was but one gun placed out of action in the Morro and one in the Socapa battery. The loss in human life was a few killed and wounded. Punta Gorda battery, the only important position in a question of forcing the harbor entrance, remained uninjured. As I have already said, I am unable to state the total number of projectiles which the American ships fired in order to attain this modest result. In any event, the number is out of proportion to the result, and has proved once more a fact well established by the history of naval wars, namely, that coast fortifications are extremely difficult to place out of action, even with an expenditure of large quantities of ammunition. The American method of firing may perhaps be susceptible of improvement—that is not for me to say. But the American naval officers may take comfort in the thought that other seafaring nations would not have done any better in their place—perhaps not so well; for no navy, with the exception of the French, has made it a point in time of peace to make the bombardment of coast fortifications, fortified cities, etc., the subject of thorough, practical study.

11. As for the fire of the Spanish batteries, I have read of but one case where a Spanish projectile hit an American ship. It was in a fight with the Socapa battery that the battleship *Texas* received a hit, probably from one of the 16-centimeter guns taken from the *Reina Mercedes*. The projectile struck the port side about 20 feet abaft the bow and exploded, after passing through a stanchion between decks killing one man and wounding six. The American officer who took charge of the battery at Morro Castle also told me the following amusing incident: There was a bombardment of the Morro battery at night, and one of the American ships was throwing her search light on the battery. The Spanish answered the fire part of the time. The ship with the search light was not hit, but the battleship *Iowa*, lying quite a distance away in the dark, was unexpectedly struck by an accidental hit from one of the Spanish howitzers. The projectile passed through the deck, entered the officers' mess-room, exploded there, and caused some minor damages to the rooms; but none of the crew were hit. But what more could be expected of the kind of guns the Spanish had at their disposal? It must surely have given the American officers who took charge of the battery a slight shock when they saw the dates 1668, 1718, etc., on the guns which they had been fighting. Part of the mediæval howitzers still had charges in them when the American officer took possession of the Morro battery. He therefore decided to fire them, which gave him an opportunity of establishing the fact that even with the greatest elevation the range was

only 800 yards! It is possible that the cartridges had suffered from humidity; but, on the other hand, it is quite as probable that this was really their greatest range. One thousand meters was not a bad performance for guns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. No wonder that the Spanish could not reach the hostile ships with these guns! This will also explain why the Spanish garrisons, seeing the uselessness of their efforts, often stopped firing during the bombardments and withdrew to the trenches. It was on these occasions that the newspaper reports stated that the batteries had been silenced, when, as a matter of fact, they were uninjured and in condition to resume their "unbloody work" at any time.

12. But now another question. Did the American fleet really allow itself to be deceived by these batteries? In the beginning, perhaps. And why not? I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I had the same experience, together with several other officers. When we inquired into the nature of the batteries, we had no idea of the venerable age of those guns, but set them down as 12 and 16 centimeter guns. It is true that we did not go through a fight with the batteries, and that is the essential factor for estimating their efficiency. From observations made at the Spanish batteries I judge, as already stated, that the Socapa battery was the main objective of the Americans. They seem to have known that the only serviceable guns, namely, the 16-centimeter Hontoria guns from the *Reina Mercedes*, had been set up there; but Morro battery, too, was fired upon quite a number of times. Would the Americans have done this if they had known what miserable guns their enemies had? Hardly. So there can be no doubt that in the beginning at least the Americans were deceived as to the strength of the foe, whom they overestimated, as is usually the case in war. Moreover, there was no occasion for the American commander of the fleet, even if the Spanish batteries had been recognized as efficient and dangerous, to attack them under prevailing circumstances. If the harbor entrance was to be forced, neither the Morro nor the Socapa battery need have been considered, because they could not sweep the narrow entrance with their guns. The Punta Gorda battery was the only one that controlled the entrance, and owing to the great distance and the difficulty of observing the fire, it was almost impossible to place this battery out of action from the sea. Then, why the bombardments of the batteries and the immense expenditure of ammunition, especially since the American commander in chief did not intend to force the entrance, but on the contrary was desirous of obstructing it, as is plainly shown by Hobson's attempt? A simple blockade, without any further attack on the fortifications, would have had exactly the same result. I can not possibly believe that the American commander in chief had nothing more in view than to harass the enemy by the numerous bombardments and reassure the home press. My idea is that Admiral Sampson, as a practical and

experienced gunner, had a very definite object in view in these bombardments. I have no proofs to offer in support of this assumption, but I have an idea that there is something in it. After the batteries had been brought out all the subsequent bombardments were nothing more or less than target practice. The admiral wanted to accustom his officers and men to sharp firing. The whole crews were made to practice at regular intervals—the commanders in the manner of handling their ships, the officers in conducting and superintending the firing, the gun captains in training and aiming, the gun and ammunition crews in serving the guns and passing the ammunition, and all these under conditions of actual war, in fights with coast batteries. When the decisive day arrived—the battle on the high sea, ship against ship—the American fleet was well prepared and able to achieve its task in a brilliant manner and in the shortest possible time.

13. Whether I am right or wrong in this assumption, whether it was a question of actual bombardments or of target practice, the final result remains the same. Even at target practice each one fires as well as he can. Therefore we are still confronted with the fact that the coast fortifications, in spite of vastly superior naval artillery and the expenditure of immense quantities of ammunition, were not placed out of action. What lessons are we to derive from this?

Aside from the forcing of harbor entrances, where the assailant must eventually expose himself for a short time to the hostile fire, cases may arise in war where it becomes necessary prior to such forcing, or for other reasons, to destroy certain forts. The history of war teaches us that this is one of the most difficult problems. It should therefore be made a subject of study in time of peace, the same as any other problem. Of the necessity of studying tactics and strategy and their practical application, everyone is convinced, from the commander in chief to the youngest lieutenant. Immense sums are being expended for coal alone in order to have the ships of the fleet pass through all manner of evolutions in tactics and strategic maneuvers. Money should also be devoted to target practice under exactly the same conditions as in actual war. For what is it that decides a naval battle? The tactics of the commander in chief of the fleet and the commanders of the different ships are certainly of some influence on the battle, but nothing more. The decision will always be dependent on the good training of officers and men for the fight and the good firing of gun captains and officers. That is what the naval battle of Santiago has once more plainly demonstrated.

V. THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND CIENFUEGOS.

1. Immediately after the rejection of the Union's ultimatum by Spain, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two nations, Havana was blockaded, and later Cienfuegos.

On our way to Havana, about the middle of May, we met in the Yucatan Channel the first American war ships. They were a cruiser of the *Raleigh* class and a torpedo cruiser. The former, painted dark gray and stripped for service, having only a signal yard at the fore-topmast, being in all other respects cleared for action, made a good appearance. A large number of the crew were standing on the upper deck and near the guns, curiously eying the foreigner who had entered the line of blockade. After the exchange of a few signals as to name, place of departure, and destination, we resumed our course for Havana. The next morning (May 17), through the veil of mist covering the shore, we had a first glimpse of the mountain at Mariel, which, by its peculiar shape, affords the sailor an excellent point of bearing. A heavy fog was still enveloping Havana, and was not dispersed until the sun rose higher in the cloudless blue sky. The first object that met our eyes was the old castle of the Morro, with the red and yellow Spanish flag waving proudly in the wind. We could distinguish the high light-house to the left of the entrance, and adjoining it a huge mass of stone walls and fortifications. Havana from the sea forms a singularly beautiful picture; but this was a time of war, and our eyes, after gazing admiringly on the magnificent panorama, turned, as though instinctively guided by the military spirit, to the long rows of fortifications visible close to the shore at the Vedado, indistinctly at first, then more and more sharply. There was much to be seen. During the short moments while we were passing by, we had to observe carefully in order to gain at least an approximate idea of the value and strength of the forts. The whole line of fortifications at the Vedado appeared to have been recently constructed. At Santa Clara and La Reina workmen could be seen strengthening and changing the original batteries. To the left of the harbor entrance, also, we could see two or three newly erected batteries extending as far as Cochima (Cojimar?).

The American blockading vessels remained at a considerable distance and were apparently composed of only a few gunboats of the *Annapolis* class and auxiliary cruisers (small steamers or yachts armed with a few rapid-fire guns). We were slowly approaching the harbor entrance, and with the assistance of a pilot entered the harbor, passing through the mine obstruction and the channel, which was literally lined with guns, though mostly of old designs. Great numbers of people, mostly soldiers and workmen, were crowding both sides of the entrance. Silently they were staring at our ship, and the same dismal silence also prevailed in the harbor itself. The beautiful wharves for loading and unloading steamers were empty. Only a number of workmen out of employment were sitting or lying around. A few boats were moving about in the harbor. All the others, as well as the larger sailing vessels which in time of peace are engaged in coasting trade, were at anchor in the inner harbor. The coal

depots at the other side of the harbor contained immense supplies, but at the quays and coaling piers, which are the busiest places in normal times, there was not a single vessel to be seen. Finally, when we entered the harbor proper, we saw a few Spanish warships—the cruiser *Alfonso XII*, torpedo gunboats *Marques de la Ensenada*, *Nueva España*, *Conde de Venadito*, and a number of smaller gunboats. These ships, also painted gray, stripped for service and cleared for action, made at a first glance a very good appearance, especially the large cruiser; but a second glance through glasses sufficed to convince us that the large cruiser, *Alfonso XII*, had no large guns on board, which caused us to infer that on the inside also everything was not as it should be (and, indeed, it appeared subsequently that the boilers were unserviceable). Close to the *Alfonso XII* the wreck of the *Maine* could be seen above the water, furnishing the key, so to speak, to the strange changes which Havana had undergone in such a short time, the warlike preparations of the garrison on the forts outside, the stillness of the harbor, the inactivity of the population, and the appearance of the Spanish warships cleared for action.

2. A walk through the streets of the city revealed the usual everyday life. Of course the traffic was not as great as in time of peace. The wealthier families—Cubans and Spaniards as well as foreigners—had left Havana in large numbers. Many beautiful houses, the former residences of these families, were now standing empty. Beggars were lying about in front of the church doors and in the main streets, among them women with half-starved little children, but not in very large numbers. Many a coin was dropped into their outstretched hands by the passers-by; but there was nothing to indicate at that time that the blockade had entailed serious results for the poorer population. Many stores in the principal streets were open, but in the majority of cases the clerks were taking it easy, either in the store or in front of it. The restaurants and cafes, on the contrary, were enjoying good patronage. The prices, of course, were higher than usual, but not extravagant; and for good pay, good dinners could be had in these restaurants. Meat was, on an average, 1.50 marks (37 cents) a pound. Eggs were particularly expensive. The general opinion was that there were sufficient provisions in the city to sustain the blockade for some length of time; but what was to become of the poorer class of the population in that event was a problem. At the restaurants the large number of uniforms was striking. They were worn by the volunteers, who were represented at the capital in particularly large numbers. A special guard of honor of volunteers had been ordered for Captain-General Blanco, and they had taken charge of the guard service at the palace. As for the military qualities of these half soldiers, they were probably not of a high character, for proper training and drilling were lacking here as well as

in Puerto Rico. From the city I went to the seashore and took a look at the fortifications, especially Santa Clara and La Reina, and I could not help admiring the energy and zeal of the Spanish. Everywhere the greatest activity prevailed. From early until late work was going on at the fortifications. The old forts were being strengthened by earthworks and heavy guns mounted at Santa Clara. In some of the forts volunteers could be seen practicing at the guns until late at night; other divisions of volunteers had gathered for instruction; feverish activity everywhere, from the private to the officer and Captain-General. The latter frequently visited the forts and inspected personally the progress of the work. But in view of all this energy one may well ask, Was there not too much to be made up that had been neglected in time of peace? It is not possible to make soldiers, especially accurate and cool-headed marksmen, in a few weeks or months. That can only be done by constant practical training under able officers in time of peace.

3. On May 14 the Spanish gunboats *Conde de Venadito* and *Nueva España* had made an attack on the American blockading vessels, and as this is the only instance of initiative on the part of the Spanish ships at Havana, I will give an account of it. The *Conde de Venadito* is one of the older cruisers, of 1,200 tons displacement, launched in 1888, having a speed of 12 knots, armed with four 12-centimeter guns and a few light rapid-fire guns. The *Nueva España* is a torpedo gunboat of 600 tons, armed with two 12-centimeter guns and a few light rapid-fire guns, reputed to have a speed of 18 knots, but in reality she would probably not make more than 14 knots. The 12-centimeter Hontoria guns were installed behind shields. According to the statement of a Spanish officer, these could be fired not oftener than once in five minutes. No target practice had taken place. The *Nueva España* had fired the first shot at an American war ship. Her torpedo armament consists of four Schwartzkopff torpedoes of the older type, with small explosive charge (about 25 kilograms), and two torpedo tubes. No regular exercises in torpedo launching had taken place. Both vessels have a great deal of woodwork. On the forward conning bridge is a saloon with heavy wood wainscoting, tables, chairs, etc., none of which had been removed for the fight. Both ships went out to sea at 5 o'clock p. m., followed at some distance by two small tugs. The blockading line was quite a distance from the shore, and it was about an hour before the engagement commenced. Five American vessels, probably only gunboats and auxiliary cruisers, were soon surrounding the Spanish ships, so that the latter could use their guns on both sides. The vessels approached to within 8 kilometers. A successful hit from the Spanish is said to have caused the American ships to retreat, but owing to the darkness the Spanish ships did not dare follow them, and returned to Havana at 8.30 p. m. without having been hit once. This was not very much of a success, and does

not appear to have raised the spirit of the Spanish; for, even after the harbor flotilla had been reenforced by the cruiser *Infanta Isabel*, it never again attempted an attack on the American ships, either at night or in daytime. That does not speak very highly for the initiative and spirit of enterprise on the part of the Spanish naval officers, especially as the blockading fleet consisted only of gunboats and inferior auxiliary cruisers, which later were reenforced by the large cruiser *San Francisco*. Even the latter might have been successfully attacked at night by the Spanish torpedo boats under able command and with intelligent handling of the torpedo weapon.

4. In order to cut off the supply of provisions from the sea the cities of Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, which are connected with the capital by railway, had been blockaded since the beginning of the war. Several attempts of the United States to land troops at these places were unsuccessful, owing to the inadequate means with which they were undertaken. The Americans therefore confined themselves to a few insignificant bombardments, and finally to the blockade alone. When I arrived at Cienfuegos, on June 11, I did not meet a single American vessel keeping up the blockade, either in Yucatan Channel or in front of Cienfuegos. I have subsequently been told that the American ships would often leave the harbor without any guard and then suddenly reappear at the end of a few days. I infer from this that the Americans did not handle the blockade service very strictly at Cienfuegos. The result was that several steamers were successful in running the blockade. If the Spanish Government had used some energy in securing blockade runners at the beginning of the war, or had encouraged them by premiums, Havana, as well as the other provinces of the island, could have been abundantly supplied with provisions. How little such enterprises were supported by the Spanish Government is shown by the fact that at Cienfuegos, for instance, two large steamers were lying idle during the whole period of the war, while with a little more energy they might have been of the greatest service. Besides Cienfuegos, the waters near the Isle of Pines—the town of Batabano among others—were very favorably situated for blockade runners. From suitable anchoring places in deep water, which are abundant in that vicinity, the cargoes could have been taken ashore by smaller vessels. Of course, all such matters require preparation and decisive action—conditions which did not exist among the Spanish. As a matter of fact, at different times in the course of the war supplies did reach Cuba just in that manner, and that was the reason why the United States saw themselves compelled to extend the blockade from Cape Antonio to Cape Cruz, the whole territory here under discussion.

5. When we arrived at the entrance to Cienfuegos we noticed to the right the ruins of a light-house, which the Americans had fired upon in an unsuccessful attempt at landing. To the left of the harbor

entrance, which was now plainly visible, was a large castle in the usual Spanish style of architecture, standing on an elevation, and below it the town, which, with its white houses hidden among trees, reached down to the water's edge. The houses were mostly one-story high, with porches running all around. Some boats and small steamers were lying at the landing piers. After hoisting the necessary signals and waiting patiently we saw two Spanish gunboats approaching. We could plainly see that they had been cleared for action and were extremely suspicious, for they advanced, but very slowly. Finally, they seemed to come to the conclusion that the white ship with awnings, lying there quietly, without any warlike preparations, could have only a peaceful mission. A boat was lowered, the pilot came on board, and we ran in. The entrance is similar to that at Santiago de Cuba, and quite narrow. There is a bend to the north which makes it difficult for large ships to enter the harbor, because the current coming from several directions is usually very strong at this place, so that a ship turning slowly might easily run aground on the eastern point. Here also the indefatigable activity of the Spanish troops could be noticed. They were working energetically on new batteries, which were armed with field guns. There were mines in the entrance. Works of defense, trenches, etc., had been built in the direction of the castle. The number of regular troops was conspicuous; there appear to have been no volunteers at that place. As we passed, the soldiers stopped in their work to take a look at the ship. At one of the landing piers, at the narrowest place of the entrance, a crowd of people and regular soldiers had gathered. A band on the porch of one of the houses was playing "The Watch on the Rhine," a courtesy extended to the German ship by the Spanish commander. We steamed into the large bay and after passing several small islands and shallow places we saw before us the city of Cienfuegos. The channel is narrow even here; the large bay has many shallow places, and only a narrow passage leads to the city, at which our ship cast anchor some distance from the shore. Nevertheless, the harbor of Cienfuegos is one of the best of the whole island of Cuba, and with the expenditure of the necessary funds a very fine place could be made of it. Outside of Santiago, whose commerce, owing to the inaccessibility of the country back of it, will probably never be developed to any great extent, Cienfuegos is the only good harbor on the southern coast, and has therefore probably a great future. It is also to be noted that the largest sugar factories of Cuba, which are mostly operated by American capital, are in the vicinity of Cienfuegos.

6. The small Spanish gunboats lying in the harbor were doing guard service at the entrance, relieving each other every day. Besides these the torpedo-boat cruiser *Galicia* was in the harbor. An unlucky star seems to have been over this vessel. At first it was stated that she was to be docked in order to make repairs. Afterwards she was again

pronounced seaworthy; but the fact is that she never left the harbor during the whole period of the war. There was no lack of provisions noticeable in the city. The Spanish Government had bought up the provisions and set selling prices on them. For instance, a pound of beef was only 80 pfennigs (20 cents)—certainly a low price considering that the blockade had already lasted two months. On June 13 gun fire was heard in the direction of the entrance. The Spanish gunboats went out and had a slight engagement with an American auxiliary cruiser, probably the *Yankee*. The gunboat *Vasco Nuñez de Balboa* was shot through the bow above the water line, and several of the crew were wounded. In other respects the engagement was of no importance. The following day we left Cienfuegos, spoke the American cruiser *Yankee*, which was on blockade service, and after stopping a few days at the Isle of Pines we shaped our course for Havana.

7. In the morning of June 22 we came within sight of the tableland. We kept close to the shore in order to inspect the harbor of Mariel and to see how far the American blockading line extended. It was not long before the blockading ships, among them the gunboat *Wilmington*, which was lying close to Mariel, came in sight. There was the usual exchange of signals. A heavy thunderstorm was threatening. Morro Castle, which had been visible in indistinct outlines, disappeared behind a dark cloud. The storm came up rapidly. The flashes of lightning followed each other in quick succession, the thunder roared, and the rain was coming down in torrents with a force only possible in the Tropics. The blockading ships had vanished from sight. We could hardly see a ship's length in front of us, and the torrents of rain continued to fall, merging the lines of the sky and the sea. As we had made out Morro Castle before the storm commenced, I had the ship steer for it very slowly. Soon it commenced to clear up in the direction of the land, and while the storm continued to rage on the sea and the whole line of blockade was still enveloped in rain, we entered the harbor with the assistance of the pilot. Involuntarily the thought occurred to me, what an opportunity that would have been for a blockade runner; but the matter is not as simple as it looks. It is true that at this season of the year a heavy thunderstorm, usually about noon or in the afternoon, may be counted upon almost daily. Still the chances of being thus favored are too slim to make it advisable for a ship to attempt to run the blockade in daytime. The only real opportunity is at night. The American blockading fleet consisted of the gunboat *Wilmington*, two gunboats of the *Annapolis* class, one or two monitors and about four auxiliary cruisers, the latter partly small vessels. The ships were distributed over a line about 30 miles long, surrounding the harbor in an arc at a distance of about 120 to 140 kilometers. In my opinion it would not have been difficult for a

fast ship (15 or 16 knots would have been sufficient, since the American blockading vessels, with the exception of a few small cruisers, did not exceed 12 knots) to run the blockade at night. The requirements were that the night should be as dark as possible, the lights on board darkened, and the course shaped straight for the entrance through the middle of the blockading line. As the beacon light was kept burning all the time, there was no difficulty about steering for the entrance. The blockade runner would have had to depend entirely on her speed and maintain her course without regard to hostile projectiles. The firing of guns, including rapid-fire guns, with night sights is so difficult that hits can hardly be counted on unless the distance is very small. To approach the line of blockade by hugging the shore I consider hazardous. The vessel could not have remained entirely hidden, owing to the close formation of the line. There would have been danger, as soon as the alarm signal was given, for the blockade runner to be cut off from Havana by the blockading fleet and forced upon the shore.

8. Since our last visit to Havana, about a month ago, there was hardly any change noticeable in the aspect of the town and the conditions prevailing there. The harbor was empty and deserted. Two steamers, however, could be seen, of rather enterprising appearance, one of them even with two small rapid-fire guns on board. The Spanish war ships were still at anchor at the same place. There were no foreign war ships. Work on the improvement of the fortifications was still going on with the same restless activity. The volunteers continued their drills. Provisions were expensive, but the prices were held down by the Government, so as to prevent excesses on the part of the dealers. The poor were being taken care of as far as possible by the distribution of food in free kitchens and by entertainments for their benefit. The theaters were kept open. On certain days there was music in the public places. The Governor-General did all he could to keep up the spirit of the inhabitants. The rate of sickness and death was said to be hardly higher than usual. The climate at this time of the year is especially unfavorable, because the beneficial effects of the rainy season are not yet felt. Inside of the fortified region the Government had laid down so-called *zonas de cultivo*, which were intended for the raising of vegetables, etc., and were expected to prove of great benefit. One of the chief articles of food consisted of pineapples, which in time of peace are exported in incredible numbers, and which could now be bought in quantities for a fabulously low price.

9. In the forenoon of June 24, I noticed some preparations on board the Spanish steamers *Montevideo* and *San Domingo*, from which I inferred that they were about to put to sea. The time was well chosen. The moon set about 10 o'clock, and at midnight both steamers, with

all lights darkened, passed through the entrance. They were successful in eluding the American ships. I afterwards met the *Montevideo* again at Vera Cruz, with a full cargo, ready to leave the harbor at any moment; but as far as I could ascertain, the steamer, after putting to sea, preferred to return and unload her cargo again. The *San Domingo*, upon her return to Cuba, was captured by American blockading ships and run ashore near the Isle of Pines.

10. We remained at Havana until June 29. We then proceeded to Kingston and from there to Santiago de Cuba and Cienfuegos, casting anchor at the latter place on the evening of July 8. The blockade was now quite strict, as we had an opportunity to find out upon approaching Santa Cruz. At Trinidad we met the American gunboat *Helena*, and at Cienfuegos the cruiser *Detroit*, lying close to the harbor. Nevertheless, the auxiliary cruiser *Reina Maria Cristina*, a large, fast steamer, armed with fourteen 5-centimeter rapid-fire and several revolving guns, had succeeded in entering the harbor of Cienfuegos. Her cargo consisted of dried codfish and ham. Part of the steamer's guns and ammunition were used to reinforce the fortifications. The city itself had not again been harassed by the American ships. Communication with Havana by rail was kept up, though there were frequent delays in the arrival of trains, owing to the lack of fuel. There did not appear to be any great scarcity of provisions. A proclamation by Captain-General Blanco, published in the *Gaceta de la Habana*, apprised the city of the catastrophe of Santiago, which was so disastrous to the Spanish.

The Spanish at Cienfuegos gained an idea that the ships had gone down with all their crews. It was not learned at that time that the ships had been run ashore and that the Americans had taken many prisoners. The heavy blow was borne with comparative equanimity. It was the general opinion that the fate of Santiago was also sealed and that then peace negotiations would be opened.

11. On July 10 the crew of the steamer *Alfonso XII* arrived at Cienfuegos and was transferred to the auxiliary cruiser *Reina Maria Cristina*. The *Alfonso XII* had attempted to run the blockade at Havana, keeping close to the shore, but had been compelled by the American blockading ships to run ashore at Mariel. The majority of the crew was rescued. The cargo was destroyed by the Americans, who fired upon the steamer and set her on fire. In connection with this attempt to run the blockade we seek in vain for an explanation as to why the cruisers, torpedo gunboats, and other vessels in Havana Harbor did not assist the blockade runner. The time of her arrival could have been announced by cable. It then became the duty of the Spanish warships to go out in accordance with a prearranged plan and try to divert the blockading ships. Such a maneuver would not only have raised the moral courage of the garrison, condemned to

demoralizing inactivity, but would in all probability also have been attended with success.

12. We left Cienfuegos on July 12, and after visiting Vera Cruz, again returned to Havana on August 1. The blockading fleet appeared to have drawn closer together, so that there was one ship to every 2 miles. The flag ship *San Francisco* was also seen this time. Few changes were noticeable in the city itself. There was not as yet an actual famine, but the poorer classes were evidently much worse off than they had been on our former visit, for the number of beggars in the streets had increased. Crowds of poor people would come alongside the ships in boats to try to get something to eat. It was a sad sight to look upon those half-starved women and emaciated little children, barely covered with miserable rags, holding out their hands imploringly and asking for alms. Everything floating around in the water was examined by these miserable people. Nothing escaped their eyes. Parings of fruit and other refuse were caught up and sucked out. The suffering was terrible, and we were powerless before it. All could not be helped, but at least a few. This scene was repeated every noon and evening. The crews gave willingly what could be spared, and more than that. Ashore, as already stated, the poor people were being taken care of as far as possible by free kitchens. Since the middle of July about 30,000 rations had been distributed in these kitchens. The health conditions were remarkably good this year. Yellow fever had not yet made its appearance, but there was typhoid fever and dysentery. The sentiment of the population, as well as of the troops, seemed to incline toward peace. A general feeling of listlessness had settled upon them since the capitulation of Santiago. "If the Americans would only attack Havana," the people would say, "they would soon find out what the garrison of the capital is made of. They would get their heads broken quick enough. But Uncle Sam is only beating about the bush. He is not going to swallow the hot morsel and burn his tongue and stomach." No wonder that the Spanish troops, condemned to inactivity, poorly fed, cut off from the whole world, and without any prospect of relief, were anxious for the end to come. And so peace was being talked of everywhere, and there was a persistent rumor that the French ambassador at Washington had been empowered to conduct peace negotiations.

13. After a cruise around Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, upon which I had started at the beginning of August, I returned to Havana for the fourth time on September 3. How different everything looked! The clouds of smoke of the blockading ships were no longer seen on the horizon. That circle of brave vessels, greedy for prey, ready every moment to pounce upon anything that came within their reach, had vanished. Our first glance was for the flag on Morro Castle. The red and yellow colors were still waving there, but there seemed to be an air of sadness and listlessness about them, as though they

were anticipating their fate of having to make way for another flag without having been conquered. The harbor entrance was animated. Many sailing vessels were going in and out. In the harbor itself German, English, and Norwegian steamers were busily engaged in loading and unloading. Alongside the custom-houses there were a number of American and Mexican sailing vessels that had brought food and wine. All the storerooms were filled with provisions of every kind. The city had awakened to new life, business houses were once more open, merchants were again at their work, the streets were full of people; yet there was an air of depression over the whole city. The one thought, what was to become of them now, seemed to have cast a spell over everything. The insurgents were lying close to the city, and many of the inhabitants of Havana went out to visit with friends or to satisfy their curiosity. Will the United States succeed in dispelling the specters it has conjured up? Will Cuba Libre triumph, or will the island be annexed to the Union? These are the questions which are now ever present.

14. As peace is now at hand, there is no reason why a discussion of the fortifications of Havana, which were erected or improved by the Spanish with so much skill, should be kept secret any longer. I will therefore try to give an approximate idea of the same:

(a) The harbor entrance had been made inaccessible by several rows of mines. Along the entrance many guns had been set up which were fired through embrasures from behind thick masonry walls. All these guns were muzzle-loaders of old types. Farther inland there was a torpedo battery—two ordinary launching tubes, which had been temporarily installed on a float without any protection.

(b) The object of the shore fortifications was partly to defend the entrance and partly to prevent landings. During the first few days after the breaking out of the war the Spanish had feared a bombardment of Havana and a landing of American troops at the Vedado, and this fear was well founded, as there was only one fortification on the Vedado, and that not entirely completed. The Americans allowed that opportunity for attacking Havana by surprise to go by without taking advantage of it, because they were themselves by no means prepared for the war and had neither troops nor transports in readiness. By dint of unremitting activity the Spanish were able in the course of the war to place the following works in good condition, part of them having been newly erected:

EAST OF THE ENTRANCE.

Battery No. 1 (permanent): Four 15-centimeter Ordoñez guns; on the wings, two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns.

Battery No. 2 (permanent): Two 30.5-centimeter Krupp guns; four 21-centimeter Ordoñez howitzers; two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns.

Velasco battery (temporary): Three 28-centimeter Krupp guns; three 12-centimeter Hontoria naval guns; one 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire gun.

Between the latter two batteries there were three small temporary batteries, the first of which was armed with two 9-centimeter field guns and the second and third with three 12-centimeter and 15-centimeter guns, respectively.

WEST OF THE ENTRANCE.

La Punta (permanent): Two 15-centimeter Ordoñez guns.

La Reina (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly armed): Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns (from the cruiser *Alfonso XII*); two 25-centimeter muzzle loaders; seven 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers.

Santa Clara (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly armed): Two 30.5-centimeter Ordoñez guns; three 28-centimeter Krupp guns; four 21-centimeter howitzers. On the flank, two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns and three 15-centimeter guns.

Battery No. 3 (permanent): Four 21-centimeter Ordoñez howitzers; two 15-centimeter Ordoñez guns; two 24-centimeter Ordoñez guns.

Battery No. 4 (temporary): Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns (from cruiser *Alfonso XII*); four 15-centimeter Ordoñez guns; two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns.

Besides these, temporary stands had been erected on the west wing for field guns.

(c) The shore fortifications had their bases of support in some of the larger forts, like El Principe and Atares forts, forming the inner belt around the city. An outer belt had also been established at a distance of about 10 kilometers from the city. The fortifications on the outer belt consisted of a large number of infantry sites protected by artificial obstructions, stakes, wire fences, etc. For each two or three of these sites there were more extensive works with gun stands. Thus, all the important points had been connected by one long line of fortifications. The defense of the coast east of battery No. 1 near Cochima (Cojimar?) was surprisingly weak. Batteries Nos. 1 and 2 are trained toward the sea; only one 4.7-centimeter rapid-fire gun covers the flank. The fortifications on this part of the coast consist of only one gun site with two field guns. It would seem as though a landing with a sufficient force of troops, assisted by the fleet, might have had a chance of success. Fortunately for the city the fortifications were not put to a severe test. Aside from a few shots at the beginning of the blockade, about twenty shots were fired at the American cruiser *San Francisco* toward the end of the war, namely, on August 12. The ship did not answer the fire. A Spanish projectile hit the stern of the American cruiser as she was steaming away, but without causing serious damage or loss of human life.

15. In order to show in a comprehensive form the steamers which during the war ran the blockade of Cuba, I give in the following table the names of the steamers and the different harbors they entered, together with their respective cargoes :

Harbor.	Name of ship.	Date.	Cargo.
Cienfuegos	Steamer Montserrat	Apr. 26	War material.
Do.....	Steamer Adula.....	June 17	50 barrels flour, 50 barrels corn, 50 sacks rice, 10 tubs butter, 15 barrels pork, 15 barrels beef, 10 barrels hard tack, 6 sacks beans, 5 sacks pease.
Do.....	Steamer Reina Maria Cristina.	June 22	1,000 boxes bacon, 50 barrels bacon sides, 600 barrels codfish, 200 sacks beans.
Santiago de Cuba <i>a</i> .	Steamer Polaria	May 7	300 sacks barley, 14,000 sacks rice.
Caibarien <i>a</i>	Steamer Alava.....	July 4	2,500 sacks flour, 6 barrels codfish.
Do.....	Steamer Franklin.....	do	2,495 sacks flour, 3,056 sacks corn, 200 sacks spices, 333 sacks potatoes.
Manzanillo	Steamer Anita	<i>b</i> June 18	Small quantities flour, rice, and meat.
Sagua la Grande <i>a</i>	Steamer Fritjol Nansen	July 3	Small quantities potatoes, onions, meat, and rice.
Matanzas.....	Steamer Montserrat	July 29	8,000 sacks rice, 805 sacks beans, 600 sacks pease, 500 sacks flour, 1,399 boxes bacon, 213 boxes codfish, a large quantity of smoked meat, 15 barrels drugs.
Cayo Frances <i>a</i>	Steamer Franklin	July 31	3,495 sacks flour, 1,350 sacks corn, 500 sacks rice, 165 sacks beans.
Batabano	Coast steamer Arturo.....	<i>b</i> June 13	800 sacks corn, 150 sacks flour, 20 sacks pease, 100 sacks beans, 80 cans lard.
Do.....	Coast steamer Sara.....	<i>b</i> June 24	35 boxes flour, 20 half boxes and 2,490 sacks corn.
Do.....	Bark Tres Hermanos.....	<i>b</i> June 20	Beans, flour, and corn.
Do.....	do	July 14	156 tubs bacon, 200 sacks rice, 160 sacks corn, 129 barrels flour, 60 boxes meat, 65 boxes condensed milk.
Do.....	Coast steamer Victoria	July 13	237 sacks corn, 20 sacks pease, 100 sacks flour, 200 sacks beans, 5 sacks lentils, 12 boxes salt meat, 120 cans, 2 barrels, and 4 tubs lard.
Do.....	Steamer Villaverde	<i>b</i> June 23	4,785 sacks flour, pease, coffee, beans, corn, and rice.
Do.....	Brig Bujia.....	July 26	6 barrels lard, 438 sacks rice, 22 sacks beans, 200 sacks flour.
Nuevitass <i>a</i>	Steamer Saffi.....	May 20	125 sacks pease, 95 sacks rice, 185 barrels wine, 650 sacks salt, 50 boxes oil, 5 boxes cheese, garlic, hard-tack, and pepper.
Do.....	Steamer Franklin.....	June 11	2,266 boxes flour, 284 sacks rice, 2,593 sacks beans, 96 sacks spices, 50 sacks pease, 697 sacks corn, 72 sacks coffee.
Do.....	Steamer Chateau Lafitte.....	June 17	50 barrels codfish, 6 barrels soup, 3,885 barrels flour, 9,295 sacks flour, 5,000 sacks rice.
La Isabella (sea- port of Sagua la Grande). <i>a</i>	Steamer Regulus	July 19	6,573 barrels flour, 1,000 sacks wheat, 4,000 sacks corn, 450 boxes canned meat, 1,000 barrels pork, 500 barrels hard-tack, 30 boxes groceries, 1 box quinine.
San Cayetano.....	Steamer Pralrno.....	<i>b</i> Aug. 8	400 sacks flour, 100 sacks rice, 100 sacks beans, 200 sacks corn, 272 tubs lard, 20 baskets garlic, 10 baskets onions.

The above demonstrates once more how difficult it is to maintain a blockade even under the most favorable circumstances, as in this case, where the Spanish navy did not make a single attempt to shake off the blockading ships. I am unable to say what part of the provisions mentioned in the foregoing table went to Havana; probably

a These ports were never declared to be blockaded.

b These ports were not declared to have been blockaded until after these dates.

Only four of the above-mentioned ports were included in the President's proclamation declaring certain ports to be blockaded, viz, Cienfuegos and Matanzas on and after April 22, 1898, and Manzanillo and Batabano on and after June 27, 1898.

Out of the 22 instances given in the table of vessels entering Cuban ports during the war, there were but 9 of these which ran the blockade.

all those that were landed at Batabano, but I have information from reliable sources that on August 12 the military administration of Havana had provisions on hand for three months longer, outside of what the blockade runners had brought into the country and what was hidden away in the houses of the city. One can therefore understand the indignation of Captain General Blanco when he heard that the peace protocol had been signed. But of what use would have been a further resistance on the part of the Spanish garrison? The United States Government only needed to make the blockade more rigid. That would necessarily have sealed the fate of Havana sooner or later. A fortress in the ocean, cut off from its mother country, can be rescued only with the assistance of the navy. The enemy who has control of the sea need only wait patiently until the ripe fruit drops into his lap.

The lessons to be derived from the foregoing are evident and need no further explanation. May our colonies be spared the fate of Havana.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES No. IV.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

SKETCHES

FROM THE

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

BY

COMMANDER J.
(CONCLUDED.)

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN.



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
(CONCLUDED.)

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INTRODUCTORY.

Sketches from the naval battle of Santiago and occupation of Puerto Rico, by Commander Jacobsen, of the German protected cruiser *Geier*, given in this number of the War Notes, are a continuation of Sketches from the Spanish-American War, by the same officer, given in War Notes No. III.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,
Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *March 27, 1899.*

Approved:

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD, *Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,*
Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

hits could not be controlled by the crews, who had lost their heads under the hail of hostile projectiles. All three of the ships present pictures of the most frightful ruin, chiefly due to the explosions and the conflagrations, which did not reach their full intensity until after the ships had been run ashore. All the woodwork and combustible material had been burned. The following will give an idea of the intense heat that must have prevailed:

The iron deck beams and other horizontal iron parts were very much warped; the bearings of the connecting rods had been melted; the iron masts had been partly melted where they pass through the upper deck; the brass frames of the ports between decks had been partly melted, and the ports themselves were found on deck converted into large lumps of glass; parts of the rapid-fire mounts had been melted, the lead in the small caliber and machine-gun projectiles had melted and run out, and the casings had been reduced to ashes.

(c) Besides the conflagrations and subsequent explosions, the ships sustained such severe leaks when running ashore that it will be impossible to float them again, with the exception of the *Maria Teresa*, which is now being attempted to be hauled off.¹

All the masts of the ships had fallen aft and had been hurled to the deck with their tops. Only the mainmast of the *Maria Teresa* was left standing, which is an evidence that she ran ashore at less speed, which is further shown by the fact that she sustained less leaks than the other ships. The mainmast of the *Oquendo* had fallen to starboard and broken in two upon striking the railing and one part gone overboard.

(d) Nothing definite could be ascertained as to the boats that had been on board. There was nothing left but the wrecks of two iron steam launches hanging in the warped and partly broken davits on board of each of the ships.

(e) The engines were probably intact in all of the ships at the time they ran ashore, for they were apparently running at great speed—at least the *Oquendo* and the *Vizcaya*.

The machinery installation on board the ships was about as follows:

α. The two main engines and six main boilers are located in five water-tight compartments below the protective deck. Above them, between decks, and protected by lateral coal bunkers, are two large auxiliary boilers of at least 12 tons capacity, and many auxiliary engines, conspicuous among which is a large and powerful centrifugal bilge pump with a discharge pipe of about 300 mm. diameter. The protective deck, extending from the stem to the after torpedo room, is slightly vaulted forward of the boiler rooms, and pierced above the boiler and engine rooms for the passage of smokestack casings and engine skylight, but is protected at this place by a strong glacis, rising

¹In the meantime the *Maria Teresa* has been floated by American wreckers, but she sank on her way to Norfolk.—ED. "RUNDSCHAU."

at an angle of about 30 degrees from the inner bunker walls. The openings in the engine skylight and smokestack casings were protected by iron gratings. The protection by lateral coal bunkers extended through boiler and engine rooms, reaching to the battery deck, a height of 3.5 meters. Alongside the engine rooms in each of the bunkers to port and starboard forward and starboard aft was a room for engine supplies, while to port aft was a well-equipped workshop, extending nearly to the ship's side. In the workshop was a small 1-cylinder steam engine for driving transmission gear, actuating a turning-lathe, a boring engine, a grindstone, and very strong shears, also five vises. The supply rooms appear to have been well equipped, but everything seems to have been stored in wooden closets and on wooden shelves, for all the tools were found scattered on the floor in wild confusion.

β. There was a surprising number of rough castings, especially of stuffing boxes. Spare parts for the main engines were found suspended in the engine skylight; covers, pistons, and slide-valve faces for low-pressure cylinders on the bulkheads. To the smokestack casings were secured three connecting rods, eccentric rods, etc.

γ. Nothing could be noticed of any provisions having been made for the protection of the machinery installations except the iron gratings. In the *Almirante Oquendo* coal sacks were found near the auxiliary boiler, but their object could not be determined, the boiler room being flooded. The steam pipes above the protective deck do not appear to have been disconnected before the battle. Valves leading to auxiliary engines, which were not used during the fight (such as ash-hoisting machinery, pumps for auxiliary boilers, etc.), were found open. The centrifugal bilge pump above mentioned also appeared to have been in gear. The bulkhead doors above the protective deck were all open. They could not have been opened subsequently, since all the bulkheads had been warped by the heat, but the bolts were intact.

(f) At the time of our inspection nothing could be ascertained regarding the injuries in the engine rooms, because they were all under water almost up to the protective deck. It was learned from an American engineer engaged in the wrecking operations of the *Infanta Maria Teresa* that no dead bodies had been found in the engine and boiler rooms, and hence it is probable that there have been no material injuries to the boilers and steam pipes. All the bunker bulkheads and connecting doors are said to have been open and all the fires of the boilers lighted.

(g) The damages above the protective deck had been caused chiefly by the conflagrations, but also by hits from the enemy's secondary battery. The inadequacy of the lateral protection of the engine rooms was striking. The supply rooms and workshops had been hit a number of times. Shots which entered the coal did not go through. Only one hit was noticed in the auxiliary piping above the protective deck of

the *Infanta Maria Teresa*. The shot had gone clear through the pipe without ripping it open, from which it may be inferred that there was no steam in it at the time.

(h) On the gun and upper decks the smokestack casings had been perforated in several places, also the smokestacks themselves. Apparently no measures had been taken for closing up these shot holes. The electric wiring had been struck in many places. Shot holes were also noticeable in the speaking tubes. It was not possible, owing to the complete destruction by fire, to make any further investigation of the means of communication and command.

(i) The three ships inspected had all their guns on board. The only ones that could not be found were the two 7-centimeter rapid-fire boat guns, but pivots had been provided on both sides of the stern, where these two guns were apparently intended to be installed for use against torpedo boat attacks at night.

(k) From the slight losses which the American ships claim to have sustained, it may be judged that the training of the Spanish gun crews must have been very inadequate. This is not surprising, in view of the statement of one of the Spanish naval officers to the effect that no target practice is held in Spain in time of peace. Other circumstances also give evidence of very inefficient handling of the guns. The turrets and their guns, with the exception of the forward turret of the *Almirante Oquendo*, were found entirely intact. The loading apparatus for the 28-centimeter guns (Whitworth, Manchester, 1895) was of the hydraulic order, and the loading time was about two minutes. The 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns also were probably not used to their best advantage, owing to want of experience. There was evidently no lack of ammunition, for near some of the guns a number of cartridges were found, and some of the guns were still loaded, but had not been fired. To what circumstance it is due that the breechblocks of two of the guns were found lying in the rear of the guns with their pivot bolts torn off, and the projectiles jammed near the muzzle of the tubes could not be explained. Perhaps this may also be attributed to inefficient handling of the projectiles.

(l) Only the port side of the ships was fired upon. The starboard side shows but a few holes, where shots have passed out. Where the course of projectiles could be traced it was usually ranging from port aft to starboard forward. The destructive effect of the American projectiles is mainly due to the conflagrations caused by them. Aside from a shot through one of the turret roofs, no hits were observed in any of the armored turrets. Neither have any projectiles pierced the side armor, which shows no injuries. Only indentations are noticeable in places where projectiles have struck the armor. Projectiles of 15 centimeters and larger calibers that had hit the ship had in many instances gone out through the other side, making holes about 1 meter square, but without bursting. As the same observation has been made in the bombardments of Santiago and San Juan, it may be assumed

that it is due to the uncertain functioning of the base fuse. It is not probable that the Americans used armor-piercing shell, as fragments of projectiles of different sizes found in the vicinity show that explosive shell and not nonexplosive shell were used. Projectiles which had hit smokestacks and masts had gone clear through, making only small, round or oblong shot holes. Hits of small-caliber projectiles (5.7-centimeter) could be noticed in large numbers, and this was corroborated by the statement of an American officer to the effect that they were used in great quantities.

(m) The question whether the Spanish had any intention of making use of the torpedo weapon may probably be answered in the negative. The torpedo armaments of the ships, although including a large number of tubes, were so defective that there could hardly be any chance of success as against the powerful American ships. The armaments consisted of two bow, four broadside, and two stern tubes, all above water and of antiquated design, with large cartridges, band-brakes, etc., all located above the armored deck and entirely unprotected. In a very primitive manner the tubes had been partly protected by grate bars lashed with chains.

(n) The projectiles were 35-centimeter Schwartzkopff torpedoes with large depth-regulating apparatus.

No war-heads were to be found, with a single exception. According to the statement of an American petty officer, the war-heads had been left at Santiago, where they were to be used in connection with the mine obstructions. It is true that this does not agree with the fact that a torpedo head exploded on board the *Almirante Oquendo*. It is possible, however, that the ships retained one or two war-heads to be used in case of necessity as against rams, since the broadside tubes were adapted to be turned in any direction, or perhaps it was the commander's wish to take a war-head along.

(o) The following points support the assumption that it was not the intention to make use of the torpedo weapon:

α. Not one of the tubes still in existence was loaded, and all the tubes were closed. In the tubes destroyed by shots or otherwise no remnants of torpedoes were found.

β. The remaining torpedoes, almost without exception, were lying in their places along the ship's side. No torpedoes were found lying back of the tubes, with the exception of the bow tubes of the *Almirante Oquendo*.

γ. There was no pressure in any of the flasks. This is shown by the fact that the flasks were entirely uninjured, although the heat had partly melted the tailpieces of the torpedoes.

δ. In several of the torpedoes lying on top, the protecting cap for the depth-regulating apparatus had not been taken off, while it is necessary to remove it in order to put on the war heads.

ε. In a few of the torpedoes the sinking valves had been put in place,

but in most of them they were still found soldered, with connecting links raised.

ζ. The tubes for filling the launching cartridges were not connected, and only on the *Almirante Oquendo* was the powder charge in readiness.

A. INFANTA MARIA TERESA.

(p) This was the flagship, and the first one to be beached, about 6 miles from the entrance of Santiago. The ship's bow was lying only a little higher than usual above the water line, the stern a little lower; otherwise upright. She evidently ran ashore at slow speed, for aside from the fact that there were only small leakages in the bottom, no boiler explosion took place, nor was the mainmast thrown down. In other respects also her injuries are much less than those of the other ships. The ammunition rooms appear to have been previously flooded, and therefore did not explode.

(q) This ship shows very few hits from the hostile guns, especially few of small caliber as compared with the others. While all the wood-work has been burned, the same as on the other ships, little damage has been sustained by the ship's hull. The ship has therefore been floated by the Americans.¹ All leaks had been stopped up, the ship pumped out, and then hauled off by steam tugs about 6 feet toward the sea. In this operation she sprang another leak aft and was again filled with water. On the day of our inspection this leak was being stopped up and the water pumped out by means of four steam pumps. Heavy articles, such as anchors, chains, etc., had been transferred to one of the wrecking steamers. While the ship was dry the two forward boilers had been set to work, and with them the auxiliary piping and several bilge pumps. One of the workmen stated that the engines had been found intact. The engine rooms could not be visited, because they were under water up to the tops of the cylinders. It could only be ascertained that the engine skylight had not been damaged.

(r) Three hits of large caliber—probably 20-centimeter—were observed:

α. A shell had entered the after torpedo room close above the water line, had passed through a heavy stanchion and a lateral bulk-head, and out through the starboard side, where it had torn a hole about 1 meter square. There were no indications to show that the projectile had burst. The shot hole on the starboard side was slightly forward of and about 1 meter higher than that on the port side.

β. Another projectile had passed through the whole length of the compartment above this torpedo room and out through the starboard side, likewise without exploding.

γ. A heavy shell must have exploded at the upper conning bridge, for the top of the conning tower, without having been perforated, showed large oblong scars, caused by heavy explosive fragments.

¹ She sank again on her way to the United States.—Ed. "RUNDSCHAU."

(s) A 15-centimeter shell had struck the port bow and loosened the reinforcement ring of the hawse hole. No injuries from explosive fragments were noticed here.

Another 15-centimeter shell had perforated the 3-centimeter shield of a 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun on the port side. Fragments had destroyed the shaft of the elevating gear and both hand wheels. Others had perforated the forward smokestack casing. This hit appears to have annihilated the whole crew of this gun, near which six charred bodies were found.

Another 15-centimeter shell had damaged the after smokestack, after passing through the empty part of a coal bunker, which was still filled with coal to within 1 meter of the ceiling.

(t) Very few small-caliber hits were noticed, only 6 in the ship's sides, 2 in the forward, and 5 in the after smokestack, though one of the latter may perhaps have been caused by a 15-centimeter projectile. Near the stern three indentations were noticeable in the side armor, probably caused by 5.7-centimeter projectiles which, striking at a very small angle, had glanced off.

(u) Further observations made are as follows:

All the breechblocks of the rapid-fire guns and parts of the mechanism of the revolving guns had been thrown overboard by the Spaniards. Whether the turret guns had also been rendered unserviceable could not be ascertained. In any event, they had not been injured by hostile projectiles nor by the conflagrations. The gun sights were also missing. Inside the armored turrets no damages of any kind were noticeable. Even the paint had hardly suffered from the heat. In the after-turret gun a projectile had been rammed home, but apparently the cartridge had not been entered. The conning tower was not injured, only burned on the inside.

(v) The torpedo-launching tubes and torpedoes had been less damaged by shots and fire than in the other ships. The complete remnants of twenty-four torpedoes were found, with the exception of the war heads. Only a few practice heads were found.

B. ALMIRANTE OQUENDO.

(w) This ship sustained very severe leaks when running aground. She lies over to port, with the bow about 1 meter light and the stern $1\frac{1}{2}$ meters deep. The ship appeared to have her back broken in the region of the foremast. The rapid-fire ammunition room just forward of the after turret had exploded. Amidships everything above this room had been hurled down. The protective deck was heaved up and wrenched from the sides. The deck beams throughout were badly warped, and both sides of the ship showed large holes, through which the water was washing in. The second explosion had taken place in the forward rapid-fire ammunition room. The effects were about the same as aft. On one side they were still further increased by the

explosion of a torpedo war head in the forward broadside torpedo room. Here the aperture in the ship's side had reached the dimensions of two meters in width and about 5 meters in length, its lower edge being formed by the armor.

(x) The *Almirante Oquendo* had suffered more than either of the other ships from hostile projectiles.

α A 15 to 20 centimeter shell had torn a piece about 20 centimeters wide and 50 centimeters long from the upper edge of the gun port in the top of the forward 28-centimeter turret and burst inside. A number of small holes, caused by shell fragments, covering a space of about 1 meter square, were noticeable in the top of the turret. There were no other traces of shell fragments. The bore was empty, the breech-block closed, and a shell was found in the rear of the gun in position for loading. Back of the gun and to the left of it two charred bodies were found, and to the right a mass of human remains that had apparently formed two more bodies. A head was found lying on the platform under the gun. Where the turret commander had been standing another charred body was found lying on its back, with the gun sights under it. The gun itself appeared to have sustained no injuries.

β. A shell, probably of 20-centimeter caliber, had passed through the ship's side in the engine workshop, where it had demolished the transmission shaft, the boring engine, and the turning lathe; then through the engine skylight and exploded on the other side of the latter, in the engine supply room.

γ. A heavy projectile had passed through the smokestack and out through the starboard side without having bursted in the ship.

δ. About 25 meters from the stern a heavy shell had struck the 'tween-decks and passed through it. On the starboard side inboard, several small holes were visible, apparently from fragments of this shell.

ε. A shell, probably of 15-centimeter caliber, had hit the shield of the fourth 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun. The irregular holes noticeable in the forward smokestacks are probably attributable to fragments of this shell. The wheels of the revolving and elevating gear of this gun had also been damaged.

ζ. A 15-centimeter shell had passed through the port coal bunker and out through the starboard bunker.

η. A 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun on the starboard side had been hit on the left side by a 5.7-centimeter shell ranging forward. The projectile with solid point had passed entirely through the forward hoop and penetrated the bore to the depth of 2 centimeters. There were no splinters from the gun, but the displaced metal had been forced out at the edges, which is a proof of its great tenacity. The point of the projectile had been broken off and was lying near the gun. The hole is about 15 centimeters long and at the widest place 5 centimeters wide.

θ. In the whole port side about forty small-caliber hits were counted,

most of them amidships. The smokestacks had also been hit several times by small projectiles.

1. Other observations made on board the *Almirante Oquendo* are as follows:

The armor had not been injured by any hits. In two of the rapid-fire guns the sights were found set for ranges of 13 and 14 kilometers, and in the 5.7-centimeter after-port gun at 10 kilometers. The sights of all the guns, with the exception of the revolving guns, had traveling eyepieces. None of the sights were found set for short ranges. Some of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire breechblocks were missing, while some of the guns were found completely loaded.

(y) The torpedo tube in which a torpedo had exploded had been torn into small fragments, the largest of which were a guiding bar and a hinged door. The torpedoes secured to the ship's side had also been destroyed, with the exception of the flasks, which had been hurled several meters from their positions. The bulkhead 'tween-decks near the place of the explosion showed traces of the same. Pieces about 4 centimeters square had passed entirely through it, while still smaller pieces had penetrated it to the depth of several millimeters. The conning tower had remained intact.

In the forward torpedo room torpedoes were found near each of the tubes, but without war heads on them. The port tube had the depth-regulating apparatus in readiness. The outer cap of one of the tubes was still open. The tubes had been bent by the grounding of the ship. They were not loaded.

C. VIZCAYA.

(z) The *Vizcaya*, like the *Almirante Oquendo*, is so seriously damaged that there is no prospect of hauling her off. This ship also ran ashore at great speed, and the keel was apparently broken in two, for with each sea the stern would rise and fall with loud creaking and groaning. The vessel was lying almost upright with only a small list to port. All the rooms below the protective deck, and the after rooms above it, were flooded.

Near the forward turret an explosion had taken place in the lower part of the ship, probably in one of the ammunition rooms. The wood part of the upper deck had been burned, and the iron plating torn open, and through the gap could be seen a chaos of broken anchor gear, capstans, chains, cement, rubbish, torpedo tubes, etc. The hull is about equally damaged on both sides.

α. The protective deck had been ripped open and the plating folded back on the starboard side, between the forward smokestack and the ship's side, probably as the result of a boiler explosion. The pivot sockets of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns had been torn away and the guns bent back to such an extent that the bores were pointing upward almost vertically.

β. Hot coal gas and smoke issuing from an open bunker hole showed that the coal was still burning.

γ. The *Vizcaya* has suffered little from hostile fire. A 15 to 20 centimeter shell had struck the forward broadside torpedo room, dismantled the port tube, and had apparently killed a number of men. Several charred bodies were found scattered over the whole room.

A 20-centimeter shell, ranging forward, had passed through the ship's side, through a locker amidships near the second 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun, and through a lateral bulkhead abaft of the forward turret; then, striking the turret, had glanced off without causing any impression, and exploded on the starboard side.

A heavy shell had entered the gun deck forward of the after turret and passed out through the starboard side without bursting in the ship.

Besides these three large-caliber hits, about twelve smaller ones could be noticed in the broadside, most of them of 4.7 and 5.7 centimeter caliber; also five hits in the forward and one in the after smokestack.

Other observations were made as follows:

The conning tower had not been damaged by projectiles, but completely burnt out on the inside. The conning bridge was totally demolished. Two charred bodies were found still lying in the tower, also several bodies or parts of bodies in different places on the iron gun deck. Many rapid-fire cartridges, either whole or in part, were found scattered about; also a quantity of exploded small-arm ammunition.

The breechblocks of two 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns were found near the guns. In one of these guns the projectile had been jammed near the muzzle. The whole cartridge was found in one of the bores. The breech was open.

δ. The torpedoes had not been made ready for use and the tubes were not loaded.

15. If we compare the observations made by the officers of the *Geier* as to the number of hits with the results of the examination made immediately after the battle, we obtain the following figures:

Hits from—	Maria Teresa.	Oquendo.	Vizcaya.	Colon.
10-cm. projectile	1	5	2
12.7-cm. projectile	5 IV	5 III	6	4
20-cm. projectile	3	3 IV	4 III
30.5 } cm. projectile	2		
33 } cm. projectile
Secondary battery	20 XV	42 XL	11 XVIII

In the above table the Arabic figures designate the results of the United States Board, while the Roman figures represent the observations made at the time of our inspection in August last. It will be

noticed that there is not much discrepancy in the figures. Of course, observations made so long after the action can not lay claim to absolute accuracy, especially as our sojourn on board was necessarily short. The traces of many hits have been partly obliterated by the powerful action of the surf, especially in the superstructures, of which hardly anything is left standing. It may therefore be inferred that the figures of the United States Board are more nearly correct than ours; but even they probably fall short of the actual results.

16. The *Brooklyn* was hit about twenty times by shells and several times by fragments and machine gun projectiles. The cruiser sustained no serious injuries of any kind. The *Iowa* is said to have been hit twice in the bow, just above the water-line, by 15-centimeter shells and seven times by small-caliber projectiles. The *Texas* and *Indiana* were hit twice by light projectiles without sustaining serious injuries.

17. In order to be able to realize the complete defeat of the Spanish fleet it is necessary to call clearly to mind its situation in Santiago Harbor. Cervera had entered the harbor on May 19. As early as May 27 five hostile cruisers with several gunboats and auxiliary cruisers were observed in front of the harbor, and there was no longer any doubt that the whole American battle fleet was blockading the harbor. Then followed the bombardments of Morro Castle and the Socapa, several shells falling into the bay, and the Spanish ships retreated closer to the city. On June 3 the *Merrimac* was sunk, but the entrance remained unobstructed. On June 22 occurred the landing of the American troops, who on July 1 attacked the fortifications of the city. Five hundred men of the landing corps of the Spanish ships took part in the defense and are said to have fought very valiantly.

18. The Government authorities at Havana were very anxious to have the fleet leave the harbor, in order to remove the main object of the attack upon Santiago; for the ships had been the cause of the blockade and of the attack on the unprepared city. Hence it was imperative that the ships should leave. It is probable that ever since the middle of June this had been suggested to Admiral Cervera by the authorities at Havana; but the Admiral appears to have declared that it was impossible to make an attempt to run the blockade at night. Whether direct orders were finally given to leave the harbor under all circumstances I have not been able to ascertain.

19. Admiral Cervera was in a very difficult position. He was expected to act in some manner. He did not dare make the attempt at night, and so he decided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The whole crew fell a victim to this fatal decision. Instructions for the order of the sortie and the taking of the western course had been previously issued by the chief of the fleet. According to the *Revista General de Marina*, Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898, the Admiral was entirely convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy or of reaching another Cuban harbor, even if he should succeed in steaming right

through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and impotence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else that I attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and a half in the harbor without even attempting to attack the blockading fleet when a favorable opportunity presented itself, or even of harassing it. The two torpedo-boat destroyers were not used for the purpose for which they were intended. This inactivity and lack of initiative must have had a very demoralizing effect on the officers and men. If we add to this the certain knowledge that the opposing forces were much stronger, it will be readily understood that the idea of general flight after coming out of the harbor entrance was the only acceptable one, especially in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby rendering them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From the very moment that this feeling of impotence took possession of the Spanish and led to the above reflections their fate, psychologically speaking, was sealed. We do not mean to disparage their valor and tenacity in the midst of the hostile fire; but, on the other hand, it is quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything was happening as he had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running his ship ashore. All the other commanders followed this example.

20. On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Admiral Sampson's fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade was being conducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as were also the arrangements in case of the enemy's attempt to escape. Frequent engagements with the Spanish forts had given commanders and crews that calm and assurance in the handling of their weapons which guarantees success. The long blockade service, exhausting and monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the part of the Spanish, had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody was anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape. All the passions that had been smoldering under the ashes break forth. The welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had come at last, and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their victims. At the beginning the American fire, owing to the excitement of the personnel and the great distances, was probably not very effective; but when the Spanish admiral turned to westward and the other ships followed him the moral superiority of the Americans reasserted itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had their ships follow the same course, and the Americans, having every advantage on their side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in their total annihilation.

21. I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish crews, the neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate education of the commanders of the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers. It is mainly due to these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and that the American ships sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there can be no excuse for having allowed the cruiser *Cristobal Colon* to

leave Spain without her heavy armament. It has also been stated that the rapid-fire guns of this cruiser were unserviceable, so that she was really completely defenseless. The training of the engine personnel also was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive cruises. The bottoms of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long time, and as they had been lying in Santiago Harbor for a month and a half they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers *Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, which in all official books are credited with 18.5 knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from 10 to 12 knots at most, and the *Cristobal Colon*, which is the latest ship and was to run 20 knots, hardly attained a speed of 13.5. Under these circumstances, in every way unfavorable for the Spanish, whose crews were insufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long inactivity, whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting efficiency, it is no wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy and paid for with insignificant sacrifices.

22. There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should have been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal investigation of the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practicable for a fleet to leave Santiago Harbor at night. The wreck of the *Merrimac* did not constitute an obstruction. It is true that Admiral Sampson's report on the night blockade states that the light-ships were lying from 1 to 2 miles from Morro Castle, according to the state of the atmosphere, and that they lighted up the channel for half a mile inside. Even the best search light, however, does not reach farther than 1 mile. Therefore the illumination could not have been very effective. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the light-ships, could have compelled them to change their positions; but, strange to say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon about the middle of June would have been best suited for the enterprise. Besides the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant vessels lying in Santiago Harbor might have been taken out in order to deceive the enemy. The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have followed each other out of the harbor entrance, in predetermined order, as fast as possible. They should then have steered different courses, previously determined, with orders not to fight except when compelled to do so by the immediate vicinity of a hostile ship or when there was no possibility of escaping the enemy in the darkness. A rendezvous should have been fixed for the next day, where the ships that succeeded in escaping were to assemble.

23. If the fleet did not dare attempt a night sortie and was nevertheless compelled to leave the harbor in obedience to orders, then the ships should have been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, including the torpedo and the ram, should have been used. A bold attack in close formation was the only chance of success against the

superior hostile fighting forces, who would hardly have found time to form their lines.

24. I shall not attempt to discuss at length all the lessons which may be derived from the battle, because this would lead too far. I will only enumerate them, and confine myself to dwelling a little more fully on those which are of the greatest importance for practical service.

(a) Abolition of all woodwork.

(b) No unprotected torpedo tubes.

(c) Protection for all gun crews against shell fire.

(d) Protection of the fire-extinguishing apparatus against shell fire.

(e) Smokeless powder; greatest possible simplicity in the service of the guns and greatest possible rapidity of fire.

(f) Good speed of the ships under normal conditions.

(g) Thorough training of the crews in all branches of the service.

25. The last two are the most important. A ship may show very brilliant results at the trial trip and be credited with the greatest speed in the different books on the navies of all nations; but for the officer who is to command the ship in battle this is not a criterion from which to judge of her efficiency. Frequent trial trips under full steam, making it possible to discover and cure defects of the machinery in time of peace, and familiarizing the personnel with the functioning of the vessel in all its details, can alone give the commander an idea of what he may expect of his ship in battle. Extensive cruises at war speed should also be made, in order that the personnel may get an idea of how much more will be required in time of war. This is especially important in the tropics, where the great heat materially affects the physical endurance and efficiency of the boiler and engine personnel.

26. The most perfect training of the crews in all branches of the service, especially by all kinds of torpedo and gun practice, as nearly as possible under war conditions, is the foundation of success. As I said in Part IV of this work, nothing should be left undone to attain the greatest perfection possible in time of peace. No expense should be spared to enable those who bear the responsibility of the battle—the chiefs of fleets and squadrons, as well as all commanders—thoroughly to test the actual degree of efficiency of their crews by practical exercises, resembling as nearly as possible the operations of actual warfare.


27. Such exercises will also demonstrate whether the weapons, from a technical standpoint, are equal to all the exigencies of war. I learned, for instance, that the following defects were found to exist in the American artillery matériel:

(a) *Brooklyn*.—In the 5.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns cartridges were jammed in several instances. In the 20-centimeter guns the plugs stuck several times. Some of the 12.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns became unserviceable toward the end of the battle because the elevating gear did not function properly, and all these guns had to be supplied with new mounts after the battle.



ISLAND OF PUERTO RICO.

ATLANTIC OCEAN.



CARIBBEAN SEA.

(b) *Texas*.—The two 30.5 centimeter guns had been fired several times across the deck, considerably damaging the latter. A suggestion made in time of peace that the guns be tested in that respect had not been followed out.

(c) *Iowa*.—On this ship, also, the deck had been damaged by the firing of the heavy guns. The training gear of the 20-centimeter guns had not been able to sustain the firing at great elevation.

The most careful examination of the artillery matériel in time of peace is absolutely necessary. Even when the strictest requirements are made and fulfilled in testing the guns, it is no guarantee that the matériel will not in the course of time show defects on board ship. In order that such defects may not remain hidden, to become apparent only when the guns are used in actual war, at least part of the target practice should be held with full service charges.

VII. THE OCCUPATION OF PUERTO RICO.

1. In my first visit to San Juan de Puerto Rico (see Part III of the Sketches), I found there, to my great astonishment, a comparatively large German colony. I learned that in all the principal towns on the island, such as Ponce, Mayaguez, Aguadilla, and Arecibo, Germans are likewise settled, and in the possession of large business houses, enjoy the esteem of the Spaniards as well as of the Puerto Ricans. Under these circumstances it appeared necessary to send thither a war ship for the protection of the Germans when the Government of the United States commenced action against Puerto Rico. I have successively visited the harbors of Mayaguez, Ponce, and San Juan. The first two were already occupied by the Americans, while the third city was still in the hands of the Spaniards. On the 13th of August it became known that peace negotiations had commenced, and hostilities ceased.

No great battles were fought in this campaign; only a few minor skirmishes took place. But the American troops were marched up in such a simple and skillful manner that the operations are not without interest. Moreover, our readers will be glad to learn some particulars about this beautiful island, in which these many years German merc'ants, mostly from Hamburg and Bremen, have exerted their best energy in steady, unremitting toil, and which now, as the price of victory, falls into the lap of the United States.

2. The accompanying map of the island is the latest and best published. It shows the different departments, so that a description is not necessary. All the turnpikes and roads which are to be considered in connection with the advance of the American troops, as well as the railroad skirting the coast, are also indicated on the map. The mountain range which extends nearly parallel to the southern coast from Adjuntas to Cayey is, on an average, not over 1,000 meters high, and from both towns is continued in several spurs to the eastward and westward. This range constitutes a weather barrier, as the fresh northeast trades cool the northern part of the island and provide

abundant rains, while in the southern part of the island the mountains prevent this moderation, and the heat often becomes unbearable. Numerous streams water the fertile soil, which in former years produced mainly sugar, but now also coffee, tobacco, and bananas, and furnish large areas of magnificent pastures. The number of inhabitants in round numbers is 800,000. The area of Puerto Rico is about one-tenth that of Cuba, which has hardly 1,500,000 inhabitants. The whole island of Puerto Rico is inhabited. There are no extensive uncultivated stretches, as in Cuba. Still, much remains to be done to obtain better yields than heretofore from the rich and fertile soil. In the first place, the agricultural methods should be improved, better communication established with the coast, and, finally, the mineral treasures of the island exploited. In this latter direction hardly anything has been done. As far as the social conditions of the island are concerned, it has been spared the serious disorders that have been raging in Cuba during the last few decades. The Spanish, by means of military posts distributed all over the island, and especially the Guardia Civil, an excellent police system, have succeeded in maintaining order and safety throughout the country. There have been minor disturbances, it is true; but at no time has there been an actual rebellion against the Spanish Government, such as was spoken of at the beginning of the Spanish-American war. Nevertheless, there has gradually developed among the Puerto Ricans an intense hatred toward the selfish Spanish administration, and with open arms they received the Americans who came as liberators from the Spanish yoke.

3. The general opinion, reinforced by the United States press, was that the troops would land east of San Juan, probably at Tajardo. General Miles was the only one who was informed as to the landing place selected, and he left Guantanamo on July 21, with the auxiliary cruiser *Yale* and seven transports with about 3,500 men. The battleship *Massachusetts*, the cruiser *Columbia*, and six small gunboats and auxiliary cruisers, among them the *Dixie*, *Annapolis*, and *Gloucester*, accompanied the transport fleet. Upon reaching Mona Passage the fleet headed for the southern coast of Puerto Rico, and on July 25, the troops were landed at Guanica without encountering serious resistance. The very next day, after a short fight with the Spanish, Yauco, which controls the railway to Ponce, was occupied.

On July 27, the *Dixie*, *Annapolis*, and several other vessels appeared in front of Ponce and demanded the surrender of the city. The United States general granted time until the next morning, and told the commander of the city that unless the surrender had taken place by that time he should at once proceed to bombard the city, and land his men. Captain-General Macias, at San Juan, had given the commander strict orders to defend the city to the utmost, but the combined efforts of the foreign consuls prevailed upon Colonel San Martin to agree to the surrender of the city on condition that the Spanish troops would not be pursued for forty-eight hours. This agreement, however, of which the

United States commander had already been notified, was declared null and void by Captain-General Macias, who at the same time discharged Colonel San Martin from office, and it was only due to the energetic efforts of the German and British consuls that the captain-general became convinced of the necessity of surrendering, and finally consented to the evacuation of the city. Thus the Americans took possession of Ponce at 6 a. m. on July 28, without loss of life or injury to property, and on July 29, they landed a large division of troops, consisting of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, with artillery and wagons. On August 1, two vessels occupied Arroyo, where about 3,000 men were landed.

4. Thus the Americans in a short space of time had gained possession of the three principal harbors on the southern coast of Puerto Rico without firing a single shot. They owe this first of all to the friendly disposition of the population and the lack of energy of the Spanish officers, who did not dare offer any resistance. General Miles's subsequent plan of campaign is self-evident. The troops landed at Arroyo were to advance upon Guayama, thence to Cayey, which lies on the main road to San Juan. The fighting forces at Ponce were also to advance upon Cayey by way of Juana Diaz, Coamo, and Aibonito. The troops at Guanica were to advance by way of Yauco, San German, and Hormigueros, and occupy first Mayaguez, then Aguadilla and Arecibo. A glance at the map will show that this plan would compel the Spanish forces, in order not to be cut off, to retreat to San Juan. When all the United States forces had been concentrated at San Juan, they were to surround the city, supported by the blockading fleet, and it was here that the decisive blow was to fall.

5. General Miles's plan of campaign was carried out as intended. On August 8 General Schwan advanced from Yauco upon San German. At Hormigueros they were opposed by the Spanish, who with 1,000 men occupied an excellent position; but as soon as the American artillery was lined up and the American lines advanced the Spanish evacuated the heights and retreated. On August 11 General Schwan took possession of the town of Mayaguez, which had been evacuated by the Spanish, and met with a hearty reception from the inhabitants. The American troops pursued the Spanish and succeeded in surprising them on August 12 at Las Marias. The Spanish troops were resting, without any special measures of precaution, on the bank of the Guasio River, when the Americans were discerned on the heights. As the river was very high from recent heavy rains, the Spanish had difficulty in crossing it. The American commander demanded their surrender; but it seems that the Spanish had opened fire, thereby compelling the Americans to answer with their artillery. This caused great confusion in the Spanish lines. Two companies only succeeded in crossing the river, the others had to surrender. The Spanish had 40 killed and wounded. Among the many prisoners who were taken to Mayaguez were several colonels and captains.

On August 4 the main body of the troops advanced on the excellent road from Juana Diaz, a small town about 25 kilometers from Ponce. On August 9 they took Coamo, which the Spanish were holding with a force of about 1,000 men. The fight lasted five hours, and ended in the evacuation by the Spanish, as the Americans had succeeded in going around the enemy's flank. The Spanish had 15 killed, among them the commander in chief and several officers. About 150 were taken prisoners. The Americans had 7 wounded. The Spanish retreated to Aibonito, where they intrenched themselves in a fortified position. They were not effectively attacked here, because hostilities were suspended about that time.

The third division of the American troops had advanced from Arroyo and taken Guayama on August 5. On August 8, while advancing toward Cayey, the Americans had a slight engagement with the enemy intrenched in a fortified position, ending in the retreat of the latter. But the American troops had to return to Guayama, because they did not consider themselves strong enough to accomplish the task set them--viz, to advance as far as Cayey. When, on August 12, the Americans started a second time, they found the Spanish in the same fortified position. No fight took place, because the news arrived that peace negotiations had been entered into.

6. According to the census of January 1, 1898, the Spanish had the following troops in the different departments:

ARMY.

	Generals.	Com- manders.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
San Juan.....	2	39	136	2,217	2,394
Arecibo.....		1	15	253	269
Aguadilla.....		2	13	313	328
Mayaguez.....		3	51	1,101	1,155
Ponce.....		5	51	1,317	1,373
Guayama.....		4	44	997	1,045
Numacao.....		1	16	320	337
Vieques.....		1	4	96	101
Total.....	2	56	330	6,614	7,002

NAVY.

	Admirals.	Com- manders.	Officers.	Sailors, mechanics, and fire- men.	Marine infantry.	Total.
San Juan.....	1	9	20	287	22	339
Arecibo.....			1	3		4
Aguadilla.....			1	2		3
Mayaguez.....			1	4		5
Ponce.....			1	5		6
Guayama.....			1	2		3
Numacao.....			2	4		6
Vieques.....			1	1		2
Total.....	1	11	26	308	22	368

The volunteers have not been included, because, with very few exceptions, they laid down their arms as soon as the Americans landed in Puerto Rico.

7. In Puerto Rico, as well as in Cuba, no plans had been made for concentrating the troops at the beginning of the war. The fighting forces were so small that landings of the enemy at any point on the coast could not be impeded. The troops, by remaining in their different departments, might find themselves under the necessity of having to fight far superior hostile forces, and finally to retreat within sight of the enemy in order not to be cut off. The best plan would have been to concentrate all the troops in a fortified position near Cayey, keeping up retrograde communication with San Juan. If the enemy had landed east or west of San Juan, it would have been easy, in view of the good road, to effect a change of front or for the whole force to retreat to San Juan, which was the most important point of the Spanish. If that city had been defended by 7,000 men, it could have resisted the enemy for a long time. It is true, however, that without the prospect of assistance from the Navy, the final surrender of the city, as the result either of the harbor being forced by the enemy or of starvation, would have been only a question of time.

8. At the time of our arrival at Mayaguez hostilities had just been suspended. General Schwan had taken charge of the administration of the department. The inhabitants were entirely satisfied with the new order of things, but many families were mourning the fatal defeat of the Spanish troops at Las Marias. The prisoners taken by the Americans had been quartered in the barracks and were being strictly guarded. We had to abandon our attempt to inspect the scene of the battle because the road, owing to recent rains, was in very bad condition and obstructed by the numerous baggage carts of the American troops. But in order to gain at least an idea of the immediate surroundings of Mayaguez, I drove to Hormigueros, where the first engagement had taken place between American and Spanish troops. A well-kept road follows the coast over almost level ground, passing through several small hamlets. Soon the scenery changes. Cane fields resplendent in their fresh verdure are seen in every direction, and beautiful hills closely covered with banana palms and coffee trees appear before our eyes and gradually rise higher and higher.

In the distance the river may be seen, crossed by a number of iron bridges, over which the railroad passes that runs along the river. The road rises very gradually, and after we had passed over the top of the range of hills we saw at our feet the pretty town of Hormigueros. At its highest point stands the church from which one must gain a magnificent view over the whole region. We went there, and after mounting the stone steps into the belfry, we saw before our eyes a panorama of indescribable loveliness. Indeed, a better point could hardly be found from which to gain an idea of the exquisite beauty of Puerto

Rico. Far as the eye can see stretch the picturesque ranges of hills clad in the loveliest green; at their feet a few scattered cottages and small hamlets, and glistening streams winding their way through them. But we could not allow our eyes to be completely captivated by the natural charms of the country. We had also to satisfy our military curiosity. One thing became evident at a glance, namely, that the church was the best tactical point of the whole region, as all the different positions could be observed from there. The Spanish commander in chief appears to have realized this circumstance; for, as the kindly priest of the church told us, it had been his intention to occupy the church and line up his artillery on the adjoining hill; but the priest had succeeded in dissuading the commander from this plan, which would surely have entailed the destruction of the church and town. Probably no serious resistance had been planned by the Spanish, and they were therefore only occupying the range of hills between which a defile leads to the town of Mayaguez, to which the troops retreated as soon as the Americans commenced to advance after the first few volleys. In the little town of Hormigueros peace and quiet were reigning. The Americans had already appointed a mayor. A few families from Mayaguez had come hither to await further developments. On my return to Mayaguez I had an opportunity of inspecting a company of United States volunteers. They were nearly all tall, robust men, most of them with healthy complexions and of good military bearing. All the volunteers were equipped with Krag-Jørgensen rifles.

9. On August 16 we left the harbor of Mayaguez and steamed to Ponce, where we arrived in the evening of the same day. The harbor was crowded with American war ships, auxiliary cruisers, and transports; but as a result of the peace negotiations, many of the war ships had received orders to return to Guantanamo or to proceed to the United States, so that the harbor was considerably cleared during the next few days. General Gilmore, in the absence of General Miles, who was then at Coamo, had established the headquarters of his staff at the custom-house. The United States garrison was encamped near the harbor on both sides of the main road leading to Ponce. The camp consisted of ordinary tents, with camp beds raised a few feet above the ground. As it always rained several hours during the day and usually all night long, one may easily imagine the condition of this camp. Men were constantly at work digging new drains for the water. At times the guards and patrols surrounding the camp had to wade in the mud up to their knees. It is a wonder that there was not more sickness in the camp, for the American general told me there were only a few cases of malarial fever. But exposure to the burning rays of the sun, to constant rains, and the exhalations of the soil is extremely dangerous in this climate, as the residents know only too well, and can not fail but have its injurious effects sooner or later. As a matter of fact, many cases of fever have subsequently developed among the

American troops. I can not understand why the military authorities had not exercised greater care. Would it not have been better to send the troops to Coamo, which is located on much higher ground, leaving only a small garrison at Ponce? Such a garrison would have been quite sufficient for the protection of the latter town, and might have been quartered in public buildings, such as the church, the theater, etc. The United States transport steamers are said to have had on board all the material necessary for the construction of a small shipyard. If it is true that they carried their preparation to that extent, then better provisions should also have been made for taking care of human lives. If it was not deemed advisable to quarter the men in the towns, then corrugated-tin barracks should have been taken along, which can be taken apart and speedily erected on piles driven into the ground. Ordinary tents were certainly inadequate.

10. On one of the following days we made an excursion to the vicinity of Coamo, about 30 kilometers from Ponce. The beautiful wide road extending all the way to San Juan is a true work of art, and makes it possible to advance rapidly. The whole distance from Ponce to San Juan, about 135 kilometers, can be made in vehicles, by changing the horses twice, in fourteen to sixteen hours. The rise is very gradual. On both sides are small huts of natives with corrugated tin roofs, or covered simply with palm leaves and built on piles about 1 meter high. Soon we came out upon the open country, where wooded hills and valleys alternated with coffee plantations and banana and sugar-cane fields. The profuse tropical vegetation, especially the slender palms with their magnificent crowns, is a constant delight to the eye. After the rain, which had been falling all through the preceding night, the foliage was particularly green and fresh and the shady road nearly free from dust. In several places the road is crossed by the river, which can usually be forded. Where it is too rapid bridges have been built. Upon reaching Juano Diaz the landscape becomes even more beautiful. The heights afford a splendid view of the whole region from the coast to the high mountain range. At Coamo we left the main road and soon reached a beautiful valley made famous by the "Baños de Coamo." There is a large hotel for the accommodation of visitors. The bathing establishment also is very conveniently arranged. A natural spring furnishes sulphur baths. The only thing that reminded us of war during our trip were a few squads of American cavalry and long trains of wagons, each drawn by six mules, which were taking the necessary supplies to the troops encamped at Aibonito. From what we could learn, it seems that the American authorities were preserving excellent order and safety at Ponce and vicinity, but the Puerto Rican inhabitants showed their hatred for the Spanish so openly that in spite of the strict measures taken by the Americans there is danger of demonstrations by the inhabitants in that direction.

11. On August 23 we made a second visit to San Juan. The mines

in the entrance had been removed and the channel was marked by buoys in the usual manner. Besides the Spanish gunboats *Isabel II*, *General Conche*, *Creola*, and *Ponce de Leon*, and the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror*, there were neither war nor merchant vessels in the harbor. The city itself presented the same aspect as before the blockade. It was not until the latter part of August that steamers arrived and commerce and traffic were reestablished. I took advantage of our presence there to learn further particulars about the engagement between the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror* and the United States auxiliary cruiser *St. Paul*. The commander of the *Terror* gave me the following account of the battle:

At 9 a. m. on June 22 the lookout at the fort signaled a suspicious vessel. The commander gave orders for the *Isabel II* to go out to reconnoiter and for the *Terror* to be ready for action. By 11.30 the vessel had come closer and the *Isabel II* went out. Upon sighting her, the hostile cruiser immediately hoisted her flag and waited. The *Isabel II* opened fire on the foe. The destroyer then received orders to go out and assist the *Isabel*. The *Terror*, which had been left by her fleet at Martinique, had not been able to recover her guns and ammunition, which during the voyage had been transferred to the *Maria Teresa* in order to make room for coal. The *Terror* therefore had no other weapons than her torpedoes and two 57-millimeter guns with little ammunition. The *Isabel* fought the *St. Paul* at a distance of from 10,000 to 12,000 meters. As the utmost range of our guns was only 4,000 meters, we could not assist the *Isabel* by going closer to her. I therefore gave orders to head the *Terror* east, so as not to interfere with the *Isabel* firing north on the enemy. When we were sufficiently clear of her and had the open sea before us, I headed straight for the *St. Paul* at a speed of from 20 to 21 knots.

The enemy, who hitherto had been firing on the *Isabel*, now directed upon us the well-aimed rapid fire of both her batteries, the lower one of which appeared to have eight, the upper one ten to twelve guns. At 4,000 meters we opened fire with our guns, in order to keep up the spirit of the crew during the long interval between the beginning of the hail of projectiles and the launching of the torpedo. Our fire was very accurate. At the first shot we saw the shell explode on the stern. Several other shots also hit their target, and our men were wild with joy. We had approached to within 1,200 meters and were about to launch the torpedo when the *Terror* commenced to veer to starboard. I had the helm shifted to port, but the ship kept on turning. Then I ordered the port engine stopped, and still the ship continued to turn to starboard. I then learned that a shell had exploded on deck and destroyed the leads to the steering gear and telegraph, so that the vessel followed the movements of the screw and was unmanageable. The hand-steering gear was at once put in operation; but as we passed the enemy at such close range, several projectiles hit us, one of them passing through the port side into the engine room, where it burst. The engine room became flooded and the engine appeared to have been disabled. We just managed to steam into the harbor.

From an inspection of the *Terror* it appeared that the fatal shell, ranging obliquely downward, had passed through the ship's side, torn off a steam gauge, killed three men, and struck the lower edge of the main steam pipe, tearing off its covering. This had deflected the shell, and it had passed out through the starboard side. It was through the hole made by the projectile in passing out that the engine room had been flooded up to the lower edge of the steam cylinder; but the engines continued to run, so that the *Terror*, though with gradually

slackened speed, was able to reach the harbor under her own steam. The shortest distance between the *Terror* and the *St. Paul* had been 800 meters. The gunboat *Isabel II*, I was told by her commander, had not gone closer than within 6,000 meters of the enemy.

12. We then visited the fortification works and made the following observations, which may be considered as a supplement to the description of the bombardments contained in Part III of these Sketches:

(a) *Morro Castle*.—On the highest terrace are three 15-centimeter Ordoñez guns of 30 calibers length and two 24-centimeter breech-loading howitzers of modern type; direction of fire northwest to west. On the next lower terrace are two 15-centimeter Ordoñez guns. These are all the guns that had been mounted. No guns were dismantled during the bombardments. The walls of the fort are over 6 meters thick and extremely solid. They show many hits of heavy, medium, and light artillery. The heavy projectiles had entered the walls to the depth of 2 meters and torn large pieces out of the masonry work. The smaller projectiles had done very little damage, which had already been repaired. One shell had struck the corner of the wall on the lower terrace and killed two of the men serving the guns and wounded several others by shell fragments and débris.

(b) *Cristobal Castle*.—Two 15-centimeter Ordoñez guns of 30 calibers length, trained north, fired about eighty rounds during the bombardment. A little to the rear are three 24-centimeter breech-loading howitzers of modern type. At one of these an enfilading shot passing over Morro Castle had struck the breech and killed one man. As a result of this accidental hit, and to protect the men serving the farther guns against shell fire and débris, earth traverses had been thrown up between the guns after the battle. A little further back and to the east three 15-centimeter guns, with an arc of fire north by way of east to southwest, and hence also adapted to fire on the land, were mounted on central-pivot carriages. These took part in the fight with about thirty rounds. Finally, at the Princesa Battery, adjoining Cristobal Castle on the east, there are four more 15-centimeter guns and two 24-centimeter howitzers. Cristobal Castle and the Princesa Battery sustained only a few hits, slightly damaging the outer walls.

(c) The howitzer and gun batteries of the harbor entrance show no serious injuries. Morro Castle appears to have been the main object of the American fire. The fact that many shells did not explode has been much commented upon.

(d) Besides the fortifications mentioned above, the Spanish had erected a new battery at Escambron, with three 24-centimeter howitzers of modern type in central-pivot mounts, for indirect fire. For land defense a series of earthworks had been erected near San Antonio and armed with mortars and bronze guns.

13. As we left Morro Castle Spanish soldiers were engaged in taking down the shield with the Spanish coat of arms over the main

entrance. As the remains of the ever-glorious Columbus had been removed from the cathedral at Havana, where they had a beautiful and well-cared-for resting place, so it was also desired to carry to Spain this escutcheon which for centuries had been the witness of the victories and greatness of the Spanish nation. When both of these—the remains of the man to whom the whole world owes so much and the emblem of Spanish power—reach Spain there will be profound sadness throughout the whole country over the final loss of its colonies. The history of this short struggle is another example of the instability of power and fame in the ever-changing destinies of the nations of the earth!



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES NO. V.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

EFFECT OF THE GUN FIRE
OF THE
UNITED STATES VESSELS
IN THE
BATTLE OF MANILA BAY
(MAY 1, 1898).

By LIEUT. JOHN M. ELLICOTT, U. S. N.,
Intelligence Officer, U. S. S. Baltimore.



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1899.

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INTRODUCTORY.

This report on the Effect of the Gun Fire of the United States Vessels in the Battle of Manila Bay, by the Intelligence Officer of the U. S. S. *Baltimore*, has lately been received. In transmitting it Admiral Dewey calls attention to the value of the information contained.

The conclusions drawn by Lieutenant Ellicott at the end of his report are particularly interesting.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,


Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *March 27, 1899.*

Approved:

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. N., Chief of Bureau of Navigation.



EFFECT OF GUN FIRE, BATTLE OF MANILA BAY,

May 1, 1898.

U. S. S. BALTIMORE,
Iloilo, P. I., January 1, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report on the effects of the gun fire of the United States fleet upon the Spanish war vessels in the battle of May 1, 1898, and respectfully request that it be forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence. The report is based upon a personal examination of all the vessels, personal conversations with officers who served on them in the action, and extracts from Admiral Montojo's official report.

REINA CRISTINA.

This vessel was flagship of Admiral Montojo during the greater part of the first engagement. She received a large concentration of gun fire and was placed hors de combat by conflagrations fore and aft, the destruction of her personnel, the destruction of her steering gear, and the bursting of a shell in her super-heater. She was then sunk by the Spaniards and abandoned in shoal water under the north wall of Cavite heading eastward, where she burned, with bulwarks awash. During the conflagration there were frequent heavy explosions. The injuries visible above water afterwards were as follows:

One large shell across bulwarks at break of forecastle, cutting away starboard lower boom.

One large shell swept bridge, apparently from starboard to port, and destroyed starboard search light. This may have been the shell described by Admiral Montojo as destroying the steam steerer.

In the forward smokestack the following shells: One 8-inch low, one 8-inch high, one 6-pounder low, one 6-pounder high; and in forward escape pipe one 5-inch and one 6-pounder midway.

In ventilator forward of after smokestack, one 6-pounder waist high and one 6-pounder midway.

The after smokestack fell 60 degrees to port, probably caused by the large shell mentioned by Admiral Montojo as exploding in the super-heater. This stack was struck, apparently while still upright, by one 8-inch shell low, two 6-pounders near the top, and one 5-inch midway.

Underneath topgallant forecastle one 8-inch shell entered near the deck and close under break of forecastle, going from port to starboard

and forward at an angle of 45 degrees, and burst under the forecastle, a large fragment passing out on starboard side.

Two 5-inch shell also penetrated under the forecastle on port side well forward, 6 feet above deck, and burst.

One 5-inch entered on starboard side in same locality and passed out on port side without exploding.

The mizzenmast, although much burned, showed evidences of having been pierced six times, and the fore and main masts once, by shells of various calibers.

The starboard after launch's davit was shot away, as if by a large shell.

An 8-inch shell pierced the shield of the port forward 16-centimeter gun, above and to left of the breech, and exploded, slipping the elevating arc band just its width to the rear and wrecking the elevating wheel, rod, and pinion on left side of gun. A fragment of this shell wrecked the elevating gear on the right side of the opposite gun. The portion of the shield penetrated sloped at an angle of about 30 degrees with the axis of the shell. The bursting of the shell about 2 feet in rear of its point of impact was coordinated by a huge hole torn upward in a sheet-iron bulwark rail arched over the sponson embrasure.

Admiral Montojo reports additional injuries as follows:

A shell burst on the forecastle, disabling all the crews of the four rapid-fire guns and driving splinters from the foremast which wounded the helmsman, who was steering on the bridge.

A shell burst on the orlop deck, setting fire to the lockers of the crew, who fortunately succeeded in putting out the fire.

The enemy * * * covered us with a hail of rapid-fire projectiles.

About half past 7 a shell completely destroyed the steam steerer.

Another shell exploded aft, putting nine men out of action.

* * * Another carried away the mizzen truck and gaff, bringing down the ensign and my flag, which were immediately replaced.

Another shell burst in the wardroom * * * and destroyed the wounded who were there under treatment.

Another burst in the after ammunition room, filled the compartments with smoke, and prevented the coupling of the handwheel. It being impossible to keep down the fire, this ammunition room had to be flooded when the cartridges were beginning to explode.

Amidships * * * a large shell had penetrated the super-heater, putting out of action a gunner's mate and twelve men who were serving the guns.

Another disabled the starboard bow gun.

* * * The fire forward was renewed by a shell which penetrated the side and burst on the orlop.

When many men had already been saved * * * a shell killed her heroic captain * * * who was directing the rescue of the crew.

Summing up, it is in evidence or officially recorded that the *Cristina* was struck by five 8-inch, five 5-inch, and thirteen other large shell, and by seven 6-pounder and nine other projectiles, or thirty-nine projectiles in all. These are not all, as Admiral Montojo reports having been covered by a hail of rapid-fire projectiles, and in conversation has estimated that the *Cristina* was hit about seventy times.

CASTILLA.

This vessel had developed such weakness in steaming to Subig Bay some days before the battle that she was not under way on the 1st of May, but in the beginning of the engagement was moored head and stern in the line of battle, her port broadside bearing. A string of iron lighters loaded with sand was moored in prolongation of Sangley Point to protect her water line. During the engagement her bower chain was cut by a shell and from the impact of another shell she swung around till her starboard broadside was presented. Being a wooden vessel she was readily and repeatedly set on fire. About 10 o'clock, while the United States squadron was drawn off, her flag came down, either by design or accident, and she burst into flames fore and aft. She then sank until her main deck was awash, and her bulwarks and upperworks were completely consumed by flames. Her forward smokestack fell 60 degrees toward the starboard quarter, probably weakened, like the *Cristina's*, by the explosion of a large shell. Next to the *Cristina* she received the greatest injury from gun fire. Injuries visible to inspection are as follows:

One 5-inch shell dismounted 37-millimeter gun on port forward bridge over sponson.

One 6-inch cut fore and aft beam over port forward gun sponson.

Seven small shell passed through forward smokestack.

Five small shell passed through forward drum room.

A large shell tore a 4-foot hole in the port side below the main deck and just abaft the port midship gun.

There is a similar injury on the starboard side, nearly opposite.

One 5-inch shell through the after smokestack.

Three 5-inch shell, close together, entered port side under main deck, abaft after smokestack.

One 6-pounder in after smokestack.

One 6-pounder in after escape pipe.

Two 5-inch entered port side between mainmast and after sponson.

One 5-inch passed through shield of 37-millimeter gun on port after bridge, over sponson, dismounting gun.

One 6-pounder cut forward part of upper edge of port after gun-sponson embrasure.

One 1-pounder cut forward vertical edge of same.

One 5-inch raked outside of starboard after sponson.

One 6-inch entered starboard side, under main deck, under midship gun.

There are two jagged holes, 4 feet and 1 foot in diameter, on starboard side under main deck, abreast after smokestack.

One 5-inch on starboard side under main deck, just abaft forward sponson.

One 5-inch through after side of forward starboard sponson.

One 5-inch through port after sponson, forward side, near deck.

Two scars of small shells on port after 16-centimeter gun shield.

Several small holes in after smokestack as if from fragments of a bursting shell.

Total, two 6-inch, twelve 5-inch, and four other large shell; three 6-pounders and sixteen other small shell; thirty-seven shell in all. Survivors tell of three 8-inch shell which burst on the orlop deck forward, amidships, and aft, causing fires which could not be controlled. This raises the known hits to forty.

Admiral Montojo states:

The *Castilla* * * * had all her guns put out of action except one on the poop. * * * Riddled by shot and in flames from the enemy's shells, she was sunk and abandoned by her crew.

Survivors state that they were rescued by boats from shore which came off in obedience to a prearranged signal.

DON ANTONIO DE ULLOA.

This vessel was not in repair on May 1, parts of her machinery being on shore. She was moored head and stern on the left of the Spanish line, in Canacao Bay, just behind Sangley Point, her starboard broadside bearing, the port guns having been removed to be emplaced on shore. The low sandy point was expected to form some protection to her hull. She was only manned by men enough to fight her starboard battery, about half of her normal complement. She received but little gun fire in the first engagement, but was riddled and sunk by the leading American ships in the second, and was abandoned with colors flying. She listed heavily to starboard just before settling, but righted on the bottom and lay with her poop awash, superstructure and fore-castle above water. She had sent down yards and topmasts and these spars were on shore, except the fore yard, which had been untrussed but not sent down. The slings of this yard were cut during action and the yard fell across the fore-castle on the sheet bits, breaking the beam at the break of the fore-castle. The other injuries visible above water are as follows:

One 6-pounder entered under fore-castle from forward, passed through the midship waist ventilator and burst in front of pilot house, near deck.

One 8-inch raking shell entered at break of topgallant fore-castle just under the deck and burst.

One 8-inch burst just under the superstructure deck, port side, on line with after end of pilot house, a long half fragment passing out through the skin of the ship.

One 5-inch came over starboard rail a little farther aft and passed out through port bulwarks.

Six 6-pounders came over same way between superstructure and poop, and passed out through hammock nettings on port side.

One 8-inch passed clean through both sides, starboard to port, just under after break of superstructure deck and near mainmast.

One 6-inch came in starboard rail abaft mainmast and passed out through port hammock netting.

Seven large shells, probably 5-inch, ripped across superstructure deck, coming from direction of starboard bow.

One 8-inch across forecastle from starboard to port dismantled starboard 6-pounder gun, cutting away the mount.

One 6-inch shell passed through the shield of this gun.

Three 6-pounders from starboard to port passed through mount of port 6-pounder gun.

One small raking shell gouged skin of ship just forward of port sponson.

One large shell ripped poop in front of mizzenmast.

One large shell cut starboard binnacle stand.

Three large shells ripped poop deck, coming from direction of starboard bow.

Two large shells burst under poop, one near break and one aft, forcing up the deck.

The left side of after 4.7-inch gun shield and the sponson rail were cut through by a 6-inch shell.

Total hits observable: Four 8-inch, three 6-inch, one 5-inch, and fourteen other large shells; ten 6-pounder and one other small shell; thirty-three projectiles in all.

Admiral Montojo states:

The *Ulloa* * * * was sunk by the holes made along her water line by the enemy's projectiles.

DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA.

This vessel was sunk by the Spaniards behind Cavite Arsenal, in Bacoor Bay, about two cables off shore abreast the west arsenal gate, after retiring from battle at the end of the first engagement. She was anchored by the port anchor and sank heading east, her topgallant forecastle above water and poop awash. After being abandoned, and while sinking, she was set on fire by a party from the *Petrel* sent for that purpose, and burned from the after engine-room bulkhead to the stern. Her starboard guns remained trained on the bow, and port ones on the beam.

Twelve empty 6 pounder cartridge shells lay at starboard forecastle gun and nine at the port one. A full box of 1-pounder ammunition remained on starboard side of superstructure near the pilot house.

The injuries to this vessel were as follows:

Two 6-pounders, or smaller, scarred foremast.

One 6-pounder and one 5-inch entered port side under topgallant forecastle and burst without causing fire.

One 6-inch or 8-inch passed through superstructure deck under the

bridge on port side and burst in the captain's galley, causing no fire, there being no woodwork in its neighborhood.

Another similar shell coming from same direction (one and one-half points abaft the beam) struck the superstructure deck near the corner of the pilot house, glanced up and demolished the steering wheel and gear and engine telegraphs.

Two 6-pounders passed through the pilot house, one from port to starboard low, and one from starboard to port halfway up.

One 5-inch cut through the mizzenmast about halfway up.

One 5-inch entered under port hawse pipe and burst, damaging port torpedo tube.

One 6-pounder entered at waterway under superstructure on main deck, port side.

One 5-inch entered port hammock netting abreast the mainmast.

One 6-pounder struck the rail abaft the port after 4 7-inch gun.

No further injuries were found after the vessel was raised. Summing up, she was hit by the following shells: Two 6-inch or 8-inch, four 5-inch, five 6-pounders, and to other small shells; thirteen projectiles in all.

The *Austria* has two bow torpedo tubes. When raised a 14.2-inch Schwartzkopff torpedo was in the upper starboard outboard rack abreast the tube, and another lay on the deck in rear of the starboard tube without a head.

The *Austria* assisted in rescuing the men from the *Castilla* before retiring behind the arsenal.

ISLA DE LUZON.

This vessel and the *Isla de Cuba* maneuvered together on the Spanish right flank, more retired than the other vessels, circling together at considerable speed. The *Luzon* retired behind the arsenal at the end of the first engagement, anchoring near the *Austria*, and was sunk by her own crew. Her stern settled upon a submerged wreck, keeping the cabin above water and the topgallant forecastle awash. After sinking her head lay northeast, she being about a cable's length southwest of the *Austria*. She was set on fire and burned by the same party which burned the *Austria*, the damage by fire being almost identical.

One 4.7-inch common shell, nose fuzed, remained in a rack between the after guns.

The injuries by gun fire were as follows:

One large shell crossed her rail in wake of the two forward guns, disabling both guns.

One shell cut the chain topping lift of the fore gaff, letting the peak fall across the bridge.

The *Luzon* assisted the *Cuba* in rescuing men from the *Reina Cristina* before retiring behind the arsenal.

Admiral Montojo states that—

The *Luzon* had three guns dismantled and some small injuries to her hull.

There seem, therefore, to have been three hits in all. No additional injuries could be discovered when this vessel was raised.

ISLA DE CUBA.

Admiral Montojo transferred his flag to this vessel when the *Cristina* was abandoned. After rescuing a part of the latter's crew she stood in behind the arsenal and was anchored by the starboard anchor a cable's length southwest of the *Luzon*, heading southeast. She was sunk by the Spaniards and burned by the *Petrel's* party in the same manner as the *Austria* and *Luzon*. Her main-battery guns remained trained on the bow. This vessel used armor-piercing shells from her after 4.7-inch guns, and these being the only guns of that caliber firing armor-piercing shells in the engagement, it must have been one of these which struck the *Baltimore*.

The injuries to the *Cuba* were as follows:

One 6-pounder through the pilot house, starboard to port.

One shell cut away both forward vangs abreast the pilot-house rail.

One 6-pounder passed through under the topgallant forecastle without exploding.

One 6-pounder glanced from left side of starboard after 4.7-inch gun shield.

One 6-pounder struck conning tower shoulder high, but did not penetrate.

Total hits, four 6-pounders and one unknown caliber; five in all.

The *Cuba* showed no additional injuries when raised.

MARQUES DEL DUERO.

The *Duero* was in action in the left wing of the Spanish line and under steam. She assisted in rescuing the survivors of the *Cristina* and retired like the others behind the arsenal, where she was anchored close to the shore, about 800 yards west of the *Cuba*, heading east, and was there scuttled and abandoned. A party from the *Petrel* burned her. She was entirely gutted by fire and lies with bulwarks awash. She shows the following injuries from gun fire:

One 8-inch shell entered close under topgallant forecastle deck, starboard side, and probably exploded.

One 6-inch very close to the latter, probably exploded; there being no evidences of egress by either of these shells.

One 6-pounder passed through midship-gun sponson, starboard side, forward of gun shield.

One 6-pounder passed through after bulwarks, starboard side, down through deck and out port side near break of poop.

Admiral Montojo reports:

The *Duero* had one engine crippled, as well as her 12-centimeter bow gun and one of her sponsons.

Thus there seem to have been five hits in all.

VELASCO.

This vessel was undergoing extensive repairs and lay at moorings near the east water front of Cavite arsenal. Her main deck in wake of the boilers had been removed to take out the latter, which were on shore. A new superstructure deck had been laid, but was unfinished. She had no steering gear in place. She took no part in the action. All her guns had been removed to be mounted in shore batteries. She was sunk by the Spaniards after the first engagement and then burned by a party from the *Petrel*. She lies on an even keel, heading westward, with bulwarks awash, and was not seriously injured by fire. There are evidences of the explosion of a quantity of small-arm ammunition on her deck aft, probably when she was burned. She was struck by one stray shell, which crossed her stern from port to starboard, carrying away the taffrail and keedge-anchor fluke on starboard quarter.

GENERAL LEZO.

Admiral Montojo states that this vessel was under repair and not in action. After the second engagement she was found anchored in Bacoor Bay by the port anchor about 2 cables south of the *Luzon*, heading south and settling. She was burned by a party from the *Petrel*, her after magazine exploding with great violence, as well as some ammunition on deck. Her midship guns were missing and, although she had a bow torpedo tube, there were no evidences of torpedoes on board. The elevating gear of her 9-centimeter bow gun had been damaged by a projectile. She lies with main deck about 2 feet under water.

ARGOS.

The *Argos* was a hydrographic survey vessel lightly armed and not in the fight. She remained anchored behind the arsenal about 800 yards west of the *Velasco*, and was scuttled by the Spaniards and burned by a party from the *Petrel*. She settled till her bulwarks were awash, heading east. One large shell struck her starboard bulwarks at break of forecastle, passing outward.

Summary of hits in evidence or officially reported.

Name of vessel.	Number of hits.	Remarks.
Reina Cristina	39	Probably not more than half.
Castilla	40	Do.
Don Antonio de Ulloa	33	Do.
Don Juan de Austria	13	Complete record.
Isla de Cuba	5	Do.
Isla de Luzon	3	Do.
Marques del Duero	5	Probably more.
Velasco	1	Probably all.
General Lezo	1	Do.
Argos	1	Do.
Total	141	

Of these, thirteen were 8 inch, six 6-inch, and twenty-two others 5-inch or larger; thirty-one were 6-pounders and twenty-nine others smaller calibers.

The Spanish ships had removed all light spars, slung gaffs, and snaked rigging, but they went into action without unshipping awning stanchions, ridge ropes, or canopy frames, and they carried many of their boats. They were all painted gray except the *Castilla*. She was still white except her gun sponsons, which were gray, and her smoke-stacks yellow.

The killed and wounded, as nearly as I have been able to ascertain by painstaking inquiry, were as follows:

Vessel.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Reina Cristina	130	90	220
Castilla.....	23	80	103
Isla de Cuba		2	2
Isla de Luzon.....		6	6
Don Juan de Austria.....		22	22
Don Antonio de Ulloa.....	8	10	18
Marques del Duero.....	0	0	0
Shore batteries.....	6	4	10
Total.....	167	214	381

Officers killed and included in the above: *Reina Christina*, captain and six others; *Castilla*, one; *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, captain and two others.

The total casualties agree with Admiral Montojo's official report.

The following points in connection with my examination seem to be brought out or emphasized:

1. The sides of iron and steel built cruisers do not arrest projectiles enough to explode them.
2. The incendiary effect of bursting 8-inch shells is great, and far greater than would seem proportionate to that of lower calibers.
3. At ranges over 2,500 yards the gun shields of cruisers are in no sense a protection, but insure the annihilation of the gun's crew and the disabling of the gun if struck by a large projectile.
4. War ships of the present day will generally be placed hors de combat by conflagration and the destruction of their personnel before they are sunk by gun fire.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. ELLICOTT,
Lieutenant, United States Navy, Intelligence Officer.

To the COMMANDING OFFICER, U. S. S. BALTIMORE.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES No. VI.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

BLOCKADES AND COAST DEFENSE.

BY

SEVERO GÓMEZ NÚÑEZ,
CAPTAIN OF ARTILLERY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH.



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
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INTRODUCTORY.

Since the issue of the interesting diary by Lieut. Müller y Tejeiro, of the Spanish navy, there has been nothing written in Spain on the war worthy of reproduction until lately a work by Severo Gómez Núñez, a captain of artillery, who served in the city of Habana during the war. The aversion of the Spaniards to writing on the war and their reticence thereon is characterized by the writer as a "deathlike silence." In his final conclusions he states:

It is surprising how much has been written in foreign countries on the Spanish-American war during these few months. We have before us dozens of American, English, French, Italian, and German books, reviews, and periodicals, in which writers relate, to their hearts' content, the phases of our defeat. And in the face of this wonderful activity, which often interprets erroneously the causes of the appalling decline of Spain, we, on the other hand, preserve deathlike silence. This is not as it should be. In the United States, for instance, there is not a single officer of high rank who took an active part in the war but has furnished, in books or reviews, an exposition of the facts, substantiated by documents, and the Government, in its turn, has followed the same plan and published reports of the Army and Navy. Among us, as stated, deathlike silence reigns, and thus it is that foreign critics lack all knowledge of our claims to vindication which, though slight, may nevertheless throw light on many things, for by the side of much that is bad and for which we are being justly censured, there is also some good which is being ignored, while it should be truthfully and conscientiously set forth, so that we may not be judged without being heard and considered more inefficient and incapable than we really are.

The correspondence of Admiral Cervera, which was published by the Office of Naval Intelligence at the close of the recent war with Spain, and was obtainable only in part, is given in full in this work.

This translation of Captain Núñez's book is complete except where indicated in the first chapter. The paragraphs there omitted are the personal opinions of Captain Núñez regarding the actions of our people. His feelings under the circumstances are pardonable, but his ideas have no historical value.

The concluding chapter of a previous work on the Spanish-American war by Captain Núñez, entitled *Ships, Guns, and Small Arms*, is given in Appendix A.

Appendix B is the decree of the council assembled in the trial of General José Toral Velásquez, commander in chief of the Spanish

forces, and other officers engaged in the defense and surrender of Santiago de Cuba, translated from *El Mundo Naval Ilustrado* of September 15 and October 1, 1899.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,

Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *October 5, 1899.*

Approved:

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD,

Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

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THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

BLOCKADES AND COAST DEFENSE.

By SEVERO GÓMEZ NÚÑEZ, Captain of Artillery.

[Translated from the Spanish.]

INTRODUCTION.

I frankly acknowledge that I had considerable misgivings when I gave the first book of this work to the public.

I was afraid that a storm would be raised against it, and although I always try to use moderation in my criticism, I had at times to fight with so many obstacles in conforming to that line of conduct that I was tempted to tear up what I had written.

But the conviction triumphed within me that anyone who knows *anything* relative to the defeats we have suffered is under moral obligations to speak out, and that by doing so he renders a valuable service, because nothing is gained by suffering in silence; on the contrary, by clearly setting forth the facts we make the benefits inherent in truth accessible to all, and at the same time, by conveying an accurate knowledge of the errors which have brought us to our present pitiful condition, we give a better understanding of the responsibilities which, in the distribution of the same, fall to each entity, and of the dangers which the future has in reserve for us—dangers of death, of absolute dissolution, of complete annihilation—which will fall down upon us with crushing force, unless we place our whole trust and energy at the service of one single idea, the *defense, preservation, and development of what there is left to us of our country.*

Fully convinced of the necessity of promulgating these theories, I put in print the second volume of *The Spanish-American War*, inspired by the same motives as set forth in the preface to that work, although at present I possess more freedom of action, since I do not labor under the disadvantages which I experienced before. The cause of this change is the good will and approval with which the public has received the first part of this work, entitled *Ships, Guns, and Small Arms*, and the kindness with which the press has commented upon it. From these circumstances I gather the conviction that the great mass of the people is not indifferent to the causes of the present terrible decline of Spain, and that therefore it will not be labor lost to examine into the disaster for the purpose of deriving lessons therefrom and obtaining the means for obviating still more radical misfortunes.

As the subject of the present volume, I propose to analyze the principal system of warfare (if I may be permitted to use that term) which the

United States employed against our colonies—the blockade—in order to explain the fatal circumstances which rendered efficacious a course of action hitherto looked upon as a secondary means of little consequence in naval conflicts, and will then enter upon an analysis of coast defense and show, always with reference to the results of the Spanish-American war, how necessary it is for our country to prepare for the defensive, applying the maxim of *less theory and more practice, less studies and more action.*

And when I set down these words, with which I closed the first book of this work, it must not be supposed that I deem studies and theory superfluous; on the contrary, the less studies are required in the execution of anything, the more studies are necessary in the preparation therefor. Technical knowledge is becoming each day more indispensable, and we may be sure that as its foundation grows more solid the mind will be more and more freed from fantastical schemes, followed by irresolute action, with serious detriment to the service. What I mean is this, that to defend our coasts it is not sufficient to widen the field by studies *a posteriori*, when the essential thing, a knowledge of the harbors, is an already much abused matter, on the subject of which innumerable plans have been drawn and lucid essays written; we should also understand that our tendency should be to begin with the acquisition of the most modern and perfect material with which to equip our works of defense, because the factors of defense and, to a certain extent, their location are subordinate to their equipment. There was a time when it was possible to pursue the opposite course; that is to say, to construct fortifications with numerous emplacements for guns, which were to be had in large numbers; but nowadays, when guns are very expensive and of complicated construction, it is indispensable to have the guns first and adapt to them the works of defense, and that is precisely what requires a great deal of previous study on the part of those who are called upon to decide as to the acquisition of our future war material, because, as was said by a general of our army, well known for his scientific learning:

They should be inspired with the most complete knowledge of the technical principles which underlie modern inventions, and it is only with such knowledge and the application of the results achieved in other countries, together with further experiments in our own, that the problems which present themselves, one after another, can be speedily solved and the country prepared for the future.

To these ideas we might add the advisability of giving an impulse, on a large scale, to our military industries—gun, shell, cartridge, and powder factories—but as the men who are at present in charge of our military matters appear to have realized this, we do not deem it necessary to insist upon it.

But it should be remembered that nothing we have said is opposed to the rapid development of our defenses, with *less studies and more action.*

SEVERO GÓMEZ NÚÑEZ.

MADRID, *Jurç* 2, 1899.

CHAPTER I.

THE UNITED STATES PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

POLITICAL BLINDNESS—WHAT SPAIN COULD DO—WHAT THE UNITED STATES COULD DO—NAVAL STRATEGY.

Anyone who had not seen the war coming must have been blind.

* * * * *
To us the war seemed inevitable and imminent. Nevertheless the news which reached Cuba from the Peninsula revealed great confidence that the conflict would be settled peaceably. The mistake was patent and the harm it worked was infinite. This hope should never have been harbored in Spain, and yet there were people who believed in it, and their belief seemed warranted by the absolute calm that reigned, for neither in Spain nor in Cuba were any of those rapid and energetic measures taken which the war demanded in the way of provisioning the country, concentrating the troops, and developing the naval power.

The plan of campaign of the United States commenced to be clearly outlined. The astonishing voracity of the press in that country gave free play to its anxiety and devoted itself to sketching the outlines of the naval and military operations likely to be undertaken against us. The Yankee strategists attached the greatest importance to our navy, which appeared to be quite strong judging from the published lists of our warships and the attributes with which they were credited, among others the speed and efficiency claimed for our destroyers, which really succeeded in producing a certain panic among the United States sailors. We feel sure that the exaggerated reports about the expedition of which they formed part were not without influence on the subsequent maneuvers of the United States squadron.

In the United States the war was considered so imminent that more than two months before it broke out, namely, on February 13, the New York Herald gave to the press a complete plan of operations, which was considered of semiofficial character.¹

Much of this plan was so rational that there could be no doubt as to its having been traced by an expert hand, and it might very well have been taken as a basis for the future policy of our country. But perhaps our Government had better information. We had not, and, moreover, there was so much consistency between what the plan said, what logical reasoning advised, and what the Americans did that we will take it for the basis of our argument.

¹ We considered it of sufficient importance to undertake the task of translating and publishing it in the *Diario del Ejército* at Habana. It appears to have been inspired by the strategic board.

It might be objected that there could be little foundation for a plan of war which was imparted beforehand to the enemy. Anticipating this objection, we will say that anyone who has lived in the United States and is acquainted with its mode of being knows that there is nothing hidden in that country. This special idiosyncrasy is carried to such a degree that even the most secret plans are published. As an example, we might cite the filibustering expeditions, which were always announced beforehand and afterwards confirmed by facts.

In the plan of war referred to, the following questions were discussed:

In case war should be declared between Spain and the United States, what would be the plans of campaign of the two nations?

Would Spain be the first to take the offensive?

Would the initial action be taken by the United States?

Would the struggle be easy if carried abroad, on land or on the sea, or in both places, and to what extent?

These different subjects are discussed in the following manner:

In strategy there are three things which demand special consideration:

(1) The base of operations.

(2) The objective.

(3) The line of operations.

The base of operations is the position from which the forces are able to advance and to which they can withdraw.

The objective comprises four different phases: Attack upon the enemy's commerce; bombardments of hostile ports; blockade of hostile coasts; invasion of hostile territory.

The line of operations designates the place where the fighting occurs—that is to say, the scene of war generally.

THE SPANISH BASE OF OPERATIONS.

The principal base of operations for Spain would be the island of Cuba, and for the United States, Key West. Cuba is the largest island of the West Indies and the most important Spanish colony. It is situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, 130 miles south of the State of Florida and 75 miles distant from Key West, from which it is separated by the Florida Channel. To the east, the island is separated from Haiti by the Windward Passage, which is over 50 miles wide; 90 miles to the south, in the Caribbean Sea, lies the island of Jamaica; to the west, Yucatan Channel, 130 miles wide, separates it from the nearest part of Central America.

The extent of its coasts, leaving minor sinuosities out of the question, is 2,600 miles. The littoral is very dangerous and full of rocks and reefs, and of sand banks extending several miles into the sea. Owing to these sand banks there are only few places where it is possible to land. There are not to exceed fourteen bays of sufficient depth to allow warships of average draught to enter.

Hence there are along the coasts arms of the sea which are protected by keys and sand banks and can only be entered through straits and sinuous channels, at the extremities of which the bays open, or which terminate toward the outside, between sand banks, in the shape of bays.

This configuration must be taken into consideration from a strategic standpoint and from the point of view of the advantages and disadvantages which these coasts present. From what has been stated it will be seen that it would not be a difficult operation to close the ports of Cuba against a foe and leave them open as places of safety and refuge for the friend.

WHAT SPAIN COULD DO.

For the defense of the eastern part of Cuba Spain could keep the Windward Passage under surveillance, using it as a lookout upon the Caribbean Sea. On that side the island terminates in Cape Maysi. The Windward Passage at the place where it separates this cape from Haiti is about 45 miles wide. Practically the whole navigation between the eastern coasts of the United States and the lower part of Central America goes through this passage. Cape Maysi is a point of low land, uninhabitable, without any port; the nearest anchorage is the harbor of Baracoa, 25 miles distant, on the northern coast of the island.

The base of operations of a squadron designed to blockade the Windward Passage might be either Baracoa on the northern coast or Guantánamo on the southern coast. The harbors of both are sufficiently deep for warships of large draught.

THE DEFENSIVE SQUADRON.

Two squadrons would be necessary, one to operate on the north from Baracoa, the other on the south from Guantánamo, and in order to insure cooperation between the two fleets a line would be required from sea to sea across the country. When this line is established and the patrol of the Windward Passage and the Caribbean Sea provided for, the action would have to be extended to the northern channels toward the central part of Cuba, farther remote from the passage referred to. For that purpose another harbor would be required to serve as a depot not far from Baracoa—Nipe, for instance, 75 miles distant from the former.

The harbor of Nipe is very safe and its water deep. This bay is 9 miles long and from 3 to 7 miles wide. The distance of 75 miles from Baracoa could be made by the squadron in five hours if necessary, or one division might be kept at Nipe and the other in the Windward Passage, one of which could be cruising while the other remained at its station.

BAHAMA CHANNEL.

From Nipe the Bahama Channel can be effectively blockaded by the Spanish fleet. The limits of the cruising line from Nipe might be 150 miles, from the island of Lobos to Crooked Island, 600 miles from Puerto Rico.

A powerful hostile squadron might make an attack from the northeast, in which case the Bahama Channel and Windward Passage would play an important part, because it is there that the principal battles would take place.

The ships necessary to close these passages and operate in the south in case hostile forces should present themselves from that direction would be 3 armored cruisers, 4 cruisers of large tonnage, 8 smaller ones (including gunboats and seagoing torpedo boats), and a few torpedo boats as adjuncts of the armored cruisers.

The fleet required to control the sea on the northern and eastern coast of Cuba might consist in all of 3 armored cruisers, situated 150 miles apart, 4 large protected cruisers at intermediate stations relative to the former, and 8 smaller cruisers or gunboats between each of the large cruisers and the line of harbors which serve as bases.

Such a fleet, in the positions indicated, could be concentrated in twelve hours at any point where the enemy might appear with sufficient forces and with the intention of breaking through the line, and would moreover guard a good part of the Windward and Mona passages, so as to prevent hostile attacks from the south.

As we have stated, the squadron of the south might be stationed at Guantánamo; but this harbor might prove inadequate for the needs of the large squadron of the north, especially in connection with the southern squadron.

If that should be the case, the harbor of Santiago de Cuba would constitute a better base for the fleet, as it has better resources. It is situated 5 miles from the coast, and can be reached only through a narrow channel which is intricate and tortuous and in several places only 200 feet wide.

THE KEY TO THE ISLAND.

On the northwest Cuba is bounded by Florida Channel, 130 miles wide, and Yucatan Channel, 100 miles wide. For operations in Florida Channel, the base might be a line 45 miles long connecting Habana with Matanzas. These two cities play the most important part from the standpoint of strategy and commerce.

Habana, the capital of Cuba, is the key to the island; but its defenses, like those of all other Cuban harbors, are old and vulnerable and equipped with guns that are not adapted for attacks upon modern armored ships.

Habana is practically undefended,¹ and yet, by adequate defenses for its harbor and coasts, it might have been made an impregnable base of operations, and at the same time a base for refitting and a safe depot for men as well as supplies of every kind for the ships, and the center of the necessary reserves.

Matanzas, the other extreme point of the western base, is a much smaller city than Habana, its population reaching only 70,000 at most. The channel is 4 miles long and 1 mile wide, and is defended by three antiquated batteries.

The coast between Habana and Matanzas is open and can be safely navigated at a distance of 3 miles. Within this base the ships can cruise without danger by day and night. If the adversaries should attempt to effect a landing here, they might find it impossible, provided there were some mobile defenses and some means for harassing the enemy on the sea. This action could be further extended by controlling the 80 miles of the Florida Channel in the manner indicated below, and the result would be the destruction of the hostile commerce in that direction. A first-class battle ship could be stationed midway of the channel, 40 miles from Habana, and one armored cruiser between this battle ship and Key West, and another between the battle ship and Habana. On both sides of the line formed by these three large ships would be placed large protected cruisers, and in the intervals between them dispatch boats.

YUCATAN CHANNEL.

In this arm of the sea might be stationed three cruisers, assisted by three or four gunboats, to watch for and pursue merchant vessels. At Cape San Antonio there are no harbors, but good anchorages are quite near where the gunboats could have their stations. In case they should find it necessary to go into port, there is Batabanó, between cays, but well marked by bnoys, and with 12 feet of water. Gunboats would be quite safe here, because no large ships can enter from without.

ATTACK UPON COMMERCE.

Having indicated the bases of operations which Spain might occupy in order to render both the defensive and offensive effective, and having examined into this second and most important conception of strategy, we will branch out on some other considerations.

The principal objective of attack will be the enemy's maritime commerce. The disposition of the Spanish fleet as above set forth will facilitate the pursuit of United States vessels navigating in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

All merchant vessels bound for Central America passing through the straits between the West Indian islands would be at the mercy of a couple of cruisers of the *Alabama* type.

If Spain wanted to operate against the commerce of the United States, she would have to watch, besides the Caribbean Sea, the outer part of the Gulf Stream, beginning at Cape Hatteras, in the vicinity of which the merchant vessels bound for the south usually leave the Gulf to avoid the current.

¹In treating of the defenses of Habana we shall see how erroneous this opinion was.

Another important point where the commerce with North America might be intercepted is about 1,000 to 1,200 miles east of New York, in a circle not exceeding 300 miles in diameter. At this place pass all the merchant vessels from Europe bound for the eastern ports of the United States.

THE SPANISH COMMERCE ENDANGERED.

We should remember that in warfare upon commerce the party attacking may suffer as much damage as the party attacked. Suppose Spain should intend the destruction of the United States commerce. In that case she might lose her own maritime commerce, for the simple reason that she would be compelled to devote the ships which are necessary for the protection of her commercial routes to the pursuit and destruction of hostile merchant vessels in the courses which they in their turn have to follow.

The Spanish merchant marine consists of 960 vessels, 402 of which are steamers of over 1,000 tons; 37 of these have a tonnage of over 3,000 and 37 are of tonnage between 2,000 and 3,000. Thirty-two of all the merchant vessels have a speed of 12 knots, and only 2 of them attain 16 knots an hour. These latter vessels are therefore subventioned by the Government, and in case of war they must be placed at the disposal of Spain. The greater part of her commerce would be placed outside of her flag.

BOMBARDMENTS AND BLOCKADES.

Among the main objectives is the possibility of Spain bombarding, blockading, or invading the United States coasts.

Bombardments appear attractive, but would not be of much avail, if practicable at all. The large cities of the United States cannot be reached by the guns of a hostile fleet without great danger to the fleet itself. A superior and powerful navy might take the risk, but for an inferior navy like the Spanish it would mean meeting disaster half way.

LANDING OF FORCES.

The landing of Spanish forces in the United States is a hypothesis which must be rejected. If Spain had a squadron of the first order she might invest Key West, although even then it would require a bombardment in good earnest to reduce the forts defending the entrance. But this would not be of any advantage, as our forces would be at a distance from the "Key," beyond the range of the guns of the fleet. The naval station might be destroyed and some coal captured, but to reduce the place would require a large amount of ammunition, which would be difficult to replace, and it would not be worth spending it for that purpose.

From these few remarks it may be concluded that Spain's only objective would be the destruction of our commerce, especially to the West Indies, where our traffic is extensive and our prestige great. These losses would injure us, but they would not profit Spain either and would have no influence on the duration of the war. The depredations of the *Alabama* were of no influence on the conclusion of hostilities between the North and South.

THE LINE OF OPERATIONS.

The third point of importance in naval strategy is the line of operations, which in this case is clearly indicated. It would consist in protecting Cuba by means of an offensive fleet, acting as a defensive fleet, as far remote from the coasts as possible; that is to say, this fleet would always have to maintain contact with the bases of operations and be in condition at any time to search for and annihilate any hostile forces that might attempt to enter its waters by forcing a passage. If the passage were forced it would probably be impossible to eject the enemy. If the Spanish fleet should be victorious, it would then be in condition to attempt blockades and bombardments.

On the other hand the Spanish fleet might be defeated, its line broken, its forces demoralized, and then Habana and Matanzas, Yucatan Channel, and the Windward Passage would fall into our hands, and Cuba would cease to be a Spanish colony.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES COULD DO.

The plan of campaign sets forth that the principles of strategy require from the outset the number of ships that will be necessary for the defensive as well as the offensive; it indicates the theories to which they would have to conform and states that the scene of war would be the same for them as for us, but with the advantage in their favor that the United States forces would be a thousand times better situated than the Spanish. It then proceeds to treat of the invasion of Spain.

It states that the invasion of Spain would probably not enter into the plan of campaign, but that no doubt attacks might be made by war ships upon the fortified harbors of Spain, in which case the fire of cruisers of the most modern type would rage in the bays of Biscay and of the Atlantic.

To invade the Peninsula would require many transports to take the troops across the ocean. The long line of communication would have to be protected and the army of Cuba might constitute another obstacle requiring an army to fight it. Nevertheless the invasion would follow if the first attack were crowned with success. This first attack, of course, would be made upon Cuba.

ATTACK UPON HABANA.

Cuba can be reached easily. The lines of communication are short and can be protected without difficulty, and, moreover, in the very heart of the hostile country we should find thousands of allies. It is a question to be carefully considered whether it will be necessary to make an invasion of the island. Contributions of arms, food, and military supplies sent to the interior by our war ships would weaken the Spanish forces and encourage the Cuban insurgents, so that the military forces required by the United States would be less than an army corps. There is a saying that Napoleon ended in Spain. Well, Spain might end in the Pearl of the Antilles.

CHARACTER OF THE WAR.

Thus the war would from the beginning be of a naval character and the fight would be concluded in a short time. We need not speak of the confidence of our people in this fact; nevertheless we do not want to indulge in exaggerations which would cause disappointment if the conflict should not be short, because there are many things which can not be foreseen, and the Americans should not be put in the same class with the unfortunate French people, who in 1870 shouted: "On to Berlin!" and whose predictions of one month of campaign were ridiculed by every nation.

It is true that the forces we have at our disposal are superior to those of Spain in every class except that of torpedo boats; it is also certain that the auxiliary fleet under our flag is much larger and can be mobilized more readily, and that, leaving valor entirely out of the question, the discipline and training of our Navy are of a very high order, because superior intelligence and noble traditions animate our service, and it is equally certain that our facilities for refitting are superior and that we have better resources for meeting the expenses incident to a war. It is further

true that our house is better guarded, that we can supply our forces more easily with coal, provisions, and war supplies, and that we have yards for construction and repairs conveniently at hand.

COALING AND REPAIRING.

In the matter of coaling facilities we have an enormous advantage, because the Spanish ships have to rely to a great extent on imports from without. They would have to get coal from friendly nations, who, through the obligations of international laws, would have to become neutrals.

The coal depots in Spain would soon become exhausted and the resupply might prove difficult, if it is not entirely prevented by our cruisers on the sea. There would also be great difficulties in the matter of making repairs which, while often necessary in time of peace, become numerous in time of war.

The task of our Navy would be the reduction of Habana, the blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the equipment of the Cuban insurgents, the destruction of Spanish commerce, and the defense of our bases of supplies and other ports. This is work of tremendous magnitude and will require great energy. Naval battles must be fought before Habana will fall into our hands, and to this object we shall be able to devote all the ships of our Navy that are not required for the protection of our coasts.

The catastrophe of the *Maine* occurred on the 15th day of February, 1898, at half past 9 o'clock at night, and this plan of war against Spain, as set forth above, was published two days prior to that date, on February 13, in the Herald. This is one more circumstance in support of the fact that that catastrophe was simply a pretext skilfully utilized by the Americans for launching themselves into the fight, and that the latter had long been decided upon and was one of the secret aspirations of the United States.

But this plan of campaign, as well as many other manifestations of hostility against us, might well have been thoroughly considered by those who were at the head of our affairs, in order to adopt the more rational of the two following propositions:

If we had a squadron that could measure itself with the United States fleet on equal terms—then on to war!

If we did not have such a squadron, nor any resources, nor any support, and if we had no plan and were not able to formulate one—then we should by all means acknowledge this to ourselves and avoid the war.

Was it so very difficult to decide which of these two courses would be best?

The facts which we give further on show that the problem was clear and simple. There could be no doubt as to the fact that we had no squadron to speak of. If with the knowledge and in spite of all this the war was nevertheless necessary for absolutely imperious reasons which are beyond my ken, then we had to enter into it with all possible energy, without beating about the bush, and set on foot all offensive means that we could possibly raise.

Nothing but the most vigorous and heroic initiative could keep our national honor intact.

CHAPTER II.

BLOCKADES AND PRIVATEERING.

LAWS REGULATING THEM—LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL— BRUTALITY OF BLOCKADES—BLOCKADING ON A LARGE SCALE.

Pasquale Fiore defines blockades as operations of war which consist in surrounding a hostile coast in order to intercept all communication by sea, maintaining an arc around such coast with a number of ships that are really and effectively in condition to prevent by force any ship which might attempt to cross the blockading line from doing so, without exposing themselves to be sunk by the guns of the station vessels.¹

¹The principal rules which at present govern blockades may be summed up as follows:

(1) *Objects of a blockade.*—A belligerent may blockade, in whole or in part, the coasts, ports, and roadsteads of the hostile country, as far as may be necessary to attain the object of the war; but the war must actually exist, and in case of civil war, one of the parties must be seeking to recover the right of sovereignty in the territory which it occupies together with the other party.

(2) *Different kinds of blockades.*—A blockade may be simple or by notification. It is considered as by notification when formal notice of the same has been given to other nations by the nation establishing it. Other blockades are termed simple. In the former case, the captured parties must establish discontinuity of the blockade in order to become exempt from the penalties imposed upon those who break it. In the latter case, it devolves upon the captors to establish the existence of the blockade at the time of the capture.

(3) *Authority of the commander in chief of the forces.*—When the commander in chief of a squadron establishes the blockade of a port, the blockade is not to be considered void for lack of special authority, unless the respective government has disauthorized such commander in chief. Some doubt the right of a commander in chief to order a blockade without instructions when he is near the seat of his Government, where it would be easy to receive such instructions; but the more generally accepted opinion is to the contrary.

(4) *Necessity of notification.*—A private neutral vessel bound for a blockaded port is not liable to capture unless it has been expressly notified of the blockade, and such notice entered on the ship's log, by a vessel of the squadron maintaining the blockade. The intention alone of entering a blockaded port, when this fact is not connected with others, is not sufficient to decree the condemnation of a neutral vessel. Notification of the blockade given to the government of a neutral nation is considered sufficient for the citizens of that nation.

(5) *Effectiveness of blockades.*—In order to be binding, the blockade must be maintained with a number of ships sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy's coasts. As a general rule, temporary absence of the ships maintaining the blockade is permitted. The blockade ceases when the ships maintaining it withdraw for any reason, giving rise to the conclusion that the enterprise has been abandoned, at least temporarily.

(6) *Breach of a blockade.*—If the blockade is absolute, it is considered broken by any positive act committed by a vessel for the purpose of entering or leaving the blockaded port, except in case of injury or distress.

(7) *Penalties.*—The penalty threatening those who break the blockade of a port is confiscation of both vessel and cargo.

According to him, therefore, the blockade is the occupation of waters within the jurisdiction of the enemy, which naturally carries with it an exercise of sovereignty which is estimated differently by different writers on international law; for while Hübner, Ortolán, and Hautefeuille admit that the belligerent party acquires that sovereignty when it occupies waters within the jurisdiction of its enemy, others are of opinion that such right is not incontrovertible, because the blockaded coast is almost always in the power of the enemy, who exercises his sovereignty as far as the range of the guns of his ports extends, and that therefore the right of blockade is really practiced on the high seas where the blockading vessels are stationed, and those seas are not subject to any State. Hence the generally accepted opinion is that the blockade is founded solely on an exigency of war, to which neutrals must submit, although it prejudices them. Gessner, following the opinion of Grotius, also considers blockades a necessity of war which should be confined to cases in which they are absolutely indispensable; and Dudley Field (*Outlines of an International Code*, art. 891) says that belligerents can only blockade military ports, and only as far as may be necessary to take possession of contraband of war, meaning by "military port" a fortified harbor or one occupied by more troops than are required for the maintenance of internal order. He bases this opinion on the principle that the hardships of a blockade will be effective only in ports belonging to an island or which unite exceptional conditions.¹

There can be no doubt that the island of Cuba united these conditions, and hence it is that in the United States' plan of campaign, which we have described in the preceding chapter, the blockade played quite an important part, in as far as it relates to the operations of the Americans, as also to the operations of defense against any which the Spanish might undertake, for they realized that, owing to our lack of naval power, the island of Cuba, separated from Spain by a long distance and without direct means for supporting its army and people as a result of its agricultural conditions, could be easily cut off and reduced by starvation, without much effort or bloodshed.² This was in pursuance of the theory of humanity under which the Yankees had for a long time been taking shelter to hide their intentions.

But the Americans never imagined that they might be able to establish a blockade of the entire coast of Cuba, because they were far from realizing that our squadron was as deficient as it actually was. At first, therefore, they only announced the blockade of the northern coast comprised between Bahia Honda, Habana, Matanzas, and Cardenas, and only when they had positively ascertained that not all the destroyers were coming over, and that the only ships which we could make imme-

¹In the work cited by Captain Núñez, David Dudley Field presented a draft outlining a proposed code, not one having any authoritative sanction.—O. N. I.

²The greater part of the articles of first necessity, such as flour, rice, bacon, dried beef, butter, etc., were imported into Cuba.

diately available were those of Cervera's division, was the blockade extended to the southern coast, first from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba, and subsequently to the entire island after our squadron had been closed in at Santiago Harbor. After that the blockade at times assumed the character of a veritable farce (*juerga*). With glasses we could see from the batteries of Habana, among the blockading ships and exercising functions of vigilance and even chasing coasting vessels and carrying orders back and forth, private tugs of the United States Press and pleasure yachts, on board of some of which we could distinguish lady excursionists and almost feel the excitement of champagne.

And in the face of all this, we did not even use the one method of warfare which the enemy feared, privateering, while in the United States, though not under the name of privateers, yet under that of auxiliary vessels, there were in the blockading fleet numerous craft whose functions, as a matter of fact, were identical with those of privateers.

There was, there must have been something, some secret reason which the people suspected at the time and which was, perhaps, the obstacle to our issuing letters of marque and reprisal which, by their moral force alone, would have compelled the enemy to divide his squadron, and in that case, who knows whether our defeat, if we had to suffer it, would not have been less disgraceful?

This something—could we not find out what it was? Could we not ascertain to whom we are indebted for it?

For if there were no obstacles, no embargoes, it was a grave responsibility not bravely to resolve upon privateering.

The convention which abolished privateering for some States, and was sanctioned by others, namely, by Spain, the United States, and Mexico, who were not signatories to it, and only accepted articles 2, 3, and 4, says:

APPENDIX TO PROTOCOL No. XXII.

DECLARATION.

The plenipotentiaries who signed the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, assembled in conference,

Considering that,

Whereas the maritime law in time of war has for a long time been the subject of unpleasant controversies; and

Whereas the uncertainty of the law and duties relative to this matter gives rise, among neutrals and belligerents, to differences of opinion which may lead to serious difficulties and even conflicts; and

Whereas it would therefore be of advantage to establish a uniform doctrine on a point of such great importance; and

Whereas the plenipotentiaries assembled at the Congress of Paris could not better voice the intentions of their respective Governments than by trying to introduce into the international relations fixed principles on this point:

Now therefore the said plenipotentiaries, being thereunto duly authorized, have agreed to unite upon the means for attaining this object and have consequently resolved upon the following solemn declaration:

1. *Privateering is and remains abolished.*
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.

4. *Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.*

The Governments of the undersigned plenipotentiaries bind themselves to submit this declaration to the States who were not called upon to take part in the Congress of Paris, and to invite them to accede to the same.

Convinced that the above maxims can not help but be received with gratitude by the entire world, the undersigned plenipotentiaries trust that the efforts of their respective Governments in the direction indicated will meet with the most complete success.

This declaration *is not and shall not be* binding except as to the powers who have acceded to it or who will accede to it.

Done at Paris this 16th day of April, 1856.

For Austria:	BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN, HÜBNER.
For France:	A. WALEWSKI, BOURQUENEY.
For Great Britain:	CLARENDON, COWLEY.
For Prussia:	MANTEUFFEL, HATZFELDT.
For Russia:	ORLOFF, BRUNNOW.
For Sardinia:	C. CAVOUR, DE VILLAMARINA.
For Turkey:	AALI, MEHEMMED DJEMIL.

It is therefore incontrovertible that Spain, with good international law on her side, could have decreed and practiced privateering and derived from this means of commercial warfare, which the Yankees dreaded, every advantage consistent with the laws regulating it.¹

It would have been the more natural for Spain to adopt this means of warfare, as she had to do with a nation that had not acceded to the abolition of privateering, and which, for that reason, was also at liberty to practice it if it cared to. If the war had been between Spain and one of the powers which had declared themselves in favor of the abolition of privateering, it would have been quite a different thing.

¹ Privateering is completely regulated by law, and therefore offers no danger of crime nor abuse.

The conditions imposed by conventional law as well as usage, and which will always be observed by civilized nations to make privateering legitimate, are as follows:

1. The taking out of a letter of marque and reprisal.
2. The giving of security.
3. The opinion of a competent court as to the captures made by privateers.

A letter of marque and reprisal, which is to be issued by the commander in chief of the squadron, is a legal document conferring upon a private individual a commission in due form to take an active part in the operations of war and antagonize the enemy in the waters specified in such letter.

Under the Spanish law a person who wishes to equip a vessel for privateering must make application to the chief of the naval forces of his province for permission to do so, setting forth in his petition the kind of vessel he intends to equip, its displacement, the weapons and ammunition it is to carry, and the number of persons who are to form the crew, as also the securities which he offers; when these legal formalities have been complied with, the document referred to is issued to the captain of the vessel.

In the absence of such special authorization by the sovereign or the head of the State any act of aggression committed by a private individual, except in case of natural and legitimate defense, is considered piracy.

Letters of marque can be issued only to merchant vessels of the power whose

The negative attitude toward the suppression of privateering, says Ortolán, assumed by a nation like the United States or like Spain, which possesses within itself all the necessary factors for making it now, as in the past, a naval power of the first order, deprives the principle of the declaration of Paris of that character of universality which is necessary to make it an absolute and uniform rule of international naval law founded on treaties. The principle of legitimate defense inherent in sovereignty implies necessarily, for a nation engaged in warfare, the right to call to arms all its citizens, and organize on land and on the sea a national militia; this being one of the rights which writers call primitive and absolute. The powers which agreed to limit or abandon the principle of privateering pursued chiefly the object of avoiding the repetition of the abuses that were attributed to it. But such excesses are not inherent in that mode of warfare. The abuses sometimes committed by privateers should be attributed, first of all, to the uncertainty of the rights and duties between neutrals and belligerents, to which uncertainty the second and third articles of the Paris declaration put an end as far as possible by laying down a uniform doctrine as to certain important points, which had already been observed by all nations, with the exception of Great Britain.

From whatever point of view we may look at this question, the mistake remains apparent: There is no possible excuse to justify our not having taken advantage of this means of warfare.

And on the other hand, what did we gain by not practicing privateering? Was it not a covert method of privateering which the United States practiced? In this connection we reproduce below what the *Diario del Ejército of Habana* said during the blockade (June 10):

What is the United States method of warfare if not privateering? It is evident

colors they carry and over which the sovereign exercises his jurisdiction, as the law of every country, as a rule, prohibits its merchant vessels from soliciting or accepting letters of marque from foreign powers. Some treaties stipulate that the belligerent power may treat as pirate any neutral vessel in possession of a letter of marque and reprisal from the enemy of the former.

Letters of marque are usually issued for a limited term therein specified, and when that term expires they become void; that is to say, from that moment on the vessel ceases to be a privateer and becomes once more a merchant vessel. Hence, if such vessel, after the expiration of the term for which the sovereign had granted the commission, continues to practice privateering, its actions assume the character of illegality, and any captures it might make are likewise illegal and the prize courts must annul them, restore the captured vessels to liberty, make the captor pay the costs and damages, and impose upon him such penalty as the laws of the country provide for punishing such irregularity.

Letters of marque also become void as to their effects on the day when the treaty of peace is signed, and vessels captured after such date must be returned to their legitimate owners, except in case of an express stipulation modifying this general principle; but in the former case the owners of the captured vessels are not entitled to indemnity, the privateer having acted in good faith.

The property captured, whether by a warship or a privateer, and whether belonging to the enemy or to neutrals, is not conceded as a prize to the captor, unless a special court instituted for that purpose declares the capture valid and legitimate.

that they are practicing it, because not only do they utilize, in their so-called blockade, the ships of the squadron proper as privateers to chase and capture our mercantile vessels, but they have also equipped numerous merchant vessels for war and are devoting them to that operation.

The merchant vessels which the United States has equipped for war are cruising in our waters, capturing our vessels, and taking them to its ports, there to be confiscated and the proceeds distributed, which is no more nor less than what privateers do. Why can we not do the same thing?

If it is a question of name under which the true purpose is covered up, let us resort to the same method. Whether they are called auxiliaries to the squadron or whether they are called privateers, the service rendered by these merchant vessels, equipped for war, is the same—they capture hostile vessels which they meet and paralyze commerce. It is arrant madness that Spain, from incomprehensible scruples, is not doing what the United States has been doing ever since the beginning of the naval campaign.

Here in Cuba we have valuable factors which we could use in such enterprises. There are numerous coast vessels which could be made to do service as auxiliaries to the fleet, if we do not wish to give them the more explicit name of privateers.

Besides, the blockade of the island of Cuba never was effective, and this must at times have been apparent and would have furnished facilities for taking in provisions.

The majority of writers on international law agree as to the fact that the blockade ceases the moment the ships forming the arc of vigilance and force disappear for any reason whatever from the waters of which they have taken possession.

There are some authors, like Hautefeuille, Negrin, Riquelme, Ortolán, Halleck, and Fanchille, who lay down the radical principle that, if the blockading ships are compelled to leave the blockaded port, either on account of stress of the weather, or injuries, or to rest their crews, or from lack of provisions, the blockade becomes ineffective, and in order to reestablish it new notification is required.

Others, like Bello, Perels, Bluntschli, Le Moine, Wheaton, Heffter, and Scott, do not admit that the blockade ceases when the blockading ships absent themselves because of fortuitous circumstances, and it is their opinion that the blockade is not to be considered interrupted on that account. This is the theory generally professed by English, and hence by American, writers as opposed to the other theory advocated by French authors, with better right and reason.

Our rear-admiral Manuel J. Mozo, in a recent and very excellent treatise on the Rights of People, which is used as text-book in the general school of the Armada, declares himself in favor of the French doctrine, because, he says, if the blockade consists in the conquest of the enemy's maritime territory, really and effectively maintained by the naval forces of the blockading party, it is clear and obvious that when such conquest ceases and the occupation is suspended the blockade also ceases and is suspended, and it is not necessary to enter upon an investigation as to the causes thereof, for, whether they are voluntary or involuntary, fortuitous or predetermined, the result remains the same. In either event they put an end to the dominion and jurisdiction which the blockading party had assumed and in virtue of which it pro-

hibited access to the waters over which it had control and which ipso facto return to the jurisdiction and dominion of their original sovereign; and as the latter had permitted the entrance and sojourn of vessels of friendly nations in these waters, such vessels are at liberty to take advantage of the permission without being considered blockade breakers, for since there is no actual blockade it could hardly be broken.

Leaving aside these controversies of law, we must fix our attention on the point on which all authors agree, namely, that when the blockading squadron raises the blockade in order to engage in another operation of war, and especially when compelled to raise it in order to meet an attack of the hostile squadron, the blockade ceases, and in order to reestablish it the same formalities must be gone through as though it were a new blockade.

Now, then, the United States squadron was repeatedly compelled to abandon the blockade of Habana and several other ports of the island in order to look after other objectives which were not due to fortuitous causes, but, on the contrary, to the necessity of giving attention to the danger represented by our squadron. The fact may be pointed out that for three days the United States ships were absent from the waters of Habana, owing to the rumored approach of Cervera's squadron, during which time they left at the blockading station only a few inefficient vessels, some of them sailing craft, which could not really be considered as blockading ships, because they lacked the necessary attributes and power to prevent by force the ingress and egress of the harbor. The blockade of Habana must have ceased several times if the law had been properly laid before the nations of the civilized world.

The newspaper above referred to said under date of May 5:

The blockade of Habana, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and Cardenas is not effective, and the proof is that it was broken by several steamers, among them the *Cosme Herrera*, *Arilés*, *Monserrat*, and a number of sailing vessels which have entered or left said ports.

In the second place, the naval forces of the United States for three days, from Sunday, May 1, to Wednesday, May 3, had to abandon almost entirely their blockading mission because they were needed elsewhere; which goes to show that they were insufficient to render the blockade of such harbors as Habana real, effective, and absolute, and this very day, while the *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Montgomery*, *New York*, and *Marblehead*, that is to say, all the powerful hostile ships, are out of sight, anyone could run the blockade, for only the *Wilmington* and a few merchant vessels in the service of the squadron are left in front of Habana to blockade the harbor.

Having gone somewhat extensively into these questions, we will not close this chapter without setting forth our ideas as to the brutality and inhumanity of blockades when practiced as they were practiced in Cuba.

For reasons of universal morality the different nations have turned their attention to making wars more humane, by dictating general measures and agreeing to abstain from methods contrary to civilization and which work hardship to the innocent, the noncombatants, women, children, invalids—in a word, all those whose destruction leads to nothing and whom it is barbarous to injure.

To this end treaties and conventions have been drawn up which regulate the use of the instruments of war and put restrictions on destructive tendencies. An absolute and extensive blockade, under the circumstances under which Cuba had to sustain it, is not a means of war, but of oppression and death, which is contrary to every law of God and man, even though it is considered the most gentle method to reduce the enemy.

Perhaps it is because it has never before been attempted on a large scale and in an absolute manner that it has escaped the perspicacity of the "humanizers" of wars to place restrictions on the system of reducing to starvation not only the combatants, but an entire population—old men, women, children, and invalids, who, as a general rule, should not be subjected to the privations incident on battles—in these times when so much philanthropy and so much universal love is being preached.

The blockade as practiced in Cuba caused a thousand times more victims and more horrors than bursting shells, the burning of cities, the massacre of battles, and all the cruelties of weapons. The blockade makes living expensive, extinguishes the means of livelihood, gradually decimates the population, destroys family life, annihilates human beings without distinction—or rather, with one distinction, for it strikes particularly the feeble, the children, the women, and the sick.

Let the observations I have made on the subject of the practice of naval blockades, the most important of modern times, be taken into consideration when the "humanizers" of war meet again, and let them not only take thought of regulating the use of bursting shell and the protection of real property, but also give a prominent part in their deliberations to the humanization of the blockade as far as it affects those who should not be made to suffer the rigors of war in a brutal manner; for it is brutal to reduce to starvation and death human beings who have no share in the conflict and are in no manner responsible for it.

In our opinion, absolute blockades should be limited to fortified cities and harbors, and as far as towns are concerned there should be restrictions on the introduction of men, arms, ammunition, and war supplies; but it is not humane to extend these restrictions to food, medicines, and clothing for the noncombatant inhabitants.

In the Spanish-American war the whole enormity of the effects of the blockade became apparent in the frightful mortality. After two months of blockade in Cuba there could be seen in the cities and in the country thousands of human beings looking like ghosts, and men, women, and children dying of hunger in the public roads. A sad contrast to the condition of that war, fought on the pretext of humanity!

We will now leave this subject to speak of the advantage and influence which the mistakes and incompetence of the men at the head of our affairs and the scantiness and deficiency of our war resources had on the United States plans of campaign.

CHAPTER III.

OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SQUADRON.

BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON—WHAT THE NAVAL ANNUAL SAYS—INITIAL ORDERS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AT WASHINGTON.

The first signal of "Hostile squadron in sight" was made by the semaphore at Morro Castle on Friday, April 22, at 5 o'clock p. m., while, strange to say, it was not until Monday, the 25th, that President McKinley signed the joint resolution declaring that war between the United States and Spain had commenced on the 21st.

From the telemetric observatory of Morro Castle we witnessed the first appearance of the enemy and closely followed the movements of the hostile ships, the vague outlines of which could be seen on the horizon.¹ The gunners stood in readiness to fire and all were waiting for the moment when fire would be opened; but to everybody's surprise the United States ships kept beyond range, at a distance of about 20,000 meters from the batteries, and in that position they remained the next day. It was evident that they were refusing battle and that their plan of campaign was founded on the blockade.

It was well known that one of the enemy's most ardent desires was to take Habana as early as possible. Why was the enterprise delayed? Why were the tactics changed?

In order to explain this we must begin by giving some interesting data.

The Naval Annual—a very important book which has been published for fifteen years by T. A. Brassey—furnishes us certain antecedents, to which we shall refer.

The nominal forces of the two belligerent fleets were believed to be approximately equal.²

¹A few moments later three steamers came out of the harbor, among them one United States vessel, the *Saratoga*, displaying her flag. As soon as she had rounded the Morro she sped away at full speed. We shall never be able to comprehend why that vessel did not remain in our power.

²This error, which had so much to do with the declaration of war, and for which we had to pay so dear, should never have prevailed in Spain, for there was one man at least who, thinking of the future and foreseeing the conflict which was hanging over us, devoted many hours to the study of the United States Navy and published extensive technical data concerning the ships of that nation. It was Adolfo Martínez Jurado y Ruíz, a captain of artillery, subsequently assigned to the navy-yard at Habana, who carried out this work with unflinching perseverance and on his own initiative, following step by step the United States publications and making every possible effort to obtain information. A year before the breaking out of the war he published an album of the United States fleet, a perfect piece of work, which contains all the ships, their plans of construction, the material of which they are built, their armor, armament, speed, engine installation—in a word, everything necessary to form a correct idea of the modern ships of that navy. This work was known at Madrid. Pity it is that it was not made to serve better purposes than to be used in the telemetric observatories of the Habana batteries to supplement observation in case of the opening of fire, which unfortunately never occurred on a large scale!

In order to give an idea of what is taken into account by naval experts—and Lord Brassey has the universal reputation of being one of them—in estimating the military efficiency of war ships, we will here copy the comparison made by the *Naval Annual*:

Class of ships.	United States.	Spain.
Battleships	5	1
Armored cruisers.....	2	7
Armored coast-defense vessels.....	6
Armored ram.....	1
Cruisers, protected.....	21	5
Cruisers, unprotected.....	8	10

The following tables show the classification which Col. Sir George Clarke gives in the *Naval Annual* of the real fighting ships, which is evidence of the slight value attached to small vessels and shows how the naval forces are estimated among powerful nations:

UNITED STATES.

Class.	Name.	Tons.	Speed.	Date of launch.	Armaments.
Battleships	Iowa	11,410	17	1896	4 30-cm. 8 20-cm. 6 10-cm. 20 57-mm. 6 37-mm. 4 33-cm.
	Indiana	10,228	16	1893	8 20-cm. 4 15-cm.
	Oregon				20 57-mm. 6 37-mm.
	Massachusetts				2 30-cm. 6 15-cm.
	Texas (second class)	6,315	17.8	1892	12 57-mm. 6 37-mm. 6 20-cm.
Armored cruisers.....	New York.....	8,200	21	1891	12 10-cm. 8 57-mm. 4 37-mm.
	Brooklyn.....	9,215	21.9	1895	8 20-cm. 12 12-cm. 12 57-mm. 4 37-mm.

SPAIN.

Battleship	Pelayo	9,900	16	{ 1887 1897	2 32-cm. 2 28-cm. 1 16-cm. 12 12-cm. 2 42-mm. Nf. R. F. 3 57-mm. H., R. F. 13 37-mm. H., rev.
	Cárlos V	9,235	20	1895	2 28-cm. 10 14-cm. 4 10-cm. 4 57-mm., R. F. 10 13.2-cm.
	Cristobal Colón	6,840	20	1895	6 12-cm. 10 57-mm. 10 37-mm.
Armored cruisers.....	Vizcaya.....	7,000	20	1891	2 28-cm. 10 14-cm.
	Oquendo	7,000	20	1891	8 57-mm., R. F.
	Infanta María Teresa	7,000	20	1890	8 37-mm. H., rev. 2 24-cm.
	Cisneros	7,000	20	1896	10 14-cm.
	Princesa de Asturias	7,000	20	1896	8 57-mm., R. F. 8 37-mm. H., rev.

NOTE.—The *Vitoria* and *Numancia* are excluded as being little more than harbor defense ships.

This comparison shows the superiority of the United States in battle ships and protected cruisers, while Spain had apparently more armored cruisers; but when the time arrived for using them it was found that out of the seven only four could be made immediately available, nor could the only battle ship be made available for immediate service. Consequently, far from being equal to the Americans in effective naval forces, we proved to be very much inferior in number and quality of fighting ships. On the other hand, we had more personnel, for while the United States Navy counted only 12,000 men and no reserves, we had 23,000 men besides the reserves, including officers.

The hostile squadron which made its appearance off Habana was the so-called North Atlantic Squadron, which had for months been in process of organization at Hampton Roads, carrying out practices along the coasts of Florida, and after the blowing up of the *Maine* it was stationed at Key West, a few hours' distance from the Cuban shore.¹

We have already spoken of the composition of this squadron in the first part of this work (Ships, Guns, and Small Arms, p. 34 et seq.). It was under the command of Mr. Sampson, at that time captain, who was very anxious to attack Habana, although he is said to have expressed the opinion that the battle of Habana would have to be fought at the expense of some of his ships, and in view of the equality which was supposed to exist between the United States naval forces and those of Spain and the recent loss of the *Maine*, that would have been a serious calamity.

The squadron was admirably officered. But the United States Government decided, very wisely, to try the crews first and give them additional training, and not send them at once into a battle which could not help but be fierce, without initiating them by means of less difficult operations in which the victory would be sure and complete, and where the gunners would acquire greater facility in firing. This was the more important as the *Maine* catastrophe, in which 266 sailors lost their lives, had given rise to certain fantastic legends that Cuba and its ports were full of mines and torpedoes which could sow death and destruction everywhere and at all times.

The principle prevailed which underlay the plan of campaign described in the first chapter, namely, that before proceeding directly against Cuba it would be necessary to fight naval battles to see who was the preponderance on the sea. This will also explain why the Americans kept their ships so close together and why Sampson's squadron always remained near the Flying Squadron, which was under Schley's orders, so that the two fleets, in case of necessity, might be able to cooperate in a battle against the Spanish fleet with overwhelming superiority. As we go on we shall see that the plan was carried out in full.

¹This was an excellent base of operations. It was stated that during the blockade of Habana even beefsteak and fried potatoes were daily sent to the crews of the fleet from Key West.

For this reason it would have been of great advantage if those who had charge of conducting the war on the Spanish side had made efforts to divide the United States squadron, which could surely have been accomplished by permitting privateering or resorting to the system adopted by the United States, namely, disguising privateers in the shape of auxiliary vessels, for while some of these auxiliary vessels were commanded by regular naval officers, like the *St. Paul*, which had been given to Captain Sigsbee, of the *Maine*, the majority of them were commanded by officers of a special corps of reserves formed of active and retired sailors of the merchant marine. What was there to prevent us from giving the same character to our merchant vessels and following the example of our enemies, who thus equipped for war not less than 128 vessels? If it is true, as maintained by some, that privateering is no longer any use in our time, why were our enemies so anxious that we should not resort to it? And why did we reserve the right to practice it?

A few score auxiliary vessels would have constituted a menace to commerce, which the Americans worship, and would have compelled their squadrons to subdivide and operate without that close correlation which gave them so much strength. A threat of operations against the undefended ports of Florida or against the United States fleet at the Philippines—anything in the nature of naval strategy or plan of campaign—should have been resorted to, so as to make at least an attempt to scatter Sampson's and Schley's squadrons.

Nothing of all this was thought of; or if it was the people did not hear of it. If there was any fixed and concerted plan of campaign, if every resource of intelligence was exhausted in formulating it, it has not come to the knowledge of the general public, and thus, while the American people are already in possession of official reports rendering an account of everything that has happened, of the expenses incurred, the injuries suffered, we know nothing at all except what we see before our eyes in the evidence of our terrible débacle. We must envy the system of other nations, for obviously we have among us none who are capable of imitating it.

The opinion which Sir George Clarke formed of the naval capacity of Spain is pitiful, and it has gone abroad and become the opinion of the world on the strength of his authority.

"In Spain," says the *Naval Annual*, "some efforts of preparation were made, but want of money, of resources, and of *administrative capacity* proved fatal. At the beginning of 1898 there was not a single completely effective war ship, and in home waters there was no organized squadron. The isolated force in the Far East, composed mainly of obsolete craft, of which the flagship was scarcely the equal of our *Active*, was not, in the modern sense, a real fighting body. The efficiency of a navy, involving the fulfillment of exceedingly complex conditions, is a delicate test of sound government and of national vigor.

Spain throughout her history, in spite of great natural advantages, has never proved able to create and maintain a really efficient fleet."

We think these statements are a little exaggerated. There was a time when Spain was all-powerful on the sea. Everyone knows the causes of our decline. As far as the present time is concerned, Brassey's opinion is correct and is confirmed by the sad facts of a terribly disastrous conflict. But we will not yet despair; we still think that days of rejoicing and glory may return if we can become convinced that morality and order and good government are the basis of the civil and military prosperity of nations.

The Americans had a pretty accurate idea of our deficiencies, thanks to information received from intelligent spies operating in Spain.

Among a number of documents recently published by the United States is one, bearing no signature, which is unique of its kind and may be of interest as being suggestive. It can be found in the original on page 27 of the second volume of the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898, and is as follows:

APRIL 16, 1898.

SIR: Yesterday the Spanish Government began to take extraordinary precautions to prevent the getting out of news relating to the movements of ships or anything pertaining to war preparations. It is quite probable, therefore, that definite information in regard to these subjects will be difficult if not impossible to get. My latest information, which I have telegraphed, is to the effect that the torpedo squadron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and the *Ciudad de Cadiz*, *Colon*, and *Teresa* are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions. It is said that the *Colon* and *Teresa* left Cadiz not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply of ammunition. The *Oquendo* and *Viscaya*, from Puerto Rico, should arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite information, I believe the *Pelayo* arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. It was intended that she should go, after a few days' necessary delay in Cartagena, and it is reported that she was sighted in the Straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. The *Proserpina*, *Osado*, *Destructor*, *Barcelo*, *Retamosa*, *Habana*, *Halcon*, torpedo boats and destroyers, and the *Vitoria* are now practically ready in Cadiz, awaiting the arrival of the *Carlos V* and the *Pelayo*. The *Alfonso XIII* is also about ready in Cartagena.

The installation for moving the guns by electricity in the *Carlos V* is not completed, and I am unable to get at any estimate of the date when she will be entirely ready for service. I know on good authority, however, that in an emergency she could be used at once, working some of her machinery by hand. Work is being pushed, also, as rapidly as possible on the *Cisneros*, but she can hardly be ready for several weeks. The trans-Atlantic steamers *Mexico*, *Panama*, *Santo Domingo*, *San Augustin*, and *Villaverde*, now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary cruisers. To this number should be added the *Columbia* and *Normannia*, recently purchased in Germany, and the *Givalda*, now being converted in Barcelona. This makes 21 auxiliary cruisers concerning which I have quite definite information. The two steamers bought in Germany were strengthened there and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day. I call your special attention to the newspaper slip which I inclose, entitled, "Fe en la Armada." It was published in the *Heraldo* of April 6, the leading and most influential paper of Madrid. The *Imparcial* of the following morning called attention to it and spoke in very severe terms of the impropriety of a former secretary of the

navy speaking so unreservedly of such important matters at this critical time. The following is a translation:

"We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General Beránger, the last minister of marine under the Conservative cabinet.

"To the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces.

"The attack on our island ports is not to be feared, he said, by taking advantage of the darkness of night.

"The reason of this is that Habana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitás, and Santiago are defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes, which can work at a great distance.

"Señor Canovas del Castillo, who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, the shipping to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, which are surely located in these ports at present.

"The transportation and installation of these war machines was in the charge of the distinguished torpedoist, Señor Chacón.

"I have already said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am going to give you my reasons.

"The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our war ships, and the second, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American ships will commence to desert, since we all know that among them are people of all nationalities.

"Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared.

"I believe that the squadron detained at the Cape de Verdes, and particularly the destroyers, should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have nothing to fear from the American fleet.

"In this class of ships we are on a much higher level than the United States."

The Company Bandera Española have been ordered to suspend the voyages of their ships to Habana, and I presume the Government intends to take these ships into service. Also the Compañía Trasatlántica has ordered its ships not to touch at Corinna hereafter, presumably for the same reason.

It is said quite openly here that the intention of the Government is to make some kind of an effort on our coasts. I am inclined to believe that they have this plan in view; but I have been unable to verify the reports or to get at any of the details.

Just at this moment, here at Madrid, everything is very quiet. Considerable turbulence is reported from the provinces. How great this may be we are unable to judge, as the Government is keeping a sharp watch on the telegrams and does not permit news to be disseminated. A few days ago there was some excitement and danger of a mob here in Madrid, after the announcement of the proclamation of the armistice in Cuba. That crisis is now apparently passed. Everybody here expects war, and the lower classes ardently desire it. The Government and the more intelligent classes dread it, but will accept it if it is forced upon them. The press has fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the superior discipline on board the Spanish ships, and the greater fighting power of the navy.

The people believe that this superiority of the Spanish navy over that of the United States is overwhelming and that they must defeat us. This opinion is shared also by many intelligent persons—in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards. They say they have nothing to lose; they could not be worse off with the war than without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do incalculable damage to our commerce, and seriously injure, if not destroy, our Navy, and although they would probably be beaten in the end, they will have taught us a salutary lesson for the future. One of the most intelligent, best-informed Spaniards I have met here, a man who had traveled much and claims to have a great admiration for the United States, and who knows much about our history and resources, a senator of the Kingdom, told me yesterday that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period

that the hostilities would last. He was sure that the struggle might last three years; that he could very well understand and appreciate the feelings and ambitions of a young and powerful nation like the United States for conquest; that he could understand that we were desirous of taking the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Canaries, and even of coming to Madrid itself; but what he could not understand was that, while protesting a desire for peace, a decided disinclination to the annexation of any territory, the people of the United States had done everything in their power to foment the rebellion in Cuba and to make it impossible for Spain to overcome it by the force of arms.

I give you this as a matter of interest solely, but it represents the attitude of the intelligent, educated, and traveled Spaniard.

This is certainly remarkable information.

The Secretary of the United States Navy, on April 6, addressed to Sampson, commander in chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, the following instructions:

WASHINGTON, *April 6, 1898.*

SIR: In the event of hostilities with Spain the Department wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Habana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz, the destruction of the enemy's vessels without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries.

There are two reasons for this:

First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect the landing, until after the yellow-fever season is over, about the first of October.

Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels.

3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Habana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season arrives.

4. All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available United States ports for adjudication.

5. Should it be decided to furnish the insurgents with arms and ammunition, the Department suggests that Nuevitas and Puerto Padre would be the most suitable places to land them and establish communications with the Cuban forces.

6. Should the Department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Puerto Rico, it is possible that the flying squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of your vessels may be needed to reenforce that squadron.

7. The Department hopes to be able to cut the cable off Santiago de Cuba, even if it has to employ a special cable vessel for this purpose, and it has also under consideration the practicability of cutting the cable near Habana and connecting the end to one of the vessels of your command, so that you can always be in communication with the Department. This plan has not yet been decided upon. Please consider it.

8. The Department need not impress upon you the necessity for stringent sanitary regulations. It leaves this matter, as well as the details in regard to conducting

operations, to the commander in chief, in whose judgment it has the greatest confidence.

Wishing you every success, very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG.

Admiral Sampson answered these confidential instructions on April 9, from Key West, expressing himself in favor of a direct attack upon Habana, and setting forth the manner in which the batteries could be easily destroyed, Captains Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick concurring in his opinion. We will treat of this matter more fully when speaking of Habana in the volume which is to follow the present one.

The next instructions of the Secretary of the Navy were as follows:

WASHINGTON, *April 21, 1898.*

SIR: The Department's instructions of April 6 are modified as follows:

You will immediately institute a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, from Cardenas to Bahia Honda; also, if in your opinion your force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the south side of the island. It is considered doubtful if the present force at your command would warrant a more extensive blockade.

If it should become necessary for the army to embark for Cuba, the navy will be required to furnish the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it does not seem desirable that you should undertake at present to blockade any more of the island than has been indicated. It is believed that the blockade will cut off Habana almost entirely from receiving supplies from the outside.

The Navy Department is considering the question of occupying the port of Matanzas by a military force large enough to hold it and to open communications with the insurgents, and this may be done at an early date if part of the army is ready to embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are directed to cooperate with the army and assist with such vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a movement.

If you obtain any information of the movements of Spanish ships of war in any part of the West Indies you will, if practicable, inform the Department.

In conducting the other operations you will be governed by the instructions contained in the Department's letter of April 6.

The Department does not wish the defenses of Habana to be bombarded or attacked by your squadron.

Very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG.

Nothing could be more precise, simple, clear, and of sounder judgment than these instructions.

We may gather from them that the Government at Washington had definitely decided to avoid the operation of attacking Habana, because the information that was being received and the weakness of Spain which was becoming more and more apparent, rendered it probable that better and easier results could be attained by a simple blockade. Yet in all these admirable initial orders there may be noticed a certain fear of the Spanish squadron and a desire to keep the ships intact for the encounter with them and to accumulate naval forces with the same object in view, and that is the reason why so much circumspection was required of Sampson; for the loss of any of his ships at Habana—which was by no means an improbable result if they entered upon an

engagement with the batteries, and which would have produced bad effects in the United States, where there was a strong faction opposed to the war, the partisans of which were decreasing as reports of easy victories arrived, but which is still in existence—would destroy the pretended naval equality of which some prominent Spaniards were boasting, either from ignorance or because they were misinformed.

In whatever light we may look at this matter, it is obvious that it would have meant a great deal to us if we could have divided the United States squadron by means of privateering, having recourse, as a last resort, to an attempt or threat of some daring operation.

It would likewise have been of good effect if we had compelled the enemy to engage in a battle against Habana. A victory there would have cost them much time and blood. Such a battle could probably have been provoked on several occasions when one of the best Yankee battle ships, through her own heedlessness, came within range of the windward batteries. If the first shots had been exchanged at that time, who knows how the battle would have ended, for it is not to be supposed that a battle ship would be undignified enough to take to flight before a battery. The officers in charge of the artillery at the forts could hardly control themselves in the presence of certain superior orders. This is a matter of which we shall speak more at length when, in the course of this work, we take up the organization of the fortifications of Habana; for we wish to point out that the artillery of a fortified place, when in the presence of the enemy, should be accorded more liberty of action, as a whole, as also in each battery or group of batteries, than was the case at Habana.

We have already expressed our admiration for the foresight and strategic judgment shown in the orders of the United States Navy Department, and as we pursue this purely technical analysis we will show that on our side, on the contrary, everything was confusion, incompetence, and terrible discord.

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS OF OUR SQUADRON.

OPINIONS OF ADMIRAL CERVERA—REPLIES THERETO—APPALLING DEFICIENCY OF OUR NAVAL POWER—SORTIE OF THE SQUADRON.

The comparison of both navies, based upon the studies made in prevision of a war with the United States, suggested to the admiral the following considerations on February 25, 1898: ¹

If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern vessels capable of active service, we find that the United States have the battleships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*; the armored cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*; the protected cruisers *Atlanta*, *Minneapolis*, *Baltimore*, *Charleston*, *Chicago*, *Cincinnati*, *Columbia*, *Newark*, *San Francisco*, *Olympia*, *Philadelphia*, and *Raleigh*, and the rapid unprotected cruisers *Detroit*, *Marblehead*, and *Montgomery*. Against this we have, following the same classification, the battleships *Pelayo*, *Infanta María Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo*, armored cruiser *Colón*, and protected cruisers *Cárlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and *Lepanto*; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the *Pelayo*, *Cárlos V*, and *Lepanto* to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the *Alfonso XIII*. I do not mention the other vessels, on account of their small military value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, 6 monitors still in service, the ram *Katahdin*, the *Vesuvius*, and the torpedo boats and destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate enough.

Comparing the displacements, we find that in battleships the United States have 41,589 tons against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471 tons against our 6,840; in protected cruisers, 51,008 against 18,887, and in fast unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we none. The total of vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,415 tons against 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half.

In speed our battleships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is superior to ours.

Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the pieces of less than 20 cm. are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of the calibers 32, 30, 28, 25, 20, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 17.5, 5.7, 4.7, and 3.7 be represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1, which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in centimeters $\left(\frac{\text{caliber in cm.}^3}{100}\right)$, we find that the artillery power of the American battleships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29,449; that of the American armored cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (*Colón*) by 6,573; that of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected cruisers by 12,300. Therefore, according to these figures, the offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's.

¹ The data and letters which follow were published in *La Epoca*, and have been circulating for some time in numerous facsimile copies, which have not been denied.

To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the *Pelayo* and *Cárlos V*, which probably will not be ready in time; the *Lepanto*, which surely will not be ready, and the *Alfonso XIII*, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN.

Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we can not. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly, the port would be Habana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this department, where everything is scarce, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, and aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources. This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive campaign.

* * * * *

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified port which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use them as a base for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become more formidable.

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors. Our motto is "the fulfillment of duty."

[To the admiral.]¹

MADRID, March 4, 1898.

I notified you that, when I should have recovered somewhat from the painful impression caused by the reading of your personal letter, I should answer it, and now do so, and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, omitting some of our vessels at Habana, which are available for a conflict with the United States, show a difference of tonnage, but not so excessive as would appear from your lines. In my opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of the present distribution of the United States forces, remembering that it will be to their interest to maintain the ships now in the Pacific for the protection of San Francisco and the arsenal at San Diego, as also their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city and Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about to be annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are being maintained there. With your good judgment you will understand that the long and difficult voyage which these forces, among them the *Oregon*, would have to make in order to join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region unprotected, could not be effected

¹ The matter inclosed in brackets, on this and subsequent pages, does not appear in O. N. I. publication, "Views of Admiral Cervera." The brackets have been inserted by O. N. I.

without the knowledge of others, and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lacking. I must therefore refer you to the inclosed statement; while it shows deficiencies, which the Government is endeavoring to remedy at any cost by the acquisition of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist to such an extent as stated in the comparison with the United States Atlantic Squadron. There is no doubt that, in order to concentrate our nucleus of forces, we shall require some time, the whole month of April, in my estimation.

Since I have been in charge of this department, His Majesty's Government has known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval forces, which are being remodeled or repaired abroad, and in conformity with such knowledge the Government has endeavored, and is endeavoring by every possible means, with a view also to the general interests of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United States a policy of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which were not easy of solution. But with your good judgment you will understand, and I want therefore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba; our flag is still flying there, and the Government, to meet the sentiments of the people, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that this Spanish colony should not be separated from our territory, and is trying by every possible means, political, international, and military, to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is the prevailing opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. As already stated, the Government is acquainted with our situation, and for that reason is endeavoring to collect all possible resources at Habana Harbor, fortifying it so that it may serve as a base for our naval forces, equipping it with a dock, already in operation, where our ships will be able to repair slight damages.

It is my opinion that it will not be possible, either on our side or the enemy's, to repair those injuries which may be caused by the action of a battle in the short period of time in which international military campaigns are enacted, compared with the material interests they affect. The other harbors of the island, such as Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. In your estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous troops, well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews of hirelings (mercenaria), and you might find historical facts, evoking sad memories for us, to confirm what I say. I will close, never doubting for one moment that you and all of us will fulfill the sacred duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you my opinions in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace.

SEGISMUNDO BERMEO.]

The above letter was accompanied by the following comparative statement of the tonnage of the principal ships:

[NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.

Possible formation.

	Tons.		Tons.
New York	8,200	Vizecaya	7,000
Indiana	10,288	Pelayo	9,900
Massachusetts	10,288	Carlos V	9,250
Texas	6,315	Maria Teresa	7,000
Brooklyn	9,271	Oquendo	7,000
Iowa	11,410	Cristobal Colon	6,800
Montgomery	2,000	Alfonso XIII	4,826
Marblehead	2,000	M. Eusenada	1,064
Detroit	2,000	Alfonso XII	3,900
Nashville	1,071	Venadito	1,189
Terror	3,600	Reina Mercedes	3,900
Yorktown, dispatch boat		Infanta Isabel	1,189
Total tonnage	66,537	Total tonnage	162,818
5 torpedo boats; average speed, 21 knots.		3 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats; average speed, 25 knots.	

Letter from the admiral.

CARTAGENA, March 7, 1898.

[Yesterday I received your personal letter of the 4th, to which I am about to reply, but you must first permit me to give you a general idea of our situation as I see it. That it is the intention of the United States to engage us in war appears beyond all doubt, and it therefore becomes more important each day to examine into the advantages and disadvantages which such a war may have for us. Inspired by these ideas, I deemed it my duty as a patriot to reply to the official communication through which I was advised of the distribution of the American vessels and the condition of certain points on the United States coasts, and I did so in my personal letter of February 25 last. To-day, feeling at liberty to express my ideas more freely in a confidential letter, I will reply to your communication.]

An examination of our forces, based upon what I already knew and upon recent information and observation, not only confirms what I said, but shows it to be still worse. I have visited the *Vitoria*, on which I counted, and from my visit I have drawn the conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflict. Neither does my information permit me to count on the *Pelayo*, *Cárlos V*, or *Numancia*. And yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal observation, I include them in the inclosed statement [solely because you have included them in yours]. Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict, either war, negotiations direct or through a third party, an arbitrator or otherwise, the longer the decision is delayed the worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our position can not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions.

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island in the worst possible manner. But even supposing an improbability—that is, that we should obtain a victory—that would not change the final result of the campaign. The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the ultimate result would be always a disaster. Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to discount the high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become graver than it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in comparison with the last.

Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here the problem already pointed out by somebody arises: Is the island worth the ruin of Spain? (Silvela, in Burgos.) I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of the character of modern vessels.¹ [Although I do not attach much importance to certain details, which can have but little influence on the general events, I shall nevertheless speak of some upon which you touch, in order to set forth my point of view in answering your letter.]

The accompanying statement [which appears to me to be more correct than the one inclosed with your letter] shows that our forces in the Atlantic are approximately one-half of those of the United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery power.

¹ We do not agree with this opinion. In the course of this book we show that privateering might have brought us many advantages.

I have never thought of the forces which the United States has in the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resistance to oppose to them. And as regards the American coasts of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation will change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither the *Cárlos V*, the *Pelayo*, the *Vitoria*, nor the *Numancia* will be ready, and nobody knows how we will be as regards 14-centimeter ammunition. It seems sure that by the end of April the 25.4-centimeter guns of the *Colón* will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of that of the Americans in tonnage and 47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority would be in torpedo boats and destroyers provided all of them arrive there in good order.

I do not know exactly what are the sentiments of the people concerning Cuba, but I am inclined to believe that the immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the continuation of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which it is not for me to analyze.

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went overboard while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an old awning line. A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it has not yet been replaced. [More than one official letter has been written on this interesting subject.] In times past, forty-three days after the *Hernán Cortés* was laid down the vessel was at sea. It is now fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers of a steam launch of the *Teresa*, and I do not yet know when it will be finished. This will probably be the proportion between us and the United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having the Habana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all. As for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the same way. [I beg that you will not consider this an argument against yours, for that would be accusing me of great presumption in speaking of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs to me.]

These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express them to [you with the request that you will transmit them to] the Government. If you should deem it advisable for me to express them personally, I am ready to do so at the first intimation. After I have done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite ready to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

With the foregoing letter the admiral inclosed the following statement:

Comparison with the United States fleet.

SPAIN.

Protected vessels actually there, or unprotected, but with a speed of over 15 knots:

	Displacement.	Armament.
	<i>Tons.</i>	
Vizcaya.....	7,000	6,130
Oquendo.....	7,000	6,130
Marques de la Ensenada.....	1,064	1,100
	[15,064]	[13,360]
	[23 per cent.]	[23 per cent.]

Comparison with the United States fleet—Continued.

UNITED STATES.

Same kind of vessels:

	Displacement.	Armament.
	<i>Tons.</i>	
New York	8,200	6,400
Indiana	10,288	9,304
Massachusetts	10,288	9,304
Texas	6,315	4,550
Brooklyn	9,271	7,880
Iowa	11,410	8,360
Montgomery	2,089	4,100
Marblehead	2,089	4,100
Detroit	2,089	4,100
Terror	3,600	2,896
	65,639	60,994

To these may be positively added:

SPAIN.

	Displacement.	Armament.
	<i>Tons.</i>	
Infanta Maria Teresa	7,000	6,130
Cristóbal Colón	6,840	<i>a</i> 8,490
Alfonso XIII	4,826	4,340
	18,666	18,960

a Without the 25-cm. guns, the value of which is represented by 1,248.

UNITED STATES.

	Displacement.	Armament.
	<i>Tons.</i>	
Minneapolis	7,375	4,790
Columbia	7,375	4,790
	14,750	9,580

Doubtful additions.

SPAIN.

	Displacement.	Armament.
	<i>Tons.</i>	
Pelayo	9,917	6,987
Cárlos V	9,250	5,620
	19,167	12,607

UNITED STATES.

	Displacement.	Armament.
Atlanta	3,000	4,270
Charleston	3,730	4,570
Chicago	4,500	4,470
Newark	4,098	6,740
Philadelphia	4,324	7,640
Dolphin	1,485	700
Yorktown	1,703	3,320
	22,840	31,710

Doubtful additions—Continued.

In the South Atlantic they have:

	Displacement.	Armament.
	Tons.	
Cincinnati	3,200	4,795

All the other vessels have very little military value, with the exception of the torpedo boats and destroyers, not mentioned in this statement, including the *Katahdin* and *Vesurius*.

From the admiral.

CADIZ, April 6, 1898.

[In last night's mail I received your letter of the 4th, having previously received your telegram concerning the same matter. It is precisely] on account of the general anxiety prevailing [that] it is very important to think of what is to be done, so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some chance of efficiency, and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don Quixote, go out to fight wind-mills and come back with broken heads.

If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States, the question would be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar their way. But as our forces, on the contrary, are very inferior to theirs, it would be the greatest of follies to attempt to bar their way, which could only be done by giving them a decisive naval battle. That would simply mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy of the enemy, who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by establishing there a base of operations, crush our commerce and safely bombard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide what we are going to do, and, without disclosing our proposed movements, be in a position to act when the time comes.

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not changed since then. If we are caught without a plan of war, there will be vacillations and doubts; and, after defeat, there may come humiliation and shame.

[You will understand these frank and loyal statements of an old friend and comrade, who desires nothing more than to help the Government and act with circumspection.

PASCUAL CERVERA.]

[To the admiral.

MADRID, April 7, 1898.

We are in the midst of a serious international crisis. While I have not yet lost all hope of a peaceable solution, it being the wish of the Government to avoid war at any cost, we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the influence of foreign powers; but the President of the United States is surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is now trying to appease. It devolves upon you as the admiral of the squadron, and owing to the prestige which you are enjoying in the navy—or God himself has singled you out for that purpose—to carry out the plans which will be formulated and intrusted to your intelligence and valor. I believe I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as it was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had the necessary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, my conscience is entirely clear. In the instructions which you will receive a general idea is outlined which you will work out with your captains. I will close, begging that you will express my regards to the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which H. M. and the Government place in your high ability.

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.]

From the admiral.

CADIZ, April 8, 1898.

[I have received all your telegrams. The ships are ready and I expect to go out this evening. I have just sent the paymaster to San Fernando for the money, as the Captain-General advises me that it has been received there. At Cape Verde I shall await the instructions which you are to send me. The reproduction of the cipher telegram differs in one word: it says that the instructions *se ampliarán* (will be amplified), while the first telegram received said *se emplearán* (will be used): that is the reason why I indicated my idea of protecting the Canaries, and now, as previously stated, I shall wait.] I regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon some plan, even in general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see that the Government persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago. I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to defend itself with its present means, perhaps it would give the Americans some annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves concerning the strength of our fleet. If you will look over our correspondence of the last two months you will see, not that I have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not have any illusions as to what we can do [which will be in proportion to the means available].

PASCUAL CERVERA.

From the admiral.

ST. VINCENT (CAPE VERDE), April 19, 1898.

[The *San Francisco*, and with it your instructions and letter, arrived yesterday. If the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* have really sailed for here, they have now been out ten days and must arrive to-day or to-morrow, for that is all the time they would require to make the voyage of 2,400 miles from Puerto Rico. But I am thinking that perhaps the date stated, the 9th, is that of the cablegram issuing the order, and not the date of sailing, in which case they will arrive later.]

The boilers of the *Ariete* are practically unserviceable, so that this vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the fleet. She could only be used for local defense. The boiler of the *Azor* is eleven years old and is of the locomotive type. As for the destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*, their bow plates give as soon as they are in a seaway, and some of their frames have been broken. [Villaamil has had this remedied as far as he has been able.] The *Plutón* had an accident of this kind when coming from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol.

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords good protection for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Mayaguez can not be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most unfavorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall await the arrival of the *Vizcaya*, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the Canaries. It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, as well as the island commanding the port of La Luz in Gran Canary.

[From your instructions] it seems that the idea of sending the fleet to Cuba has been abandoned, I believe very wisely.

Concerning Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accumulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rico is loyal, it will not be such an easy job for the Yankees; and if it is not loyal, it will inevitably follow the same fate as Cuba, at least as far as we are concerned.

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, as I have said before, the Canaries; and above all, the possibility of a bombardment of our coast,

which is not impossible, considering the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with four or five vessels of higher speed than our own. For all these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for me to do; and I will not take any decision without your opinion and that of the council of captains, as indicated in your letter.

I leave this letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen.

I was here interrupted by the information that the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* were in sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of health and spirits, but the *Vizcaya* needs docking badly. During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more than the *Oquendo*, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots according to my reckoning, and a diminution of her radius of action of from 25 to 30 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed [to which you called special attention in your instructions]. Both are now coaling, but it is a long job, for, unfortunately, we do not fuel at home here. We are indeed unlucky!

[Until to-morrow. The mail has come in and will shortly go out again; I will therefore close this. * * *

PASCUAL CERVERA.]

From the admiral.

[For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on board the *Colón*, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings.]

The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical circumstances. The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat—for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior forces—forced them to see that such sacrifice would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be. I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finishing once and for all. But, as I said before, the vision of the country violated by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in particular, and which believe that the *Alfonso XIII* or the *Cristina* can be pitted against the *Iowa* or *Massachusetts*, they expressly and energetically declared that the interests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us.

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments—it is hardly necessary to say—his scruples were soon overcome. [My reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of everything that happened.] Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written down his ideas, and I send you a copy of his statement, which reflects, better than I could express them, the opinions of all. This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in the meeting.

[Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving Your Excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

PASCUAL CERVERA.]

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS.

The second in command of the naval forces and the captains of the vessels, having met on board the cruiser *Colón*, by order of his excellency the commander in chief of the squadron, and under his presidency, the president submitted for discussion the following question:

“Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries and provide from here for any contingency?”

Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to offer for the purpose of establishing bases of operations. In consideration of this, and the grave consequences for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed to call the attention of the Government to these matters by means of a telegram as follows:

“Commander-General of the Squadron to the Minister of Marine: In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I suggest going to the Canaries. *Ariete* has boilers in bad condition; boiler of *Azor* is very old. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother country.”

On board cruiser *Colón*, April 20, 1898.

PASCUAL CERVERA.
 JOSÉ DE PAREDES.
 JUAN B. LAZAGA.
 EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.
 VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.
 ANTONIO EULATE.
 JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.
 FERNANDO VILLAMIL.

OPINION OF CAPT. VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

[Commander of the battleship *Infanta María Teresa*.]

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the council of war held on board the battleship *Cristóbal Colón* my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made—besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the East—that they have sufficient forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the Philippines. Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was perhaps most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been done with a single battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Peninsula, which would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and perhaps the loss of some island. As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American Flying Squadron will sail for Europe; and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts, the just alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits of an easy victory.

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula, the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the *Alfonso XIII*, of very little speed, are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no

manner for that of the Canaries. The yacht *Giralda* and the steamers *Germania* and *Normania* [of the acquisition of which official notice has been received] are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject, and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico, the trip across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas its base of operations—is a strategic error, the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the trip must remain entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battleships and the *Cristóbal Colón*, without her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from its base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, [and it will not be possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or less if the enemy brings along a light division, nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided].

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which the country gave us, and the needs which present circumstances bring on the country in danger.

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to these forces. But after pointing out the probable consequences, the responsibility must remain with the Government.

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 20, 1898.

VICTOR M. CONCAS.

From the admiral.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, *April 22, 1898.*

[MY DEAR GENERAL AND FRIEND: I have not yet answered your letter of the 7th, which the *San Francisco* brought me, because, though I have written you since, I did not have it before me.]

It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return, while in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation.

[It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only the case with reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two other places. But is Graciosa Island safe, for instance? If the Yankees should take possession of it and fortify the port they would have a base for any operations they might wish to undertake against Spain, and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there.]

Such a thing will not be possible at present, with the squadron at the Canaries, but it will be inevitable when the squadron has been destroyed.]

You talk about plans, and in spite of all my efforts to have some laid out, as would have been wise and prudent, my desires have been disappointed [to such an extent that, if the circumstances had been different, I should have applied to be placed on the retired list, and I shall ask for it, if God spares my life, just as soon as the danger is over. I should even apply for it to-day, without caring a straw for being accused of cowardice, if it were not for the fact that my retirement would produce among the squadron the deplorable effect of a desertion of its admiral before the enemy]. How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for? The *Colón* does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 14-centimeter ammunition, with the exception of about 300 rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the *Colón* can not be recharged. We have not a single Bustamante torpedo. There is no plan or concert, which I so much desired and have suggested in vain. The repairs of the servomotors of my vessels have only been made in the *Infanta María Teresa* and the *Vizcaya*, after they had left Spain. In short, it is a disaster already, and it is to be feared that it will be a more frightful one before long. And perhaps everything could be changed yet! But I suppose it is too late now for anything that is not the ruin and desolation of our country.

[I can understand that your conscience is clear, as you state in your letter, because you are a good man and your course is clear before you, but think of what I tell you and you will see that I am right. I assembled my captains, as you told me, and sent you by telegraph an extract of their opinions. I have since forwarded you a copy of the minutes of the meeting, and by this mail I send you an official letter commenting on it. I have nothing further to add.]

The *Vizcaya* can no longer steam, and she is only a boil in the body of the fleet.

But I will trouble you no more. I consider it an accomplished fact and will try to find the best way out of this direful enterprise.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898.

The telegram ordering us to start has just arrived, and I have given orders to tranship from the *Cádiz* to these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the destroyers, which was on board the *Cádiz*.

I intended to sail without finishing the provisioning of the ships, but since the *Cádiz* is to remain here, I have decided to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to sail to-morrow.

As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken! You see I was right when I told you that by the end of April the *Pelayo*, *Cárlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* would not be finished; that the *Colón* would not have her big guns unless we took the defective ones; that we should not have the 14-centimeter ammunition with which to fight, etc.

With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I cannot understand the [unanimous] decision of the general officers of the navy against my opinion.

I have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of [5,700 tons of] coal for Puerto Rico, where it is expected to arrive on the 11th or 12th of May, but I am much afraid that it may fall into the hands of the enemy.

It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval battle at will. The *Vizcaya*, on account of her stay in Habana and not having had her bottom cleaned for nine months, is nothing more than a buoy, and I can not abandon her.

[PASCUAL CERVERA.

27TH.

I am almost in despair at the slowness of the *Cádiz*; she is well prepared for a voyage, but very poorly for loading and unloading. I think we can start to-morrow.]

AT SEA, May 5, 1898.

DEAR JUAN: To complete our collection of documents, I think proper that you should have the inclosed copy of a telegram from Villaamil to Sagasta. I send you this letter by two destroyers which I am sending to Martinique in search of news. All is well on board, and the spirit is excellent. We shall see what God has in store for us. The final result is not doubtful; but if we could only start with a good lucky stroke! God be with us! Good-bye. Regards to your folk, etc.

PASCUAL.

Telegram from Villaamil.

APRIL 22, 1898.

[PRÁXEDES SAGASTA, Madrid:

[(To be deciphered by naval key.)]

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you should know, through a friend who does not fear censure, that, while as seamen we are all ready to die with honor in the fulfillment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless for the termination of the war, if the representations repeatedly made by the admiral to the minister of marine are not taken into consideration.

F. VILLAAMIL.¹

ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER IV.

At the conclusion of the war the Office of Naval Intelligence published a pamphlet under the title of "Views of Admiral Cervera Regarding the Spanish Navy in the Late War," being a translation of a series of letters published at Madrid in *La Epoca* of November 5, 1898, in vindication of the Spanish Navy. The pamphlet referred to contains the following letters in addition to those given in Captain Núñez's book.

In January, 1898, Admiral Cervera wrote to one of his relatives:

DEFICIENCIES OF THE NAVAL INDUSTRY.

"About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our condition to go to war with the United States. I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it should be necessary to bring it to light in defense of my memory or myself when we had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best of intentions.

"To-day we find ourselves again in one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and to explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with the other one, so that the two may be my military testament.

"The relative military positions of Spain and the United States has grown worse for us, because we are extenuated, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only with the *Colón* and the torpedo destroyers, and they have increased theirs much more.

"What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in everything we look at. There is the *Cataluña*, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriotism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. And the condition of our industry is the same in all the arsenals.

¹ See the addendum which here follows.—O. N. I.

"Let us consider, now, our private industries. The Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima supplies the engines of the *Alfonso XIII*; Cadiz the *Filipinas*. If the *Cárlos V* is not a dead failure, she is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power. And remember that the construction is purely Spanish. The company of La Graña has not completed its ships, as I am told. Only the *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, and *Maria Teresa* are good ships of their class; but, though constructed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would be a sad thing for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The *Vizcaya* carries a 11-cm. breech plug which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night. And that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention! But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a disaster. But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be arranged without coming to a conflict which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us."

STATE OF THE FLEET.

In the beginning of February Admiral Cervera wrote to a high official personage: "Although I am sure that I am telling you nothing new, I think it is not idle, in these critical times, to make a study of the condition of the fleet. We must discount the *Alfonso XIII*, so many years under trials that it appears we shall not have the pleasure ever to count it among our vessels of war. The fleet is reduced to the three Bilbao cruisers, the *Colón*, the *Destructor*, and the torpedo destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*. The three Bilbao battle ships are practically complete, but the 14-cm. artillery, the main power of these vessels, is practically useless, on account of the bad system of its breech mechanism, and the bad quality of the cartridge cases, of which there are only those on board.

"The *Colón*, which is undoubtedly the best of all our ships from a military point of view, has not received her guns. The *Destructor* may serve as a scout, although its speed is not very high for this service in the fleet. The *Furor* and *Terror* are in a good condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 75-mm. pieces. As for the supplies necessary for a fleet, we frequently lack even the most necessary. In this arsenal (Cadiz) we have not been able to coal, and both at Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obtain half of the biscuit we wanted, and that only because I had ordered 8,000 kilos to be made here. We have no charts of the American seas, although I suppose that they have been ordered; but at the present time we could not move. Apart from this deficient state of the material, I have the pleasure to state that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that a lack of better and more abundant material, greater supplies, and less hindrances are wanting to put this personnel in a condition to amply carry out its role."

"I note," said the Admiral in another letter, "what I am told concerning the heavy artillery of the *Colón*. It is to be very much regretted that there is always so much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so much of it now regarding the acceptance of the 254-mm. guns, because if we finally take them, it will seem that we are yielding to certain disagreeable impositions, and if things come to the worst, it seems to me we will have to accept, as the proverb says, 'hard bread rather than none;' and if we have no other guns, and these ones can fire at least 25 or 30 shots, we will have to take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient. And we must not lose time, so that the vessel may be armed and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible."

Some time afterwards, when matters were getting worse and worse, the admiral was more explicit still. Shortly after the Dupuy de Lome incident he said:

"I do not know when the *Pelayo* and the *Cárlos V* will be able to join the fleet, but I suspect that they will not arrive in time. Of the first one I know nothing at all, but I have received some news concerning the second one, and certainly not very satisfactory as regards the time it will take for it to be ready. It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United States. In the Cadiz division I believe the *Numancia* will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the *Lepanto*. Of the *Cárlos V* and the *Pelayo* I have already spoken. The *Colón* has not yet received her artillery, and if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns. The eight principal vessels of the Havana station have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost us very dear.

"Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that with this force, extenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against them will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may be turned. As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids with our fast vessels in order to do them as much harm as possible. It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, but I think it convenient to analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments."

MORE DEFICIENCIES—THE COUNTRY MUST BE TOLD THE TRUTH.

On February 26 the admiral wrote the following:

"When I received yesterday the letter in which, among other things, you asked me if the *Colón* could go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was ready, and at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which might be used in that practice should be recharged, but it appears that there is no furnace in which they can be reannealed, or a machine to reform the cartridge cases. The extra charges which the vessel brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless.

"I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed afflicting, but can we afford to cherish illusions? Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the Queen and by the whole council of ministers."

That this thoughtful and patriotic advice was not favorably received by the Government is shown by the following letter a few days afterwards:

"Yesterday I received your letter of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful impressions caused by my remarks; but I am not surprised, because they are truly sad, and still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one sees. Just now we have another proof of this in the fact that the difficulty of obtaining cartridge cases for the *Colón* arises from the want of means (money), and

this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against the richest nation in the world. I do not wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result could be obtained. But every detail points out either our lack of means or our defective organization, and, above all, our utter lack of preparation.

"I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities clearly and without beating around the bush. Now let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst."

CERVERA WISHED TO EXPLAIN HIS OPINION TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

Admiral Cervera's already expressed desire to personally inform the council of ministers was still more clearly expressed under date of March 16:

"Yesterday I received your favor of the day before, by which I see that our opinions agree concerning the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As both of us are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It also appears that the whole Government participates in this opinion, but I am afraid that there may be some minister who, while believing that we are not in favorable conditions, may have been dazzled by the names of the vessels appearing in the general statement and may not realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, especially if he is not thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary for a naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, etc. We have nothing at all. If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it is of the greatest importance that the whole council of ministers, without exception, be fully and clearly informed of our terrible position, so that there may not remain the least doubt that the war will simply lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightful ruin; for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war but to find some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is not done, the more time is spent the worse will be the final result, whether it is peace or war.

"From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since we can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster, and since we can not treat directly with the United States, whose bad faith is notorious, perhaps there is nothing left for us to do but to settle the dispute through arbitration or mediation, provided the enemy accepts. However, this order of consideration does not come within my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited to reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders of the Government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of the situation. Before dropping this subject I must insist that perhaps it would be well for me to verbally inform the members of the cabinet and to say that I am ready to start at the first intimation.

"Concerning the available forces and what may be expected of them, I will be very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about the 254-mm. guns of the *Colón*. The 14-cm. cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. This vessel has only 30, and it is to be supposed that the stores of the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* are not better supplied. For the present the firm is supplying only 100 per week, and supposing that the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz one of these days, at this rate we won't have finished until October. Then they have to be charged; therefore they can never be ready in time for the present conflict. I thought I would have the first ones by January, and I will not have them until April. The engines of the *Pelayo* are ready and the vessel can sail, but how about the secondary battery and the armored redoubt? These will not be ready. If the old battery could be mounted! But I doubt it; the ports will not permit it. I have heard it said that the crew which brought the *Pelayo* was taken from the *Vitoria*, which is another proof of our excessive poverty. It will be very well if the *Carlos V* is soon ready, but I understand that the 10-cm. battery has not yet been mounted, and then the trials are to be made.

“I never had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels. Too much fuss is made over every detail by ignorant people. It was through this that we lost the *Garibaldi*, and now we have lost the Brazilian cruisers. In fact, we have only secured the *Colón*, an excellent ship, but which has not yet arrived, and the *Valdés*. And supposing that we had everything our own way, and that Providence should grant us a victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find ourselves in the condition explained in my last and which it is not necessary to repeat. It only rests for me now to be informed of the destination of the fleet. I believe the *Teresa* ought to be in Cadiz, where the cartridge cases are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all her guns were mounted.

“I will insist no more, but the voice of my conscience, animated by my love for my country, tells me that in saying this I am fulfilling my unavoidable duty.”

CONDITION OF THE FLEET IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WAR.

In the month of April, shortly before the war, Cervera wrote:

“My fears are realized. The conflict is coming fast upon us; and the *Colón* has not received her big guns; the *Carlos V* has not been delivered, and her 10-cm. artillery is not yet mounted; the *Pelayo* is not ready for want of finishing her redoubt, and, I believe, her secondary battery; the *Vitoria* has no artillery, and of the *Numancia* we had better not speak.

“But after all I am glad the end is coming. The country can stand this state of affairs no longer, and any arrangement will be a good one, however bad it looks, if it comes without our having to lament a great disaster, as may happen if we go to war with a few half-armed vessels, and with want of means and excess of incumbrances.”

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END.

INCREASE OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET—OPERATIONS ON THE CUBAN COAST—BOMBARDMENT OF DIFFERENT PORTS—OPERATIONS AGAINST PUERTO RICO—DESTRUCTION OF OUR CABLES—OUR SQUADRON AT SANTIAGO.

The Americans used every endeavor to increase their fleet, without having to stop at such considerations as kept us back. We should be glad to give here a list of the 128 vessels which they purchased and equipped for war under the name of auxiliaries of the fleet. We do not do so in order not to burden the reader with numerical data, and will confine ourselves to a short review of the strength of their Navy on August 15, 1898.¹

¹ A list of the vessels purchased, their value, and the names with which they were christened, may be found in the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Vol. I, 1898.

Through the United States Consul at Cadiz, C. L. Adams, says the New York Herald, the Navy Department at Washington received detailed information as to the Spanish merchant marine. Mr. Adams furnished a complete list of all vessels carrying the Spanish flag, specifying those which might be used as auxiliary cruisers in time of war, and those which would probably continue to be merchant steamers and might be captured by a United States fleet of light vessels sent to the coasts of Spain.

The following is the information furnished by Consul Adams:

Compañía Trasatlántica (Barcelona and Cadiz): Thirty-two steamers, 20 of which have over 12 knots speed and some of which are ready to be fitted out as cruisers and armed transports. These vessels carry on traffic with Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, New York, Liverpool, the Philippines, Río de la Plata, and Africa.

Pinillos Sáenz y Ca. (Barcelona): Five steamers, 3 of which can be equipped as auxiliary cruisers. These ships go to Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, and the United States.

F. Prat y Ca. (Barcelona): Five steamers of 2,000 tons each; same route as those of Pinillos Sáenz y Ca.

De Aarotegui (Bilbao): Seven freight steamers; same route as preceding ones.

Compañía de Navegación La Flecha (Bilbao): Seven freight steamers; to Liverpool and preceding lines.

Hijo de J. Jover y Serra (Barcelona): One steamer of 2,000 tons. Route: Spain, Puerto Rico, and Cuba.

J. Jover y Costa: One steamer of 2,000 tons. Route: Spain, Puerto Rico, and Cuba.

Sociedad de Navegación é Industria (Barcelona): Four steamers. Route: Spain and Canaries.

Empresa de Navegación á vapor La Bética (Seville): Twelve steamers. Between Spain, England, and Germany. Freight vessels.

Compañía Marítima (Barcelona): Eighteen freight steamers. Carry on traffic

At that time the personnel of the Navy, which at the breaking out of the war numbered only 12,000 men, had risen to 24,123, and the fleet was composed as follows:

Battleships, first class.....	4
Battleships, second class.....	1
Armored cruisers.....	2
Coast-defense monitors.....	6
Armored ram.....	1
Protected cruisers.....	12
Unprotected cruisers.....	3
Gunboats.....	18
Dynamite cruiser.....	1
Torpedo boats.....	11
Old warships, including monitors.....	14

Auxiliary Navy.

Auxiliary cruisers.....	11
Converted yachts.....	28
Coast-guard vessels.....	15
Lighters.....	4
Converted tugs.....	27
Colliers.....	19
Miscellaneous vessels.....	19

To these must be added a number of stipulations and contracts for supplying the squadrons at Cuba and the Philippines with coal and fresh provisions; also hospital ships, tank and distilling ships, repair ships, steamers of great speed to carry orders back and forth, etc.

The difficult and arduous task of blockading was therefore performed by our enemies with comparative ease, the vessels being frequently

with the coasts of England and Spain. (This and the preceding line belong to McAndrew & Co., London.)

P. M. Tinore y Ca. (Barcelona): Four freight steamers; traffic between Spain and England.

Compañía Bilbaina de Navegación (Bilbao): Six steamers for transportation of mineral between Bilbao and England.

J. M. Martínez de las Rivas (Bilbao): Three steamers for transportation of mineral between Bilbao and England.

Hijos de Tomás Haynes (Cadiz): Eight freight steamers; between Spain and North Africa.

Sociedad Isleño Marítima (La Palma and Mallorca): Five steamers; traffic between Barcelona and Balearic Islands.

Sociedad Mahonesa de Vapores. Five steamers; Barcelona and Balearic Islands.

Ibarra y Ca. (Seville): Twenty-one steamers; coast traffic.

Clavería Lozo y Ca. (Gijón): Five steamers; coast traffic.

Melitón González y Ca. (Gijón): Five steamers; coast traffic.

España y Ca. (Seville): Five steamers; coast traffic.

Compañía Valenciana de Navegación (Valencia): Five steamers; coast traffic.

The conclusion which the Herald drew from this statement was that we should probably use many of these steamers as auxiliary cruisers, and the others it held out as a bait to the United States auxiliaries, reminding them that the prizes would be distributed as follows: One-half would go to the United States Treasury and the other half to the officers and crews. There can be no doubt as to this system being privateering, and it was practised as often as there was a chance.

relieved and in constant communication with the base of operations established at Key West and Dry Tortugas.

Now and then the bombardment of some port on our insular coasts was combined with the blockade. Among the most important, aside from the bombardment of Santiago, of which we will speak separately, may be mentioned the following:

On April 25 the torpedo boat *Cushing* attempted to reconnoiter the bay of Cardenas; the *Ligera*, which went out to meet her, fired and hit her condenser, destroying it, as was subsequently learned. The torpedo boat withdrew.

On April 27 Admiral Sampson received notice that works of defense were being erected at Matanzas and he decided to stop the work. To that end he entered the bay with his flagship, accompanied by the *Puritan* and *Cincinnati*. The works were bombarded without any effect on the new batteries of Morrillo, Punta Gorda, and Punta Sabanilla, all of which were of sand and rose only a little above the level of the sea. The works answered boldly and the ships withdrew. The French and Austrian consuls protested against this bombardment, of which no previous notice had been given to the city.¹ On the 29th of April the *Eagle* engaged with our small gunboats, among them the *Diego Velázquez*, at Cienfuegos, with the intention of reconnoitering the entrance of the bay. Soon after the *Marblehead* fired upon the entrance, and the batteries of Pasacaballos and gunboats *Satélite*, *Lince*, and *Gariota* answered.

The same day the squadron was apparently trying to effect a landing at Mariel, which was not carried out, because as three towed launches full of men approached the beach of Herradura they were received by the fire of the troops belonging to the Gerona battalion and had to reembark in great haste. It should be remembered that the Americans had chiefs of the Cuban insurrection and many insurgents on board their vessels as pilots, and they were the ones who went ahead in these operations. The troops which had occasion to repulse these attempts at landing stated that they heard the classic voices of the Cubans apostrophizing the Spanish as they were wont to do in their battles.

On April 30 the steamer *Argonaut* was captured near Cienfuegos, and 1 colonel, 6 officers, 3 sergeants, and 5 privates were taken prisoners. The vessel was looted in a barbarous manner.²

On May 6 a torpedo boat opened fire on the works of the battery of Punta Maya at Matanzas; Punta Sabanilla battery answered, and the torpedo boat withdrew without having caused any damage. On the 8th the small gunboats *Ligera*, *Alerta*, and *Antonio López*, starting from Cardenas, met the hostile ships *Winslow* and *Machias* between Buba

¹ We touch on these bombardments lightly so as to follow the thread of the operations, intending to describe them more fully in the future.

² A trustworthy person told us that as the passengers rushed to the boats hot water and steam were thrown upon them.

and Mangle keys. Fire was opened and they were forced to leave the bay.

On May 11 the boats of the *Marblehead* and *Nashville*, under cover of the guns of said vessels, and the *Winslow* attacked the mouth of the bay of Cienfuegos, with a view to effecting a landing. They were received by the fire of the artillery and infantry, which compelled them to withdraw, with one dead and eleven wounded. The same day the *Machias*, *Wilmington*, and *Winslow*, accompanied by the coast-guard vessel *Hudson*, attempted an attack upon Cardenas, and were all repulsed by the fire of our *Antonio López*.¹ The *Winslow* was struck by many shells, disabling her engine and boiler, causing a conflagration on board, and killing Ensign Bagley and five sailors. Her commander was wounded. The vessel and crew were rescued through the intervention of the *Hudson*, which towed her out of range. Combined with this operation was the landing of a force at Cay Diana, in the bay of Cardenas, for the purpose of blowing up the mines located there. The enterprise could not be prevented, owing to superior hostile forces, and for the first time the Americans raised their flag in Cuba.

On the 12th San Juan de Puerto Rico was bombarded by 11 vessels under Admiral Sampson's command; they withdrew without having produced any effect, being repulsed by the fire of the batteries of the forts. On the 14th the gunboat *Diego Velázquez* sustained an engagement with a hostile vessel at Cienfuegos. On the 15th an American vessel appeared in front of Caibarien, but retreated when fired upon by our launches. On the 20th a gunboat fired from a distance upon Varadero and Punta Camacho, between Cardenas and Matanzas, and on the same day two vessels entered the bay of Guantánamo, firing upon Playa del Este and the gunboat *Sandoval*. The fire was returned from Punta Caracoles and the mouth of Guantánamo River, and they retreated without having done any damage. Two batteries of antiquated guns had been established here, one at Caimanera and the other at Cay Toro. On June 13 the *Yankee* had an engagement with a gunboat of ours and the batteries at the entrance to Cienfuegos. On the 15th of the same month the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, and *Suwanee* entered the outer bay of Guantánamo, where there were no defenses, properly speaking, and took possession of it. On the 22d the *St. Paul* had an engagement with our destroyer *Terror*, assisted by the gunboat *Isabel II*, near San Juan de Puerto Rico. The fire of the rapid-fire guns of the *St. Paul* caused several deaths and serious damage on board the *Terror*, which was thereby prevented from firing her torpedoes. This fact is worthy of notice in connection with battles between torpedo boats and cruisers.

On June 21 a vessel appeared before Mariel, exchanging heliographic signals with the shore. The old guns of the Fort San Elias battery

¹ The report of the Secretary of the Navy states that there were shore batteries here. This we have already denied in the first volume of this work.

opened fire, but it fell short. On the 29th the *Eagle* and the *Yankee* had an engagement with some of our troops at the mouth of the river Hondo. On the 30th the *Hist*, *Wompatuck*, and *Hornet*, while making a reconnoissance between Cape Cruz and Manzanillo, had an engagement with our vessels anchored there, the field batteries erected ashore, and some infantry. The *Hornet* was struck several times and was completely disabled, the main steam pipe having been cut. She was towed out of action by the *Wompatuck*. On July 1 our gunboats at Manzanillo, the *Delgado Parejo*, *Estrella*, and *Guantánamo*, under way, and the *Cuba Española*, *María*, and *Guardián*, at anchor, under cover of the field batteries of the place, sustained an engagement with the *Scorpion*, *Osceola*, *Hornet*, *Wompatuck*, and others, which retreated after three hours of firing, one of them having been injured. On July 2 the anchoring place of Tunas was attacked by two hostile vessels, one of them a turret ship, followed by transports. They were repulsed by a battery of two 8-centimeter Krupp guns. They returned to the attack on the 3d, and were again repulsed by the same guns and two Plasencia guns. They had evidently intended a landing.

On the 12th of the same month the *Eagle* gave chase to the *Santo Domingo* west of the Isle of Pines. On the 15th the *Annapolis* engaged the shore batteries near Baracoa. On the 18th the *Wilmington*, *Helena*, *Scorpion*, *Hist*, *Hornet*, *Wompatuck*, and *Osceola* again attacked the vessels and batteries at Manzanillo, destroying the gunboats we had at that anchoring place. The same day¹ the *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, *Leyden*, and *Topeka* took possession of the Bay of Nipe, destroying the gunboat *Jorge Juan*.

On the 30th three vessels bombarded Punta Maya, at Matanzas. The improvised 21-centimeter battery to the west returned the fire and the vessels retreated.

On August 12 the *Newark* and *Resolute* carried the First Battalion of Marines to Manzanillo, where they were joined by the *Suwaee*, *Hist*, and *Osceola*. They then asked for the surrender of the place, which was refused, and the city sustained a bombardment.

¹ At daybreak of the 13th it became known that the peace protocol had been signed and the battle was suspended.

The transports with the army corps intrusted with the campaign against Puerto Rico were convoyed from Santiago to the southern coast of that island by the *Massachusetts* (flagship), *Columbia*, *Yale*, *Dixie*, and *Gloucester*. The *Columbia* and the *Yale* also carried troops. This squadron was under the command of Capt. F. J. Higginson. At Guanica the *Annapolis* and *Wasp* joined the fleet, and at Ponce the *Cincinnati*. The *Puritan* and *Amphitrite*, together with the *New Orleans*, were blockading San Juan. On June 18 Ponce fell into the hands of the enemy, represented by the *Dixie*, *Annapolis*, *Gloucester*, and *Wasp*, and their landing forces. On July 1 the *Gloucester* and

¹ According to United States reports Nipe Bay was taken the 21st.—O. N. I.

Wasp took possession of Arroyo. On August 6 the *Amphitrite* landed forces at Cape San Juan. They took possession of the light-house, which they abandoned again upon an attack by our troops on August 8.

These operations did not lead to serious battles, as may be judged from the small number of casualties sustained by the hostile squadron.¹ The main thing was to blockade, terrify, and make a show with lively bombardments of open and undefended places, without any decisive battles. The preconceived plan of cutting Cuba off from all assistance from without was entirely successful. As it became obvious that our squadron, in which we had placed so much confidence, was nothing but an illusion, the Americans grew more and more audacious.

In order to isolate us completely, they sought to cut the cables connecting us with Europe. Spain, after four centuries of dominion in Cuba, did not have a single cable of her own connecting her with her wealthy and much-coveted colonies. Let the reader make his own comments on this fact, which is one more item on the list of criminal neglects.

In Cuba we harbored the hope that, inasmuch as the cables are protected by international law, the United States would not dare do anything against them. But such was not the case. The intention of destroying them was very obvious from the beginning, for, as previously shown, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, suggested it to Sampson in his preliminary instructions, before hostilities had broken out. Hence the Americans never thought of respecting this sacred property. On the contrary, they made every effort to destroy it, and succeeded in cutting us off from the rest of the world and from the mother country, so that toward the end of the campaign the only means of communication from Habana was the cable by way of Key West, of which the Americans had taken possession. According to some writers, who have given this matter special attention, it is not certain whether the island was cut off from other countries. But certain it is that Santiago preserved communication by means of the English cable until the last days of the blockade, because this cable was landed quite

¹The total number of casualties sustained by the United States Navy in these actions and at Manila is as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Battle of Manila	9	9
Battle of Cienfuegos	1	11	12
Battle of Cardenas	5	3	8
Battle of San Juan	1	7	8
Battle of Guantánamo	6	16	22
Battle of Santiago de Cuba:			
June 22	1	9	10
July 3	1	10	11
On board Eagle, July 12	1	1
On board Bancroft, August 2	1	1
On board Amphitrite, August 6	1	1
On board Yankee, August 11	1	1
Total	17	67	84

a distance inside the bay and could not be cut. And it is also certain that the Americans did whatever they pleased about the cables, without any protest from the civilized world against this spoliation. Although some claims have been formulated, it was more from the standpoint of commercial enterprise than from that of international law, and the object was to claim damages rather than punish and exact amends for the abuse. It would almost seem as though the powers of Europe were afraid of what is called the Colossus of the North.

On April 25, Long issued instructions to Sampson, contrary to former suggestions, not to touch the cables, and when the latter complained of this order, the Secretary replied that there was some idea of declaring them neutral. The cable from Habana to Key West was at once taken possession of by the Americans, and we shall see that the so-called neutrality was nothing but a feint to better conceal the real intentions and to prepare the final blow in Europe.

This was the general policy of the Americans: Stoical calm in order to prepare the ground; decided action when they knew that their plans had been perfected and that no one could bar their way.¹

We will now mention the principal operations carried out by the Americans to destroy the cables.

The order to cut the cables south of Cuba was issued April 30. On May 11 the *Eagle* dragged unsuccessfully for a cable laid between Cienfuegos and Batabanó in shallow and clear water. On the same day, Captain McCalla reported that the cable between Cienfuegos and Manzanilla had been successfully cut by boats used close to the shore. Both

¹ One of the many proofs of the solidarity which existed between the United States and England against Spain is the following telegram:

"London, July 13.—The first meeting of the Anglo-American League took place at Safford House to-day. The Duke of Sutherland presided. There were present the Earl of Grey, the Earl of Jersey, Baron Farrer, Baron Brassey, Baron Tennyson, Baron Monkswell, Sir John Lubbock, Rear-Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, Cardinal Baughan, the Duke of Westminster, Henry M. Stauley, and many others. The Duke of Fife sent a letter stating that he regretted very much not to be present at the first meeting, but that it was utterly impossible.

"The Duke of Sutherland stated in the opening speech that the society had nothing to do with politics, its only and exclusive object being to give expression to the affection and cordiality existing between the people of Great Britain and that of the United States, and he believed that this effort would be appreciated and find an echo in the United States.

"Upon the motion of Lord Brassey it was resolved that—

"Whereas the people of the British Empire and that of the United States are closely allied by the bonds of blood; and whereas they have inherited the same literature and laws and preserved the same principles in their Governments; and whereas they recognize the same ideas of liberty and humanity, and are closely allied in many parts of the world by questions of interest; now, therefore, this society is of opinion that every possible effort should be made, in the interest of civilization and peace, to insure the most cordial and constant cooperation on the part of both nations."

An executive council to represent the association was then appointed.

of these cables were landed in Spanish territory and laid in Spanish waters, so that no question was raised on account of their destruction. The cutting of the latter cable could only be effected about 180 meters from the shore, because the boats employed in the work were covered with such a galling fire that they were compelled to retreat after cutting two of the three cables they had found there.

The *St. Louis* and *Wompatuck*, the latter especially fitted for this class of operations, attempted to cut the cable from Santiago to Jamaica during the night of May 16, but had to abandon the enterprise when the *Wompatuck* was discovered by one of our patrol boats.

On May 18 the attempt was renewed and the cable was successfully grappled in 500 fathoms of water, hardly a mile from the Morro. When these vessels were fired upon from the Morro they could do nothing but steam out, with the picked-up cable. Captain Goodrich of the *St. Louis*, was under the impression that there were two cables here and was in hopes that the second one had been damaged; if this was not the case, the enterprise was a failure.

On May 19 the same vessels attempted to cut the French cable at Guantánamo. A gunboat succeeded in preventing them and compelled the United States ships to retreat when they had already grappled the cable. The other end of it was landed near Mole St. Nicolas, west of Santo Domingo. Captain Goodrich went thither, and on the morning of May 20 he cut the cable in deep water, being careful not to pass inside the 3-mile limit from Santo Domingo.

An attempt was then made to cut the cable from Puerto Rico to Ponce; but the nature of the bottom and the deep water prevented its success. Captain Goodrich was of opinion that specially fitted vessels with adequate apparatus were required for this service of cable-cutting. He said in this connection:

I venture to remind you that cable grappling is a very slow and tedious operation, often necessitating repeated drives over the same ground. The good fortune which has attended our efforts so far is quite exceptional in grappling practice.

In the East, Commodore Dewey, who was master of the Bay of Manila after the destruction of the Spanish squadron, made application to the representatives of the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company at Manila for permission to send telegrams the same as under normal conditions. The Captain-General refused permission, whereupon Dewey cut the cable and took the end of it on board his ship. Before he could make use of it, considerable time elapsed owing to the lack of instruments and operators. But soon after he had succeeded in establishing communication with his Government, the Spanish Government exercised its right by reason of its contract with the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company and sealed the end of the cable at Hongkong, thereby isolating Dewey and Manila.

From the above it will be seen that shore batteries and boats, in spite of their weakness, in many instances prevented the cutting of the

cables, and also that cable-cutting is a difficult operation in deep water, even when there is no enemy to contend with.

In this connection Admiral Colomb says:

As to international law, it is understood to be clear that a neutral cable within the enemy's territorial waters takes the chances of war, as does all neutral property in the enemy's territory. But the somewhat curious and clearly misunderstood point is, that out of territorial waters a neutral's cable is protected by international law as being neutral property, and can not be cut there except in defiance of the rights of neutrals.

If I rightly understand matters, Captain Goodrich transgressed international law by cutting the French cable outside the 3-mile limit off Mole St. Nicolas. He respected the neutrality of Haiti, which did not count for much, but he destroyed, or attempted to destroy, French property on the high seas. Apparently the French cable from Cuba to Haiti was in three conditions. It was open to destruction by the belligerent within 3 miles of the Cuban shore, without raising any claims of neutrals. From the Cuban 3-mile limit to the Haitian 3-mile limit the cable was as much French property as any French mail steamer in the same waters, and the belligerent had just as much right to cut the cable as he had to capture the French mail steamer. Within the Haitian 3-mile limit the cable was doubly protected. It was French property in Haitian territory, so that French rights and Haitian rights would have been equally defied had the cable been touched in those waters.¹

Practically, then, it seems that, quite apart from any difficulty arising from grappling cables in deep water, an intending belligerent proposing to astonish us by way of dramatic surprise would have to cut all our cables within three miles of our own shores or else leave it alone. The lesson appears to be that it is not impossible that, if we were at war, attempts might be made to damage us in that way, and it seems a legitimate conclusion to assume that the ends of our cables ought to be covered and protected by a few of the longest-ranged guns properly mounted in a battery. Where possible, as illustrated by the usefulness of the Spanish gunboat at Guantánamo, naval force should be localized with the same defensive object. On the whole, the lesson does not seem unsatisfactory.

The case of the Manila cable is evidently special, and it is understood to be so. We may have noticed by the announcement in the papers the other day that the Eastern Extension Company had brought a claim against the American Government, which the American Government had in the first stage disallowed. It is evident that the claim made is likely to raise the whole question of the neutrality of cables, but, the matter being *sub judice*, I might prejudice it by offering any opinions. All I will say is that we should watch the case as closely as we can.

Relative to this matter we will say that, as is well known, the theory of the strongest predominates. Everything is permissible to the powerful. While we refrained from privateering, the Americans not only carried on something very similar, but also cut our cables, without any consideration or respect, and no one has interfered nor will interfere. Perhaps the nations of Europe may have to pay dear for this selfish conduct.

We now come to the fate of our squadron.

From Admiral Cervera's letters there is no doubt that the four cruisers and the three destroyers—*Terror*, *Plutón*, and *Fuor*—left

¹ There is at present great uncertainty as to what constitutes territorial waters; some hold that it extends to 3 miles; others claim 5. The range of guns which was formerly the standard has changed so much nowadays that it would perhaps be proper that an international agreement should settle this point definitely.

Cape Verde in a precarious condition, and it will also be understood that the return of the other three torpedo vessels, together with the *Ciudad de Cádiz*, to the Canaries, must have injured us much in the eyes of the world and must have had a demoralizing effect in our own country.

On this point we read in the Naval Annual:

It must be assumed that the Spanish Government, in the peculiar circumstances, felt bound to make an apparent effort to succor Cuba in the face of the strong opinion of Admiral Cervera and his officers that disaster was inevitable. The movement across the Atlantic must be regarded as *political rather than naval*.

We add no comment of our own. We only wish to state facts and give the opinions of others, in order that each one may, with absolute independence, form his own dispassionate judgment.

Admiral Cervera, with the *Colón* and the *María Teresa*, had left Cadiz on April 8, and on the 15th he reached Cape Verde (Porto Grande), where the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* joined them. They remained at anchor, transshipping coal from the *Cádiz* and making repairs, until the 29th, when the squadron started for Cuba with the admiral's flag hoisted on the *María Teresa*.

There were great difficulties to contend with. Several times it became necessary for the *Teresa* to tow the *Plutón*, the *Oquendo* the *Terror*, and the *Colón* the *Furor*; damages had to be repaired, the greatest precautions used, and practices carried out. On the 12th the squadron came in sight of Martinique, where it stopped from 5.15 to 6.15 a. m. One of the destroyers went into port. The vessels with extreme caution then shaped their course for Curaçao, where they arrived on the morning of the 14th. The *Teresa* and *Vizcaya* went in, while the *Oquendo*, the *Colón*, and the destroyers remained outside.

At midnight the *Terror* was towed inside. On the 16th the *Plutón*, with the *Teresa* and *Vizcaya*, entered the bay, and the engine of the latter was repaired. The squadron took as much coal as it was possible to obtain and started on the 18th for Santiago de Cuba, where it arrived on the morning of May 19. There it took some coal, under very unfavorable conditions, from the depots of the Juragua Mining Company and the San Luis Railway.¹

The Americans, who had accurate information as to the starting of the squadron from Cape Verde and its probable course for the West Indies, had maintained their squadrons, one near Habana (Sampson's) and the other at Hampton Roads (Schley's). On the supposition that Cervera would go to Puerto Rico, it was decided that Sampson's fleet should take position in the Windward Passage. To that end it started on May 4 with the battle ships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and *New York*, the monitors *Amphitrite* and *Terror*, a few auxiliaries, and one collier. The monitors proved an impediment because they had to be towed long

¹The operations of the squadron while in this harbor, that is to say, to July 3 when it went out, are closely connected with the land battles, and we shall therefore speak of them when we come to that part of our account.

distances and resupplied with coal several times. On the 7th Sampson arrived at Cape Haitien, where he was advised from Washington that no news had been received of the Spanish squadron. Nor did the two vessels which had been detached to cruise east of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the *Harrard* and *St. Louis*, succeed in sighting our squadron. On the evening of the 9th Sampson held a council with his captains and decided to shape his course for San Juan de Puerto Rico to see whether the squadron was there. But at 11 o'clock he received a telegram from Washington advising him of the rumors of the press to the effect that the Spanish squadron had been sighted off Martinique, and indicating the expediency of his return for fear of an attack upon Key West and the breaking of the blockade at Habana.¹

But Sampson continued on his course to San Juan, and at daylight of the 12th the bombardment commenced. The admiral says that he could have taken the place, but when he found that our squadron was not there and that he would have to leave his ships there until the army of occupation arrived, he decided to return to Habana. Our opinion does not coincide with his. To bombard a fortified place is easy; to take it is quite a different matter. It is reasonable to suppose that Sampson was very desirous to take San Juan and make himself popular, but he had not counted on the resistance he encountered, and that is what caused him to desist. It is said that the following night, while en route for Habana, he learned that Cervera had been sighted at Martinique, and afterwards he received official notice of his arrival at Curaçao on the morning of the 14th. The *Harrard* was chased by the *Terror*, which had remained behind, probably on account of injuries, which compelled her to go to Fort-de-France, which the *Harrard* had left owing to international laws, which provide that there shall be an interval of twenty-four hours between the going out of two belligerents. In the meantime the battleship *Oregon* was shaping her course for the Bermudas to join Sampson's squadron, after her long voyage from the Pacific coast.

On May 13 Sampson received orders to proceed to Key West, and Schley was also instructed to go there from Hampton Roads. The latter arrived on the 18th, and Sampson with his flagship *New York* the same day, the remainder of the squadron following him closely.

Obedient to orders from the Department at Washington, several fast cruisers were guarding the passages between Haiti and Puerto Rico. The *St. Louis* had been at Santiago on the 18th and bombarded the Morro and Punta Gorda at short range. She was struck by a shell in the bow. It is a pity that the Socapa battery had not been completed at that time, as it could have seriously injured the ship, which, in conjunction with the *Wompatuck*, was attempting to cut the cable. From

¹This part of Sampson's conduct does not seem clear. If he had information as to the whereabouts of our squadron, why did he undertake the bombardment of San Juan? What we have read concerning this matter seems cleverly devised, but is not convincing.

there she proceeded to Guantánamo without having sighted the Spanish squadron, which, as stated, entered Santiago Harbor on the 19th.

On the 25th the *St. Paul* captured a vessel, the *Restormel*, carrying 2,400 tons of coal for our squadron. This vessel had been at San Juan de Puerto Rico, had gone thence to Curaçao, and arrived there two days after Cervera had departed. Her captain informed the Americans that there were at San Juan two other vessels loaded with coal. It was also learned that there were only 2,300 tons of coal at Santiago.

Schley, with the Flying Squadron and the *Iowa*, while off Cienfuegos, received instructions to go to Santiago, where he arrived on the 26th, finding the *Minneapolis*, *St. Paul*, and *Yale* already there. By that time it was positively known that Cervera's fleet was at Santiago, and Sampson received orders to proceed there at once. He arrived off Santiago on June 1.¹ The *Oregon* had in the meantime joined his squadron.

On the subject of so important an operation as the entering of Cervera's squadron into this harbor, the English Vice-Admiral P. H. Colomb, a well-known authority on naval matters, to whom reference has already been made and will again be made in the course of this work, says in a recent article entitled *The Misfortunes of Cervera*:

Instead of crossing the Atlantic at 10 knots, Cervera was only able to cross at 7 knots, and then his coal was exhausted by the time he got to Martinique. Because of this, and because of the breakdown of one, if not two, of the destroyers, his presence at Martinique was known all over the world a few hours after he arrived there. Then further delay in the search for coal came about by the visit to Curaçao, and again the presence of the squadron and its hapless condition was everywhere known. It could only cross to Cuba at the rate of some 5 knots, and when it finally arrived at Santiago, on May 19—four days later than should have sufficed to finish the stroke at Key West—the fate of the squadron was as absolutely sealed as if it had run there and then into the heart of the combined American fleets.

It was, of course, instantly blockaded. Probably, had there been ample supplies of coal, and ample appliances for coaling at Santiago, it would not have been able to get away for a stroke in the time allowed. As it was, there were neither of these things in the Spanish port, and it was but a question of time when Cervera's squadron would fall with the surrender of Santiago to a land attack, or be driven out by the land force as rabbits are driven out of their holes by a ferret.

It followed that nothing could be done by the Americans until the Spanish squadron was put out of existence, and all the existing force of America was thrown upon a point that became of consequence when Cervera appeared there.

Still obeying orders that had no reason in them, Cervera made an attempt to escape on July 3. Had the squadron been everything in reality that it appeared on paper, the attempt was probably hopeless; but it may be said that had tactics apparently more dangerous, but really more hopeful, been adopted, it is not impossible that a better show might have been made. As it was, with foul bottoms, the wrong guns, and not the whole of them, and short ammunition, the fate of the unfortunate ships was only made more certain by a run alongshore, which enabled the Americans to employ all the fire possible against their enemies without any hesitation caused by the danger of hitting their friends.

It might have been worse for Cervera, but perhaps it would have been better for Spain, had Cervera taken the position that was his due as the leading Spanish

¹ While the Americans boast of having known the situation of our squadron for a long time, it is certain that none of their actions bear this out.

admiral, and absolutely refused to take a part in annihilating the naval power of his country.

The plan of operations, which, according to Admiral Colomb, Cervera was expected to carry out, was as follows:

The moment it put to sea it was bound to have on the American Navy all the paralyzing effect of Lord Torrington's "fleet in being,"¹ and, indeed, it had precisely this effect when the time came. The news that the squadron had left St. Vincent forced the Americans to abandon the blockade of Cuba practically, brought down to Cuban waters the division of the United States fleet, that, somewhat owing to popular and very ignorant clamor, had been detained in the north, and it drove Sampson's division away to the eastward, and to a position which would hardly have contributed to the success of Cervera's operations had success been possible.

The program I had sketched as a likely one for Cervera to follow—when I supposed that he had with him, in fact, what paper accounts gave him credit for—was the following: I assumed that the four cruisers would take the three destroyers in tow and steer straight for the passage between Martinique and St. Lucia, timing itself so as to pass through in darkness on the ninth or tenth day, so as not to be seen from either shore; then to pass well to the southward of Jamaica, to round the west end of Cuba, well out of sight, and to *strike a blow at the shipping, transports, etc., in Key West, on the fifteenth day, soon after daylight. It was a pretty program, a daring one no doubt, but I think quite feasible had all been as it appeared to be.*

¹ A fleet inferior to the hostile forces and which refuses battle, constituting a constant menace for the enemy.

CHAPTER VI.

BLOCKADE OF HARBORS.

THE OQUENDO AND VIZCAYA—BLOCKADE OF THE COAST—ASPECT OF THE BLOCKADE OF HABANA—CONDITIONS OF THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO—SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC—A FEW STRANGE FACTS.

From all that has been stated in this book we must come to the conclusion that the United States really feared our squadron and the fortified places on our colonial coasts. The Americans had no conception of the small number of our available vessels, and thought that those we did have were models of their kind. This fact—though we do not imagine that in the long run the struggle would have been decided in our favor, as it would soon have become apparent that it was moral rather than material—might at least have been taken advantage of in good season, and in that event, perhaps, we should not have lost the whole of our colonial empire; perhaps only the island of Cuba would have been taken from us, while we should have retained Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

Among the most important means to that end, from a strategic standpoint, would have been a basis of naval power in Cuba, adapted to keep alive among the enemy that uncertainty and dread which was apparent in all their actions.

This would have been possible if we had retained at Habana the cruisers *Vizcaya* and *Almirante Oquendo*, which, though doomed to be sacrificed in any event, would without any doubt have done a great deal more good here in cooperation with the shore batteries.

The *Vizcaya* had been sent to New York by reason of the dark and unwarranted rumors to which the *Maine* catastrophe had given rise. She was subjected to much annoyance while in New York harbor, but there is no doubt that her presence there made considerable impression on the minds of the Yankees. On the 1st of March she entered Habana harbor.

Shortly after, on the 5th, the *Oquendo* arrived there.

There can be no doubt that some significance, some plan, underlay the arrival of these two battle ships at Habana, where they found an adequate base for brilliant action, and sufficient resources for maneuvering, fighting, taking refuge, and keeping a whole hostile squadron in check.

In the chain of errors, the final link of which—for the present!—is the terrible defeat we suffered, not the least, perhaps, is the order for these two ships to return to Cape Verde to join the destroyers and torpedo boats already there and those which Cervera afterwards took there from Cadiz. It seems to us, though we are not of the profession, that after the long voyage of the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*, as the result

of which the former had a foul bottom and had lost her speed, the most natural thing would have been to put them in perfect condition and keep them at the scene of the prospective war. In cooperation with the small but by no means inefficient vessels which we had at Habana and other ports of the island, and auxiliary vessels in the shape of merchant steamers, they might have constituted a flying squadron which would have given the enemy something to do and something to fear.

The reader will agree with us that if we had had such a naval force at Habana the Americans, who had, moreover, to reckon with Cervera's squadron, which could have gone out a little later if it chose, reinforced by the *Pelayo* and one or two other ships, would have been compelled to divide their fleet considerably, especially if we had considered the possibility of using some privateer cruisers—*under the name of auxiliaries*, if preferred—against their commerce.

Are these conjectures well founded, or are we mistaken?

We are inclined to believe the former. But in case of doubt it must be admitted that, even if the results of the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* remaining in said harbor had not been as favorable as we presume, it is at least reasonable to suppose that if those two ships had been kept at Habana Cervera's squadron would not have gone to Santiago, and the latter city, in the eastern extremity of the island, would not have become the enemy's objective. For there can be no doubt at this time that it did not enter into the United States' plans to make the capital of the eastern province the scene of war. The attack of that city became necessary and easy by reason of the Spanish squadron having taken refuge there.

Finally, it will be readily understood that it is not expedient to wear out ships by long voyages on the eve of war. The *Vizcaya* reached Cape Verde in unserviceable condition, *nothing more than a buoy*, as Admiral Cervera says graphically in one of his letters.

We are firmly convinced that leaving those two ships at Habana would have given the enemy much to think of and much to fear, and would have made it necessary for them to draw their naval forces farther west. In that event the blockade of Habana and other ports and coasts of the island would at once have assumed an entirely different aspect, and the whole nature of the campaign would have been changed.

It was therefore with feelings of profound sadness that we saw the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya*, obeying superior orders, steam out of the harbor at 5 o'clock in the evening of April 1. The ships stopped at Puerto Rico, which island they left on the 9th, shaping their course for St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and leaving the West Indies at the mercy of the blockade which was announced a few days later.

A blockade when continued for some length of time is a tedious operation for warships, because it compels them to remain constantly on the high sea, always on the lookout, in almost unendurable monotony, which is very exasperating and fatiguing. The United States squad-

ron hardly felt these onerous effects. There being no enemy to be feared in the immediate vicinity, and bases of operations and large dockyards and depots being near, the ships could move at their ease, and were frequently relieved to replenish the ammunition expended and resupply themselves with provisions and fresh water.

Hence the blockade of the coast was nothing more than simply quiet cruising.

The blockades of the harbors were of a more difficult nature, especially at Havana and Santiago, and as these are naval operations of infrequent occurrence, we deem it expedient to describe them somewhat more at length.


In order to give an idea of the blockade of the former place we avail ourselves of the observations which were made day and night for nearly four months by the Central Telemetric Station at the *Pirotecnia Militar*, which was connected by telephone with the telemetric apparatus of the batteries and with the different chiefs of the forts, artillery, and batteries, all of which organizations we will describe at length when we speak of Habana in the book which is to follow the present one.

From the charts which represent the observations of the station referred to we have selected a few of different dates, in order that the reader may form an accurate idea of the blockade of a harbor and of the manner in which the United States vessels effected the blockade of Habana.

Situation of hostile ships in the order from windward to leeward.


[Artillery. Telemetric observatory of the "*Pirotecnia*." April 22, 1898, 6 p. m.]

No.	Class.	Name.	Masts.	Smoke-stacks.	Armament.	Distance from observatory.
						<i>Meters.</i>
1	Gunboat		2	1	22,000
2	Cruiser	Montgomery..	2	2	10 12.5-cm. R. F	23,500
					6 57-mm	
					2 37-mm	
					2 machine	
3	Yacht.....			1	20,500
4	Cruiser	Marblehead...	2	2	10 12.5-cm. R. F	23,000
					6 57-mm	
					2 37-mm	
					2 machine	
5	Battleship	Iowa.....	1	2	4 30-cm	20,500
					8 20-cm	
					6 10-cm. R. F	
					20 57-mm	
					6 37-mm	
6	Gunboat		2	1	19,500
7	Battleship	Indiana.....	1	2	4 32.5-cm	22,000
					8 20-cm	
					4 15-cm	
					20 57-mm	
					6 37-mm	
8	Cruiser		3	1	20,000
9	do	New York....	2	3	6 20-cm	22,500
					12 10-cm. R. F	
					8 57-mm	
					4 37-mm	
					4 machine	
10	Merchant		2	1	23,500
11	do		2	1	22,000




The United States squadron appears at 5.30 p. m., following a north-easterly course. When within 22,000 meters of this observatory the ships stop and separate into three groups, which take their positions to leeward, north, and windward. The squadron is composed of battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, armored cruiser *New York*, two unprotected cruisers, apparently the *Marblehead* and *Montgomery*, and one three-masted cruiser the type of which can not be made out. The remaining vessels, 11 in number, are small merchant vessels. The alarm signal is given from the forts at 6.20. Two steamers have left the harbor, shaping their course northward, one of them English, the other United States; also a schooner of the latter nationality. At 9.25 p. m. Battery No. 5 signals that several ships, believed to be quite near, are discerned in that direction. At 10 a second alarm signal is given. About 2 o'clock the light of the Morro light-house is extinguished. All through the night red and green lights, obviously signals of the hostile fleet, are noticed at a great distance.

APRIL 28, 6.30 P. M.




In the morning only the *Iowa* and one merchant vessel, indicated on the chart, were in sight. A war ship was sighted to windward at 8 and disappeared shortly after. At 5, a ship was seen passing to windward at such a distance that she could not be recognized. At 5.30 a small yacht and the *Triton* appeared, steering toward the *Iowa*.

MAY 5, 2 P. M.




At 6 there are in sight the *Wilmington*, an antiquated cruiser, and three gunboats. At 9 the dispatch boat *Dolphin* appeared and stopped, forming a group with three vessels to windward; they exchange flag signals and boats pass to and fro. At 10 the *Dolphin* shapes her course to windward and disappears. At 12 another cruiser, of antiquated type, appears to the northward. At 1 a gunboat appears to windward. At 3 a small Spanish schooner is sighted, steering for the harbor. At 3.30 she is captured by a gunboat, which takes her in tow, and they disappear to windward. At 5.30 the French steamer *Lafayette* appears to windward. The hostile ships steer toward her. At sunset the group formed by the latter and the *Lafayette* is still in sight. Nothing of interest was observed during the night.

MAY 14, 4.30 P. M.




At 8 three gunboats. At 8.30 two cruisers and one gunboat to windward. At 8.40 a steam launch appears. At 11 two gunboats disappear to windward, reappearing at 11.15. The Mexican schooner *Arturo* leaves the harbor. At 1 a merchant vessel, whose nationality could not be made out, appears to the northward. A cruiser starts in pursuit and fires a shot; the merchant vessel stops, then proceeds on her course. At 3 two gunboats appear to windward; at 4.20 one of them disappears. The *Conde de Venadito* and *Nueva España* come out of the harbor, steering first to windward, then changing their course to leeward, then again returning to the former direction. A hostile cruiser, two gunboats, one of them small and with a single mast, and the tug *Triton* concentrate to the north. The Spanish vessels steer toward them. A hostile gunboat advances, followed by the cruiser. The *Conde de Venadito* turns about and steers to windward; the *Nueva España* continues on her course toward the United States gunboat. At 4,000 meters the hostile gunboat referred to opens fire, which is returned by our vessels. The *Nueva España* also turns to windward. The United States vessels stop at 17,000 meters, then retreat to a distance of over 20,000 meters. Our vessels again turn to windward, passing in front of the enemy, and the *Conde de Venadito* fires another shot. They continue on their course to windward and are joined by the *Aguila* and *Flecha*. At night our vessels enter the harbor. The effect of the shots could not be ascertained, owing to the distance.

MAY 21, 1 P. M.




At daybreak there are seen on the horizon the monitor *Miantonomoh*, two old cruisers, dispatch boat *Dolphin*, first-class gunboat *Wilmington*, and seven smaller gunboats; total, 12 vessels. The battle ship *Iowa*, which was in sight last night, has disappeared. At 6 a gunboat disappears and the monitor *Puritan* appears to northward. There remain 11 vessels. At 7 two gunboats appear to northward. Thirteen vessels. The nearest is the *Wilmington*, about 8,500 meters distant. At 9 a gunboat appears to northward. Fourteen vessels. At 10.40 the first-class battle ship *Indiana* and armored cruiser *New York* appear to northward. Sixteen vessels in sight. At 12.30 three more vessels appear, making a total of 19, shown on the chart. From 7 to 8 the telegraph lights of the United States vessels are observed to be in operation. The searchlight of the Velasco battery has been in operation all night. Nothing further of interest during the night.

JUNE 10, 9.30 A. M.




At daybreak six gunboats, among them the *Wilmington* and one cruiser. At 7.40 a gunboat with one mast and one smokestack appears to windward. To leeward another gunboat is sighted. At 8.30 the Spanish vessels *Conde de Venadito*, *Nueva España*, *Yáñez Pinzón*, and *Flecha* come out of the harbor and steam to windward, keeping about 1,000 meters from the shore. When within 3,800 meters of Battery No. 1 they turn to leeward. The hostile gunboat sighted to windward steers to leeward, firing a shot. The cruiser and another gunboat also fire, but no shells are seen. They proceed to windward and approach four gunboats. At 10,000 meters from our vessels they open fire, which is at first quite accurate. Our vessels increase the distance between them and continue to cruise to leeward, close inshore, as far as Almendares River. In the meantime the enemy has turned to leeward, but at a distance of over 15,000 meters. At 1.35 our vessels enter the harbor.

JUNE 13, 12 M.




At daybreak nine gunboats, among them the *Wilmington*, two cruisers, one of them the *Montgomery*, and the monitor *Terror*. At 7.40 a gunboat appears to windward. At 10.30 the gunboat *Maple*, displaying a white flag, steers towards the city and stops 6,300 meters from the shore. At 11.15 the gunboat *Flecha* goes out to speak with the United States vessel, returning to the harbor a few minutes later. The *Maple* shapes her course northward. At 12 a gunboat disappears to the northward. At 3 another gunboat disappears to the northward. At 3.21 a gunboat is sighted far to windward, approaching another gunboat, 2,000 meters from the shore. At 3.50 the cruiser *Montgomery* advances to within 8,300 meters of the leeward shore. The Santa Clara Battery fires three shots at her, and Battery No. 4 two. Owing to the high wind the shells were deflected to the left. At the flash of the first shot the cruiser started at full speed. At 5 a gunboat approaches the windward shore to within less than 8,000 meters. Battery No. 2 fired a shot at her and the gunboat withdrew. At 8.30 p. m. a hostile ship throws her searchlight towards the city on the leeward shore for five minutes. A group of two vessels could be distinguished. All through the night light signals were seen, which were watched by our searchlights.

JULY 6, 6 P. M.



At daybreak the horizon can not be distinguished, owing to dense fog. At 7.20 the fog disappears and the following ships are seen: Three cruisers—the *Montgomery*, *Vicksburg*, and one of antiquated type—five gunboats, among them the *Machias*, *Maple*, and one of antiquated type, and the monitor *Terror*. Total, 9 vessels. At 7.25 a cruiser appears to northward. Total, 10 vessels. At 8.30 the gunboat *Anita* appears to leeward. Total, 11 vessels. During the day the trans-Atlantic steamer *Alfonso XII* was seen burning at Mariel Beach.

AUGUST 13, 12 M.



At daybreak there are in sight a monitor of the *Miantonomah* type, two cruisers, the *Vicksburg* and *San Francisco* and five gunboats. At 9 a cruiser with two masts and two smokestacks appears to the northward. At 8.20 a gunboat appears to leeward. At 9.30 two gunboats disappear to windward. At 10 the cruiser with two masts and two smokestacks disappears to windward. At 11 a cruiser with three masts and one smokestack and a gunboat appear to leeward. At 11.30 a gunboat appears to leeward. At 2.15 the monitor of the *Miantonomah* type and a gunboat disappear to the north. At 8 red and white lights begin to be seen on the horizon, obviously from hostile ships. Nothing of interest occurred during the night. The searchlight of the navy was in operation. The news of the conclusion of peace was received this day. At daybreak not a single hostile vessel was to be seen on the horizon, so that it seems that the blockade has been raised.

The four electric searchlights—three belonging to the artillery and one to the navy, the latter designed to guard the net of torpedoes—were subject to the authorities in command of the fortifications, and in accordance with their orders illuminated or left in darkness the maritime region near the windward and leeward shores and the entrance to the harbor, thus establishing a system of perfect vigilance which would have furnished excellent results in case a formal battle had been fought, and which prevented the enemy from displaying too much audacity.

The light-house at the Morro was lighted, when so ordered by the authorities, when some friendly vessel was expected, and when it was not necessary to keep it dark so as not to serve the blockading vessels as a guide.

The following are incidents of various kinds which occurred during the blockade of Habana:

April 25.—At 4.50 p. m. the gunboats *Nueva España* and *Marqués de Molins* went out of Habana Harbor and returned from off Marianao, having gone outside a distance of 8,100 meters.

April 27.—A hostile cruiser ran aground near Dimas (Colorado Reefs).

May 6.—At 5 o'clock a small gunboat with two masts and two smokestacks approached to within 4,700 meters of the windward coast of Habana. Batteries Nos. 1 and 2 received orders to open fire, after several consultations by telephone. The gunboat escaped at full speed at the first shot. Several shells fell near it.

May 7.—Two gunboats chase a schooner near the mouth of Almendares River, 4,700 meters from the advanced leeward batteries. Batteries Nos. 4 and 5 open fire, which is so accurate that the vessels are surrounded with the cartridges of our shells, and withdraw with injuries. The schooner was towed into the harbor. A 24-centimeter shell of the Punta Brava Battery exploded on board one of the vessels.

May 9.—The hostile gunboat *Triton* approaches to within 4,800 meters of Battery No. 4, which opened fire, whereupon the gunboat speedily withdrew.

May 10.—The *Triton* approaches, and is fired upon by Battery No. 5.

May 13.—Two hostile gunboats fire on the coast of Habana from Marianao, and withdraw.

May 15.—A hostile vessel approached with a flag of truce, and the gunboat *Flecha* went out to parley.

May 23.—The vessels of the blockading fleet disappear to the east, leaving only two gunboats.

May 27.—The gunboat *Marqués de Molins* leaves the harbor under a flag of truce, to confer with a hostile ship.

May 28.—Another vessel under a flag of truce. The *Yáñez Pinzón* goes out. Exchange of prisoners.¹

June 13.—Battery No. 2, at a distance of 7,020 meters, discharges a 30.5-centimeter shell against a hostile vessel.

June 14.—Another hostile vessel appears under a flag of truce and the gunboat *Flecha* goes out to parley.

¹ Colonel of cavalry Cortijo, Army Surgeon Julián, and assistants Faustino Albert and Antonio Emilio Zazo (of the *Argonauta*) were exchanged for two United States journalists taken prisoners at a landing.

June 16.—A United States gunboat approached to within 5,000 meters of the Velasco Battery, which opened fire on her, and the gunboat retreated at full speed. A hostile ship approaches under a flag of truce, and the *Nueva España* goes out to parley.

July 1.—At 7 p. m. a hostile gunboat approached to within 6,000 meters of the Cojimar Battery, which opened fire, and the gunboat escaped at full speed.

July 19.—At 10 a. m. a cruiser approaches the Chorrera Battery, which opens fire on her at 7,000 meters. At 6.40 p. m. she returned and approached to within 6,400 meters, was again fired upon and withdrew.

August 2.—A boat with a flag of truce is detached from the hostile ship *San Francisco*, and the *Yáñez Pinzón* goes out to parley.

August 4.—Another vessel under a flag of truce. The *Yáñez Pinzón* goes out to confer with her. She returns to the harbor and then goes out again.

August 12.—At 5 o'clock the cruiser *San Francisco* approached to within 4,000 meters of the windward coast; the Velasco and Barco Perdido batteries open fire; she was hit by three shells and withdrew, hoisting a white flag.¹

A vessel carrying a flag of truce appears, and the *Yáñez Pinzón* goes out to confer with her.

The following is an approximate record of foreign vessels which entered or left Habana Harbor during the blockade:

The English cruiser *Talbot* entered May 2, went out the 11th, and returned again June 6. The French frigate *Dubordieu* entered May 6 and went out the 17th. On the same day the French dispatch-boat *Fulton* also went out. On the 16th of May the French steamer *Lafayette* entered. This transatlantic steamer had attempted to enter several days earlier, but was prevented by the blockading vessels, which took her to Key West; she was released and entered Habana on the day stated; but after unloading part of her cargo she took it on again for certain reasons and went out May 10 and was once more taken to Key West. The steamer *Cosme Herrera* (Captain Sanson) entered April 22, having eluded the enemy. The *Arilés*, of the same company, also entered. On May 14 the Mexican schooner *Arturo* went out. On May 25 a German cruiser went out. The German cruiser *Geier* entered June 22 and left the 29th.² On June 23 the transatlantic steamers *Santo Domingo* and *Monterideo* ran the blockade at half past 12 at night. On the 24th the Honduras brig *Amapala* went out and was captured by the enemy. On July 5 the English cruiser *Talbot* left the harbor. The same day the transatlantic steamer *Alfonso XIII* attempted to enter, but was surprised and set on fire by hostile shells at Mariel, where she ran aground trying to reach the port. On July 8 the French cruiser *D'Estaing* entered without saluting the blockading vessels and went out again on the 28th. On July 29 the *Talbot* entered and went out again the 30th, saluting the blockading vessels. On August 1 the German cruiser *Geier* entered the harbor, after saluting the blockaders, and went out again on the 4th. On the latter day the French cruiser *D'Estaing* entered again and went out the 14th.

The blockade of Santiago Harbor offers the peculiar feature that the electric lighting of the mouth of the channel was effected by the block-

¹ No white flag was shown, and *San Francisco* was hit but once.—O. N. I.


² The *Geier* entered Cienfuegos June 16, where she was entertained by our officers.

aders instead of the blockaded, as it was to the interest of the latter to keep the entrance dark, while it was imperative for the former to keep it well illuminated in order that Cervera's ships might not escape.

For the same reason, the position of the blockading ships was more definitely determined than was the case at Habana.

In the beginning the ships withdrew at night to the open sea. Afterwards they adopted the order shown in the following sketch :


AT NIGHT.



A Battleship with searchlight.
 B Supporting battleship ready to open fire
 in case of appearance of enemy.
 C Three small cruisers as pickets.

D Three steam-launch pickets.
 E Blockade outer line.
 F Spanish ships.

In daytime the blockading vessels extended their line so as to be entirely out of the range of the guns of Morro Castle and the Socapa



IN THE DAY-TIME.

Battery, and also to leave sufficient room for maneuvering in case our squadron should attempt to force the entrance. The radius of the blockading circle was 6 miles, and the vessels nearest the shore were 2 miles distant from it. The more powerful ships, such as the *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and *Massachusetts*, were usually opposite the entrance, and next to them the fastest cruisers, *New York* and *Brooklyn*, while the vessels of less tonnage, the gunboats and auxiliaries, kept nearer the shore. This disposition shows that there still existed in the United States fleet a fear of some exploit on the part of our destroyers.

A constant watch was kept up from the heights of the Socapa batteries and Morro Castle, and as soon as there was the least indication of the enemy attempting to come nearer the rapid-fire guns of the lower battery and on the crest of the Socapa, the rifles of the infantry, and the guns at Morro Castle would open a lively fire, which compelled the enemy to retreat. The *Cristóbal Colón*, stationed near Punta Gorda, the *Reina Mercedes*, near Cay Smith, and the torpedo-boat destroyers also had a share in the defense.

We will follow the same plan that we adopted in connection with the blockade of Habana, and give first a brief account of the principal actions of the blockading fleet against the works at the entrance of Santiago Harbor, and speak more fully of them as opportunity offers.

May 18.—First demonstration in front of Santiago. One hundred and sixty shells were fired. Punta Gorda answered.

May 18 to June 5.—A few insignificant bombardments.

June 6.—At 8.30 a. m. 10 vessels, forming two divisions, opened a lively fire, which lasted until 11.30, with two intervals of fifteen minutes each. The eastern division bombarded the Morro and Aguadores, the western division the Socapa and Mazamorra. In all, 2,000 shots were fired, 100 guns being in action for one hundred and seventy-five minutes, being equal to a shot per gun every two minutes.

The Socapa fired only 47 shots, on account of the dense smoke enveloping the ships. A hostile shell of large caliber hit the *Mercedes*, killing the second in command, Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, a native Cuban, also five sailors, and wounding Ensign Molins, several sailors, and one boatswain.

June 14, 16, and 18.—Renewed bombardments.

June 22.—The landing expedition disembarks. The *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, and *Texas* bombard the Morro and Socapa, which return the fire. Punta Gorda fires only two shots.

June 22 and 23.—Landing of army corps at Daiquiri, while the squadron is bombarding the coast from Punta Cabrera to Punta Barracos; lively bombardment of Siboney.


July 2.—Bombardment.

July 3.—Our squadron goes out and is destroyed by the United States fleet.

The most noteworthy event recorded during this blockade was the attempt to force the channel made by the *Merrimac*, a merchant vessel equipped for war, in command of Lieutenant Hobson. This is also the only act which the Americans have to record in which heroism was displayed during this campaign, for the operation carried with it the probability of death for those who effected it.

It occurred early in the morning of June 3. The blockading ships opened a lively fire on the entrance, probably in order to prepare the way for the operation and divert attention from the principal object. Before daybreak the *Merrimac* entered the harbor, but was surprised and sunk at a spot where she constitutes no obstruction to the egress and ingress of the harbor. Our crews captured the crew of the *Merrimac*, consisting of Lieut. Richmond Pearson Hobson and seven sailors, all of whom, by a miracle, escaped with their lives.

The sketch which we give below has reference to this enterprise, as described by Lieutenant Hobson in a handsome book which he has



- Submarine Mines, Unexploded Mines, Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12.
 ■ " " fired at Vessel, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
 * " " that struck Vessel, No. 5.
 - Automatic Torpedoes fired by "Reina Mercedes" and "Pluton."

recently published, and although it contains many exaggerations, as, for instance, the statement that all the submarine mines contained 500 pounds of gun cotton, it gives nevertheless a clear idea of the operation.

Sampson and Hobson worked out the plan of sinking the *Merrimac* in the channel and chose the hour of 3.30 a. m., June 2, for carrying it into effect.

The method of sinking the vessel and the spot where she was to be sunk were fully discussed. As to the method, it was decided to secure to the sides of the *Merrimac*, below the water line, ten torpedoes of a

special type charged with brown powder and actuated by electric circuits. As to the spot, the bend of the channel off the Estrella battery was selected. The operation was carried out, but was not successful. Of the ten torpedoes, only two exploded; in the others, says Mr. Hobson, the circuits were destroyed by the Spanish fire. Our shore batteries, the pickets near the entrance, the *Plutón* and *Reina Mercedes*, the lines of contact and electric mines, the infantry—in a word, all the different elements of defense—fired on the *Merrimac*, and she was sunk at a spot farther in than had been intended by Sampson and where she did not obstruct the entrance. Hobson and his crew, clinging to a raft which had been taken along for the purpose, gave themselves up, but none of our men touched them except to save them. Mr. Hobson states that he was rescued by Admiral Cervera himself in his steam launch. This is an act of chivalry in time of war which even the Americans are compelled to extol.

At the last hour, the *Reina Mercedes* was also sunk in the channel, but likewise without obstructing the entrance.

In order to give a clear idea of the operations of the blockade of the coasts and ports of Cuba, we must not omit to mention some strange facts which occurred in the course of it.

Among these we will mention, in the first place, the entrance of the transatlantic steamer *Montserrat* into Cienfuegos Harbor, under the command of Captain Deschamps, who eluded the blockade on April 27, and went out again with great audacity without being caught. The valiant Captain Deschamps repeated the operation after a trip to the Peninsula. This time he entered Matanzas, again eluding the blockade and keeping himself in readiness to go out whenever he should be ordered to do so. He went out on the 16th, after the suspension of hostilities.

When the war broke out, the steamer *Purísima Concepción*, of the Menéndez Company (Captain Gutiérrez), was at Batabanó. She went out in search of provisions, eluding the blockade, and reached the Cayman Islands; not finding there what she wanted, she shaped her course for Jamaica. When she had taken on a cargo there, a United States cruiser came alongside: but during the night she eluded the latter's vigilance and went out to sea, reaching Casilda on June 22. Here she was chased and fired upon, but succeeded in going out the 25th and unloading at Manzanillo. A Honduras steamer reached Batabanó with provisions. The transatlantic steamer *Reina Cristina* (Captain Casquero) entered Cienfuegos, having also been chased unsuccessfully. The *Villaverde*, coming from Mexico with a cargo of provisions, entered Coloma, likewise escaping from her pursuers.

The transatlantic steamer *Antonio López* ran aground on June 30, near Arecibo on the southern coast of Puerto Rico, but succeeded in getting off, saving both vessel and cargo.

As already stated, the *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo*, under the command of naval officers, succeeded in running the blockade of Habana

and reaching Mexico in search of provisions. They are said to have had some difficulty there in getting their clearance papers on account of their character as warships. The *Santo Domingo*,¹ on July 12, reached a small port situated between Bailén and Punta Cartas on the southern coast of Cuba.

The Spanish colony in Mexico sent the island a great deal of assistance, thus furnishing an example of generous patriotism.

The steamer *Humberto Rodríguez* rendered excellent services by resupplying the *Holguín Gibara*, near Nuevitas, with great risk to herself. The *Alara* made several trips between Caibarién and Nuevitas. From the latter port, many officers, and even women and children, escaped from the blockade and went to Caibarién in small boats, navigating between keys and at times pushed by hand. The German steamer *Polaria* entered Santiago with a cargo of rice. An English sloop coming from Jamaica, and the steamer *Reina de los Angeles* (of the Menéndez Company) also entered Santiago.

Among the strange facts it may also be stated that during the blockade several vessels went out with sugar, and Yankee speculators took advantage of this circumstance; but this was finally prohibited. Among the vessels which made trips from Sagua may be mentioned the steamers *Bergen* and *Mirthele*.

Another peculiar fact is that the *Texas* one night fired on the *Marblehead* and *Viven*, mistaking them for some of our vessels; but they escaped without injuries. This circumstance shows that ships may move about at night with impunity and that it is difficult to hit them.

¹The *Santo Domingo* failed to reach port as here mentioned, having grounded between Punta Cartas and Bailén, and was captured and burned by the converted yacht *Eagle*.—O. N. I.

CHAPTER VII.

COAST DEFENSE.

STATIONARY DEFENSES—MOBILE DEFENSES—SHORE BATTERIES—SEA FORTS—FLOATING BATTERIES—TORPEDOES—TORPEDO BOATS—MONITORS—BATTLE SHIPS AND CRUISERS.

Any country that has anything to lose must nowadays guard well its coasts and boundaries by providing them with such elements of defense as are sanctioned by modern progress.

As far as our own coasts and boundaries are concerned, our administrations have treated this essential point of military organization with even more neglect than is apparent at first sight.

In view of the imperious necessity of preserving what we have left and maintaining it against an enemy, should the case arise, it is a question of the highest importance to prepare for the defense of our coasts and boundaries, and this includes the plans for the rapid and efficient fortification and armament of our principal ports.

That it is in this direction that the beginning should be made, there can be no doubt.

Coast defense comprises two different aspects:

- (1) Stationary defenses.
- (2) Mobile defenses.

To the first class belong the fortifications that are tied to the earth; that is to say, either located on the shore or connected with it, forts having their foundations on shoals or on the bottom of the sea and surrounded by water, floating batteries, and torpedoes.

The second class comprises fleets and vessels of every description operated by sailors and adapted to carry their offensive action as far as may be necessary.

The nature of shore batteries, therefore, is defensive and stationary; that of fleets is offensive and mobile.

The first question to be considered is: Which of the two classes mentioned should be given preference?

As a matter of fact, both are necessary. They should therefore be developed side by side, and that is what is being done by wealthy and powerful nations, which, while providing their coasts and ports with strong defenses, develop and strengthen their fleets at the same time.

But our case is somewhat different. We are at present almost entirely without ships, and the ports along our coasts without defenses. There is danger impending. What line of conduct should we follow?

In considering this question, we should observe absolute impartiality and avoid everything that is akin to prejudice. The general opinion

coincides with the fact that for offensive warfare nothing can be attained with a few battle ships. Many are required; they constitute the basis of a fleet, as the Spanish-American war has demonstrated. But they cost an immense amount of money and consume vast sums in their maintenance. Battle ships necessitate navy-yards and docks, which in their turn require the existence of naval industry and many other accessory and auxiliary branches of industry, which we lack. The attempts we made to improvise the same during the war proved disastrous, and to this fact is attributed by many a considerable share of our disasters. Hence the beginning for the defense of our peninsula and adjacent islands can and should be made with stationary defenses—that is to say, those comprised in the first class, without, however, losing sight of the development of our offensive naval power; and we will add that it is not sufficient to possess a nucleus of active forces, but it is also necessary to have a well-organized reserve, and this increases the difficulty as well as the price.

It is the question of money which at present preoccupies us and is of the utmost importance, rendering it necessary for us to begin with the most economical part, and provide, first of all, for the defense of our own mother country, which must always remain the base and refuge of the mobile defenses, if the happy time should ever arrive that we possess such defenses.

In connection with the Spanish-American war there has been a great deal of discussion as to these questions concerning the greater importance of stationary defenses or mobile defenses, and their relation to each other, which might be called either strategic or tactical, according as reference is had to distant fighting and the places of refuge and bases of operations rendered necessary thereby, or to fighting close by, the actual defense of the coast or harbor which the enemy may elect as his objective, in which case the factors of mobile defense may be successfully combined with those furnished by the stationary defense.

In our attempt to examine into the different theories in connection with this matter, we will refer to a naval authority of world-wide reputation, Captain Mahan, who, in recent articles entitled "The War on the Sea and its Lessons," touches on this question in a very able manner.

We take the liberty of availing ourselves of Captain Mahan's arguments, which have indisputable merit.

It is proper here to say, for the remark is both pertinent and most important, that coast defenses and naval force are not interchangeable things; neither are they opponents, one of the other, but complementary. The one is stationary, the other mobile; and, however perfect in itself either may be, the other is necessary to its completeness. In different nations the relative consequence of the two may vary. In Great Britain, whose people are fed from the outside world, the need for a fleet vastly exceeds that for coast defenses.

With us, able to live off ourselves, there is more approach to parity. Men may even differ as to which is the more important; but such difference, in this question, which is purely military, is not according to knowledge.

In equal amounts mobile offensive power is always and under all conditions more effective to the ends of war than stationary defensive power. Why, then, provide the latter? Because mobile force, whatever shape it take, ships or men, is limited narrowly as to the weight it can bear; whereas stationary force, generally, being tied to the earth, is restricted in the same direction only by the ability of the designer to cope with the conditions. Given a firm foundation, which practically can always be had, and there is no limit to the amount of armor—mere defensive outfit—be it wood, stone, bricks, or iron, that you can erect upon it; neither is there any limit to the weight of guns—the offensive element—that the earth can bear, only they will be motionless guns.

The power of a steam navy to move is practically unfettered; its ability to carry weight, whether guns or armor, is comparatively very small. Fortifications, on the contrary, have almost unbounded power to bear weight, whereas their power to move is nil; which again amounts to saying that, being chained, they can put forth offensive power only at arm's length, as it were.

Thus stated, it is seen that these two elements of sea warfare are in the strictest sense complementary, one possessing what the other has not; and that the difference is fundamental, essential, unchangeable—not accidental or temporary.

Given local conditions which are generally to be found, greater power, defensive and offensive, can be established in permanent works than can be brought to the spot by fleets. When, therefore, circumstances permit ships to be squarely pitted against fortifications—not merely to pass swiftly by them—it is only because the builders of the shore works have not, for some reason, possibly quite adequate, given them the power to repel attack which they might have had. It will not be asserted that there are no exceptions to this, as to most general rules; but as a broad statement it is almost universally true.

"I took the liberty to observe," wrote Nelson at the siege of Calvi, when the commanding general suggested that some vessels might batter the forts, "that the business of laying wood against stone walls was much altered of late." Precisely what was in his mind when he said "of late" does not appear, but the phrase itself shows that the conditions which induced any momentary equality between ships and forts when brought within range were essentially transient.

As seaports and all entrances from the sea are stationary, it follows naturally that the arrangements for their defense also should, as a rule, be permanent and stationary, for as such they are strongest. Indeed, unless stationary, they are apt not to be permanent, as was conclusively shown in the late hostilities, where all the new monitors intended for coast defense were diverted from that object and dispatched to distant points, two going to Manila, and stripping the Pacific coast of protection so far as based upon them.

This is one of the essential vices of a system of coast defense dependent upon ships, even when constructed for that purpose; they are always liable to be withdrawn by an emergency, real or fancied.

Upon the danger of such diversion to the local security Nelson insisted when charged with the guard of the Thames in 1801. The block ships (stationary batteries) he directed were on no account to be moved for any momentary advantage, for it might very well be impossible for them to regain their carefully chosen positions when wanted there.

Our naval scheme in past years has been seriously damaged, and now suffers from two misleading conceptions—one, that a navy is for defense primarily, and not for offensive war; the other, consequent mainly upon the first, that the monitor, being stronger defensively than offensively, and of inferior mobility, was the best type of war ship.

The civil war being, so far as the sea was concerned, essentially a coast war, naturally fostered this opinion. The monitor in smooth water is better able to stand up to shore guns than ships are which present a larger target; but, for all

that, it is more vulnerable, both above water and below, than shore guns are if these are properly distributed. It is a hybrid, neither able to bear the weight that fortifications do, nor having the mobility of ships; and it is, moreover, a poor gun platform in a sea way.

There is no saying of Napoleon's known to the writer more pregnant of the whole art and practice of war than this: "Exclusiveness of purpose is the secret of great successes and of great operations." If, therefore, in maritime war you wish permanent defenses for your coasts, rely exclusively upon stationary works if the conditions admit, not upon floating batteries, which have the weakness of ships. If you wish offensive war carried on vigorously upon the sea, rely exclusively upon ships that have the quality of ships and not of floating batteries.

We had in the recent hostilities 26,000 tons of shipping sealed up in monitors, of comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic and the Pacific. There was not an hour from first to last, I will venture to say, that we would not gladly have exchanged the whole six for two battle ships of less aggregate displacement, and that although from the weakness of the Spanish defenses we were able to hug pretty closely most parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanish guns at Santiago kept our fleet at a greater distance, we should have lamented still more bitterly the policy which gave us sluggish monitors for mobile battleships.

The unsatisfactory condition of the coast defenses deprived the Navy of the support of its complementary factor in the scheme of national sea power and imposed a vicious though inevitable change in the initial plan of campaign, which should have been directed in full force against the coast of Cuba.

The four newer monitors on the Atlantic coast, if distributed among our principal ports, were not adequate singly to resist the attack which was suggested by the possibilities of the case, though remote, and still more by the panic among certain of our citizens.

On the other hand, if the four were massed and centrally placed, which is the correct disposition of any mobile force, military or naval, intended to counteract the attack of an enemy whose particular line of approach is as yet uncertain, their sluggishness and defective nautical qualities would make them comparatively inefficient. New York, for instance, is a singularly central and suitable point, relatively to our northern Atlantic seaboard, in which to station a division intended to meet and thwart the plans of a squadron like Cervera's if directed against our coast ports, in accordance with the fertile imaginations of evil which were the fashion in that hour. Did the enemy appear off either Boston, the Delaware, or the Chesapeake, he could not effect material injury before a division of ships of the *Oregon* class would be upon him; and within the limits named are found the major external commercial interests of the country, as well as the ocean approaches along which they travel. But had the monitors been substituted for battle ships, not to speak of their greater slowness, their inferiority as steady gun platforms would have placed them at a serious disadvantage if the enemy were met outside, as he perfectly well might be.

It was probably such considerations as these that determined the division of the battle fleet and the confiding to the section styled the Flying Squadron the defense of the Atlantic coast for the time being. The monitors were all sent to Key West, where they would be at hand to act against Habana, the narrowness of the field in which that city, Key West, and Matanzas are comprised making their slowness less of a drawback, while the moderate weather which might be expected to prevail would permit their shooting to be less inaccurate. The station of the Flying Squadron in Hampton Roads, though not so central as New York relatively to the more important commercial interests upon which, if upon any, the Spanish attack might fall, was more central as regards the whole coast, and, above all, was nearer than New York to Habana and Puerto Rico. The time element also entered the calculations in another way, for a fleet of heavy ships is more certainly able to put to sea at a moment's notice in all conditions of tide and weather from the Chesapeake than from New York Bay. In short, the position chosen may be taken to indicate that

in the opinion of the Navy Department and its advisers, Cervera was not likely to attempt a dash at an Atlantic port, and that it was more important to be able to reach the West Indies speedily than to protect New York or Boston—a conclusion which the writer entirely shared.

The country, however, should not fail to note that the division of the armored fleet into two sections, nearly 1,000 miles apart, though probably the best that could be done under all the circumstances of the moment, was contrary to sound practice, and that the conditions which made it necessary should not have existed.

Thus, deficient coast protection reacts unfavorably upon the war fleet, which in all its movements should be free from any responsibility for the mere safety of the ports it quits. Under such conditions as then obtained it might have been possible for Spain to force our entire battle fleet from its offensive undertaking against Cuba and to relegate it to mere coast defense. Had Cervera's squadron, instead of being dispatched alone to the Antilles, been recalled to Spain, as it should have been, and there reinforced by the two armored ships which afterwards went to Suez with Camara, the approach of this compact body would have compelled our fleet to concentrate, for each of our divisions of three ships, prior to the arrival of the *Oregon*, would have been too weak to hazard an engagement with the enemy's six. When thus concentrated, where should it be placed? Off Habana or at Hampton Roads? It could not be at both. The answer undoubtedly should be "Off Habana," for there it would be guarding the most important part of the Spanish fleet and at the same time covering Key West, our naval base of operations.

Mahan's reasoning is such as to be convincing. We have filled several pages with his valuable opinions relative to coast defense, and do not regret it, for the question has come to be of the highest importance, owing not a little to the admirable resistance which the deficient batteries at the mouth of Santiago Harbor opposed with great persistency to a powerful squadron, compelling it to stop before a few old guns.

During the last few months attention has again been directed toward experiments as to the value of coast defenses, and the result is that the latter have been found efficient to such an extent against large squadrons that new means of warfare have been taken under consideration, and that the greatest interest is being manifested in torpedo boats in connection with attacks on harbors, not as measures of main force, but as secret factors adapted to enter surreptitiously the anchoring place where a squadron is stationed and to attempt its destruction.

Very near us, at Gibraltar, where very significant battle maneuvers are frequently held, of which we hardly take any notice until foreign reviews publish accounts of them, there took place recently thorough experiments in the nature of a simulated battle, in which the objective was a squadron attacked at night in the port of refuge by torpedo boats, while shore batteries, with the assistance of their electric search lights, were in operation in order to defeat and repulse them.

The case is an extremely interesting one. An account of it has been published by Maj. Gen. J. B. Richardson in the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, and also in the Journal of the United States Artillery for January and February last, under the title of "Coast defense against torpedo-boat attack."

This study shows that the subtle and daring torpedo boat is given a prominent place in the attack of ports, and consequently rapid-fire guns and the electric illumination of the region controlled by the batteries are also placed in the foremost rank as far as the question of defense is concerned.

It is not only in that bold offensive whose object it is to save the squadrons and keep them from being compromised in engagements with the guns of shore works that the torpedo boat is sought to be utilized, but also for coast defense.

In this connection we deem it expedient to refer to the measure recommended in a recent essay, the publication of which was commenced in the *Revista General de Marina* for the month of June last.¹ This article says:

Maritime defenses, stationary as well as mobile, recognize as their base and principal foundation the most powerful weapon hitherto known for fighting battleships, namely, the torpedo. The rapidity and efficacy of its effects, the security and simplicity of its operation, its immense moral force, and the constant improvement of the weapon itself and of the vessels destined to use it exclusively, increase its importance from day to day, and maritime defenses which dispense with them or do not give them the prominence they deserve are but incomplete.

What monitors and coast-defense vessels are able to do is a matter of history, and while it can not be denied that they may be useful in certain cases—for in war nothing is useless that is capable of inflicting any injury, no matter how small, on the enemy—it is not to be supposed that nations will in future waste large sums of money in the construction of these factors of defense. We have never had any until recently, when we built a couple of them, the *Numancia* and *Vitoria*, the criticism of which not even the least charitably disposed are willing to undertake, because even to attempt to criticise them is equivalent to showing that they possess no defensive power. If we were to employ them as coast guards in a war, with what are they going to fight? With modern battleships? With torpedo boats and cruisers of high speed? Either hypothesis is absurd. In any case that we may imagine the employment of these two coast-defense vessels of ours could only lead to jeopardizing in vain the lives of a thousand men and enveloping in a cloud of censure the reputations of the hapless commanders whose sad duty it would be to lead them to destruction. But aside from this palpable example, to think that the maritime defense of our coasts could be intrusted to ships of large tonnage is to think of suicide. Five battle squadrons, distributed between Barcelona, Cartagena, Algeciras, Cadiz, and Ferrol, would hardly be sufficient to prevent the most ordinary coups de main on the rest of the coast. The ships would nearly always arrive too late to hinder them; and even if they should succeed in coming within sight of the aggressors, if the latter have cruisers of great speed, the avengers would play but a sorry rôle. It may be objected that they would be able in their turn to attack the hostile coasts, but that would depend on the system of defense which the enemy would employ there; and, moreover, to attack another country is not to defend our own, nor can there be much comfort in returning the injuries received when we might have obviated those inflicted upon us.²

In the most favorable case—that is, if the point attacked is one where we have a squadron stationed—if the attack is made by a battle fleet, it is not to be supposed

¹ La defensa de las costas, by Salvador Díaz Carbia, Lieutenant, Spanish Navy.

² The military and economic situation of our country will not permit us for many years to come to attack another country; we will be grateful if we succeed in defending our own.

that the enemy, who has taken the offensive, will commit the folly of presenting inferior forces just for the pleasure of having us defeat them; they will, on the contrary, make sure of their superiority so as to render vain any effort on our part. And if the attack is effected by fast vessels they will place ours in great danger, unless we have a reserve on which to draw to replace those put out of action, especially in such harbors as Cadiz or Algeciras, which, being so open, are particularly adapted for night surprises. Aside from offensive operations, which do not come into consideration here, and confining ourselves to coast defense, it is our opinion that hostile admirals would have to be very dull if our five hypothetical squadrons, in spite of their power, did not prove entirely inefficient, unless accompanied by other forces, which in that case would be the ones that would in themselves constitute the defense.

Of course, these hypothetical squadrons are, and always will be, nothing but a myth in our case. Their cost would amount to over 1,000,000,000 pesetas, and their maintenance would require an appropriation of over 100,000,000 a year. Is such a plan feasible? Even if it were feasible we could not rely on its efficacy, because, as we stated at the beginning, the defense, in order to be complete, must be rational, and our hypothesis was nothing but an absurdity.

If such sad results can be arrived at with such a large number of ships, what can we expect of the three, four, or five battleships which, in the course of time and by dint of sacrifices, we may be able to acquire? The only thing we can reasonably expect is that, when we do get them, we will not be much better off than we were before the disaster; and truly, rather than that it would be better to desist from the undertaking, for we shall never find an enemy such as the Americans found in us.

The solution is to abandon the course which, as we have already seen, is a poor one, and embrace another which, though less well known, may give us better results. Do not let us accumulate factors without plan or method, without rhyme or reason; but let us study them from a technical and economic standpoint, select those which, with the least expense, represent the greatest power and are of the most general application, and finally combine them intelligently in order to obtain from them the best possible results. These are the bases on which any plan of mobilized defenses must be founded, and hence the type of vessel destined to form the main nucleus is the torpedo boat. From the destroyer, capable of crossing the ocean, down to the little 60-ton craft, it is adapted to repulse from our shores flotillas of the same type, as well as powerful squadrons, or transports and convoys. It is true that torpedo boats require protection and ports of refuge, as they can not always operate in daytime; but large squadrons require such ports at night and are much more expensive, so that the disadvantage would be the same for both classes of ships. On the other hand, fast vessels can always elude an engagement, while battleships have no other recourse but to accept a battle when it is offered them.

It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that in the Spanish-American war the torpedo boats do not appear to have realized in practice the expectations that were placed in them in theory.

The superiority of stationary defenses and their relation to mobile defenses is defined in the following words of Mahan:

The fencer who wears also a breastplate may be looser in his guard. Seaports can not strike beyond the range of their guns; but if the great commercial ports and naval stations can strike effectively so far, the fleet can launch into the deep rejoicing, knowing that its home interests, behind the buckler of the fixed defenses, are safe till it returns.

This argument alone lends considerable force to our defensive tendencies. If fortified harbors are indispensable in connection with squadrons so as to enable the latter to operate and put to sea in offensive actions,

it is evident that, in the absence of them, and being necessarily confined to a circumspect defensive, we must content ourselves with defending our coasts if we wish to protect our commercial interests and the integrity of our territory.

It is probably this last consideration that is most important as far as Spain is concerned. It is obvious that, in view of the shock which our country has sustained, we can not, for years to come, think of battles and adventures. But the whirlwind of a European war, which is always threatening, might very easily involve us in such a manner as to render it difficult for us to maintain absolute neutrality, and in that case we should deeply regret our inability to prevent our becoming the toy of anyone whom it might please to make one of our ports on the Cantabrian or Mediterranean coast his base of operations or his naval station. And perhaps that would not be the worst. It might also happen to us to become involved in the theory of compensations, under the rules of which the stronger takes from the weaker whatever he pleases, and countries are dismembered and distributed at the will of the more powerful party, unless the former have some power by which to command respect and attract the sympathy of some other strong party.

An example of what fortified harbors in themselves are worth is furnished by Habana—many times referred to in these pages—which kept our defeat from being even worse than it was, and that although this harbor was in very poor condition to constitute what is termed a modern fortified city and still less a military port. If this place had been supported by a few battleships—the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya*—there is no doubt but that it would have formed for the enemy a serious obstacle, capable of altering materially Sampson's and Schley's maneuvers, and compelled the United States to immobilize the greater part of its fleet for the defense of its extensive coasts and wealthy cities, which would have changed the terms of the problem. And it was not only the coasts that preoccupied the United States, but also its commerce, especially the coasting trade, which represents very important, and, at the same time, vulnerable interests.

But applying this argument to our present sorry condition, we repeat that there is no use in trying to do the impossible. Admitting the urgent necessity of defense, we shall have to reduce our aspirations considerably, because the financial situation of our country makes it impossible to do all that is to be desired.

Hence we must not count on powerful squadrons for a long time to come. But it will be possible, within the limit of our resources, to constitute a modest, regular force, which will have to be supplemented by the essential base, the armament and fortification of our coasts.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT A MILITARY PORT SHOULD BE.

CHOICE OF LOCATION—COMMERCIAL CITIES—MILITARY PORTS— GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION—SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

For the defense of a country such places should be chosen as are best suited for the purpose, subject to the conditions imposed by the configuration of the coasts and boundaries. These places, as a rule, are easily apparent to the eye of the technical expert and even of the uninitiated.

The exigencies of the defense, however, are subject to other conditions besides those represented by the nature of the soil.

On the one hand—confining ourselves to the question of coasts—we must take into consideration the commercial and social development of certain ports, which are frequently bound to become strategic points and to constitute strongholds, even though not well adapted for defense.

The difficulties are greater now than they used to be, owing to the increased distances at which defenses are able to strike, thanks to the greater power and range of guns.

Hand in hand with the military development of certain places on the coast, there have sprung up in the course of years, under the protection of guns, commercial colonies which have finally come to constitute large cities and wealthy commercial centers. But the day has arrived when the progress in the means of attack has rendered the old protection useless, because projectiles can strike so much farther. And thus we have come to possess commercial cities, located right on the coast, which have all the requirements for traffic, but are little suited for defense.

Still, the defense of such places can not be dispensed with, and there arises the material difficulty of carrying it into effect, especially if perfection is aimed at, which in this case would mean to secure the city against bombardment.

This ideal can not at present be attained for cities located immediately on the coast, or very near it, and devoid of natural protection from the fire of ships and without advanced positions of sufficient height and extent to install thereon powerful batteries, almost invulnerable to fire from the sea and which would constitute a grave danger for warships at a great distance. And even then it would not be at all certain that bombardments could be obviated, because gunfire at ranges beyond 6,000 or 8,000 meters, when aimed at ships, is very inaccurate.

But since cities so situated can not possibly be left unprotected, expensive means will have to be resorted to in order to advance the

first line of battle and protect the destructible property by removing the line of bombardment to a greater distance, for to obviate it entirely seems almost impossible.

Nowadays a bombardment is considered an incident of the attack, and not sufficient value is attached to it to surrender a place as a result thereof. We are returning to the times of a certain admiral who compared the effects of a bombardment to the results that would be attained by attempting to break windows with guineas. But what we want is to avoid having our windows broken, for we might come across someone who had an abundance of guineas and would not mind spending them in this kind of diversion.

If a commercial city does not possess natural advantages for defense it will be difficult to guard against bombardments, although the latter may be considered a danger little to be feared, because, when carried on from a great distance, its effects must necessarily be slight.

This is the case with some of the cities on our coasts, and any nation with an extensive seaboard has cities in similar conditions.

Habana is one of the cities which do not possess natural advantages for defense against bombardments. New York is not much better off, but the Americans are trying to remedy this defect by creating defenses by artificial means. Among the late plans for converting this immense metropolis into an impregnable city is the construction of sea forts on the Romer Shoals, 19 miles from the city, off Sandy Hook, where large armored cupolas are to be erected almost even with the surface of the water, to be armed with guns of powerful caliber, well adapted to keep any hostile ship beyond the distance from where bombardments would be effective.

It was the well-known Brialmont who suggested the use of sea forts and floating batteries out to sea, in which the share of the Navy would be secondary to the armament, veritable platforms capable of supporting the most powerful guns.

A few years ago a distinguished engineer of our Army¹ suggested a similar system of floating batteries for the advanced line of the harbor and city of Barcelona, which, as is well known, does not possess natural advantages for defense.

In our opinion this method has a disadvantage, as coast defense is characterized by the stationary nature of the works, and although the engines of floating batteries—formerly bomb ketches—permit only of slow movement, yet, having to deal with fickle temperaments like ours, the probability is that they would change their stations many times, and it might happen that just when we wanted them they would be far from the spot where they were most needed and to which they were assigned. Captain Mahan objects to monitors on similar grounds. It would therefore be preferable to have stationary coast defenses, and, if

¹ Las baterías en la defensa de Barcelona, by Mariano Rubio y Bellvé, Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers, published in the *Memorial de Ingenieros*, 1897, p. 365.

necessary to have them out to sea, sea forts are to be preferred whenever practicable. They cost more, it is true, but on the other hand they do not require the expense of maintenance, which is indispensable for floating batteries; they also last longer and are not put out of action as easily, nor are they subject to being blown up by torpedo boats.

The share of the Navy in coast protection is the mobile defense, which must be able to attack and operate at a great distance and seek the hostile armored vessel in its cruise, many miles from the shore, and for these purposes, as shown in the preceding chapter, the torpedo boat is best adapted.

We have spoken of places which do not possess natural advantages for defense, and it is obvious that such places can not be considered military ports in the full sense of the word.

A natural military port—and if not natural, its construction is extremely difficult and expensive in time and money—requires ample space for the shelter and protection of squadrons, also docks, depots, and navy-yards; and the anchoring places, workshops, storehouses, etc., must be protected from all attacks, including bombardments; for only thus can they be places of safety adapted to serve as bases of fleets. Hence, military ports are not identical with commercial cities, though frequently classed together. A military port must open into the sea by a long channel, preferably tortuous and not very wide, so that, while permitting the country's own ships to pass through, it will not be easy of access for the enemy. At the head of this channel must stretch out a deep bay, on which the stationary resources and the city itself are located. The entrance to the channel should afford good positions of sufficient height and extent to install artillery thereon and erect works of defense.¹

The natural advantages which, as stated, Habana lacked, Santiago de Cuba, on the other hand, possessed to a high degree, and to this circumstance is partially due the admirable resistance which, with a few old guns, was so long opposed to the whole United States squadron, armed with a large number of powerful modern guns. This resistance filled with admiration the United States gunners and engineers, when, upon taking charge of the matériel at the Morro, they convinced themselves that there were no other guns than those they saw.

The principal defenses at the entrance to Santiago Harbor were as follows.²

MORRO.

About 200 meters east of the old castle is the light-house, and about 100 meters east of the latter a new battery, about 63 meters above the

¹It seems almost superfluous to state that, in connection with the proper configuration, the geographical situation must also be taken into consideration, as it greatly affects the interests sought to be protected.

²Streffleur's *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* says that some of the guns at Santiago dated from the years 1688, 1718, and 1769, and had been used in fighting the buccaneers.



Fold-out Placeholder

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Fold-out Placeholder

This fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date.

level of the sea, had been erected. The parapet consisted of wooden boxes filled with cement, on top of which barrels, likewise filled with cement, had been placed. The distance between the guns was 6 meters, and the spaces between them had been partially filled with cement and sand. Ten meters back of the battery was a trench 1.50 meters deep and 60 centimeters wide, parallel with the front of the battery. From this trench small trenches in zigzag line led to the guns. This battery was armed on May 28 with five 16-centimeter guns (old 15 centimeter smooth-bore which had been converted into 16-centimeter rifled guns), and on June 25 it was reinforced by two 21-centimeter howitzers.¹

SOCAPA.

About 400 meters from the Morro, on the opposite side of the entrance, was a battery of three 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers and two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns, with 3-centimeter shields; these latter guns could be fired every two or three minutes. The battery was situated on the crest of the hill called Socapa. The guns were separated from the howitzers by a wide traverse. About 20 meters back of the guns was the ammunition magazine, a tin-covered building. East of this battery was another, intended for the defense of the submarine mines; it comprised one 57-millimeter gun, four 37-millimeter Hotchkiss guns, and one 11-millimeter machine gun.

PUNTA GORDA.

This battery was 2,000 meters back of the entrance and comprised two 9-centimeter Krupp guns, two 15-centimeter Mata howitzers, and two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns. This as well as the Socapa batteries were of similar construction to that of Morro Castle.

REINA MERCEDES.


She was practically useless owing to the unserviceable condition of her boilers, and it was from this vessel that the 16 centimeter Hontoria guns were taken for the Punta Gorda and Socapa batteries. The small guns were left on board.

For a distance of 2,000 yards, which Sampson gives in his report for the bombardment of June 6, the protection of the parapet of the Morro battery was very effective, as shown in the figure. If the angle of situation c is taken into account it will be seen that the height of the crest s nearly equal to the maximum ordinate BD of the trajectory AB ,

¹The data are taken from a notable work on the defense of the month of Santiago, by Mr. Benoit, captain of the French artillery, published in the *Revue d'Artillerie* for April, 1899. There was also published in the *Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio* for the same month an interesting article on the same subject, condensing the data published by Mr. Lorente y Herrero, captain of engineers, in the *Memorial de Ingenieros* for December, 1898; also many articles by foreign writers in United States and English periodicals.

corresponding to the firing data for United States 8-inch and 12-inch guns. Thus in this particular case the distance $A D$ (2,000 yards) corresponded exactly to the fire through the apex of the trajectory, and the angle of incidence being zero only accidental hits that would knock off the crest of the parapet could be counted upon to strike the personnel or matériel.

At shorter distances—that is to say, when the crest is situated between the maximum ordinate of the trajectory $A_1 B$ and the ship A_1 —the angle of incidence becomes negative and the fire of the ship's guns becomes less and less effective. At great distances the fire acquires greater effectiveness, because the angle of descent will be more favorable, but the fire will lose in precision.



The height of 63 meters at which the battery was situated increased the protection of the parapet and explains to a certain extent the slight effects obtained by the United States guns.

Captain Benoit, of the French artillery, says:

In the location of their improvised batteries the Spanish were happily inspired, obviating traverses and earthworks, which, by forming parapets, increase to a considerable extent the effect of projectiles upon the personnel of the battery. But they do not appear to have taken any thought of trying to conceal these batteries, of too pronounced geometrical forms, and to attract the hostile fire toward fictitious batteries, losing sight of the fact that the principal defense of coast batteries when face to face with the guns of always visible ships is their invisibility.

Streffleur's *Zeitschrift* draws the conclusion that experience has shown once more that "coast batteries do not have much to fear from war ships."

The United States Army officers who were charged with taking an inventory of the defenses of the Morro said:

It is unpardonable that the fleet has not destroyed the city and its defenses in all these days.

Among the many articles devoted to these questions in the proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution is one which was published in July, 1893, by Maj. R. P. Johnson, who quotes Admiral Selwyn's words:

I hope that naval officers will consider that a fort is a thing to be avoided.

In the *Naval Annual* for 1898 Mr. J. R. Thursfield concludes an article on Naval Maneuvers as follows.

Un canon à terre vaut un vaisseau à la mer, and when it comes to defending a narrow and tortuous estuary, a few guns not of extreme calibre, but well placed and well handled, are worth a whole armada of ships. Nevertheless, it remains as true now as it was in the days of the Armada, that the surest way of preventing attacks on the shore is to impeach the enemy's fleets at sea."

We will add the opinions of some military authorities concerning the attack of coast batteries by ships.

In a work published in 1896 Admiral Fournier says:

In a battle between ships and cemented coast works, armed with powerful modern artillery, the risks incurred by the two parties can not be weighed in the same balance. Such an operation is conceivable when commanded by necessity in order to support from the sea, by means of a bombardment at a great distance, the principal attack on land by a corps of troops having in view the capture and military occupation of the obstacle. But when effected by ships alone, it can only lead to a retreat of the assailant. And indeed, whatever comparative success such bombardment may have had, the ships will be compelled to withdraw when, without having gained any material advantage, they find themselves weakened by the losses and injuries due to the enemy's fire and by the exhaustion of the greater part of their ammunition, which exposes them to the danger of falling into the hands of a hostile naval force coming to the assistance of the defense, or of being at the mercy of a storm, which might surprise them on their return and fill them with water through the openings caused by the enemy's shells and perhaps cause them to sink.

In short, the main object of our naval forces should be, above all else, to fight the enemy afloat, anywhere and under all favorable circumstances, wherever he can be found, so as to maintain the empire of the sea after reducing him to impotence. But as long as this result has not been attained it will be imprudent to expose our ships to coast works in unproductive struggles, which, as a rule, are much more debilitating and demoralizing to the assailants on the sea than to the defense ashore.

The *Mémorial de l'Artillerie de la Marine* for 1894¹ arrives at the following conclusions:

The great power of guns, the precision of their fire, the use of telemetric devices, the course and speed of the target, the employment of powerful explosives in shells, the substitution of smokeless powder for black powder for gun charges, the improvements in the organization of works of defense, torpedo boats, stationary torpedoes, and electric lights have considerably increased the defensive value of shore batteries. The ship, on the other hand, which represents the offensive power, while carrying nowadays more powerful guns, armor of greater resistance, etc., has nevertheless, in spite of the greatly increased cost price, remained so frail that it can be put out of action by a single shell. This increased cost price constitutes another cause of inferiority, as it excludes the ship from any offensive, the result of which is not commensurate to the risks incurred.

As concerns the naval operations considered in this article, not only has the defensive power grown more than the offensive power, but these operations themselves have lost their value almost entirely.

We often hear of ravages wrought on a coast by the guns of fleets, but these are generally illusions which do not deserve much consideration. All that could be

¹ Des opérations maritimes contre les côtes et des débarquements, by M. D. B. G.

attained would be to cause the population along the coast some annoyance, and it is for something more than that that European nations fight nowadays.

We are among those who believe that the establishment of too numerous batteries on the coast constitutes a useless expense. They should be established with great discretion. * * * Batteries are intended to prevent a sudden descent upon important cities, or to protect a navy-yard, the preservation of which is necessary for the national defense.

That favorably situated and well-equipped batteries can attain this object is shown by the gallant resistance and accurate work of the batteries at Santiago. There is no doubt that the latter were favorably situated, but their armament was inadequate and deficient, being confined to the few available guns mentioned, and as for protection, it was limited, as stated, to parapets of sand and earth, merlons of barrels filled with cement, and sandbags.¹

The effects of the fire from the United States vessels were very slight, in spite of their powerful guns.

Morro Castle was riddled with shot holes, as also the houses to the right of it which were outlined against the sky. The light house, built of 25-millimeter metal plate, was pierced by many small-caliber projectiles and by two 15 centimeter shells. Another 20-centimeter shell, which had been fired without base fuse, was found back of the battery. No damage had been done to the works, except that a few sandbags had been shot through and the sand had run out.

At the Socapa a 33-centimeter shell exploded on June 16, covering one of the Hontoria guns with earth; but by next morning it was again ready to fire. A 15-centimeter shell pierced the shield of a Hontoria gun and injured the carriage, but without dismounting the gun or putting it out of action. On July 2 a shell disabled the carriage of a Hontoria gun.

Many small projectiles struck the works and guns without doing much damage.

The metal-roofed building, which was used as an ammunition magazine at the Socapa, was not touched.

A 16-centimeter Hontoria shell of the Socapa battery struck the *Texas* near the bow, entering and exploding in the berth deck, killing one sailor and wounding six others.

A 21-centimeter shell from the Morro hit the *Iowa*² and exploded in the officers' cabin without wounding any one.

¹For these works of fortification special credit is due to Col. Florencio Caula in command of the engineers' corps at Santiago, and for the armament of the same to Col. Salvador Díaz Ordóñez, in command of the artillery. They and the personnel of officers under their orders deserve the highest praise. Their names will be mentioned in due time.

²*Indiana*.—O. N. I.

Among the personnel of our batteries there were many casualties, as shown in the following statement:

Batteries.	Date.	Killed.	Wounded.		Total.
			Officers.	Men.	
Morro	June 6	2	5	25	32
	June 16	1	1	10	12
	June 21	3	3
	June 26	8	8
Socapa	July 2	1	1	33	35
	June 6	8	8
	June 14	1	6	7
	June 16	2	1	6	9
Other works	June 22	1	1
	July 2	3	1	6	10
Total	10	11	107	128

We wish to mention here the names of some officers who were wounded and who distinguished themselves by their bravery in the defense of the entrance to Santiago Harbor:¹

Colonel of Artillery Salvador Díaz Ordóñez, commander of the artillery of Santiago.

Commander of Infantry Antonio Ros, governor of Morro Castle.

Captain of Artillery José Sánchez Seijas, commander of the battery on the esplanade of the Morro.

Ensign Venancio Nardiz, commander of the Socapa Battery.

Ensign Ricardo Bruquetas (wounded twice), commander of the Socapa Battery.

Ensign Fernández Piña, commander of the Socapa Battery.

First Lieutenant of Artillery Pedro Irizar, of the Morro Battery.

Second Lieutenant of Artillery Juan Artal Navarro, of the Morro Battery.

¹ We have already spoken of Commander Acosta, who was killed, and Ensign Tolins, wounded, on board the *Reina Mercedes*.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCLUSIONS.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT—THE NAVAL ASPECT—THE MILITARY ASPECT—THE NEEDS OF OUR NATION.

Following our usual method of placing by the side of the facts the lessons arising therefrom, we will set forth those which may be logically derived from the pages of this book.

In years to come, when the history of this war is written on the basis of absolutely impartial information, a different method may perhaps be pursued, giving all the facts first, and at the end deducing the results. But at present we must alternate the facts with the results, because all nations are waiting to profit by what Spain has experienced, and we must offer them data from which they can judge with impartiality.

It is surprising how much has been written in foreign countries on the Spanish-American war during these few months. We have before us dozens of American, English, French, Italian, and German books, reviews, and periodicals, in which writers relate to their hearts' content the phases of our defeat. And in the face of this wonderful activity, which often interprets erroneously the causes of the appalling decline of Spain, we, on the other hand, preserve death-like silence.

This is not as it should be. In the United States, for instance, there is not a single officer of high rank who took an active part in the war but has furnished, in books or reviews, an exposition of the facts, substantiated by documents, and the Government, in its turn, has followed the same plan and has published reports of the Army and Navy. Among us, as stated, death-like silence reigns, and thus it is that foreign critics lack all knowledge of our claims to vindication, which, though slight, may nevertheless throw light on many things; for, by the side of much that is bad, and for which we are being justly censured, there is also some good which is being ignored, while it should be truthfully and conscientiously set forth, so that we may not be judged without being heard and considered more inefficient and incapable than we really are.

In the first place, it should be stated that the cause of our disasters lies much deeper and dates much further back than is generally believed.

We do not mean to exonerate this or that branch of the Spanish Government, nor do we wish to confine the blame to any particular one. The evil is so great that there is enough responsibility for all. But it

is unjust, criminal even, to want to throw the whole burden of responsibility for the catastrophes upon the military institutions, and still that seems to be the tendency.

(1) Because the Cuban war, the source of or pretext for our ruin, was due to causes of a political order, and even the measures for suppressing it and the election of those who were to bring this about were in obedience to considerations of the highest political order.

(2) Because our principal enemy, the United States, without whose assistance the Cuban insurrection would not have existed and could not have been continued, was aided by our erroneous policy, which in these colonial questions went from one mistake to another, without heeding any warning or advice.

(3) If there were deficiencies in the organization of our armed forces and in the direction and general strategic conception of the war, the cause must be sought, not in the army alone, but higher, in the disorganized condition of the highest branches of the Government, in the power whose duty it is to regulate and correct, without hesitation, whatever may be detrimental, and to keep a close watch always, so that everyone may be made to do his duty and strive for perfection.

(4) We went to war without any support or sympathy, led on by an erroneous conception of our strength, which may have been excusable in the common people, but it was inexcusable that it was fostered by fanatic speeches and by people whose duty it was to know the condition of our naval and military resources.¹

The London Times, in answer to Captain Mahan, says:

The direction of warlike operations should never be influenced by the clamor of public opinion, and no government worthy of that name will sink millions in defenses merely for the purpose of calming the fears of people whom Lord St. Vincent appropriately designated as "old women of both sexes."

It is infinitely simpler and cheaper to educate public opinion by imbuing it with sound principles than to accede to mad demands, and one of the most important lessons of the recent war is that very modest coast defenses are sufficient for all actual needs, provided they are well armed and under efficient command. Even the miserable works hurriedly improvised at Santiago may be said to have fulfilled their object, since they compelled the Americans to resort to military operations on land.

As to the naval aspect of the question, the publication of Cervera's letters has confirmed abroad the opinion of experts. The most eminent critics who comment on our defeat, without losing sight of the naval responsibilities as to whether it was expedient or not for the squadron to enter Santiago Harbor; whether or not it could have reached another port before it was blockaded here, and whether that would have been preferable; whether the sortie should have been ordered; whether, when ordered, it was better to go out at night or in daytime; whether it was better for the ships upon coming out to follow

¹ It is interesting to examine England's decree of neutrality, which we expect to analyze in the course of this work.

divergent courses, or to hug the shore as they did—without losing sight of all this, we say, the naval experts of the world agree:

(1) That the destruction of the squadron was decreed from the very moment that it received orders to leave Cape Verde, for our naval deficiency was unquestionable.

(2) That from that very moment the problem ceased to be naval and became a political problem, for to political motives only can we attribute the fact that a squadron which amounted to so little was made to go out and fight with one so powerful.

This statement is corroborated by the following words:

The United States Navy has demonstrated its ability to carry out much greater enterprises than the one intrusted to it last year, and still it can not be said that the fleet as a whole was managed with great skill, by which circumstance the Navy has contracted a great debt of gratitude with the Spanish Government.—The Times.

(3) That the main responsibility should not be sought in the disaster itself, but in events prior to the disaster, in order to ascertain the reasons why we had no fleet, and why the matériel that we did possess was in such poor condition, in spite of the enormous sums which the nation had expended upon it.

(4) That even within the limits of our deficiencies and errors, having once launched on a mad war, we should have gone into it with madness, without considering means of attack, without considerations of any kind, making *war upon commerce* to the greatest possible extent.¹

From what we now know, it is clear that in the United States also great indecision prevailed and grave errors were committed, and if our ships had been distributed with more wisdom, allowing the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* to remain at Habana, and if our troops had been handled more skillfully, such indecision and errors would have become more apparent, with not a little prejudice to the enemy.

As to the military aspect, properly speaking, on land as well as on the sea, there may be found in this book accounts of a number of minor battles in which the enemy always retreated, perhaps in accordance with some system, or because it was found expedient; nevertheless these battles show—

(1) A desire on our part to fight, without measuring the forces, and thus we see at times troops of infantry fighting from the shore with only the fire of their rifles, and without any protection, against armored vessels equipped with powerful rapid-fire armament (Cienfuegos, Guantánamo, etc.), or small gunboats fighting hostile ships of great power

¹ It has been positively stated that after the declaration of war a ship left Gibraltar with a cargo of saltpeter without being molested, which is a proof of the lenity and fear with which we proceeded. It has also been widely reported that after the *Maine* catastrophe the *City of Paris* took to the United States from England a large quantity of war material; also men particularly skilled in the handling of modern guns. It is only too well known what difficulties our squadron encountered in the Suez Canal, and at whose hands.

(Cardenas and Cienfuegos); or, again, mountain and field batteries and old bronze guns cast a century ago, seeking to engage with modern ships (Santiago, Tunas, Manzanillo, and Matanzas).

(2) That neither great strategy nor even great tactics have been displayed in this campaign, which circumstance may also be partly attributed to the chaos reigning in the centers of the administration, for the heads of States have a considerable share in the conception of plans of campaigns. But when it was a question of testing personal valor, we find instances of desperate disregard of life—as, for example, in the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill—which will find a place in history among the bloody battles of the world.¹

(3) That the blockade as a means of warfare was effective, owing to the weakness of our forces, and that blockades assume a very cruel character when applied to isolated cities which do not possess within themselves means of subsistence. On the other hand, no value is attached to bombardments.²

In conclusion, we will set forth certain doctrinal results relative to the question of coast defense.

From our former book (*Ships, Guns, and Small Arms*) we deduced certain principles relative to the matériel—the guns with which the batteries are armed—and from this book may be gathered principles relative to the works—the fortifications in which the guns are mounted—as to the greater or less vulnerability from the fire of ships, according to the height above the level of the sea at which coast batteries are installed.

This question is so essential that the old aphorism that “a gun ashore is worth a ship on the sea” has again come into vogue, but if this saying is to prove true the gun must be located in the most favorable conditions.

The great height of coast defenses has the disadvantage of being detrimental to the perforating effects of the fire against the vertical armored sides of ships, but it facilitates the perforation of horizontal armored decks by the use of howitzers or rifled mortars. Great height naturally results in the increase of the dead angle; but in most cases the danger of ships repairing to this angle can probably be obviated, as coasts are not often entirely rectilinear, and hence some of the batteries can flank the dead angles of others.

Through the resistance of the batteries at the mouth of Santiago Harbor the value of coast defenses against squadrons has been cou-

¹This book is not intended to treat of the battles fought on land during the Spanish-American war. We expect to devote a whole volume of our work to this phase, at which time we shall further develop this conception.

²In the *Revue Maritime* for April, 1899, it is stated that when the contact mines at Santiago were raised one was found in which the fuse had operated, probably upon contact with the *Merrimac*, but only one-half of the charge of gun cotton had become ignited as the result of the damaged condition of the latter. At Guantánamo the stationary mines showed signs of having been touched, but did not operate, owing probably to defective fuses. This information comes from the United States, and should therefore “be put in quarantine.”

firmed to such an extent that it does not appear amiss to lay down a few principles on the situation of coast works.

(1) Coast batteries, being designed to fight the different classes of war ships which may attack maritime cities, it is indispensable that their power, precision, and effect upon hostile ships be in harmony with the offensive and defensive conditions of such ships. To this end it becomes necessary to employ, in the first place, guns of extraordinary power and sufficient caliber to perforate the armor of ships and turrets; in the second place, guns adapted to assist the former, but which, besides producing perforating effects, are also capable of destroying the less strong parts of ships and disabling the rigging; and finally, guns which by means of so-called curved fire are adapted to batter the decks of hostile ships.

(2) It will at once be understood that the guns designed to batter the armor of ships must be of great power and have projectiles of adequate shape to preserve the greatest possible amount of initial energy, which requires the greatest possible thickness of wall in the projectile compatible with its diameter.

(3) The fire must have the requisite precision, the zone of fire relative to the vertical height of the vessel must be extensive, and at the same time the impact of the projectile must be approximately in the normal direction. In order to attain these requirements, the height of the battery above the level of the sea must be limited. But as the men who serve the guns (usually installed in barbette batteries) must be protected as far as possible, they should be placed in shelter from the fire of the rapid-fire guns of ships. These requirements must necessarily be harmonized, which can be done to a certain extent by giving the batteries heights of from 25 to 30 meters, although no general rules can be laid down on this question, because another requirement is that the batteries should be merged as far as possible with the topographic lines of the coast and give the enemy as few points of reference as possible.¹

(4) As to the second class of guns referred to, there is no objection to increasing the height when deemed necessary, since the object will frequently be to play upon ships at greater distances, and therefore the height may be increased to 60 or 80 meters.

(5) Finally, as concerns the howitzer batteries which are designed to batter the decks of ships, it is important to obtain an inclination of fall

¹Major-General Richardson, speaking of the recent experiments at Gibraltar, above referred to, says: "To convince anyone of the necessity for control it is usually sufficient to open fire from a number of absolutely independent batteries of Q. F. guns at a fairly fast target in broad daylight. No battery, except such as are very high-sited, say 600 feet, can distinguish its own shots, and the means of ranging and hitting is removed. Very low-sited Q. F.'s often never get on the target at all. If there is this confusion when working with the easiest possible of lights, what reasonable certainty of striking torpedo boats can be looked for when the difficulties of seeing are enormously increased?"

approximating as much as possible the vertical direction, and at the same time the piercing power, and hence the energy of the projectile should be as great as possible. These requirements make it advisable to place these batteries at a greater height (Italians consider that the height should exceed 100 meters). In this manner not only the objects referred to may be attained, but at the same time the ships will be compelled to take positions at a greater distance, so that the trajectory in passing over the parapet will be on the descent, and hence at this increased distance the precision of the fire will be less and the energy of the projectiles will be decreased.

But all plans must be subordinated to topographic conditions, and therefore when no elevated positions are available (which, as a general thing, would require effective guns of small caliber on the flank to play on the dead angles), these howitzer batteries may be installed at less elevated points, and, if necessary, higher parapets may be used for the proper protection of the batteries, and the system of indirect firing may be resorted to.

* * * * *

The least that can be expected of us is to see that the defeat we have suffered may serve us as a warning, in order that it may not lead to the total obliteration of our nation. If we have been ruined because we were weak, let us make up our minds to be weak no longer; let us become strong in our own country, for there is still reason to believe that a day will come when we shall have something afloat capable of withstanding misfortunes, something of what some people call "the manifest destiny."

The expenses necessary for that purpose are within the limits of the attainable; but do not let us leave it for others to do; for if some ambitious foe should further reduce our territory, he would defend his new acquisition at the cost of the conquered or usurped country. In other words, if we do not reestablish our military power and defend our coasts and boundaries, the probability is that *others will defend them at our expense.*

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

SHIPS, GUNS, AND SMALL-ARMS.

By SEVERO GÓMEZ NÚÑEZ, Captain of Artillery.

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSIONS.

RAPID-FIRE—REDUCTION OF CALIBER—LARGE CALIBER—TRAINING DEVICES—SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION—ARMOR PLATE—PROTECTION OF SECONDARY BATTERIES—STRENGTHENING OF DECKS—SUPPRESSION OR GREAT RESTRICTION IN THE USE OF WOOD ON BOARD—MORTARS IN CONNECTION WITH BOMBARDMENTS—TORPEDO-LAUNCHING TUBES—SMALL-CALIBER RIFLES—THE NATIONAL DEFENSE.

We have now reached the most difficult part. To draw conclusions when there is so little upon which to base them is a task fraught with difficulties. The fear of making mistakes, however, should not deter us in matters of such vital importance, in which the opinions of some, modified and strengthened by those of others, finally form a consecutive chain of ideas constantly perfected by the critical study of new cases arising in practical experience.

The first natural result of the defeat we have sustained is the firm conviction, which is making its way to the heart of every Spaniard, that we have been living too long without compass or guide, without definite aim or fixed ideas, without a vigorous and strong hand to point out to the nation the horizon of its future greatness and compel it to follow the straight path, a concerted plan, a system, and a just government, devoting to that purpose all the energies at the country's command; and as these have not been entirely exhausted, we come to the conclusion that it may still be possible to repair our great losses by following a system diametrically opposed to the one which has brought us so much sorrow and ruin.

It would be unpardonable for us to go back to our former thoughtlessness and indolence. To profit by the severe lessons of the present

in order to obviate disasters in the future is a noble task, and we should set to work on it as soon as possible.

Every social organism needs revivifying modifications, and this applies especially to the army, the national defense, the navy; in short, the whole armed organization of our country.

To accomplish this there is no better time than the present, while life is not yet extinct in what remains of our former power.

If we examine the accounts published in the United States, it will be found that they are almost unanimous in the opinion that the victory in the battle of Santiago was due to the 20-centimeter gun, and the conviction is expressed that there will be a great revolution in favor of 20-centimeter and 25-centimeter rapid-fire guns.

The 57 mm. and 37 mm. guns suffer from the defect of short range, which fact should be taken into special consideration, because in the Spanish-American war the battles were fought at greatly reduced distances.

Rapid fire has gained much ground, and Capt. A. S. Crowninshield attributes to it the majority of hits upon our ships.

Universal praise is accorded the small-caliber rifle. The innocuity of bullets has not succeeded in coming into favor. Practical experience, the mortality in battles, the seriousness of wounds, the piercing and destructive effects of subtle projectiles, must be considered.

To sum up, the following conclusions may be drawn from this book:

(1) Powerful semi-rapid or rapid fire artillery, installed in such manner as to enable it to be utilized from the very beginning of the battle; to open fire from the greater part of the guns—in fact, from nearly all the guns of a ship or battery, so as to cover the enemy with a hail of iron without giving him time to recover. This requires many guns and instantaneous training devices by means of which the fire can be regulated so as to enable the guns to enter upon the action at any given moment, for we should always bear in mind that these devices are delicate, and it is doubtful whether they can be kept intact during the whole of the battle. With the harmony of the whole should be combined a certain independence of action of the several parts; in other words, each battery, type, or section of guns should be permitted to operate on its own account, and be provided with all the elements required for firing.

(2) Reduction of the large caliber in order to secure greater rapidity of fire without detriment to the effectiveness of projectiles.

(3) Simplification of the apparatus designed for the handling of the guns. We should strive for simpler and more rapid mechanism to facilitate operation by hand at any given moment, so that the commander of a ship or battery may feel assured that some minor injury, such as the breaking or disabling of a tube or electric wire, will not cause a momentary suspension of fire and that the guns can only be silenced through the effects of hostile projectiles.

(4) Large supplies of ammunition, in order to make sure that the use of rapid fire will not entail a lack of ammunition in a fierce and protracted battle.

(5) Since it has been ascertained that the number of hits on the water line is very small, it may perhaps be possible to reduce the thickness and enormous weight of the armor plate, which will permit an increase in the number of guns and supply of ammunition. On the other hand, it is obvious that the men who serve the secondary batteries are at present afforded too little protection, and means should be devised for providing better shelter for them. The necessity of better protection for decks is also generally conceded.

(6) The upper works of ships should be fireproof. Little wood should be used in the construction, and where it is used it should first be subjected to a fireproofing process. Even aside from projectiles charged with incendiary substances, experience has shown that ordinary shells are sufficient to cause conflagrations when they explode in the midst of wood and other combustible material.¹

(7) Chief Constructor Hiebhorn is of opinion that for bombarding purposes auxiliary vessels fitted for war should be equipped with mortars, and that armor clads should be reserved exclusively for use in the destruction of the hostile fleet.

(8) Torpedo-launching tubes should be done away with on board of large ships, because they constitute a serious danger through explosions which may be caused by projectiles entering the torpedo rooms. This is confirmed by what happened on board the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya*, especially the latter.

(9) The incontestable advantage of small-caliber rifles and smokeless powder.

Before concluding these pages we deem it proper to speak of some matters of a less general character than the preceding conclusions—matters pertaining to us directly, to Spain, to our present condition.

The national defense.—Ever since we can remember we have been hearing of plans for it, and have harbored hopes and listened to promises tending toward the realization of this ideal. But the time passes, conflicts come up, we are defeated, and the much-talked of national defense lives only in our remembrance and serves no other purpose than to make us regret that we did not have it when the critical moment

¹ First Lieutenant of Artillery Martin Loma, who examined the contents of one of the 8-inch shells fired on May 1 against the battery of La Luneta at Manila, told us that it was charged with ordinary fine powder mixed with pieces of cloth saturated with pitch or impregnated with some other inflammable substance. We learned this when this book had already gone to press.

[This statement is incorrect. Lieutenant Loma no doubt reported correctly what he saw, but was ignorant of the fact that the bursting charge of the shell, consisting of black powder, is contained in a cloth bag, and, that as an additional precaution against premature ignition, it is customary to lacquer the inside of the shell, all of which would account for the conditions mentioned.—O. N. I.]

came, and to make us feel once more its peremptory need. At best, we see now and then some timid attempt, a place here and there being equipped with artillery in a desultory and incomplete manner, by piecemeal, while others of greater importance remain devoid of all protection.

This is the way this serious problem has been treated for the last twenty-five or thirty years. Will it ever be thus?

We think not. At present we have good reason to believe that national defense will enter upon a practical era. The question is being generally studied and there is a profusion of intelligent plans.

As an illustration of the above statements we will mention Habana, where the plans that had been formulated for years would never have been carried into effect if a powerful will had not asserted itself and caused at least a few guns to be installed in the works along the coast; not a sufficient number, but enough anyway to check the audacity of the enemy.

The expense required will be profitable and is not unattainable for our treasury, exhausted though it be, as it can be adapted to our financial conditions. We should not forget that economy in these matters would be equivalent to greater sacrifices in the future.

There is nothing to prevent us from beginning on the execution of the plan of defense at once by installing in the fortresses along our coasts and on the coasts of Africa and the Balearic and Canary Islands medium-caliber rapid-fire guns. And since large-caliber steel guns are very expensive and take a long time to construct, let us resort for the present to howitzers and rifled mortars, which are cheap and can be manufactured at home. These guns are admirably suited for service against the weakest parts of ships—namely, decks—which are easy to hit with comparatively numerous batteries, good telemetric systems, and an adequate force of well-trained personnel, who in time of peace should be given a great deal of target practice and ample drill in correction of fire.

All nations, even the wealthiest among them, like the United States, our fortunate rival, accord nowadays great preference to howitzers and rifled mortars for use in coast defense.

Nor is there anything to prevent us from throwing off our lethargy and beginning at once on the reconstruction of our armada, so that we may be equal to the important rôle which we still play among maritime nations. A well-conceived and scrupulously executed plan might give us, in the space of a few years, the requisite number of true battleships.

We will close here. Our ideas may be expressed in these few words: *Less theory and more practice; less studies and more action.*

APPENDIX B.

THE CAPITULATION OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

DECREE.

[Translated from *El Mundo Naval Ilustrado*, September 15 and October 1, 1899.]

The *Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra* publishes the sentence of the supreme council in the proceedings instituted concerning the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, and although this document is quite extensive, we do not hesitate to reproduce it in full, so that a sentence on which the history of the war will be based may not be absent from *El Mundo Naval*. The decree is as follows:

The council assembled in the hall of justice on August 4, 1899. Present: The president, Castro, Gamarra, Martínez Espinosa, March, Muñoz Vargas, Zappino, López Cordón, Jiménez, Rocha, Piquer, Urdangarín, Campa, and Valcárcel.

It appearing that this cause has been prosecuted before this supreme council, as the tribunal of first and only instance, in the matter of the capitulation to the enemy of the army forces at Santiago de Cuba against the following defendants: José Toral Velázquez, general of division and commander in chief, having succeeded to the command of the Fourth Army Corps of the island of Cuba on the evening of July 1, 1898, when the commander in chief of said corps, Lieut. Gen. Arsenio Linares, fell wounded; General of Brigade Félix Pareja Mesa, chief of the brigade of Guantánamo; Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry Feliciano Velarde Zabala, military commandant of Baracoa; Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry Rafael Serichol Alegría, military commandant of Sagua de Tánamo; Commander of Infantry Arturo Campos Hidalgo, military commandant of Alto Songo; Commander of Infantry José Fernández García, military commandant of San Luis; Commander of Infantry Romualdo García Martínez, military commandant of Palma Soriano, and Commander of Infantry Clemente Calvo Peyro, military commandant of El Cristo.

It appearing, further, that on the 18th day of May, 1898, two United States vessels appeared off the entrance of Santiago harbor and bombarded the batteries under construction and fired a few shots which were answered by the forts, and that on the morning of the 19th they

fired upon the detachment at the Playa del Este at Caimanera and the gunboat *Sandoral*.

It appearing, further, that from the 20th to the 22d day of the same month, Calixto García bombarded for two days the town of Palma Soriano with guns and small arms, and that General Vara de Rey crossed the Cauto River with two guns and compelled the enemy to withdraw to beyond 2 leagues, having suffered many casualties, while 16 of our men were wounded.

It appearing, further, that on the 29th day of May, the hostile squadron, among which were discerned the *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Montgomery*, 1 trans-Atlantic steamer, and 12 merchant vessels, approached to within 5 miles, and on the 31st, at 2.30 o'clock p. m., opened fire, which was answered by the Morro, Socapa, and Punta Gorda batteries and the guns of the *Colon*, firing in all about 100 shots in forty-five minutes, which was the duration of the battle.

It appearing, further, that on the 1st day of June, the hostile squadron was sighted, reenforced by the battleship *Oregon*, the cruiser *New York*, and a gunboat, making a total of 19 vessels in sight; 4 battle ships, other ships not classified, a destroyer, the gunboat *Vesuvius*, another gunboat, 2 trans-Atlantic steamers, and 5 auxiliary tugs; that on the 3d day of June, a merchant vessel, the *Merrimac*, protected by a battle ship, attempted to force the channel; that the cruiser *Reina Mercedes* and the batteries of Punta Gorda and Socapa opened fire and succeeded in sinking the *Merrimac* and taking one officer and seven sailors prisoners, and that said vessel went to the bottom without obstructing the channel.

It appearing, further, that on the 6th day of June, at 8 o'clock p. m., the hostile squadron commenced the bombardment with ten ships, discharging over 2,000 projectiles, causing serious injuries to the *Reina Mercedes* and the garrison quarters at the Morro, without dismounting any of our guns, which answered the fire with great assurance; that we had 1 chief and 8 men killed, and 2 chiefs, 5 officers, and 56 men wounded; that the bombardment was repeated on the 14th, and that on the day following the Asia column repulsed at Punta Cabrera an attack of insurgents who were attempting to communicate with the Americans; that the bombardment by the squadron was renewed on the 16th and 21st, while the Cebrero and Rabi detachments were at Aserradero and the Castillo detachment at Ramón de las Yaguas.

It appearing, further, that on the 20th day of said month of June the transports of the hostile fleet, with the landing forces on board, appeared to the eastward, convoyed by the battle ship *Indiana* and other war ships, forming a total of 63 vessels; that General Vara de Rey, with three companies of the battalion Constitución, a flying company of guerrillas, and two guns, took position at El Caney, and four companies of the Asia Battalion, with a colonel, intrenched themselves at Punta Cabrera, another at Monte Real, two more at Cobre, together

with the garrisons of Loma Cruz and Puerto Bayamo, and another division of the Asia Battalion at Punta Cabrera; and in order to repulse any landing attempt at Cabañas Bay the commander of the Asia Battalion, Ramón Escobar, with one company of that battalion and one mobilized company, took position at Mazamorra.

It appearing, further, that on the 21st and during the night part of the infantry and light material of the hostile forces was landed at Berracos, and on the 22d fire was opened by the whole squadron from Socapa to Daiquiri; that several hostile vessels, towing launches with landing forces, supported the bombardment of Siboney and Daiquiri, while the forces landed on the previous day made an attack on the flank, in conjunction with parties of insurgents.

It appearing, further, that on the 25th day of June General Vara de Rey withdrew to El Caney with three companies of the Battalion Constitución and several guerrilla companies, and entrenched himself for the purpose of checking the advance of the United States forces.

It appearing, further, that the enemy was encamped from June 25 to July 1, in three lines, from Santa Teresa to Sevilla, and that for repulsing the attack of July 1 there were available six companies of the Talavera Battalion, three of the Porto Rico Battalion, three of the San Fernando Battalion, one and one-half companies of sappers, three mobilized companies, 14 horse and 2 rapid-fire guns, in all 1,700 men, the forces of the West being at a distance and engaged in other objectives.

It appearing, further, that at daybreak of July 1 the ships of the hostile squadron approached Aguadores Inlet, while at the same time the landing forces opened fire, advancing in large numbers toward El Caney and Las Lagunas, supporting the gun fire on the positions of San Juan and El Caney, especially the latter point; that the advance échelon of San Juan, consisting of two companies under the command of Colonel Vaquero, was reenforced by another company, and Colonel Ordóñez arrived with the section of rapid-fire artillery to check the fire of the hostile batteries, and the battery situated at El Pozo succeeded in silencing their fire.

It appearing, further, that in view of the intensity of the hostile fire from their artillery, machine guns, and small arms, and the number of wounded, among whom were Colonel Ordóñez, Commander Lamadrid, and one-half of the officers, it was decided to have the cavalry advance to protect the retreat and save the artillery, which was successfully carried out and the enemy was compelled to withdraw upon San Juan; at that moment General Linares was wounded and General Vara de Rey killed, the latter having succumbed to the numerical superiority of the enemy and lack of ammunition, when the attack upon El Caney was renewed in the evening, having already been wounded and shot through both legs; and that on that glorious day over 500 men and 50 generals, chiefs, and officers were killed and wounded.

It appearing, further, that General Toral having taken charge of the command in accordance with regulations, El Caney being lost, the enemy in possession of San Juan Hill, the railroad left without defense, the water supply cut off, and the forces deprived of their commanders as the result of the fierce battle they had sustained, it became necessary to concentrate all the detachments of the forts, which was effected without casualties.

It appearing, further, that on the 1st and 2d days of July the enemy fortified himself on the heights of San Juan and San Juan de Millares, attempting to install a battery close to our trenches, which was frustrated by the sure fire of the Cuban regiment; that from 5 to 10 o'clock a. m. of the 2d the enemy attacked the positions of San Antonio, Canosa, Guayabito, and Santa Ursula, renewing the attack at noon with increased intensity until 5 o'clock p. m., and a third time from 9 to 10 o'clock p. m., and being repulsed each time; that simultaneously with these attacks the squadron bombarded Aguadores, the Morro, and the batteries of Punta Gorda and Socapa.

It appearing, further, that the enemy devoted the 3d day of July to intrenching themselves and installing batteries from Loma Quintero to the San Juan River, overlooking the positions of Santa Ursula and Cañadas, and that on the same day, July 3, our squadron, in obedience to higher orders, left the waters of Santiago and was destroyed on the reefs of the coast a few hours later in unëqual battle, General Toral thus finding himself deprived of the important factors of defense which the fleet had furnished him in the way of landing companies and light artillery, of which the land forces stood so much in need, owing to their inadequate artillery, the reduced contingent, and the extent of the line they had to defend.

It appearing, further, that the city of Santiago, being more closely besieged by the enemy, had no permanent fortifications left except a castle without artillery at the mouth of the harbor and a few forts on the precinct of the city, all of little value, so that almost its only real defense consisted of the open trenches around the city and other earth-works thrown up in a hurry and with inadequate material, and that for the defense of said line, about 14 kilometers in length, there were available only about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom had performed constant service in the trenches, without any troops to support them and without reserves of any kind, since the remainder of the forces were garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of the Socapa and Punta Gorda, performing also the services of carrying water to different points, patrolling the city, and rendering such other services as the inhabitants could have rendered had the city remained loyal.

It appearing, further, that the extent of the line referred to, the position of the forces on said line, the difficulty of communication, and the proximity of the enemy rendered it difficult for the troops stationed at a certain point of the line to reach speedily some other point more seri-

ously threatened; that the troops had at their disposal only four 16-cm. rifled bronze guns, one 12-cm. and one 9-cm. bronze gun, two long 8-cm. rifled guns, four short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm. Placencia and two 75-mm. Krupp guns; that the 16 cm. guns, according to expert opinion, were liable to give out at the end of a few more shots, that there was hardly any ammunition left for the Krupp guns, and that the guns enumerated were all there was to oppose the numerous and powerful artillery of the enemy.

It appearing, further, that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges, which was all there was on hand at the artillery park and in the army, would not last for more than two attacks on the part of the enemy, that the Argentine Mauser ammunition could not be utilized for want of weapons of that type, nor could the ammunition for Remingtons, these weapons being in the hands of the irregular forces only.

It appearing, further, that the supply of provisions furnished by commercial enterprise was inadequate; that owing to the lack of meat and the scarcity of other articles of subsistence, nothing could be furnished the soldiers but rice, salt, oil, coffee, sugar, and brandy, and that only for about ten days longer, and that under these circumstances over 1,700 sick persons at the hospital had to be fed, to say nothing of the soldiers who spent day and night in the trenches, after three years of campaign, during the last three months of which they seldom had meat to eat and were often reduced to the rations mentioned above—poor rations for soldiers whose physical strength was already considerably broken.

It appearing, further, that the aqueduct having been cut, there arose serious difficulties in the matter of furnishing water to the majority of the forces in the trenches of the precinct, especially on the coast; and that these difficulties, owing to the bombardment of the city by land and sea, were increased to such an extent that there was well-grounded fear lest the soldiers, who could not leave the trenches, would find themselves deprived of this indispensable beverage.

It appearing, further, that in view of the situation of the enemy in positions close to ours, entirely surrounding the city and in control of all the approaches thereto, it was not possible for the Spanish army to leave the city without engaging in a fierce battle under the most unfavorable circumstances, owing to the necessity of concentrating the forces under the very eyes of the enemy, and in view of the physical debility of the soldiers, who were kept up only by their exalted spirit and the habit of discipline.

It appearing, further, that, aside from the numerical superiority of the hostile contingent, they had, according to trustworthy information, 70 pieces of modern artillery and the support of a powerful squadron, while no Spanish reinforcements could reach Santiago except by sea, which latter eventuality had become a vain hope from the moment when the American ships completely closed in the harbor entrance.

It appearing, further, that for the above reasons there was no possibility of reinforcements arriving before the total exhaustion of provisions and ammunition.

It appearing, further, that under these sad circumstances the prolongation of so unequal a struggle could, in the opinion of the acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps, lead to nothing but the vain sacrifice of a large number of lives without gaining any advantage, since the honor of arms had been entirely saved by the troops who had made such a valiant fight and whose heroic conduct was acknowledged by friend and foe, wherefore the said commander in chief convened the Junta for the purpose of drawing up the act, a copy of which appears on page 125 of these proceedings, setting forth that the necessity for capitulating had arrived.

It appearing, further, that under the terms of the second article of the military agreement of the capitulation of the army forces at Santiago de Cuba, a copy of which appears on page 129 of these proceedings, the acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps, General of Division José Toral, included in said capitulation all the forces and war material occupying the territory of the province of Santiago de Cuba, so that the brigade of Guantánamo and the garrisons of Baracoa, Sagua, de Tánamo, Alto Songo, San Luis, Palma Soriano, and El Cristo were included in said capitulation.

And considering that from the moment when the United States squadron established the blockade of Santiago Harbor, the situation of said city, which was already a difficult one as the result of the internal war which had been waged in the island for three years, exhausting every resource of the country and preventing the prompt provisioning of the island by land, was very much aggravated through the closing of the harbor, which precluded the easiest and most expeditious means for receiving the aid that was indispensable under such critical circumstances.

Considering, further, that for the effective defense of a maritime place when attacked by a squadron it is not always sufficient nor practicable to employ land forces, but that for a successful issue naval forces are also absolutely necessary, and as such forces were entirely lacking, the hostile squadron was enabled to acquire and hold undisturbed possession of those waters, the control of which meant the exclusion of all aid from Santiago de Cuba.

Considering, further, that said United States squadron, operating in comparative proximity to the coasts and harbors of its own nation, was able, without any sacrifice whatever, to maintain and constantly strengthen the blockade which it had established, frequently relieving the ships assigned to this service, and feeling always sure of opportunities and means for repairing any injuries of its ships, resupplying them with coal, provisions, and ammunition, and sustaining its base of operations under all circumstances.

Considering, further, that for a large and powerful squadron, like that of the United States, it was an easy undertaking, in view of the resources at its disposal, to effect a landing at any of the many accessible points on that part of the Cuban coast, under cover of the fire of numerous guns, and without any danger of meeting resistance, since it had become a physical impossibility for our army to cover and defend the whole coast, and since the place where the landing was to be effected could not be surmised, and the scant contingent of the army at Santiago was not able effectually to guard so large an extent of coast.

Considering, further, that in view of the lack of provisions at Santiago the situation of its defenders was further aggravated by the entrance of Admiral Cervera's squadron in that harbor, whereby not only the consumption of food was increased, but which also made that city the principal objective of the Americans in that campaign, who from that time on assembled the greater and better part of their naval forces in front of Santiago and increased the number of their transports for the landing of their army with a large amount of modern field artillery, threatening serious assaults on the city, and making the blockade by sea so rigid that ingress and egress of the harbor became absolutely impossible, thus shutting off from Santiago every hope of receiving aid and compromising the safety of our squadron, the capture or destruction of which was naturally assumed to be the principal aspiration of the enemy.

Considering, further, that after the United States army had been landed and had established its lines and positions near Santiago, in conjunction with the insurgent parties, it was difficult for reinforcements, which were so much needed, to arrive by land, and when on the evening of July 3 Colonel Escario's column did arrive, after having exhausted its rations on the march, it further aggravated the already serious situation, which was due principally to the great scarcity of provisions.

Considering, further, that after the destruction of Admiral Cervera's squadron, which ran out of Santiago Harbor on July 3, in obedience to superior orders, the enemy had no difficulty in realizing that they could, with impunity, carry out all their plans without being impeded by an army reduced in number, short of ammunition and provisions, decimated by disease contracted during three years of hard fighting in a tropical country and in a climate fatal during the summer heat, devoid of all hope except in Providence, with no alternative except death or surrender to the mercy of an enemy, who alone by blockades on land and sea, without any other means, had succeeded in annihilating those valiant troops.

Considering, further, that the Spanish admiral, in order to leave Santiago Harbor with his squadron on July 3, had to recall from said city the landing companies and field artillery which, in compliance with naval regulations issued by the chief of staff of the squadron, had been

for in good season by the artillery park; this being an important point which should be cleared up as being closely connected with the capitulation of said province.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE.

Testimony is to be taken from the document which appears at page 1379 of these proceedings and forwarded to the captain-general of New Castile to be used in connection with the proceedings had under the auspices of this supreme council assembled in the hall of justice on July 7 last, to ascertain to what extent the administrative chief of the army of Cuba is responsible for not having complied with the order of the general in chief of the same to provision Santiago de Cuba for four months.

This decree is to be brought to the cognizance of the minister of war, as provided by law, and for its execution the testimony in this cause is to be forwarded to the captain-general of New Castile. The necessary orders are to be issued.

By royal order and in conformity with the provisions of article 634 of the Code of Military Procedure I remit the same to your excellency for your cognizance and action thereon.

El General encargado del despacho:

MARIANO CAPDEPÓN.

MADRID, *August 9, 1899.*



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES No. VII.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS
RELATIVE TO THE
SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

ARRANGED BY
REAR-ADMIRAL PASCUAL CERVERA Y TOPETE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1899.

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INTRODUCTORY.

In the Cortes at Madrid, on the 30th day of October, 1899, the minister of war was requested by the Count de las Almenas and Senators González and Dávila to transmit to the senate chamber as early as possible the proceedings held in the supreme council of war and navy, from August 1, 1899, to date, relative to the wars in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

The minister of war, replying, said in part:

I do not know whether the Count de las Almenas and the worthy companions whom he represents have sufficiently considered the grave step of bringing into a political chamber and submitting to parliamentary discussion adjudged causes of the extreme gravity of those referred to. I repeat that, while I greatly respect such right, I believe that there may be serious objections to a debate of this nature, because perhaps the high tribunal of the army and navy, which has adjudged these causes in accordance with law and its own conscience, and to whose functions and importance great respect is due, might suffer, though only apparently, in its prestige. For that reason I consider it neither expedient nor prudent to transmit to the chamber the documents asked for.

It is not, therefore, probable that the proceedings of the courts in the cases of Admirals Cervera and Montojo will be made public.

Admiral Cervera, having in view the vindication of himself, had obtained from the Queen in August permission to publish certain documents, given in this number of the War Notes, which make a most interesting and connected history of the naval operations of Spain during the war, and show without need of argument the causes of her weakness.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,


Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *December 6, 1899.*

Approved:

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD,

Chief of Bureau of Navigation.



TO THE READER.

Being in possession of the documents herein collected, I have thought it my duty to publish them in order to enlighten the public, and that they may serve as a lesson for the future and as data for history.

I had thought first of having a short statement of facts precede them, but considering that the events are so very recent, and have affected our unhappy country so much, that any criticism might easily degenerate into passion, I have thought it best to give simply the documents and let them explain for themselves everything that has happened.

I should have liked to do this earlier, but put it off until the termination of the cause in which I was made a defendant, and since then it has taken some time for me to obtain permission to publish these papers, owing to my position as a naval officer and the nature of the documents, most of which either came from the ministry of marine or were addressed to it.

To that end I applied to Her Majesty in a petition, a copy of which follows, and secured a royal order, a copy of which also follows.

The collection is printed in two kinds of type. The smaller type refers to documents printed in a certain work where errors and omissions have crept in, and the larger type refers to documents furnished by myself, the originals of most of which are in my possession, and to others taken from various publications and even from the journals of the sessions of the Chambers.

If this publication should help us to mend our mistakes in the future, my wishes are granted, for all I ask is that I may be useful to my country.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

MADRID, *August 30, 1899.*

PETITION.

MADAM: Pascual Cervera y Topete, rear admiral of the navy, sets forth to Your Royal Majesty, with the most profound respect as follows:

It is well known that owing to the destruction of the squadron under my command in the battle of July 3, 1898, a cause was instituted in which the decree of the supreme council of war and navy has absolved your petitioner and others. But such decree, in which only a majority concurred, is not sufficient to satisfy the opinion which, misled at the time of the events and for a long time afterwards, has been manifested in a fierce campaign against the honor of your petitioner, that of the squadron which he commanded, and of the entire navy.

Upon noticing these symptoms the writer attempted to give the country a full explanation, and to that end he solicited and obtained the election as senator for the province of Albacete, but did not even have a chance of discussing the proceedings of his election.

When your petitioner had been made a defendant in the proceedings above referred to, he deemed it his duty not to speak until the court had pronounced its sentence.

The writer has in his possession many original documents and authentic copies of others, and among them there are not a few that have been published with errors, and others that have been printed without authorization, but have come to the knowledge of many people, and these likewise contained many errors which are bound to mislead public opinion.

These documents, many of which were at the time of a confidential nature, need no longer be kept secret, since peace has been reestablished and the publication of the same would correct many of these errors and serve as a lesson for the future. For all these reasons your petitioner humbly prays that Your Majesty will permit him to publish, at his expense, the documents referred to in order to enlighten the Spanish people.

Dated August 18, 1899.

ROYAL ORDER.

His Majesty having been informed of the petition forwarded by your excellency on the 18th instant, asking for permission to publish, at your expense, certain documents in your possession relative to the squadron under your command in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, on the 3d day of July, 1898, His Majesty the King (whom God guard), and in his name the Queen Regent of the Kingdom, in conformity with the opinion furnished by the counselor-general of this ministry, has been pleased to authorize your excellency to publish all orders issued by the ministry of marine relative to the squadron destroyed at Santiago de Cuba. The above having been communicated to me by royal order, through the minister of marine, I notify your excellency accordingly for your cognizance, and as the result of your petition referred to.

Madrid, August 22, 1899.

MANUEL J. MOZO. *Assistant Secretary.*

Rear-Admiral PASCUAL CERVERA Y TOPETE.

COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE

SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

PRIVATE.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
Madrid, November 28, 1897.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In answer to your esteemed letters I wish to say that I entirely approve of the instructions issued to the squadron and of everything you state relative to speed, diameters, and tactical movements. With great pleasure I read the telegram relative to firing trials on board the *Vizcaya*, after so many doubts and different opinions. But we should, nevertheless, not abandon ourselves to unlimited confidence, and your good judgment will know how to restrict the use of these guns¹ until we have the new cartridge cases, which, I have been promised, will begin to arrive early in November. I am continuing my efforts toward fitting out the torpedo boats, but we have to contend with scarcity of engine personnel, and this need is further increased by the men working under contract who are about to leave the service.

Wishing you every happiness, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

Nothing new in the Philippines.

SANTA POLA, *December 3, 1897.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Upon my arrival here I received your favor of the 28th. I am much pleased to know that you approve of the instructions I have issued to the squadron. The *Oquendo* was ready day before yesterday, for all she needed was to have the diaphragm of the condensers cleaned. I am of your opinion that we should wait for the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases before using these guns for

¹ Reference is had to the 5.5 inch González-Hontoria rapid-fire guns.

target practice, and I am thinking of spreading the report that we are waiting in order not to decrease our supply. One thousand five hundred cartridge cases seems very little to me. I think we should have at least twice as many, which is the regular supply for this class of ships. In order to obviate any comment on the fact of our not using the 5.5-inch guns, I am thinking of having target practice with the 11-inch guns only on certain days, and on other days with the small guns day and night, unless you should issue orders to the contrary. Night before last we had an exercise with the scouts of this ship and the *Teresa*, which was very interesting; the vedettes were discovered with the aid of the searchlights. We are continuing experiments with the latter in order to ascertain the best installation for them. The highly interesting question of the radius of action of these ships can be only approximately settled with the data furnished by this trip of mine. The reasons why it can not be definitely settled are that the *Teresa* has used an unreasonable amount of coal, for which fact I transmit to day to her commander a reprimand for the firemen; and the *Oquendo*, owing to an erroneous interpretation of one of my signals, did not follow instructions, but we have data which may be presumed to be correct for the *Oquendo*. I will send you in the near future the computations relative to this matter. I believe I have already advised you in my former letter that I intended to go out with a squadron for a few days. I also want to give the steam launches and their officers some tactical exercises, under the direction of a superior officer.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

Madrid, January 9, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have just had a call, not only from the committee of the Ansaldo Company, but also from the Italian ambassador, relative to the 9.84-inch guns of the *Colón*, and I am afraid we will have some trouble concerning this matter. As the report of the advisory board (centro-consultivo) is utterly opposed to the acceptance of gun No. 325, and still more of No. 313, you will understand that the junta over which you preside should suggest to me some solution toward substituting for these guns, at least temporarily, guns of other systems. For my part I have conveyed the impression that if two other guns, to the exclusion of Nos. 325 and 313, could be tried within a very short time, and such trials should show satisfactory results, the Government might perhaps terminate this unpleasant matter.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

I have in mind, my dear Admiral, what constitutes the press in this country, and the way they have of always treating us unfairly.

The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).

[Extract.]

HAVANA, January 8, 1898.

Two and one-third millions are due the navy, and should be liquidated so as to make it possible to place in commission a number of vessels which are now at the navy-yard with injuries that can not be repaired for lack of funds.

BATTLE SHIP VIZCAYA, THE ADMIRAL,
Cartagena, January 29, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The telegram I sent you yesterday notified you that the *Vizcaya* was ready, with her fires lighted, to go out just as soon as she received instructions and money, the only things she now lacks. It is true that three or four men belonging to her crew, and who are absent with my permission, have not yet returned, but they have been telegraphed to and will be here very shortly. However, if the money and instructions should arrive before they do, the ships will go without them. She has about 600 tons of coal on board and will continue coaling until the instructions come, or until her bunkers are entirely filled. She has fires under six of her boilers and is filling the other four boilers with water. She has also commenced distilling water, which will be continued as long as may be necessary. She has provisions on board for forty days. The 2.24-inch gun mount which was sent to *placencia de las armas* and has not yet been returned, has been replaced by another one from the *Lepanto*. The *Vizcaya* is short one lieutenant, as *Alvargonzález* was sent ashore; and as none can be furnished by the maritime district of *Carthagena (departamento)*, I will send for one from the *Alfonso*; but owing to our hurried departure he may not arrive in time, and we can not wait. The other two *Bilbao* cruisers are also being fitted out. The *Teresa* begins to coal at once, and the *Oquendo* will receive her relieving tackle to-day, after which she will immediately commence to take on coal and lubricating material. As far as the water supply for these ships is concerned, it is all right; for, thanks to the exertions of *Bustamante* and concessions of the Captain-General, the English company will be ready by to-morrow to furnish us water at the dockyard at a price of 0.032 peseta per cubic foot. I have telegraphed to *Barcelona* to ascertain when we are to have the sea biscuit. If the coal arrives from England, the ships can fill their bunkers again, and if not we will only have coal enough to reach *Las Palmas*. You are well aware that there is not in the squadron a man in the crews who has any savings; therefore there are two things lacking: First, they should be ordered to make assignments to their families, so as not to condemn 500 or 600 families to starvation, which might even affect the discipline; second, money should be assigned to us at *Havana* for our own living, because if they count upon our having collected the pay for January and propose to pay us to date

we shall perish miserably. On this vital point I send a telegram. The *Furor* will be ready to go out in a couple of days. The *Terror* will require at least a week before her boilers will be ready. I gave the Captain-General your message concerning the torpedo boats and the crew of the *Vitoria*. We have not yet received the January consignment, and I send a telegram relative to it. Three of our steam launches are not in condition to be used, and I have asked the Captain-General to let me have those of the *Lepanto* and keep ours here to have the boilers repaired, and they can then be used for the other ship. The fleet is short five lieutenants and five ensigns, and the departamento says that it has none to furnish. This scarcity will affect especially the *Alfonso*, and in order to remedy it to a certain extent I am going to commission the four midshipmen at the head of the list and transfer them to the *Alfonso*. I do not know whether I am forgetting anything.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, January 30, 1898.

DEAR COUSIN JUAN SPOTTORNO: About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our condition to go to war with the United States. I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it should be necessary to bring it to light in defense of my memory or myself, when we had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best of intentions. To-day we find ourselves again in one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and to explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with the other one, so that the two may be my military testament. The relative military positions of Spain and the United States have grown worse for us, because we are reduced, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only with the *Colón* and the torpedo-boat destroyers, and they have increased theirs much more. What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in everything we look at. There is the *Cataluña*, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriotism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. And the condition of our industry is the same in all the arsenals. Let us consider, now, our private industries. The Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima supplies the engines of the *Alfonso XIII*; Cadiz, the *Filipinas*. If the *Carlos V* is not a dead failure, she is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power. And remember that the construction is purely Spanish. The company of La Graña has not completed its ships, as I am told, and only these

(*Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, and *Maria Teresa*) are good ships of their class; but, though constructed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would be a sad thing for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The *Vizcaya* carries a 5.5-inch breech plug which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night, and that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention! But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a disaster. But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be arranged without coming to a conflict, which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us. I intrust to you a most interesting correspondence which I had with General Azcárraga, and which I desire and request you to preserve, together with this letter and the former one. In it you will see the opinion of Azcárraga. Without troubling you further, I remain your most affectionate cousin, who intrusts his honor to your hands.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *July 2, 1898.*

GINÉS MONCADA,
ANTONIO MARTÍ.

Certificate.—Ginés Moncada y Ferro, mining engineer, and Antonio Martí y Pagán, attorney at law, state upon their honor that they repaired this day to the residence of Juan Spottorno y Bienert, at the request of the latter, who exhibited to them a letter from His Excellency Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, addressed to Mr. Spottorno, dated January 30, 1898; that the undersigned read said letter and affixed their signatures thereto. They were also shown a collection of documents, of which they read only the headings and signatures, which documents had been intrusted to Mr. Spottorno by Rear-Admiral Cervera, and which are as follows: Letters from their excellencies General Marcelo Azcárraga and Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo; copies of letters addressed by Admiral Cervera to the last-named gentlemen, and to his excellency Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, and to Mr. Spottorno; copies of official letters addressed to his excellency the minister of marine; the original proceedings of the council of war held on April 20, 1898, at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, by the captains of the Spanish fleet; an opinion written at said council of war, signed by Capt. Victor M. Concas; a copy of a telegram addressed by Capt. Fernando Villamil to his excellency Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. A detailed account is made of all these documents, which we sign to-day. Mr. Spottorno

stated that he must have among his papers at Madrid a letter which Rear-Admiral Cervera wrote to him two or three years ago from Cadiz, and which is referred to in the letter of January 30, 1898, which we have signed, and in which letter, which is in answer to one written by Mr. Spottorno to Rear-Admiral Cervera from Madrid, relative to naval matters, Cervera said in substance that he foresaw, through the fault of the whole country, a maritime disaster while he (Cervera) was placed in command of the fleet, and that he feared that he would be held responsible, as the Italian Admiral Persano was held responsible for the destruction of his squadron, for which the whole country was to blame. As men of honor we attest all that has been set forth.

Dated at Cartagena, July 2, 1898.

GINÉS MONCADA.

ANTONIO MARTI.

CARTAGENA, *February 3, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The *Colón* has arrived, after encountering heavy weather in the Gulf of Leon, which carried away a ladder, a boat, and some other things of minor importance. I did not want to put this in my telegram, so as not to alarm the uninitiated. We have not yet received the consignments for January, and as the squadron has very little money left it has been necessary, in order to get the *Vizcaya* off, to resort to private funds. On the other hand, the departamento has already received its monthly allowance for February. Can not something be done so that the squadron will not always be kept behind? A remedy must be found if it is desired to keep up the good spirit now prevailing among the crews, and I beg and implore that you will be kind enough to remedy this evil. The storm which the *Colón* has encountered has shown the necessity of her having scupper holes, and I will see to this at once. I shall not have the *Colón* fill up with coal, on account of the condition of her bunkers, unless you should give orders to the contrary. I have received the royal order corroborating the telegram concerning the consignments, and you will allow me to insist on my petition about which I wrote Moret.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February 3, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO MORET.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I presume you know that upon my arrival here I found the *Vizcaya* ready to go out, and I have had the pleasure of telegraphing to that effect to the minister of marine, who ordered the fires to be lighted. I mention this because it shows the good spirit of the crews, which extends to every class, as evidenced by the fact that

not a single man was absent at the roll call, although many of them had leave granted and some had gone to Galicia. There is no wealth in the Navy (I am not speaking of the officers particularly, although I do not exclude them). There are many classes of boatswains, gunners, machinists, firemen, and dock-yard men who have nothing but their pay, which, as a rule, is small, and out of that at least two-thirds of this personnel have to take care of families, for I do not count the unmarried men; nor do I count the seamen and gunners' mates, who can leave their prizes to their families, for while they have the same pay as the others they have fewer needs, and though I plead for all I want to base my argument on truth. Thus each one of these ships about to sail from the Peninsula, leaves intrusted to Divine Providence about 100 families, and yet every one of the men was there! Why? They trust that their Admiral will look out for them, and that the Government of His Majesty will act favorably on my just petition. But I telegraphed to the minister of marine, asking that the Government authorize the establishment of assignments to the families, and he answered that existing regulations would not permit this, and I therefore sent him a letter on the 31st, a copy of which I inclose, asking that you will read it. To-day I am in receipt of the corroboration of the telegram from the minister of marine, in which he says that the concession depends also on the minister of colonies, and that he will renew his petitions on that subject. It is for this reason that I trouble you, feeling sure that you will pardon me for taking up your attention for a few moments. I don't like to trouble anyone, and have a great aversion toward a certain class of business. As an illustration of this, I will tell you that while my son Angel was attached to the legation at Pekin, in order to protect it with the detachment under his command, he was the only one who received his pay in Mexican dollars. The whole legation with the exception of himself received theirs in gold. And although we are both poor, I never troubled anyone about this when the minister of colonies refused his entirely justifiable request that his pay be made the same as to the others.¹ But the matter in question to-day is very different. I am not advocating my own interests nor those of my family, but of my subordinates, and it is the admiral's duty to look out for them. I therefore beg that you will call this matter up and have it favorably disposed of as it should be.

Trusting that you will do so, I remain,

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

¹Three months after the date of the above letter he was partially indemnified—forty-three months after the termination of his commission in China.

[Confidential.]

GENERAL CAPTAINCY OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Although I am sure that I am telling your excellency nothing new, I think it is not idle in these critical times to make a study of the condition of this fleet, if only to complete statistical statements of condition and power as to those matters which, for reasons I need not here set forth, do not appear in such statements. We must discount the *Alfonso XIII*, which has been under trials for so many years, and which we shall apparently not have the pleasure of counting among our available ships, which are therefore reduced to the three Bilbao battle ships,¹ the *Colón*, the *Destructor*, and the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*. The three Bilbao battle ships are apparently complete, but you who have had so much to do with them while in command of the squadron, and since then in your present position, know only too well that the 5.5-inch guns, the main power of these vessels, are practically useless on account of the bad system of their breech mechanism and the poor quality of their cartridge cases, of which there are no more than those now on board.

The *Colón*, which, from a military standpoint, is no doubt the best of all our ships, is still without her heavy guns. In this matter I have, at your instructions, communicated with General Guillén, in order to find a possible remedy, if there is one. The *Destructor* may serve as a scout, although her speed is deficient for that kind of service with this fleet. The torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror* are in good condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 2.95-inch guns. As for the supplies necessary for the fleet, we frequently lack even the most indispensable. In this departamento we have not been able to renew the coal supplies, and at both Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obtain half the amount of biscuit we wanted, including the 17,637 pounds which I had ordered to be made here.

We have no charts of the American seas, and although I suppose they have been ordered, we could not move at present. Apart from this deficient state of matériel, I have the satisfaction of stating that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that we do not have better and more abundant material, better resources, and less hindrances to put this personnel in condition fully to carry out its rôle. I will only add the assurance that whatever may be the contingencies of the future these forces will do their full duty.

Yours, etc.,
CARTAGENA, February 6, 1898.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
Madrid, February 6, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I take advantage of this being Sunday to answer your esteemed letters, beginning with the political situation. This has not changed at all. We are still receiving visits in Cuba from American vessels, always with the assurance on the part of the United States that they are simply visits of courtesy and friendship. If they involve any other design—as, for instance, to exhibit their ships and show their superiority over those stationed in our

¹ I have used this designation as being the official one; but I have never considered these ships battle ships, and I deem it a fatal mistake not to designate ships properly.

colonies—their object is attained. The nucleus of their force is stationed at Dry Tortugas and Key West, under pretext of carrying out naval maneuvers, which are to last until the 1st of April. We shall see what will be the outcome of all this. It troubles me a great deal, and I am trying to concentrate in Spain all the forces we have abroad. What you tell me of the *Vizcaya* is entirely satisfactory to me, and I shall write to Havana all you have stated about this ship, and also as to her departure.

The official report on the voyage of the *Colón* has acquainted me with the work that is being done on her, and I have telegraphed the Captain-General to have the work done at once, aside from the scupper-holes, which you will have made on your own account. General Guillén has probably called on you. His plans can not be decided upon until this office is acquainted with them, for influences are being brought to bear here for the acceptance of the 10-inch guns, which I shall try to prevent, because it would be a second edition of the 9.45-inch guns and mounts of the *Regente*. To-morrow I expect to see a gentleman sent here by Perrone, no doubt for the purpose of discussing these guns, which matter is to be considered by the council of ministers.

I am awaiting the result of the board sent out, and hope that no compromise will be made with Canet. As to the voyage of the *Colón*, I want to thank her commander for his skillful seamanship. You did well not to cause any alarm, since her injuries can be easily repaired and will not prevent the ship from leaving. I should like to comply with your wishes and take the *Alfonso XIII* from you, but we must await her final official trials and find out what this ship is able to do—that is to say, whether she can be considered a cruiser or whether it will be necessary to assign her to special service. From what we know of her I think it will be the latter. Your report as to the lack of officers has been forwarded to the director of personnel with my indorsement. We are very short of officers, especially ensigns; ten have gone out this last six months and six will go out the next six months. These are all the ships fitted out in addition to those still abroad, with much reduced complements.

To your petitions for dues for services, I have answered by telegram that there has been no delay on the part of this ministry, and if any delay has occurred at all, it has been caused by the departamentos in honoring orders of payment without preference of any kind.

Your communication concerning assignments, indorsed by me, is meeting, on the part of the minister of colonies, with the same interest which you manifest.

The subject of the exchange of Philippine drafts has given me a good deal of trouble, their money being worth only 50 per cent. But in spite of the time elapsed, this transaction has not been reduced to a normal basis. You are well aware that this central department has no funds of any kind, nor any branch of the administration, to meet these

expenses. Consequently the minister of colonies must advance it, to be reimbursed by the tariff on the colony, since we have no colony fund, such as exists in the army, taking as a basis the funds of the regiments and military institutions.

I believe I have overlooked nothing referred to in your letters.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, February 8, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The engineer from *Creusot* has arrived. He tells me that the first guns will be ready in June, and as it is my belief that they never keep their promise, it will surely be later than that and this solution does not appear acceptable to me. Are there no other guns that could be used? If so, it would be better, and if not, the Armstrong guns, although they are not as good as might be desired. The dynamo of the *Colón* can be fixed here; but as the injury is in the coil, and we have no spare one, I beg that you will ask for another coil.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
Madrid, February 8, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I telegraphed you to-day to have the *Oquendo* ready as soon as possible, as she is to perform the same mission as the *Vizcaya* in the Gulf of Mexico, conformable to the council of ministers, as the result of the opinion of the Governor-General of Cuba, transmitted in a cipher cable from Manterola. This will be the last detachment of ships from your squadron, for if it were necessary to send away any more, you would go with the *Maria Teresa* and some others of the ships that are now abroad and are to be incorporated with the fleet. For the present we can count only on the *Colón* and *Alfonso XIII*, although the latter is still under trials; but I hope your flag will be better represented in the future. I have given orders for the training school to be transferred to the *Navarra*, and you will transfer the second commander to any ship as you may think best, because the ships that visit Cuban ports do so simply under the representation of their commanders.

The division of destroyers and torpedo boats will assemble at Cadiz, and will proceed to Cuba under the protection of the *Ciudad de Cadiz*. Upon the arrival of the destroyers that are still in England, they will be incorporated in the squadron. As to the *Colón*, I have an Italian committee here, but shall decide nothing until I know the result of the

junta over which you preside. If they have any reasonable and equitable proposition to make I shall advise you immediately. I have told them positively that guns Nos. 325 and 313 can not be accepted. I have received your confidential letter, but I do not quite share your pessimistic views as to the 5.5-inch guns, for the guaranty of Colonel Sánchez and the firing trials held on board the *Vizcaya* have demonstrated that our fear concerning them was greatly exaggerated, and with the new cartridge cases I hope it will be dissipated entirely. There will be 2,000 tons of coal left at Cartagena, in addition to the coal ordered yesterday.

As to the other matters you referred to, I will do what I possibly can to remedy them. I should like to write more fully, but you will understand that I have not a moment's time, with so many problems to solve and so many vessels abroad that I want to bring back to Spain.

I believe the Americans will reinforce their European station, although in my opinion their tendency will be rather toward the Canaries.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, *February 9, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I received yesterday your letters of the 6th and 7th and your cipher telegram instructing me to get the *Oquendo* ready to be commissioned. As soon as I received the telegram I sent one to my adjutants to hurry matters at the arsenal, and the commissary of the fleet to buy the provisions, for as these can be had right here I did not want to get them until the last hour, and without having recourse to the departamento, for fear of the everlasting roundabout way which delays everything. I hope, when the instructions arrive, she will be in condition to have her fires lighted, if such should be the order, and day after to-morrow she will be able to go out. But if she is to leave the squadron, as would appear from the telegram giving the order to transfer the gunnery training school to the *Navarra*, she must be supplied with money, for you know how little these ships have left.

I shall wait for instructions and act in accordance therewith, in the meantime using my best efforts to do what may be necessary, or telegraphing to you in case my efforts should be futile. I am very grateful to you for keeping me posted as to the political situation, which is very critical indeed and troubles us all a great deal, owing to the lack of means for opposing the United States in war. This is certainly no time for lamentations, and therefore I will say nothing of the many things that are in my mind, as I know them to be in yours. I thank you very much for expressing satisfaction about what I have said relative to the *Vizcaya* and for writing to Havana so that she may be kept in as good condition as she leaves here. My departure is not quite what the news-

papers made it out to be, although this time they have not changed the essence of the few words I said to them.

The boats of the *Colón* are to be ready to-day. I note what you tell me about the heavy artillery of the *Colón*, and your instructions will be carried out. It is very much to be regretted that there is always so much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so much of it now regarding the acceptance of the 9.6-inch guns, for, if we finally take them, it will seem as though we are yielding to certain disagreeable impositions, and if things should come to the worst—and you are better able to judge of this than I—it seems to me we should accept, as the proverb says, “hard bread rather than none;” and if we have no other guns, and these can fire even 25 or 30 shots, we should take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient, and we should lose no time about it, in order that the vessel may be armed and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible.

I neglected to tell you that the *Oquendo* has only a little over 700 tons of coal, because there is no more to be had here. I received a telegram from Moret relative to the assignments, and I beg that you will not drop this matter. As to the provisions, we shall do what you ordered in your letter of the 7th. I believe I have forgotten nothing of interest.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February 11, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Soon after dispatching my two cipher telegrams to you yesterday, relative to the 5.5-inch guns of these ships and the heavy guns of the *Colón*, I received your letters of the 8th and 9th, which I now answer, giving you at the same time whatever news there is since yesterday. The *Oquendo* is ready to go out, except as to some things which are lacking, and which she will have to go without. To give orders to light the fires I am only waiting for an answer from you to the telegram which I sent you last night, asking whether she is to receive the same authorization as the *Vizcaya*, and the same amount of money as delivered to the latter vessel, for the *Vizcaya* carried £6,000 and the February pay, and surely there are not funds enough at this departamento to enable the *Oquendo* to leave under the same conditions as the *Vizcaya*.

As soon as I finish this letter I shall go ashore and look after this very interesting matter. If we are to take the *Alfonso*, although she is of slow speed, it will be necessary to supply her with officers and many things that I have had to take from her, owing to the scarcity of everything here, in order to make her as useful as possible. The gunnery training school has been transferred to the *Navarra*. The second commander is on board the *Colón*. The telegram I sent you yesterday, relative to the heavy artillery of the latter ship, is the result of my conference with Guillén. The junta will meet to-day, and I will at

once notify you of the result of the session, but I believe it will not differ essentially from my telegram of yesterday.

Guns numbers 325 and 313 are bad and should under ordinary circumstances be rejected; there is no doubt of it; but if the necessity is really urgent and we have no others, there seems to be no remedy, except either to compel the firm to change them, or, if that is not possible, to take them, bad as they are. Yesterday the engineer of the Creusot people said that the first two 9.45-inch guns would not be ready until the latter part of June, if they are to be delivered as planned, but if they are to have trunnion hoops it will take longer. After they have been delivered they will have to be tried at the Polygon proving ground, transported to the harbor and mounted. When will all this work be finished? It is safe to say that it will not be before September, and that prospect seems worse than to take the guns they offer us.

Guillén went to see whether 7.87-inch guns could be mounted on board, and found that it was impossible with the present turrets, and so it seems there is no other remedy but to submit to the inevitable law of necessity and make the best of it. We can either have them exchanged for better ones later on, or we will pay less for them, or we can simply rent them. If we do not accept a solution of the problem in that direction, we will have to make up our minds that it will be six or eight months at least before the ship can be ready. As long as we use the 5.5-inch guns with the present extractors they seem to me utterly worthless, even more so than the guns of the *Colón*; and this is not pessimism, but sad reality. But I use with regard to them the same argument as with regard to the *Colón* guns. If we have no others, we must use these and fight with them, if the case should arise; but it would be very much better if it did not arise.

Guns numbers 20 and 28 of this ship, which Guillén says are completely useless, can be changed at once; that would be choosing the lesser of two evils. And when the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* return, the guns that Guillén may point out in those ships can be exchanged; I believe there are four of them, not six, as my telegram said yesterday. This, and the new cartridge cases, is the best we can do for the present; but as they are makeshifts, made necessary by the circumstances of the moment, they must be done away with eventually, as has long been the wish of all who have had anything to do with this vital matter. We must take to heart the lesson we are experiencing now, and not expose ourselves to another. You know that better than I do, as you have had more to do with these matters, and for a longer time than I.

I always bear in mind what the press is in this country, and you will have noticed that I avoid in my telegrams the use of phrases which might cause alarm or stir up passion. With these private letters and confidential communications it is quite different, and I believe that I owe you my frank opinion, without beating about the bush.

May God help us out of these perplexities.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, February 12, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The *Oquendo* is ready and will go out this afternoon, after exchanging the large bills she has received for smaller ones or silver. She takes with her a little more than the 10,000 pesetas mentioned in your telegram, not only because she would actually not have enough, but also in order to obviate the contrast in comparison with the *Vizcaya*, which carried 150,000 pesetas in gold. She lacks spare gear, and I have authorized her to buy the most indispensable things in the Canaries, provided she can get them there. The lack of everything at this arsenal is quite incomprehensible.

I am very anxious for this ship as well as the *Vizcaya* to complete their voyages and be incorporated with the fleet, either at Havana or in Spain, without running into the mouth of the wolf. I can not help thinking of a possible war with the United States, and I believe it would be expedient if I were given all possible information on the following points:

1. The distribution and movements of the United States ships.
2. Where are their bases of supplies?
3. Charts, plans, and routes of what may become the scene of operations.
4. What will be the objective of the operations of this squadron—the defense of the Peninsula and Balearic islands, that of the Canaries or Cuba, or, finally, could their objective be the coasts of the United States, which would seem possible only if we had some powerful ally?
5. What plans of campaign does the Government have in either event? I should like also to know the points where the squadron will find some resources and the nature of these; for, strange to say, here, for instance, we have not even found 4-inch rope, nor boiler tubes, nor other things equally simple. It would also be well for me to know when the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* may be expected to be ready, and whether they will be incorporated with the squadron or form an independent division, and in that event what will be its connection with ours? If I had information on these matters I could go ahead and study and see what is best to be done, and if the critical day should arrive we could enter without vacillations upon the course we are to follow. This is the more needful for us, as their squadron is three or four times as strong as ours, and besides they count on the alliance of the insurgents in Cuba, which will put them in possession of the splendid Cuban harbors, with the exception of Havana and one or two others, perhaps. The best thing would be to avoid the war at any price; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to put an end to the present situation, because this nervous strain can not be borne much longer.

By this time you have probably received the telegram I sent you regarding the heavy artillery of the *Colón*, and I have nothing to add to the report which goes by this mail. To-day Guillén and I will look

into the matter of the 5.5-inch guns of these ships. There are not six useless ones, as I said in my telegram and as Guillén had told me, nor four, as I said in my letter yesterday, but five, two of them on board this ship, which can at once be exchanged for guns from the *Princesa*. I have talked with Guillén about the frequent injuries to the 2.24-inch Nordenfelt mounts, and it seems to me that it would perhaps be well to substitute for these mounts some of the old type, provided the conditions of resistance of the decks of these ships will admit of it.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

{Confidential—Private.}

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

Madrid, February 15, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I will answer your esteemed letters, in which you express your opinions with a sincerity and good will for which I am truly grateful to you. Last night a meeting was held of the council of ministers to discuss the serious Dupuy de Lome matter. With the acceptance of his resignation (without the usual formula, "Pleased with the zeal," etc.), and with some explanations, this unpleasant incident will be disposed of satisfactorily.

The Colón.—I have received the report of the Junta, which expresses itself in favor of mounting at once on the *Colón* 9.92-inch A. guns. Numbers 325 and 313 can not be accepted; to do so, even temporarily, would cause trouble, as the opinion on this question is final, and if it were carried to the Cortes, through the excitement of the press, it would place us in a very unfavorable position. I believe it could be solved promptly by the delivery of two guns by the Ansaldo Company, with whom alone we will have to settle this matter, and this can be done by dint of tact and energy, a combination which is absolutely necessary in order to obtain satisfaction under our contract.

In my interview with the Italian ambassador, in which he explained the difficulties in which the Italian Government would be placed before the Chambers if we were to refuse guns of the type which they have accepted, I said to him: "It will not be difficult for me to prove to you by technical data that the guns which are offered to us are not acceptable. But the Italian navy, through the Ansaldo Company, can easily propose two other guns which, after having been tried according to our practice and found satisfactory, would be accepted." Through different channels I know that this question will soon be solved to our satisfaction—the 5.5-inch guns. I understand the defect of the extractors and realize how it affects the rapid fire. This defect can not be remedied for the present. You ordered some made by hand, and this step was approved.

The two guns of the *Maria Teresa* will be changed, and as to the new

cartridge cases, I have very specially impressed this matter upon Faura, who has gone to England. The decks of cards asked for are on the way. Bustamante torpedoes will be furnished as far as possible, for I have to bear in mind the Philippines and Cabrera Island. As to the squadron, I want to get it away from the departamento, but that is difficult just at present until we see what is decided as to the *Colón*; for it seems to me that the rear-admiral's flag should not show itself with less than three ships. The *Carlos V* and *Pelayo* are to join the squadron; when that is done, your force will be as large as is at present within our power to make it.

As to the war with the United States, I will tell you my ideas about it. A division composed of the *Numancia*, *Vitoria*, *Alfonso XIII* (or *Lepanto*), the destroyers *Audaz*, *Osado*, and *Proserpina*, and three torpedo boats would remain in Spain in the vicinity of Cadiz. In Cuba the *Carlos V*, *Pelayo*, *Colón*, *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, *Maria Teresa*, three destroyers, and three torpedo boats, in conjunction with the eight larger vessels of the Havana Navy-Yard, would take up a position to cover the channels between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic and try to destroy Key West, where the United States squadron has established its principal base of provisions, ammunition, and coal.

If we succeed in this, and the season is favorable, the blockade could be extended to the Atlantic coast, so as to cut off communications and commerce with Europe—all this subject to the contingencies which may arise from your becoming engaged in battles in which it will be decided who is to hold empire of the sea. For your guidance in these matters, you are acquainted with the preliminary plans of the staff of this ministry, which I placed at your disposal, including the attack upon Key West. I will advise you as to the location of the United States ships and other data for which you ask.

I will also inform you that twelve or fifteen steamers will be equipped as auxiliaries to our fleet, independent of privateering, and in confidence I will tell you that if any ship of real power can be found, either cruiser or battle ship, we shall buy it, provided it can be ready by April. My life is getting to be a burden, for to all that is already weighing upon me under the circumstances are now added the elections and candidates for representatives.

I believe, my dear Admiral, that all the energy and all the good will of those who are wearing uniforms can do but very little toward preparing for the events which may happen.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, *February 16, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I received your favor of yesterday, which I hasten to answer, leaving my letter open until to-morrow in case there should be anything new by that time. To the grave

Dupuy de Lome affair is added the news of the explosion of the *Maine*, which has just been reported to me, and I am constantly thinking of the *Vizcaya*, which should have arrived in New York to-day. God grant that no attempt is made against her.

I shall be very glad if the matter of the armament of the *Colón* can be settled satisfactorily. The letter from Perrone Hijo which I sent you may have contributed to this. As Guillén is going to Madrid, I will say nothing to you concerning the 5.5-inch guns. I shall be very glad if the two of this ship are changed. I do not know when the *Pelayo* and the *Carlos V* will be able to join the fleet, but I suspect that they will not arrive in time. Of the former I know nothing at all, but I have received some news concerning the latter and certainly not very satisfactory as regards the time it will take for her to be ready.

It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United States. In the Cadiz division I believe the *Numancia* will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the *Lepanto*. Of the *Carlos V* and the *Pelayo* I have already spoken. The *Colón* has not yet received her artillery, and if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns.

The eight principal vessels of the Havana station, to which you refer, have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn-out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost us very dear. Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that with this force, attenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against that country will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may be turned.

As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids with our fast vessels, in order to do them as much harm as possible. It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, but I think it proper to analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments.

I will leave this painful subject and wait until to-morrow.

The 17th.—Nothing has happened since yesterday and I will trouble you no further. The explosion of the *Maine* seems to have occurred under circumstances which leave no doubts of its being due to the vessel herself; nevertheless, I fear this may cause new complications and a painful position for the *Vizcaya*, which God forbid.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

Madrid, February 23, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Pardon me for not answering your letters before. In spite of the *Maine* catastrophe—at least, so far—and in spite of the pessimistic tenor of some newspapers, our relations with the United States have in no manner changed. Eulate, who had to be given new instructions so that he might judiciously shorten his stay in New York, and use every manner of precautions, especially in coaling, has conducted himself with rare tact and refused to attend any festivities, alleging as an excuse that he considers himself in mourning. But as usual there are other things that worry me. Sobral, whom I have telegraphed to come home immediately, is making unfavorable statements on the organization and discipline of the United States Navy in his interviews with reporters of United States newspapers, and remonstrances are beginning to arrive.

How anxious some people are, my dear Admiral, to make themselves conspicuous and talk. It never occurs to military and naval attachés at Madrid to have these interviews with reporters, and express their opinions. Just think how this country would rise up in arms if the United States attaché should say that there was no discipline or organization in our navy, or things on that order. As to your squadron, instructions have been sent to Cadiz for the delivery of the three 5.5-inch guns, and I am in receipt of advices from London that the first installment of cartridge cases will shortly be forwarded to Cadiz.

As for the two guns of the *Colón*, Ansaldo has been notified that Nos. 325 and 313 are not acceptable, and that he must, within a very short time, submit two others for trial. He tells me that the Italian navy is very kindly disposed toward us; so I am hoping for a favorable solution. However, you are aware that I am not a partisan of guns of that caliber. I think their military value is imaginary rather than real. Moreover, I have an idea that they might affect the stability of the *Colón*. In my opinion the most desirable solution would be to take 7.87-inch guns instead, as I believe that there is great military value in medium-caliber guns, owing to their rapidity of fire. Monstrous guns and torpedoes are terrible weapons, but only on special occasions.

You will receive a less number of torpedoes than you asked for, because I have to bear in mind Cabrera Island and the Philippines. In reply to your questions relative to studies on the war with the United States, I have sent you information on the location of their ships in commission, bases of supplies, coaling stations, etc. They really only have Key West; the others are at San Luis (Atlantic), and at their navy-yards on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. Their ships, as far as the draft is concerned, are calculated for banks extending a long distance into the sea, as at New Orleans, for instance

You will realize what my situation is. I am working as hard as I can to assemble in Spain all the elements of power we have abroad. I am also trying to develop our forces, especially as to speed. As I have told you before, my idea, though perhaps somewhat optimistic, is to establish two centers of resistance, one in Cuba, the other in the peninsula; and by the end of April our position will probably have changed. We shall have to be very careful, and if possible avoid until then any conflict with the United States; but we have to reckon with the excitable nature of our nation and the evil of a press which it is impossible to control.

I should like to make dispositions relative to your ships, but the *Teresa* is waiting for the 5.5-inch guns, and the *Colón* for a solution of the question as to her 9.84 inch armament. The *Alfonso XIII*, although probably not permanently under your orders, must be included for the present while her trials are going on. When you consider the *Colón* ready for target practice let me know, and orders will be issued for her to go to Santa Pola. I will close this letter and see what I can do toward procuring funds for getting those ships ready—in this poor country which has to send 16,000,000 pesos to Cuba every month.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

I am also looking after provisions, coal, and extra guns.

[Confidential.]

HONORED SIR: His excellency the chief of staff of the ministry sent me, with the confidential letter of the 19th instant, two reports and two statements relative to studies made with a view to a possible war with the United States. A careful examination of these documents, followed by profound reflection, has suggested to me the following considerations, which I respectfully submit to your excellency:

If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern vessels capable of active service, taking the data in reference to the Americans as published in the December number of the *Revista General de Marina* and in our general statistics of the navy, we find that the United States have the battle ships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*; the armored cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*; the protected cruisers *Atlanta*, *Minneapolis*, *Baltimore*, *Charleston*, *Chicago*, *Cincinnati*, *Columbia*, *Newark*, *San Francisco*, *Olympia*, *Philadelphia*, and *Raleigh*, and the rapid unprotected cruisers *Detroit*, *Marblehead*, and *Montgomery*. Against this we have, following the same classification, the battleships *Pelayo*, *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo*, armored cruiser *Colón*, and protected cruisers *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and *Lepanto*; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, and *Lepanto* to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the *Alfonso XIII*.

I do not mention the other vessels on account of their small military value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still in service, the ram *Katahdin*, the *Vesuvius*, and the torpedo boats and destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate enough. Comparing the displacements, we find that in battle ships the United States has 41,589 tons, against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471

tons, against our 6,840; in protected cruisers, 51,098, against 18,887; and in fact unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we have none.

The total vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons, against our 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half. In speed our battleships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is superior to ours. Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the pieces of less than 7.87 inch are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of the calibers 12.6, 11.8, 11, 9.84, 7.87, 6.3, 5.9, 5.5, 4.7, 3.94, 2.95, 2.24, 1.65, and 1.45 inches be represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1, which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in inches $\left(\frac{\text{caliber in inches}^3}{100}\right)$, we find that the artillery power of the American battle ships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29,449; that of the American armored cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (*Colón*) by 6,573; that of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected cruisers by 12,300.

Therefore, according to these figures the offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V*, which probably will not be ready in time; the *Lepanto*, which surely will not be ready, and the *Alfonso XII*, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.

Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we can not. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all that we may need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources.

This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his excellency the chief of staff has been kind enough to send me. These two reports constitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the operations considered, but the principal foundation is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity to their undertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to me, at any rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at least equal to those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attainment of such control.

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use it as a base for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become formidable.

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations

for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for we have but one motto: "The fulfillment of duty."

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February 25, 1898.*

His Excellency the MINISTER OF MARINE.

CARTAGENA, *February 25, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your favor of the 23d and will answer your questions. I am very glad to know that our relations with the United States have not changed, for I believe a rupture would mean a terrible catastrophe for poor Spain, who has done all she can and is by no means ready for such a blow, which would surely be fatal. The reports and statistics forwarded to me by the staff of the ministry have suggested to me certain considerations, which I shall send to-morrow or the day after, also officially, the same as I received the reports that suggested them.

We must not indulge in any illusions relative to our situation, although we are ready and willing to bear whatever trials God may be pleased to send us. It is one thing to meet with energy and manliness whatever may befall us, and another thing to indulge in illusions as to the results to be expected. Eulate's conduct has afforded me much pleasure, and I have written to him at Havana, congratulating him. Sobral is disgusting. I can hardly believe that he could have been guilty of such indiscretion; I should rather believe that our numerous crafty enemies have invented all that.

According to a letter received from Cadiz the 5.5-inch guns need a slight alteration in order to be installed in the mounts of this ship, and it would perhaps be easier to have that done at Cadiz. It is very important that the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases should arrive and be charged, to replace those we now have. I am glad the *Colón* is almost ready. I believe you are right; the ship would be worth more with four 7.87-inch guns than with two 9.81-inch, which are about equivalent in weight; but as she is built for the latter it can not be helped. I have received the royal order regarding the torpedoes, but the torpedoes themselves have not yet arrived.

I realize how hard you must be working and how many disagreeable things you have to contend with and as we all have who love our country. I believe you are really optimistic in your views about a rupture with the United States. You think that if we can hold off until April our relative positions will be considerably changed. I believe that is an illusion, for, from what I know, it is my opinion that the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V* will not be ready by that time, and at the rate we are now progressing it is very doubtful whether the *Colón* will be.

Nor will the *Lepanto* be ready, and the *Alfonso XIII* will never be anything more than she is now. The *Vitoria* may perhaps be ready for service, but the *Numancia* will not be. The *Colón* can go out for target practice whenever it may be desirable.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February 26, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: When I received yesterday, the letter in which, among other things, you asked me if the *Colón* could go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was ready, and at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which might be used in that practice should be recharged, but it appears that there is no furnace in which they can be reannealed, nor a machine to re-form the cartridge cases. The extra charges which the vessel brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless.

To obviate this, two ways are open, one a slow one, which is to bring the appliances that are lacking and to construct a furnace in which to recharge the cartridge cases; and the other, a rapid one, which is to purchase cartridge cases for the charges on hand, and this could be done at once, as the manufacturers have some on hand which they would let us have. Moreu has asked them and they answered that they had, and gave the prices, but those were unintelligible. For this reason I telegraphed you suggesting the purchase of the cartridge cases comprising 720 5.9 inch and 432 4.7 inch. I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed afflicting, but can we afford to cherish illusions?

Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the Queen and by the whole council of ministers.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
Madrid, February 28, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your confidential communication and letter, both on the same subject. I want

to wait till I have somewhat recovered from the painful impression caused by the reading of your letters before answering them. As to the cartridge cases of the *Colón*, I am trying to find the means I lack for solving the question you suggest.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, *March 3, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your letter of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful impression caused by my remarks; but I am not surprised, because they are truly sad, and still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one sees. In your very letter we have another proof of this in the fact that the difficulty of obtaining cartridge cases for the *Colón* arises from the want of means (money), and this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against the richest nation in the world. The question is to recharge the old cases. This was asked for relative to some empty 5.5-inch cases which it was ascertained are in this departamento, and the answer is that they can not be recharged here.

I do not wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result could be obtained. But every detail points out either our lack of means or our defective organization, and, above all, our utter lack of preparation. I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities—that is, to you and to the whole Government through you—clearly and without beating around the bush. Now, let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private and confidential.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

Madrid, March 4, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I notified you that, when I should have recovered somewhat from the painful impression caused by the reading of your confidential letter, I should answer it, and I now do so, and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, omitting some of our vessels at Havana, which are available for a conflict with the United States, show a difference of tonnage, but not so excessive as would appear from your lines.

In my opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of the present distribution of the United States forces, remembering that it will be to their interest to maintain the ships now in the Pacific for the protection of San Francisco and the San Diego arsenal, as also

their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city and Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about to be annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are being maintained there.

With your good judgment you will understand that the long and difficult voyage which these forces, among them the *Oregon*, would have to make in order to join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region unprotected, could not be effected without the knowledge of others, and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lacking. I must therefore refer you to the inclosed statement. While it shows deficiencies, which the Government is endeavoring to remedy at any cost by the acquisition of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist to such an extent as stated in comparison with the United States Atlantic Squadron. There is no doubt that, in order to concentrate our nucleus of forces, we shall require some time—the whole month of April, in my estimation.

Since I have been in charge of this department His Majesty's Government has known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval forces, which are being remodeled or repaired abroad, and in conformity with such knowledge the Government has endeavored, and is endeavoring by every possible means, with a view also to the general interests of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United States a policy of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which were not easy of solution.

But with your good judgment you will understand, and I want therefore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba. Our flag is still flying there, and the Government, to meet the sentiments of the people, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that this Spanish colony should not be separated from our territory, and is trying by every possible means—political, international, and military—to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is the prevailing opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. As already stated, the Government is acquainted with our situation, and for that reason is endeavoring to collect all possible resources at Havana harbor, fortifying it so that it may serve as a base for our naval forces, equipping it with a dock, already in operation, where our ships will be able to repair slight damages, for it is my opinion that it will not be possible, either on our side or the enemy's, to repair those injuries which may be caused by the action of a battle in the short period of time in which international military campaigns are enacted, compared with the material interests they affect.

The other harbors of the island, such as Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. In your estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous troops, well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews of mercenaries (mercenarias), and you might find historical facts, evok-

ing sad memories for us, to confirm what I say. I will close, never doubting for one moment that you and all of us will fulfill the sacred duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you my opinions in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

North Atlantic Squadron—Possible formation.

United States.	Tons.	Spain.	Tons.
New York	8,200	Vizcaya	7,000
Indiana	10,288	Pelayo	9,900
Massachusetts	10,288	Carlos V	9,250
Texas	6,315	Maria Teresa	7,000
Brooklyn	9,271	Oquendo	7,000
Iowa	11,410	Colón	6,800
Montgomery	2,000	Alfonso XIII	4,826
Marblehead	2,000	M. Ensenada	1,064
Detroit	2,094	Alfonso XII	3,900
Nashville	1,071	Venadito	1,189
Terror	3,600	Reina Mercedes	3,900
Yorktown, dispatch boat		Infanta Isabel	1,189
Total tonnage	66,537	Total tonnage	α 62,818
Five torpedo boats; average speed, 21 knots.		Three destroyers and three torpedo boats; average speed, 25 knots.	

α 62,018.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

March 5, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of a telegram from Ansaldo, in which he says: "We yesterday repeated our request to Messrs. Armstrong, of Elswick. They telegraphed would order ammunition for guns by letter, which we shall communicate to you. The constructing firm uses great diligence, but can not furnish cartridge cases before August. We make another request of the Italian navy.—G. Ansaldo."

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

[Confidential.]

CARTAGENA, March 7, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your personal letter of the 4th, to which I am about to reply, but you must first permit me to give you a general idea of our situation as I see it. That it is the intention of the United States to engage us in a war appears beyond all doubt, and it therefore becomes more important each day to

examine into the advantages and disadvantages which such a war may have for us.

Inspired by these ideas, I deemed it my duty as a patriot to reply to the official communication through which I was advised of the distribution of the American vessels and the condition of certain points on the United States coasts, and I did so in my confidential letter of February 25 last. To-day, feeling at liberty to express my ideas more freely in a confidential letter, I will reply to your communication.

An examination of our forces, based upon what I already knew and upon recent information and observation, not only confirms what I said, but shows it to be still worse. I have visited the *Vitoria*, on which I counted, and from my examination of her I have drawn the conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflict. Neither does my information permit me to count on the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, nor *Numancia*.¹ And yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal observation, I include them in the inclosed statement, solely because you have included them in yours.

Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict—either war, negotiations direct or through a third party, an arbitrator, or otherwise—the longer the decision is delayed the worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our position can not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions.

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island in the worst possible manner. But even supposing an improbability—that is, that we should obtain a victory—that would not change the final result of the campaign. The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the ultimate result would always be a disaster.

Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to discount the high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become

¹ This prediction was actually fulfilled, since, after the signing of the peace protocol, it was necessary to send the *Pelayo* back to La Seyne to be completed, and even before the signing the 3.94-inch guns of the *Carlos V* had to be dismantled. The *Numancia* is in the arsenal at Lá Carraca receiving her artillery, and it can not be said when this will be ready. None of these vessels, therefore, were ready at the declaration of war.

graver than it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in comparison with the last. Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here the problem, already pointed out by somebody, arises, Is the island worth the ruin of Spain? (Silvela, in Burgos.)

I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of the character of modern vessels. Although I do not attach much importance to certain details which can have but little influence on the general events, I shall nevertheless speak of some upon which you touch, in order to set forth my point of view in answering your letter. The accompanying statement, which appears to me to be more correct than the one inclosed with your letter, shows that our forces in the Atlantic are, approximately, one-half of those of the United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery power.

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resistance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation will change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, the *Vitoria*, nor the *Numancia* will be ready, and nobody knows how we will be as regards 5.5 inch ammunition.

It seems sure that by the end of April the 10-inch guns of the *Colón* will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of those of the Americans in tonnage and 47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority would be in torpedo boats and destroyers provided all of them arrive there in good order. I do not know exactly what are the sentiments of the people concerning Cuba, but I am inclined to believe that the immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the continuation of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which is not for me to analyze.

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went overboard while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an old ridge rope. A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it has not yet been replaced. More than one official letter has been written on this interesting subject. In times past, forty-three days after the *Hernán Cortés* was laid down, the vessel was at sea. It is now fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers

of a steam launch of the *Teresa*, and I do not yet know when it will be finished. This will probably be the proportion between us and the United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having the Havana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all.

As for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the same way. I beg that you will not consider this an argument against yours, for that would be accusing me of great presumption in speaking of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs to me. These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express them to you with the request that you will transmit them to the Government. If you should deem it advisable for me to express them personally, I am ready to do so at the first intimation. After I have done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite ready to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.—COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES FLEET.

Vessels more or less protected now composing the squadron, or unprotected, but with a speed of over 15 knots.

Spain.			United States.		
	Displacement.	Armament.		Displacement.	Armament.
<i>Vizcaya</i>	7,000	6,130	New York	8,200	6,400
<i>Oquendo</i>	7,000	6,130	Indiana	10,288	9,304
<i>M. de la Ensenada</i>	1,064	1,100	Massachusetts	10,288	9,304
			Texas	6,315	4,550
	15,064	13,360	Brooklyn	9,271	7,880
	23 per cent.	23 per cent.	Iowa	11,410	8,360
			Montgomery	2,089	4,100
			Marblehead	2,089	4,100
			Detroit	2,089	4,100
			Terror	3,600	2,896
				65,639	60,994
To these may be positively added:			Minneapolis	7,375	4,790
<i>Infanta Maria Teresa</i>	7,000	6,130	Columbia	7,375	4,790
<i>Cristóbal Colón</i>	6,840	6,490		14,750	9,580
<i>Alfonso XIII</i>	4,826	4,340			
	18,666	18,960	Atlanta	3,000	4,270
Doubtful additions:			Charleston	3,730	4,570
<i>Pelayo</i>	9,917	6,987	Chicago	4,500	4,470
<i>Carlos V</i>	9,250	5,620	Newark	4,098	6,740
	19,167	12,607	Philadelphia	4,324	7,640
			Dolphin	1,485	700
			Yorktown	1,703	3,320
				22,840	31,710

a Without the 9.84-inch guns, the value of which is represented by 1,248.

In the South Atlantic they have the *Cincinnati*, 3,200 displacement; 4,795 armament.

All the other vessels have very little military value, with the exception of the torpedo boats and destroyers, not mentioned in this statement, and also the *Katahdin* and *Vesuvius*.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
Madrid, March 13, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I take advantage of this being Sunday to write to you in answer to your confidential lines on our respective opinions relative to the events which may develop in Cuba, if it should come to the worst. I have informed the Government of our deficiencies, and I repeat to you what I have said before, namely, that the Government will act prudently in order to maintain friendly relations with the United States, and try by every means to ward off any conflict, since the opinion as to our unfavorable situation is unanimous.

I will now speak of matters relative to your squadron and the reinforcement which it may receive. I have a telegram from Ansaldo, saying that the question of the 9.84-inch armament of the *Colón* will be solved this month, by means of two new guns at Spezia. He also tells me that he has applied to the Italian navy for 5.9 and 4.7 inch cartridge cases. The first installment of 5.5-inch cartridge cases is now on its way to Cadiz, and others will soon follow.

By letters from Ferrándiz I am advised that the engines will be tried by the 15th, and that the ship will be ready to go out by the beginning of April. The *Carlos V*, I am told, will also be ready by the middle of that month.

What the newspapers say as to the purchase of ships is true, although I deny it. I do so because it is owing to publicity that the negotiations for the two Brazilian cruisers,¹ which were commenced under favorable auspices, came to naught. My efforts are bent on cruisers, torpedo boats, and even steamers of over 1,000 tons displacement and 20 knots speed to serve as dispatch boats. The squadron is being kept at Cartagena, because it has not been decided what course it is to follow. It will probably go to Cadiz, but the *Colón*, if her armament can be completed, which is to be hoped, will have to go to Genoa, and that will leave only the *Maria Teresa*, *Alfonso XIII*, which has not yet completed her endless trials, and the *Destructor*.

Arrangements have been made to send the testing and recharging machinery to Cartagena.

I will close now. I leave it to you how arduous my work is. To-day, Sunday, which the Lord has set aside as a sacred day of rest, I commenced my work at 8 o'clock in the morning and close it at 9 o'clock at night with these lines.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

¹ The two cruisers referred to are the *Almirante Abreu* and the *Amazonas*, which were purchased by the United States while Spain was negotiating for them. They are now the *New Orleans* and the *Albany*.—O. N. I.

[Confidential.]

CARTAGENA, *March 16, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your favor of the day before, by which I see that our opinions agree concerning the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As both of us are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It also appears that the whole Government participates in this opinion, but I am afraid that there may be some minister who, while believing that we are not in favorable conditions, may have been dazzled by the names of the vessels appearing in the general statement, and may not realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, especially if he is not thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary for a naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, provisions, etc. We have nothing at all.

If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it is of the greatest importance that the whole council of ministers, without exception, be fully and clearly informed of our terrible position, so that there may not remain the least doubt that the war will simply lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightful ruin; for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war, but to find some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is not done, the more time is spent the worse will be the final result, whether it is peace or war.

From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since we can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster, and since we can not treat directly with the United States, whose bad faith is notorious; perhaps there is nothing left for us to do but to settle the dispute through arbitration or mediation, provided the enemy accepts. However, this order of consideration does not come within my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited to reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders of the Government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of the situation. Before dropping this subject to answer the other points of your letter, permit me to repeat what I said in my last communication, and to which no reply has been made in yours.

Perhaps it would be well for me to inform the members of the cabinet myself. If this is deemed expedient I am ready to start at the first intimation. Concerning the available forces and what may be expected of them, I will be very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about the 10-inch guns of the *Colón*. He has disappointed us so many times already. The 5.5-inch cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. You know that this vessel has only 30, and it is to be supposed that the stores of the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* are not better supplied. For the present the firm is supplying only 100 per week, and supposing that the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz in the near future, at this rate we will not have finished until October. Then they

have to be charged, etc.; therefore they can never be ready in time for the present conflict. I thought I would have the first ones by January, and I will not have them until April.

The engines of the *Pelayo* are ready and the vessel can sail, but how about the secondary battery and the armored redoubt? These will not be ready. If the old battery could be mounted temporarily! But I doubt it; the ports will not permit it. I have heard it said that the crew which brought the *Pelayo* was taken from the *Vitoria*, which is another proof of our excessive poverty. I shall be very glad if the *Carlos V* is soon ready, but I understand that the 3.94-inch battery has not yet been mounted, and then the trials are to be made. I never had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels.

Too much fuss is made over every detail by ignorant people. It was through this that we lost the *Garibaldi*, and now we have lost the Brazilian cruisers. In fact, we have only secured the *Colón*, an excellent ship, but which has not yet been equipped, and the *Valdés*. And supposing that we had everything our own way and that Providence should grant us a victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find ourselves in the condition explained in my last and which it is not necessary to repeat. It only rests for me now to be informed of the destination of the fleet.

I believe the *Teresa* ought to be in Cadiz, where the cartridge cases are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all her guns were mounted. Really, if the *Colón* goes to Italy, the admiral's flag will not be very well represented, but this consideration should not be placed above the requirements of the service, and if the dissolution of the fleet should make it advisable I could lower my flag and leave the ship, and hoist it again when the ships now scattered were united again in a body, unless the reunion should be for a few days only. I say this to you to remove all idea of personal considerations, which I have always made subject to the interests of the service. Moreover, the flag is the same here as at Cadiz.

When the English fleet arrived there were three ships in the harbor—the *Navarra*, with the flag of the Captain-General; this ship (*Teresa*), with my flag, and the *Colón*, with that of Paredes. I will trouble you no more; believe me, I regret having troubled you so much, but the voice of my conscience, which, animated by love for my country, tells me that I thus fulfill a high duty, is what impels me to do so in order to aid, in this way also, the old and cherished friend to whose lot it has fallen to bear this heavy cross.

Yours, etc.,

PASQUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, March 19, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: When I received your cipher telegram night before last, I asked for rectification of the name of the ship to be fitted out, but with a strong presentiment that it was the

Colón. I had her enter the dock yesterday morning, and at once commenced coaling, which I hope to complete to-day, although over 500 tons are required to replenish her bunkers. When I received your other cipher telegram this evening, I answered at once, and will now add that this ship (*Maria Teresa*) is already in the dock, and we are about to begin putting in the 180 tons of coal which she needs. The gun that is ready will be mounted in a little while. It is a pity that we do not have the other two; they will not be ready for ten or twelve days.

In the way of 5.5-inch ammunition we carry 78 rounds per gun, but of these only 30 cartridges have been pronounced serviceable by Guillén. I saw Pedro Aguirre yesterday and asked him concerning the ships at Havana. He says that there is but one ship ready, namely, the *Venadito*. I had him repeat this statement several times. He also told me that the dock did not work. If the defects can not be remedied we will have to do something about the *Vizcaya*, as she has not had her bottom cleaned for eight months. As I know nothing further than what your telegrams tell me, I am very much perplexed and do not know what orders to issue relative to the berthing of petty officers. Could you make any suggestions, I should be greatly obliged to you. I presume you have received my letter of the 15th, which I hereby confirm.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
Madrid, March 21, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: You ask me about the commission of the *Colón*. It is as follows: Since it is desirable to shorten the itinerary laid down for the torpedo-boat flotilla there is some idea of having the *Colón* accompany it to Puerto Rico. As this ship can not enter there, she would have to go to St. Thomas for coal and return to Spain to complete her armament. As two captains will take part in this expedition, the second in command of the squadron is to go. I do not know yet whether this will be carried out. As it is possible that she may go to Cadiz when she has finished mounting her guns, she can get her charts there and begin to take on the cartridge cases.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CARTAGENA, *March 27, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Your favor of the 24th was received yesterday. I am ready and waiting for orders to proceed to Cadiz.

As I stated in one of my former letters, I take with me all of the 5.5-inch projectiles which are in this departamento, namely:

Ball cartridges.....	500
Ordinary shells of English manufacture.....	333
Ordinary shells made at Cartagena.....	216
Segmental shells of English manufacture.....	67
Segmental shells made at Cartagena.....	112

Total number of projectiles..... 1,228

The Cadiz Departamento, which I asked on the 21st for a statement of the projectiles on hand, answered that they have: Ball cartridges, 27; ordinary shells, 460; segmental shells, 150; steel shells, 40; total number of projectiles, 677, which, added to those now on board, shipped from this Departamento, namely, 1,228, make a total of 1,905; but as the number of cartridge cases contracted for is, I believe, 4,500, we are short 2,595. Even if we use all the shells that we have, some of which, of English manufacture, are quite defective. Moreover, we should have spare ones for those that are fired. The shell workshop here is not in operation, and if you think well of it, an order might be issued to resume work. I think the *Colón* should have target practice, but at anchor, not under way. It would be worth while to stop a day to that end, or have her go out from Cadiz expressly for that purpose.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

PUERTO REAL, *April 2, 1898.*

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: It seems hardly credible that since my arrival here I have not had time to write to you, as I have been wanting to do. But owing to long distances and many things to be done I have not been able to write. In spite of the heavy weather we arrived safe and sound, and the injuries of the *Colón* were of much less importance than I thought at first. Only a few tubes were disabled, and for that reason I asked you by telegram to procure from Nielausse the 50 tubes which he has ready. I have made requests for the coal and lubricating material, in order that we may always be ready for any emergency. My fears are realized, for the conflict is approaching at a rapid rate, and the *Colón* does not have her heavy guns; the *Carlos V* has not been delivered, and her 3.94-inch armament is not mounted; on the *Pelayo* the redoubt is not completed, and I believe she lacks her secondary battery; the *Vitoria* is without her armament, and of the *Numancia* we had better not speak.

But after all, it is well that the end is coming; the country can not stand this state of affairs any longer, and any arrangement will be good, however bad it may seem, if it can save us from lamenting a great disaster, which we may expect if we go to war with ships half

armed, and only a few of them, and with want of means and excess of incumbrances. I shall take along all the ammunition that is ready, so that these two ships, such as they are, can be counted upon at any moment. The circumstance that the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* are so far away is very unfortunate, because if they are not incorporated soon they may be separated from the squadron.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CADIZ, April 4, 1898.

I believe it very dangerous for torpedo-boat flotilla to continue voyage. As I have no instructions, deem it expedient to go to Madrid to receive them and form plan of campaign. The Canaries trouble me; they are in dangerous situation. If during my absence it should be necessary for squadron to go out, it could do so under second in command.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, April 4, 1898.

Your cipher telegram received. In these moments of international crisis no definite plans can be formulated.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,

April 4, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your telegram and letter. In these moments of an international crisis, while diplomacy is exerting its influence and while a truce is being discussed, and even the situation of the respective naval forces, nothing can be formulated or decided. Next time I shall write you more fully.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

CADIZ, April 6, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In last night's mail I received your letter of the 4th, having previously received your telegram concerning the same matter. It is precisely on account of the general anxiety prevailing that it is very important to think of what is to be done, so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some chance of efficiency and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don Quixote, go out to fight windmills and come back with broken heads. If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States the question would be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar their way.

But as our forces, on the contrary, are very inferior to theirs, it would be the greatest of follies to attempt to bar their way, which could only be done by giving them a decisive naval battle. That would simply mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy of the enemy, who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by establishing there a base of operations crush our commerce and safely bombard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide what we are going to do, and, without disclosing our proposed movements, be in a position to act when the time comes.

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not changed since then. If we are caught without a plan of war, there will be vacillations and doubts, and after defeat there may be some humiliation and shame. You will understand these frank and loyal statements of an old friend and comrade, who desires nothing more than to help the Government and act with circumspection.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).

HAVANA, April 7, 1898.

Public opinion remains dignified and quiet, though somewhat excited by reports of impending war. Some dissatisfaction expressed over lack of ships in island. Those now here not in condition to render service. Detention of flotilla at Cape Verde leaves our coasts unprotected. You know international situation better than I under present circumstances, and will realize expediency of sending ships.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, April 7, 1898.

Squadron must go out to-morrow. Proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Immediately upon arrival take coal and water. Communicate with semaphore Canaries to notify you of anything new. Instructions, which will be amplified, are in substance to protect torpedo-boat flotilla, which is placed under your orders, *Amazonas* and *San Francisco* being in Europe. These are the only American ships there at present.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CADIZ, April 7, 1898.

These battle ships are ready for any duty. Beg that you will permit me to insist on having general plan of campaign to obviate fatal vacillations. No doubt Government has formed its plan; I must know it without fail if I am to cooperate with it intelligently.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CADIZ, April 7, 1898.

Will leave to-morrow evening for Cape Verde, where torpedo-boat flotilla is placed under my orders. Not knowing plan of government, and not having been told what to do next, I shall await instructions, protecting the Canaries.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, April 7, 1898.

Hurry of departure prevents for the moment making you acquainted with plan you ask for, but you will receive it in detail a few days after arrival at Cape Verde, as steamer loaded with coal is following in your wake.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CADIZ, April 8, 1898.

Your cipher telegram of yesterday received. Shall await instructions at Cape Verde.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CADIZ, April 8, 1898.

It is 5 o'clock p. m., and I am about to leave with *Teresa* and *Colón*.

CADIZ, April 8, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have received all your telegrams. The ships are ready and I expect to go out this evening. I have just sent the paymaster to San Fernando for the money, as the Captain-General advises me that it has been received there. At Cape Verde I shall await the instructions which you are to send me. The reproduction of the cipher telegram differs in one word; it says that the instructions *se ampliarán* (will be amplified), while the first telegram received said *se emplearán* (will be used). That is the reason why I indicated my idea of protecting the Canaries, and now, as previously stated, I shall wait.

I regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon some plan, even on general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see that the Government persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Canaries and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago.

I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to defend itself with its present means perhaps it would give the Americans some annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves concerning the strength of our fleet. If you will look over our correspondence of the last two months you will see, not that I have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not have any illusions as to what we can do which will be in proportion to the means available. Without troubling you any further,

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

[Private.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
Madrid, April 7, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: We are in the midst of a serious international crisis. While I have not yet lost all hope of a peaceable solution, it being the wish of the Government to avoid war at any cost, we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the influence of foreign powers; but the President of the United States is surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is now trying to appease. It devolves upon you as the Admiral of the squadron, and owing to the prestige which you are enjoying in the navy—or God himself has singled you out for that purpose—to carry out the plans which will be formulated and intrusted to your intelligence and valor.

I believe that I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as it was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had the necessary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, my conscience is entirely clear. In the instructions which you will receive a general idea is outlined, which you will work out with your captains. I will close, begging that you will express my regards to the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which His Majesty and the Government place in your high ability.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED AT THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

The Minister of Marine (Bermejo) to the Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera).

[Confidential.]

HONORED SIR: Although up to date the friendly relations existing between Spain and the United States of North America have not changed, yet, in anticipation of possible complications, and in view of the probable presence in European waters of the United States cruisers *San Francisco* and *Amazonas*, it becomes necessary to protect the first torpedo-boat division, which has recently reached the Cape Verde Islands, whether it be deemed expedient for such division to proceed to the West Indies, or whether it be necessary for it to return to the Canaries.

Immediately upon receipt of this order you will therefore proceed with the flagship and the *Cristóbal Colón* to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, where the division referred to is to join your fleet and remain for the present under your orders, together with the trans-Atlantic steamer *Ciudad de Cadiz*, which accompanies it. At St. Vincent you will await instructions, which will be forwarded in good season, and if the exigencies of the service should make it advisable for the squadron and torpedo boat division to proceed to Puerto Rico you will do so, bearing in mind that if prior to your departure the situation should have become aggravated the battle ships *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* will join you at Cape Verde or meet you at 18° 30' north latitude and 53° 30' west longitude. This point has been determined from the general Spanish chart of the Atlantic Ocean, and you will stand for that point for the purpose indicated.

The protection given the torpedo boats by you will place the division in much

better condition from a military standpoint, as each battle ship, as well as the trans-Atlantic steamer, can take charge of two of the torpedo boats for the purpose of provisioning them and lending them such other aid as may be necessary during the voyage, which under these circumstances can be made in less time and with greater safety. As far as the contingencies feared make it possible to determine the objective of the expedition, it will be the defense of the island of Puerto Rico. In this operation you will take charge of the naval part, in cooperation with the army, with the concurrence of the Governor-General of the island, without forgetting, however, that the plan rests with you alone, in view of your incontestable ability, in your capacity as admiral, to measure the forces of our probable enemy, estimate the significance of their movements, as well as the best purposes to which the ships under your command can be put.

If the case in question should arise, you will deploy the squadron so that the different tactical units composing it will sustain each other, supported by the destroyers and torpedo boats, and not present a compact mass to the enemy, unless the hostile forces should be equal or inferior, in which case it will be expedient for you to take the offensive. It is on these bases that your plan must rest, considering as the principal factor the speed of our ships, which, as a general rule, is superior to that of the enemy's ships, and taking into account that the hostile forces which, if the case should arise, will operate in Puerto Rico will probably not exceed 7 ships, including 3 auxiliary vessels.

As it may become necessary to give you further orders during your voyage from Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands, you will pass within sight of the semaphore of the Canaries (Punta Anaga). As to the provisioning of your ships at St. Vincent, the necessary instructions have been given to the commander of the torpedo-boat division; and in Puerto Rico, in case it should be necessary to go there, you will find every kind of supplies, including ammunition.

In everything compatible with these instructions you will observe the orders transmitted to the commander of the torpedo-boat division, as far as relates thereto. The foregoing is communicated to you by royal order, and at the same time I beg to tell you that, in view of the grave circumstances through which the nation is passing at present, the Government of His Majesty places full confidence in your excellency's zeal, skill, and patriotism, and in the incontestable valor of all who are subject to and will obey your efficient orders.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MADRID, April 8, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 14, 1898.

Arrived here safely. Am anxious to know instructions. I beg for daily telegram. Need 1,000 tons of coal to refill bunkers.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 14, 1898.

Serious news. Transatlantic *San Francisco* leaves for Cape Verde with instructions and 2,000 tons of coal. But begin coaling anyhow from the coal ordered to be purchased by commander of flotilla. *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* under way since 9th to join you.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 15, 1898.

Situation continues to be grave. Violent and humiliating speeches against our country in United States Congress. Great powers appear desirous of peace. Con-

fidential information received from Washington that flying squadror, composed of *New York*, *Texas*, *Columbia*, *Minneapolis*, and *Massachusetts*, put to sea the 13th to prevent our battle ships from joining you. Doubt this to be true, war not having been declared, but you should nevertheless be warned. Provide yourself with everything necessary, and upon arrival of battle ships refit them immediately.

Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).

CAPTAINCY GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: In compliance with the orders of your excellency, and as I have had the honor of telegraphing you, I sailed from Cadiz on the evening of the 8th with the *Colón* and *Teresa*, shaping my course for Punta Anaga, island of Teneriffe, where I communciated with semaphore on the morning of the 11th, and received your order to proceed, and the information that indications were more favorable. I advised you that the squadron had arrived there safely.

The *Colón* was waiting for me off the city of Santa Cruz. A tug had brought her an official letter from the commandant of marine, transmitting to me said telegram from the semaphore, adding that on the previous evening a steamer had been waiting for me at Punta Anaga, to communicate the telegram to me. At 9 o'clock a. m. of the 11th I shaped my course for St. Vincent, Cape Verde, casting anchor at Puerto Grande on the 14th at 10 o'clock a. m. Here I found the first division of torpedo boats, whose commander placed himself under my orders and advised me that nothing of importance had occurred.

We had a good voyage, with wind and sea in the first quadrant (from northward and eastward), calming down as we reached a lower latitude. Our usual speed was 12 knots, at times reduced to 11 knots, so as to arrive in daytime and have no trouble in reconnoitering. The coal consumption of the *Colón* has been enormous, and that of the *Teresa* also quite large. During the voyage of 1,570 miles, with the speed above mentioned, the *Colón* has used about 500 tons and the *Teresa* about 400. The consumption, therefore, of the *Colón* has been 3,738 pounds per horsepower per hour, at 12 knots speed, and 3,919 pounds at 11 knots, and that of the *Teresa* 2,546 and 2,969 pounds, respectively. Upon arrival here the *Colón* had only 550 and the *Teresa* 570 tons left. I wish to call your excellency's attention to another point, also of great importance. Thinking about this extravagant consumption of fuel, I attribute that of the *Colón* to the type of her boilers and lack of experience in managing them, and that of the *Teresa* to the very low pressure in the boilers, considering that the engine is of the triple-expansion type. When I gave an order to raise the pressure from 100 to 150 pounds the first engineer in chief made certain explanations to me, which I impart to your excellency under separate cover, and as I fear that his objections are well founded I have decided not to raise the pressure in the boilers of this ship, except in peremptory cases.¹

Upon arrival here I dispatched to you the following telegram: "Arrived here safely. Am anxious to know instructions. I beg for daily telegram. Need 1,000 tons of coal to refill bunkers." This evening the captain of the *Ciudad de Cadiz*

¹The engineer in chief says that he has noticed that whenever the pressure in the boilers has been raised above 115 pounds there has been some injury, especially in the joints of the auxiliary steam piping, which he attributes to the lack of expansion joints, in conjunction with the facts that the boiler tubes have lost much of their resistance, and that there are a few slight leaks in the seams where the furnaces are joined to the boilers, which might become serious if the pressure were raised in the latter, and he therefore advises not to do so under ordinary circumstances, because the saving in fuel would not compensate for the expense of repairs and interference with the service.

notified me that he had received the following telegram, dated at Cadiz the 14th, at 5.05 o'clock p. m.: "Steamer *San Francisco* has sailed from Las Palmas with 1,000¹ tons of coal for the fleet. Notify the admiral." This morning I received your excellency's telegram of the same date (7.50 p. m.) referring to the same matter and to the battle ships *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*. After consulting with the second in command and the captains, I answered as follows: "For coal they ask 51 shillings per ton paid in London. As it is much needed I have ordered it to be bought. Nothing new." Just as I am about to close this letter, which is to go by a steamer leaving to-night, I received your other telegram, dated to-day (12.50 p. m.), referring to the movements of American ships.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON BOARD INFANTA MARIA TERESA,

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 15, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, *April 16, 1898.*

Nothing new. Owing to last report of your cipher telegram concerning flying squadron, the torpedo boat flotilla is fitting for battle, lightening the coal which hampers it.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, *April 17, 1898.*

Owing to heavy weather, have been unable to complete taking on coal purchased. *San Francisco* has not arrived. Am impatiently awaiting her arrival.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, *April 18, 1898.*

San Francisco has arrived.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, *April 19, 1898.*

Oquendo and *Vizcaya* have safely arrived.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, *April 19, 1898.*

HIS EXCELLENCY SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The *San Francisco*, and with it your instructions and letter, arrived yesterday. If the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* have really sailed for here, they have now been out ten days and must arrive to-day or to-morrow, for that is all the time they would require to make the voyage of 2,400 miles from Puerto Rico. But I am thinking that perhaps the date stated, the 9th, is that of the cablegram issuing the order, and not the date of sailing, in which case they will arrive later.

The boilers of the *Ariete* are practically unserviceable, so that this vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the

¹ Telegram from minister to Cervera says 2,000.—O. N. I.

fleet. She could only be used for local defense. The boiler of the *Azor* is 11 years old and is of the locomotive type, and that tells the whole story. As for the destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*, their bow plates give as soon as they are in a sea way, and some of their frames have been broken. Villaamil has had this remedied as far as he has been able. The *Plutón* had an accident of this kind when coming from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol.

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords good protection for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Mayaguez can not be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most unfavorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall await the arrival of the *Vizcaya*, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the Canaries.

It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, as well as the small island commanding the port of La Luz in Gran Canary. From your instructions it seems that the idea of sending the fleet to Cuba has been abandoned, I believe very wisely. Concerning Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accumulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rico is loyal, it will not be such an easy task for the Yankees; and if it is not loyal, it will inevitably follow the fate of Cuba, at least as far as we are concerned.

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, as I have already said, for the Canaries; and above all I fear the possibility of a bombardment of our coast, which is not unlikely, considering the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with four or five vessels of higher speed than our own.

For all these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for me to do, and I will not take any decision without your opinion and that of the council of captains, as indicated in your letter. I leave this letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen.

I was here interrupted by the information that the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* were in sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of health and spirits, but the *Vizcaya* needs docking badly.

During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more coal than the *Oquendo*, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots according to my reckoning, and a diminution of her radius of action of from 25 to 30 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed to which you called special attention in your instructions. Both are now coaling, but it is slow work, for, unfortunately, we do not feel at home here. We are indeed unlucky! Until to-morrow. The mail has come in and will shortly go out again, I will therefore close this.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Governor-General of Puerto Rico (Macías) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).

[Extract.]

PUERTO RICO, *April 20, 1898.*

Your excellency and the minister of war know scant resources at my disposal. I should know what our naval forces are doing. Do not know situation of our squadron.

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Upon reaching this harbor I had the honor of notifying your excellency of my arrival under date of the 15th. Agreeable to your orders I acquired and distributed between the *Colón* and *Teresa* the 700 tons of coal, which was all I could obtain here at the exorbitant price of 51 shillings per ton. I also purchased all the lubricating oil I could find (about 125 gallons of olive and 132 of mineral oil), so as to be able to supply the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*. At the same time I made efforts to get boats for unloading the coal of the *San Francisco*, and succeeded, though not in as large number as desired.

The *San Francisco* arrived on the 18th at noon, and at daybreak of the 19th the unloading of the coal was commenced. Her captain delivered to me the instructions which you mentioned. The custom-house raised some difficulty and wanted to collect duty on the coal landed; but the matter was settled by the governor of these islands, after conferring with the government by telephone.

On the 19th, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* arrived; the latter at once commenced to coal, working all night. The *Oquendo*, which has about 200 tons left, could not begin to coal until the following morning. The fitting out of the vessels will be continued with all possible speed. The battle ships had nothing special to report. In the torpedo-boat division slight defects have been noticed in the joints of the bow plates of the *Terror* and *Furor*, which we have remedied temporarily. (The *Plutón* had these same repairs made at Ferrol.)

The boilers of the *Ariete* are in poor condition, so that this torpedo boat, far from being of use, is an impediment. Her engines are very delicate. In a separate letter I confirmed to your excellency all the telegrams which I have dispatched since my last communication. The sanitary condition of the fleet is good.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON BOARD INFANTA MARIA TERESA,
St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 20, 1898.

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of the proceedings of the meeting of the captains which I called to-day at your suggestion. As the mail is about to go out I do not have time to speak about it fully, but will do so in my next letter.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, *April 20, 1898.*

PROCEEDINGS.

The second in command of the naval forces and the captains of the vessels, having met on board the cruiser *Cristóbal Colón*, by order of his excellency the commander

in chief of the squadron, and under his presidency, the president submitted for discussion the following question: "Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries and provide from here for any contingency?" Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to offer for the purpose of establishing bases of operations.

In consideration of this and the grave consequences for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed to call the attention of the Government to these matters by means of a telegram, as follows:

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SQUADRON TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE:

In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I suggest going to the Canaries. *Ariete* has boilers in bad condition; boiler of *Azor* is very old. *Vizcaya* must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to preserve her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother country.

PASCUAL CERVERA.
 JOSÉ DE PAREDES.
 JUAN B. LAZAGA.
 EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.
 VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.
 ANTONIO EULATE.
 JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.
 FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

ON BOARD CRUISER COLÓN, April 20, 1898.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 20, 1898.

Both Houses of United States Congress have approved armed intervention, declaring Cuba free and independent. It is thought President will sign resolution to-day. Urgent to complete fitting out.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 20, 1898.

If you approve going to Canaries, I beg you will send at once all the torpedoes to that point.

[Confidential.]

HONORED SIR: For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on board the *Colón*, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and

whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances.

The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat—for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior forces—compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be. I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finishing once for all.

But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in particular and believe that the *Alfonso XII* or the *Cristina* can be pitted against the *Iowa* or *Massachusetts*, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us.

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon overcome. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of everything that happened. Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement which reflects better than I could express them the opinions of all.

This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in the meeting. Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

His Excellency the MINISTER OF MARINE.

APRIL 21, 1898.

[Document referred to.]

Capt. VICTOR M. CONCAS,

Commander of the Battle Ship Infanta Maria Teresa:

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the Admiral of the fleet at the council of war held on board the battle ship *Cristóbal Colón*, my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior

to our own in number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made, besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the East, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been done with a single battle ship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American Flying Squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits of an easy victory. The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula—the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the *Alfonso XIII*, of very little speed, and even that not certain—are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries.

The yacht *Giralda* and the steamers *Germania* and *Normania*, of the acquisition of which official notice has been received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject, and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations—is a strategic error, the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage must remain entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battle ships and the *Cristóbal Colón*, with-

out her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or less if the enemy should bring along a light division, nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided.

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which the country gave us, and the needs which present circumstances bring on the country in danger.

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to these forces. But, after pointing out the probable consequences, the responsibility must remain with the Government.

VICTOR M. CONCAS.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, *April 20, 1898.*

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, *April 21, 1898.*

Torpedo boat *Ariete* may return to Spain, towed by *San Francisco*. Issue such instructions as you may deem necessary.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, *April 21, 1898.*

The more I think about it I am convinced¹ that to continue voyage to Puerto Rico will be disastrous. I can leave for the Canaries to-morrow. The coaling is proceeding slowly, there being a lack of appliances. The captains of the ships are of same opinion as I, some more emphatically. I need instructions.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, *April 21, 1898.*

As Canaries are perfectly safe, and you are aware of telegrams on impending sailing of flying squadron, you will go out with all the forces to protect Puerto Rico, which is menaced, following the route which your excellency has traced, bearing in mind the free scope which the instructions give you, and which I hereby renew. The phrase *Am going north* will advise me that you have sailed. Absolute secrecy must be maintained as to your movements.²

¹This is the text in the pamphlet referred to, but the telegram as sent by me from Cape Verde says: "The more I think about it the more I am convinced."

²In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram has been suppressed. It says: "The nation, in these extreme moments of the declaration of war, follows your squadron in its expedition, and sends to it its enthusiastic greetings."

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

Have received cipher message concerning the *Ariete*. *San Francisco* will not finish unloading coal for at least five days. As the *Ariete* can cooperate in the defense of Canaries, I beg that you will recall the order for her to return to Spain. Her boilers would not hold out for long trips, but will do for local defense. I reiterate my request of cipher telegram for further destiny of fleet.

Governor-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

[Extract.]

HAVANA, April 22, 1898.

Public spirit very high; great enthusiasm among all classes. But I must not conceal from your excellency that if people should become convinced that squadron is not coming, disappointment will be great, and an unpleasant reaction is possible. Beg that your excellency will advise me whether I can give them any hope of more or less immediate arrival of squadron.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 22, 1898.

The Government is inquiring constantly about your sailing. It is absolutely necessary to go out as soon as possible. Have *Ariete* towed to Canaries by *San Francisco*.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

Have received cipher telegram with instructions to proceed to Puerto Rico. Though I persist in my opinion, which is also the opinion of the captains of the ships, I shall do all I can to hasten our departure, disclaiming all responsibility for the consequences.¹

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I do not know location of hostile ships, nor on what the instructions are based. Beg your excellency to send me all possible information.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I do not know officially whether war has been declared. It is absolutely necessary that I should know in order to treat the American flag as an enemy.

¹ In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram is omitted, which is as follows: "We are grateful for the greeting of the nation, whose happiness is our only wish, and in the name of all I express our profound love for our country."

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, April 22, 1898.

If war had been declared I should have advised you; but, as a matter of fact, a state of war exists, since the United States fleet will begin to-morrow the blockade of Cuba. The ships of the flying squadron, which I mentioned to your excellency, and about which I have had no further information, are to blockade Puerto Rico, but have not yet left Hampton Roads. The foundation of the instructions is to intrust to your excellency the naval defense of Puerto Rico. I have no special news to communicate to you to-day.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I need precise instructions by which I can shape my conduct in case war has been declared officially by the time I sail.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 22, 1898.

Have received your second telegram. Can not give you more definite instructions than you have, leaving you free to choose the route to be followed, eluding, if possible, an encounter with the hostile fleet, and reaching some point on the coast of Puerto Rico. The *Ciudad de Cadiz* will accompany you with as much coal as possible.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have not yet answered your letter of the 7th, which the *San Francisco* brought me, because, though I have written you since, I did not have it before me. It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return, while in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation.

It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only the case with reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two other places. But is Graciosa Island safe, for instance? If the Yankees should take possession of it and fortify the port they would have a base for any operations they might wish to undertake against Spain, and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there. Such a thing will not be possible at present, with the squadron at the Canaries, but it will be inevitable when the squadron has been destroyed.

You talk about plans and in spite of all efforts to have some laid out, as would have been wise and prudent, my desires have been disappointed to such an extent that if the circumstances had been different I should have applied to be placed on the retired list, and I shall ask for it, if God spares my life, just as soon as the danger is over. I should

even apply for it to day, without caring a straw for being accused of cowardice, if it were not for the fact that my retirement would produce among the squadron the deplorable effect of a desertion of its admiral before the enemy. How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for?

The *Colón* does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, with the exception of about 300 rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the *Colón* can not be recharged. We have not a single Bustamante torpedo. There is no plan nor concert, which I so much desired and have suggested in vain. The repairs of the servomotors of my vessels were only made in the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and the *Vizcaya* after they had left Spain.

In short, it is a disaster already, and it is to be feared that it will be a more frightful one before long. And perhaps everything could be changed yet. But I suppose it is too late now for anything that is not the ruin and desolation of our country. I can understand that your conscience is clear, as you state in your letter, because you are a good man and your course is clear before you, but think of what I tell you and you will see that I am right. I assembled my captains, as you told me, and sent you by telegraph an extract of their opinions.

I have since forwarded you a copy of the proceedings, and by this mail I send you an official letter commenting thereon. I have nothing further to add. The *Vizcaya* can no longer steam, and she is only a boil in the body of the fleet. But I will trouble you no more. I consider it an accomplished fact, and will try to find the best way out of this direful enterprise.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898.

I beg your excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of honor. I beg your excellency to read this telegram and my whole official and confidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my conscience.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, April 22, 1898—6 o'clock p. m.

As result of heavy seas, *Audaz* had bow bent at right angles to port as far as second bulkhead. I notify you so that you may have bows of destroyers strengthened as much as possible.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

PALACE, Madrid, April 23, 1898—noon.

I call meeting of general officers. Awaiting their decision. Advise me immediately whether torpedo boats are ready.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

At principal ports West Indies, where these ships are likely to touch, we should have confidential agents to give me authentic information, and credits should be opened.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

Received cipher message last evening. We are working night and day to fill bunkers. Have telegraphed already that appliances are lacking. Eight hundred tons still remain and it will take three days longer. Before sailing I must know whether war has been declared.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

Torpedo boats ready for war; destroyers likewise, except 2.95-inch guns. They carry coal instead. Guns can be mounted in a few hours.

Proceedings of meeting of general officers of the navy, held at the ministry of marine, under the presidency of the minister of marine, Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo, on April 23, 1898.

Present: Admiral Guillermo Chacón y Maldonado; Vice-Admirals Carlos Valcárcel, José M. Beránger, Eduardo Butler, and Fernando Martínez; Rear-Admirals Manuel Pasquín, José Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel de la Cámara, Eduardo Reinoso, and José de Guzmán; and Captains José Gómez Imaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquín Lazaga, Joaquín Cincúnegui, and Ramón Auñón.

The session opens at 3 o'clock p. m.

The Minister explains the situation of the country relative to the state of war with the United States of North America, the distribution of the Spanish ships, and the information he has concerning the enemy, and reads to them the instructions which he has issued to the admiral of the fleet for his departure from Cadiz, which instructions he did not receive until he arrived at Cape Verde, his departure having been hastened by subsequent telegraphic orders.

Mr. Beránger says that if the explanation made by the minister has no other object than to inform them of what has happened, he thanks him and takes notice thereof. But if the object is to ask for opinions on the subject, he should abstain from everything not conformable to discipline, reserving judgment thereon until such time when he will have a right to express it.

The Minister replies that so far he has simply explained the situation. But now that the general officers are acquainted with it he begs them to assist him with their advice as to what they deem most expedient for the plan of campaign to be followed.

Mr. Pasquín says that the members have a right, without prejudice to discipline, to express their opinions, since they have been convened for that purpose; that the question is not a technical one, but appertains to the Government, and it is for the latter to form the plans of campaign; that that is no reason why each one of them, if the minister so desires, should not express his opinion; but before doing so they should be informed whether it is the Government which convenes them as a council of war or whether the minister simply asks them as comrades for their private opinions; because in the former case each one is responsible for the opinions he expresses, while in the latter case they have no other value but that of friendly advice; and that, in any event, since they have been convened without being informed of the object of the meeting, they have not been able to prepare for setting forth plans of the importance and gravity of the one about which they are being consulted.

The Minister explains that the plan of the Government was to send the squadron now at Cape Verde, together with the first torpedo boat division, to Puerto Rico, and intrust to the admiral the defense of that island, which he (the minister) considers in great danger from hostile attacks, being poorly defended, having very open coasts, and inadequate garrisons in case of an uprising; that it was further intended to keep in Spain all other available ships, so as to be able to send them at the proper time wherever it might be necessary; but that the instructions issued to the admiral and received by him at Cape Verde had not yet been carried out, for the reason that the admiral made certain objections to the plan, which he did not consider expedient.

A short controversy followed between Messrs. Beránger and Butler, the former maintaining the possibility that certain opinions to which he attributes great weight might get out, and the latter asserting that the discretion of the members is a complete guaranty for the secrecy of whatever might be discussed.

Mr. Chacón asks whether the squadron had already received the order to start from Cape Verde, as has been reported, since, if the squadron had actually sailed, there was no need of discussing the point.

The Minister replies that the order to start has been issued, but has not yet been carried out, because the Admiral's remonstrances, reinforced by the opinions of the captains of the ships, has given him much to consider, and since then he has not reiterated the order, deeming it proper that the president of the council should be made acquainted with such remonstrances.

Mr. Beránger calls attention to the fact that they are being consulted after the breaking out of hostilities, which is hardly a time for asking advice; that he should never have advised the assembling of the squadron at Cape Verde, nor the formation of a flotilla of heterogeneous vessels, some of which impede the march of others, for which reason the destroyers can not do what they might be able to do by themselves; that he should have preferred the formation of a comparatively numerous squadron, letting the ships go separately or in small divisions, so as to enable them to operate with greater freedom in seeking or refusing battle, as may be best; that the idea of going back now could not be entertained, because the advance toward Puerto Rico could be made by the fleet either as a whole or in divisions by different routes; some of the vessels might even be sent to the Bermudas, in order to compel the enemy to divide his forces; that, whatever plan might be adopted, he harbored the hope that the victory would be on the side of Spain, owing to the good qualities of her ships, the skill of those who commanded them, and the valor of the crews, citing in support of his belief the fact that during the war of Independence of the United States it happened that eleven English ships, after maintaining a blockade for forty-two days, during which time they were constantly attacked by gunboats manned by valiant crews, had to return to England without attaining their object.

The Minister replies that the flotilla was formed while peace was reigning and in ample time to reach Puerto Rico, and that the stop at Cape Verde was not part of the Government's plan, but was due to subsequent unfortunate causes.

Mr. Gómez Imaz says that there is no use in losing time over the discussion of what has happened, or had to happen, but that a resolution should be adopted as to what the squadron is to do in the future.

Mr. Mozo states that when the minister convened the general officers of the ministry on Holy Thursday, April 6, for a similar purpose as the present, a majority of them expressed themselves in favor of concentration at Cape Verde; that the speaker was still of opinion that all possible forces should have been assembled and concentrated at a port in the Canaries; that the war should be carried on in the nature of an active defense, placing every available resource at the disposal of the admiral of the fleet, since it was he who would be held responsible hereafter.

Mr. Beránger says that his opinion is diametrically opposed to that of Mr. Mozo, because an unfortunate encounter of the united fleet would be the ruin of the country; that the concentration should never have taken place at any port abroad, but that since such had been the case it was imperative for the fleet to start at once for the West Indies, together with the destroyers, leaving the torpedo boats at Cape Verde to return to the Canaries.

The Minister says that he deems it important for the discussion to make the members acquainted with the last telegram received from the Governor-General of Cuba, stating that all the Spanish of that island were animated by the very best spirit for resistance; but that this was due to a great extent to the hope they harbored that the fleet would promptly return to Cuban waters, and if the return was delayed, or the hope lost, the Spanish population might at the same time lose the spirit animating it.

Mr. Auñón says that, although he is the youngest of the members and can shed no light on the discussion, he deems it nevertheless proper that he should take part in it, if not to formulate plans of campaign, which could not be done without the knowledge of further data than had so far been brought out in the discussion, yet to particularize the debate so that it might produce some good result and fix on the minds the value of the opinions expressed; that the first remarks of the minister might be divided into two parts—the exposition of what has already occurred, and a request for advice for the future.

Relative to the first, he coincided with Mr. Beránger in believing that they had not been consulted on what had already been done and could not be helped, bad though it might appear, and that all they could do was to take up matters from the present moment, inquiring carefully into the future, and not deny the minister nor the comrade the advice for which he asks, since anyone occupying his high position under the present circumstances would need advisers to keep up his courage and spirit to carry him through the critical period, as to which everyone would demand explanations and require responsibilities to be fixed in one manner or another.

As to the question of forming plans of campaign, though on a forced basis and under the pressure of present circumstances, it was not an easy undertaking and without a knowledge of all the antecedents which is indispensable for the purpose of formulating opinions as to possible contingencies; that the superficial knowledge of matters derived from the press, so often erroneous, can not be taken as a basis. For that purpose he wished to call upon the minister to explain to them the condition of the ships composing the nucleus assembled at Cape Verde and the time required before those still in the Peninsula would be in condition for active service.

As to the instructions to be issued to the admiral, they were probably not definite, except as to the objective which the Government had in view, leaving him free to develop the same as the circumstances of the moment might require, since instructions to be complied with two weeks after they were issued, and at a distance of 2,000 miles from where they emanated, had the disadvantage that they either must be followed blindly, or must be violated, leaving it for the outcome of events to decide whether the man following the latter course would be hailed as a hero or court-martialed for disobedience.

Finally, in view of the gravity of the situation, he called upon the esteemed admirals and comrades, if need be, to examine the future calmly and dispassionately, leaving the past out of the question, and giving the benefit of their opinions for the good of the country and the assistance of their comrades, upon whom are fixed just now the eyes of the nation, which is not well informed as to the true circumstances under which fate has driven the country into the disaster of a war so unequal, as far as material resources are concerned.

The Minister thanks Mr. Anón for the sentiments which have inspired his words, and offers to exhibit whatever data may be necessary to found thereon an opinion as to the future. He says that the two battle ships coming from Puerto Rico carry provisions for forty-five days, and those coming from Spain for thirty days; that he had sent them 2,000 tons of coal by a trans-Atlantic steamer and instructed the admiral to get at Cape Verde whatever he might need, and that he therefore considered the battle ships in perfect condition to engage in a naval campaign; that the three destroyers were in similar condition, but of the torpedo boats only two were able to put to sea, because the *Ariete* had arrived with her boilers disabled.

The fitting out of the *Carlos V* could not be completed until the beginning of May, the *Pelayo* would be ready before that time, and the *Alfonso* was ready now, but the greater part of the supply of ammunition for the *Carlos V* was on the way and he could not tell exactly when it would arrive. The *Pelayo* had so limited a radius of action that she could hardly go from the Canaries to Puerto Rico without being embarrassed, and the speed of the *Alfonso XIII* was so low that she might prove an impediment to the movements of the fleet. As to the *Vitoria*, he did not consider her fit to join the squadron on account of her slow speed, and as to the *Numancia*, although she would return to Spanish waters in a short time, the remodeling of this ship was not completed, owing to strikes which had interrupted the work.

Mr. Pasquín asks that the communications from the admiral of the squadron, in which he speaks of the dangers he fears for the expedition to Puerto Rico, be read.

The Minister reads a telegram from the Admiral in which he expresses a desire to have it plainly understood that it is his opinion and the opinion of the captains of the ships that the voyage to Puerto Rico may mean a disaster for the future of the country; but that, obedient to instructions, he is hastening all the preparations, so as to carry out the order the moment it is received. He also reads his reply advising the Admiral that he submits the resolution to the assembly of general officers of the navy.

Mr. Beránger states that the telegram read by the Minister is of such importance that, in his opinion, it should not have been read, but now that it is known, he insisted that the squadron at Cape Verde should at once start for the West Indies, no matter what risks it might run, the same as Tegetthoff, when he was ordered to attack a superior Austrian squadron at Lissa.

Mr. Lazaga says that he has given some thought to the plan of campaign, and he submits his plan, such as it is, to the consideration of all. At first he was in favor of scattering the forces, but since reading the cablegram from the Governor-General he has modified his opinion. The *Carlos V* should go out immediately to join the squadron, taking workmen along to complete the electrical installation for operating the turrets. The *Pelayo* should complete the work of fitting out, working night and day, and purchasing without delay whatever might be required. At Cadiz they should join the *Alfonso XIII* and the two destroyers now in Spain and go in search of the squadron, after first agreeing on a geographical point of rendezvous 100 miles west of Cape Verde.

The united forces should then proceed to Puerto Rico and fight a battle there under regular conditions, after which they should continue their course south of Santo Domingo and Cuba, appear off Havana from the west, and enter that harbor, or, if necessary, engage in another battle with the blockading forces. The torpedo boats

should return to the Canaries or to Spain with the transatlantic steamers. The cruisers *Patriota* and *Rápido* should be detached and sent to the Bermudas to divert some of the hostile forces to that vicinity and prey upon the enemy's commerce.

Mr. Cincinégui expresses the opinion that to compel the squadron to remain at Cape Verde or on the sea until the arrival of the ships to be concentrated at Cadiz would mean a further delay in the appearance of the Spanish naval forces in Cuba; but that the squadron now at Cape Verde could be sent to the West Indies at once and the Cadiz ships could be ordered later to the United States coasts for the purpose of causing alarm, attracting some of the hostile forces in that direction, and perhaps carrying out some bold operation on hostile cities. He adds that the departure from Cape Verde is absolutely necessary, because if the squadron should remain there any longer it would probably be requested to leave by the Portuguese Government, in virtue of the law of neutrality.

The Minister says that for operations on the United States coast speed is an important factor; that the *Alfonso XIII* has very little speed, the *Pelayo* a very limited radius of action, and that neither the latter vessel nor the *Carlos V* can enter and refit in the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, by reason of their draft.

Mr. Butler states that, while he realizes the necessity for the squadron to start at once from Cape Verde, he thinks that it should be notified of the Government's intention to reinforce it with the ships now in Spain, as an encouragement in the difficult task upon which it is about to embark; that the Admiral should be given every possible facility for shaping his actions according to circumstances; for, while it is deemed necessary for the ships to go to the West Indies, they should not be led to a useless sacrifice, especially as there are not in Puerto Rico the necessary facilities for repairing injuries.

Mr. Chacón speaks of the difficulty of harmonizing so many different opinions, and states that they can be only in the nature of advice and not of precepts. He believes that public opinion is greatly mistaken in its estimate of the value and efficiency of the Spanish squadron, but that it is, nevertheless, necessary to satisfy it within reasonable bounds. He deems the departure from Cape Verde necessary, not only in view of the considerations deduced from the cablegram from the Governor-General of Cuba, but also for the reason pointed out by *Mr. Cincinégui*, namely, that the fleet can remain no longer in a neutral port; that it is reasonable to calculate that it will take from ten to fifteen days to complete fitting out the ships now in Spain, and that the departure of the squadron from Cape Verde can not be delayed so long, and therefore it should start at once for the West Indies, even at the risk of having to face the results of an unfortunate encounter. If the fleet blockading Puerto Rico should retreat or be defeated, the Spanish squadron should there await the reinforcements to be sent to it before proceeding to Cuba. As to future operations, he thinks, it is hazardous to say anything before knowing the result of the first operations.

Mr. Valdevel says that, in view of the situation and the gravity of the question, he thinks that the squadron at Cape Verde should leave for the West Indies. He does not think that there is any hope of reinforcing it with the ships fitting out in Spain, since from what the minister has said they would require a number of days before they could undertake the trip.

Mr. Auñón wishes to state that, when the minister first spoke of the opinions expressed by the admiral of the fleet, he did not read the whole cablegram, which might cause an unfavorable impression among those present; but that from its whole context it was clear that Admiral Cervera had acted wisely in setting forth his opinion, while at the same time declaring himself ready to use all possible diligence in doing the very thing which in his conscience he believed to be prejudicial to subsequent operations; that his declaration could have no other object than to set down his opinion, fearing perhaps that in case of his death—a glorious death, no doubt—his far-seeing advice would remain forever unknown.

Relative to the answer that the minister had sent him, he believed it proper to call attention to the phrase, "submit to the resolution of an assembly," since the

assembly could not and should not adopt resolutions, but only give advice, leaving it wholly to the Government to dictate resolutions and accept the responsibility therefor, whether in conformity with the advice received or not.

Mr. Gómez Imaz insists on his opinion that the squadrons should be united before exposing them to an encounter, because the result of a delay of ten days could not be as serious as a possible disaster.

The Minister, deeming the matter sufficiently discussed, suggests that each member present express his opinion in a concise form, not in the shape of votes and resolutions, which are inherent in the Government, but by condensing their opinions for the purpose of ascertaining which is the prevailing opinion among the many expressed.

The Minister's suggestion was adopted, and the following résumé was the result: *Résumé of the opinions expressed by the general officers of the navy upon the question which the Minister addressed to them, in the nature of a consultation, on the 23d day of April, 1898, after explaining to said officers the situation of our naval forces and acquainting them with the last cablegrams from the Governor-General of Cuba and the commander in chief of the squadron at Cape Verde.*

QUESTION.

In view of the present state of war and the situation of our naval forces in Europe and at Cape Verde, what orders should be issued to said forces relative to their movements?

ANSWERS OF OFFICERS IN THE ORDER FROM THE JUNIOR TO THE SENIOR.

Capt. Ramón Auñón y Villalón. The four battle ships and three destroyers now at Cape Verde should start immediately for West Indian waters, and after the imperative necessity of defending the island of Puerto Rico has been pointed out to the admiral, he should be given entire freedom of action as to the route, port to be entered, and as to the cases and circumstances in which battles should be sought or eluded, according to the condition in which the ships arrive, the strength of the hostile forces, and the information which the admiral may acquire or which may be transmitted to him prior to his arrival.

The three torpedo boats now at Cape Verde should return to the Canaries when and as best they can under conditions of comparative safety. The ships *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, *Vitoria*, *Patriota*, and *Rápido*, the destroyers which are in Europe, and other available ships which may be purchased or fitted out should be concentrated at Cadiz and speedily equipped; but the final destiny of these vessels should not be determined *a priori*, but according to the situation of the war at the time when these vessels are ready.

Capt. Joaquín Cincúnegui y Marco expresses the same opinion as Mr. Auñón, adding that the cruisers *Patriota* and *Rápido* should simultaneously be sent to the coasts of the United States in order to create alarm, call the enemy's attention to other points, compel him to divide his forces, and thereby enable the Spanish squadron to seek a port under more favorable conditions.

Captain Joaquín Lazaga y Garay maintains the opinion he expressed in the course of the debate; but if nevertheless the opinion in favor of the immediate departure of the squadron from Cape Verde should prevail, at least the *Alfonso XIII* and the destroyers now in Spain should be incorporated with the squadron, and simultaneously the cruisers *Patriota* and *Rápido* should go to the United States coasts, provided they are in condition to do so.

Capt. Antonio Terry y Rivas. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Capt. José Gómez Imaz, presents his answer in writing as follows: "The squadron assembled at Cape Verde should not go out immediately, but only when the *Carlos V*, *Pelayo*, and other available vessels are ready to reenforce the squadron, either directly or, preferably, by strategic maneuvers (similar to the one mentioned by

Captain Lazaga), so that the battle, if inevitable, may take place under more favorable circumstances. When the forces are united, Admiral Cervera should be permitted to operate with the freedom of action inherent in an admiral."

Rear-Admiral José Guzmán y Gallier. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Rear-Admiral Eduardo Reinoso y Díez de Tejada. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Rear-Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermooore. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Rear-Admiral Manuel Mozo y Díez-Robles formulated his opinion in writing as follows: "If His Majesty's Government, for reasons of the country's highest interests, thinks best that the squadron should start immediately for Puerto Rico, the undersigned rear-admiral is of the same opinion. If not, he thinks that the squadron should be reenforced, because, like the admiral of the fleet, he is convinced that a disaster is impending, and such a disaster within sight of Puerto Rico would surely not contribute toward raising the spirits of the inhabitants of that island nor of the island of Cuba."

Rear-Admiral Ismael Warleta y Ordovas. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Rear-Admiral Antonio de la Rocha y Aranda. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Rear-Admiral José Navarro y Fernández. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Rear Admiral Manuel Pasquín y de Juan. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Vice-Admiral Fernando Martínez de Espinosa. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Vice-Admiral Eduardo Butler y Anguita. The four battle ships and three destroyers now at Cape Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, with instructions to accept or elude battle as may be necessary. But being convinced that in union is strength, he is of Captain Lazaga's opinion relative to the increase of the ships and reinforcement of the Cape Verde squadron by all available vessels, in such manner and at such point as the Government may deem expedient; but he believes that this can not be done without prejudice to the immediate departure for the West Indies.

Vice-Admiral José Beránger y Ruiz de Apodaca confirms what he has stated at the beginning of the debate, namely, that the squadron now at Cape Verde should under no circumstances return to the Canaries, and still less to Spain, but should start immediately for the West Indies, using the destroyers as scouts to procure information prior to going into port.

Vice-Admiral Carlos Valcárcel y Ussel de Guimbarda. Same opinion as Mr. Auñón.

Admiral Guillermo Chacón y Maldonado thinks that the squadron now at Cape Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, before being compelled by international order to leave the neutral port where it is now. Its admiral should have full authority to proceed according to the requirements of war and the exigencies of national honor. The ships remaining in Spain should be concentrated at Cadiz and completed and equipped as speedily as possible, so as to be in readiness to comply instantly with any instructions which the Government may see fit to issue to them, as the situation of the country may demand.

In virtue whereof and by order of the minister of marine the foregoing proceedings have been drawn up and signed by the gentlemen taking part therein.

Segismundo Bermejo, Guillermo Chacón, Carlos Valcárcel, José Maria Beránger, Eduardo Butler, Fernando Martínez, Manuel Pasquín, José Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel de la Cámara, Eduardo Reinoso, José de Guzmán, José Gómez Imaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquin Lazaga, Joaquin Cineúnegui, Ramón Auñón.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 24, 1898.

Assembled general officers of the navy. Opinion is that the four battle ships and three destroyers should start immediately for West Indies. Have submitted this

opinion to His Majesty's Government, which ratifies it, ordering that your excellency be given complete freedom of action in proceeding to West Indies, trusting in your skill, knowledge, and valor. You can obtain information in West Indian waters before entering port in Puerto Rico, or in Cuba, if deemed more expedient in view of information received. You are given entire freedom of action as to route, port, and cases and circumstances in which battle should be sought or eluded. Fifteen thousand pounds are at your disposal in London. The torpedo boats are to return to Canaries with auxiliary vessels. You will prescribe their route. The United States flag is hostile.¹

¹ In the pamphlet so many times referred to the last sentence of this telegram is omitted, which says: "I renew the enthusiastic greeting of the nation and Government."

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898.

Hope to finish coaling to-morrow. After turret *Oquendo* does not obey horizontal training. Have been trying in vain for two weeks to ascertain cause. We continue to work incessantly.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE,

April 24, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The telegram ordering us to start has just arrived, and I have given orders to tranship from the *Cadiz* to these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the destroyers, which was on board the *Cadiz*. I intended to sail without finishing the provisioning of the ships, but since the *Cadiz* is to remain here I have decided to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to sail to-morrow. As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken!

You see I was right when I told you that by the end of April the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* would not be finished; that the *Colón* would not have her big guns unless we took the defective ones; that we should not have the 5.5-inch ammunition for the new guns, etc. With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand the unanimous¹ decision of the general officers of the navy indicating disapprobation and censure of my opinions, which implies that some one of them should have relieved me.

I have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of 5,700 tons of coal for Puerto Rico, where it is expected to arrive on the 11th or 12th of May, but I am much afraid that it may fall into the hands of the enemy. It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval battle at will. The *Vizcaya*, on account of her stay in Havana and not having had her bottom cleaned for nine months, is nothing more than a buoy, and I can not abandon her.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

¹ At that time I thought the vote unanimous. It will be seen from the proceedings of the meeting of the general officers that this was not the case.

P. S., 27th.--I am almost in despair at the slowness of the *Cadiz*. She is well prepared for a voyage, but very poorly for loading and unloading. I think we can start to-morrow.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898.

Taking advantage of delay, am having boiler tubes of *Ariete* repaired. If ready shall take her along.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 24, 1898.

The *Gaceta* to-day publishes decree that neutral flag covers merchandise, except contraband of war. Neutral merchandise, except contraband of war, is not subject to confiscation under hostile flag. The Government reserves the right to issue letters of marque and reprisal, although for the present it will use only the auxiliary cruisers of the navy. In compliance with foregoing, warships and auxiliaries will exercise right of search on the high seas and in waters within jurisdiction of enemy.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898.

Have received urgent telegram ordering departure of squadron. To-morrow, after completing coaling, filling vacancies from crew of *Cadiz*, and transshipping armament of destroyers, will comply with your excellency's instructions.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 25, 1898.

Is it certain that *San Francisco* and *Amazonas* are at Madeira? Answer direct to captain of *Cadiz* in case I should start before reply is received.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 25, 1898.

The ships mentioned are at Hampton Roads. *Columbia* and *Minneapolis* believed to have sailed for Europe. I am told there are numerous spies among coal trimmers. Immediate departure imperative. Maintain absolute secrecy as to route.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 25, 1898.

Much swell prevents transshipping coal and supplies from *Cádiz* to-day.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 25, 1898.

Situation unchanged. Flying Squadron has not yet left Hampton Roads. The £15,000 will be deposited in England, and to that extent you can draw on London

for what you need. *San Juan, Puerto Rico, will be advised of signal agreed upon with pilot.*¹

The Spanish Minister at Lisbon (Ayerbe) to the Minister of State (Gullón).

MADRID, April 26, 1898.

Minister foreign affairs asks me confidentially to inquire of your excellency whether you can state time that squadron will remain at Cape Verde. Same request made of Portuguese minister at Madrid in case United States should remonstrate, as stated in a newspaper to-day.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 26, 1898.

Work continues night and day shipping coal and cartridges of destroyers, but progresses slowly, as hatchways of trans-Atlantic do not permit rapid work; 400 tons still lacking. The battle ships have engines all ready, so as not to delay departure. Villaamil follows with squadron.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 26, 1898.

In view of departure of fast hostile cruisers, of which you notify me, and slow speed of *Caliz* and *San Francisco*, believe it expedient that you should issue instructions direct to commander of *Azor*, in charge of expedition.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 26, 1898.

Have given orders London send 5,000 tons of coal to Curaçao at disposal of your excellency and commandant of Porto Rico.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 27, 1898.

Transshipping progresses slowly. Am in despair, but impossible to work more rapidly. Three hundred tons of coal remain to be shipped.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 27, 1898.

I go out to-morrow evening. Before that I wish last reports of war and situation in Spain.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

MADRID, April 28, 1898.

Hope this will arrive in time. Havana and north of Cuba still blockaded. San Juan, Puerto Rico, so far free. No hostile ships in European waters. Quiet and harmony reigning in Spain. *Reiterate enthusiastic greeting of nation.*² Great activity displayed in fitting other ships.

¹The sentence in *italics* is omitted in pamphlet.

²The sentence in *italics* is omitted in the pamphlet.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898.

In spite of every effort made working at night, can not go out until morning. Notwithstanding hard work can not do all that is desired. Turret of *Oquendo* ready.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPE VERDE, April 29, 1898.

Am going north.¹

[Confidential.]

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Under date of the 20th I had the honor of sending you a report on the squadron up to that date. The unloading of the *San Francisco* was continued, working day and night, and completed on the 24th. As I told your excellency in a separate communication, the coal was 180 tons short of the 2,000 she was to bring, owing no doubt to the hurry with which the steamer shipped the coal and the loss from coal dropped in the water during the work of unloading, especially at night. This must also have been the case with the *Cadiz*. I purchased all the lubricating oil I was able to find at Cape Verde, and the ships are well supplied in that respect.

In this connection I wish to point out to your excellency the expediency of always accompanying supplies of coal with a corresponding quantity of lubricating material. On the evening of the 24th I received your telegraphic instructions to start for the West Indies and detach from the fleet the three torpedo boats and the *Ciudad de Cadiz*, and as these vessels were also short of coal, and I deemed it necessary that they should carry as large quantities as possible, I gave orders at once for them to take 625 tons of the coal on board the *Cadiz*, also engine supplies and provisions; and the 2.95-inch guns and ammunition of the three destroyers which are to follow me were transhipped.

Owing to the conditions of the hold of the *Cadiz*, the lack of transshipping appliances, and the heavy swell, this work was very arduous and slow; but I thought it was better to lose these few days than to reach our destination badly provisioned. The ships of the *Teresa* type leave with 1,080 tons each, and the *Colón* with 1,270 tons. The latter ship consumes considerably more coal than the others, owing to the type of her boilers. The destroyers carry about 140 tons each, which is 34 in excess of their bunker capacity. With this supply they have theoretically an approximate radius of action of 2,800 miles at the rate of 10 knots an hour. But I feel sure I shall have to resupply them before reaching our destination, in case the state of the sea should not permit me to tow them. The great weakness of their construction will have to be taken into consideration in this connection.

The *Vizcaya*, as I advised you, is very much fouled. During her ten days' run from Puerto Rico here she burned 200 tons more than the *Oquendo*. This is a weak point, but as I see no remedy for it at present, I contracted here for having her cleaned by divers, but this could only be done to a limited extent. I had the divers of the fleet clean her screws and sea cocks. Owing to pressure of time and lack of space on board the battle ships, already much overloaded, I left 1,500 spare boiler tubes of the destroyers with the *Cadiz*.

If your excellency thinks that the campaign will last long enough and that there will be chances for changing boiler tubes, I beg that you will send these wherever

¹ The phrase agreed upon in telegram from minister dated April 21.

you may deem best. I also repeat my request for Bustamante torpedoes, which would surely be of great service. I take with me to-day the torpedoes brought by the *Ciudad de Cadiz* and *San Francisco*. The expedition, as I have already told your excellency, will go in command of the oldest lieutenant, Claudio Alvargonzález, commander of the *Azor*.

In a separate letter I confirm to your excellency the telegrams I have sent since my former communication. There only remains for me to tell you that there is nothing special to report relative to the crews of the fleet, and that they are all firmly resolved to sacrifice their lives in the fulfillment of their duty. May God grant our forces the success worthy of the justice of our cause.

On board flagship, St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 28, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).

[Confidential.]

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Under this date I issue the following instructions to the commander of the first division of torpedo boats: "About 450 miles from the port of Fort de France, Martinique, you will, upon signal made, detach your division from the squadron, with the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*, and proceed to the last-named port, at the rate of 20 knots an hour, and will there obtain information on the points I have stated to you and return at once to communicate such information to me, bearing in mind that the squadron will run parallel to the southern point of Martinique at the rate of about 8 knots an hour. Being acquainted with my plans you will operate within the limits of the same with complete freedom of action.

"Signals of recognition during the night will be the letter R of the Morse alphabet, made with a searchlight, it being understood that the point is to be represented by maintaining the luminous ray for a certain length of time at an elevation of 45 degrees and flash it for a greater length of time at the same elevation. Between one R and the next, three horizontal movements are to be made with the luminous ray; the first, for instance, from left to right, the second from right to left, and the third again from left to right, or vice versa. The answer on the part of the flagship will be the letter A, made in the same manner, and three horizontal movements. To enable you to communicate speedily any information you may have, I inclose herewith a sheet of conventional signals to be used on this occasion only.

"You may also communicate information by using key A B O755. In the unlikely case that in the performance of this mission you should meet hostile forces, you will act as you may deem expedient, according to circumstances, bearing in mind that your principal mission is to communicate to me the information referred to." I have the honor of advising your excellency of the foregoing for your knowledge and approval.

On board *Teresa*, on the sea, May 1, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

AT SEA, May 5, 1898.

DEAR JUAN: To complete our collection of documents, I think proper that you should have the inclosed copy of a telegram from Villaamil to Sagasta. I forward this letter by two destroyers, which I am sending to Martinique in search of news. All is well on board and the spirit is excellent. We shall see what God has in store for us. The final

result is not doubtful, but if we could only start with a good lucky stroke. God be with us. Good-bye. Regards to your family, etc.

PASCUAL.

[Telegram.—To be deciphered by naval key.—Key CD 4393.]

MADRID, *April 22, 1898.*

PRÁXEDES SAGASTA:

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you should know, through a friend who does not fear censure, that, while as seamen we are all ready to die with honor in the fulfillment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless for the termination of the war if the representations repeatedly made by the admiral to the minister of marine are not taken into consideration.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

[Private.]

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo).

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: As I had the honor of advising your excellency in my communication of the 28th ultimo, dated at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, I left that port on the day following with the four battle ships and three destroyers, leaving instructions behind for the departure of the three torpedo boats and the steamers *Cadiz* and *San Francisco*. Upon starting I issued to the second in command and the captains of the ships certain instructions, of which I herewith inclose a copy, as also of my address to the crews, which was read to them after we had left the harbor and received with great enthusiasm by all.

After mature consideration and in view of the wide scope of the instructions received and the unusual situation in which these forces will be placed, I formulated a plan (which I did not announce until after we had left) of shaping my course for Fort de France, Martinique, there to obtain information, and, if possible, coal and provisions, which would permit me greater freedom of action. To that end I shall detach to-morrow morning, about 470 miles from the port referred to, the *Terror* and *Furor*, under the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, who will take with him this letter and the following cipher telegram:

"All well in the squadron. Spirit excellent. Villaamil is to obtain information on which the future operations of the squadron will depend. Five hundred and seventy thousand pesetas are required for the pay now due. The funds on board and those deposited in London amount to 675,000. I do not wish to exhaust resources completely. It is therefore necessary to increase credit."

In confirming this telegram I have the honor of impressing upon your excellency the necessity of increasing the credit placed at my disposal, so that these crews who have received only a small advance for their families and for messes may get their pay for May, which they would already have received if they were in Spain. So far our voyage has progressed without anything worthy of mention. We have encountered fair weather, as is usual in this season and latitude. Although with some misgivings, I had the three destroyers taken in tow the day of our departure, and started out at the rate of 10 knots an hour.

As I feared that these frail vessels might be injured by yawing, I had the speed

reduced to 7.2 knots, and we continued at that rate until yesterday, when I increased it to 8 knots. In doing this I have taken into consideration not only the trouble and delay it would cause if we had to recede them on the sea before reaching our destination, but also the advantage of their crews arriving fresh and in condition to render services at once and the saving of coal by the battle ships at this rate of speed.

I also inclose herewith copy of a proclamation, addressed principally to the subaltern classes, and which I distribute to the ships to-day, embodying instructions which I have drawn up for the exercise of the right of search; also copy of the instructions which I gave to Villaamil. I can tell nothing as yet as to my future plans. I only repeat that I place my trust in God, and being animated by the most ardent desire to serve my country I shall do so to the best of my ability and strength.

On board the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, on the sea, 14° 42' north latitude and 44° 26' west longitude, May 8, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO.

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: Under date of April 27 last, I issued the following instructions to the captains of the ships of this squadron:

During the voyage the squadron will proceed in the order and at the respective distances indicated in sketch No. 1, hereto annexed.

(The sketch referred to as No. 1 shows the squadron forming a square, the length of the side of which being 5 cables, with the *Teresa* at the forward left-hand corner, the *Vizcaya* in the center of the square, the *Colón* at the forward right-hand corner. Two of the torpedo boats fill the remaining corners of the square, and the third torpedo boat is in line with them, but 5 cables on the left flank of the square. The *Oquendo's* station is on the left flank of the square midway between the *Teresa* and the third torpedo boat.)

"The above order will be adopted immediately upon starting, without further signal, but subject to the provisions of evolution No. 15 (for order with ships dispersed) of the Tactical Evolutions, which are to remain in force. This order has been adopted so that each destroyer may be in easy contact with the battle ship to which she is assigned. When so ordered (which will probably not be the case until near destination or in sight of the enemy) the formation shown in sketch No. 2 will be adopted; that is to say, the battle ships in line ahead, with the *Teresa* leading and the *Vizcaya* forming the rear, at the distances indicated, and the destroyers in another line ahead, each destroyer between two battle ships, observing between themselves the same distances as the latter, and the two lines 6 cables apart, unless otherwise ordered.

(Sketch No. 2 shows the ships in double column, the left column consisting of the *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, *Colón*, and *Vizcaya*, and the right column consisting of the three torpedo boats.)

"When this order in line ahead is adopted, the commander of the division of destroyers will go on board one of them, and if it should become necessary to fight he will remove the destroyers to a distance, out of the range of hostile projectiles, if possible, closely observing the phases of the battle for the purpose of descending upon the enemy when a favorable opportunity offers.

"The commander of the division is given entire freedom of movements, as also the captains, in case for some reason or other they can not be directed by their commander in chief, who enjoins each one of them not to allow their zeal to lead them into firing before the proper time. For passing from the order of the voyage to the order of line ahead, evolutions Nos. 10 and 11 of the Instructions will be observed, it being understood that the *Teresa* and *Oquendo* will form one group and the *Colón* and *Vizcaya* another.

"The destroyers, in a countermovement, will follow the movements of the head of the line. If signal Z 96 is made (take in tow, etc.), the battle ships will gradually slow down, after hoisting pennant Z, to the slowest speed (unless otherwise instructed), and each destroyer will proceed at once to take the tow of her respective battle ship. When the flagship orders the destroyers to be supplied with provisions, she will make the signal Q 02, and the destroyers will manuever accordingly, after hoisting pennant of execution.

"If the speed is to be moderated, it will be indicated by signals, but the captains of the battle ships are authorized to do so without signal, if, in their opinion, it should become necessary. If the destroyers themselves ask for provisions, they will make signal Q 11, and with that signal hoisted they will at once stand for their respective battle ships. If water is wanted in place of provisions, signals Q 61 and Q 65, respectively, will be made, and in case of coal the signals will be J 76 and J 84. When standing inshore, the order of occupations of the crews will be changed as follows:

"1. The reveille will be sounded early enough so that all the men can be at quarters and the ship in battle trim one hour before sunrise, and everything will remain in this condition until full daylight and until it has been ascertained, after careful reconnoitering, that a surprise is improbable.

"2. The crews will then breakfast.

"3. After breakfast such exercises will be had as may be deemed necessary for a desired length of time, and the different apparatus which it may be necessary to use in battle shall be carefully examined.

"4. The men will then rest until 10 o'clock, at which time the cleaning shall take place.

"5. After dinner the men will rest until 2 or 3, after which such work as the ship may require will be done. Supper at 6 o'clock, and immediately after supper clearing for action, everything being left in position for battle as far as it involves no risk. The partitions of the bunks shall remain in position and the bunks made up, but without the blankets, as each man will have his own, while one bunk serves for two.

"These instructions shall go into effect once for all upon signal A5 2 being made (hang out nets, etc.).

"I have the honor of advising you of the foregoing for your information and approval.

"Yours, etc.,

"PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON BOARD MARIA TERESA, *On the Sea, May 8, 1898.*"

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

MARTINIQUE, *May 12, 1898.*

Squadron arrived safely. Spirit excellent. Villaamil is to obtain information on which the future operations will depend. *Five hundred and seventy thousand pesetas are required for the pay now due. The funds on board and those deposited in London amount to 675,000. I do not wish to exhaust resources completely. It is therefore necessary to increase the credit.*¹

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.*²

MADRID, *May 12, 1898.*

Government is pleased to hear of your arrival at Martinique. Nothing new in the Peninsula. Telegram received to-day announcing attack San Juan, Puerto Rico, by hostile fleet composed of *New York, Indiana, Terror, Puritan*, two cruisers, one torpedo

¹The part in *italics* is omitted in the pamphlet.

²I did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned to Spain. I suspected the last one at Santiago de Cuba.

boat, and two colliers. Island of Puerto Rico is watched by auxiliaries *Paris* and *New York*. Admiral at Havana says four hostile ships in sight yesterday, one at Mantanzas and several off Cienfuegos. News of bombardment of Cardenas by a battle ship, monitor, and another vessel; enemy repulsed.

Credit increased; another £15,000 on same house London. Steamer *Alicante* must have arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer with 3,000 tons is to make that harbor under orders of captain of *Alicante*. Both vessels at your disposal.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.*¹

MADRID, May 12, 1898.

According to late information battle ship *Oregon*, accompanied by *Marietta* and another similar ship, are on the way from Rio Janeiro to West Indies.

*The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.*¹

MADRID, May 12, 1898.

Situation changed since your departure. Your instructions amplified so that if you do not believe that your squadron can operate there successfully may return to Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt and indicate decision.

PROCEEDINGS.

[Document No. 2 referred to on p. 76.]

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, being assembled in the admiral's cabin on the 12th day of May, the admiral acquainted them with the information obtained on the day previous at Fort de France by the commander of the torpedo-boat division.

Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, which is extremely critical, owing to the scant supply of coal, the governor of Martinique having refused to give aid in that direction, and it having been learned that there is no coal in San Juan, nor probably at Santiago, and in view of the bad condition of the boilers of the destroyers, those of the *Terror* being practically unserviceable, so that it became necessary to send her back to Fort de France this morning to await orders from the Government, these officers seeing no other solution—on penalty of placing the squadron in a position where it will be unable to move and will hence become an easy prey for the enemy—except to go to Curaçao, in hopes of finding there the coal announced by the minister of marine in his telegram of April 26.

In witness whereof they sign the foregoing, on the sea, off Fort de France, Martinique.

PASCUAL CERVERA.
 JOSÉ DE PAREDES.
 EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.
 JUAN B. LAZAGA.
 ANTONIO EULATE.
 VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.
 JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.
 FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

A true copy:

CERVERA.

¹ I did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned to Spain. I suspected the last one at Santiago de Cuba.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CURAÇAO, May 14, 1898.

After consulting with the second in command of the squadron and the captains of the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal announced in your telegram of April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not been able to obtain here the coal I need. There is a controversy about it, and I must see what I can do. Only two ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has been limited to forty-eight hours.

The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).

HAVANA, May 14, 1898.

I beg your excellency that you will tell me truly whether the squadron is coming. Telegrams denying this are arriving and I stop them on the way. I must positively know the truth, so as to be able to act accordingly. I assure your excellency that absolutely no one besides myself shall know your reply.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curaçao.¹

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

Your telegram received. Transatlantic *Alicante* anchored at Martinique (with coal)² has been ordered to leave immediately for Curaçao. If you can not wait, telegraph immediately to captain (of *Terror*) where you want the coal. In view of your going to Martinique, steamer sent to Curaçao was ordered to go to Martinique. Do not know whether latter has arrived.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curaçao.³

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

If you can not await trans-Atlantic *Alicante* leave orders at Curaçao, so that said steamer may go immediately upon arrival wherever you order; likewise English steamer *Tuickhand*, which also carries coal.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curaçao.³

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

Our minister from Toronto communicates to-day, 15th, the following telegram: "It is reported that hostile squadron under command of Sampson was at Puerto Plata yesterday."

The Minister (Bermejo) to the First Commandant Puerto Rico (Vallarino).

MADRID, May 15, 1898.

Use every means possible to get to Admiral of squadron, who is at Curaçao, the

¹ This telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I received it.

² The words in parentheses did not appear in the telegram as received.

³ This telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I received it.

telegrams you have for him, as also information on situation hostile squadron, and arrange for immediate departure of English steamer *Roath*, if she has coal on board for squadron.¹

[Confidential.]

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON.

HONORED SIR: Through my official letter of the 8th, written on the sea, your excellency knows of the few incidents of our monotonous voyage across the Atlantic, during which I sacrificed everything in order that our frail torpedo-boat destroyers might arrive fresh and in condition to render useful service. But my efforts were in vain, for hardly had the *Furor* and *Terror* been made for twenty-four hours to maintain two-thirds of their trial speed, when the boilers of the latter became disabled, putting us to the necessity of losing still further time, and finally leaving the *Terror* in the neutral port of Fort de France in the island of Martinique.

The accompanying copy of the official report of her captain, marked "Document No. 1," will give your excellency further details as to what has occurred. It was a great and very unpleasant surprise to me when I saw our two destroyers at day-break of the 11th, the *Terror* nothing but a buoy, and the *Furor* guarding her, so that she might not be abandoned in the midst of the ocean until she was sure of being seen by the squadron. When we reached her I took her in tow, and we had to proceed even more slowly than at the beginning, as the destroyer no longer had the protection of the swifter with which the commander of the flotilla had provided her.

I will say nothing further of this accident, since it has occurred to a ship under very efficient command, and with an engineer in chief who enjoys the highest reputation. It only proves the frailness of these ships. They have another defect, almost worse, namely, the temperature which develops in them and which is unbearable for all, but especially for the engineers and firemen, who are frequently overcome by the heat.

The commander of the flotilla, who, as your excellency is aware, went to Martinique in search of information, went out with the *Furor* at daybreak of the 11th, and at midnight of the 11th he rejoined the squadron, brimful of news, but all bad, and, among other obstacles encountered, having had to contend with a chase by a hostile cruiser. The commander, Captain Villaamil, has once more demonstrated in this enterprise the rare intelligence, energy, and presence of mind with which he is gifted. The information he brought me, in answer to the questions I gave him upon trusting the mission to him, is as follows: That the hostile ships are blockading the western part of Cuba, from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, with the nucleus of their fleet; that just now, according to secret information which, however, is not entirely reliable, they are off San Juan de Puerto Rico, with their Admiral, and bombarded the capital on the 11th; that San Juan appears to be blockaded and Santiago free; that two of the enemy's auxiliary cruisers, the *Harrard* and *St. Louis*, are at Guadeloupe and Martinique, respectively; that the Americans have taken possession of Puerto Plata and, it is believed, also of Samana; that the war of insurrection in Cuba is still going on, and the last news is of a fierce battle at Sierra Maestra; that Spain is passing through a ministerial crisis; that we should not be permitted to take coal in Martinique, but that we could get provisions there; and finally, that there was no special news from the far East.

He also brought me a bundle of press telegrams containing a great deal of news; among others, of the destruction of our poor fleet in the Philippines, which, glorious though it may be, is nevertheless a great disaster. In view of the very serious

¹I did not know of this telegram until long after my return to Spain.

news, and although my opinions on the subject have been manifested (too frankly, perhaps) in my correspondence with the Government, by telegrams as well as official letters, and in my confidential communications to the minister of marine, I considered it my duty to assemble the captains and second in command of the squadron, whom I acquainted with the situation and consulted as to what, in their opinion, was best to be done.

After discussing this very serious question, it was decided that there was no advantage in going to Martinique, since we would gain nothing thereby and only consume coal. To go to San Juan would be madness, as we would only be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. And as we have hardly coal enough to reach Santiago de Cuba, with the speed necessary on the sea of operations, and as our destroyers would probably not be able to withstand the trip, it was the unanimous opinion of the officers that we should go to Curaçao in search of the coal which was promised us by telegram of April 26. Proceedings were drawn up to that effect, a copy of which, marked "Document No. 2," accompanies this letter.¹ As I was of the same opinion, we proceeded to that island, adopting at first a wrong course in the direction of Santo Domingo, until at a distance of 30 miles from Martinique. Permit me here to make a few observations to explain and justify my operations.

There is not the least doubt that a sacrifice, such as made by our comrades in the Philippines, is worthy of the highest honor, and I take pleasure in expressing to them from here my enthusiasm and admiration. But is there any practical result in such sacrifice? Evidently not, and from pitting vessels like the *Castilia* and *Christina* against modern ships no other result than the one obtained can possibly be expected. The result will always be the same where there is great disparity between the opposing forces, whether in the number of ships, their efficiency, or the stores they carry.

This painful result therefore justifies the crude ideas I have expressed in my correspondence above referred to, upon which I insist no further, as I do not want to be a bore, which is always a bad thing, especially when addressing a superior. I therefore proceed with the report of our voyage. The run from the waters of Martinique to those of Curaçao offered nothing worth mentioning. At 7 o'clock a. m. of the 14th, about 5 miles from Little Curaçao, I gave orders to the destroyers to enter the port first; but at 8.30 I saw them off the entrance. The *Plutón* signaled: "Awaiting permission of governor." The squadron stopped and soon after the *Plutón* signaled that only two ships were permitted to go in. This was confirmed by the pilot, who arrived soon after, demanding to know the names of the ships, their complements and armament, and the amount of coal required. I selected the *Teresa* and *Vizcaya*, whose coal supply was lower than that of the others. I gave the information asked for, stating that each ship needed 700 tons, and the pilot went back.

I gave instructions that the *Furor* should be recoaled from the *Colón*, and that the latter ship, together with the *Oquendo* and *Plutón*, should remain outside. The pilot returned, accompanied by the Spanish consul, who told me that the stay in the harbor must be limited to forty-eight hours. At 12.30 we cast anchor inside, after which I had an interview with the governor, who told me that this was a necessity imposed upon his Government by both belligerents. I accepted the 600 tons of coal, which was all that could be had in the town, and ordered the purchase of provisions so as to supply each ship for thirty days, from the captain down to the cabin boy.

At 5 o'clock p. m. I dispatched to your excellency the following cipher message, which I hereby confirm: "After consulting with the second in command of the squadron and the captains of the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal announced in your telegram of April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not been able to obtain here the coal I need. There is a controversy about it, and I must

¹The document referred to is given on p. 73.

see what I can do. Only two ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has been limited to forty-eight hours."

I tell your excellency nothing of my plans, as I do not wish to intrust them to paper, and furthermore, when this letter reaches you, you will certainly have received telegraphic news from me. The coaling proceeds slowly owing to lack of means for shipping it, but I intend to go out by any means this evening, no matter what quantity I may have on board, for while the question of coal is of the utmost importance to me, I do not want to spend another night with the squadron divided.

On board *Infanta Maria Teresa*, St. Ann Harbor, Curaçao, May 15, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

DOCUMENT NO. 1 REFERRED TO ON P. 75.

HONORED SIR: Agreeable to the orders of your excellency, we left the squadron on the morning of the 9th instant, together with the *Furor*, having on board the commander in chief of the division. We had three boilers in operation, and proceeded at the rate of 18 knots. About 1.30 several tubes of the forward boilers burst. They were therefore disconnected and the fires put out. We lighted the fourth boiler, and as soon as the injured boilers were cold we examined them and proceeded to repair No. 2, which had suffered the least.

By daylight the injured tubes had been stopped up, the fire was relighted, and by 8.30 a. m. we had steam up. By 10.30 the three boilers had neither water nor steam, the fires were put out, and we called the *Furor* to take us in tow. After reconnoitering, we commenced once more to repair No. 2, and had steam up by 7 o'clock a. m., when we stood for the squadron, which was sighted at that moment. In conformity with my duty, I have the honor of reporting the foregoing to your excellency for your information.

Yours, etc.,

FRANCISCO DE LA ROCHA.

ON BOARD *TERROR*, *On the Sea*, May 11, 1898.

A true copy.

JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE,
Chief of Staff.

[Confidential.]

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: I believe it to be my duty, in view of the change of government, to call your excellency's attention to the main deficiencies with which this squadron went out to war. The principal deficiency, not of this ship alone, but of the whole squadron, is in the lack of reliable 5.5-inch ammunition, of which all the ships together have only about 620 rounds out of the whole 3,000. Moreover, the *Vizcaya* has two 5.5-inch guns and the *Oquendo* one which can not be relied upon and which had been ordered to be changed for others. Among the fuses there are a large number which are not safe, owing to defects of original construction.

The squadron has not a single one of the 60 Bustamante torpedoes which it was to have. The *Colón* does not have her heavy guns, nor apparatus for re-forming and charging the cartridge-cases of the 5.9 and 4.7 inch guns. The *Vizcaya* has not been cleaned since July, and she has consequently lost her speed to such an extent that she can not now make more than 13 or 14 knots an hour. By reason of this fact the squadron has lost the only advantage which it might have had over the hostile fleet,

for so important a ship can not be abandoned. And here I close, not because there are not many other things, but because they are of less importance in connection with the campaign, and it is not my object to trouble your excellency, but only to acquaint you with the true condition of our forces.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON BOARD TERESA, *St. Ann, Curaçao, May 15, 1898.*

The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).

HAVANA, *May 17, 1898.*

(To be deciphered by your excellency personally.)

Have asked commandant navy whether he has received news on situation of our squadron. He tells me received from San Juan confidential cipher message saying that telegram has been sent to commander in chief of squadron at Fort de France that his instructions are amplified, and if he can not operate there successfully may return to Peninsula. If this should happen, situation here would be wholly untenable, and I could not prevent bloody revolution in this capital and whole island, feelings being already overmuch excited by delay in arrival of our squadron. Therefore, beg your excellency to tell me whether it is true that order has been issued to squadron to return to Peninsula, and if so does Government realize the significance of such a decision, which might be the cause of a bloody page staining our history, and of final loss of this island and the honor of Spain? If our squadron is defeated, it would increase here determination to vanquish or die; but if it flees, panic and revolution are certain.

The Governor-General, Puerto Rico (Macías), to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).

PUERTO RICO, *May 18, 1898.*

Order for squadron to return to Peninsula will end enthusiasm and high spirit in island. Inhabitants will say Spain abandons them and situation may become very critical. Consider it my sacred duty to tell you so.

The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girón).

HAVANA, *May 19, 1898—9 a. m.*

Our squadron has just entered Santiago de Cuba. Congratulate its Admiral on his arrival and skillful voyage.

The Minister of State (Gullón) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

MINISTRY OF STATE.

HONORED SIR: The Spanish minister at Caracas, in dispatch No. 79, dated May 18, advises this ministry as follows:

“On Friday, the 13th instant, a report was circulated in this city that the Spanish squadron was in the port of Higuerote, in this Republic. The origin of the rumor could not be ascertained because, owing to the revolution which is still devastating this country, there is no telegraphic communication with that point. Troubled by this report, I received on Saturday, the 14th, a telegram from our intelligent and energetic vice-consul in charge of the Spanish consulate at Curaçao, Mr. Morris E. Curiel, telling me that the Spanish squadron, composed of six ships, was sighted in that harbor. I telegraphed immediately, asking for frequent information, and at

the same time dispatched to your excellency a cipher telegram as follows, '[Spanish] squadron [in] sight to-day [off] Curaçao,' in order that the Government might know as early as possible the whereabouts of the squadron.

Mr. Morris telegraphed me the same day, the 14th, at 6.45 p. m., that the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and *Vizcaya* had entered the harbor, the *Oquendo*, *Cristóbal Colón*, and destroyers *Plutón* and *Furor* remaining outside. Sunday, the 15th, I learned that the squadron was in search of coal, and that 500 tons, all there was in that port, had been sold it by Captain Smith, United States consul. The latter being severely reprimanded by the United States minister here, replied that the coal did not belong to him, but to a friend, upon whom he had prevailed not to sell any more than had already been shipped at the time he made complaint to him, namely, about 300 tons.

I am waiting for the mail from Curaçao to confirm or correct this and other information which I have received and from which it would appear that the squadron purchased a large amount of provisions and that the destroyers had their bunkers full of coal. I was also informed that the United States minister had telegraphed to Washington and to the American dispatch boat at St. Thomas that the United States fleet was awaiting ours in Mona Passage, between Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. I at once telegraphed to Curaçao, and the consul answered at 5.30 p. m. that he had given warning and that the squadron was going out.

"As I knew that the United States fleet was expected at Curaçao, where two telegrams have been waiting for Admiral Sampson since the 13th, and knowing further that the French Cable Company has telegraphed its agents at La Guayra, Puerto Cabello, and Curaçao, opening unlimited credits to said admiral for telegraphing purposes, I sent a trustworthy person with precise instructions to our consul at La Guayra, Mr. Perera, and urged him to have one of the pilots of the port, all of whom happened to be Spanish, in readiness in case our squadron should be sighted, to start immediately and notify Admiral Cervera of all this, as also of the fact that there is coal available in the port of Guanta, near Barcelona, in this Republic.

"By secret information I learned that same day, the 15th, that the correspondent here of the New York Herald had received a telegram from that paper asking him to telegraph whether the Spanish squadron was at Barranquilla, United States of Colombia, which shows that it is believed in the United States that our ships are off the Leeward Islands and Colon. All this strictly confidential information I have received from different persons who are desirous of proving to me their loyalty to Spain, and none of this information has cost this legation a single cent. On the 16th the consul at Curaçao telegraphed me that the Spanish vice-consul at Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo, had informed him of the arrival of the United States fleet.

"On the same day I dispatched to you a cipher telegram, saying: 'Spanish squadron composed (of) six ships has obtained (at) Curaçao only 300 tons (of) coal, weighing anchor yesterday, notified by me (that) United States fleet is awaiting (them in) Mona Passage.' 'United States fleet is in Puerto Plata (and is) expected (at) Curaçao and Venezuela. Coal available at Guanta.'

"To-day the consul at Curaçao has transmitted to me a telegram from our consul at Santo Domingo in key 74, and as I do not have this it was deciphered by the secretary of the Spanish legation, who, fortunately, has an excellent knowledge of the cipher keys of your ministry. The telegram said: 'Hostile fleet went out Saturday Samana.' I do not know whether this telegram has reference to a movement prior to the arrival of said fleet at Puerto Plata, Monday the 16th. I have also received a telegram from the Governor-General of Puerto Rico, asking me whether I had cipher key 74, and, trusting to the cryptographic knowledge of the secretary of this legation, Mr. Mariategui, I answered that I had.

"The consul at Curaçao has received and forwarded to me a telegram from the commandant-general at Havana, Rear-Admiral Manterola, and one from the commandant-general of Puerto Rico, one yesterday and the other to-day, both in the naval key, which neither he nor I have been able to make out. I have asked both

to telegraph to me in the key of the ministry of state, but have so far received no reply.

"About a week ago a United States officer arrived here as military attaché to the legation, and he and his minister are working hard, the former making frequent trips to the port of La Guaira. But I do not lose sight of them, and shall do whatever I can to frustrate their plans."

Obedient to royal order from the minister of state, I transmit the above to your excellency, for your information and to such ends as may be deemed expedient.

Palace, June 17, 1898.

L. POLO DE BERNABÉ,¹
Assistant Secretary.

*The Minister (Auñón) to the Captain of the Terror, at Martinique, and Naval Commandant at Santiago de Cuba.*²

MADRID, May 19, 1898.

If possible to communicate with Admiral our squadron, notify him that Government cancels telegram as to return to Spain.

*The Spanish Minister at The Hague to the Minister of State (Gullón).*³

THE HAGUE, May 19, 1898.

Minister plenipotentiary United States has called attention Dutch Government to quantity of coal furnished Spanish squadron at Curaçao, believing it to be more than 400 tons. Has insisted on the island not being converted into a base of operations.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898.

The squadron entered the harbor this morning. Imperative to clean engines and boilers, which will make it necessary for me to remain here several days. Moreover, I need more coal than I have.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898.

Have cast anchor to-day in this harbor, whence whole squadron sends you greeting, desirous of cooperating in the defense of the country.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of the Navy-Yard (Manterola).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898.

Cast anchor in this harbor this morning, and have the pleasure of placing myself at your disposal.

¹ I did not learn of this communication and three preceding telegrams until long after my return to Spain.

² I learned of this telegram at Santiago on the 20th.

³ I did not know of this telegram until long after my return to Spain.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago de Cuba.

MADRID, May 19, 1898.

Ministry congratulates your excellency and squadron on skillful maneuver. Have ordered commandant navy-yard to supply you with whatever you require. Act in cooperation with the Governor-General and give me frequent news.

Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to General Linares, Santiago.

HAVANA, May 19, 1898.

Kindly advise Admiral Cervera that I congratulate him on safe arrival and skillful voyage, and offer him my cooperation in everything. Need hardly tell your excellency that I am always at your service. My last information is: Sampson's fleet at Samana and Puerto Plata. Flying Squadron on the way from Charleston to Key West, where it is expected to arrive to-day.

The Commandant Navy-Yard, Havana (Manterola), to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 19, 1898.

Your telegram received. Learning of your arrival through commandant, navy, hasten to congratulate you in name of all on safe arrival. From information received United States squadron of evolution was to sail for Key West, unite with Sampson's, and seek ours. A transport, two cruisers, and a gunboat are blockading this harbor.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).¹

HAVANA, May 20, 1898.

As I notified your excellency, Cervera's squadron arrived at Santiago minus *Terror*, which was left at Martinique with *Alicante*, both blockaded by hostile ships. Squadron without provisions and coal. Taking coal at Santiago where it can not remain long; danger of being blockaded and entirely cut off; resources of place limited. If *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, and torpedo-boat flotilla had come with them might attempt some action and lend powerful assistance in defense of islands. But reduced as it is, squadron must elude encounter and confine itself to maneuvers which will not compromise it and which can not have great results. Has brought no transports with coal and provisions which would have helped so much, nor weapons and ammunition.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 20, 1898.

Intend to refit ships in shortest possible time, because, in my opinion, Santiago will soon be in difficult situation if it does not receive aid.

¹ I learned of this telegram long after my return to Spain.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 20, 1898.

It is reported that island of Cuba will be invaded latter part of next week by 28,000 men. Hostile ships stationed south of Santiago and St. Thomas and near Martinique to capture *Terror* and *Alicante*. (The enemy supposes defensive power of Puerto Rico very slight.)¹

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 20, 1898.

Necessary to notify admiral of squadron that English steamer with 3,000 Cardiff coal leaves for Curaçao to-day, by superior order, carrying urgent telegram from minister marine. Consul St. Thomas says hostile squadron, reenforced by another Key West, has gone out to meet ours in direction Martinique.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 20, 1898.

These ships must have engines repaired. I do not know composition of hostile squadrons nor distribution of their other naval forces. Would be grateful to you for this information. Also beg you will advise me whether 5.5-inch ammunition and other stores have been received for this squadron, and whether Cienfuegos has resources and communication by land with Havana. Deem it absolutely necessary to send coal and large quantity provisions here at once. We are very grateful to your excellency and personnel of navy-yard for congratulations.

The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

FORT DE FRANCE, May 20, 1898.

Repair of boilers completed.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of the Terror.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 20, 1898.

Congratulate you on repairing boilers. When you can proceed to Puerto Rico in comparative safety, start. But I understand at present hostile ships stationed at St. Thomas to capture you and *Alicante*. Notify *Alicante*.

¹ The sentence in parentheses was not transmitted to Santiago.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Your telegram received. Advise me whether you have received sufficient coal and whether you have news of *Terror*.¹ Thirty thousand pounds at your disposal in London.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Our transports in Martinique and Puerto Rico are urged to carry coal to you and to the naval officer assigned to Kingston, Jamaica, who is instructed to place himself under your orders.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Received information that Sampson's fleet left Key West last night.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898.

Congratulate your excellency on elevation to ministry, of which we hope great results. Santiago de Cuba very short of provisions, and if it does not receive any it must succumb. As this squadron is greatly inferior to American, we can not accept decisive battle, which would mean certain defeat, and if we are blockaded before we finish taking coal, which is (scarcely) *difficult*,² we shall succumb with the city. If provisions are received, resistance will be possible as long as they last.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 21, 1898.

Her Majesty charges me to congratulate your excellency in her name on your skill and sends greeting to crews of squadron, whose movements she follows with interest.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898.

Received telegram from *Terror* yesterday, notifying me boilers repaired. Have instructed her to go to Puerto Rico if opportunity offers, notifying her that enemies are at present watching for her.

¹ The part in *italics* omitted in pamphlet.

² In the pamphlet the word in *italics* is omitted and the word in parentheses, which does not occur in the original, is inserted.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898.

Beg your excellency will express to Her Majesty our profound gratitude and loyalty, hoping only to render ourselves worthy of distinction shown us.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

Tell Admiral Cervera that English ship with coal has left Curaçao for Santiago. You can afterwards use said vessel for provisions.

Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

Guantanamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have Bustamante torpedoes; latter place doubtful. Cienfuegos and Havana, electric torpedoes.

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

Cienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow.

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HAVANA, May 21, 1898.

The hostile forces are composed of seven cruisers, namely: *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Minneapolis*, *Columbia*, *New York*, *Indiana*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon*. Two of 6,000 tons, *Texas* and *Puritan*, expected in the near future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six torpedo boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted off Havana and Cienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and transports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number reported to exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm.

At present there are off the harbor cruiser *New York*, *Indiana*, *Puritan*, and five other cruisers, six gunboats, and two dispatch boats. Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5-inch guns, twenty-five rounds for 11-inch, three boxes fuses for *Vizcaya*. On April 1 I reported to minister

in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty-five vessels composing this fleet thirty-two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless.

"Engines of *Alfonso XII* totally disabled. *Reina Mercedes*, seven of the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of *Marqués de la Ensenada*, *Isabel II*, and *Venadito*, the latter is the only one in condition to put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. *Magallanes* can not light fires, either. Gunboats converted into cruisers, for which purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which constitutes their principal defense. Transport *Legazpi*, highest speed 7 knots. Of the small English gunboats I believe I need say nothing."

A look at the *Reina Mercedes* will give an idea of what my forces are. *Infanta Isabel* and *Marqués de la Ensenada* will soon be ready. Torpedo gunboats *Martín A. Pinzón*, *Nueva España*, *Marqués de Molins*, and *Vicente Y. Pinzón* can be used, or at least are able to move. Provisions for two months for this fleet and the one under your excellency's command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on private stores probably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival with your squadron and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and torpedo boat flotilla.

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have, we may agree with your excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor private, and the fastest one we have, the *Santo Domingo*, is in dock. I await your answer.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 22, 1898.

Have been compelled to engage firemen to increase complements inadequate for this service.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 22, 1898

I repeat my telegrams of April 26 and May 12, advising you that you have at your disposal in London, banking house Mildred Goyoneche, £15,000.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 22, 1898.

We are still cleaning engines and boilers, which is absolutely necessary. We are taking coal, but there is not enough to refill bunkers;

but if collier arrives from Curaçao we can refill, and there will be some left over. Sent you information about *Terror* by telegraph yesterday.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 22, 1898.*

Have received your cipher telegram advising me of pitiful condition of your naval forces. Believe no more can come from Spain, as none were available except *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and a few destroyers and torpedo boats. *Pelayo* has not, I believe, her secondary battery installed. Possibly some of the trans-Atlantics purchased may come with stores. I believe there are four; speed good. My coming here has been somewhat accidental; according to instructions I was to go to Puerto Rico. Do not believe convoys have been thought of at all, since I have always been told that I should find everything here. These ideas may perhaps have changed with ministerial crisis.

Captain of Alicante (Genis) to the Admiral (Cervera).

FORT DE FRANCE, *May 22, 1898.*

Marquis Comillas tells me to go to Santiago and leave coal. Captain of destroyer advises on the part of your excellency that hostile ships are stationed to capture me. Beg that you will give me instructions.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of Alicante (Genis).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 22, 1898.*

Do not go out for the present.

The Commandant-General of Puerto Rico (Villarino) to the Commandant, Navy, Santiago de Cuba.

SAN JUAN, *May 22, 1898.*

English steamer *Restormel*, 3,000 tons Cardiff coal for squadron, left Curaçao yesterday for Santiago. Speed, 7 knots.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, *May 23, 1898.*

I approve increase of firemen. Coal left San Juan for Santiago. There are 3,000 tons at Cienfuegos. Hostile squadron, Admiral Schley, left Key West for south Cuba on night 20th, and afterwards Sampson's. It is believed [4] monitors and several cruisers watching Yucatan Channel. If trans-Atlantic *Alfonso XIII*, armed,

arrives with coal and provisions, you may, if desired, incorporate her in squadron. I notify commandant-general of navy-yard. If impossible to pass through channels, may go roundabout way or create diversion on hostile coast, but not considered necessary.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Yesterday enemy reenforced blockading line to 21 vessels, among them 3 battle ships; to-day there are only 6; 3 battle ships off Cienfuegos.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

To-day 12 hostile ships off Cienfuegos.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Of the ships off Havana yesterday, the battle ship *Indiana*, cruiser *New York*, cruiser *Montgomery*, dispatch boat *Dolphin*, large gunboat *Wilmington*, and other cruisers have gone to windward.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Since 10 o'clock this morning almost the entire horizon Havana free from hostile ships, only four insignificant gunboats remaining to windward. The others have gone out with course to windward.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 23, 1898.

Secret information from Montreal that Schley's fleet goes to south of Cuba (afterwards Sampson's), and that four monitors and several cruisers are watching Yucatan Channel. Nothing new from Puerto Rico. English cruiser with coal sailed yesterday from Curaçao for Santiago. Have already advised you of ships off Havana this evening.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant Puerto Rico (Villarino).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 23, 1898.

The trans-Atlantic steamer is not to go out for the present.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 24, 1898.*

Squadron being ready to leave anchorage in search of stores it needs, have assembled captains of ships, which are *unanimously*¹ of following opinion: In view maximum speed this squadron reduced to 14 knots, account of *Vizcaya* bottom fouled, lack of coal, location of hostile fleets, and condition of harbor, certain danger of sortie greater than advantages gained by reaching San Juan, *only* (near) harbor where we could go. Proceedings drawn up signed by me. Shall await more favorable opportunity. Meanwhile will get all possible supplies, and in conjunction with commander in chief of army *division* aid in defense of harbor and city. To supply city, necessary to run blockade with fast vessels 20 knots *at night*, after agreeing on day and hour to send (a boat) out of harbor (with) pilot and keep channel clear. Have instructed trans-Atlantic steamers Havana and Martinique not to go out because (according to information) would *certainly* be captured.

PROCEEDINGS.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo boat division having been convened by the admiral, assembled in the latter's cabin on the 24th day of May, 1898.

The Admiral acquainted the officers present with the information received since the preceding evening, from the Governor-General of the island, the commandant-general of the navy-yard, and Her Majesty's Government, to the effect that Admiral Schley's fleet had left Key West on the 20th instant, bound for the south of the island of Cuba, and that Admiral Sampson's fleet had been sighted off Cienfuegos yesterday. As these forces are each far superior to this squadron, and as the truth of such information was confirmed by the fact that four ships remained in front of the harbor entrance all day yesterday, the Admiral desired to hear the opinions of said officers as to what was best to be done by the squadron under the circumstances.

It had been decided yesterday that the best plan was to start at day-break for San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the necessary telegrams had been sent to detain there the collier and the trans-Atlantic steamer *Alfonso XIII*, which the Government had, by telegraph, placed at the disposal of the squadron.

Owing to the location of the hostile forces and their number and strength, it was unanimously considered impossible to carry out said plan, as the maximum speed of this squadron is calculated to be 14 knots, which is the speed of the *Vizcaya* as the result of the fouled condition of her bottom. Taking into consideration that the ships had not been able to get more than one-third of their coal supply, that the conditions of the harbor make it necessary for the sortie to be effected by the ships one by one, at slow speed, which might make it necessary for the first ship, or ships, that go out to return, though only for the

¹ Words and praises in *italics* are omitted in the pamphlet; those in parentheses were not in the telegram as dispatched.

purpose of reconnoitering, with a consequent loss of moral strength, all the officers present were of opinion that the certain danger of the squadron was much greater than the few advantages which might be derived from reaching the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico, and that it was therefore necessary to abandon this plan and remain at Santiago, refit as far as possible from the stores to be had here, and take advantage of the first good opportunity for leaving the harbor, at present blockaded by superior forces.

All the officers present were also of opinion that the present situation of the squadron compels it to remain in this harbor.

Pascual Cervera, José de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Víctor M. Concas, Fernando Villaamil, Joaquín Bustamante, Antonio Eulate, Emilio Díaz Moreu.

The Captain-General of Ouba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 24, 1898.

Oregon has reached Key West. Flying Squadron proceeding to Santiago, where Sampson also intends to arrive to-morrow, unless notified of departure of Cervera's squadron. If latter does not go out, may be closed in.

The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera).

FORT DE FRANCE, May 24, 1898.

I go out early to-morrow morning.

[Private.]

ADVISORY BOARD (CENTRO CONSULTIVO) OF THE NAVY,
Madrid, May 24, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I send you these few lines to express to you my best wishes on your arrival in Santiago Harbor with the squadron under your able command. I assure you I was very happy to know of your safety, as I had thought it unavoidable that you would meet one of the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters, and as each of them is superior in strength to the squadron under your command, it was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be defeated and destroyed.

Thanks to your skillful seamanship and efficient management, and above all to Divine Providence, we do not have to lament to-day the lives of many victims and the loss of the best ships of our small navy.

Upon this I congratulate you with all my heart, as also the crews under your orders, and I pray that God may further be with you.

Keep well; give my love to your son Angel, and believe always in the affection of your devoted friend,

ANTONIO DE LA ROCHA.

MADRID (LA CONCEPCIÓN), *November 16, 1898.*

His Excellency ANTONIO DE LA ROCHA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Upon my return from the island of Cuba I received day before yesterday your affectionate letter of May 24, which I appreciate very much, and which has given me a great deal of pleasure, as it is a document of value to myself, first of all, but also to you and all the officers who at the meeting of general officers voted in favor of the squadron going to the West Indies.

I went to the ministry yesterday to thank you and talk with you of these matters, but did not find you and was sorry to hear of the cause of your absence. I therefore write to you, as it will be impossible for me to go to your house either to-day or to-morrow to express my sympathy and tell you what I think of your letter and what I expect to do with it. The letter is of the greatest importance to me, because your saying that you had thought it unavoidable that I would meet one of the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters, and as each of them was far superior in strength to the squadron under my command, it was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be defeated and destroyed, shows that it was not my opinion alone, but that of my comrades, and it removes all doubt of the fact that we were forced on to certain destruction, and it is of the greatest importance to me to make this point clear.

For yourself and the comrades who voted with you the letter is of importance because, in showing that in spite of your belief that the squadron was going out to defeat, you voted that it should go out, it demonstrates that it was neither ignorance nor lack of consideration, but much higher motives that impelled you, and although I believe that such motives should not have altered your opinions, it is comforting to see in the service that spirit of sacrifice, even though the sacrifice had to be made by others than those who did the voting.

I have not told you what I intend to do; simply this, I am going to preserve your letter like a precious jewel and let its contents appear in my statement.

Reiterating to you my sympathy, I remain your affectionate friend and comrade,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 25, 1898.

We are blockaded. I qualified our coming here as disastrous for interests of country. Events begin to show I was right. With disparity of forces any effective operation absolutely impossible. We have provisions for one month.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 25, 1898.

Received your message A D 0391. I approve your determination and reiterate your freedom of action as well as confidence of Government. Squadron must not be sacrificed in vain. Am studying to attract hostile ships to their own coasts. We have no vessels 20 knots, but if you know of any you are authorized to take any steps to carry out operation you propose. Do you know whereabouts of destroyer *Fu* or *?¹*

[Urgent.]

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 25, 1898.

Private telegrams from the United States say it is intended to close in squadron Santiago. Entrance should be watched to prevent carrying out of this plan.

[Confidential.]

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army, Division of Santiago (Linares).

HONORED SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your two official and confidential letters on the movements of the hostile fleets, for which I thank you very much. It is much to be regretted that the squadron did not go out yesterday while it had all the fires lighted. But information received from the Government confirmed the report that Schley's fleet had started for Santiago on the night of the 20th and that Sampson was following with his fleet, and for that reason all the captains of this squadron were unanimously of opinion that the sortie was impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity of our coal, I ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out.

As these ships require a number of hours to get up steam, they would not be ready before night, and that would be too late, especially in view

¹This telegram, which is an answer to mine of the 24th, was completely omitted in the pamphlet.

of the rapid consumption of coal. For these reasons there is no other course open at present but to take up positions, as we agreed yesterday, to defend the harbor and city in case an attempt should be made to force the entrance. The *Colón* is already at her post and the *Teresa* will be there shortly; the others will not be there until to night or to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If another opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and take advantage of it, but as I can not hope with these scant forces to attempt any definite operations, it will only be a matter of changing this harbor for another where we would also be blockaded.

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this harbor, which is so short of everything we need, and I had chosen it in preference because, not having been blockaded, I supposed it to be well supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Although I always thought that it would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could keep the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the only effective service that can be expected of this small and and poorly equipped squadron. I beg that you will transmit these explanations to his excellency the Captain-General, as the highest representative of the nation in this island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent inaction.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 25, 1898.*

[Confidential.]

The Commander in Chief of the Army division (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: I am in receipt of your favor in which you acknowledge the receipt of my former two letters and express the desire that his excellency the Captain-General of the island should be advised of the reasons which have kept your excellency from weighing anchor from this harbor with the squadron under your efficient command. I have transmitted this information to the Captain-General by cable, making accurate extracts from your letter. I have the honor of forwarding you herewith a copy of the telegram dispatched.

Yours, etc.

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 25, 1898.*

[Copy of cablegram referred to.]

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 25, 1898.*

The CAPTAIN-GENERAL, *Havana:*

Have transmitted to Cervera information from your excellency of yesterday and this morning relative to location United States fleets.

His official answer for your information is, in substance, as follows: Regrets extremely not having gone out early yesterday morning. Opinion unanimous to remain, owing to direct information from Government that Schley's fleet had gone out night of 20th for Santiago, followed by Sampson. Scarcity of coal made it necessary to put out three-fifths of boilers. Lighting fires again and taking water would not permit going out before night, which he considers too late.

Decided to remain here for the present, changing anchoring place, putting ships in position to repulse enemy if he attempts to force entrance. Regrets bad luck brought him to this harbor lacking everything necessary, which he selected account of not being blockaded, believing abundantly supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Though subsequently blockaded, flattered himself with keeping busy greater part hostile fleet, only effective service he can render with small and poorly equipped squadron. Adds he will try to take advantage of opportunity for sortie, if possible, changing for another harbor where he will also be blockaded, being unable to attempt any other kind of operations. He makes the above explanations to you as the highest representative of nation, so that you may know causes of apparent inaction.

LINARES.

The above is a copy.

LINARES.

[Extract.]

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, May 26, 1898.

An English steamer carrying coal our squadron appears to have been captured near Santiago yesterday. *Terror* eluded American ships at Martinique. Is now at San Juan.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, May 26, 1898.

Admiral Cervera decided to remain in Santiago for present, in view superiority enemy, lack of coal, and inadequate armament of ships. Report of another squadron fitting at Cadiz. If true, absolutely necessary to be accompanied by transports with provisions and coal, and the guns, small arms, and ammunition requested of your excellency.

The Minister of Marine (Aunón) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

MADRID, May 26, 1898.

Kindly transmit to commander army, Santiago (Linares), following telegram from minister war: "Advise me for how long you have provisions and whether you can receive any by land, indicating in that case to what nearest port they can be sent. Have asked Captain-General

whether city blockaded by land also, but he has not answered. I must know to take measures for provisioning. Let me know whether you have received war key to communicate with this ministry. Answer in that or through commander in chief squadron if you do not have key."

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO, May 26, 1898.

Kindly transmit the following to the minister of war: "Santiago can hold out until middle July. Three hundred and fifty thousand rations used by personnel per month; 20,000 corn, 5 pounds each, for horses and mules. Guantamo brigade provisioned until middle June; uses 200,000 rations for personnel, 9,000 corn for horses and cattle. Baracoa and Sagua Tanamo, ports northeru coast, provisioned until end August, have garrisons 900 and 700 respectively; no horses or mules; also need drugs for hospitals, especially quinine and bismuth; men received April pay last year in January this year.

"Generals, captains, regular officers, nine months' pay due with extra allowances, three in one consignment received in bills not current here. Blockade by land broken by troops every time they go out, but rations can only be received at ports referred to for respective forces. Have not received key to communicate with your excellency. Making efforts to get for Santiago and Guantánamo two months' provisions from Halifax, Canada, and cattle from South American republics. Have no hopes they will succeed running blockade; very strict since arrival of squadron. Absolutely necessary to send sandals, 1,800 pair Baracoa, 1,400 Sagua Tanamo, 24,000 Santiago, and 16,000 Guantánamo.

"LINARES."

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago.

HAVANA, May 26, 1898.

Communicate to Admiral Cervera: "Have received your communication through General Linares. Thank you very much for your courtesy. It seems to me if I had been permitted assistance in case of such importance result might have been better, as no one better than I could have given you information on condition of island and location hostile fleets daily, which might have been of great service to you in carrying out your plans. But no one notified me of your route and points to be touched, and I could not communicate with your excellency, although I tried the 13th at San Juan de Puerto Rico, in case you should touch there, advising you of position hostile ships, as I have done since your arrival at Santiago.

"Regret with your excellency that these causes and inadequate armament ships have placed you in unenviable position. Great pity

you were not accompanied by fast trans-Atlantics with provisions and coal, which in my opinion you need most, since without them it will be impossible for you to attempt any operation, which your well-known skill and valor must surely make you wish for. Report of another squadron being ready at Cadiz, which might solve problem, but I doubt it, and if it also comes without coal and provisions better it should not come. In any event I have great confidence in you, and hope everything from your ability and patriotism. Your task, like mine, is very difficult, as we have to do it all with scant means. Always count on me and Linares, who is very efficient, and let us trust in God. Have received information arrival *Terror* at San Juan, eluding every difficulty."

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 26, 1898.

Kindly transmit minister war following: "In addition to former cable, I beg you will send 12,000 cotton suits Santiago, 7,000 Guantanamo, 1,000 Sagua Tanamo, with necessary underwear, shirts and drawers.

"LINARES."

PROCEEDINGS.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the torpedo-boat flotilla, being convened by the Admiral, assembled in his cabin on the 26th day of May, 1898.

The Admiral acquainted the officers with recent information received relative to the movements of the hostile fleets, and asked for their opinions as to the expediency of going out that day, taking advantage of the bad weather prevailing. It was unanimously decided that the squadron should proceed to San Juan, and orders were issued to spread the fires of all the boilers and be ready by 5 o'clock p. m.

At 2 o'clock the semaphore signaled the presence of three hostile ships. In view of this fact, in connection with the circumstance that the weather was clearing, the admiral again convened the officers aforesaid. Doubts as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the going out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the meeting in the morning.

To settle this question, Pilot Miguel was called, who had piloted in the flagship, and who, in the opinion of the captain of the harbor, is the most intelligent of the pilots (with the exception of the chief pilot, who is ill).

Miguel stated that with the weather prevailing there would be no trouble whatever about taking out the *Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo*

any time, day or night, their draft being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, but that the going out of the *Colón*, whose draft is 24.9 feet, might present difficulties on account of a flat rock in the water off Point Morrillo, where the water is only 27½ English feet deep.

The pilot was sent to the harbor entrance to form a more exact opinion on the state of the sea, and returned, saying that he thought it very probable that, owing to the swell, the *Colón* might touch bottom on the flat rock referred to. Under these circumstances the admiral propounded the following question, on the assumption that the whole squadron should go out together, leaving only the torpedo-boat destroyers in the harbor: Is it expedient to risk the *Colón* being injured, or should the sortie not be effected, awaiting more favorable circumstances?

The question being put in this form, Captains Concas and Bustamante were in favor of the sortie, for reasons hereinafter set forth, and all the other officers were in favor of not going out, with the exception of the admiral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions the foregoing proceedings were drawn up.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

ANTONIO EULATE.

JUAN B. LAZAGA.

EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

SEPARATE OPINIONS.

My reasons for expressing the opinion that the squadron should go out immediately, in spite of the statement of Pilot Miguel, are as follows: My impression on the probable situation of the hostile squadrons is the same as that formulated by the admiral. To-day we are certain that they are not off this harbor; they are almost sure to be there to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe well founded, I reason as follows: Our squadron, blockaded by far superior forces, has very little prospect of going out united by forcing the blockade. For each ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practicable in my opinion, and would expose us to the loss of one or more ships.

To go out openly and accept battle seems to me almost inhuman, because our defeat would be certain, and unwise, because it would be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems to me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city when, in a month from now or little more, we shall find ourselves without provisions, since we are completely cut off by land and sea. This last solution is to my mind even more inadmissible than any of the former.

This is, in my opinion, the situation of the squadron at the present time, and in view of its terrible gravity, I am in favor of saving three of the ships, even at the risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe such loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of safety, and so do hydrographers. The *Colón's* draft, according to her captain,

is 7.60 meters, that is to say, 24.93 English feet. The rock, according to the pilot, has 27.50 feet of water and is of very little extent (he says considerably less than the width of the admiral's cabin. Hence there would be a margin of $2\frac{1}{2}$ English feet, and the swell did not seem excessive to me this morning, when I was at the mouth of the harbor and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. Moreover, the *Colón* might pass over the rock without being struck by any sea, and even if she should be struck it would not be at all certain that the resulting injury would disable her from continuing the voyage.

Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, I believe it preferable for the *Colón* (which, in my mind, should be the last to go out) to remain disabled at the harbor entrance than for us to await what I fear is in store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope that I may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, and I can not hold it back.

JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.

Concurring entirely in the opinion of Captain Bustamante, I wish to add that the hostile squadron which is coming from Cienfuegos and which we expected this morning, having probably been detained by the storm, may be here at daybreak, and the blockade we should have to run in that case would be immensely superior even without counting the other squadron which is reported to be coming by way of the Old Channel.

In order to realize the seriousness of the situation of the city, it should be remembered that eleven months' pay is due the army as well as the navy; that the army owes for its provisions for almost the same length of time, and that commercial enterprise does not care to increase the debt, there being back in the minds of all the thought that with the autonomy of the island the treasury will pass out of our hands. Consequently the city of Santiago de Cuba, being blockaded by land and sea, is besieged by itself, which is the most effective kind of blockade, for there are no provisions and no one is doing anything to supply any. Therefore the capitulation will become necessary in a very short space of time, and will drag the squadron along with it.

The same as Captain Bustamante, I do not believe the loss of the *Cristóbal Colón* at all probable, and while under ordinary circumstances we should not go out and probably should not have entered, to-day circumstances demand our running the risk even of total loss, which I consider very remote, however. A delay of twenty or twenty-five days, which is all that remains to us, is not sufficient to warrant a hope of a favorable opportunity or a change of circumstances.

Santiago de Cuba, May 26, 1898.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to make it necessary to risk the loss of the *Colón* at the rock where the *Gerona*, of less

draft than the former, lost part of her false keel, and in hopes that the sea will calm down and that another opportunity will present itself the sortie is deferred.

CERVERA.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 27, 1898.*

I intended yesterday to run the blockade, taking advantage of storm, but the best pilot was of opinion that *Colón* would run great risk of touching bottom on a rock in the entrance of the harbor where *Gerona* lost false keel. Do not feel justified in running this risk and deferred sortie, second in command and captains being of same opinion except chief of staff and captain of *Infanta Maria Teresa*, who were of the contrary opinion. There are not at this harbor sufficiently fast vessels to run the blockade.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, *May 28, 1898.*

Your telegram of 27th received.¹ Notify you that enemy intends to sink hulks in entrance to harbor.

[Extract.]

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, *May 28, 1898.*

Although your excellency already has direct news from Santiago de Cuba, believe proper to tell you that that province is the one I have tried to make best provisions for on account of distance Havana and probable attack or blockade Americans and insurgents. Have reenforced it to 4 battalions, 3 squadrons, 1 Krupp mountain battery, 4 companies engineers, 10 field guns, 47 siege guns and corresponding auxiliary troops. Besides provisions paid for here by drafts on ministry have sent there 166,000 pesetas gold, 10,000 silver, 100,000 notes, and placed 100,000 pesos at Madrid and £10,000 at Birmingham. Of all this and other details referring to defense I send your excellency detailed official statement.²

Where provisions are most needed is at Gibara and Nuevitás. Appearance Cervera's squadron much impression on Americans, who have stationed 7 ships off Santiago de Cuba.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, *May 28, 1898.*

General Linares says twelve hostile ships arrived off Santiago yesterday, about 15 miles, disappearing to westward except one.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 28, 1898.*

The harbor is blockaded by hostile squadron more powerful than ours, and we are on lookout for opportunity to run the blockade. Meanwhile we are vigilant to

¹The words in *italics* are omitted in the pamphlet.

²It is certain that very much less than stated in this telegram reached Santiago.

frustrate enemy's plans. Under these conditions the battle would be unequal. Shall therefore try to elude it if possible. Coal is being shipped slowly.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army Division at Santiago (Linares).

HONORED SIR: I am in receipt of your official letter of the 26th, in which you transmit to me the ideas of the Captain-General, to whom I beg you will extend in my name many thanks for everything. I must try to get out of this dilemma, but am in despair over the slowness of coaling, and without a reasonable amount of coal nothing can be attempted. We are constantly watching the mouth of the harbor and I believe any enterprise against us will be prevented by your dispositions and our cooperation. If we only had what we need.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 28, 1898.*

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, *May 29, 1898.*

According to information brought by exchanged prisoners, arrival our squadron at Santiago de Cuba has caused sensation. United States and their admirals are being charged with lack of ability. Twelve vessels off Santiago yesterday; this morning the majority have disappeared in a westerly direction.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May 31, 1898.*

Hostile ships have fired about 60 shots, apparently for purpose of reconnoitering. Firing was done by *Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, Amazonas*, and auxiliary cruiser. Batteries and *Cristóbal Colón* answered. Auxiliary cruiser retreated, probably with injuries. From shore it seems two projectiles were seen hitting the *Iowa*. Nothing new from squadron.

The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, *May 31, 1898.*

Deputies, senators, and officers, Andalusia ask me to send your excellency and squadron affectionate greeting.¹

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June 1, 1898.*

Blockading fleet has received large reinforcements. To make successful running of blockade possible attempt should be made to draw off armored cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*, calling their attention somewhere else.

¹ This telegram is suppressed in the pamphlet.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 2, 1898.

"Received B C 5448 (telegram May 31). Her majesty bids me congratulate your excellency and combatants of squadron; Government also congratulates you. Report current of intention of landing near Santiago."¹

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO, June 2, 1898.

I beg Your Excellency to extend our deep gratitude to Her Majesty. Blockading fleet has 21 ships, 6 of them armored. The city lacks modern artillery; have therefore offered two 2.95-inch guns which *Terror* has on board.²

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 3, 1898.

Early this morning a battle ship and merchant steamer tried to force harbor entrance. Destroyers and scouts which are at mouth of harbor opened fire, followed by *Reina Mercedes* and batteries of Socapa where guns of said vessel have been mounted. Merchant steamer was sunk; battle ship repulsed. A lieutenant and 6 sailors taken prisoners. No casualties on our side from hostile fire; slight injuries to installations of 2.95-inch guns of destroyers.

The Minister of War (Correa) to the Governor-General (Blanco).

MADRID, June 3, 1898.

Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and reinforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present only two warships there and one of them I believe can not pass through canal. The only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding, the Government wishes to know your opinion as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera's fleet might produce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reinforced.³

The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, June 4, 1898.

I would be failing in my duty if I concealed from your excellency that departure of Cervera's squadron at this time would be of fatal effect on public opinion. Doubt

¹The part in *italics* does not appear in the pamphlet.

²The part in *italics* omitted in pamphlet.

³The wording of this telegram is not literal, as I do not have the original; but it has been published and has appeared in the *Diario de Sesiones*.

whether the situation that would surely result could be controlled. Volunteers already much exercised over inadequacy Cervera's squadron, and only kept up from one moment to another by hope arrival second squadron. Would rise in body upon learning that instead of reinforcements the few ships here are withdrawing. The repression would necessarily be bloody. Attitude of army in that case doubtful. Loss of island certain, in view of horrible conflagration it would kindle here.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón)

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 6, 1898.

Hostile squadron, 10 ships strong, has bombarded this harbor for three hours, being answered by batteries at mouth of harbor, among which are guns of *Reina Mercedes*. Our casualties: Killed, executive officer *Reina Mercedes* and 5 other (sailors); wounded, Ensign Molins (and) 11 other (sailors) and 5 bruised. Army has 1 dead; wounded, a colonel (of artillery), 4 officers and 17 privates. I do not know loss of enemy. *Reina Mercedes* has suffered much. *Vizcaya* received two shells, *Furor* one shell (in the) bunker without serious injury. Works of defense have suffered slight injuries of no military importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bombarded other points on coast.¹

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO, June 6, 1898.

Fear enemy will succeed in obstructing harbor entrance. We can not prevent them with their great superiority. Beg your excellency to give me instructions.

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HAVANA, June 6, 1898.

Received from minister marine following cablegram: "Received telegrams. Her Majesty bids me in her royal name to congratulate defenders Santiago de Cuba."

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 8, 1898.

As it is impossible to foresee and properly solve from here all cases that may arise in the campaign, the Government, which knows the means at your disposal, your own high qualities, and the wide scope given you, is confident that you will make of them best possible use in every case, and will consider that you have fulfilled your difficult mission if you satisfy the letter and spirit of our ordinances.²

¹ Words and phrases in parentheses are not in the original; those in italics occur in the original, but were omitted in the pamphlet.

² General Ordinances of the Navy, part 3, Chap. I, art. 153: "You will fight as far as lies in your power against any superior forces, so that, even though necessary to surrender, your defense will be considered honorable by the enemy. If possible, you will run your ship aground on own or hostile coast rather than surrender, if there is no immediate risk of the crew perishing in the shipwreck; and even after running aground, it will be your duty to defend the ship and finally burn it, if there is no other way of preventing the enemy from taking possession of it."

PROCEEDINGS.

On the 8th day of June the Admiral convened in his cabin the captains of the squadron to hear their opinions relative to the situation of said squadron. Being requested to express their opinions, they did so in the following order and manner:

Bustamante, taking into account all the circumstances of the existence of provisions, error in superiority of hostile forces, etc., is of opinion that the squadron should take advantage of the present dark of the moon and resolutely effect the sortie, and as the situation of the hostile fleet at night and the difficulties of the sortie make it impossible for the squadron to go out in a body, the sortie should be effected as follows: The torpedo-boat destroyers should go out first, shaping their course to the south and passing at their utmost speed by the *Texas* and the three large battle ships.

Shortly after the *Colón*, the fastest of the four ships, should go out with a west-southwesterly course, heading straight for the *Brooklyn*, whose position is usually in that wing of the blockading line. Then should follow the *Teresa* to the east-southeast, and finally the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*. He believes that this would create confusion in the hostile fleet and permit us to save at least 50 per cent of our squadron, which solution, in his opinion, is vastly preferable to that other solution which he foresees and which he does not wish to admit as possible, namely, of the fleet being compelled to surrender from lack of provisions.

He is also of opinion that the squadron should prepare for this step by resting a few days, especially the destroyers, upon whose crews such severe demands are being made night after night that it is a wonder they withstand the fatigues of their service. He also deems it of advantage from every point of view (one of them being to wear out the enemy) to keep firing, especially on the searchlights, which explore the vicinity of the harbor entrance during the hours of darkness. And finally, not being conversant with the means adopted by the admiral, he is of opinion that, before attempting the extreme step which he suggests, the Government should be given an accurate idea of the very serious situation of the squadron. In view of the manner in which the ships would go out, he believes that the point of rendezvous should be Havana rather than San Juan, which latter point he would prefer if the squadron went out in a body.

Captain Concas is of opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, *Brooklyn* or *New York*, should at any time disappear, the sortie should be attempted immediately; if not it should be attempted about the time of the new moon; but in that event with the whole squadron united and all the ships following the same course provided the nucleus of hostile forces is stationed, as at the present time, 5 or 6 miles from the harbor entrance.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, in view of the impunity with which the blockading fleet

approaches to within a mile of the harbor entrance, counting on the inadequate defenses of the harbor, and in view of the present conditions of the harbor, the sortie having been rendered more difficult by the position of the *Merrimac*, so that it would require a certain length of time to effect it, thus giving the enemy an opportunity to concentrate still superior forces off the entrance, even if they should not discover the going out of the first ship that undertook the sortie, are of opinion that the sortie should not be attempted as long as the present situation continues, and in the meantime every military means should be used to reenforce the defenses at the harbor entrance, so as to guard against an attack of torpedo boats and small craft which might appear in the entrance protected by one or more battle ships, the squadron in this harbor making the best possible resistance, keeping in front of it the greater part of the hostile naval forces, this being the most important service the squadron can render toward the general defense of the island.

They also deem it expedient to shelter the torpedo-boat destroyers, not only to permit them to rest their crews, but also to prevent their being boarded by a coup de main in a night attack by small craft.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

JUAN B. LAZAGA.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

ANTONIO EULATE.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 9, 1898.

I called a meeting of captains for the purpose of hearing their opinions on future operations. Second in command, captains of *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and commander of torpedo division were of opinion that we should not go out, owing to superior forces blockading fleet. Captain *Teresa* was of the opinion that, in case of detachment or withdrawal of the *Brooklyn* and *New York*, we should go out immediately, and, in any event, at the new moon, even though hostile fleet should remain together. Chief of staff was in favor of effecting sortie immediately, scattering our squadron. The fires of the ships remained lighted so as to take advantage of first opportunity, but as the blockade is very strict and the hostile fleet four times superior, I doubt (much)¹ that opportunity will present itself.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares).

HONORED SIR: Last evening I made personal observations from the high battery of the Socapa on the position of the hostile squadron, and

¹The word *much* is omitted in the pamphlet.

have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for the squadron under my command to go out without being seen, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, as long as the coast defenses do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their electric searchlights.

Santiago de Cuba, June 11, 1898.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago de Cuba (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: Since you made personal observations last night on the position of the hostile squadron, and have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for your squadron to leave the harbor without being seen by the enemy, as long as the coast defenses do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their search lights, I beg that you will advise me whether you deem the fire of the 6.3-inch Hontoria guns, which have the longest range of all the guns installed in the coast batteries, suitable for the purpose stated, so that I may give the necessary instructions to the captain of the high battery of the Socapa.

But as it is not advisable to cause unnecessary alarm in the city and to waste ammunition, nor to let our enemies see how limited are our means of defense and attack in case we should not succeed in facilitating the sortie of the squadron, I beg to represent to your excellency, in order that you may take this fact into account, if you deem proper, that the rays of the search lights are clearly seen over the city, and it would therefore be necessary to add to the distance at which the United States vessels are usually stationed at least the distance which separates the city of Santiago from the coast, namely, 4.35 or 4.97 miles, the total being the distance to which the squadron would have to retreat in order that its search lights may no longer illuminate the harbor entrance.

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 11, 1898.

The Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: The Captain-General, in a cablegram dated to-day at 11.25 a. m., says:

I remind your excellency that in case of an attack on land you may find a powerful auxiliary for repulsing the enemy in the landing companies of the squadron with their excellent field guns, which Admiral Cervera would no doubt be willing to fur

nish for the defense, which I am sure will be glorious, and the army and navy united will triumph over Americans.

The foregoing telegram I transmit to your excellency for your information, advising you that I have answered the Captain-General that your excellency had already offered the landing forces. At the same time I beg your excellency, if the case should arise, to permit that one landing company be stationed at the Socapa, one at Punta Gorda, another at Las Cruces Pier, and the remaining one at Punta Blanca, all with such number of suitable guns as you may deem necessary.

Santiago de Cuba, June 12, 1898.

ARSENIO LINARES.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares).

HONORED SIR: I am in receipt of your communication dated yesterday relative to the landing columns of this squadron, and I take pleasure in again assuring your excellency of my entire willingness to lend whatever aid may be necessary for the defense of the city.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 13, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 14, 1898.

The enemy fired several shots last night. This morning they again bombarded the defenses at harbor entrance for thirty minutes. Ensign Bruquetas and two others in Socapa battery slightly wounded. *Vizcaya* hit by shell without serious results. *Army* has three slightly wounded.¹

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 16, 1898.

During night projectile, apparently dynamite, burst on the water near *Plutón*, causing injuries which are being examined. At daybreak the enemy kept up galling fire for an hour and slower fire thirty minutes, then withdrawing. Ensign Bruquetas and 8 men wounded, 2 killed; army, 1 officer and 8 men wounded, 1 killed. *Vesuvius* fired during night. Eight ships in sight this morning.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 16, 1898.

I have a suspicion that the enemy has planted torpedoes in (this) the entrance to the harbor.² Have therefore ordered careful investigation in charge of Bustamante. Have purchased provisions, though expensive and bad, which will last until end of July at least.

¹The words in italics were omitted in the pamphlet.

²The word in parentheses was not in original; the words in italics were suppressed in the pamphlet.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

It is to be regretted independence which Cervera's squadron enjoys has prevented me from aiding in his operations, although the results are weighing on my mind, because the entrance and stay of the squadron at Santiago has completely changed the objective and aspect of the campaign, the existence of provisions and coal, and provisioning of certain places. If an attempt had at least been made of consulting with me, General Linares, and the commandant-general of the navy-yard, perhaps between us we might in the beginning have found a better solution than those now awaiting the squadron, namely, either to await the result of unequal battle in the harbor, or break hostile line to go to some other harbor, Haiti or Jamaica, where it would again be closed in. It would perhaps be preferable to go to Cienfuegos or Havana, which is still possible; or, if not, reinforce and proceed to Spain, which would be the best; anything rather than remain closed in at Santiago with the prospect of having to surrender from starvation.

The situation is extremely serious, and I have no doubt that the Government under these critical circumstances would order what is best for the good of the country and the honor of our arms. I therefore respectfully suggest the expediency of uniting military action in the present war under one head, ordering that I be invested with the command in chief of all the land and naval forces assigned to these waters.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

I am much troubled, as your excellency may imagine, over situation of division Santiago, against which is principally directed action of enemy, attracted to that harbor by presence Cervera's squadron, whose sortie it is intended to prevent. It is there that is engaged honor of our arms and fate of our best ships, which must be saved at any price. To counteract their efforts, have prepared for every possible aid. Have organized convoy of ammunition to Manzanillo, where every imaginable effort will be made to get it to Santiago. I reinforce Linares by brigade from this province, which will march through interior in conjunction with forces of said convoy of provisions and ammunition, forming with both divisions Fourth Army Corps, under the command of said general, who will thus have 19 battalions, 5 squadrons, 7 companies engineers, mounted artillery, mobilized guerrillas, and other factors, to be used as the general deems best against enemy within and without. Hope by these measures to sustain war successfully in that region without stripping Center, Matanzas, and West, which are also constantly menaced.¹

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

Seventy American vessels with landing corps off Santiago. General Linares states if Government does not have means to help them by sending a squadron against United States coasts, object to draw off part of United States fleet which attacks them, so that our squadron can go out, or squadron to arrive from Spain run the blockade in cooperation with Cervera's sortie, circumstances will take care of solv-

¹ It should not be forgotten that Santiago received no aid whatever from the outside except Escario's column, which arrived without provisions.

ing conflict. I have done and shall do everything within human power to aid him—a difficult undertaking, on account of his being entirely cut off, enemy being in complete control of the sea.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 20, 1898.

Lookout advises me there are 70 hostile vessels in sight, among them 7 modern battle ships.

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HAVANA, June 22, 1898.

The minister tells me to order ammunition by number, class, and caliber. I advise you so that you may let me know what you require.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 22, 1898.

The squadron being blockaded and the city invested, it is too late to order ammunition, for which I have sent many requests to Spain. It can not arrive in time, since the question must be solved within next few days. Six-sevenths of the 5.5-inch ammunition is useless, the fuses not reliable, and we have no torpedoes. These are the main deficiencies. If the Government could send supplies so that they could arrive this week, it might still be time.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 22, 1898.

The enemy (has landed)¹ is landing at Punta Berracos. As the question is to be decided on land, I am going to send ashore the crews of the squadron as far as the rifles will hold out. The situation is very critical.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 23, 1898.

Upon return from departamentos received D C 8041, D C 9918, C D 4892, C D 4890.² The Government approves plan of sortie (taking advantage) of first favorable opportunity which presents itself. Provisions have reached Cienfuegos. Expedition to be sent overland to Santiago, and auxiliary cruisers will be sent to hostile coast.³

¹ Words in parentheses did not occur in the original text, while those in italics did.

² The four telegrams referred to are the four preceding ones, but it will be noted that no news had been received from Madrid since June 8.

³ The auxiliary cruisers never went to the hostile coast.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 23, 1898.

The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will save city (from catastrophe).

As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape (doubting if squadron can go out) under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme. Although others are responsible for this untenable situation into which we were forced in spite of my opposition, it is very painful to be a (shackled) actor therein.¹

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HAVANA, June 23, 1898.

Captain-General states that your squadron and the city are very short of provisions, the rations of sailors being reduced to hard-tack and those of soldiers to rice, and even this for only short time longer. This being the case, the serious situation might become even worse in case city should surrender from lack of provisions or the garrisons abandon it and go west, in which case your squadron, being without provisions, the harbor blockaded, and the city in hands of enemy, your situation would be extremely grave.

In view of this I wanted to understand situation blockade at night and inquired of commandant navy. Have learned it to be so strict that I see but one chance in a hundred to elude vigilance, but something must be done. Intend to send three or four small vessels, hoping one or other may succeed. But, as you must see matters more clearly than I, do not want to act without consulting you. In case you should know of anything else to be done to change situation, beg you will let me know your opinion.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

Believe it impossible for any vessel to run present blockade of this harbor. With provisions we have can hold out until end of July, but believe the siege will be terminated before that time. Bustamante torpedoes have been planted, but entrance west of Cay Smith is free. We congratulate on brilliant battle *Isabel II*.

¹The original text does not contain the words in parentheses, but, on the other hand, does contain those in *italics*, which considerably change the meaning.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).*SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June 24, 1898.*

Received C D 4898 (of 23d). Immediately convened second in command, captains battle ships, and commander torpedo division, to ask their opinions on what could be done under circumstances. Opinion unanimous that sortie has not been and is not now possible. I then read *them* my telegram of yesterday, in which they concurred and which I hereby confirm. Have little news of enemy, but our forces continue to fall back upon city.¹

PROCEEDINGS.

On the 24th day of June in the Admiral's cabin assembled the second in command of the squadron and the undersigned captains. The chief of staff was not present, being ashore with landing forces. The admiral read a telegram from the minister of marine dated yesterday (received to-day) in which he says that the Government approves of plan of sortie at the first opportunity. When each officer had stated his opinion on the present situation, it was unanimously agreed that the sortie is now, and has been ever since the 8th instant, absolutely impossible.

The Admiral then read the telegram which he dispatched yesterday to the minister, notifying him of the above fact and of the possibility of its becoming necessary in a very few days to destroy the ships, in which all present concurred as being an accurate expression of the painful situation in which these forces are placed.

In virtue whereof they signed the foregoing proceedings on board the cruiser *Infanta Maria Teresa*.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.
 JUAN B. LAZAGA.
 FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.
 EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.
 ANTONIO EULATE.
 VÍCTOR M. CONCAS,

Secretary, Acting Chief of Staff.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June 24, 1898.*

*The Minister of War (Correa) to the Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco).*MADRID, *June 24, 1898.*

With consent of Government, minister marine will notify Admiral Cervera that squadron under his command, hitherto without definite destination, will cooperate in that island to its defense, and in that case your excellency will exercise over it, as over the other naval forces operating in the territory under your command, the powers with which you are invested by the ordinances of the army and navy, confirmed by royal order of October 29, 1872.

¹The words in italics were suppressed in the pamphlet.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 24, 1898.

To give perfect unity to conduct of war in island, your excellency, while operating in Cuban waters, will consider yourself commander in chief of the squadron of operations, and in your relations with the Captain-General you will observe royal order of November 13, 1872, dictated by this ministry, and the articles of ordinance therein referred to. You may at once enter into direct communication with the Captain-General and cooperate with the squadron toward the execution of his plans.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Although I have always considered myself under the orders of the Captain-General, I thank your excellency for instructions which give legal force to the relations already established, and by giving unity to the military operations (relieve me) *will relieve me* from taking on my own responsibility extreme measures of the utmost importance.¹

The Commander in Chief of the Army (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: I have returned to the city. Numerous American troops, in conjunction with rebel parties, attacked the column under my orders twice yesterday and once this morning with artillery, and were repulsed with many casualties, as we could see, since they were unprotected. We had 7 killed, 20 seriously wounded, among them 3 officers, and several slightly wounded and bruised. We took possession of ammunition and a cloth cape with metal button with eagle. On the march to-day they did not trouble us, in spite of good positions they might have occupied. By reason of the rain and the troops being wholly without shelter, there is much sickness among them, and as it is impossible to assume the offensive until reinforcements arrive, I have decided to have the defense fall back on the outer precinct of the city.

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Minister of marine commands me to place myself under orders of your excellency in conformity with regulations of royal order of November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest pleasure. I believe it my duty to set forth condition of squadron. Out of 3,000 rounds for 5.5-inch Hontoria guns, only 620 reliable, rest have been pronounced useless, and were not replaced by others for lack of stores when we left. Two 5.5-inch Hontoria guns of *Vizcaya* and one of *Oquendo* defective, and had been ordered to be changed for others. Majority of fuses not serviceable. We lack

¹ The original text contains the words in *italics* but not those in parentheses.

Bustamante torpedoes. *Colón* is without heavy armament. *Vizcaya* is badly fouled and has lost her speed. *Teresa* does not have landing guns, and those of *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* are unserviceable. We have little coal; provisions enough for month of July. Blockading fleet is four times superior; hence our sortie would be positively certain destruction.

I have a number of men ashore reenforcing garrison, of which I consider myself a part. Believe it my duty to tell your excellency that on the 23d I addressed to Government the following telegram: "The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time, agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will save city. As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme." The foregoing telegram expresses my opinion as well as that of the captains of the ships. I await instructions from your excellency.

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
OF THE ARMY OF SANTIAGO,

June 25, 1898.

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In a cipher cable received last night the Captain-General says, among other things, as follows: "I beg that your excellency will tell Admiral Cervera that I should like to know his opinion and plans. It is my opinion that he should go out from Santiago as early as possible whenever he may deem best, for the situation in that harbor is, in my judgment, the most dangerous of all. Last night there were only 7 warships there, 3 at Cienfuegos, and 9 here, yet the *Santo Domingo* and *Monterideo* had no trouble in running the blockade, going out at 2 o'clock a. m. If we should lose the squadron without fighting, the moral effect would be terrible, both in Spain and abroad."

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

His Excellency ARSENIO LINARES.

MY DEAR GENERAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your interesting letter of this date, which I hasten to answer. The Captain-General is kind enough to want to know my opinion, and I am going to give it as explicitly as I ought to, but will confine myself to the squadron, as I believe that is what he asks for. I have considered the squadron lost ever since it left Cape Verde, for to think anything else seems madness to me, in view of the enormous disparity which exists between our own forces and those of the enemy. For that reason I energetically opposed the sailing of the squadron from Cape Verde, and I even thought that I would be relieved by some one of those whose opinions were opposed to mine.

I did not ask to be relieved, because it seems to me that no military man should do so when he receives instructions to march against the enemy. You are familiar with the history of the squadron since its arrival here. If I had gone to San Juan de Puerto Rico when a telegram from the Government caused me to change, my situation would be the same, only the scene would have been a different one and the avalanche which has fallen upon this island would have come down upon Puerto Rico instead. I believe the mistake was made in sending the squadron out at all. The Captain-General says that the blockade at Havana has been run, and I will add that I myself with a 7-knot vessel entered Escombreras and remained there an hour and a half, although it was occupied by the provincial (cantonal) squadron.

But is there any similarity to the present situation? Certainly not. The sortie from here must be made by the ships, one by one. There is no possibility of stratagem nor disguise, and the absolutely certain result will be the ruin of each and all of the ships and the death of the greater part of their crews. If I had thought there was even the remotest chance of success I should have made the attempt, although, as I have said before, it would only have amounted to a change of the scene of action unless we had gone to Havana, where things might, perhaps, have been different. For these reasons, and in order that my forces might make themselves useful in some manner, I proposed to you to send them ashore, just at the time when the Captain-General made the same suggestion.

To-day I consider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist, after having contributed to its defense, or whether to lose it by sacrificing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of their cooperation, thereby precipitating its fall. What is best to be done? I, who am a man without ambitions, without mad passions, believe that whatever is most expedient should be done, and I state most emphatically that I shall *never* be the one to decree the horrible and useless hecatomb which will be the only possible result of the sortie from here by main force, for I should consider myself responsible before God and history for the lives sacrificed on the altar of vanity, and not in the true defense of the country.

As far as I am concerned, the situation has been changed to-day from a moral standpoint, for I received a telegram this morning which places me under the orders of the Captain-General in everything relating to the operations of the war. It is therefore for him to decide whether I am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me those 2,000 sons of Spain. I believe I have answered your letter, and trust you will see in this letter only the true and loyal expression of the opinion of an honorable old man who for forty-six years has served his country to the best of his ability.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).*SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June 25, 1898.*

Since dispatching my last telegram received letter General Linares transmitting telegram from your excellency wanting to know my opinion. Have already expressed it in former telegram and give it more fully to-day. It is incorrect that the blockading fleet has ever been reduced to seven vessels. The six principal ships alone represent more than three times the power of my four. On account of the lack of batteries to keep the hostile squadron at a distance, it remains constantly near harbor entrance, illuminating it, which makes any sortie except by main force altogether impossible.

In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of the squadron and majority of its crews. I shall never take this step on my own account, but if your excellency so orders I shall carry it out. The loss of the squadron was, in my judgment, decreed when it was ordered to come here. Therefore its painful situation is not a surprise to me. Your excellency will give instructions whether we are to go out to this sacrifice, which I believe fruitless.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).*HAVANA, *June 26, 1898.*

Your two telegrams received. I thank you for the satisfaction you express over being under my orders. I consider myself greatly honored thereby and trust that you will see in me a comrade rather than a superior. It seems to me you somewhat exaggerate difficulties of sortie. It is not a question of fighting, but of escaping from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in, and I do not believe it impossible, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances in dark night and bad weather, to elude enemy's vigilance and escape in whichever direction you deem best. Even in case you are discovered, fire is very uncertain at night, and although it may cause injuries it would mean nothing compared with safety of the ships.

You say that loss of Santiago is certain, in which case you would destroy ships, and this is an additional reason for attempting the sortie, since it is preferable for the honor of arms to succumb in battle, where there may be many chances of safety. Moreover, the destruction of the ships is not certain, for the same thing might happen that occurred at Havana last century when the English included in the capitulation the surrender of the squadron which was inclosed in the harbor.

For my part, I repeat I do not believe that the hostile fleet, no matter how strong, can do so very much damage if our squadron, choosing a dark night and favorable opportunity while part of enemy's ships are withdrawn, steams out at full power in a direction agreed upon, even if discovered. This is shown by the running out of the *Santo Domingo* and *Monterideo* from this harbor with nine ships in the blockading line, the *Purísima* from Casilda with three, and the entering of the *Reina Cristina* into Cienfuegos, also blockaded by three ships. I am very well aware that the situation of your squadron is a very difficult one. Still, the preceding cases bear comparison.

If your cruisers are in some manner captured in Santiago Harbor, the effect in the whole world will be disastrous and the war may be considered terminated in favor of the enemy. The eyes of every nation are at present fixed on your squadron, on which the honor of our country depends, as I am sure your excellency realizes. The Government is of the same opinion, and to my mind there can be no doubt as to the solution of the dilemma, especially as I have great confidence in the success.

I leave entirely to the discretion of your excellency, who are so highly gifted, the route to be followed and the decision as to whether any of the ships should be left behind on account of slow speed. As a favorable item, I will tell your excellency that the captain of German cruiser *Geier* has expressed the opinion that the sortie of the squadron can be effected without running great risks.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 26, 1898.

Government thinks in extreme case referred to in cablegram of the 23d, before ourselves destroying our squadron in harbor, should attempt to save it, in whole or part, by sortie at night, as was opinion of some of the officers of your squadron in meeting May 26 and June 10,¹ and as you stated on May 28. Advise me whether landing of crews was at request military authority and whether they were reembarked after rendering assistance.

The object of my cablegram of the 24th, for which you thanked me, is not personal consideration, but the best service of the nation. Avoid comments (which cause) *to which are attributed*² unfavorable interpretations.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 27, 1898.

Have received C D 4097 (preceding telegram). Very sorry I incurred displeasure of Government by opinion expressed long time ago, and to your excellency in cipher telegram dated May 21. With the harbor entrance blockaded, as it now is, the sortie at night is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships being closer inshore.

Landing of crews was at request of military authority, through Captain-General. I have asked for reembarkation, but doubt much if it can be effected before reinforcements arrive. Your A D 0491 (telegram of the 24th), the same as all acts of your excellency, have for object the best service, but inure, nevertheless, to my benefit, because (it will not be to me that will be due) *I will not be the one to decide upon the useless hecatomb which is being prepared.*³

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 27, 1898.

I am in receipt of your cable, and thank your excellency very much for kind words in my behalf. I have to respect your excellency's opinions without discussing them, especially after having given you my own opinion formed after mature consideration. I have always believed that there are many sailors more able than I am, and it is a pity that one of them can not come to take command of the squadron, and under whose orders I would be placed. I construe your excellency's telegram as an order to go out, and therefore ask General Linares for reembarkation of forces which were landed at your excellency's suggestion. I beg that you will confirm the order of sortie, because it is not explicit, and I should feel very sorry if I did not interpret your excellency's orders correctly.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of the Army at Santiago (Linares).

[Extract.]

HAVANA, June 27, 1898.

Tell me candidly your opinion on squadron, whether you believe it can go out and what solution seems best to you.

¹ Although June 10 is the date as it appears in the original telegram, it refers to the meeting of the 8th, as no meeting was held on the 10th.

² The words in parentheses are not in the original; in place thereof the words in italics occur.

³ The words and phrases in italics are the ones that occur in the original text; those in parentheses do not.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 28, 1898.

General Linares answers me that it is not possible to reembark my forces until troops arrive from Manzanillo.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

[Personal and confidential.]

HAVANA, June 28, 1898.

Your telegram received last evening. Being desirous of improving as much as possible situation Santiago, am making every effort to forward rations to you. If I succeed (and can send) *I shall be able to send* more reinforcements, thus prolonging the defense, perhaps raising siege, salvation squadron. If I do not succeed it is necessary, as you will realize, for squadron to leave that harbor in spite of difficulties, which I appreciate.

Therefore my plan, which I desire your excellency to carry out, is as follows: The squadron will remain in harbor, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, it will watch for a favorable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy. Acknowledge receipt.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 29, 1898.

Your telegram received. Beg for repetition from the words "become aggravated" to the end of sentence, this being unintelligible. The rest I shall carry out as far as possible, the scant supply of coal rendering it difficult. It takes these ships twelve hours to get up steam and if the fires are kept going and the ships in readiness to take advantage of opportunity each uses 15 tons a day. But I think I understand meaning your order: If favorable opportunity presents itself, to avail ourselves of it; and if not, to go out at the last hour, even though loss of squadron be certain. Difficulties might also arise by enemy taking possession of harbor entrance.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

HAVANA, June 30, 1898.

In conformity with terms of your excellency's telegram of 24th instant have dictated to admiral the following instructions: "The squadron will remain in harbor, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, it will watch for a favorable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy." I tell your excellency of this for your information, and beg that you will advise me whether the foregoing instructions meet with Government's approval.

¹ The telegram as received contains the words in italics and not those in parentheses.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

MADRID, July 1, 1898.

Advise Captain-General that Government approves his instructions to Admiral Cervera.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Lieutenant-General, Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba (Linares)¹.

HONORED SIR: I have the honor of notifying your excellency of a cablegram which I have received from the Captain-General and which is as follows: "Your telegram received last night. Being desirous of improving as much as possible situation Santiago * * * will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy." I therefore beg that, if at any time you think that the unfortunate situation referred to in the telegram may arise, you will kindly advise me in time, so that I may be able to reembark the men I have ashore and put to sea, in compliance with the instructions.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 30, 1898.

The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: In reply to your official favor transmitting to me a cable from his excellency the Captain-General, in virtue of which you ask me to advise you when the city may be in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, I have the honor to state that this being an open city, for whose defense earthworks have been thrown up on the heights and lines of trenches dug along its wire inclosure, it is not possible to determine the moment when to notify your excellency, for as soon as an attack is commenced there is danger that the powerful column will break through the outer line, along which all my scant forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the points which may be threatened the most. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to keep your excellency posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reembarkation of your forces.

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

In addition to my cablegram of yesterday I advise your excellency that General Linares replies that, as the city is open, having only earthworks and wire inclosure,

¹This new title was conferred upon General Linares about that time.

it will not be possible to determine the moment for notifying me, as there is danger of the powerful column breaking the line along which all his sent forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the most advanced points, but that he will, nevertheless, keep me posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reembarkation of my forces. As these ships can not go out without the forces, since they must expect a fierce battle at the sortie, and will, in my judgment, be destroyed or captured, as I have already advised you, the case might arise that I could not carry out your orders. I therefore notify you accordingly and beg for instructions.

PROCEEDINGS.

The undersigned officers being convened by the Admiral on the 1st day of July, at 7 o'clock p. m., said Admiral read to them the telegrams exchanged with the Captain-General at Havana, in which the latter states, in spite of the observations made as to the disaster awaiting the squadron at the harbor entrance, that the sortie should be effected by main force, especially if the loss of Santiago de Cuba is impending. The admiral then gave an account of the military operations that have taken place this day, in which the enemy took possession of the town of El Caney and San Juan Hill.

Upon being asked for their opinions as to whether they thought that the case had arisen in which the Captain-General had ordered the sortie, the officers assembled stated unanimously that they thought the case had arisen in which the Captain-General ordered the sortie, but that it is absolutely impossible to effect it without the reembarkation of the men now ashore for the defense of the city, being at present more than two-thirds of the total forces of the squadron, and that at the same time the chief of the army corps, in an official communication, has stated that he can not do without their aid, being absolutely without reserves and forces with which to relieve the men on the extensive lines to be defended. As the result of the foregoing, it is the opinion of the undersigned that, in order to cooperate in the most effective manner and with some prospect of success in the defense of the city, it would be necessary to obstruct the harbor entrance.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

JUAN B. LAZAGA.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

ANTONIO EULATE.

EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898—At night.

Through General Toral your excellency knows of the events of this day. He believes it certain that the withdrawal of my landing forces will entail the immo-

diate loss of the city. Without them the sortie can not be attempted. My opinion is the same as Toral's, and our sortie would look like flight, which is repugnant to all. My captains are of the same opinion. I entreat you will send instructions I have asked for.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

The enemy to-day made fierce attack on city with overwhelming forces. Has not accomplished much, as the defense has been brilliant. But we have 600 casualties, among them commander in chief army seriously wounded, and general of brigade killed; captain of navy, Bustamante, seriously wounded. Crews have not been reembarked because it would entail immediate loss of city. Have asked Captain-General for instructions.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

[Very urgent.—Key L.]

HAVANA, July 1, 1898—10.30 p. m.

In view of hostile progress in spite of heroic defense garrison, and in conformity with opinion Government, you will reembark crews, take advantage of first opportunity, and go out with the ships of your squadron, following route you deem best. You are authorized to leave behind any which on account of slow speed or circumstances have no chance of escaping. I will tell your excellency for your information only, not in the nature of instructions, that there are only three ships at Cienfuegos and nine here, none of them of great power.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

[Urgent.—Key O.]

HAVANA, July 1, 1898—10.45 p. m.

In addition to my former telegram of this evening, ask you to hasten sortie from harbor as much as possible before enemy can take possession of entrance.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of Army at Santiago (Toral).

[Extract.]

HAVANA, July 1, 1898—10.55 p. m.

It is absolutely necessary to concentrate forces and prolong defense as much as possible, by every means preventing enemy from taking possession of harbor entrance before sortie of squadron, which is to go out as early as possible, so as not to have to surrender nor destroy ships.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, July 1, 1898.

Admiral Cervera is troubled about leaving the harbor, fearing squadron will be destroyed in the operation, and asks for new instructions. Have answered, in conformity with your excellency's telegram No. 90, that he is to leave the harbor, taking advantage of first opportunity before enemy occupies entrance.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, July 1, 1898.

Notify you that our colliers *Alicante* and *Remembrance* are at Martinique; *Marie* and *Burton* at Guadeloupe.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

[Urgent.]

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898 (at daybreak).

Your urgent telegrams of last night received. Have sent my chief of staff to show them to General Toral, and have given orders to light fires, so as to go out as soon as my forces are reembarked.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

[Very urgent.]

HAVANA, July 2, 1898—5.10 a. m.

In view of exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral, your excellency will reembark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible, and go out immediately.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Acting Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba (Toral).

HONORED SIR: Since the receipt of the telegrams from his excellency the Captain-General, which my chief of staff showed you this morning, I have received the following:

“In view of exhausted condition * * * go out immediately.”

I notify your excellency of this in order that you may give the necessary orders for immediately carrying out the instructions of the Captain-General.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898.

The Acting Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps (Toral) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: Upon being informed of the cablegram from the Captain-General to your excellency, ordering the reembarkation of the forces of the squadron, I immediately issued instructions for the company at San Miguel de Parada to proceed to San José for reembarkation; the company at Mazamorra to go to the Socapa; that at Las Cruces to the pier of that name; the company between the forts of the gasometer and furnaces to go to Punta Blanca, and the remainder of

the landed naval forces to the Royal Pier. I have the honor of advising you of the foregoing for your information and in order that measures be taken for the reembarkation of the companies referred to.

Yours, etc.,

JOSÉ TORAL.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 2, 1898.*

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander in Chief of the Army Corps of Santiago (Torál).

HAVANA, *July 2, 1898.*

Your cablegram of 1.30 a. m. received, and I reiterate the instructions which I gave your excellency in my last telegram of this morning. It is absolutely necessary to concentrate the forces and prolong the defense as much as possible, preventing the enemy from taking possession of the harbor entrance before sortie of squadron, for which orders have been issued to Admiral Cervera, in view situation of city as reported by you, to obviate surrender or destruction of ships.

If your excellency and valiant troops can hold out until arrival of Escario or Pareja brigade, situation would be much improved; but if it is so critical as to make continuation of defense impossible, you will gather all troops and loyal citizens, try to open a path, and fall back upon Holguín or Manzanillo, destroying what can not be taken along and burning everything left behind, so that not the least trophy of victory will fall into the enemy's hands. At all events, I trust to your excellency to adapt compliance with my instructions to condition of city and forces.

The Commander in Chief of Army Corps Santiago (Torál) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 2, 1898.*

At daybreak the enemy renewed attack upon city, which is still going on, simultaneously with attacks upon Cnebitas, railroad line, and El Cobre, the latter being made to believe that Escario's column has been held up by landing forces at Aserradero. At request Admiral Cervera have ordered immediate reembarkation troops of squadron, thereby weakening defense by 1,000 men, as Asia battalion, arrived this morning, and remnant of Battalion Constitución are hardly sufficient to fill places of killed and wounded yesterday. Situation becoming more and more untenable.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago (Torál).

HAVANA, *July 2, 1898.*

Your telegram of 1.30 a. m. received. I understand situation difficult, but not desperate. Would be much improved by incorporation Escario or Pareja. In any event maintain city at any price, and before capitulation make attempt to join either of said forces, leaving wounded and sick at hospitals with assistance Red Cross. City must not be destroyed, in spite of what I said last night. Main thing is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans take possession of it Spain will be morally defeated and must ask for peace at mercy of enemy. A city lost can be recovered; the loss of the squadron under these circumstances is final, and can not be recovered. Be sure to telegraph and keep me advised of events and your opinions.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

[Extract.]

HAVANA, July 2, 1898.

Have ordered immediate sortie of squadron, for if enemy takes possession of harbor entrance it is lost.

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).

HAVANA, July 3, 1898.

Commandant-general navy, Santiago, telegraphs: "Our squadron went out, keeping up galling fire, which could hardly be heard for hostile fire. Has apparently succeeded in running blockade, taking westerly course."

The Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago (Torral), to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898.

Escario column arrived last night. Enemy attacked our forces several times this morning, killing Ramón Escobar, captain Asia Brigade, and wounding 7 men. Several shipwrecked from destroyers and a sailor from *Maria Teresa*, appearing at Socapa this morning, stated that latter ship was lost when out of sight of harbor, and that *Oquendo* was on fire. Other men from *Maria Teresa* have since arrived. Whereabouts of Admiral Cervera unknown. Will give your excellency further details as soon as I ascertain.

According to torpedo officer, the electric torpedoes of the first line do not work, and only four of the second line, and as two of the seven Bustamante torpedoes have become unserviceable and two others are defective, he thinks it will be easy for enemy to force the harbor entrance and close it, as I told your excellency. Commandant navy states that no merchant vessel could enter, and advises sinking of cruiser *Reina Mercedes*, though he says it will not obstruct navigation for ships 9 to 13 feet draft. I consult your excellency whether operation may be effected.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).¹

PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 4, 1898.

In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, and after an unequal battle against forces more than three times as large as mine my whole squadron was destroyed. *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, all with fire on board, ran ashore. *Colón*, according to information from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered. The destroyers were sunk. Do not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of *Vizcaya* was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villamil, and, I believe, Lazaga; Concas and Eulate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds.

¹ I sent this telegram through Admiral Sampson, begging him to dispatch it, and for this reason it was not received by the Captain-General until the day following.

The Captain-General (Blauco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, July 5, 1898.

Admiral Cervera under this date telegraphs as follows from Playa del Este: "I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, etc. (see foregoing telegram)."

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).

HAVANA, July 5, 1898.

At last report transmitted commandant navy, Santiago, news was uncertain. This morning I received the following two items: Sailors from *Maria Teresa* are arriving, and report that said ship and *Oquendo*, *Plutón*, and *Furor* ran aground with fire on board; that *Colón* and *Vizcaya* were lost from sight without being pursued by enemy. So far 108 have arrived from *Plutón*, *Furor*, and *Teresa*, among them officers; no captain. Do not have certain information concerning admiral; have asked for it, but so far not received. Was advised unofficially last night that he was prisoner on board hostile ship. Shall transmit as usual whatever official information I receive.

The Commandant-General Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).

HAVANA, July 6, 1898.

No communication with Santiago. Last cables received are the two forwarded yesterday. By request, Captain-General gave me the following, with proviso that he did not order Cervera to go out of Santiago at 9.45 a. m., the time when he effected the sortie. "In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning, etc." (The balance of telegram has already been given.)

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).

HAVANA, July 8, 1898.

Commandant navy, Santiago, states as follows: "According to apparently trustworthy information the four battle ships and two torpedo boats succumbed in battle of 3d. Killed, captain of *Oquendo*, sailors, and soldiers; wounded, captain of *Teresa* and officers; slightly wounded, both commanders in chief; many prisoners; latter all on the way to United States. It is believed enemy will use *Colón*. This city threatened with immediate bombardment by land and sea unless it capitulates. Enemy has cut our aqueduct.

I am told that, while we shall not be very short of provisions, we shall be of ammunition. Families are fleeing; city deserted. We are surrounded by land and sea. I think decisive events, serious and bloody, must soon follow. Joaquín Bustamante much better.¹ Twenty-four hostile ships. Total of crews squadron hitherto arrived, 153, among them Manuel Bustamante and José Caballero, only officers; Midshipman Ramón Navia. *Furor* was sunk; the other ships ran ashore with fire on board, caused probably by hostile shell. Cable communication was interrupted—reason for my not sending more news. Shall communicate all information as I receive it.

¹ Capt. Joaquín Bustamante, chief of staff of the squadron, was in charge of the naval forces that went ashore to assist in the defense of Santiago de Cuba. In the battle of July 1 he was at the head of his forces, when his horse was killed under him; on foot he continued his command with a spirit and heroism extolled by all, until he was struck in the abdomen by a bullet. He died on July 19 at the Santiago hospital. His remains were buried in the Panteón de Marinos Ilustres at San Fernando.

REPORT OF THE BATTLE.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

HONORED SIR: In compliance with your excellency's orders, aware of what had to happen, as I had so many times told you, I went out from Santiago Harbor with the whole squadron under my command on the morning of the 3d day of July.

The instructions given for the sortie were as follows: The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, my flagship, was to go out first, followed by the *Vizcaya*, *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and destroyers, in the order named. The ships had all their fires spread and steam up. Upon going out the *Teresa* was to engage the nearest hostile ship and the vessels following were to take a westerly course at full speed, with the *Vizcaya* at their head. The torpedo-boat destroyers were to keep out of the fire as much as possible, watching for a favorable opportunity, acting if it presented itself, and try to escape at their highest speed if the battle was against us. The ships left the harbor in such perfect order as to surprise our enemy, from whom we have since received many enthusiastic compliments on this point.

As soon as the *Teresa* went out, at 9.35, she opened fire on the nearest hostile ship, but shaping her course straight for the *Brooklyn*, which was to the southwest, for it was of the utmost importance to us to place this ship in a condition where she would not be able to make use of her superior speed. The rest of our ships engaged in battle with the other hostile ships, which at once came from the different points where they were stationed. The hostile squadron that day was composed of the following ships off Santiago Harbor: The *New York*, Admiral Sampson's flagship; the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship; the *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *Indiana*, *Texas*, and other smaller ships, or rather transatlantic steamers and converted yachts.

Immediately after leaving the harbor entrance the squadron took the course prescribed and a general battle ensued, in which we were at a great disadvantage, not only owing to our inferior number, but to the condition of our armament and 5.5-inch ammunition, of which I notified your excellency in the telegram I sent you when placing myself under your orders. There was no doubt in my mind as to the outcome, although I did not think that our destruction would be so sudden.

One of the first projectiles burst an auxiliary steam pipe on board the *Maria Teresa*. A great deal of steam escaped, which made us lose the speed on which we had counted. About the same time another shell burst one of the fire mains. The ship made a valiant defense against the galling hostile fire. Among the first wounded was our gallant commander, Capt. Victor M. Concas, who had to withdraw, and as we could not afford to lose a single moment, I myself took direct command of the ship, waiting for an opportunity when the executive officer could be called. But this opportunity never arrived, as the battle became more and more fierce and the dead and wounded fell all around us, and all we could think of was to fire as much as possible.

In this critical situation fire broke out in my cabin, where some of the 2.24-inch projectiles stored there must have exploded. At the same time I was informed that the after deck and chart house were burning, while the fire that had commenced in my cabin was spreading with great rapidity to the center of the ship, and, as we had no water, it made rapid headway, and we were powerless to fight it. I realized that the ship was doomed, and cast about for a place where I could run her aground without losing many lives and continue the battle as long as possible.

Unfortunately the fire was gaining ground with great rapidity and voracity. I therefore sent one of my aides with instructions to flood the after magazines, but it was found impossible to penetrate into the passages owing to the dense clouds of smoke and on account of the steam escaping from the engine hatch, and it was impossible to breathe in that suffocating atmosphere. I therefore steered for a small beach west of Punta Cabrera, where we ran aground just as the engines stopped. It was impossible to get down the ammunition and other things below the armored deck, especially aft of the boilers, and under these circumstances all we could do was

to save as many as possible of the crew. This was also the opinion of the officers whom I was able to convene, and who, when I asked them whether they thought the battle could be continued, answered no.

In this painful situation, when explosions commenced to be heard in the ammunition rooms, I gave orders to lower the flag and flood all the magazines. The first order could not be carried out on account of the terrible conflagration on the poop, which was soon completely burned. The fire was gaining rapidly. When it had reached the forward deck we hardly had time to leave the burning ship, assisted by two United States boats, which arrived about three-quarters of an hour after we had run ashore.

Among the wounded are Lieut. Antonio López Cerón and Ensign Angel Carrasco. The following are missing: Higinio Rodríguez, captain of naval artillery, who is believed to have been killed by a projectile; Ensign Francisco Linares; Second Surgeon Julio Díaz de Rio; Chief Machinist (first class) Juan Montero, and Machinist (second class) José Melgares, whose body has been washed up on the beach. The rescue had been effected by those who could swim jumping into the water and trying three times to carry a line ashore, succeeding only at the last moment, assisted by the two United States boats above mentioned.

We had lowered a boat that was apparently in good condition, but it sank at once. A steam launch was then lowered, but it was able to make only one trip; when it attempted to return to the ship a second time it sank, as the result of injuries received. Of the three or four men on board, one saved his life by swimming and the others were picked up by one of the United States boats.

The captain of the *Vizcaya*, assisted by two good swimmers, had gone ashore. The executive and third officers were directing the rescue from on board ship, and as it was also necessary to direct it from the shore after the United States boats had arrived, I swam ashore with the assistance of two seamen, Juan Llorca and André Sequeiro, and my son and aide, Lieut. Angel Cervera.

When all the men had been landed I was notified by the United States officer who was in command of the boats to follow him to his ship, which was the converted yacht *Gloucester*. I was accompanied by my flag captain, who was wounded, my son and aide, and the executive officer of the ship, who had been the last one to leave her.

During this time the burning ship offered an awe-inspiring aspect. The explosions following each other in rapid succession were enough to appall even the calmest soul. I do not believe it will be possible to save a single thing from the ship. We have lost everything, the majority of us reaching the shore absolutely naked. A few minutes after the *Teresa*, the *Oquendo* ran aground on a beach about half a league farther west, with fire on board similar to that of the *Teresa*, and the *Vizcaya* and *Colón* disappeared from sight to the westward pursued by the hostile fleet. From the paymaster of the *Oquendo*, the only one of her officers on board the same ship with me, I have since learned the history of that ill-fated ship and her heroic crew. This history, which may perhaps be corrected as to some details but not as to the main facts, is as follows:

The unequal and deadly battle sustained by the *Oquendo* became even more unequal when shortly after it had commenced a hostile projectile entered the forward turret, killing the whole personnel of the same with the exception of one gunner, who was badly wounded. The 5.5-inch battery, which had been swept by the hostile fire from the beginning, had only two serviceable guns left, with which the defense was continued with incomparable energy. The after turret also lost its captain who was killed by a hostile shell that struck him as he opened the door of the turret, almost asphyxiated by the stifling air within. The paymaster does not know the history of the rapid-fire battery; he only knows that it kept firing the same as the rest of the valiant crew. There were two conflagrations—the first, which was controlled, occurred in the forward hold; the other, which originated aft, could not

be controlled as the pumps were unable to furnish water, probably for the same reasons as on board the *Teresa*.

The 5.5-inch ammunition hoists refused to work from the very beginning, but there was no lack of ammunition in the battery while the light could be continued, as extra stores had been put on board all the ships as a precautionary measure. When the valiant captain of the *Oquendo* saw that he could not control the fire, and when he found that he did not have a single serviceable gun left, he decided to run aground, after first issuing orders to discharge all the torpedoes, except the two after ones, in case any hostile ship should approach before the last moment arrived. He also ordered the flag to be lowered a few minutes after the *Teresa* did, and after consultation with the officers who were present. The executive and third officers and three lieutenants had been killed.

The rescue of the survivors was organized by her captain, who lost his life in saving those of his subordinates. They made a raft and lowered two launches, the only serviceable boats they had left, and were finally assisted by United States boats, and, according to the statement of an insurgent with whom I talked on the beach, also by an insurgent boat. It was a sublime spectacle that these two ships presented. The explosions that followed each other incessantly did not frighten those valiant sailors, who defended their ship to such an extent that not even a single enemy has been able to set his foot on her.

When I was asked by the United States officer to follow him, as stated above, I first gave instructions for the reembarkation to the third officer, Juan Aznar, whom I have not seen since. When the United States ship, the converted yacht *Gloucester*, arrived I found on board about 20 wounded men belonging mostly to the destroyers, the captains of the latter, three officers of the *Teresa*, and the paymaster of the *Oquendo*. There were in all 93 men belonging to the crews of the squadron.

The captain and officers of the yacht received us with great courtesy, vying with each other in supplying our wants, which were manifold, for we arrived absolutely naked and half starved. The captain said to me that as his ship was so small he could not receive so many and he was going to look for a larger ship to take us. The insurgents with whom I had talked had told me that they had 200 men, among whom there were five or six wounded, and added, on the part of their captain, that if we wanted to go with them we should follow them and they would help us as best they could. I told them to thank their captain for us, and tell him that we had surrendered to the Americans; but if they had a surgeon I should be grateful to them if they would look after some of our wounded on the beach, some of whom were very seriously wounded.

I told the captain of the yacht of this conversation with the insurgents and begged him to reclaim our men, which he promised to do, and he at once sent out a detachment with a flag. He also sent some provisions, of which those on the beach were so much in need.

We then started westerly and met the nucleus of the squadron, from which the auxiliary cruiser *Paris* was detached, and our yacht proceeded until we were off Santiago, where we received instructions, according to which some were transhipped to the *Iowa* and the rest to other vessels, while the wounded were taken to the hospital ship.

During my stay on board the yacht I inquired of the captains of the destroyers as to the fate of their ships, as I was anxious to hear of their sad end. The history of the *Furor* your excellency will learn in detail from the inclosed copy of her captain's report. Capt. Fernando Villaamil met a glorious death, and the number of casualties on board bear testimony to the valiant conduct of this little ship, whose captain also was slightly wounded.

I likewise inclose to your excellency a copy of the report from the captain of the *Plutón*, who was also slightly wounded, and whose ship has as glorious a history as her companion.

When I reached the *Iowa*, where I was received with all manner of honors and marks of respect, I had the pleasure of seeing on the gangway the gallant captain of the *Vizcaya*, who came out and greeted me, wearing his sword, which the captain of the *Iowa* did not want him to give up, in testimony of his brilliant defense. A copy of his report is also inclosed, from which your excellency will see that the history of the *Vizcaya* is very similar to that of her sister ships, the *Teresa* and the *Oquendo*, which proves that the same defects had produced the same unfortunate results, and that it was all but a question of time.

I remained on board the *Iowa* until 4 o'clock p. m., when I was transferred to the *St. Louis*, where I met the second in command of the squadron and the captain of the *Colón*.

While still on board the *Iowa*, Admiral Sampson came up, and I asked him for permission to telegraph to your excellency, which I did, as follows:

"In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, and, after an unequal battle against forces more than three times as large as mine, my whole squadron was destroyed. *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, all with fire on board, ran ashore; *Colón*, according to information from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered; the destroyers were sunk. Do not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of *Vizcaya* was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villaamil and, I believe, Lazaga; Concas and Enlate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds. Cervera. July 4, 1898."

I wish to make a correction as to the fate of the *Plutón*, which was not sunk, but which, unable to maintain herself afloat, succeeded in running ashore, as your excellency will see from the report of her gallant captain.

On board the *St. Louis* the second in command of the squadron and the captain of the *Colón* told me of that ship's sad fate, the former handing me a report, a copy of which is inclosed. I refrain from any comments on a report by this distinguished officer on events of which he was an eyewitness.

In order to complete the outline of the history of this mournful day, there only remains for me to tell your excellency that our enemies have treated and are treating us with the utmost chivalry and kindness. They have clothed us as best they could, giving us not only articles furnished by the Government, but their own personal property. They have even suppressed almost entirely the usual hurrahs out of respect for our bitter grief. We have been and are still receiving enthusiastic congratulations upon our action, and all are vying in making our captivity as light as possible.

I do not yet know our loss of men, being distributed to the different ships, but it is in the neighborhood of my estimates stated in the cablegram despatched to you.

To sum up, the 3d of July has been an appalling disaster, as I had foreseen. The number of dead, however, is less than I feared. Our country has been defended with honor, and the satisfaction of duty well done leaves our consciences clear, though we bitterly mourn the loss of our beloved companions and the misfortunes of our country.

On board this ship there are, besides the second in command of the squadron and myself, with our aides, 1 captain, 4 officers, and 32 men from the *Infanta María Teresa*; the paymaster and 35 men from the *Oquendo*; the 3 commanding officers, 14 other officers, and 191 men from the *Colón*; the captain, chief engineer, and 10 men from the *Furor*; the captain, 1 officer, and 19 men from the *Plutón*, and Lieut. Enrique Capriles, whom I took on board the *Vizcaya* as a passenger from Santiago.

Of all of these I send your excellency a list and shall send further lists as I receive news of the others.

I also send your excellency a list of the captains, officers, and midshipmen who were killed or wounded or who are missing, as also a list of all the wounded other than officers who are on board this ship. The majority of the wounded are on board the hospital ship *Solace*.

As I realize that your excellency might have difficulties in forwarding this communication, I take the liberty of sending a copy of the same to his excellency the minister of marine.

Of special facts worthy of mention which do not affect the general action I shall send separate reports as I learn of them.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS, July 9, 1838.

REPORT OF THE COLÓN.

The Second in Command of the Squadron (Pareles) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: I have the honor of submitting to your excellency a report on the battle and the fate of the battle ship *Colón* on the 3d instant, as communicated to me by her gallant captain, as follows:

"In compliance with orders received, I went out of Santiago Harbor with the ship under my command, taking the position assigned to her. At 9.45 o'clock a. m., when abreast of the Morrillo, I opened fire on the *Iouca*, which was the nearest ship at the moment of the sortie.

"Five minutes later, when the *Brooklyn* was at the head of the hostile line, I gave orders to concentrate all the fire upon her and so far as possible upon the *Oregon*, which was on the port quarter, and to which we could not give special attention for lack of bow and stern guns. Our ship fired 184 rounds with 5.9-inch guns and 117 rounds with the 4.7-inch battery, 10 per cent of which are believed to have hit the target. I saw at once that neither the *Brooklyn* nor the *Oregon*, which were chasing the *Colón*, could overtake us, the former falling behind more than the latter, and I proceeded, shaping my course for Cape Cruz, hugging the shore.

"At 1 o'clock p. m. the pressure in the boilers began to go down, decreasing the revolutions from 85 to 80, and the *Oregon* commenced to gain on us, and soon after opened fire with her heavy bow guns, which I could answer only with gun No. 2 of the battery, while the distance between us grew constantly shorter. In view of this fact, and the absolute certainty of being captured by the enemy, I acted with your excellency's sanction, as it was not expedient to call any of the officers from their posts, which, in view of the structure and arrangement of the hatchways, would have meant a loss of very precious time.

"Animated by the desire to take advantage to the last moment of any opportunity to fire that might present itself, and in order to obviate being captured, I decided to run ashore and lose the ship rather than sacrifice in vain the lives of all these men who, as your excellency is aware, had fought with brilliant heroism and great discipline and coolness. I therefore shaped our course for the mouth of the Tarquino River and ran aground on the beach at 2 o'clock p. m., at a speed of 13 knots. After the ship had been beached I convened the officers, all of whom expressed themselves satisfied with the course taken, realizing that if we had kept on even for a few minutes longer we should have been in the greatest danger of falling into the hands of the enemy and becoming a trophy of victory, which was to be avoided at any cost.

"Soon after we became prisoners of war on the *Brooklyn*, whose captain came on board shortly after. During the battle we had one man killed and twenty-five wounded. I herewith inclose a list of these casualties. Though a great many of the enemy's projectiles struck us, they did not cause much damage in the protected part of the ship.

"The foregoing I have the honor of submitting to your excellency for your information, expressing at the same time my conviction that each and all did their duty under the difficult circumstances under which the sortie was effected and the disadvantages of the battle, owing to the superiority of the enemy and the great deficiencies of our means of attack."

As a witness of what occurred, I wish to state to your excellency that, in the midst of our sorrow over the loss of the ship and the gallant and heroic men, I feel great satisfaction in knowing that all have done their sacred duty in the defense of their flag and their country, proving once more that the Spanish navy may be defeated, but never with dishonor.

All on board the *Colón* have shown themselves worthy of their ancestors. It is hardly possible to recommend any one of her noble crew in particular, as all have distinguished themselves alike by their heroism. But I should be failing in a sacred duty if I did not tell your excellency that her valiant captain rose to a height which words can not express; I can only say that he is an honor to the corps in which he serves.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS, July 6, 1898.

-REPORT OF THE OQUENDO.

Lieutenant Calandria to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: The officer who has the honor of addressing your excellency is the senior officer of the battle ship *Almirante Oquendo* who survived the battle of July 3, and he therefore considers it his duty to give your excellency an account of what occurred on said ship during the battle.

When the signal for battle was given, the undersigned officer went to occupy his post, which was the conning tower of the after deck, from where I observed the movements of the hostile fleet, which, as this ship came out of the harbor, was steering in a westerly direction in line ahead, with the cruiser *Brooklyn* in the lead. As soon as we had cleared the channel we followed in the wake of the ship ahead of us and opened fire on the port side while constantly fired upon by the hostile ships, especially the battle ship *Iowa* and cruiser *Brooklyn*, and it was on these two that we mainly concentrated our fire; passing, in the opinion of the undersigned, at a distance of less than 3,826 yards from them.

We continued to steam until we left the *Iowa* somewhat behind on the port quarter, but within range of her artillery, while the *Brooklyn* was on the bow of the same side and the other ships at a distance astern of the *Iowa*. This was the situation of the hostile fleet when I was notified through the speaking tube that fire had broken out in the after torpedo rooms, and as I came out I saw flames issuing forth from the officers' hatchway in the poop. Realizing at once that it would be impossible to control the fire, owing to the proportions it had assumed, I went to the forward deck to report to the captain, and found him preparing to beach the ship with the helm to starboard.

As I was afraid that the bow torpedoes might explode when the ship ran aground in case there should be a violent shock, these torpedoes being all ready to be launched the same as the other torpedoes, I suggested to the captain the expediency of discharging them, and this was done in the forward torpedo room by Ensign Alfredo Nardiz and the personnel under his orders.

At the moment when the ship ran ashore, enveloped in flames, her deck covered with dead and wounded, her guns disabled, the captain gave the undersigned the order to lower the flag, but owing partly to the listlessness with which the order was given and partly to the natural vacillation of those who were to fulfill it, the

distressing order was not carried out. The fire, which by this time had assumed gigantic proportions, caught the lanyard and the flag fell into the flames.

The foregoing is all that the undersigned had a chance to witness of the battle, as he was isolated from the rest of the ship. The details which follow have been compiled from information and data acquired subsequently.

The orders given the two batteries and turrets were to set the sights for distances varying from 2,625 to 3,496 yards. At the fourth round of gun No. 6 (5.5-inch) the breech burst, killing and wounding the crew and blinding the gunner. By this time there were so many casualties in the upper battery—among them the captain of the same, Lieutenant Enrique Marra-López, and Ensign Juan Díaz Escribano, both wounded—that there was only personnel enough left to serve guns Nos. 2 and 4, which continued to fire until both the ammunition hoists broke; and as it was impossible to bring up projectiles, owing to the fires that had broken out in the central ammunition rooms both forward and aft, the firing was continued with the projectiles that were on deck, which, for lack of other means, were carried to the guns by Lieutenant Enrique Marra-López, Midshipman Quirino Gutiérrez, and Third Gunner Antonio Serrano Facio.

The greater part of the rapid-fire battery had been destroyed, several guns having been dismounted, and nearly all the personnel killed or wounded, among them the executive and third officers.

When the third round was about to be fired in the forward turret a projectile entered between the gun and gun port, tearing a piece from the upper edge of the latter and killing the captain of the turret, Eugenio Rodríguez Bárcena, and Third Gunner Francisco García Pnayo, and badly wounding First-class Gunner José Arenosa Sixto, also breaking the tubing and apparatus. In the after turret the captain of the same, Lieutenant Alfonso Polanco y Navarro, was also killed by a fragment. A shell which entered the after torpedo room put the whole personnel of the same out of action. A few moments later another shell, exploding in the central room aft, killed and wounded a number of men, among them Ensign Emilio Pascual del Pobil, who was wounded.

When the captain gave instructions to flood the magazines on account of the fires, the order was transmitted by Lieut. Tomás Calvar to First Machinist Juan Pantín, who went to the central compartment forward for that purpose, where the men's lockers were burning, and succeeded in flooding the forward compartment, but was unable, on account of the furious fire, to flood the after compartments; and the officers' mess room and cabins and the pantries became a prey of the flames. The fire spread to the after deck as the result of burning wood from the officers' mess room falling through the hatch of the ammunition hoist. This would have caused the explosion of the 5.5-inch ammunition room if Third Gunner Germán Montero and Sailor Luis Díaz had not stopped up the hatches, first with wooden gratings and then with wet bedding, and as, in spite of their efforts, they did not succeed in dismounting the hoist to lower the cover of the hatch, they left the deck when it became impossible for them to remain there, after first closing up the 11-inch ammunition rooms.

After beaching the ship, the engines were stopped by orders of the captain, the safety valves were opened, and the engines and boilers dismounted. The work of rescue was then commenced. We had to give up the large boats, as the fire made it impossible to lower them, and some of them were disabled. We succeeded in lowering the yawl, but it sank. The two launches were used successfully. Great acts of heroism were performed in the work of rescue as well as in the battle. Of these I give your excellency a separate account.

When the undersigned jumped into the water there were left on the forecastle the captain, Ensign Alfredo Nardiz, several men, First Boatswain Luis Rodríguez, and First Machinist Juan Pantín. The latter told me that after I had gone the captain, who refused to leave, fell suddenly to the deck, raising his hands to his breast, taken

apparently with an attack of heart failure. They attended him, and when they knew that he was dead, covered his body with a flag. This I learned on board the *Harvard*.

The ship was beached about 10 or 12 miles from the entrance of Santiago harbor. In the fulfillment of my duty, I submit the foregoing for your excellency's information.

ADOLFO CALANDRIA.

CAMP LONG, PORTSMOUTH NAVY-YARD, July 20, 1898.

THE REPORT OF THE VIZCAYA.

The Captain (Eulate) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: In compliance with the instructions received from your excellency, I got my ship ready on the morning of the 2d instant, to go out at 4 p. m. But as the reembarkation of the first company did not begin until that time, it was 6.30 p. m. before the ship was ready to put to sea. At that moment the battle flag was hoisted by the officers, whom I addressed, reminding them of the obligations imposed upon them by the Ordinances, and the heroic deeds of our ancestors in our honorable career. After a prayer, we received, kneeling, the benediction of the chaplain.

With the flag hoisted we were awaiting your excellency's last orders, and at 9 o'clock a. m. of the day following, July 3, the ship was ready to follow in the wake of the flagship. At 9 o'clock (true time) she started up, following the *Teresa*, and at 9.30, after passing Punta Socapa, we went full speed ahead, steering in conformity with the instructions previously issued by your excellency. At the same moment we opened fire on the hostile ships, very heavy at first, but gradually decreasing in the 5.5-inch battery, owing to the defects of the guns and ammunition, of which your excellency is aware.

In spite of these defects, the enthusiasm and intelligence of the officers in charge of the battery and the excellent discipline of their crews made it possible to fire during the battle, which lasted two hours and a half, 150 rounds with the port battery, one of the guns alone firing 40 rounds, the others 25 and above, with the exception of one, which only fired 8 rounds. The deficiencies of these guns were numerous, chief among them, as you already know, the fact that the breech could not be closed, the projectiles jammed, and the firing pins failed to act.

One of the guns had to try seven shells before a serviceable one could be found, another gun even eight, and it was only by dint of hard work that this latter gun could be brought into firing position. In the lower battery the firing was very heavy during the first two hours; after that the number of hostile shells striking and injuring the port guns was such as to disable every one of them and dismount the majority.

In the high battery there were so many casualties that, although there was but one gun left that could be fired, there were not men enough to serve it. In the lower battery there were no men left either to serve the guns or to conduct the firing. It therefore became necessary to decrease the crew assigned to extinguishing the fires that were constantly breaking out everywhere, and as a result of this fact, in conjunction with the circumstance that the fire mains had become useless through hostile fire, the conflagration increased to such an extent that it was no longer possible to control it. It is safe to say that the number of victims in the two batteries two hours after the beginning of the battle was between 70 and 80, most of them killed, among them the captain of the lower battery, Lieut. Julián Ristory y Torres, who for his gallantry deserves a place of honor in the annals of the history of our navy.

Owing to the valiant attack which the flagship made on the enemy at the beginning of the battle, we did not at first have so much to suffer from hostile projectiles,

as only two battle ships were firing upon us. But during the second hour we were the target of four, the *Brooklyn* to port, the *Oregon* on the port quarter, the *Iowa* on the stern, and the *New York* on the starboard quarter, but the last two very close, so that only the after 11-inch gun could answer the fire of the *Iowa* and *New York*. The guns of the starboard turrets forward and aft were able to fire four or five rounds against the *New York*, but the fire was very uncertain because the latter ship, after firing from her port broadside, yawed at the stern.

It was at 9.35 o'clock, after we had come out of the harbor and were shaping our course for Punta Cabrera, that we first received the enemy's fire, and at 11.50, when we could no longer fire with a single gun, I wanted to try whether we could ram the *Brooklyn*, which was the ship that harassed us most on the port side and which was nearest to us. To that end I put to port, but the *Brooklyn* did the same, indicating that she was going to use only her guns. The undersigned, with his head and shoulder wounded, was obliged to withdraw to have his wounds dressed. Almost faint from the loss of blood, he resigned his command for the time being to the executive officer, with clear and positive instructions not to surrender the ship, but rather beach or burn her. In the sick bay I met Ensign Luis Fajardo, who was having a very serious wound in one of his arms dressed. When I asked him what was the matter with him he answered that they had wounded him in one arm, but that he still had one left for his country.

When the flow of blood of my wounds had been checked, I went back on deck and saw that the executive officer had issued orders to steer for the coast in order to run ashore, for we had no serviceable guns left and the fire at the stern had assumed such dimensions that it was utterly impossible to control it. This sad situation was still further complicated by a fire breaking out on the forward deck as the result of the bursting of a steam pipe and the explosion of one or more boilers of the forward group. Although the executive officer, Commander Manuel Roldán y Torres, had acted in accordance with instructions, without exceeding them, I immediately convened the officers who were nearest, among them Lieut. Commander Enrique Capriles, and asked them whether there was anyone among them who thought we could do anything more in the defense of our country and our honor, and the unanimous reply was that nothing more could be done.

In order that the battle flag might not become a trophy of the enemy, I at once gave orders to Ensign Luis Castro to hoist another and lower the former and burn it, which order was promptly carried out. At 12.15, under the galling fire of the four battle ships mentioned above, the cruiser *Vizcaya* ran ashore on the shoals of Aserradero under circumstances which made it impossible to save the ship, not only on account of her position on the shoals and the nature of the latter, but also because I knew that all the magazines must necessarily explode, though there would be time for the rescue, and that was indeed what occurred.

As soon as the ship had been beached, the executive officer gave instructions to make all arrangements for the immediate rescue of the crews. Attempts were at once made to lower the boats. When I found that only one was in serviceable condition, I ordered that it be used mainly for the transportation of the wounded, and I authorized all those who could swim or who had life-preservers or anything else sufficiently buoyant to keep them above water to jump in and try to gain the reefs of the shoal, which was about 98 yards from the bow.

The rescue was effected in perfect order, in spite of the awe-inspiring aspect of the ship on fire, with the ammunition rooms exploding, the flames rising above the fighting tops and smokestacks, and with the side armor red-hot. I was taken ashore by the officers in the last boat that carried wounded, and was subsequently picked up by a United States boat, which carried me to the *Iowa*. The executive officer told me afterwards that only the dead were left on board, as he had at the last moment directed the rescue of those who had taken refuge aft, and whom he had ordered to jump into the water and hold on to ropes which had previously been made fast, and there he and the others waited until they were picked up by our

boat. The conduct of the captain, officers, and crew of the *Iowa*, the ship to which the United States boats carried us, was extremely considerate. I was received with the guard drawn up. When I wanted to surrender my sword and revolver to the captain, he refused to receive them, saying that I had not surrendered to his ship, but to four battle ships, and that he had no right to accept them.

The conduct of our officers and crew has been truly brilliant, and many deeds of heroism which have been recorded will in due season form the subject of a special recommendation, if your excellency should so order.

Of the wounded taken to the *Iowa* five died soon after arriving there, and were buried with the same honors with which the Americans bury their own dead, with the guard drawn up and with the discharge of three volleys of musketry. All the prisoners were present at these ceremonies, which were conducted by the chaplain of the late *Vizcaya*.

The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to your excellency upon the loss of my ship in a battle against four far superior ships without striking her colors nor permitting the enemy to set foot upon her deck, not even for the rescue. There are 98 men missing of her crew.

ANTONIO EULATE
(Prisoner of war).

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE AUXILIARY CRUISER ST. LOUIS,
July 6, 1898.

REPORT OF THE FUROR.

Memt. Commander Carlier to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONORED SIR: At half past 9 o'clock on the morning of July 3, upon orders received from the commander in chief of the torpedo boat flotilla, who came on board this ship, we sheered off from Las Cruces Pier, Santiago, and followed in the wake of the *Oquendo*. Before reaching Punta Gorda we commenced to hear the fire of the battle between the vanguard of our squadron and the enemy, and several shells struck near us.

Soon after, in the harbor entrance, the commander gave orders to put to starboard and follow at full speed in the wake of the squadron in a westerly direction, opening fire upon the enemy. From the very first we received an enormous amount of fire from the majority of the hostile ships and were struck by shells of every caliber.

We soon commenced to have casualties from the galling fire and many injuries to the ship, which occurred in the following order: Bursting of the steam pipe of the engine; destruction of the starboard intermediate cylinder; flooding and submersion of the stern; bursting of a boiler; further injuries to the engine; destruction of the three remaining boilers; fires in different parts of the ship, one of great intensity in the engine room, below which was the shell room, and finally, breaking of the servomotor of the helm and tiller. All these accidents occurred one after another in a very short space of time, but we never ceased firing, although the deck was already strewn with a large number of wounded and some dead.

About 10.45 the commander of the flotilla, in view of the foregoing facts, which he had either witnessed or which had been reported to him, gave orders to run ashore, which could not be carried out. As the ship was known to be doomed, having neither rudder nor engine left, the fire, no longer controllable, having invaded the stern and waist, and more than one-half of the crew having been put out of action, the commander ordered the flag and the boats to be lowered, and the men who could do so to get ashore in the boats or with the assistance of life-preservers. I transmitted this order to the executive officer. Several projectiles struck the men who were swimming ashore.

When the hostile fire had ceased, two United States boats came alongside, and

the few of us who still remained on board got in. The enemy did no more than just step on deck, and upon realizing the situation, returned hastily to the boats, fearing an explosion, which, indeed, occurred soon after we had sheered off from the ship, and she sank about a mile from the shore.

Of the crew, which was composed of 75 men, 11 are unhurt; 8 of the dead have been identified; 10 of the wounded have been picked up; the remaining 45 figure in the list as missing, though some of them were left on deck dead and could not be identified; others were drowned, but I have hopes, which I trust I may see fulfilled, that some of these 45 men have gained the shore.

It is with deep sorrow that I have to report to your excellency that among the dead who were identified is our worthy chief, the noble and brilliant Capt. Fernando Villamil.

All of the foregoing I report to your excellency for your information, in compliance with my duty.

DIEGO CARLIER.

ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS, July 8, 1898.

REPORT OF THE PLUTÓN.

Lieutenant-Commander Vázquez to the Admiral (Cervra).

HONORED SIR: In compliance with the orders received from the commander in chief of the torpedo-boat division, I sheered off from Las Cruces pier at 9.30 in the morning of the 3d instant and steered straight toward the entrance of Santiago Harbor.

I was off the little town of Cinco Reales when I commenced to notice the falling of shells, the natural result of the battle that was being fought between the vanguard of our squadron and the Americans. I followed closely in the wake of the *Furor*, according to instructions received, and when about to leave the harbor entrance I opened fire upon the nearest hostile ship and went ahead at full speed. After I emerged from the harbor steering in a westerly direction I was greeted by a hail of projectiles. This was the beginning of the battle, and the fire increased as I advanced and got into the midst of the hostile fleet.

About 10.45 a large caliber shell entered the orlop, which rapidly filled with water and the ship pitched forward. Almost at the same time other projectiles hit the forward boilers, which burst. Another entered the ammunition room of my cabin, and besides causing a leak, started a fire in that quarter.

But we steamed on, though at a slower speed, and constantly fired upon by the Americans, whose fire we kept answering. But when I saw that the ship commenced to sink, owing to the water entering at the bow, in the boiler room, and my cabin, I concluded that she could not remain afloat much longer, and tried to run ashore on a small beach near by. I ordered the helm to be put to starboard (port?—O. N. T.) but the rudder no longer responded, the servomotor having been disabled, and one of the tiller ropes broken. The ship was still going ahead and struck on the rocks, completely destroying her bow. Upon instructions from me part of the crew jumped to the ground, others into the water to starboard, some of them gaining the shore.

I then left the deck, went to my cabin, took the package of confidential letters received from your excellency and the commander in chief of the torpedo-boat division, and threw it into the water, together with signal code No. 32 and the Perea signal code and key. I then lowered the flag. After that I went forward, but it was no longer possible to gain the shore from there, as the ship had changed her position. I therefore hailed the boat which had gone ashore with some of the men and, entering it, I was able to gain the rocks. Soon after I heard an explosion and the ship went down as far as the deck.

The hostile fire having ceased, I had a white flag hoisted. A United States boat then came to pick us up and took us to one of their ships.

There were 21 of the crew left, among them 5 wounded; the rest are comprised in the list of dead and missing which I had the honor of handing to your excellency.

The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to your excellency for your information, in compliance with my duty.

PEDRO VÁZQUEZ.

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS,
July 6, 1898.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

[Received at Portsmouth, N. H., 1.52 p. m., July 11, 1898. Dated Washington, D. C.]

Admiral CERVERA, *Portsmouth, N. H.:*

The following telegram has been received for you from the Captain-General of Cuba:

Being very desirous of alleviating the lot of those heroic defenders of our country who so valiantly succumbed in unequal battle, and to whom, as to yourself, I offer a tribute of admiration, I beg that you will advise me of the amount you require and where you wish it placed. In order to gain time I also address the French consul at New York on this subject.

The following is a copy of the first part of the manifesto in this connection which I addressed to the people of Cuba on the 4th day of July: "Inhabitants of the island of Cuba: Fortune does not always favor the brave. The Spanish squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral Cervera, has just performed the greatest deed of heroism that is perhaps recorded in the annals of the navy in the present century, fighting American forces three times as large. It succumbed gloriously, just when we considered it safe from the peril threatening it within the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. It is a hard blow, but it would be unworthy of Spanish hearts to despair," etc. BLANCO.

LONG, *Secretary of the Navy.*

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

PORTSMOUTH, N. H., *July 11, 1898.*

Your excellency's cable received, for which we are very grateful. The men will remain here where they were landed, having with them 5 army officers, 2 surgeons, 2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman. We officers are to go to Annapolis, where we shall all be together. As we have lost absolutely everything, we need about \$70,000 gold for the present.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Añón).

HAVANA, *July 11, 1898.*

The consul of Jamaica says that your excellency is waiting for particulars of loss of squadron. In cablegram dated 3d instant I told your excellency and minister war of its sortie from Santiago in same terms in which it was reported to me by commander of navy and general of division. Subsequently, on the 5th, I forwarded to minister war communication from Rear-Admiral Cervera, of same date, reporting destruction squadron. Have received no further official information on this unfortunate event, which saddens the heart of every good Spaniard, and am therefore

unable to give your excellency the particulars you desire. I do not believe that the reports circulating through the American press are trustworthy. Everything indicates, however, that the disaster has not been as great as at first supposed as far as casualties are concerned, especially as to the number of killed.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

MADRID, July 11, 1898.

To clear up doubts, examine and transmit literally first few words of telegram addressed by Admiral Cervera to Captain-General from Playa del Este.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

[From Playa del Este to Admiral Cervera, care of commandant naval station, Portsmouth, N. H.]

FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

Off Santiago, July 12, 1898.

The following telegram was received from General Blanco for you:

Am deeply impressed by your excellency's telegram of yesterday and greatly admire conduct of commanders, officers, and crews. Perhaps if another time had been chosen for sortie result would have been different. Sampson states in his report he sustained only three casualties. Is that possible? Advise me how much money is required and where to place it, and I beg that you and all officers and men under your orders will believe in my deepest interest and a desire to better their situation as much as lies in my power.

BLANCO.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON.¹

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

PORTSMOUTH, N. H., July 13, 1898.

I am in receipt of telegram which your excellency sent me at Playa del Este, from where it was forwarded to me here. Am deeply grieved that all my actions meet with your excellency's censure. Trust I may be able to justify them when time comes, as the facts have taken care of showing that there was no exaggeration in my opinions expressed to your excellency, which you also censured. The sortie at night would not have obviated loss of squadron, and surely the number of dead would have been tripled, provided the sortie could have been effected at all, which pilots doubted. Many thanks for your offers. In my former telegram I have already asked for \$70,000 gold.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., July 16, 1898.

Have just arrived here, second in command of squadron and total of 43 captains, officers, and midshipmen. Petty officers and men, with 4 army officers, 2 surgeons, 2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman, remain at Portsmouth. At the Norfolk hospital there are 48 wounded.

¹ This telegram was to have been sent from Havana on the 5th or 6th.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, July 18, 1898.

The minister of marine sends respectful greeting to Spanish prisoners. Money sent you from Havana.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 12, 1898.¹

Presume when peace protocol is signed we shall at once be restored to liberty. If we do not previously receive instructions I intend to contract for passage, drawing for necessary funds upon your excellency or London committee.

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auñón).

HAVANA, August 17, 1898.

In compliance (with) orders (from) your excellency. In reply to your cable (of July 11).²

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, August 17, 1898.

If prisoners are granted unconditional liberty you may contract for passage home, preferring, terms being equal, national flag. If possible one ship bound for Ferrol and one for Cadiz and Cartagena. Draw for necessary funds.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 18, 1898.

Días Moren has obtained permission from United States Government and leaves for Madrid; also Surgeon Jurado, seriously ill, accompanied by Chaplain Riera.

The United States Admiral (McNair) to the Admiral (Cervera).

NAVAL ACADEMY, Annapolis, Md., August 20, 1898.

REAR-ADMIRAL PASCUAL CERVERA.

SIR: I have the honor of advising you that the Government of the United States will grant Admiral Cervera and the officers under his orders their liberty upon condition that they pledge their word of honor in the usual form. The admiral's word will suffice as to the troops and crews. Liberty can be granted on this condition only. I call your excellency's attention to the fact that upon pledging their word in the manner indicated about 20,000 men have been restored to liberty, some of whom have already returned to Spain. This was the mode of procedure followed by the commander in chief of the United States troops which operated in Santiago de Cuba.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the United States Admiral (McNair).

HONORED SIR: The penal code of the Spanish navy defines as crime and provides penalties for the acceptance of liberty upon promise not to take up arms during the

¹Received at Madrid the 16th.

²See telegram p. 121.

continuation of the war. We can, therefore, not accept, and I have the honor of so informing your excellency.

I report the matter to my Government.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ANNAPOLIS, August 20, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 20, 1898.

I have been officially advised that the United States Government will grant us liberty if we pledge our word not to take up arms during the continuation of the war, as the 20,000 men of Santiago have done. Have replied that we can not do so, because our penal code considers such action criminal. I beg your excellency for instructions.

Lieutenant-Commander Capriles to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 20, 1898.

I shall not accept liberty upon word of honor, even if authorized by your excellency.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, August 23, 1898.

I approve refusal of officers prisoners to accept liberty upon promise not to take up arms. Advise Lieutenant-Commander Capriles that although his intention may be different, it is considered disrespect on his part to admit possibility of Government authorizing what the penal code forbids.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, August 28, 1898.

Advise me on what terms Díaz Moren, Jurado, and Riera are returning.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 29, 1898.

Jurado returns sick; Riera to take care of him. Particulars official letter 12th instant.¹ I did not mediate in Moren's liberty.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 31, 1898.

United States Government grants us unconditional liberty. Shall at once look for transport in compliance with your excellency's instructions.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, September 1, 1898.

You may contract for steamers necessary for return prisoners. But for sanitary reasons, if only one ship, to go to Santander; if two, one to Santander and one to Vigo.

¹The sentence in italics is not in the pamphlet.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

ANNAPOLIS, MD., *September 3, 1898.*

Committee I sent to New York has contracted for transportation of men for £11,185, payable at sight in London, order Krajewski, Pesant & Co. Draft upon committee navy. Will notify of departure.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, *September 4, 1898.*

I approve of arrangements. There being only one ship, go to Santander and notify me of departure.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

NEW YORK, *September 8, 1898.*

Wounded (from) Norfolk have arrived (in) *City (of) Rome*. To-morrow officers from Annapolis will arrive. The day after steamer leaves for Portsmouth to embark nucleus of men. I leave now to arrange for embarkation.¹

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auñón).

PORTSMOUTH, *September 12, 1898.*

We are about to leave. Probable arrival 21st. I beg that commandant navy be instructed to issue passports to captains and officers for respective homes, except those mentioned by me, in immediate charge of expedition.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

PORTSMOUTH, N. H., *September 12, 1898.*

We are about to leave for Spain.

The Rear-Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

HONORED SIR: As I tread once more the soil of our beloved country I deem it my duty to give you in the shortest possible form an account of events from the day of the disaster of July 3 to the present date. I will not weary your excellency with the many transfers we had to make during the first few days, and will confine myself to stating that all the prisoners were divided into three groups. The one to which I belonged was assigned to the auxiliary cruiser *St. Louis*; another, the most numerous, to the auxiliary cruiser *Harvard*, and a third, the least numerous, but composed of the most seriously wounded and sick, to the hospital ship *Solace*.

In my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3, I had the honor of telling your excellency of the kindness and courtesy with which we were treated by the enemy, with the exception of one unfortunate incident which occurred on board the *Har-*

¹ Words in parentheses were not in the original, but appeared in the pamphlet; those in *italics* vice versa.

ward, and of which I shall speak in a separate letter,¹ and some friction at Portsmouth, N. H., which does not deserve special mention.

The United States Government had prepared on Seavey Island a camp composed of wooden barracks for the petty officers, crews, and troops; that is to say, for all except the active officers, who were assigned to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md., with the exception of the seriously wounded and sick, who were sent to the Naval Hospital at Norfolk, Va. The first expedition to arrive was that of the *St. Louis*, of which I formed part. We were landed at Portsmouth, N. H., on July 10, at which time I learned of the different points to which we had been assigned.

I requested Captain Goodrich of the *St. Louis* that a few officers be permitted to remain with the men who were to camp at Seavey Island, and that we be allowed to take with us to Annapolis a few sailors in the capacity of servants, which was granted by the United States Government. I therefore appointed Lieuts. Antonio Magaz, formerly of the crew of the *Vizcaya*, Fernando Bruquetas, of the *Teresa*, Adolfo Calandria, of the *Oquendo*, and Antonio Cal, of the *Colón*; Ensign Carlos Boado, of the *Plutón*; and Midshipman Enrique Morris to serve as interpreter on account of his knowledge of English. All these officers remained at Portsmouth with the exception of Calandria, who was not on the *St. Louis*, but on the *Harrard*. Surgs. Salvador Guinea and Alejandro Lallemand, Assistant Gabriel Montesinos, and Chaplains Matias Biesa and Antonio Granero also remained to attend to the many sick and to the spiritual welfare of all.

During our stay at Portsmouth we received a visit from the bishop of Portland and the curate of Portsmouth. Words fail me to give an idea of their kindness. We remained at Portsmouth until the 14th, when we left for Annapolis, where we arrived on the 16th. The same day the *Solace* arrived at Norfolk and landed the sick and wounded, a list of whom I sent your excellency by cable. During the night of July 4, there occurred on board the *Harrard* the incident above referred to. This latter vessel reached Portsmouth on the 15th, landing Lieutenant Calandria, Surg. Adolfo Núñez and the men, and on the evening of the 20th she arrived at Annapolis, where the captains and officers were landed.

At Annapolis I was received with the honors due my rank. I was given a well-furnished house, where I remained during the whole time of our captivity with Capt. José de Paredes and one of my aides and a sufficient number of servants to make us very comfortable. The captains and officers were also given comfortable quarters and were always treated with the greatest courtesy. The United States Government was kind enough to appoint Rear-Admiral McNair, superintendent of the Naval Academy, so that I might not be under the orders of an officer of inferior rank to mine. In a word, we were treated at Annapolis with a kindness and courtesy that have probably no equal in history in the treatment of prisoners.

When we were settled and I had the necessary clothes, I wanted to visit our men at Norfolk. I asked the United States Government for permission to do so, which was granted, and left Annapolis on August 4, arriving at Norfolk on the morning of the 5th, where I was received with the greatest courtesy, by express orders, I believe, of the United States Government. I spent the day with the sick and wounded and went back at night, reaching Annapolis the next morning. At the hospital I found every one well treated and carefully attended, and had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of Mr. Arthur C. Humphreys, who was our vice-consul until the war broke out, and who has been a friend and comfort to our wounded. He has since rendered us great service in the transportation of the sick to New York, to embark them on the *City of Rome*, which was accomplished by his disinterested efforts in a

¹The letter referred to is omitted, as I do not deem it necessary. It is contained in the pamphlet mentioned. The incident to which reference is had was the death of six sailors and the wounding of many others, some of whom have subsequently died, caused by the United States watch at daybreak of July 5.

more economical manner than I would have thought possible. I recommend him especially to your excellency.

While yet at Annapolis I asked for permission to go to Portsmouth, and the Government hastened to grant it and to issue instructions accordingly. I left Annapolis on August 12, arriving at Portsmouth at 11 o'clock a. m. of the 13th. I was met at the station by a naval lieutenant by orders of Mr. C. A. Carpenter, superintendent of the navy-yard, who invited me to his house, together with my aide, a paymaster whom I had taken along to distribute a month's pay, and Ensign Narciso Díez, who had gone with me to relieve Carlos Boado, whose health was very delicate.

I found conditions different here from what they were at Annapolis. There was not the same material comfort nor the same courtesy; on the contrary, it was noticeable at once that there was a lack of material welfare, and in the relations with our enemies I thought I could see friction, and on the part of some of them a desire to make especially the officers feel that they were prisoners, and make them suffer the bitterness of their sad lot. While it never came to open insults, there is no doubt that the people there did not act according to the desires and certainly not the spirit that prevailed in the higher Government spheres.

As to the material care I will state that for lodging the men ten barracks had been built, each 100 feet long and 15 feet wide, so that the ground covered was 15,000 square feet. As we had over 1,500 men, 150 had to be put into each barrack, which gave each man only 10 square feet of space. The officers had only one barrack, the dimensions of which I do not remember, but it had all along the walls miserable cots (I could not call them beds) and in the middle was a table lengthened by boards and disreputable looking remnants of chairs. As politely as I knew how, I commented on this to Admiral Carpenter, and in honor to truth I must say that when I left Portsmouth two days later the officers had chairs and another barrack was being built for a dining room, and instructions had been issued to stop up every crack of the old barrack.

I left Portsmouth on August 16, arriving at Annapolis on the evening of the next day. On August 20 Admiral McNair handed me the letter which I inclose to your excellency, marked No. 1, as also my reply thereto, marked No. 2. I notified you of the substance of these letters by telegram, and your excellency approved of my reply. In view of the decision of the United States Government that we should promise not again to take up arms and the fact that we could not do so under our laws, I deemed it necessary to write Admiral McNair letters Nos. 3 and 4,¹ of which I inclose a rough draft, referring respectively to the invalids and the firemen engaged in Cuba entitled to be sent back.

Admiral McNair also advised me, in letter marked No. 5, that we were to be prepared to leave the academy. Aside from the above there were no further incidents, except the deaths which have occurred since we landed, of which I sent you a list, and the return to Spain of Capt. Emilio Díaz Moren, Surg. Antonio Jurado, and Chaplain José Riera, of which I notified your excellency at the time. On August 31 Admiral McNair wrote me a letter stating that the United States Government granted us unconditional liberty, and I at once appointed a committee, composed of Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar and Paymaster Eduardo Urdapilleta, to go to New York and make arrangements for passage, in accordance with your excellency's instructions; and I also sent a surgeon to New York to purchase such medicines as the steamer did not carry and as might be needed, and I and my aides got ready to go at the last hour to settle minor difficulties that might present themselves.

Before proceeding, I wish to state that wherever we went there were demonstrations of the greatest sympathy with our misfortune. I have received many visits and many kind services from prominent people, some of very high rank, and at Annapolis the whole population was very kind toward us. Admiral McNair and the whole

¹Some of the documents referred to have not been included in this collection because it was not deemed necessary.

personnel under his orders have distinguished themselves by their exquisite courtesy, for which I considered it my duty to thank him in a letter of which I inclose memorandum. To take charge of the expedition I appointed Lieut. Commanders Juan B. Aznar and Carlos Gonzalez Llanos, Lieuts. José Butron and Lorenzo Milá, Captain of Artillery Manuel Hermida, Ensign Enrique de la Cierva, and Midshipman Juan Munoz, and Raimundo Torres. I have granted permission to all the other captains and officers who have asked to be allowed to return to Spain, without giving them any further assistance. I inclose a list of these.

When everything was in readiness at Annapolis, I thought it best to take a trip to Norfolk, New York, and Portsmouth, before the steamer was ready, and I am glad I did so, as I had a chance to settle several small difficulties which might perhaps have delayed the steamer, which would have increased the expense. Of the firemen engaged in Cuba, 20 asked for permission to go with us, and only the 19 mentioned in the inclosed list took passage for Havana, and I wrote to the commandant-general of the navy-yard, asking him to send them on to Santiago.

We had with us 29 prisoners of the army, among them 8 officers. I asked the Captain-General for instructions relative to these, and in accordance with his orders six have gone to Havana, while the others have come with us. All of them have received some aid, of which they stood much in need. I was obliged to leave Seaman José Maria Vilar Toimil at Portsmouth, as the physicians stated that it would endanger his life to take him on board. I left with Commodore George C. Remy \$50 for his expenses and a letter, of which I inclose memorandum.

The committee appointed to charter the steamer did so on the terms stated in the contract, of which I forward a copy to your excellency. In accordance with the terms provided, with the efficient assistance of the United States authorities, the whole embarkation was accomplished without trouble of any kind; no one was absent, and by noon of the 12th we were on our way home, and every face on board expressed the joy that filled every heart. The trip was made with the most beautiful weather and has benefited everyone, especially the sick. There were 300 when I went to Portsmouth, but their number has been reduced to 180, and even these are much improved, so that very few will have to be carried out on stretchers, and I am happy to say no death occurred while we were on the sea; nor has there been any disaster, and it has not been necessary to admonish a single man. Four members of the Red Cross Society came with us, and their conduct has been of the very best. Their names are given in the inclosed report.

I also inclose a list of all the personnel that came home with me, amounting in all to 2 flag officers, 8 captains, 70 officers and midshipmen, and 1,574 petty officers, sailors, and naval troops, and 2 officers and 21 men belonging to the army.

Before closing this long history permit me to say that the officers who were at Portsmouth, with the men, have conducted themselves with the greatest tact, patience, and prudence. In my official letter of August 11 I have already told your excellency of the merits of the medical corps and chaplains, which I hereby confirm. As to the special merits of some of the others your excellency will be advised by the inclosed copy of the official letter from Lieut. Antonio Magaz, who was the oldest officer there. Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar and Paymaster Eduardo Urdapilleta accomplished their mission of chartering the steamer in the best possible manner, taking into account the state of the market. Paymaster Urdapilleta has shown himself to be one of the best officers of the service, which I take great pleasure in stating.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTANDER, September 20, 1898.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).¹

ARMY OF OPERATIONS IN CUBA, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: I am just in receipt of the report which you were kind enough to address to me, dated on the sea, July 9 last, on the battle sustained by the squadron under your orders in the waters of Santiago de Cuba, on July 3, against the United States naval forces. I transmit the report to-day to the minister of war for the information of the Government, accompanied by the following letter:

“HONORED SIR: I have to-day received from Admiral Pascual Cervera the official report, of which I inclose a copy to your excellency, on the battle he sustained in the waters of Santiago de Cuba on July 3 last, said report being dated on the sea, July 9. If the accounts published as to this event should not be sufficient to make you appreciate the gallant conduct of our sailors on that day, the reading of this document will certainly suffice to make anyone realize the valor, presence of mind, and self-sacrifice shown in this fierce battle against far superior forces, not only by the flag-officers, captains, and officers, but also by the crews of the ships. Though victory has not crowned their gallant efforts, they have demonstrated once more the military virtues that grace the Spanish navy by giving the noblest example of heroism. In view of these facts, it is my opinion that Rear-Admiral Cervera, the captains of the ships composing the squadron, and all those who took part in the battle are entitled to signal rewards for their valiant conduct, and I beg your excellency to use your best endeavors with Her Majesty the-Queen to grant them such reward.”

I have nothing to add to the foregoing, except again to express my admiration for the gallant conduct of your excellency and the squadron under your command, and to lament with the army here and the whole nation the sacrifice of so many lives on the altar of the nation's honor. But, as in the first paragraph of your report you expressed an idea upon which I can not help but comment, though only in a few words, I wish to state that, if it is intended thereby to make me responsible for the results of that ill-fated operation, I accept beforehand every responsibility that can be laid to me as the result of the orders which, guided by the most patriotic intentions, I deemed expedient to dictate to your excellency, since I had the honor of having the squadron under your worthy command placed under my orders.

RAMÓN BLANCO.

His Excellency Rear-Admiral PASCUAL CERVERA.

HAVANA, August 7, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

HONORED SIR: Not until this morning did I receive your excellency's letter dated August 7, which, though not signed, I know to be

¹ This letter was received by me at Madrid shortly after my return from the United States.

genuine, as it came to me with your confidential letter of September 5, in which you notify me that you sent it in case your former letter sent to the United States had been lost.

I thank your excellency many times, not in my name alone, but in the name of those who were under my orders, for the kind words which you addressed to the minister of war in our behalf when you sent him my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3.

Relative to the matter that concerns me alone, I wish to explain to your excellency the object and motives that impelled me to place at the beginning of my report the words that gave rise to your remarks. Permit me first of all to say that it was not my desire to incriminate anyone, nor to throw responsibility upon anyone, but simply to disclaim any responsibility which a priori might be laid to me and which does not belong to me.

It is certain that we accepted a war with the United States for which we were not prepared, as we had no fleet such as would have been necessary to defend the colonies. This matter was the subject of an interesting correspondence, both official and confidential, which I had with the Government before the war became inevitable.

It is also certain that when this war did become inevitable I wanted to formulate a plan of campaign and the Government refused me permission to go to Madrid with that end in view.

My ideas on this subject were that we should have to lose Cuba in any event, and if my squadron, the only naval forces of any value that we possessed, were destroyed, that a humiliating peace entailing many other losses was sure to follow the destruction of my squadron. Subsequent events have shown that I was right on this point.

In order to save the squadron it would have been necessary to draw the enemy away from their base of operations to some point where they would not be able to take all their forces. We should have had all of ours united where we had better resources. But I never could make these ideas clear, which explains why I was so energetically and obstinately opposed to the squadron going to the West Indies.

It was this departure for the West Indies that was the signal for our loss, as I had the honor of telling your excellency in a telegram. After that nothing that happened could surprise me. Hence the introductory words of my report.

Perhaps if I had not gone out Shafter would have reembarked his forces. I was told so in the United States, and I believed it then, although this would only have prolonged the agony of Santiago de Cuba for a few days; for I considered the city lost from the moment when I arrived there, and told the Government so in my telegram of May 21, two days after I entered.

Having explained to you that it was not the object of the introduction to my report to throw responsibilities upon anyone, but simply to disclaim such responsibility as does not belong to me, there only remains

for me to reiterate to your excellency my thanks for the kind words addressed to us all.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

His excellency the CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF OPERATIONS IN CUBA, *Havana*.

MADRID, *October 8, 1898.*

The Captain-General of the Army of the Island of Cuba.

[Private.]

HAVANA, *September 15, 1898.*

His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR SIR AND HONORED ADMIRAL: AS soon as I received your telegram advising me that you were about to leave Portsmouth, I replied, wishing you a safe voyage. But you had already embarked, as you will see from the inclosed dispatch,¹ and I, therefore, take the liberty of writing to you to fulfill that duty of courtesy.

I do not know whether you will finally receive my communication dated August 7, in which I acknowledge the receipt of the report you were kind enough to address to me on the 9th of July. In case you should not receive it, I send you herewith a copy of the communication referred to.

And while I hold the pen in my hand, permit me also to answer a remark which occurred in one of your telegrams and which I thought better not to answer by telegram, especially at that time.

You said that your actions met with nothing but censure on my part. I have never censured you, my dear Admiral; on the contrary, I have always been lavish with praise, as you deserve, both before and after your arrival in Santiago. You will remember that as soon as you arrived I congratulated you on your skillful seamanship. Since then there may have been differences of opinion between us, but never censure, at least not on my part, for I can not believe that you would so construe a phrase in one of my letters, written in a moment of the greatest bitterness I have ever experienced in my life, under the impression of that great national misfortune, and in which I only expressed doubt.²

In any event, although you do not need my support, which moreover could not be of any help to you, as the blow has struck me harder than you, be sure that I shall always be on your side and on the side of the navy, whatever may be the vicissitudes of these unhappy times through which we are passing, and the attitude which you assume toward me.

Wishing you sincerely all manner of happiness, I remain as ever, yours, etc.,

RAMÓN BLANCO.

¹THE INTERNATIONAL OCEAN TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

September 12, 1898.

HON. GENERAL BLANCO:

We are advised from Portsmouth that your telegram of this date to Admiral Cervera could not be delivered, the person addressed having left for Europe on the steamer *City of Rome* before the receipt of the cable.

²The letter referred to never reached me.

MADRID, *October 7, 1898.*

His Excellency RAMÓN BLANCO.

MY DEAR FRIEND AND RESPECTED GENERAL: Last evening I received your favor of September 15, together with the official letter of August 7, which, probably through an oversight, had not been submitted to your excellency for signature. To-day I answer both.

It was not necessary for you to forward to me the note from the International Ocean Telegraph Company, for how could I ever doubt your exquisite courtesy? That would not be possible.

I am not the only one who has seen censure in some of your telegrams, especially the one you sent to Santiago, and which I do not have before me, as I have not yet received the documents which, in anticipation of the disaster, I left in that city. In this telegram you said that you believed I exaggerated, and other things which I do not wish to repeat from memory and in order not to make this letter too long; but I regret I shall not be able to make it short, though I do not wish to trouble you.

You will remember that I answered that I had to respect your opinions and not discuss them, because to my mind that is all a subaltern should do, and if I subsequently pointed out to you in another telegram the impossibility of going out at night, it was only by way of information, which I must now give you more in full.

As Santiago was short of artillery in the modern sense of the word (for, aside from the guns of the *Mercedes*, which were mounted at the Socapa and Punta Gorda, there were only two 3.54-inch Krupp guns, which were of no use against the ships, and some howitzers and absolutely useless guns), the enemy was not afraid to approach the harbor entrance, especially at night, when they remained in the immediate vicinity of the same.

At night they always had one ship, relieved every three or four hours, less than a mile from the harbor entrance, maintaining the latter constantly illuminated, and, as though this were not enough, they had other smaller vessels still nearer, and steamboats close to the headlands of the entrance. Once in a while these latter boats would exchange musketry fire with our forces.

Under these circumstances it was absolutely impossible to go out at night, because in this narrow channel, illuminated by a dazzling light, we could not have followed the channel and would have lost the ships, some by running aground, others by colliding with their own companions.

But even supposing that we had succeeded in going out, before the first ship was outside we should have been seen and covered from the very first with the concentrated fire of the whole squadron. Of the efficiency of that fire an idea may be gained from what happened to the *Reina Mercedes* during the night of July 3.

In daytime, on the other hand, the hostile squadron was more scattered and some of the ships were usually absent, as was the case with the *Massachusetts* on July 3.

Feeling sure, as I did, that the disaster was inevitable, all I could do was to see that we had the least possible number of men killed and to prevent the ships from falling into the enemy's hands, thereby complying, as we literally did comply, with an article of the Ordinances of the Navy which the minister of marine cited in a cablegram to me.

If Santiago de Cuba had been even reasonably well armed, the hostile ships would always have kept at a distance of five or six miles at least, in which case they could not have lighted up the harbor entrance so effectively, and we could then have maneuvered with some remote prospect of success.

In your letter you alluded to a phrase from another letter of yours which I never received, and my telegram from Portsmouth was only in answer to the one which you sent me in reply to mine of July 4. In this telegram you say about as follows:

If the sortie had been made at another time, perhaps the result would have been different.

I repeat that I do not have the telegram before me and shall correct such words as may not have been employed.

I confess that I saw in this sentence another censure, and I am glad to see from your letter that such was not your intention, although it was so construed by the very few persons whom I consulted.

I thank you very much for the support you offer me and still more for the generous terms in which you couch the offer. Although my attitude has already been defined in an official letter, I believe it my duty to speak of it more fully.

I never have held, nor do I hold now, any grudge against anyone, least of all against you. Hence it is not my intention to attack anyone, but I must defend myself from the many things that have been said against me here; and if in doing so I should indirectly attack anyone I shall feel very sorry.

If I were the only one concerned I should make an end of it right here and ask for my retirement, as I have been wanting to do for some time. But when I returned to Spain I found part of the nation led astray in its judgment of these matters in their relations to the future, and the navy made the subject of unjust attacks, and looking upon me as embodying in my conduct its spotted honor; and I can not betray the navy, and still less my country.

Therefore, as soon as judgment has been passed upon my conduct or the case dismissed, I shall publish my whole correspondence, and, unless my strength shall fail me, subject everything that has happened to a critical examination without going into personalities, inspired only by the interests of our country and the dangers which I see ahead for the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and Ceuta. If anything personal should result from this (which I hope not), it will not be my fault.

In closing this letter, permit me to assure you of my profound respect, and to remain as ever, yours, etc.,

PASQUAL CERVERA.

APPENDIXES

Which in Themselves Justify Many of the Statements Contained in the Text

I

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION OF THE SQUADRON OF RESERVE
TO THE UNITED STATES COASTS (MAY 27).

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cámara).

HONORED SIR: The equipment of the squadron under your excellency's worthy command having been completed and the ships supplied with provisions and coal, you will arrange for its immediate departure for the harbor of Las Palmas, where without loss of time you will replenish the coal consumed and take whatever quantity of provisions you may deem necessary, according to the respective purposes for which the different units are intended. At Las Palmas you will form three divisions of the squadron.

The first,¹ composed of the battle ship *Carlos V*, cruisers *Rápido*, *Patriota*, and *Meteoro*, and dispatch boat *Giralda*, will remain under

¹ *Description of first division.*

Name of ship.	Coal capacity.	Daily coal consumption—	
		At 11.22 knots.	At 15 knots.
	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>
Carlos V	2,000	70	169
Rápido	2,362	66	158
Patriota	2,749	(a)	(a)
Meteoro	1,945	99	236
Giralda	436	23	48

a Not known.

your excellency's immediate command. The second division, composed of the battle ships *Pelayo* and *Vitoria*, and destroyers *Osado*, *Audaz*, and *Proserpina*, will be placed under the orders of the oldest captain, being the commander of the *Pelayo*, Capt. José Ferrándiz y Niño. The third division, of which the auxiliary cruisers *Buenos Aires*, *Antonio López*, and *Alfonso XII* will form part, will be commanded by Capt. José Barrasa y Fernández de Castro.

The squadron will leave the harbor mentioned united, and in order that its subsequent movements may not be surprised it will shape its

course for the West Indies until at a sufficient distance from the Canaries and from the course most frequented by the ships crossing those waters; or the whole squadron will perform evolutions within sight of said islands, simulating tactical exercises while waiting for nightfall, when each of the divisions, upon previous orders to be issued by your excellency, will proceed in the proper direction for the purposes hereinafter set forth.

The first division under the command of your excellency will shape its course for the Bermudas, and at a proper distance from those islands you will detach a fast vessel to acquire at Hamilton all possible information, besides such as the Government will communicate to you through our consul, José Garcia Acuña, a resident of said port, as to the location, number, and quality of the hostile forces distributed along the Atlantic coast, it being understood that the communication with the Bermudas must be confined to the one vessel referred to and only for a length of time absolutely necessary for the purpose indicated, the rest of the division to pass out of sight of the islands, so that its presence in said waters may not become known.

Taking into account the information you may acquire, and eluding an encounter with superior forces, your excellency will choose such point on the United States coasts as you may deem best adapted—Charleston, if possible—to carry out in the direction from south to north a series of hostile acts, in the energy of which you will be guided by circumstances, against fortified positions as well as against such places as, owing to their industrial, military, or commercial importance, will justify the operation and make it worth while. I call your excellency's attention to the expediency of your course along the coast being from south to north as indicated. Key West being the enemy's principal base of operations, the forces detached to oppose your operations will follow you instead of going to meet you, as would otherwise be the case.

Your excellency will determine to what point the hostilities should be carried, remembering that the object of these hostilities is not only to make reprisals for the enemy's unjustified acts on our own coasts, but principally to call his attention toward the north, dividing his forces and thus facilitating the movements of the third division and at the same time those of Admiral Cervera's squadron. You might find it expedient (but this is not imposed upon you as a duty) to go up north as far as to permit you to detach a cruiser to Halifax, in order that Lieut. Ramón Carranza, who is assigned to Canada, may give you such information as he may have acquired beforehand. Having accomplished on the United States coasts the object indicated, and following the route which offers the greatest security, you will try, unless reasons of greater importance should prevent, to pass north of the island of Mariguana, or Turks Island, and collect at the latter the information which the Government will take care to forward to you there.

From that favorable position you may proceed at your discretion to the southern coast of Cuba, around Cape Maysi, and enter Santiago Harbor; or, following said coast, enter Havana Harbor, or passing north of the Keys, enter the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico. Any prizes you may be able to capture during this expedition, if the conditions of the vessel or the nature of the *cárgo* make it worth while, you will dispatch to the Peninsula, with a suitable prize crew on board, or incorporate in your division, as the case may be. If the services such prizes can render do not compensate for the trouble they require, it will be better to get rid of them by sinking them or setting them on fire, after transshipping whatever you may deem serviceable, in any event the personnel and flags, the portable armament, and the ship's papers.

As to the second division, in order that its separation from the rest of the squadron may remain unknown as long as possible, and also in order that it may be in a position to reach speedily, if need be, any given point of the Peninsula or the Canaries, where its defensive action may be required, will cruise between parallels 30 and 36 north latitude, the ninth meridian west, and the coast of Africa, for ten or twelve days from the date when it begins to maneuver independently, which is probably the time it will take your excellency to reach the United States coast, after which the second division will proceed to Cadiz to receive further orders.

The third division, upon leaving your excellency's flagship, will proceed to the latitude of Cape St. Roque, to cut off the route of the vessels plying between the eastern coast of the United States and South America or the Pacific. It will remain on this route, cruising as far as the tenth degree north latitude, as long as its radius of action (calculated by that of the ship having the smallest radius) will permit, including the return. The object of this expedition will be to capture the greatest possible number of prizes, concerning which the commander of the division will observe what I have previously stated relative to the prizes which your excellency may take.

In case of injury or any other unfortunate circumstance making it necessary for any of the ships of this division to seek a port, you will see, provided there is a possibility of choice, that preference be given to the French colonies. With the necessary prudence, the commander of these forces will detach one of his ships to Fort de France, Martinique, where it will receive orders from the Government and acquire such information as may be of importance to him. But if from unforeseen causes he should not find upon his arrival the orders referred to, it will be understood that the division is to return to the harbor of Las Palmas, following the shortest route and carefully eluding the hostile forces, if the power of the latter renders this necessary.

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the commanders of the second and third divisions, when navigating independently, will proceed within the scope of the general outline traced

above, but with all the liberty of action that may be necessary to insure the success of the plan, with the understanding that he who causes the greatest amount of damages to the enemy without endangering his own forces will best fulfill his mission. If the vicissitudes of the voyage give your excellency an opportunity to join Admiral Cervera's squadron, you will do so at once, and the forces will remain united until the Government decides that it is expedient to separate them again, or until both commanders in chief, or in case of difference of opinion, the eldest commander, should deem such separation necessary.

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be sustained, as well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that may be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere to the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for claims on the part of neutral powers. The Queen and the Government are confident that this expedition, intrusted to the zeal of your excellency and your subordinates, will be carried out in such manner as to earn the approval of the nation and serve as a brilliant example of what may be accomplished, in spite of the scarcity of resources, by energy, intelligence, and good will placed at the service of the King and the country.

MADRID, *May 27, 1898.*

II.

The Admiral (Cámara) to the Minister (Auñón).

CADIZ, *June 15, 1898.*

I can assure your excellency that all are cooperating with me for immediate departure, and if we do not sail as speedily as desired it is owing to difficulties impossible to overcome, in spite of the most earnest desire. I repeat that the utmost coal capacity of the *Rápido* and *Patriota* is only 3,000 tons. *Carlos V* will refill bunkers as far as possible while the 3.94-inch armament is being completed, having until now been busy with speed trials. I shall confer with the Captain-General of the Departamento, after inspecting the ships, in order to settle any difficulties that may present themselves, and to fulfill your wishes, which are my own as well. I hope to be ready next week.

III.

The minister of war (Correa) to the minister of marine (Auñón), Cadiz.

MADRID (not dated—about middle of June).

The military governor of Cadiz transmitted to the minister of marine the following telegram from the minister of war:

(To be deciphered by your excellency personally.) Kindly advise minister marine, in strict confidence, that I have received very serious news from the Philippines and that the Government considers it necessary for the squadron fitted out, or part of same, to leave immediately in order to calm anxiety of public opinion and raise spirit of fighting forces through knowledge that reinforcements are coming.

The minister of marine (Auñón) to the commander in chief of the squadron of reserve (Cámara).

JUNE 15, 1898.

HONORED SIR: The equipment of the squadron under your excellency's worthy command having been completed, the ships provisioned and coaled, the necessary papers issued, and the troops and supplies having been embarked in the transports mentioned in the inclosed memorandum, you will arrange for the immediate departure of the squadron in a southwesterly direction, timing yourself so that you will be near the Strait of Gibraltar by nightfall. After nightfall you will dismiss the trans-Atlantic steamers *Alfonso XII* and *Antonio López* to carry out independently their respective orders from the ministry of war. With the remainder of the squadron and the convoy you will pass through the Strait of Gibraltar at the necessary speed, so that by daybreak you will be in the Mediterranean and out of sight of the lookouts of that place.

When this has been accomplished you will dismiss those of the colliers whose rate of speed will not permit them to follow the speed of the squadron, and will shape your course for Suez, avoiding as much as possible passing within sight of land. The coal consumption of the deep-draft ships should be proportioned methodically, so that upon arrival at Suez they may be as nearly alike as possible, so as to facilitate the passage through the canal under statutory conditions without the necessity, or with the least possible necessity, of transshipping or unshipping anything.

Upon arrival at Port Said, and upon notifying this ministry by cable of the condition in which the expedition reaches that city, and the facilities or difficulties that may present themselves for passing through the canal and the means to be employed for overcoming such difficulties, if any there be, you will receive orders to continue or modify your course. In the former case, or in case you should not be able to communicate with the Government, you will replenish the destroyers with the necessary coal to enable them to return to Mahon, and will instruct them to proceed to that place either directly or with such stops as you may consider necessary.

Thereupon the remaining ships will pass through the Suez Canal, and take on board pilots and such Arabic personnel as you may deem necessary to lighten the arduous work of the firemen in the Red Sea. You will choose a point on the Red Sea or on the Island of Socotra, or any other point you may deem suitable for the purpose, and there provision and coal the ships, taking the coal from the slow colliers, provided they have rejoined the squadron, leaving these vessels enough coal for the homeward voyage and dispatching them back to Cartagena.

If the slow colliers have not rejoined the squadron and you have no

news of them, you may take coal from the colliers accompanying the squadron and continue the voyage, leaving behind for the former, if possible without endangering the necessary secrecy, instructions to rejoin the squadron, or stay at Suez, or return to Spain, as you may think best. From Socotra you will proceed to the Laccadive Islands, in one of which you may perhaps have a chance to complete the coaling of the squadron, and from there, unless it should be necessary for any of the ships to touch or be detached, to a port in Ceylon, you will continue your voyage in the manner hereinafter indicated.

From any point where the colliers of the squadron may lighten their cargo you may dispatch them back to the Peninsula, or the nearest place where they can renew their cargo, giving them instructions in the latter case as to where to rejoin the squadron. From the Laccadives you may choose your route according to circumstances, either passing from the north through the Strait of Malacca and coaling again at some anchoring place on the northern coast of Sumatra; or, passing through the Strait of Sunda, touching at Singapore or Batavia if deemed necessary, and proceeding thence to Labuan, Borneo; or, finally, passing south of Sumatra and Java and through the Strait of Lombok, going thence directly to Mindanao, without stopping at Labuan.

If either of the first two routes is adopted, you can communicate at Labuan with Madrid, stating the condition in which the ships arrive, and receive the confirmation or modification of these instructions, after which you may proceed with the united squadron, or detach ships, as in your judgment may be most effective, to Balabac, Jolo, Basilan, or Zamboanga, reenforce the detachments with the landing troops, or, if possible, enter into communication with the authorities at Manila for the purpose of cooperating in the future.

As it is the main object of the expedition to assert our sovereignty in the Philippine Archipelago, and as it is impossible to tell what will be the condition of the islands at the comparatively remote date of your arrival at Mindanao, you will from that time on make your own plans and take such steps as will lead to the attainment of the total or partial success of this enterprise, according to circumstances, either assisting the Bisayas, or running along the eastern coast of the archipelago to effect a landing of the forces on the opposite coast of Luzon, provided the conditions of the territory in the part nearest the lagoon and Manila admit of doing so; or passing around the north of said island to operate upon Subig or Manila, if the information you may acquire as to the hostile forces will permit you to meet them without signal inferiority on your side, and even detaching the convoy of troops, with more or less escort, or without it, if deemed expedient, in order to facilitate movements or conceal the true object.

If you succeed in communicating with the Governor-General of the Philippines, you will consult with him and proceed, within the means at his disposal, to do anything that may lead to the defense or reconquest of the archipelago, but always trying to operate carefully, as the

ordinance prescribes, so as to obviate all encounters that have no prospect of success, considering it an essential point to avoid the useless sacrifice of the squadron, and under all circumstances to save the honor of arms.

The Government, which realizes the difficulty of the mission intrusted to you and the deficiency of means which it has been possible to furnish you, traces these general outlines to show the final object it seeks to attain; but at the same time you are fully authorized to depart therefrom whenever circumstances promise greater chance of success by following a different course.

If in the course of your voyage you should find it necessary to enter any port on account of injuries or from other causes, you will remember the expediency of preferring French colonies or the territory of the Kingdom of Siam. Any prizes which you may be able to capture during the expedition you will manage properly, incorporate them in the squadron, and send them to a Spanish port, or destroy them by fire or sink them, according to circumstances and the services they may render or the impediment they may represent, first transshipping to the vessels of the squadron everything considered serviceable, in any event the personnel and flags, portable arms, and the ship's papers.

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the captains of the ships or groups of ships, who may on certain occasions operate independently, will proceed within the scope of the general outlines traced above, but with all the liberty of action that may be necessary to insure the success of the plan, with the understanding that he who causes the greatest amount of damage to the enemy without endangering his own forces will best fulfill his mission, and that Her Majesty, the Government, the nation, and his own conscience, will be satisfied if each one in his sphere follows in all of his actions the letter and spirit of our ordinances.

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be sustained, as well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that may be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere to the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for claims on the part of neutral powers.

A few days after the departure of the squadron there will be dispatched to join the squadron at Suez the trans-Atlantic steamer *Isla de Luzon* with provisions, coal, lubricating material, supplies, and the personnel that has remained behind on account of sickness or from other causes. To this vessel you can transship the troops on board the *Buenos Aires* in order that the latter may be better adapted for any military operations with which she may be charged.

The Queen and the Government are confident that this expedition intrusted to your excellency and your subordinates will be carried out in such a manner as to earn the approval of the nation and serve as a brilliant example of what may be accomplished, in spite of the scarcity

of resources, by energy, intelligence, and good will placed at the service of the King and the country.

The above is communicated to you by royal order for your action.

RAMÓN AUÑÓN.

CADIZ, June 15, 1898.

MEMORANDUM REFERRED TO.

Group A.—Fighting ships which are to go to the destination of the expedition, *Pelayo, Carlos V, Patriota, Rápido.*

Group B.—Fighting ships which are to return from the canal, *Audaz, Osado, Proserpina.*

Group C.—Transports of troops, *Buenos Aires, Panay.*

Group D.—Colliers, *Colón, Covadonga, San Agustín, San Francisco.*

Group E.—Ships destined for different purposes which are to sail with the squadron and separate from it, *Alfonso XII, Antonio López, Giralda, Piélago.*

ORDER OF SAILING.



1, *Pelayo*; 2, *Carlos V*; 3, *Patriota*; 4, *Rápido*; 5, *Buenos Aires*; 6, *Panay*; 7, *Colón*; 8, *Covadonga*; 9, *San Francisco*; 10, *San Agustín*; 11, *Alfonso XII*; 12, *Antonio López*.

V.

The Admiral (Camara) to the Minister (Auñón).

PORT SAID, June 30, 1898.

After waiting four days for decision of Egyptian Government to transship coal to *Pelayo*, the transshipment has been prohibited, and we have been notified to leave at once all Egyptian ports. In view of critical aspect of question, and with assistance of Spanish minister at Port Said and consul, have succeeded in gaining time to receive full instructions from your excellency by telegraph. If I were to pass through canal at present without coaling here or at Suez, should have to tow *Pelayo* all through Red Sea, there being no port where transshipment could be effected until reaching Bab-el-Mandeb. If to avoid

international conflict it should be impossible for me to remain here until I receive your excellency's instructions, shall go out to Mediterranean and wait outside of territorial waters for your telegrams.

 VI.

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cámara) to the Minister (Auñón).

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE
SQUADRON OF RESERVE, STAFF.

HONORED SIR: From the 16th, the day of our departure from Cadiz, until that of our arrival in this harbor, the weather has been perfect and the health and spirit of the crews excellent, so that we have been able to practice military exercises every morning and evening. On the 17th the *Patriota*, *Rápido*, and *Buenos Aires* took the three destroyers in tow, but several times during the voyage the lines parted, and on the third day the *Buenos Aires* collided with the *Proserpina* so hard that the iron cable was lost, so that she could not again tow the *Proserpina*. I then ordered the *Carlos V* to take the latter in tow, which was done without difficulty. As I have already stated, the lines of all the ships parted several times as the result of the bad arrangement and lack of strength of the bridles which the destroyers carried.

The towing ships furnished coal and provisions to the vessels towed. This operation was always carried out as rapidly as possible, and the only drawback was that the squadron had to reduce its speed. The destroyers sustained several injuries to their engines, which were remedied with the contrivances on board. The *Audaz* was the only one that had injuries of any importance, the piston of the air pump being broken, which is detaining the vessel in this port. The flagship sustained some minor injuries in the feed-water apparatus and the air pump of the port engine, which were remedied without trouble. On the morning of the 26th, when near Port Said, a dense fog compelled us to moderate our speed for an hour. When it was over we went ahead at full speed and entered the canal at 11.20 o'clock, casting anchor at noon.

Yours, etc.,

MANUEL DE LA CÁMARA.

ON BOARD THE PELAYO, *Port Said*, July 1, 1898.

VII.

The Minister (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cámara), Cartagena.

MADRID, July 23, 1898.

When the torpedo-boat destroyers have rejoined your squadron, start for Cadiz with the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Rápido*, *Patriota*, *Buenos Aires*, and the destroyers, keeping close to the shore, so as to be seen from

Spanish cities, exhibiting when near them the national flag, illuminated at night by searchlights, which are also to be thrown upon cities. If you meet any coast guard vessels, communicate with them. Advise me in advance of hour of sailing. The colliers that have unloaded or transhipped the good coal they carried may proceed to Cadiz, either with squadron or alone.

HARVARD INCIDENT.

Rear-Admiral Cervera to the United States Admiral (McNair), Superintendent of the Naval Academy.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Upon my arrival at Portsmouth, N. H., I read in the papers of an event that occurred on board the *Harvard*, and which has cost the lives of six of my sailors and resulted in many others being wounded. As I know, on the one hand, the spirit of discipline among my men, whose conduct is of the very best, and see, on the other hand, for myself the generosity and extreme courtesy with which we are being treated by the American nation, which fact I have had the pleasure of expressing in writing to Admiral Sampson and Captain Goodrich and take pleasure in confirming here, I did not believe this piece of news, which I took to be one of the many inventions which may be seen in the press every day, but when the *Harvard* arrived yesterday I learned, to my surprise, that it was true.

Any act which costs the lives of six innocent men is extremely serious, and when to this is added the fact that they are defenseless prisoners of war, the seriousness is increased, as your excellency is well aware. In view of the spirit of justice and generosity shown us by this nation, prisoners though we are, I must believe and do believe that a full and impartial investigation has probably been made, for the purpose of clearing up the facts and in order that justice may be done to prevent the repetition of an act like the one in question. If the generosity of the United States Government would go so far as to advise me of the result of the investigation that has probably taken place, and whether any of my men have been examined, or only their slayers, also as to the measures adopted, I should be extremely obliged for this new favor. If, furthermore, I may be authorized to communicate this information to my Government, with such remarks as the reading may suggest to me, the whole civilized world will recognize therein a gigantic progress in the rights of men.

If the United States Government does not deem it expedient to grant my request, I shall not again speak of this matter while I remain a prisoner.

I beg that your excellency will pardon me for troubling you, although it is simply love of justice and of my subordinates which inspires these lines.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., July 21, 1898

*The Rear-Admiral (Cervera) to the United States Admiral (McNair),
Superintendent of the Naval Academy.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: On the 21st of July last I had the honor of forwarding to your excellency a letter, in which I referred to the incident that took place on board the *Harvard* which cost the lives of six of my sailors, and through which others were wounded, some of whom have since died. Your excellency did me the kindness of sending me a letter from his excellency the Secretary of the Navy, which letter kindly informed me that as soon as steps could be taken to get witnesses together I should be notified of the fact. It is not impatience and far less doubt that puts the pen in my hand, for that would be an insult to this great nation, and God save me from falling into such a grave error. It is simply the desire to contribute, so far as is in my power, toward establishing the truth in the interest of justice. I inclose you at the same time a copy of the report made to me by Lieut. Commander Juan Aznar. Not wishing to hurt your excellency's kind feelings, I refrained from sending it before, but seeing now by the papers that the regiment whose members fired upon my men is returning from Cuba, I thought that the opportune moment had arrived.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 29, 1898.

DOCUMENT REFERRED TO.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: As the person most prominent among the prisoners taken on board the United States auxiliary cruiser *Harvard*, I have the honor to give you an account of all the happenings from the moment I became separated from your excellency on the Nimaniba beach. Once ashore, the balance of the crew of the *Infanta María Teresa*, including the wounded, marched toward the interior of the thick-wooded land, and finding a clearing in which we were safe from the explosions of the vessel, intended to camp there for the night. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon there appeared a lieutenant of the United States Navy, accompanied by an armed squad of sailors, and with provisions sufficient to last more than one day, who announced to us, after inquiring insistently if we had been ill treated by the insurgents, that we were to remain there under the protection of the United States flag until the next day, when he would return to take us away in a large boat. The vessel, which happened to be the *Harvard*, came up that same night and sent boats ashore to take us away, when we embarked after some difficulty, owing to the sea breaking with some force.

While in the act of embarking there came up 250 men of the *Oquendo*, who had been detained at the camp by the insurgent leader Cebrero, and they were also taken on board the *Harvard*. Having boarded the latter vessel at about 9 o'clock in the evening, each officer was provided

with a fatigue suit and a pair of shoes, and we were shown to our quarters in the first-class saloon, where we were ordered to remain from 10 o'clock in the evening till 6 the next morning, and cautioned not to hold any communication during the day with the noncommissioned officers and men, who had been placed on the upper deck aft. The wounded were treated that same night on the deck of the ship by the two surgeons of said ship, aided by those of the *Oquendo*, Guinea and Parra, and transferred the next morning to the hospital ship *Solace*. In spite of all our efforts to separate the noncommissioned officers from the men, it could not be done, and they kept together, corralled, so to speak, in the after part of the ship, guarded by the Massachusetts volunteers.

On the same day, the 4th, a list was made of all the prisoners, which, with the changes that occurred until the day of landing in Portsmouth, N. H., I have the honor to inclose to your excellency. At 2 o'clock in the morning of the 5th, while I was in my stateroom, I was summoned to the cabin of the commander of the vessel, Capt. S. Cotton. This gentleman in the presence of the executive officer expressed to me his regrets for the events that had taken place on board the vessel an hour before, and which had resulted in the killing of several prisoners. According to the investigations made by the captain, which he communicated to me, the incident happened as follows:

One of the prisoners at 11.30 of that night went forward of the lines indicated by means of cables stretched from port to starboard. The sentry ordered him to go back, and as he showed resistance in obeying, the sentry fired. The firing woke up the 600 men who, I repeat, were crowded aft, and jumped up naturally excited. The watch, which was under arms, ordered them to sit down, and as they did not obey, fired a volley which resulted in the immediate death of five and the wounding of about fourteen, also causing several to jump overboard. The latter were picked up by the ship's boats.

When the captain had finished speaking, I stated to him how much I deplored the act; that I could assure him that our people were incapable of doing anything that would have made the firing necessary, and that the disregard of the order, first of the sentry and then of the watch, must have been due to their ignorance of the language, and that, had the watch been composed of members of the Regular Army instead of volunteers, the thing would certainly not have occurred. As we were not allowed to communicate with our people during our stay on board the *Harvard*, I was not able to obtain information as to what happened that night. I could have only a moment's talk with the quartermaster of the *Teresa*, who told me that the men had jumped up, thinking that the ship was on fire.

As all the witnesses are in Portsmouth, I don't think it would be difficult to find out exactly what occurred, which will, without doubt, lead to trouble, to judge by the expressions of regret for what occurred, on

the part of some of the ship's officers. The wounded were cared for by our own surgeons, and transferred the next day to a hospital ship, except one who died that same night.

On the 5th, at noon, the bodies of the unfortunates shot the previous night were slid overboard. The ship's crews in line, with their officers at their head were present, as well as our people in line and also the military guard of the ship, who presented arms during the ceremony and fired three volleys at the moment the bodies fell to the water. The latter were wrapped in the Spanish flag and received the prayer and benediction of the chaplain of the *Teresa* before being committed to the deep.

Before the 7th it had been impossible to separate the warrant and petty officers from the men, the former being placed in the third-class passenger cabins and the first-class seamen in the emigrant's steerage, with the privilege of ascending to the deck aft. All were provided with a change of underclothes, soap, and a towel. From the night they picked us up until the 8th we stood off between Altares and Punta Cabrera. At noon of the 8th we anchored off Playa Este, and the ship began coaling. In the afternoon they brought on board as prisoners 4 officers and 200 men of the *Cristóbal Colón*, and landed the Massachusetts volunteers, who were replaced by 40 marines.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th we sailed for Portsmouth, in which port we cast anchor at 7.30 on the morning of the 15th. During the trip many cases of fever broke out among our people with fatal results for some, their deaths occurring on the dates your excellency will find recorded in the list herewith inclosed. At 9 of the morning of the 16th all the petty officers and men were sent to the navy-yard with Lieut. Adolfo Calandria, except 55 sick who remained on board for observation, and were landed on the 18th with Surgeons Guinea and Lallemand.

At 5.30 in the afternoon of the same day we went to sea, and anchored off Annapolis at 5 o'clock yesterday afternoon. Before terminating, I think it my duty to call your attention to the marks of consideration and respect shown to us by Captain Cotton, of the *Harvard*, who endeavored to make our stay on board his ship as pleasant as possible. This is all I have the honor to communicate to your excellency in the fulfillment of my duty.

Yours, etc.,

JUAN B. AZNAR,
Lieutenant-Commander.

NAVAL ACADEMY, *Annapolis, July 21, 1898.*

A true copy:

CERVERA.

The Secretary of the United States Navy Department to Admiral Cervera.

SIR: The Superintendent of the Naval Academy has placed before the Department translations of your letter of the 29th ultimo and the report of Lieutenant-Commander Juan Aznar, therein mentioned, with

respect to the unfortunate incident which occurred on board the U. S. S. *Harvard* on the night of July 4 last, resulting in the killing and wounding of certain Spanish sailors, prisoners of war on board that vessel. When your former communication, that of July 21, on this subject was received, this Department immediately, under date of the 23d, addressed a letter to the honorable the Secretary of War transmitting, with a copy of your letter, all the other papers relating to the matter which were in its possession.

This action was taken because, while the incident occurred on board a vessel of the Navy, this Department recognized the fact that the firing was actually done by men belonging to the Army. At the same time the opinion of the Secretary of War was requested as to whether the subject was a proper one for joint investigation or whether the inquiry should be conducted by the War Department alone. No reply having been received, this Department subsequently, August 18 last, addressed to the Secretary of War a further communication on the subject. I deem it proper to add that copies of your letter of August 29 and of Lieutenant-Commander Aznar's report were on yesterday transmitted to the honorable the Secretary of War, inviting attention to the prior correspondence, and in view of the urgency which this matter presents, the Spanish prisoners under the control of this Department being soon to be released, and it being understood that the regiment to which the soldiers who did the shooting belong may be shortly disbanded, early consideration of the subject was earnestly requested.

In this connection it is proper to add that at the time the affair under consideration occurred Capt. Charles S. Cotton, the commanding officer of the *Harvard*, made an investigation of the circumstances, and the results of this investigation were communicated to Rear-Admiral Sampson, the commander in chief of the squadron, who, upon review of the matter, considered that no further inquiry was necessary.

Renewing the expression of sincere regret conveyed to you in this Department's letter of the 23d of July last that so unhappy an incident should have occurred, and assuring you that such steps as may be practicable will be taken to promote any further investigation of the matter which may be necessary and proper, so far as this Department is concerned,

I am, very respectfully,

CHAS. H. ALLEN,
Acting Secretary.

WASHINGTON, *September 1, 1898.*¹

¹After my return to Spain I received the result of an inquiry made by order of the ministry of war by Judge-Advocate-General of Volunteers Edgar Dudley on the subject of this bloody and disgraceful incident. The conclusion reached was that it was an accident for which no one was responsible. All these documents were forwarded by me to the minister of marine.

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ADDENDUM.

Letter from Admiral Cerrera to Mr. Juan Spottorno y Biernet, cited in the letter and certificate on pages 12 and 13 of the text.¹

PUERTO REAL, March 14, 1898.

DEAR JUAN: Three days ago I received your letter of the 9th.²

* * *

The conflict with the United States seems to be averted or at least postponed, but it may revive when least expected, and each day confirms me in the belief that it would be a great national calamity.

As we hardly have a squadron, wherever it may go it must be as a whole, because to divide it would, in my judgment, be the greatest of blunders, but the next greatest would perhaps be to send it to the West Indies, leaving our coasts and the Philippine Archipelago unprotected. For my part, I am not eager for the sad glory—if there can be any glory in going to certain defeat—of perishing at the head of the squadron. If this falls to my lot I shall be patient and fulfill my duty, but with the bitterness of knowing my sacrifice fruitless; and before I go Beránger and Cánovas must hear what I say to you.

Still, if our small squadron were well equipped with everything necessary and, above all, well manned, something might be attempted; but you are right in saying that there is no ammunition but that on board, and I add that worse than this is the lack of organization in every respect, the result of many causes, conspicuous among which are the absurd economy in coal, the continual sending of the ships from place to place, and the local exigencies.

What you say to me concerning myself does not surprise me, for Beránger believes me his enemy, but, in truth, I am not the enemy of him or of anyone. Yes, I am the enemy of the system which leads to this disorder and to this disorganization, and I instinctively call to mind Admiral Byng, hung at Plymouth for a similar reason; Persano, after the battle of Lissa; Mathews, exonerated after the battle of Cape Sicié; Bazaine, condemned to death after the battle of Metz, and now

¹ After the whole book had gone to print, Mr. Spottorno sent this letter, cited in the letter of January 30, 1898, which will be found on page 12 and in the certificate on page 13. It being impossible to include it in the book in its proper place, it has been added at the end.

² The stars represent family matters omitted.—O.N.I.

Baratieri, who is just being tried by a council of war and already anticipates that he will be condemned to death or to imprisonment for life.

And thus it is that when the people are disorganized their governments (the products of such disorganization) are disorganized also, and when some logical disaster takes place they do not seek the true causes, but always cry "treason" and look about for the poor victim, who expiates the faults which were not his. For these reasons I was very vacillating before accepting the charge; but, having accepted it, I will fulfill it with the consequences which it may entail, and, as I said before, I will do my duty, but I shall recall the words of Jesus Christ and, not for myself as much as for poor Spain, say: "O, my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me."

Butler seems to me a very good choice, but I pity him, as I would anyone upon whom the lot should fall.

There is no occasion ever to divulge these things and less now, for which reason I enjoin upon you great secrecy as to what I say to you; but at the same time I beg you not to destroy this letter, but to preserve it, in case it should some day be expedient to make known my opinions at this time.

Your cousin,

PASCUAL.



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WAR NOTES No. VIII.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

THE
SQUADRON OF ADMIRAL CERVERA,

BY

CAPTAIN VÍCTOR M. CONCAS Y PALAU,

Formerly Commander of the armored cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, and Chief of Staff of said Squadron in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba,

Vice-President of the Geographical Society of Madrid.

TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH.



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
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INTRODUCTORY.

This number will probably close the series of "War Notes" on the Spanish-American war. The object in making and publishing these translations has been to give to history from reliable sources, where the writers were actual participants, a correct version of the Spanish side of the war. It has sometimes occurred that these writings contain unverified statements and harsh expressions, which at a later date, when the writers are better informed, and time has exercised its mollifying influence, would not be made, and it has been questioned by some whether it is not proper to omit such portions from the publications of this office. The accepted view, however, has been that the series should be presented as written. In the case of Captain Concas's book, it seems proper that reference should be made, as is done in the footnotes, to portions of Chapter XII, wherein he comments on his alleged loss of valuables on board the U. S. S. *Gloucester*, and criticises the surgeon of the *Solace*, the commander of the marines at the prison barracks near Portsmouth, N. H., and the personnel of the regiments that were on board the *Harvard* when the unfortunate affair of the prisoners occurred. It is to be borne in mind that in this chapter Captain Concas has recorded impressions formed by him at a time which was doubtless one of great mental depression and was certainly a period of severe physical suffering. Under such circumstances criticism is perhaps to be expected. In other parts of his work he is cordial in his praise and gratitude for kindness shown by our officers and men. He is a brave and able officer and was badly wounded at Santiago. His book is valuable both professionally and historically.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,

Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *January 24, 1900.*

Approved.

WM. S. COWLES,

Acting Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

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P R E F A C E .

The 3d of July, 1898.

“Alas for the vanquished!” is an old saying, but we should now add: “Alas for those who are sent out to be vanquished!” For no matter how many may fall in the struggle, there can never be enough to cover the mistakes of others and the treason to the country; for it certainly is treason to lead the country to ruin and to the loss of ten million inhabitants, while invoking romanticism and legends. Political men should know that these are not the reality; that they do not now and never did constitute war, and that the nations which have had recourse to them have ended by disappearing from the map of the world.—*(Defense of Admiral Montojo, of the Squadron of the Philippines, before the Supreme Council of the War and Navy.—CONCAS.)*

CHAPTER I.

It is some time since peace has been concluded and diplomatic relations with the United States renewed. The Spanish Government is no longer composed of those political elements that have been the cause of our disaster, that enforced silence upon us, calling it discipline, while we had to listen to insults, and that purposely kept the people in ignorance of the facts of which they alone bear the responsibility. The supreme council of war and navy, after slow and minute proceedings, has rendered its judgment of complete exoneration relative to the great disaster of Santiago de Cuba, and in view of the easily impressed character of the Spanish people we may almost say that it has already become a matter of past history, though surely not for those families who are still weeping for their lost friends, nor for us who have covered with our blood the decks of the Spanish ships, and who, to fill the bitter cup to overflowing, have since had to suffer the terrible torment of having to keep silent before those who have torn our country and its flag to pieces, and before whom we, who are among the few Spaniards that can boast of having left nothing undone that their duty required of them, proudly raise our heads, conscious that we have been loyal in council, soldiers in danger, and slaves to our duty.

Has the hour arrived when matters will be cleared up? According to foreigners nothing has been said in Spain in explanation of matters of such gravity, with the honorable exception of the letters of Admiral Cervera which were published in *La Epoca*, of Madrid, and those foreigners are right in asking that everything pertaining to the matter should be made public. The Spanish people, also, ask why we do not defend ourselves. Many of them are not honest in asking this question, for they know perfectly well that the law relating to courts-martial and the exigencies of discipline have tied our tongues, for reasons erroneously called considerations of state, though no consideration, either in that sense nor in a purely military sense, has been shown any of us.

Captain Mahan, of the United States Navy, one of the men who have had the greatest influence on the war, in speaking of the manoeuvres

of our squadron in his famous articles entitled *The War on the Sea and its Lessons*, says on this point:

What Cervera's actual reasonings were is unknown to the writer, and probably will remain unknown until he sees fit to publish them, or until he has appeared before the court-martial which, by the almost universal practice of naval nations, awaits a commander who has lost a ship or incurred a considerable disaster, a practice merciful as well as just, bringing to light a man's merits as well as his faults, if such there be, and confronting idle gossip with an authoritative expert judgment. The course, being usual, implies no antecedent implication of blame, and therefore is never invidious as regards an individual. Until it is decided whether such a court shall be convened, it is not to be expected that the Spanish admiral will reveal the line of his defense, or lay himself open to attack by the statement of inferences and decisions, which at the time of their formation may have been sound and yet in the event have proved unfortunate.

In the absence of certain knowledge, conjectural opinions, such as the writer has here deduced, * * *.

While a man of the profound knowledge of Captain Mahan told the whole world that he spoke only from conjectures, there are few men in Spain who have not constituted themselves infallible judges over us, reminding us at the same time, first, of our military duties, then of our duties as being under court-martial, and finally exacting silence from us for political reasons, since in the opinions of some our declarations might be of international significance. Sad it is that we who have had a share in the bloody tragedy of July 3, 1898, in the waters of Santiago de Cuba, can not make such explanations as we deem best for the interests of our country. But as no one prohibits us from arranging the data which are already known to the whole world, and which, when confirmed by one of us, assume a guaranty of reliability which they might not otherwise have, future generations will at least be able to judge whether that sad battle was a natural encounter of the war, or whether it was brought about by politicians, designated by the misnomer of statesmen, who in cowardly fear of an uprising did not hesitate to sacrifice the whole country, on the extremely original theory that the disaster, imposed by the law of necessity, would compel the people to resignation. As though disasters, on the contrary, had not always been the true reason for great social disturbances and the cause of cruel and exorbitant demands on the part of the enemy. And on this occasion the tranquillity and good sense of the Spanish people when brought face to face with misfortune is the best proof that there was neither rhyme nor reason in the exaggerated fear of our statesmen.

For all these reasons we shall abstain from expressing opinions wherever the rocks and reefs of discipline do not permit us to go ahead, and let the reader find between the lines what it is not now possible for us to discuss. For instance, in referring to a telegram of July 3, 1898, from our Government to the Captain-General of Cuba, which was published in large capitals in the *New York Journal*, in which

telegram the Captain-General was consulted as to whether the blockaded squadron could go to the Philippines and return to Cuba without loss of time, we shall not add any of the considerations which such a consultation would suggest to us, though the telegram is not sufficient in itself to explain the fatal policy of the campaign. We shall only quote it such as it has circulated through the press of the whole world, without even putting it in large letters; for if we were to adopt that type of letters to quote similar matters, there would be very little left to be printed in ordinary type, and this book would look like one of those devotional books which are printed with a view to being read almost in the dark.

The naval battle of Santiago will surely not be forgotten for many a year. And if God should work a wonder so that the Spanish people will some time know a little more of what is going on in the world than they do now, it is possible that the *pros* and *cons* will then be discussed in this country as something new. Therefore, when we who have had a share in this disaster have been called home by the Lord, we want to impress upon those who shall then wear the uniform of the Spanish navy to keep alive the defense of the memory of those who were not afraid, upon their return to Spain, of the stones and insults thrown at them by the Spanish rabble for having insisted on the opinion that we ought not to go to war nor the squadron to the West Indies, always invoking the salvation of the country: *of the country abandoned, insulted, and trampled upon by the enemy*, as Admiral Cervera said literally in his official letter of April 21, in which he reported on the council of war convened at Cape Verde Islands. At that council we were sad prophets of coming disasters which it was still time to reduce to reasonable, though bitter, terms that would not involve the whole country in the catastrophe. And if duty and discipline carried the squadron to the disaster predicted ("and so Cervera went forth with his four gallant ships, foredoomed to his fate by folly or by national false pride, exhibited in the form of political pressure disregarding sound professional judgment and military experience"—these are the words of Captain Mahan, of the United States Navy, who is known the world over as the foremost naval writer) and to its total ruin, we knew at least how to fight and how to die, even though under circumstances of the greatest strategic absurdity known to military history, and for which we, the admiral and his captains, jointly and separately, disclaim positively before history, before our country, and before every Spaniard without exception, all manner of responsibility, in whole and in part.

We do not claim that these pages are an official history of the events. That history will be furnished by the admiral by publishing the documents themselves. Moreover, it would confine us to too narrow limits. Our intention is simply to furnish a chronicle in regular order,

derived from authentic sources, which no one would dare deny me, as I was not only in command of Admiral Cervera's flagship, but also his chief of staff on the memorable day of the battle when my beloved comrade, Bustamante, who held that important post, lay ashore mortally wounded. This chronicle is designed to set the people right; for public opinion is formed from the daily press, which is more intent on reporting events rapidly than on reporting them well, and the historical information furnished by it often requires rectification and explanation from beginning to end.

We do not mean to open up a discussion with the entire press, for so many and such different opinions have been put forward all over the world that it is quite impossible for one work to embrace them all, nor would it be within human power to read them all. We shall confine ourselves to making certain statements, in which everyone who does us the honor of reading these pages will find the solution of the doubts which have been raised against the navy, treating with proper disdain the writings of some foreigners, probably youthful officers of no experience whatever and of great presumption, whose writings do not deserve the honor of criticism nor any attention except that of their own insignificance.

In taking notice of the press, which is the more necessary as no one else has hitherto spoken freely of the events of the war, we must observe that it is characterized by different nationalities rather than different criterions.

Strange to say, it is the United States press that has treated the battle of Santiago de Cuba and the causes that brought it about with the greatest accuracy, fairness, and charity. Aside from the facts that everyone is prone to praise his own people, wherein the Anglo-Saxon race excels particularly; that the Americans have concealed or misrepresented more than one defeat which their flotilla experienced in the West Indies, which, however, did not affect the outcome of the war; and their evident desire to conceal the decided advantages which they have derived from the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines, the statements of the Americans have been on the whole very fair; and the writings of such men as Mahan and others we may consider as a defense of ourselves and at the same time as a judgment against the inefficiency of our politicians. Translations of these writings, though abbreviated—but not in those parts in which the navy is criticised—have been published in our newspapers and *hardly anyone had read them.*

The publications of the United States Navy Department also are very noteworthy and of great value in the study of the war, for seldom has the public been furnished a collection of such truthful data. But while recognizing this circumstance, we believe that these publications lack one requisite which, according to Balmes, is indispensable in telling the truth, and that is that the whole truth should be told;

and in this respect the report of the United States Bureau of Navigation, in the original as well as in the translation, has omitted matters which may have seemed inconvenient, or which do not redound to the credit of the Americans. This must not be forgotten when we have recourse to that source of information.

The English scientific press has treated the matter with that decorum which a not overconscientious miss might employ to save appearances. That is the tone adopted by all the English constructors who had a share in the building of our cruisers and were responsible for some of their defects, for which no one, however, has blamed them, and which, moreover, are not of importance, for such defects might be found in any other ships, no matter how great the reputation of their building yards. We will mention, for instance, that one of the constructors, who was a very skillful engineer, forgot the 5.5-inch ammunition hoists, which he subsequently built himself by an installation of his own invention, which turned out to be pretty bad, as would naturally be the case with anything in the construction of our modern ships not provided for from the beginning. But as the constructor and those associated with him knew very well that these hoists were among the things that must necessarily function badly in the first serious encounter of the cruisers, he hastened to publish in *Engineering* a series of explanations which absolutely lacked truthfulness. And there were many similar instances on which we shall not waste time. In the daily press the tenor has been much lower, for even over the signature of people of high standing articles have appeared of such shameful servility for anyone who has any regard for his professional dignity that they have been ridiculed by the whole world, especially by their cousins on the other side of the Atlantic. Some of their admirals, afraid of losing the prestige which they have so well earned in the maritime world, have changed their opinions; and it is curious to watch the acrobatic feats they execute when they give free reins to their opinions and judge the facts, and when, as though in obedience to an order from the foreign office, they plan campaigns and perform other skillful acts which seem hardly possible in men of such practical minds. Really, it seems impossible, absolutely impossible, that in a country of such naval intelligence as England so many high officers should have written so many utterly ridiculous opinions without superior orders to praise the Americans at any cost. Nothing else could be expected of the only nation in Europe which, with the same object in view, has seriously sustained the tale of the blowing up of the *Maine* from the outside by means of a torpedo. While I was in America, many Americans in talking to me of this tale made fun of it—that is to say, of these English articles; however, business is business; but in the end everything must be paid for, as Spain has paid for the great political mistake she made when she aided the British colonies in achieving their independence.

From the point of view of criticism we will speak of one noteworthy article, which is important on account of its great circulation, having appeared in *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1899, written by Col. Sir George Clarke with a freedom of criticism that truly honors him, especially as he has heard only one side, which serves to demonstrate what we have said before; for in conclusion of his article, on page 174, he states explicitly that he has obtained his information from different officers of the United States Navy, which, as already stated, with the exception of concealing some minor defeats, has furnished the most correct report of the events.

The press of France, Italy, and Germany has treated Spain with more moderation and its navy with greater fairness. But in its evident desire to be generous, for which we are truly grateful, it is often led aside from the path of truth, and what should be justice has come to be charity.

There finally remains the Spanish press. We forgive it from the bottom of our hearts, though before God and before history it is principally responsible for the disasters of our country. It is a severe, moral lesson that public opinion in Spain, except in the case of a few sound-minded men who were not led astray, has returned to the right channel without the aid of the press—even in spite of the press—compelling even the most hostile to recognize that the mistakes and responsibility rest with the Government factors and not with those who, after insisting that we should not go to Cuba, counted neither enemies nor obstacles when they received the order to go out to meet death for their country, though they were convinced, not only of the futility of the enterprise, but also of the fact that the order meant the delivering up of all Spain to the mercy of the enemy.

In our country everything goes to extremes; soldiers must all be heroes, martyrs, or traitors; the just medium is completely lacking; but it is precisely in the just medium that common sense prevails, which in war, as in everything else, is needful at the decisive moment. In our country we would have qualified as a monstrosity the order given Sampson, as appears from several telegrams published in the Appendix to the Annual Report of the Secretary of the United States Navy for 1898, not to go near the heavy guns of our coast defenses in order not to expose his ships to being injured. We should have considered that cowardice, and preferred a squadron crippled and rendered useless by a glorious battle without any objective, to a squadron that has remained intact and is ready to give the whole benefit of its unbroken forces. If the Spanish press had so understood the best interests of our country, it would not have defended what it did defend, nor accused those whom it did accuse, and who, covered with blood, might have asked the press when they learned that Watson was threatening the coasts of the Peninsula, "What have you done with our squadron?"

CHAPTER II.

One of the most unfortunate circumstances of this period of the war was the firm resolution on the part of the Spanish Government to obviate the war at any cost. This was not only the resolution of the administration then in power, but of all the preceding ones without distinction. But the relinquishment of the island of Cuba, which was the only means of obviating it, never entered into this resolution, although that, and that alone, could ward off the conflict which could have no other outcome than the total ruin of Spain. Thus it was that not the least preparation was made, either on land or on the sea, and while the whole world was under the impression that we were frantically getting ready for a struggle to the bitter end, the navy remained entirely on a peace footing. The armored cruiser *Cristóbal Colón* did not have her heavy guns. The firm of Armstrong, anxious to take advantage of the opportunity, offered us two old guns, which the admiral of the Mediterranean Squadron begged for with insistence, as they were better than none at all; but this solution was not adopted because it was not believed that the case was very urgent. The *Pelayo*, *Numancia*, and *Vitoria*, which were in foreign building yards, would not be ready nor have their new armament until September—that is, if the constructors fulfilled their contracts—and the *Carlos V* was having her heavy guns installed at Havre, with great activity, it is true, but she also lacked part of her secondary battery.

The *Pelayo* had 203 men on board, including the commander, which number is absolutely necessary to take care of her machinery and armament; the *Carlos V* had in all 282 men, and the cruisers *Numancia* and *Vitoria* had 51 men each, while a crew of over 500 men was provided for each one of these ships on a war footing. Moreover, it takes a very long time to organize a modern warship, for even after months had been spent in fitting them out they were not in condition to render the best service that could be expected of their machinery and armament. The figures given above show better than anything else could, even to people not versed in these matters, that we were on a complete peace footing.

On this subject our daily papers have published the semi-official correspondence of Admiral Cervera with the Government, in which the former insisted time and time again on the danger that was threatening

us, on the unfinished condition of our ships that were being fitted out abroad, on the impossibility of going to war, and on the probable results. When this correspondence has been published in full it will be given a place in the opinions of the whole world, with sorry reflections upon our statesmen who maintained a wholly untenable optimism.

On land not a single gun had been mounted on our coasts. The field artillery in Cuba had not been increased by modern guns, although it was evident that they would be needed against an Anglo-Saxon army, better equipped with matériel than with personnel, and the only precaution taken was that of sending to the Canaries and Balearic Islands some troops that would have been of little avail if the hostile squadron had made its appearance on our coasts, and if, as would have been the natural result, it had brought its pressure to bear on our coast cities.

On the other hand, it is positively certain that several good ships were offered to us, although this is not apparent from the letters of the minister of marine, who was desirous of protecting his colleagues in the cabinet. And it is also certain that this same minister, Mr. Bermejo, made superhuman efforts to acquire these ships, but met with no support—because there would be no war.

Although it is going back to the same subject, we shall call attention a hundred times to the fact—moral rather than material—that the cruiser *Cristóbal Colón* did not have her heavy guns, for when the Government was not willing to accept those that were offered it, that is to say, when it was decided that the *Colón* was not to have any heavy guns, it must have been because it was positively convinced that she would not require them, although the whole universe thought differently.

While this was the spirit prevailing in the Government, strengthened by the belief that this, the most unjust war recorded in history, would never be undertaken against us, the press embarked on an entirely different campaign. For, aside from the natural protest caused by the aggression of the United States, it lost no opportunity to misrepresent that country's resources and elements of power, undervaluing its squadron and making comparisons devoid of all common sense. Moreover, it is well known that a nation like ours, whose coasts are not only accessible, but where the repression of contraband is confined by law almost entirely to capture when caught in the act, requires two complete belts of surveillance, on land and on the sea, and the latter requires numerous flotillas of fast vessels. The same was also needed for the coasts of Cuba and the Philippines for active coast patrol. But such flotillas do not represent any power in an international conflict, and to call them a squadron would be the same as though we were to designate under the name of regular army the police force, gamekeepers, and civil guards, whose forces in every country, and especially in ours, represent many thousands of men. But every vessel has a name, and that

of a 40-ton launch is frequently twice as long and more high sounding than that of a battleship; and so the press, believing it its duty to be inspired by patriotic views, and without noticing whether the ship whose name was mentioned was in Europe or in the West Indies, or perhaps in the lagoons of Mindanao, in the Philippine Islands, hundreds of feet above the level of the sea, simply counted the names and figured up the total, and with the assistance of illustrations numerous squadrons were conjured up, for when ships are taken out of the sea and transferred to paper it is all a matter of different scales.

About this time there occurred a split in the navy, which we mention especially because Mahan lays it to Vice-Admiral Beránger, former minister, referring to an interview published in the *Heraldo* of April 8, 1898, in which said admiral made some statements which he had also made in public while minister, to the effect that we had the necessary means and elements to face the conflict.

While this was going on our navy followed step by step the developments in our relations with the United States, and when it found that it would have to bear the brunt of the conflict, and would even be charged with the mistakes of others, it tried by every possible means to induce the ministry to compel the press to speak the truth. The alarm of the navy was justified, for while it was recognized at Madrid that we should have to lose the island of Cuba, it was said that this could not take place without a *second Trafalgar* to justify so painful a loss. This phrase, a *second Trafalgar*, was attributed to no less a personage than Antonio Cánovas del Castillo; but we who have had occasion to become intimately acquainted with this eminent statesman believe this report utterly devoid of any foundation, for we feel certain that he never would have gone to war for fear of the internal disturbances which have dragged us into so mad a conflict.

This dissension in the navy increased when Admiral Cervera's letters became known; but we do not believe that either party was entirely in the right, for while we do not deny that there was great lack of discretion in the ministry, which was always controlled by the idea that there would be no war, we must also recognize that a minister interviewed by a newspaper correspondent could not possibly say that we were irremediably lost. Hence the testimony cited from the *Heraldo* is of no more value than interviews of that kind usually are; they can easily be invented and, as a matter of fact, frequently are invented by reporters who are acquainted with the political opinions and the position of the person interviewed.

Admiral Cervera's letters were confidential, even as regards the officers under his immediate orders, and although the situation has materially changed since then, in writing of these events to-day we are confronted with the same difficulties that he was. If the accounts are not signed by some one who has had an actual share in the events

they lack value in the eyes of the public, and if attested by the signature of one of us, how are we to write them and how comment on them?

All the officers of the navy are constantly being asked by many people why they did not tell the country the truth. But that is unjust, for the truth has been told in every tone of voice and from every quarter, only it was not signed with the names of the persons telling it; and they did well in not signing it, for it might have been said that they were seeking a way to be sent to prison in order to escape the necessity of going out to meet the enemy.

This is the dilemma which military writers belonging to the service have had to solve; and there is but one way of solving it, namely, to leave the active service. There can be no other solution, when the penal code provides severe penalties for any military person who speaks highly of the enemy's forces. But unfortunately in Spain, when men have left the service, it has not always been in order to work for their country and its armed forces. And that is why we were restricted; for those among us who might have signed their writings lacked the necessary prestige, and those who would have been listened to could not sign them. But it will ever remain a severe charge against the Government that it did not use its powerful influence to call upon the patriotism of the press, which would surely have responded at once and abandoned an ill-advised campaign in favor of the war, when the Government not only did not desire it, but had not taken the least precaution to prepare for it in case events should be precipitated.

While on our part not the least preparations were being made, the United States was not neglecting the smallest details, as though the war they were anticipating was to be fought against the most powerful nation. A captain of the United States Navy came to Spain and imprudently we opened our navy-yards to him, so that he might inform himself to his heart's content of the calm prevailing there and of the backward condition of our ships under construction. Whenever it was desired to send torpedoes to Cuba, the declaration of war was threatened and hence those many orders and revocations which the public could not understand. Objections were made to the construction of the torpedo-boat destroyers as well as to the purchase of the *Cristóbal Colón*, and it is the general belief in naval circles that some of the work we were having done in England was interfered with, for that is the only explanation of the delays and the many fines consequent thereon, which finally amounted to £75,000.

The vigilance, even in the smallest details, went so far as to make a lecture I delivered before the Geographic Society of Madrid, of which I have the honor of being vice-president, the subject of violent remonstrances; and I take pleasure in stating that I said very compli-

mentary things about the United States, which I should have liked to hear said about Spain. But I was a sad prophet of what was to happen, which, however, I do not believe could have been news to anyone who was well acquainted with the situation. And although the Geographic Society is of a purely scientific nature, the Government had to interfere, and the president, Antonio Cánovas de Castillo, had to request me to sign a letter written by himself, which I did, saying that the defense rested with him.¹

In speaking of the preparations made by the United States, I do not have reference to those which are known to the whole world—for the Americans stated themselves that months before the war they had 128 auxiliary vessels fitted out and in readiness—but to the work done in our country by their agents, who were powerfully aided by the insurgent committee which the Cubans were maintaining at Madrid, and relative to which we abstain from all comment, because, in the first place, these are matters which are difficult to prove, and, in the second place, because, after all, they only demonstrate that, as already stated, we had overstepped the limits of the most ridiculous sentimental policy.

All this did not alarm the Spanish people, nor even the Government, which treated the communications of the delegates of the ministries of state and marine as exaggerations. For, though it may seem strange, Spanish diplomats and naval men have for the last ten years sounded the note of alarm, with what result we all know.² While the storm over our heads was thus gathering in intensity, people used to engage in discussions as to whether the resolutions of the United States Congress would be joint resolutions or not, with a lack of political understanding and instinct of preservation which has no equal in modern history.

¹As it is not easy wholly to lay aside the personal part one has taken in these events, I will state that, for fear I might enter upon some other course, as it was an entirely personal matter, the minister of state, José Elduayen, wanted to smooth my ruffled spirits with a splendid breakfast, and at the dessert he presented to me the letter referred to, dictated by the president of the council, asking me, in the name of the interests of the country, to sign it. As stated above, I did so, though not without remarking that this document would probably be misused by the persons to whom it was to be delivered, saying that I did not have a very high opinion of them, and I was not wrong, for it was soon after published in the New York papers.

On that occasion I filled no particular office of any kind; therefore my statements could have only a literary value. It was the insurgent committee at Madrid that had promoted this incident.

²Among the documents of this class which are known to me are the noteworthy communications of the Naval Officer Gutiérrez Sobral in 1896, in which he states that the attack upon our Philippines was sure to come, and that the United States, before declaring war, would take possession of the Hawaiian Islands, to be used as an intermediate base of operations. He also calls attention to the sending of a number of newspaper men to Japan to embark upon a campaign of defamation, on the order of the campaign which the Cubans were carrying on in the United States and Europe, thus using artless Japan in the interests of others, while apparently working for what the Empire of the Rising Sun considered its legitimate spoils in the future.

The Government believed at that time that the granting of autonomy would solve the Cuban problem. While the Cubans aspired to independence, there is no doubt that they would have accepted autonomy as a means for achieving more easily complete separation, without losing the Spanish emigration, for without it—and this in spite of the United States, or perhaps because of the United States—the island of Cuba is fatally doomed to fall into the hands of the colored races. Moreover, the discouragement of the insurgents was great; they saw no hope of immediate victory, and there was no lack of sound-minded Cubans and true patriots who gave their support in good faith to the policy of autonomy as a transitional stage. Insurgent parties also commenced to flock to it, and peace would have been reestablished within a short time. It was then that the U. S. cruiser *Maine* was sent to Habana to promote disturbances, and that the United States squadron took up its position at Dry Tortugas, so as to be ready at a moment's notice. Our Government answered by sending the armored cruiser *Oquendo* to Habana and the *Vizcaya* to New York—to return the call. This movement of ships deserves a place in the annals of the continued policy of artlessness.

The letters of Admiral Cervera, published in *La Epoca*, and from which we shall hereafter copy a few paragraphs, show that the commander in chief of the squadron clearly foresaw what would and must necessarily happen, and also demonstrates the incredible optimism of the Government, with Señor Moret, minister of colonies, in the lead.¹

The armored cruiser *Vizcaya* was about to be docked, had the admiral on board, and was the least ready of all the ships of the squadron, while the *Teresa*, which was under my command, was the only one that was in a condition to render immediate service. But on account of the lecture referred to it was feared that I might not be *persona grata*, and so the *Vizcaya* started without having her bottom cleaned, and the result was that when the war broke out she had not been in dock for a year and had lost considerable speed.

¹The report submitted to the Senate by the Governor-General of the Philippines, Fernando Primo de Rivera, says on page 191: "The meddling of Señor Moret in military matters, his demands for data, his estimates of battles, his opinions as to whether or not they were expedient to attain what was desired, etc., * * * his wanting to handle everything, occupying himself with matters wholly foreign to his ministry, were truly laughable. He did nothing to carry out the compromise I had worked for, and, as no investigation was made of these sacred interests, I found myself under the necessity of quaffing the bitter cup which he held out to me with that simplicity which Señor Moret, in his good faith or his innocence, always assumed. While such was his conduct in political matters generally, in personal matters there are no words to qualify the lack of respect for the sacred interests of Spain and for its representatives in those countries."

General Marqués de Estalla himself has authorized us to publish the following telegram of March 5: "The minister of colonies to the Governor-General of the Philippines: As our relations with the United States are very cordial, your excellency will receive its squadron in the same manner as other foreign squadrons have been received in that harbor."

While our cruiser was on her way to New York the *Maine* was blown up (February 15, 1898), and one can easily imagine the anxiety of all, including the Government, for the safe arrival of the *Vizcaya* in the United States, with her bunkers almost empty.

In addition to the scattering of the ships at Habana, New York, Cartagena, Toulon, and Havre, and to spread further anxiety among the squadron, letters that were being received from Madrid repeated, as common property, the idea expressed by the phrase of a *second Trafalgar* to justify the loss of the island of Cuba, and a letter circulated from hand to hand, in which D. M. B., a surgeon of the armada, stated that upon the advice of Señor Moret it was destined to go to the Philippines in place of the squadron, because the latter would probably be destroyed. Then the admiral, who was closely following everything that happened and forming his opinions with that clear judgment which characterizes him, asked with insistence for permission to go to Madrid in order to formulate a plan of campaign, repeating again and again that if the war broke out the West Indies and the Philippines would be lost, and that it would mean the total ruin of Spain. The answer he received was that *in moments of international crisis no definite plans can be formulated*.

Consequently nothing, absolutely nothing, was done; no thought even was given to what was to be done if the war should become a fact.¹

So the supreme moment arrived, and the Government, which had not enlightened the people and had made no preparations whatever, found itself completely disarmed before the tremendous wave which threatened to change all existing conditions in Spain. The Government being afraid to do anything but accept the war to hide its own blunders, the war was accepted, still in the simple belief that the disaster would be confined to the island of Cuba, and that it would not mean the total ruin of Spain, as Admiral Cervera had said, and as everyone must have said who knew anything of elementary history.

We shall never weary repeating the fact—moral rather than material—which is apparent in everything we have hitherto stated, namely, that the war was not desired by the Government nor by the people, nor even by the press, which believed it impossible. An eminent man, of the greatest influence in Spain, Emilio Castelar, to whom

¹ The United States Army and Navy desired the war. But when it is learned, if it is ever learned, what efforts were made at Paris up to the last moment before the war broke out, in which efforts our ambassador and the Spanish minister who had been at Washington took part, it may possibly appear that the United States Government did not desire the war, and that, with the exception of Cuba, we might have saved everything, including even the recognition of the debt.

The United States Navy had considerable influence in the Senate, and, supported by public opinion, it pushed matters with great success, as may be seen from a comparison of the incidents of that period. How many things will be written, or could be written, within the next fifty years!

monuments are being erected for having reestablished the discipline of the army, in emulation of Juan de Robres, author of the peace proposition and bard of universal love, but who spoke of the building of new ships as of throwing millions into the Nervión, had in his writings spoken in such extravagant language of the United States of North America as the purest expression of democracy, equality, and progress, that there was hardly anyone in Spain, from the most uneducated to the most learned, who did not feel the marvelous charm of the harmonious prose of perhaps the most eminent writer that ever lived. But we who remembered the history of Florida and of Louisiana, the unjust campaign against Mexico, and how the Latin race has been robbed of the best territories of the world, which throws the lie in the face of the whole universe against that so-called just and humanitarian policy, and the active part which the United States had taken against our dominion in Cuba long before the first expedition of Narciso López, and above all we who had lived among them were called sectarians, impassioned men, little short of partisans of the inquisition. This went so far that the writer, about fifteen years before the events herein recorded, felt himself isolated in the Geographic Congress of Madrid, the Geographic Society and the Athenæum of Madrid, the center of the intellectual culture of all Spain, and was politely rebuked because his opinion differed from the mad Anglomania of 99 per cent of his colleagues. These bitter disenchantments had to come in order to make the Geographic Society think it necessary tacitly to beg my pardon, leaving in the heart of the citizen and the patriot the sad satisfaction of having been right. We cite this case as one of the thousand instances of such great moral deterioration relative to everything English or American that, without this chastisement sent by God, the time might have come when, in order to be considered as belonging to *high life*, our women would have been required to debase themselves by drinking whisky and brandy, or to send their fathers and husbands to hospitals, as the people of *pur sang* do in that model country of Moret's and Castelar's.

It was impossible for us, who plainly saw the storm approaching, to make ourselves heard by those who considered us mad. And if at this moment all of Europe were to descend upon Spain with all her forces on land and sea, although we are ruined, shattered, and in one of the most critical periods this noble country has ever passed through, still, if the whole country were to unite with us in one grand effort, morally as well as materially, and with the powerful assistance of the will of a nation, we should be in better condition than the navy was in the war into which it was forced, and in which it had no more chance than a detachment of the civil guard would have if sent out against a powerful party of highwaymen, simply as a matter of form, and as though the hostility of the United States were merely the fancy of some idler.

CHAPTER III.

While the situation was shaping itself, as described in the previous chapter, there had been prepared at Cadiz a flotilla of three torpedo boats and three torpedo-boat destroyers, and after overcoming a thousand difficulties, apparently of a naval nature, but in reality of a diplomatic character, it had put to sea and was at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, awaiting the order to start for the West Indies. Its departure was delayed in the vain hope of a peaceful solution, in view of the repeated threat that its departure would be considered a *casus belli*.

On April 8 Rear-Admiral Cervera left Cadiz to join this division, with the armored cruiser *Infanta María Teresa*, his flagship, and the *Cristóbal Colón*, the latter without her heavy guns, as previously stated. The admiral did not carry with him any instructions from the Government, but was to receive them at his destination by a collier which was to follow him. This proceeding is the more incomprehensible, as the collier left almost at the same time as the squadron.

To send instructions to a modern squadron by means of a steamer of 8 knots speed, which was to stop at the Canaries for the purpose of coaling, in place of giving them to the admiral himself, is a proceeding which before the tribunal of history will stand as one of the gravest charges of this period. But that is not all. It would have been the most natural thing for Admiral Cervera's squadron, if it was irrevocably to go to the West Indies, to stop at the Canaries, where it could have refitted in a few hours, not only because the navy had contracts there, but also because the necessary appliances were to be found there for shipping all needed supplies, in addition to the very important circumstance that the telegraph was at the disposal of the Government and the cable was moored at Cadiz, so that it could not be interfered with. All this led the admiral to believe that he was sent to Cape Verde to get the torpedo-boat flotilla and convoy it back to the Peninsula; for when war had once been declared it would be impossible for said torpedo boats to cross the Atlantic.

Upon our arrival at St. Vincent, on April 14, we learned that the armored cruisers *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* were coming from Puerto Rico to meet at the former harbor, as they did with mathematical precision. But two large ships more considerably aggravated the prob-

lem of coal, which has been the foundation of our disasters, those in power having forgotten that modern tactics are the tactics of fuel.

The United States consul had bought all the available coal at Cape Verde, and only after a thousand difficulties and by paying twice the regular price did we succeed in obtaining 700 tons, which were sold us upon orders from England, probably in the firm belief that the 10 vessels we had there, counting both large and small ones, would not be able to do anything with that quantity.

In the meantime the collier *San Francisco* arrived with the fatal instructions.

We immediately proceeded to unload her and recoal all the ships, which is a very difficult operation at St. Vincent, because the sea coming from the island of San Antonio and striking ships headed toward the breeze on the broadside renders it impossible in that harbor for one ship to go alongside of another, so that we had to do the coaling by means of a few small coal lighters which the English company let us have, though very unwillingly. It was a slow and arduous task, and even with the coal brought by the *San Francisco* and *Cádiz* there was not enough to refill the bunkers.

Owing to the instructions, of which we shall speak hereafter, the three torpedo boats did not return to the Peninsula with the steamer *Cádiz*, which had convoyed them. This steamer, which was originally a passenger steamer, had on board the main armament of the destroyers, as well as the ammunition, torpedoes, and many other articles which it is very difficult to transship when the order in which they are arranged in the storerooms is changed, making it necessary at times to take out things which have a whole cargo on top of them. And worst of all, the squadron was so much in need of coal that it was necessary to take it even from the bunkers of the *Cádiz*, which, as above stated, was not a freight steamer, and how difficult that is can hardly be realized except by those who have a knowledge of nautical matters. The latter need not be told how slow and arduous a task is transshipment under such circumstances.

The admiral opened the instructions with veritable anxiety, for although he was in a measure prepared they must have affected him deeply.

The instructions provided that the squadron was to go to Puerto Rico, as its principal mission was to be to defend that island. The admiral was authorized to go to Cuba. He was also given authority—and the politicians qualified this as great liberty of action—to choose his own route and accept or refuse battle with the United States squadron, as he might deem best. This authorization meant nothing, for in the first case it was self-understood, and in the second case he had to do the best he could.

The admiral convened a council of war, consisting of Captain

Paredes, second in command of the squadron; Capts. Díaz Moreu, Lazaga, and Eulate, commanders of the cruisers *Cristóbal Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, respectively; Bustamante, chief of staff; Villaamil, chief of the torpedo-boat flotilla; and myself, commander of the *María Teresa*, flagship of the squadron. This memorable council was held on the 20th of April on board the *Cristóbal Colón*, whose commander was sick at that time.

It is impossible to describe the impression which the reading of the instructions made upon us. For the squadron to go to the West Indies meant, as Captain Mahan says, the foredooming of the four gallant ships; it meant the carrying of the war to Puerto Rico, for wherever the squadron went there war must follow it; and it meant the adding of one more to Spain's tribulations, since Puerto Rico was as yet quiet. The harbor of San Juan, the only one the squadron could enter, offered no military protection for ships, nor any coast defenses to speak of, and it was no wonder that Admiral Sampson, after the bombardment of May 12, said in his official report—and he spoke the truth—that he decided not to continue the attack, although he was satisfied and certain of the possibility of attaining the surrender of the city, which he had not done because he did not have landing forces to occupy it. We mention this in order to destroy the illusion, which is still being clung to by some, that the United States squadron was repulsed at San Juan.

In case the squadron went to Cuba it would be impossible for it to reach Habana Harbor, which was the only military harbor, properly speaking; for the enemy, who had several months ago established their base of operations at Key West and Dry Tortugas, only five or six hours distant from the capital of the Greater Antilla, would be sure to watch very closely the only harbor possessing powerful artillery, especially as the approaches of said harbor were very easy to control. It was not known whether Cienfuegos was fortified; all we knew was that it had some torpedoes, and the natural assumption was that this harbor would be watched the most closely next to Habana, because it was connected by rail with the latter. Cienfuegos, moreover, could without difficulty be blockaded by the enemy, as the United States squadron could lie at anchor at the neighboring reefs, and by means of scouts at Cape Cruz could be informed in good season of the approach of our ships and receive them with forces four times as large.

The enemy at that time had in the Atlantic Ocean the battleships *Indiana*, *Iowa*, and *Massachusetts*, which were invulnerable as far as we were concerned, and each one of which represented greater power than our whole squadron together, so that it was only in the highly improbable case of meeting one of them alone that we had the slightest chance of defeating her by ramming, and even then probably not until we had lost half of our ships.

Besides these battleships they had the *Texas* (a cruiser of the type of our *Vizcaya*), the *Brooklyn* and *New York*, each far superior to any one of our ships, two ships of the *Columbia* type, powerful auxiliaries, besides a number of other cruisers and monitors, and over 120 vessels armed for war purposes, which, while not strong individually, represented, when supported by a powerful nucleus of armor clads, a tremendous force which it would have been madness for us to want to oppose.

This whole force, even before the arrival of the *Oregon*, could have formed four groups or squadrons, each overwhelmingly stronger than ours. For us there was no solution within human power but to go to Habana, Cienfuegos, or Santiago de Cuba, or even San Juan de Puerto Rico (although to go there would have meant to go in search of destruction), and if each one of those four divisions had taken up its position in front of one of the harbors which we had to enter, such division could have compelled us to battle, with absolute certainty of destroying our squadron. Even granting that such had not been the case and that we had had the rare good fortune of forcing our way through, it would have been with such injuries and losses that our squadron would have been rendered useless for the rest of the campaign, which would have ended the war for Spain, for the war was the squadron, and nothing but the squadron. To suppose, as it was supposed at that time, that the hostilities could be continued after the loss of the ships shows a sad lack of knowledge of our military situation and of the meaning of modern squadrons.¹

The Americans, on the other hand, did have such knowledge. Taking into account injuries and accidents to machinery, the necessity of renewing the coal supply and other difficulties from which no ship is exempt, they formed only two squadrons in place of four, so that even if two or more of the most powerful ships were temporarily absent, the remaining forces would still be such as to exclude any doubt as to the result. This is an admirable military precaution, even in case of overwhelming superiority. If we had done such a thing it would have given rise more than once to the question whether we were afraid.

The object of military operations is final success and not proofs of valor. But it is useless to discuss this point, for it will never be understood in Spain.

On the other hand, the enemy had made all manner of preparations months before the *Maine* went to Habana. They occupied the sea of operations, made sure of the powerful cooperation of the Cuban

¹ "Admiral Cervera's squadron having been destroyed," said the London Times of August 16, with good reason, "the war was practically at an end, unless Spain wanted to continue the struggle solely for the sake of honor, for there was nothing else she could save."

insurgents, through whom they received information, not only as to Cuba, but as to all the Lesser Antilles, through which were scattered many emigrants and sympathizers, and finally, they used for their final preparations all those days which were occupied by the voyage of our squadron.

On our part, leaving aside the defects of the ships, of which I shall speak in connection with the battle, we would arrive with our engines in the condition which is the natural result of a squadron crossing the Atlantic, especially if it is remembered that the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* had to make that voyage twice, without even a collier that would permit us upon arrival partly to replenish the coal consumed and to manœuvre untrammelled without having to think of our bunkers. Spain had at that time twelve heavy naval guns, and to divide this already scant force by sending six to the West Indies and leaving the other half in the Peninsula was so great a strategic mistake that it alone would have been sufficient to make a name for the hostile admiral who accomplished this by virtue of his manœuvres.

In view of these considerations, which are rigorously exact and which have since been repeated by all naval writers of the world, with the exception of a few English publications in bad taste, we all agreed that it would be mad, criminal, and absurd to go out to surrender the country to the mercy of the enemy, for there was no doubt that the less difficulties the campaign presented to them the more exorbitant would be their demands.

It was the unanimous opinion of all that the Philippine Archipelago was in the greatest danger, as appears from the official report of which we give a copy hereafter, for we felt sure that the insurrection would again arise there and support the attack from the outside. But this was no time to go to the Philippines when the mother country was in urgent need of us, for there was no doubt in our minds that if the Americans, counting on the Cuban insurrection, first directed their efforts against that island in order to facilitate the campaign, the war, as is the case with all naval wars, must necessarily end on the coasts of the unsuccessful nation. Therefore, the war would have to be considered terminated when the United States squadron threatened to go to Spain, as would no doubt happen one way or another. And in this connection we deny the combinations relative to sending reinforcements to the United States squadron in the Philippines, which the eminent writer Mahan describes in detail at the conclusion of his articles, explaining the wherefore of the movements of the forces referred to; for if the United States squadron did not cross the Atlantic when no one could prevent it from doing so, it was because it did not please England, their ally, who did not want to see her cousins spread alarm on the Continent, which, without exception, was pained to see our ruin, or because England realized that her friends

had gone a great deal farther than she had counted upon. While we did not at that time clearly understand the part Great Britain played, though we had our suspicions, it was not so as to the outcome of the war which we saw as clearly then—that is, while we were at the Cape Verde Islands—as we do now.

It was therefore evident that the only possible solution was to return to the coasts of Spain. That is what all military writers of the world now say, and the English Admiral Colomb goes so far as to say that Cervera should have done so, disobeying orders, even at the risk of being shot, for he would thereby have saved Puerto Rico and the Philippines for Spain, and there can be no doubt as to this. Thus we were of unanimous opinion that the squadron should return to the Peninsula. We therefore assembled all the fighting ships. We had a nucleus of torpedo boats which, though small in number, were good and adapted, even by themselves alone, to render permanent operations on our coasts difficult for an enemy whose harbors were so far distant. The enemy, in order to go to Spain, would have to divide their forces, as we had had to divide ours to go to their country. Our fortifications, though not very powerful, were yet sufficient to keep at bay a squadron which had no harbor near as a refuge for its injured ships, and even if they should take from us some abandoned island and use it as a base of operations, they would still be compelled, in order to repair their ships thoroughly, to take them across the Atlantic, and hence an injury to one of their principal ships would make a general retreat necessary. Finally, all of Europe, including even England, must have realized more clearly than it was realized in Cuba, where the sympathy of the whole world had been estranged from us as the result of calumny, that for the first time in history the guns of the new continent were to knock at the harbors of old Europe, beginning with the oldest of her nations; but the turn of the others was sure to come and then it would be too late for the latter to repent of having abandoned us in the hour of need.

True that our return might have carried the war to the Peninsula, but under such different circumstances that surely not one of our seaboard cities would have had to suffer; and when peace was concluded, instead of our sorrowfully pleading for mercy, we might have threatened to renew the war, especially as the invasion of Cuba by the United States Army, while our squadron was intact at the Peninsula, would probably not have taken place. This is the opinion of the Americans themselves, and it has since been corroborated by the prudence they observed, which, we state again, we do not censure, but which, on the contrary, we consider worthy of professional and political admiration.

At that council of war, which we compared at the time with the council held on the eve of the battle of Trafalgar, expression was

given to the greatest energy and patriotism, and a vehement telegram was drawn up addressed to the Government, in which we set forth our opinions.

But one thing happened at this meeting which, we trust, will acquire importance from the candor with which we relate it. The circumstances were known to all; each one had formed his own opinion concerning them, as became evident from the statements made at the meeting; but none of us knew anything of the exertions made by the admiral, who had not spoken of them even to his chief of staff nor to myself, his flag captain, although we were very intimate, for I had been his executive officer on board several ships and his lifelong friend, and this was the fourth ship which I commanded under his flag as admiral. Thus, from a wonderful devotion to discipline, he had preserved the most absolute secrecy and had carried on personally, with the assistance of a son of his, who acted as his amanuensis, the whole official and semiofficial correspondence, so that there had been no interchange of ideas between us, and we knew nothing of the Government's strange proceedings, which was necessary if we were to discuss matters of such vital importance with proper intelligence.

The telegram first drawn up in which we opposed the Government appeared so vehement, although it would seem quite just and mild at this time, that all of us, without exception, agreed to change it, and it was thus that the following telegram, which, owing to the natural reaction, was deficient in the opposite extreme, was approved and forwarded on the evening of April 20:

In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I suggest going to the Canaries. *Ariete* has boilers in bad condition; boiler of *Azor* is very old. *Vizcaya* must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to preserve her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother country.

The proceedings of the meeting were signed by the commanders in chief, Cervera and Paredes, and by Captains Lazaga, Díaz Moreu, Eulate, Concas, Bustamante, and Villamil, the latter, being the youngest, signing as secretary.

At the conclusion of the council of war I returned to my ship together with the admiral, to whom I privately stated my belief that the telegram hardly expressed what had occurred at the meeting, and I insisted on my opinion set forth at said meeting that each one ought to have given his views in writing and signed them with his name, as these proceedings would pass into history and might constitute the military testament of each one of us, the only thing, perhaps, that would defend our memory, the honor of the navy, and the name which was to be our legacy to our children, whom we should probably never see again.

The admiral thought a moment, placed his right hand on his forehead, closing his eyes for an instant, then laying his hand on my shoulder, he turned to Bustamante, who was writing, but listening at the same time, and said to him: "V́ctor is right!" and shaking me affectionately, as I was still absorbed in profound meditation, he added: "You write it out, then." I told my beloved admiral that I could not do so, because it would seem like disloyalty toward my comrades, as it would appear to be my own personal views, when with slight differences the opinions of all had been the same. "Precisely because all were of the same opinion, you write it out as the expression of the views of all the captains of the squadron; and now I command you to do so," the admiral added kindly.

I did so, and Admiral Cervera accompanied the document with the noteworthy communication which I copy below, together with my views, as taken from the Madrid newspaper *La Epoca*, and which are therefore public property, the same as all other documents which we quote herein, regretting that we can not do the same with many others:

THE MINISTER OF MARINE:

For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on board the *Colón*, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances. The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat—for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior forces—compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be.

I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finishing once for all. But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in particular and believe that the *Alfonso XII* or the *Cristina* can be pitted against the *Iowa* or *Massachusetts*, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us. One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon overcome. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of everything that happened.

Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement, which reflects better than I could express them the opinions of all. This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in the meeting.

Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Yours, etc.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

APRIL 21, 1898.

Views of Capt. Víctor M. Concas, commander of the battleship *Infanta María Teresa*:

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the council of war held on board the battleship *Cristóbal Colón*, my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made, besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the east, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been done with a single battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American flying squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits of an easy victory.

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the peninsula—the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the *Alfonso XIII*, of very little speed, and even that not certain—are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries. The yacht *Giralda* and the steamers *Germania* and *Normania*, of the acquisition of which official notice has been received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject, and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations—is a strategic error, the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage must remain entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battleships and the *Cristóbal Colón*, without her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula, and to the few old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coasts from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one

if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or less if the enemy should bring along a fast division, nor even the protected coasts, from an attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided.

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which the country gave us and the needs which present circumstances bring on the country in danger.

(6) Lastly; I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his orders and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to these forces. But, after pointing out the probable consequences, the responsibility must remain with the Government.

VICTOR M. CONCAS.¹

ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, *April 20, 1898.*

These significant communications we suppose reached Spain on May 5. I say *we suppose*, because, although duly acknowledged by the then minister of marine, they do not appear in the archives, and probably went astray at the council of ministers, since the latter was the cause of the highly important order to the squadron to return to Spain, issued on May 12, and of which we shall speak later. But, treating this matter with due loyalty, as everything else herein set forth, we must say that the Government had on that day no further information than the telegram of April 20, above referred to, giving an account of the meeting.

The answer was another telegram, ordering the departure to be delayed and stating that a council of admirals was to be convened at Madrid.

In the meantime the telegraphic correspondence with Madrid was continued, as the result of the fact that we all went more deeply into the question.

On April 21 Admiral Cervera addressed to the Government the following significant telegram:

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that to continue voyage to Puerto Rico would be disastrous. The captains of the ships are of same opinion as I, some more emphatically.

On April 22 the admiral had to ask whether war had been declared. On the same day the admiral telegraphed as follows:

I beg your excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of

¹As it is always gratifying to present testimony in support of an opinion sustained under very unusual circumstances, I beg to be permitted to state in support of the foregoing views that it appears from Admiral Sampson's telegram dated May 12 that he sent the auxiliary cruiser *Yale* to St. Thomas in search of information; and from his telegram of May 8 that he told his Government, among other things, that "if the auxiliary vessels he had asked for were sent to him he would proceed to San Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establishing a temporary base at Culebra Island, to the east of Puerto Rico," etc.

honor. I beg your excellency to read this telegram and my whole official and confidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my conscience.

In the meantime two telegrams had been received to the effect that the mission of the squadron was the defense of Puerto Rico, and finally, on the 24th, another telegram in which the minister said that the Government, in conjunction with the council of admirals, ordered the departure, adding that the United States flag was hostile. These telegrams will in due time be published in full, so that each one of them will stand before history for the part it played therein.

Villaamil, taking advantage of the circumstance that he was a deputy, telegraphed on April 22 to Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, premier of the Government, stating that he considered the sacrifice of the squadron as certain as it was useless and disastrous. And as the sublime and the ridiculous are often closely connected, this telegram was answered by Señor Moret, minister of colonies, by an English telegram saying, "*God bless you.*"

The telegram ordering the departure of the squadron and the one containing Señor Moret's blessing, which each one of us honestly appropriated to himself, were answered by the admiral in a letter dated the 24th and closed on the 27th, in which he said, among other things:

As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken! You see I was right when I told you that by the end of April the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* would not be finished; that the *Colón* would not have her big guns unless we took the defective ones; that we should not have the 5.5 inch ammunition for the new guns, etc. With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand the unanimous decision of the general officers of the navy indicating disapprobation and censure of my opinions, which implies that some one of them should have relieved me.

There was, therefore, no way out of the dilemma. The idea of returning to Spain contrary to instructions, which was fermenting in the minds of all, was sustained with energy by Capt. Díaz Moreu as the only salvation of the country. But the opinion of the others, though this point was not discussed at the council of war, was that the ignorance prevailing in Spain as to the true situation was so great, even among the most highly educated classes, that we should not only be punished, but also ridiculed, and no one would ever understand that it was a heroic resolution and a sublime sacrifice. And hence we had no choice but obedience, which for Spain was equivalent to the loss of those of her colonies which she still had a chance of preserving. Moreover, there was the council of admirals.

It was with profound sorrow that we realized that discipline forbade our discussing that council, not to censure it for the decision it had arrived at, but, on the contrary, to defend it from the charges which history will bring against it, if at the time when it is written and when

these matters can be talked about with entire freedom the admirals composing said council should no longer be among the living to add to their respective decisions a full account of everything that led up to them, as they, and they alone, can do. Below we give in full a letter written by Señor Francisco Silvela, now president of the council of ministers, who quotes the words of Señor Guillermo Chacón, late admiral, who was one of those who voted for the squadron going to the West Indies. These words say more in favor of the said meeting and of the above statements than anything I could add.

To this meeting were convened all the admirals residing at Madrid, including those on the retired list, who are never called to such councils, because on account of their advanced age or invalidism, they are not able to keep themselves posted as to the marvelous transformations of the matériel. The majority of them, however, were politicians, and it was from the standpoint of politics that the question was laid before them, as the uprising of the very stones in the street in Cuba as well as in Spain had to be represented to them. So one of two things had to happen; either the politicians or the purely naval men had to prevail at said meeting. And while we know and esteem all the officers present and have no doubt that all maintained their opinions with the independence that characterizes each one of them, there will nevertheless always remain a question as to one of the opinions, the one which carried the others along with it: for he who pronounced it, a politician *par excellence*, was only twenty-seven days later called to the ministry of marine as though as a reward.

Four admirals voted against the departure of the squadron, though their opinions varied in form, and favored rather concentration of all the ships. Since then many a voice has been raised in favor of that opinion; for the same thing that happened at our council of war at Cape Verde occurred also at this meeting, namely, those present were taken by surprise; and we know positively that, if in either case there had been twenty-four hours' time between the convening of the council and the all-important decision, the vehemence of our telegram would have been such that it would have made even the blind see, and the decision of the council of admirals would no doubt have been unanimously to the effect that our fighting ships ought never to have left the coasts of the Peninsula, neither united nor separately.

Those who voted against the departure were Admirals Lazaga, Gómez-Imaz, Mozo, and Butler; but the former two, believing that they had not done enough and fully convinced that a national catastrophe was hanging over us, carried their efforts by common consent outside of the council, using every possible endeavor, for they believed—and they were right—that there was still time to save our country.

We regret that Rear-Admiral José Gómez-Imaz has not been able to authorize us to speak of the many efforts he made in certain quar-

ters, as they would redound in the highest degree to his patriotism and the consciousness of his duty as a good Spaniard, and would also honor those to whom he applied and who did all in their power. But fortunately Joaquín M. Lazaga has authorized us to publish the share he took in these last efforts to save the country and for which we feel deeply grateful, because if he had not done so it might seem like an argument in favor of our theory.

Admiral Lazaga went to see Señor Francisco Silvela, leader of the Conservative party, who was deeply impressed and became convinced of the disaster threatening us. He at once went to interview the president of the council of ministers, in order to induce him to use every endeavor against the departure of the squadron, and the letter we give below, and which we have been authorized to publish, tells better than anything we might say what was the result of the patriotic efforts of Señor Silvela and Admiral Lazaga, and shows at the same time that there were men in Madrid who shared our opinion and who realized how statesmen should understand their duties.

The letter referred to is as follows:

Francisco Silvela, 1 Serrano, Madrid, to His Excellency Joaquín M. Lazaga.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I have spoken to the president, as I told you I would, but without any practical result. He said that the instructions to Cervera give him absolute freedom as to his route; that the superior speed of his ships will permit him to elude an encounter if he is not in condition to fight; that he can go to Cuba, Puerto Rico, or United States harbors, and can await, for a decisive battle, the ships that will be sent from here to join him. This seems to me neither practical nor possible. Admiral Chacón has told Villaverde that he too deems the concentration of the squadron absolutely necessary, and that it would be a great thing if Sagasta could be made to see this. I have tried hard to convince him; but it is too late. God protect our brave sailors! It is with them that rests our only hope of salvation, at least the salvation of honor. I shall try to see you soon and give you further details; but as I realize how anxious you must be I tell you this much, feeling sure that it is safe in your hands.

Very affectionately, your friend,
(Wednesday.)

F. SILVELA.

But in spite of all, the telegram ordering the departure was confirmed. God had withdrawn his hand from Spain! The die had been cast, and the Moret-Sagasta administration had written upon our history the words: *Finis Hispaniæ!*

CHAPTER IV.

Spanish statesmen, it is to be supposed, thought that the honor of their country was better served by exposing to the world its incomprehensible incapacity than by making terms with the United States, and parting with Cuba for a consideration, before this incapacity was exhibited to the world.—(*The Lessons of the Spanish-American War.*—COLOMB.)

If we could have given the above lines to the public at the time of the events to which they refer, they would surely have passed from hand to hand, not with a view to seeking our justification, nor that of the disaster, but to put in practice Talleyrand's profound maxim that, "Whatever you may say and write will be repeated and turned against you." But not even that can we hope for, we who are anxious to be discussed even though unfairly, since the facts speak so loudly for themselves that we need fear no controversy. But it would be in vain for us to aspire to the interest of past times, when those who have the greatest interest in hiding their responsibility, of which they have not, like ourselves, been exonerated by any tribunal, have succeeded in throwing upon this period of history the great remedy of politicians, time, and with it, public indifference.

This being the case, we claim the protection of history and of our comrades in the navy, Spanish as well as foreigners, in conjunction with fair-minded men who make a study of the development of this drama, to constitute an honest, intelligent, and absolutely independent jury to whom we do not hesitate to submit our cause, since circumstances have taken from us universal suffrage.

In order to complete the necessary data to strengthen the conviction of what we have stated in the previous chapter, it is necessary to make the reader acquainted with part of the official documents which have been published in full abroad, and some of which have been copied by *La Epoca*, and others by *El Correo Gallego*, of Ferrol, in its supplement of February 17, 1899, as also by several other papers. We repeat again that we make mention only of those documents which have been published, and not of those which should have been published.

Before proceeding we will speak of a matter which will surely find many imitators in future. Admiral Cervera, foreseeing not only accidents to his flagship, but also the struggle of opposed interests which always accompanies great historical events, especially when success can not reasonably be hoped for, and considering the necessity of leaving a testament of his military history, forwarded all his documents to a safe person, who, in conjunction with two other men, likewise highly respectable, drew up a certificate in which he acknowledged the receipt of said documents. In the same manner, during the night of July 2, the admiral placed in the care of the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba all his other official and semiofficial documents up to said date, so that these extremely important papers were not destroyed the next day by the flames which devoured the flagship of the squadron.

We do not copy these documents, since they have already been published in full and circulated through the whole world, and we shall comment on them only briefly. It is sufficient for our object to give a few precise extracts in defense of the theory which we have set forth relative to the preparations made in Spain prior to the war, leaving out details which distract the attention from the principal facts, and at the same time reducing the length which has kept many persons from reading these documents.

Although the admiral commenced his important correspondence on December 3, 1897, it was not until February, 1898, when the events became precipitated and the voyage of the cruisers *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* had been determined upon, that the admiral made his observations with increased energy, as shown by an official letter dated February 6, 1898.

In his letter of the 7th he said, among other things :

I feel sure that absolute secrecy will be maintained, even as to my flag captain."

And this, as stated in connection with the council of war at Cape Verde, is strictly true.

On February 9, in speaking of the guns of the *Colón*, he said :

And if we have no other guns, and these can fire even twenty-five or thirty shots, we should take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient, and we should lose no time about it in order that the vessel may be armed and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible.

It is clear that this indicates a profound conviction that the declaration of war was inevitable.

In his letter of February 11 the admiral said to the minister:

I always bear in mind what the press is in this country, and you will have noticed that I avoid in my telegrams the use of phrases which might cause alarm or stir up passion. With these private letters and confidential communications it is quite different, and I believe that I owe you my frank opinion, without beating about the bush.

We wish to impress this remark on all fair-minded people, for the press, the world over, wants everything discussed on the street, and

a hundred times have we heard the question asked in connection with these matters, why we had not said so, as though we should and could have consulted each Spaniard separately.

On February 12 the admiral asked what was to be the plan of campaign in the prospective war with the United States.

On February 16, after showing the enormous disparity of the relative forces, the admiral said, among other things:

I dread to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful one for us.

By these words the admiral expressed what countless writers have said since, namely, that damages to our ships would have rendered them useless for the remainder of the war, while the enemy's forces were such as not to be much affected by injuries that some of the ships might sustain, and their resources for repairing damages, in case they should be material, were inexhaustible.

On February 25 he stated that none of the ships undergoing repairs would be ready by the time the war would probably break out, and he doubted whether the *Colón* would be ready, and he was right.

In several letters he spoke of the vital question of the metal cartridge cases for the 5.5 inch guns. We shall refer to this matter in connection with the sortie from Santiago.

His letter of February 26 contains the following memorable words, which should forever remain engraved upon the hearts of all good patriots:

I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed conflicting; but can we afford to cherish illusions? Do we not owe to our country not only our lives, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures *which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain*. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no more, because, even if we should not lose it by right in the war, we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal.

It was perhaps believed that the admiral saw matters in too dark a light, while in other quarters all was optimism, for on March 3 he said to the minister:

I have deemed it my duty to express my opinion to the proper authorities—that is, to you and to the whole Government through you—clearly and without beating around the bush. Now, let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision.

As events followed each other in rapid succession, the admiral wrote on March 7:

Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict—whether war, negotiations direct or through a third party, an arbitrator, or otherwise—the longer the decision is delayed the worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is post-

poned the greater will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our position can not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions.

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island in the worst possible manner.

In the same letter he says further on:

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resistance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them on our account.

On March 16 the admiral begged again and again to be permitted to go to Madrid in order to formulate a plan of campaign and to explain the terrible danger of the situation. His words are not any too strong when he says:

We can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster. * * * The war will surely lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightful ruin.

In conclusion, he asks to be allowed to go to Madrid to inform the Government verbally. This request was reiterated with vehemence in his telegram of April 7, in reply to which he was told that he would receive the instructions at Cape Verde.

We have purposely omitted to mention any of the answers which these patriotic remonstrances received; but we must mention one letter from the minister to the admiral, dated April 7, which has already been published and the character of which impels us to speak of it. It says, among other things:

But the President of the United States is surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is now trying to appease. * * * In the instructions which you will receive a general idea is outlined which you will work out with your captains, etc.

This phrase of *the waves* was repeated a great deal in Madrid, the same as that of *a second Trafalgar*, and serves as an apology for the policy which Admiral Colomb censures with as much justice as severity.

The second sentence quoted from the letter referred to indicates that the instructions had been written out. The admiral might therefore have received them at Cadiz on the 8th before he left, either by the same mail, or by a special engine or tender, or by telegram, which would have been well worth while, but never by a collier.

We shall not comment on the remainder of this letter nor on any of the others, out of affection, respect, and sympathy for the minister who had the ill-fortune of holding the portfolio on that occasion. But there is in connection with this particular matter something much more serious which affects the whole Government, namely, while on

April 7 the departure of the squadron for Cuba had already been determined upon and the instructions written out, a telegram was sent to the Philippines on the 12th ordering the immediate return to the Peninsula of the captain-general of the army, Fernando Primo de Rivera, who had recently surrendered the governorship-general of the archipelago, and who, considering that the man who had relieved him was new in the Philippines and that the circumstances were extremely grave, urged the expediency of his remaining there under the orders of the new captain-general, on account of his prestige in the country, and also to take command of some of the army forces if the war should break out. Thus, when the squadron, on April 11, had already passed the Canaries on its way to Cuba, in accordance with the instructions brought by the collier, Señor Moret, minister of colonies, on the 12th ordered the return of a general whose services had unquestionably been of the greatest value in the far east, especially as it was on the part of the latter a tremendous sacrifice to remain there, since no success could be expected. This is indeed a serious matter, which reflects upon the statesmen of the Sagasta ministry, and while our defective organization can not call them to account for it, God and history will treat them more severely.

We should not have found fault if an order to start for Habana at full speed had been received by telegram on April 7, as the concentration could have been effected there with great ease some days before the declaration of war, which in that case would have taken a very different turn.

It is reported that about this time very urgent telegrams were received from the Philippines, Habana, and Puerto Rico, all asking for the squadron. We are not acquainted with these telegrams, but it seems to us they were very natural and not at all reprehensible, for it is clear that each one was pleading for his own church, which was right. But these telegrams, which the Government is trying to use as an excuse for having sent the squadron to the West Indies, can in no manner exculpate it from its responsibility, for it was the part of the Government to combine common interests, and what it did at the last hour, when it invoked the salvation of the mother country, it should have done at this time instead of procrastinating for several days, which, by gaining a few hours, resulted in the total ruin of Spain. We have already said that to take the squadron to Puerto Rico would have meant its loss as well as the loss of the island. This is what Mahan and Sampson have said, and even the United States Navy Department, and we should hardly have believed it possible that Puerto Rico asked for the squadron had we not seen it confirmed by telegrams of April 20 and May 18, which we regret not to be able to insert here.

The request for the squadron by the Philippines was quite reasonable, as there was time to improvise a port of refuge prior to the

arrival of larger forces. In Cuba, while the petition was not reasonable, it would have been rational at least for the squadron to go there as long as it was still possible to enter Habana Harbor without previous battle. But by the time the squadron started from Cape Verde its voyage was equivalent to certain defeat, since it could no longer enter Habana Harbor.

Our voice was not listened to; but we are nevertheless grateful for having been considered men of honor and valor, as we unquestionably were, for in spite of everything, those ships, the only ones which Spain possessed, were left intrusted to our hands.

CHAPTER V.

And so Cervera went forth with his four gallant ships, foredoomed to his fate by folly, or by national false pride, exhibited in the form of political pressure disregarding sound professional judgment and military experience.—
MAHAN.

On April 29, at 10 o'clock a. m., we lost the Portuguese islands from view to the eastward.

The squadron was composed, first, of the armored cruiser *Infanta María Teresa*, under my command, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera and having on board as chief of staff the learned Capt. Joaquín Bustamante.

The *Infanta María Teresa* had a displacement of 7,000 tons, a protection of 11.8 inch compound steel armor, and a protective deck extending over the whole lower part of the hull. This cruiser had two 11 inch González-Hontoria guns mounted in two armored barbettes, constituting the strong part of the ship. The main battery consisted of ten 5.5 inch guns of the same type, mounted on deck and having no other protection than vulnerable shields. These were rapid-fire guns, but somewhat antiquated, having been remodeled. The lower battery consisted of eight 2.24 inch Nordenfelt and eight 1.45 inch Hotchkiss guns, with no protection whatever. On trial her speed had been 20½ knots.

Then followed the *Oquendo*, under the command of Capt. Juan Lazaga, and the *Vizcaya*, under that of Capt. Antonio Eulate, both of which were sister ships of the *Teresa*.

Finally the *Cristóbal Colón*, recently built at Genoa, under the command of Capt. Emilio Díaz Moreu, having on board the second in command of the squadron, first-class Captain (Commodore) José de Paredes. This ship, as previously stated, did not have her heavy guns, that is to say, the two 30 ton guns. Her armament consisted of ten 6 inch Armstrong guns, six 4.7 inch, ten 2.24 inch and 1.45 inch guns, all protected by a 6 inch nickel-steel belt and armored redoubt.

To complete the squadron there was a division of torpedo-boat destroyers under the command of Fernando Villaamil, composed of the *Terror* and *Furor*, of 380 tons each, under the command of Lieutenant-Commanders Juan de la Rocha and Diego Carliez, respectively,

and the *Plutón*, of 420 tons, in command of Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Vázquez.

There were no auxiliary vessels and no fast cruisers, and worst of all, no colliers.

The order of sailing was in two columns, with a flagship at the head of each, navigating in such manner as to permit the ships greater freedom of movement, while they were at the same time in a position to form almost instantaneously in line ahead.

The admiral permitted the destroyers to be towed, in order that it might not be necessary to have them coal on the sea and that the delicate machinery of these ships might be in good condition for service upon arrival in America. But this contingency had not been taken into consideration when we left Cadiz, and even if it had been the destroyers could not have been properly equipped, as they require special bridles for that purpose, which were to be found neither at the arsenal nor on the market, and other appliances which involve little expense, but which can not be improvised with the resources on board ship, and the result was that it became extremely difficult to tow the destroyers, especially as their small size and their large screws caused them to yaw considerably, so that the towlines parted frequently and much valuable time was lost.

Still, this was better than coaling them at sea, which, owing to the swell caused by a fresh breeze in which we lost the torpedo boats from view a few yards from the ships, would have been very difficult and dangerous, as anyone familiar with nautical matters will readily understand.

The *Vizcaya*, whose bottom had not been cleaned for almost a year, was the only ship which did not take any of the destroyers in tow, especially as her coal consumption, even with the moderate speed of 7 knots, to which we were reduced while towing, was so much greater than that of any of the other ships that we were all alarmed about it.

Two days before our arrival in the West Indies the towing was discontinued. The larger ships formed in line ahead, with the flagship at their head and the destroyers alongside of them, ready to receive orders. All the fires were lighted, and the speed was regulated at 11 knots. The destroyers were the first to cause delay, on account of injuries to their engines. The machinery of the larger ships was not wholly free from injuries either, but these were of a less serious nature.

On May 10, the admiral detached the destroyers *Terror* and *Furor* to Martinique, under the command of Villaamil, with instructions to try to obtain coal, and especially news.

The operation had been calculated at a speed of 20 knots, but a few hours after the destroyers had left the squadron the boilers of the *Terror* became unserviceable, and there she was on the open sea noth-

ing but a buoy. With no small difficulty one of the boilers was repaired; Villaamil then left her to her fate, knowing that we should meet her on our course, and went on with the *Furor*.

Our exact destination was not known to any one outside of the squadron, as the admiral, fearing some indiscretion, had not even notified the Government of it. But as Admiral Cervera had telegraphed the minister of marine from Cape Verde on April 22: "At principal ports West Indies, where these ships are likely to touch, we should have confidential agents to give me authentic information." He had reason to expect that he would find such information at Martinique, not only as to what had occurred in the meantime, but also as to the manner in which the enemy was carrying on the campaign and, if possible, the distribution of his ships. It was therefore natural to suppose that our consuls would be on the alert, and one can easily imagine the disappointment of Villaamil when, upon his arrival at Fort de France, he found that our representative was in the country. The fact of his being a Frenchman and only a consular agent had nothing to do with it, for he subsequently showed so much interest and zeal in the discharge of his duties that, if he had had the least intimation, he would unquestionably have been in the city to lend his cooperation in favor of Spain.

Not being accompanied by our consul, Villaamil was received ungraciously by the governor, and would have obtained no information whatever had it not been for the hospital steamer *Alicante*, of the Transatlantic Company, which was in port at Fort de France, and whose captain, Antonio Genis, kept a diary of everything that occurred; but as his source of information was the daily press it was not wholly reliable. However, it was all Villaamil could obtain, in addition to the statement on the part of the governor that we could not get any coal, and that the ship carrying fuel which the Government had promised was not there; also, that we were prohibited from going out, as he said that the United States auxiliary cruiser *Harvard* had just put to sea from a neighboring port.

One can easily appreciate the situation of Villaamil, who knew that the admiral was rapidly advancing and would wait for him on the open sea. Therefore, before the detention of his ship could be carried into effect, he weighed anchor at midnight, and, assisted by some of the boats of the *Alicante*, in which her captain himself illuminated the buoys of the harbor entrance, he escaped at full speed, running at the rate of 20 knots an hour, and went in search of the squadron.

Something occurred in this connection which can easily happen in war, and which caused a misapprehension on either side.

The commander of the *Harvard*, as may be seen from documents since published by the United States Government, believed that he was blockaded by one of our torpedo boats; which was not the case,

since the *Furor* had gone to Fort de France, not only without knowing whether there were any hostile ships in those waters, but also with positive instructions to elude any encounter that might interfere with the principal object of her mission.

On the other hand, as the governor had told Villaamil that the *Harvard* had gone out, the latter believed that she had about six hours' start of him, and when he saw a large steamer on the coast, he believed himself discovered and even pursued, which, as since ascertained, was likewise incorrect.

Incidents like these, which are so common in war, furnish a plausible explanation for three alleged engagements, two in the West Indies and one in the Philippines, in which the Americans, perhaps mistaking some wreckage for torpedo boats, imagine that they have destroyed three of our torpedo boats. This is wholly inaccurate, for they could hardly have fought or destroyed any when there was not a shadow of a torpedo boat in either place.

A question arises here, which has since been discussed, but which at that time seemed very clear to us, namely, that it would be the telegraph rather than hostile scouts that would betray us, and as a matter of fact that is what happened. Without it the squadron would have passed at night between two islands, and once in West Indian waters it could have gone, without previous notice, to whatever harbor it deemed most expedient. But it was absolutely necessary to obtain information and coal, as anyone will realize (for it will be remembered that the admiral did not even know positively whether war had been declared), and so there was no choice but to proceed to some coast in search of news and coal.

The hour agreed upon had passed and there was great anxiety. Silence was imposed upon the ships which were advancing with all lights extinguished, except a screened light at the stern to guide the next cruiser. All the men were stationed for general quarters, ready for any emergency, until shortly after 2 o'clock a. m., when we saw the signal agreed upon thrown upon the clouds by the searchlights of the *Furor*, and we answered; and so we were once more in communication with our valiant destroyer and her plucky commander.

By 3 o'clock a. m. Villaamil was alongside of the flagship, and from him we heard of the disaster at Manila on May 1; we further learned that a powerful squadron was off San Juan; he also had some information as to the blockade established by the enemy and as to the movements of the hostile squadrons, though guaranteed only by newspaper reports. In view of this information we felt sure that the telegraph had already announced our arrival; that the trans-Atlantic steamers *Harvard* and *St. Louis* had sighted us; that we were right on the scene of war, and that the enemy had gained control of it, without any opposition whatever, having preceded us there by a number of days.

CHAPTER VI.

On May 12 we approached the western coast of Martinique for the purpose of leaving the destroyer *Terror* in territorial waters, with instructions to proceed to Fort de France to repair her boilers, since in her present condition she was an impediment to the fleet.

A few miles to the westward the squadron stopped and the admiral convened the commanders while the other two destroyers were being coaled. At this meeting it was decided to proceed to Curaçao, which resulted afterwards in our going to Santiago de Cuba. These manœuvres have since been discussed by all naval experts the world over, and we will therefore speak at length of the considerations and reasons which led to these operations.

In the first place it had been reported for some time that the United States was negotiating for the purchase of the island of St. Thomas. We had therefore good reasons to suppose that the enemy would have a station there, if only a merchant vessel, so that the squadron, which we had been told was at San Juan, would be notified of our arrival that very same day, and as said squadron could have no other object in view but to await us, it was highly probable—almost certain—that, knowing us to be to the southward, the hostile fleet would cut off our passage at Cape Maysi and Mole St. Nicolas, or at Gibara, from which points the hostile squadron was 450 and 600 miles distant, respectively; while we, passing to the southward of Santo Domingo, since to the northward an encounter was certain, were 950 miles from Cape Maysi, and still further from Gibara, without being able to elude an encounter with much superior forces, if we wanted to go to Habana through the old Bahama channel, which encounter would probably have taken place at a distance of not less than 400 miles from Habana. In that case, the hostile forces being overwhelmingly superior, our ships, if even slightly injured, were hopelessly lost, for under such circumstances, and when harassed by the enemy, ships can not run hundreds of miles.

The only harbors which, as stated, we could enter were: First. San Juan, which we had to discard altogether, because, as the United States admiral has said with good reason, he could have taken it whenever he pleased. Second. Habana, which we had to suppose to be well guarded, and it was indeed, since the Americans themselves have since said *that it was considered highly improbable that we should attempt to*

enter Habana: and it must be understood that it was better guarded by the squadrons at a distance than those near by, because, in spite of the blockade, it would have been difficult to prevent ships, whether injured or not, from placing themselves under the protection of the batteries of the city, while an encounter at a distance from Habana meant the total destruction of our squadron. Third, Cienfuegos, which we also supposed guarded, especially since, our squadron having been sighted to the southward, it was from here that our passage to Habana could be most effectually cut off; moreover, this harbor, situated at the head of Cazones Bay, is a veritable rat trap, very easy to blockade, and from which escape is more difficult than from any other harbor of the island. We knew there were torpedoes there, but no fortifications to amount to anything, and, moreover, the entrance is very difficult to defend against a serious attack from the sea.

On the other hand, we were 1,250 miles distant from the latter harbor, while from Habana, or Dry Tortugas and Key West, the enemy's base of operations, they had to make a run of only 500 miles to cut us off. For these reasons Cienfuegos Harbor was not seriously considered by us at that time. Later, when starvation stared us in the face at Santiago de Cuba, the former harbor was thought of as a possible solution, but not on the day of our arrival at Martinique.

There remained as the only solution going to Santiago de Cuba, the second capital of the island, which we had to suppose, and did suppose, well supplied with provisions and artillery in view of the favorable conditions of the harbor entrance. Moreover, the southern coast of the island offered chances of sortie on stormy days and an open sea for operations, after we had refitted and made repairs. But as we also supposed that the fortifications there were not sufficient to afford us much support in the sortie, it was not at that time decided to go to said harbor in the hopes of a solution which would permit us to force our way into Habana Harbor. The distance from Martinique to Santiago is about 950 miles, so that the hostile squadron, which was at San Juan, could easily have arrived there ahead of us. But we never believed that it would do so, thinking that Admiral Sampson, though it has since come to light that he did not know of our arrival, would do what he actually did do, namely, cover the remotest possibility, the entrance to the only fortified point, Habana.

Moreover, the Government had notified us that we should find a collier at the island of Curaçao; and as we were not more than 480 miles from said island, and by going there should lose only about 200 miles on our way to Cuba, it was decided to proceed to Curaçao, because, if we had a collier with us, we could have disappeared in the Caribbean Sea and, though at great risk, reached Habana, and our entering the harbor, though we might have to suffer more or less in the attempt, would not have been prevented by anyone, provided always that the battle had taken place within sight of the forts.

There are such strange ideas prevailing as to naval matters, especially in Spain, that it is perhaps not superfluous to say that, after hostilities have broken out, warships cannot, as in-time of peace, nor as passenger steamers can, proceed to a port with empty bunkers; for if their course should be intercepted it is absolutely necessary for them to have coal in order to be able to manœuvre and not be compelled to remain on the open sea without the possibility of moving. Hence, while the squadron had coal enough to go from Martinique to Cienfuegos under conditions of peace, it would have been highly imprudent to proceed to any distant harbor of Cuba, as is shown in the case of the *Oquendo* which reached Santiago de Cuba with hardly 100 tons of coal. Therefore, as we had good reason to believe that we should find at Curaçao the coal which the Government had promised in its telegram of April 26, and also news which we needed more than anything else, it was decided to go to Curaçao as the best solution.

In this connection Mahan says:

It may very well be, also, that Cervera, not caring to meet Sampson, whose force, counting the monitors, was superior to his own, thought best to disappear once again from our knowledge. He did, indeed, prolong his journey to Santiago, if that were his original destination, by nearly 200 miles, through going to Curaçao, not to speak of the delay in coaling. But, if the Dutch allowed him to take all that he wanted, he would in his final start be much nearer to Cuba than at Martinique, and he would be able, as far as fuel went, to reach either Santiago, Cienfuegos, or Puerto Rico, or even Habana itself—all which possibilities would tend to perplex us. *It is scarcely probable, however, that he would have attempted the last named port.*

Mahan thinks it would have been of advantage to him if Admiral Cervera's squadron had gone into Habana Harbor, because, being near the United States base of operations, it would have made the war easier and he would at the same time have covered our naval base. As to this point, it was as a matter of fact covered from the moment that the squadron was blockaded, and it seems to us it is very difficult to say what would have happened.

On the one hand the landing of troops, which was so easy at Santiago, would have presented insurmountable difficulties here, but on the other hand the bombardment of Habana, which is always possible to effect with impunity from a great distance at night, or even in daytime, in spite of the forts, was a problem which we were inclined to consider very much against us; for among the inhabitants of the island, including the Spaniards who had accumulated wealth and gained a firm foothold in these cities, there was no one disposed to remember the example of Cadiz except in popular songs, and we believe it quite possible that a wholesale uprising in the country, until then apparently quiet, would have left the Captain-General with only an insignificant contingent of his forces for fighting a battle. We therefore deem it very risky to venture an opinion as to what would have been the course of events, for even though American writers

pretend to deny it, the insurrection in Cuba would have ended the war, and the island, as Admiral Cervera said in his letter of February 26, 1898, which we have previously quoted, was no longer ours anyway.

For all these reasons there was among us no doubt as to the choice; for though the city of Habana, terrified by the bombardment, would have delivered us to the enemy without hesitation, still the burning ships could have returned to the harbor under the protection of the forts and the greater part of them would have been saved as well as their crews. These considerations must have presented themselves from the moment that the mistake was made to send an inadequate squadron to the West Indies.

Having concluded this digression, which was suggested by the many discussions on this subject, in which we have always found the best and most fair-minded support in the opinions of those who were our enemies, we will now return to our squadron, which was proceeding to Curaçao in line ahead, with the flagship in the lead and the destroyers on the beam, to facilitate our manœuvres in accordance with the circumstances. The speed of the ships was regulated so as to time our arrival at a convenient hour, and it is almost superfluous to say that the fires were lighted under all the boilers and that the ships were ready for any emergency.

It was about this time, namely, on May 18, that the *Oregon* cast anchor at Barbados. The United States Government was under the impression that it might be the object of the manœuvres of our squadron to go in search of that ship, which we, however, supposed to be in the Pacific. This illustrates how the commander in chief of our squadron was supplied with information.

Upon reaching Curaçao on the morning of May 14 the squadron was detained at the harbor entrance. After lengthy and unpleasant negotiations, the governor stated that the conditions of neutrality permitted him to allow only two ships to enter and that these could not remain more than forty-eight hours; also, that we could ship only a limited quantity of coal. It was about 2 o'clock p. m. by the time the armored cruisers *Infanta María Teresa* and *Vizcaya* entered the harbor, while the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and the destroyers, *Furor* and *Plutón*, remained outside.

It was with difficulty that we acquired the coal available, which, if I remember right, amounted to only 400 tons, and we proceeded to get it on board, working frantically, shipping also such provisions as we could obtain. Nothing can give an idea of the anxiety of that night of May 14, when we interpreted every noise we heard as an attack upon our comrades, and we could not even go to their assistance, for the harbor of Curaçao, which is closed by a bridge, is completely cut off from the outside at sunset.

In the meantime we had ascertained the sad fact that the anxiously looked-for collier was not there, nor was there any news for us; and as though ill luck were pursuing us even in the least details, one of those two days was a holiday and everything was strictly closed up, so that we could not even buy postage stamps for our letters, which we had to intrust to the consul to be mailed the next day.

On the evening of the 15th, as daylight was fading, the two cruisers went out, having to leave in the harbor launches with coal and provisions, but did not rejoin the other ships until it was quite dark, owing to the fact that a man of the crew of the *Plutón* had fallen overboard, but fortunately he had been rescued.

When the line had been formed again with every precaution made necessary by the grave situation, we proceeded at an economical speed on account of the *Oquendo* and *Colón*, which were short of coal, and timing ourselves so as to reach Santiago de Cuba at daybreak, the squadron shaped its course for that harbor, which the admiral indicated by signals to be our destination. All the ships were in complete readiness to open fire.

During the night of May 18, off Jamaica, we crossed two trans-Atlantic steamers which left us in doubt as to whether they were auxiliary cruisers or not. But soon one of these vessels passed within sight of us, making signals with the Morse alphabet and with a search light in operation. But she did not discover us, as we were proceeding without lights, with the exception of a small screened lamp at the stern, of such feeble light that it could not be discerned beyond a distance of three cables, which was the distance maintained between our ships.

We paid no attention to these cruisers or merchant vessels, for as their presence seemed to indicate that there were hostile forces at Santiago it was necessary for us to reach that harbor before daylight, whether to fight at the entrance, or whether to force our way through before being defeated in case the enemy was superior. The admiral did not have the least information as to whether there were hostile forces there, and if so, what they consisted of.

At dawn of May 19 the squadron was off Santiago, without having seen a hostile ship. The destroyers therefore made a reconnoissance of the coast, while the large ships entered the harbor, where they cast anchor in complete security at 8 o'clock a. m. of that day. This was very fortunate, as the *Oquendo* and *Colón*, which had not been able to enter Curaçao, had very little coal left, especially the former, which had hardly 100 tons.

In the meantime the Government and the authorities in the West Indies had exchanged some telegrams and orders, which we regret not being able to transcribe here, but which we have no doubt will be published in full in due season.

One thing is certain, namely, that the Government, on May 12, ordered the return of the squadron to the Peninsula, having no doubt changed its opinion on account of the disaster at Manila, as also of the communications from Cape Verde, which must have reached Madrid on May 5, and the bombardment of San Juan, which took place that same day, the 12th, and demonstrated that the defense of that island was a mistaken idea.

To this telegram vehement remonstrances were made by the governors general of Cuba and Puerto Rico, as we have since learned, who predicted revolution if the squadron should withdraw. These blessed fears of revolution, the cause of our disasters in the Old World as well as the New! and yet experience has shown that there was no foundation for such fears in either continent.

It is also reported that one of these governors advanced the astounding theory that the defeat of the squadron would increase the enthusiasm, on which we abstain from commenting. But while all this was going on without coming to the knowledge of Admiral Cervera, who had not received the telegram of the 12th, he could conjecture it from another telegram dated May 19, from which, though some words were ambiguous, it was plainly to be seen that the Government canceled the telegram relative to the return to Spain.

It was too late. Even if we had received the order we lacked the necessary colliers, without which it is madness in time of war to send a squadron out to sea, as it would be madness to send an army corps into a campaign without provisions and cartridges except such as the soldiers might carry in their knapsacks.

The squadron was at Santiago. By a miracle it had arrived there intact, and there was nothing to be done but to suffer the consequences of its departure from Cape Verde.

CHAPTER VII.

Nothing can be compared with the disastrous condition of Santiago the day of our arrival, and the stupendous ignorance of the Spanish residing there must be counted among the most disastrous features, for they had no conception whatever of the true condition of things.

Without pretending to describe the location of Santiago, except as to what relates strictly to the situation of the squadron, we will give a few particulars for the benefit of those who are not familiar with that locality.

Santiago de Cuba, although it is the second capital of the island, had no other communications than those within its zone of cultivation, and a country road leading to Manzanillo, another to Holguín, and a third to the neighboring port of Guantánamo. These roads could very easily be cut off by felling heavy trees across them and by flanking them from the impenetrable underbrush on either side, so that it would be a serious enterprise to conduct any force over them. On the other hand, the south front of the island is a virgin and impenetrable forest, communication with which had always been by sea.

Although the city was in reality besieged by the insurgents, it was still able to obtain some vegetables for its own maintenance owing to the field being occupied by military detachments which were defended in small blockhouses. But the city, which like all those of Cuba depended upon imports for its principal supplies, was feeling the effects of being closed in and the poorer classes that of hunger a month before any hostile ship had appeared off the entrance of the harbor.

The merchants, all of whom were Spanish, had ceased ordering goods, as they anticipated the country's defeat, and no one was willing to endanger interests, the fate of which was very uncertain, or to furnish goods on credit not knowing who would pay in the end. Even the Spanish Bank had only 4,000 silver dollars on hand, for the sake of appearances. This ridiculous sum is the best picture we could draw of the difference which existed between what everyone thought and the falsehoods which fell from their lips.

Notwithstanding all this, there was a great deal of foolish talk, and as this might seem exaggerated we will relate that at a banquet given

in honor of the squadron, while the officers of the army and navy were continually talking of duty, which ought to have opened the eyes of even the most blind, the archbishop himself proposed a toast to our assault upon the Capitol of Washington. This toast was received with feverish enthusiasm by some and with profound sorrow by us who knew that our fate was already decided and that we were irredeemably lost. But this did not prevent the Spanish themselves from taking advantage of the occasion, as was shown during the latter half of June, when, in order to do honor to Admiral Cervera, who had not eaten bread for two weeks, I bought for him from a Spaniard a small barrel containing 50 pounds of flour and had to pay for it \$42 in gold. And while this is not considered anything in particular, and the same thing happens everywhere, what is unpardonable is the fact that while clutching their money they still pretended to be ardent patriots.

We have purposely left until the last the consideration of the military side of the question in regard to which the commander in chief, Arsenio Linares, lieutenant-general of the army, had no illusions.

The troops of the army at Santiago were completely exhausted by three years of warfare in that horrible climate, with arrears in pay amounting to thirteen months, and impossible food, the result of this lack of pay. They were much more like specters than soldiers, and nothing but the steadfastness of the Spanish people could keep them at their posts. And when we say people we do not mean to refer only to the private soldiers, for an infantry officer whom Admiral Cervera invited one day to his very modest table was unable to eat, such being the condition to which the stress of circumstances had brought these honorable defenders of Spain; a condition which affected all the military forces from the general down, while the Spanish in general and the commissary department in particular lived in a very different manner.

In regard to the defenses, those of the city consisted of a number of bronze guns of the earliest models, which came from France after the war with Italy, and the effects of which could not be other than to cause the needless death of some of the gunners at their sides, and this fact, so little understood and still less appreciated, is called military honor by those responsible for it in order to clear themselves.

At the harbor entrance, and this is the most interesting, five 6-inch bronze guns had just been mounted which bore the date 1724. It is true these pieces had been rifled to improve their appearance, but in view of the height of the hill upon which they were placed, it was evident that the enemy could always station themselves beyond their range.

The navy had furnished four González-Hontoria guns of the 1883 model by removing them from the *Reina Mercedes*, two of which had been placed on the Socapa by the army engineers in charge of mount-

ing them, and two at Punta Gorda for the defense of the channel, and at the time of our arrival, almost a month after the declaration of war, they had finished mounting only one. In conclusion, the fortress of the Morro had a few mortars, but inasmuch as the fortress was in ruins they could not be fired and were entirely abandoned.

Surely nothing was wanting in these circumstances to induce the admiral to leave the harbor as early as possible, but the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* had just been twice across the Atlantic, their engines having been in operation for many days, and it was absolutely necessary to put out the fires. Those of the other ships had also been in operation since the 29th of March, and they needed a general cleaning. The boilers especially needed to have their water renewed if they were to maintain their efficiency, as naturally they had not been able to change their water on account of movements, alarms, and orders from Spain without the admiral being able to interfere, since for six months we had held ourselves in constant readiness, without being able to stop the engines for more than twenty-four hours, and always lighting and putting out our fires; circumstances which are so well known to every officer of the navy that we mention them solely for the benefit of those who wrongly believe that engines are like the old sails, always ready to render their most efficient service, without knowing that those of the trans-Atlantic steamers undergo a thorough repair every two weeks and are handled with incredible care.

So the fires were put out and the question of renewing the water of the boilers was discussed. Almost 600 tons of water, without counting the reserve! A work which was impossible from lack of appliances, for there was nothing but our boats, which at the most were only partially adequate for this work. The water lighters of the harbor carried at the most but 6 tons, and moreover there were only three or four of them, and they made but two trips a day.

The coal supply of the six ships also had to be renewed, and this work was undertaken with frenzy. What coal there was belonged to the State and was on a cay belonging to the naval station, where it was difficult for the lighters to come alongside, and where with all the means at our command, and with all that we could hire for their weight in gold, and in spite of the energetic aid of the army, we were not able to ship more than 150 tons of coal daily, an insignificant amount for six ships which even before relighting the fires of the engines, which was almost immediately, consumed 4 to 5 tons of coal per day solely for lighting, winches, cooking, and steam launches. Everything which was required for rapid coaling—lighters, tugs, and even baskets—was lacking, and we had to use the sacks which we had bought at Cape Verde for use on the destroyers, but which were insufficient for the larger vessels.

In this work, as in all that occurred at Santiago, there was the most

admirable accord between the army and navy, the two vying with each other in harmony and disinterestedness, and furnishing a most patriotic example, beginning with the two commanders in chief, Lieutenant-General Linares and Admiral Cervera, who were in constant communication and who did all they could to assist each other. The artillery of the cruiser *Mercedes* had been disembarked, and being the only one which merited the name, had, together with its officers, been placed under the orders of the artillery officers of the army. Later, the landing companies were added to the defense of the city, and always in the first line, as they were the only men well fed, and thus far had not been exposed to the evils of the climate. We never haggled about our services, and the general in chief of that district, Arsenio Linares, mobilized his forces in order to furnish us with water and coal from Daiquiri and whatever else he could get out of his limited resources.

While this work was in progress the admiral convened a council of war, in view of the probability of our being blockaded, the difficulty of defending the city from a serious attack by land, and the fact that the squadron could not wait for the season of hurricanes, for before that time hunger would compel them to capitulate the city, as the latter could not be effectively aided from Habana. The presence of the squadron at Santiago de Cuba would carry the war to that city, just as it would have carried it to San Juan, or wherever it might have gone, and neither the city nor the harbor was in a position to sustain it. As to the advisability of going to Cienfuegos, which has since been so much discussed, we repeat what has already been said, namely, that that harbor was a veritable rat trap, and that the defense of torpedoes could have been destroyed from the sea with the greatest ease, after which the American squadron could have forced the harbor with no possibility of being prevented from land. Moreover, Schley was stationed off Cienfuegos with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, and *Iowa*, and it was impossible to enter that port or the Yncatan Channel, for forces so important could not be simply for the blockade of Cienfuegos. Sampson was at Habana with the rest of the forces, and consequently there was no other course but to remain where we were or go to San Juan. And why to San Juan? Certainly not to remain in the harbor, for the disaster would have happened the sooner. Hence the object in going to San Juan could only be to coal more rapidly and put to sea before the arrival of the enemy, in order to make an attempt to go to Habana or to return to Europe.

These observations, which we make here once for all, will serve better than anything else to describe the circumstances prevailing at that time.

Urged on by the dark future of Santiago, our ships were working frantically at coaling when, on the 25th of May, there appeared at the

mouth of the harbor several of the enemy's fast vessels which we supposed were scouts belonging to Schley's squadron, which had left Cienfuegos, apparently because of the bad weather prevailing for the first time since our arrival.

The English steamer *Restormel* was captured on that day off the Morro, on her way from Curaçao with coal, and it could not be prevented, for even if the *Colón* had gone out, the only ship which could get up steam quickly in consequence of her Nielausse boilers, the collier would have been sunk and nothing would have resulted but the loss of the coal which we so much needed.

On the morning of the 26th Schley's squadron appeared off Santiago and at night withdrew to the southwest to take shelter under the lee of the island of Jamaica from the storm prevailing.

On that day the *Infanta María Teresa* had 300 tons of coal in her bunkers, the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* 500 each, and the *Colón* 700. The ships all had steam up and were ready to go out, for Admiral Cervera, realizing that the blockade would begin the following day, which in reality had been inaugurated the day before, had called a council of war of his captains to determine what was best to be done.

The situation was as we have described it, being obliged to suppose that the hostile squadron was closely guarding the channel at Cape Cruz, that Sampson was coming down by way of the Old Channel with the *New York* and the *Oregon*, according to information from the Government itself, and that Habana was sufficiently blockaded against an attempt by our half-dismantled ships. There was, therefore, no alternative but to go to San Juan. And to what end? To coal. And could we coal at San Juan in twenty-four or thirty-six hours, which was the latest that we could suppose the enemy would arrive, and in this space of time stow away as much as 1,000 tons in each of our cruisers? Before answering this question, and referring to certain American writings which speak of the colliers at San Juan, we ought to say that the following steamers of the Transatlantic Company had already been officially offered to the squadron: First, at Cape Verde, the steamer *Cadiz*, which was a passenger steamer, whose storerooms were filled with the equipment of the torpedo boats; later, at Martinique, the steamer *Alicante*, which was a completely equipped hospital ship, the storerooms and hold of which were fitted up for this purpose; and, finally, the *Alfonso XIII*, at San Juan, the most luxurious steamer of the Transatlantic Company, adapted for first-class passenger traffic, and whose storerooms were reported to have a capacity of little more than 1,000 tons burden. These vessels were consequently not colliers, and could only be an impediment to the squadron.

These facts being evident, all agreed that it would be impossible to coal at that place in the short space of time which the circumstances demanded. The problem was further complicated by there being a

heavy swell at the mouth of the harbor, and the *Colón*, whose draft aft was excessive, would be sure to touch bottom in going out.

Opinions were divided. Some thought we should go out in any event, directing our course toward San Juan, and if we should perish there it would be by the will of the Government, and if we succeeded in getting to sea with all or part of the squadron it would be safe. Others thought that, as it was quite possible and even probable that the *Colón* would be lost at the mouth of the harbor, for which reason she must be the last to make the sortie, the squadron would be reduced to nothing. Public and official opinion which we thought so exaggerated, and as a matter of fact it was so in Spain, would not have considered the loss of the *Colón* justified, and as we certainly could not have gone out from San Juan either, it was better to remain at Santiago and await events there. Two of those who had voted for the sortie declared on their honor and conscience that they were convinced that the Government at Madrid was determined that the squadron should be destroyed as early as possible in order to discover some means of attaining peace at an early date, and that they had therefore voted for the sortie, not because it was logical, but because we would receive the definite and military order to do so under still worse conditions.

Confronted by these terrible dilemmas, the admiral ordered the mouth of the harbor to be sounded, and having ascertained that there would be but 8 feet of water under the keel of the *Colón* in passing over the rocks of the bar, and as the swell presupposed serious injuries if not her total loss in going out, notwithstanding that I had been one of those who voted for the sortie, believing that our destruction was what the Government desired, I think that Admiral Cervera was very wise in deciding to have the fires extinguished under eight boilers of each ship and remain at Santiago in expectation of whatever opportunity fortune might offer us. But such opportunity never presented itself, as it never does when the disproportion of forces is so great and when all the fundamental principles of naval strategy have been disregarded.

At dawn of May 26 the cruiser *Minneapolis* appeared at the entrance of the harbor, and at 11 o'clock in the morning the blockade was established, but the manœuvres of the hostile squadron up to the 29th were incomprehensible to us.

It would not explain matters if we were to describe the coming and going of the hostile ships, but we do want to mention their good fortune, for the sea, in general so rough to the south of Cuba, was so smooth in this instance that the cruisers were able to coal, sometimes having a steamer on each side, which could not be done even in the majority of the harbors. As for the rest, the communication with Jamaica, the real base of operations, was so manifest and barefaced that if any doubt as to the complicity of England had existed, an

ascent to the Morro would have been sufficient to convince anyone of the contrary.

A series of bombardments at the entrance of the harbor followed the blockade and it is to be regretted that these have not been described by foreigners, for it must be difficult to believe that a single 6.3 inch gun was the sum total of the artillery which opposed the powerful American squadron. In the attack upon the so-called fortifications of the entrance, made by the squadron on the 6th of June, we had on our side five rifled bronze guns of 6.3 inch, which, as has already been said, showed by their date that they had been cast in 1724, and whose maximum range was 3,281 yards, within which the enemy never came. A few iron howitzers of 8.27 inch, the maximum range of which was 4,373 yards, had not even been mounted, as the majority of them could not be fired, and those which could were not able to reach the enemy, who, either from precaution or because of the high position of our batteries, always kept at more than 7,587 yards distance. The second 6.3 inch gun of the cruiser *Reina Mercedes* was not yet mounted, hence there was but one of them which answered without being silenced by the tremendous fire of the whole American squadron, which lasted a little over four hours and, according to the New York papers, represented an expenditure of \$2,000,000, while causing us only an insignificant number of casualties. They destroyed four huts belonging to the families of the light house tenders without dismounting a single gun, and the great tales related by the American press about the Morro are absolutely incorrect, for that ancient fortress had but one mortar, which was never fired, and was in such a state of ruin that orders had been given to abandon it except for a few caverns in the living rock back of the hill which served as a shelter for the troops. It is incomprehensible that so little damage was done considering how many shells were directed against it, including a dynamite projectile thrown one night by the *Vesuvius*.

Nevertheless this prodigality could not fail to be very profitable to the blockading squadron, as it was a veritable battle drill without any battle, properly speaking, a drill which has no precedent in the world. From the military point of view it is a model of prudence without parallel, for if the enemy had shortened the distance, although they might not have been able to dismount the scant and antiquated artillery defending the entrance, as the parapets would have concealed the guns, they might, on the other hand, have been able to reach the ships of the squadron, which of course was their object. But the American vessels kept themselves at such a distance that not a single projectile could have had any decided effect. In one of these bombardments (on May 31) the admiral stationed the *Colón* at the head of the channel with her broadside bearing on the harbor entrance; but that ship had only 6 inch guns, and although these were primed, the

fact that the hostile ships remained at a distance (7,000 yards according to Schley's official report) at which heavy artillery only could be effective, which was entirely lacking from our only protected ship, made it advisable to recall her within the harbor, and Admiral Cervera did so in order not to expose her to no purpose.

During these days Admiral Sampson resolved to prevent the sortie by sending the English steamer *Merrimac*, half full of coal and under the command of Naval Constructor Hobson, to be sunk in the curve at Diamante bank. The steamer, skillfully handled, was duly received by the batteries of the Morro and Socapa. Hobson must have thought that by hugging the shore they would not be able to fire at him, since, being located on the heights at either side of the entrance, the hills themselves would cover him, and this was the case. But hardly had he entered the mouth of the harbor when all the rapid-fire batteries of the submarine defenses, those of the two destroyers which were on guard, and the battery of Punta Gorda opened fire upon the *Merrimac*. It seemed that the crew must surely become demoralized under this fire and throw themselves with all haste upon a raft which they carried alongside, but, on the contrary, it is inexplicable that no one was even wounded under this downpour of iron at pistol range, and above all that they did not drop the anchor or anchors which they had ready, and whether across the channel or not, the boat would have been sunk at the desired locality and the channel obstructed for ships as large as ours. Along the outside of the *Merrimac* was a line of powder charges for 8 inch guns so arranged as to immediately sink the vessel upon being fired. Some of these I afterwards opened in company with our ill-fated comrade Bustamante, and the powder in them was thoroughly wet. Evidently this was an impromptu device constructed from the elements on board and it seems very probable that none of them functioned. The hostile collier was struck by two Whitehead torpedoes, one submarine mine, and a deluge of projectiles, and it is clear that it took several minutes to sink her, which were sufficient for her to be carried past the narrowest part of the channel and thus not to obstruct it.

Constructor Hobson, whose heroism on this occasion was admirable and merits the hearty congratulations of all, has written an account of this enterprise which reads like a novel, which, however, does not detract from the merit of his unquestionable bravery.

The blockade constantly grew more strict, the ships coming so close at night that sometimes the cries of the watch could be heard, and Admiral Sampson says they could not understand why we never fired at their searchlights. This, nevertheless, was clearly explained by the resistance which had been made to the bombardment, similar to that at Strasburg, with which he had honored the empty hills at the entrance of the harbor; for since we had only two modern guns with

a caliber of 6.3 inch, and only a hundred rounds each for the whole period since the beginning of the war, every engagement was an occasion for showing our lack of forces and even for exhausting our scant supply of ammunition, while what was inexplicable to us was that the squadron had not long before reduced our archaic batteries to perpetual silence and made a more serious attack upon the entrance of the harbor.

This explains why the dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius* was able to discharge a number of her peculiar projectiles, but the only injury they inflicted was to kill a poor gunner who was sleeping in the open air, and upon whom one of them fell; but even a poor searchlight at the entrance of the harbor and a few more guns to keep the enemy at a distance would have made her fire at very short range impossible.

A rigorous blockade followed the landing of the army, as was to be expected, and the weather gave us no hope whatever that the hostile squadron would be forced to abandon its position. The situation on land had grown much worse, for in spite of the fact that the Americans are not willing to acknowledge the assistance which they received from the insurgents, this was so decided that without them they would certainly not have been able to attain their object. In fact, the same day the troops were landed Santiago was left without any of the resources which she had received from her zone of cultivation and the sufferings from hunger increased. All communications were cut off, forests, roads, and mountains. Everything was infested by the Cubans, and even the west coast of the harbor itself was unsafe, the American Army being relieved of this painful service. The final yielding from starvation was plainly foreseen—starvation which was decimating our wretched troops, and which the inhabitants of the city, Cubans as well as the majority of the Spanish, were not disposed to endure. And thus the decisive moment was drawing near, and there was no other course but to go out to unavailing death at the entrance of the harbor, or to blow up our ships at the last moment, disembarking the rapid-fire guns and all our forces for the defense of the city.

The American Army was advancing, being aware of our lack of modern artillery, for two 3.54 inch Krupp guns and two 6 inch Matabele howitzers, the only guns of this class which the city had, were at the mouth of the harbor, and although Escario's brigade, which was on its way from Manzanillo, was expected and arrived the day following our sortie, still the greatest aid which could have been given to the city would have been the landing of the rapid-fire guns; but this could not be done, because the idea of the sortie of the squadron dominated all else in Habana and Madrid.

As many as 1,000 men were disembarked from the squadron for the aid of the city, under the command of the chief of staff of the former,

Capt. Joaquín de Bustamante. About 400 of these men fought in the battle of July 1, in which El Caney was taken by the enemy, also in consequence of our having no guns. The valiant defender of this place, Gen. Vara de Rey, was killed while sustaining the action under conditions so agonizing that General Linares found it necessary to take the convalescents from the hospital to send them to the trenches. That general having been seriously wounded, as well as nearly all the commanders and officers of the army, who themselves, rifle in hand, took a share in the actual fighting, it was the naval column which, with its valiant commander at its head, repelled the attack, illustrating once more that what is needed for war are sound and well-fed men such as our robust sailors, who, as yet unaffected by the climate, were in a condition to sustain the battle.

In this battle fell wounded, never to rise again, our learned and valiant Capt. Joaquín de Bustamante, an eminent electrician and the inventor of the torpedoes which bear his name, and whose writings will insure to him a place among the most illustrious of the service.

On the night of this day the situation of the city was desperate and would become more so if we were to withdraw our sailors, as the Captain-General had telegraphed to Gen. José Toral, upon whom the command had fallen. But the idea of our sortie prevailed over all else in Habana and Madrid, which, nevertheless, was not so urgent since the capitulation did not take place until two weeks later. Escario's brigade arrived the following day, and as the climate could not fail to have its effect upon the encamped forces of the enemy, each day gained was a victory for us. On the other hand, we regarded with anxiety the heights on which were located the defenses for the harbor entrance, against which General Shafter did not direct his forces, more regardful of his own interest certainly than that of his country, for if he had done this, following the natural and sound councils of the Admiral of the squadron, as appears from what they themselves have since published, there would not have been so great a loss of life, nor would the outcome of his expedition have been so uncertain, in spite of the terrible condition in which they found our troops as well as the defenses of the city.

During this interval a veritable correspondence by telegraph was held between Admiral Cervera, General Linares, Captain-General Blanco, and the Government, which we hope to see published in full, for that hitherto published in our newspapers is only a portion of it. We will, therefore, give here only as short an account of it as possible, in order that this narrative may not be incomplete.

On the 20th of May General Blanco, who had requested the coming of the squadron, asked for reinforcements for it, when he surely must have known that there were none, and announced that we were going to be blockaded, which was also well known before we left Spain.

A multitude of telegrams from Spain and Habana showed the anxiety over a situation which seemed to them a new state of things, while it was only what had been foreseen and foretold by Admiral Cervera.

The New York Journal published the following telegram in very large type:

MADRID, *June 3, 1898.*

Captain-General BLANCO, *Habana:*

Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and reinforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present only two war ships there, and one of them I believe can not pass through canal. The only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding the Government wishes to know your opinion as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera's fleet might produce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reinforced.

CORREA, *Minister of War.*

On June 3 General Blanco announced the possibility of a revolution, that the army might rebel, and that the salvation of Spain and the dynasty rested in Cuba. These telegrams, like the foregoing, we are not permitted to comment upon.

On the 21st of June General Blanco asked to be given authority over Cervera's squadron. In this connection we must call attention to the injustice shown by this request, for the squadron was, in fact, not only already under the orders of the Captain-General, but even of General Linares, commander in chief of the army at Santiago de Cuba.

As we have already said, history will make all these telegrams known in full, and we will speak of only the last three. On July 1 Admiral Cervera received a telegram in which, among other things, was the following:

In conformity with the opinion of the Government, you will reembark those of your crews which were landed, taking advantage of the first opportunity to go out of the harbor with all your ships.

He convened a council of war on that day, and while the battle was raging on land, by unanimous consent, he telegraphed to General Blanco, stating that if his landing forces were reembarked the city would surely be lost. On the 2d the answer to this was received, expressed in the following unequivocal terms:

Reembark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible and go out immediately.

The following telegram was published with the foregoing when it appeared in the newspapers of Spain:

Captain-General BLANCO, *Habana:*

The instructions given by your excellency to Admiral Cervera are approved.

CORREA.

These telegrams were translated from Spanish into English and from this language again into Spanish by our newspapers, so that they

differed slightly from the originals, but these differences were not essential either as to form or substance. By publishing the translations instead of the originals we keep within the law.

The hour foreseen at Cape Verde had arrived, and the departure of the squadron from that place for Cuba was the source and cause of the inevitable disaster which was not even lessened by giving to the squadron a small convoy with which we would at least have been able to come off with more military honor by attempting some enterprise upon our arrival at the West Indies. But this would not have prevented the disaster, for once the error had been committed, it only remained to determine the place of our defeat. As for the time when this occurred, it was not in reality the 3d of July, but in April, when, anticipating seditious movements in Spain and the West Indies, even going so far as to make the absurd mistake of supposing that the volunteers could be placed side by side with the regular army, the most elementary principles of strategy and the interests of the country were forgotten, even by the members of the Government who were not willing to recognize that, just as military men must give their lives in a holocaust for the country, political men should also make some sacrifice for it, and take at least a little risk before they permit the Crown of Spain to lose 10,000,000 of its subjects.

CHAPTER VIII.

Although we have spoken of this in an earlier chapter, we will state again the condition of both squadrons, giving the details more in full.

The armored cruisers *Infanta María Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo* were protected at the water line by a compound steel belt 11.8 inches thick, which extended over two-thirds of their length. Theoretically, this protection was vulnerable to 8, 12, and 13 inch guns, but practically we had to suppose it vulnerable only to the fourteen 12 and 13 inch guns with which we would be confronted.

These ships each had two 11 inch guns mounted in strong, perfectly protected barbettes, practically invulnerable save to the fourteen guns referred to above, except in case of a casualty such as occurred in the forward barrette of the *Oquendo*, in which a projectile entered between the gun and the gun port.

These ships had in addition—and this should have constituted their principal strength—a battery of ten 5.5 inch R. F. guns with their shields, but with no other protection of any kind, and exposed to all the splinters of the boats and their equipment. The ammunition hoists for these guns were entirely unprotected, and their construction and installation left much to be desired.

The rapid-fire armament, in addition to being not very numerous, had also no protection of any kind.

These ships were overloaded with wood, both in their decks and in the quarters and installations, although the tables and benches for the crews, the small boats, and whatever object it was possible to dispense with, had been disembarked at Cadiz in order to clear the ships and avoid conflagrations.

To sum up, these ships were protected in their so-called vital parts, as if anything could be more vital than the lives of the crews, and even as regards their being sunk they had to fear at the most not more than 18, or, if you will, 64 guns (of course we are speaking of the 3d of July), while the upper works of these ships were vulnerable to 265 guns, in addition to all those of the auxiliary boats.

The cruiser *Cristóbal Colón*, protected by a 6 inch armor of nickel steel, had the ten 6 inch Armstrong guns of the main battery protected, and six 4.7 inch and ten 2.24 inch Nordenfelt guns unprotected although

well installed. This ship, as was stated at the beginning, did not have her big guns mounted.

In reference to the protection of this cruiser, we will say that her water line was more exposed to the 8 inch guns; hence she could be considered vulnerable to 64 guns, but invulnerable to the others.

As regards the enemy, the armorclads *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, and *Massachusetts* were practically invulnerable to us. Their vertical armor of harveyized steel 14 to 18 inches thick could have been pierced by our 11 inch guns only with difficulty and at the muzzle of the gun and on the proving ground, but under the conditions of war, they were practically invulnerable and we could only have partially injured them in the small turrets of the 6 and 8 inch guns. The remainder of our guns in firing upon these ships had the same effect as barking at the moon. Any one of these four ships alone would have been able to oppose our whole united squadron, and all of them together, supporting each other, represented a force so colossal in comparison with ours, that an officer who was certainly very competent estimated it from a purely scientific point of view as the relation of 40 to 1.

The armored cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York* were each superior to ours, above all in having all the armament protected, and, being more recently constructed, everything had been avoided in them which could furnish food for flames.

The *Texas*, although better armed, was very similar to our ships of the *Vizcaya* class, having been constructed at the same period, and, in conjunction with the others, was a very powerful ship, as ours would have been had they had the support of some large armorclads.

We may not and should not depreciate the armament of the auxiliary vessels, which was very large; and these vessels are especially useful because in the heat of battle they can fire with impunity, for, as has been seen in many naval battles, no one pays any attention to them.

In regard to gunnery, the enemy had had a great deal of practice, for they had spent two years preparing for the war, spending fabulous sums in target practice, as shown in all the annuals of the world. In addition to this, the great experience gained in the bombardments of Puerto Rico, Santiago, and Daiquiri had served not only to train their men, but to overcome the numerous difficulties arising from the complicated mechanism of the mounts and breeches of modern guns, which were also experienced by Dewey's squadron at Cavite on May 1, and by Sampson's at San Juan, as appears from the United States official reports.

As for us, we had fired in practice but two shots with each of our 11 inch guns—which were of the very best—and therefore we had no opportunity to acquire the skill so necessary to prevent what happened on board the *Vizcaya* in practice and on the *Teresa* in combat,

namely, that after the first discharge of the stern guns we had no means of closing the breech of either gun.

But the awful thing was what happened with the 5.5 inch guns. These pieces, which constituted the real strength of the ships, were fired, as every expert knows, with their charges inclosed in metal cartridge cases like the charges for revolvers (we mention this for the benefit of the uninitiated), and these cartridge cases, manufactured by Armstrong at Newcastle, disastrously recalled by whatever artillery material they furnished us, had given very bad results, as in discharging them gases escaped through the breech. Part of the breechblock of a gun on the *María Teresa* had been blown off from this cause, injuring several of the gunners and threatening a greater disaster. As these cartridge cases are not manufactured in our country, others were ordered abroad to replace the defective ones, and it is painful to confess that owing to the formalities of contract and trials, which occupied the time from the middle of 1896 to March, 1898, when their manufacture was begun, almost two years had elapsed after negotiation was begun before we received the first cartridge cases; circumstances which indicate once more how little the needs of the country are recognized and how dearly these formalities cost in extreme circumstances.

At the breaking out of the war there were only 300 rounds of the new cartridge cases of this type, and these we distributed among the three cruisers, I will not say willingly, for I, who had them on board the *Teresa*, gave them up very reluctantly, until the admiral, half serious and half smiling, gave me definite orders to divide them up. The others were assorted, and those which seemed best were tried on board the *Vizcaya*, and although no accident occurred, when these cartridge cases were examined it was found that some of them were without caps, and they might, therefore, easily have blown out the breechblock of the guns, killing all the gunners. In consequence of all this the following dilemma presented itself, either not to fire a shot from these guns until the moment of battle, in which case, whatever the injury, it would pass unregarded and fire would be kept up in any event, or to fire with them and give the gunners the training which was so necessary; but as it was possible for grave accidents to occur all the batteries would, in that event, become demoralized in the most dreadful manner.

It was necessary to choose and we chose the first alternative; that is to say, we went into the battle under the fearful condition of *not having fired a single shot from the 5.5 inch guns until we fired against the enemy*, and the inevitable occurred, for a gun on the *Oquendo* blew out the breechblock, killing the whole gun crew, and I myself saw a splinter of ebony removed from the head of one of the gunners of the *Vizcaya*, which showed that another breechblock had been blown out

either in whole or in part. This much at least is known, but it is possible that there may have been many other accidents.

Nothing, therefore, was wanting to make our situation a gloomy one, and as for the disaster, officially foretold by the admiral at different times and for which he was censured, especially by those who were in a measure responsible, it was obvious and inevitable. Nothing but disaster could result, as all foreigners reiterated, saying that if the squadron went out it would be annihilated, as nothing less could follow.

Nevertheless we do not desire that what we have just set forth should give rise to an opinion similar to that deduced from the correspondence of Admiral Cervera, leading to the supposition that the ships were in an impossible condition. This is not the case. The correspondence which has been published is not solely and exclusively upon the war. It is a correspondence covering a period of many months, and has reference to the wants and necessities which are experienced by all the squadrons of the world. Admiral Cervera desired to publish the documents as a whole solely in order that no one could think he had mutilated the communications.

And thus it is that we never weary of repeating that the ships were magnificent, that in the training of the personnel they were not second to the best ships of any navy of the world, and that, except for the cartridge cases for the 5.5 inch guns and the necessity of consuming a great deal of coal in the training of our firemen, they had no essential defect. The mistake consisted in sending them against immensely superior forces at the last moment and without auxiliary elements. It was the same as if a few squads of cavalry should be sent against inaccessible intrenchments after having given the enemy time to fortify himself, to choose his position, and to assemble large forces with which to annihilate them. This does not mean that the squads were to be despised because this or that detail was lacking in their service. The really detestable thing would be the command for them to go out to certain death in order that their dead bodies might offer an argument to the Spanish people which would justify the necessity of asking for peace.

CHAPTER IX.

July 2, 1898.

At daybreak the admiral convened his captains and brought to our notice the contents of the telegram, the original text of which, and not the translation we have given, says at the end: "Your excellency will go out immediately." He stated to us that the time for discussion had passed, that we had done all that was within human power to avoid the catastrophe, and that nothing was left now but to obey, to which we all agreed. The learned and beloved Bustamante, who fell wounded in the battle of the previous day never to rise again, was absent, in consequence of which I performed the duties of chief of staff from the day of his landing.

We unanimously agreed to make the sortie precipitately, because, as the insurrectionists were in constant communication with the city, and as it was not easy to conceal the sortie, we felt certain that Admiral Sampson would know of it in a few hours, and that we would thus lose the only hope which remained to us, that of engaging them before their engines were entirely ready.

The admiral immediately proceeded to give us instructions for the battle. These were based on the knowledge which he had of the usual maneuvers of the enemy observed during the time of the blockade. The enemy's ships, resting against Daiquiri on the east, and very close to the shore, were in the habit of forming a great arc, with the *Indiana* on the east, followed in a westerly direction by the *New York*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, and *Texas*, which latter remained approximately to the south of the mouth of the harbor. Close inshore, toward the west, there was a yacht which we supposed to be in constant communication with the insurrectionists, and supporting the yacht was the *Brooklyn* in the center of the interval and far away from the other ships, consequently leaving a large space open to the southwest between the *Texas* and the coast.

Supposing, therefore, that the *Brooklyn* was at her usual station when we came out, the *María Teresa* was to engage her in battle, endeavoring to ram her, and while the rest of the enemy's squadron were grappling with our flagship the other ships, headed by the *Vizcaya*, without delaying to succor the *Teresa*, were to pass in column between her and the coast and endeavor to escape. The destroyers were to place them-

selves under the protection of the larger ships, and as soon as possible, under forced draft, endeavor to steam away and to take no part in the battle except in case a good opportunity should present itself. Upon encountering any single ship, however, they were to improve the opportunity to attack her. Those of the ships which succeeded in escaping were to gain Habana or Cienfuegos.

The words of the admiral were received with enthusiasm, and we all clasped each other's hands fervently, as soldiers who knew how to meet death and destruction, from which no power could save us. There were harsh and well-merited denunciations of many statesmen who remain as calm as if they owed nothing either to God or their country, and we swore that if anyone of us should survive he would defend the memory of those who perished in the encounter.

Four o'clock in the afternoon was set as the hour for the sortie, if by that time the reembarkation of the forces of the squadron had taken place; if not, the following morning.

Every captain now returned to his ship. I, as chief of staff, went to see the general of division, José Toral, who, as has been stated, was commander in chief at Santiago, and whom I met at 7 o'clock in the morning under fire in the trenches before El Caney, and asked him to order the reembarkation of the 1,000 men whom we had sent ashore. An aid of the admiral left, at the same time, in the hands of the archbishop all the original documents of the tragedy, which documents fortunately have now been recovered; and to this admirable forethought of Admiral Cervera we who were fortunate enough to serve under him, and the whole navy, owe the salvation of our honor against interested imputations.

In connection with the sortie we have studied particularly one feature, which constituted the most essential point and which was to determine the character of the battle. We find no explanation of the fact that this point, which was the most decisive, has been passed over unnoticed by all the professional writers who have occupied themselves with this subject.

The entrance to the harbor of Santiago is a narrow channel about 1,100 yards in length, which is made still narrower near its outlet by the location of Diamond Bank, which reduces its width to about 76 yards. These narrows take a slight turn, which makes it necessary in coming out to steam at a moderate speed, in order not to run upon the rocks on the opposite shore, and therefore it is impossible, when several ships are going out, for more than one to be in the channel at a time, otherwise there is danger of collision, if by chance some damage should be done to the ship which goes out first or if it should run aground, which would not be strange in view of the difficult character of the maneuver. The situation would be the same as that of a regiment of artillery passing through the gate of a fortress if one of its

pieces should get caught and the others crowd upon it in case they were not able to draw back nor turn within the walls of the passage.

To this natural difficulty of the harbor must be added the obstruction of part of the channel near Cay Smith caused by the sunken *Merrimac*, against which we would not only scrape, but the ships would have to turn before clearing it, for which reason the port screws would pass within 3 or 4 yards of the hull of the wreck, with great risk of being entangled in it or its rigging.

It was necessary, therefore, that the ships go out a considerable distance apart, and although this circumstance in itself would not be prejudicial to our fire, it had, on the other hand, the serious drawback that the ship which went out ahead, as well as each successive ship, would have to suffer alone the fire of all the enemy's vessels, resulting in a battle of only two available guns against more than two hundred.

This was the problem which presented itself to us and which we were unable to avoid, and this is the tactical reason for the way the battle unfolded itself; and I again call attention to the fact that foreign critics have laid much stress upon the distance of one ship from another, but have not considered the time, which was the most important factor.

The embarkation of the seamen who had gone ashore took place rapidly except those of the *Vizcaya*, who were farther away on the road to El Cobre and who arrived at 4 p. m. completely exhausted. For this reason the admiral decided to suspend the sortie for this day, and allow everybody to rest, since everything was in readiness and no further preparations were necessary.

We will not conclude the narrative of this day without stating that on land the firing continued very lively, so that at certain moments we watched with new anxiety the heights at the entrance of the harbor. At 2 o'clock in the morning, by order of the admiral, I went ashore and for the last time communicated with Villaamil, who, with his destroyers, was below the piers of the iron mines, where the firing sounded so near that it seemed as if the enemy had surrounded that position. However, nothing extraordinary occurred, and all the captains saw that their crews enjoyed a refreshing rest to prepare them for the action of the following day.

CHAPTER X.

July 3, 1898.

Poor Spain!

A foggy day dawned; the ships had all their fires spread; the guns were loaded; the use of torpedoes was left to the discretion of each commander, and the anchors were ready to be weighed. The men had been given an extra ration. At 7 o'clock I went, by order of the admiral, with the gunboat *Albatross* to the entrance to reconnoiter the position of the enemy, who could not be seen from inside the harbor.

The enemy's ships were in the following order, beginning in the east: The *Indiana*, *New York*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Brooklyn*, and a number of auxiliaries, which I did not mention before. The *Massachusetts* was absent: the *Indiana* was closer inshore than usual, and the *Brooklyn*, contrary to her position of the preceding days, perhaps because it was Sunday and she could not communicate with the land, was close to the *Texas*, and in the intermediate space which she before occupied there was a small yacht. The enemy, then, was presenting an array of 14 guns of 12 and 13 inches; 38 of 8 inch, and 191 of smaller caliber, all rapid-firing guns, in addition to machine guns and torpedoes. Of these guns 96 of larger caliber were perfectly protected.

On our side we had only six 11 inch guns protected, and the others, 114 in number, were completely unprotected, and 30 out of the 40, which constituted the mainstay of our armament, had their ammunition in the condition we have described.

The relative strength of the armament changed somewhat, because at half past 8 in the morning the *New York*, with Admiral Sampson on board, had gone to Siboney to confer with General Shafter, and by the absence of that ship from the enemy's line there were temporarily withdrawn 6 guns of 8 inch and 20 of less caliber.

In regard to distances, with a stadimeter which I carried I determined that of the *Brooklyn* to be more than 7,656 yards, which was the maximum range of my instrument. I calculated that the distance was nearer 9,843 than 7,656 yards, since from an elevation of about 40 feet above sea level her water line could scarcely be seen. Concerning this matter of distances Admiral Sampson's report is not exact, and one need only look at the official plan published in the United States to

understand this. It shows the *Brooklyn* about 5,468 yards from the harbor entrance, which would have obliged the *Teresa* to pass about 328 yards from the flagship of Admiral Schley, which is what we should have desired for our torpedoes and main battery; the *Gloucester*, 875 yards from the Morro, from which place the Mausers of the garrison would have driven her away; the *Vixen*, 1,640 yards distant from the only good gun of the Socapa, which would instantly have made its presence felt; and, finally, the *Indiana*, about 3,826 yards from the entrance of the harbor, and it is sufficient to remember that the last of our ships to go out did so about thirty minutes after the first in order to understand that if the *Indiana* had been stationed 3,826 yards from the mouth and close to shore she would have awaited the *Oquendo* at the sortie, which she could have done with impunity, since a speed of 4 knots per hour would have been sufficient to get abreast of the Morro before the *Oquendo* came out; that is, on the supposition that the *Indiana* occupied the place which her admiral assigns to her. It is true that the position of the *Indiana* was near the coast, but probably not less than 2.5 miles from it, and about 8,746 yards from the mouth of the harbor. It is very easy to reconstruct the position of the ships at the moment of the sortie, because from the *Teresa*, in doubling Cay Smith, only the *Texas* could be seen, and soon afterwards the *Iowa*, forming an arc of about 9,843 yards radius stretching to eastward of the harbor. The captain of the *Iowa* himself states that he fired at 6,000 yards, which, added to our advance toward the enemy's line, coincides with what we have stated respecting distances, contrary to what Admiral Sampson says. Moreover, if what he himself affirms were true, it would have been his duty to court-martial all of his captains for not having sunk our squadron at the very entrance of the harbor.

Neither does the official plan of battle as given by Admiral Sampson conform to the reports of his commanders, for the captain of the *Texas* says that he was 1,500 yards off the Morro, which, according to Sampson's report, could not have been the case. The captain of the *Iowa*, which was by her side, states that he was between 3 and 4 miles from Morro Castle. However, in other particulars it is comparatively acceptable, the documents published by the Navy Department, as already acknowledged, being usually quite impartial, and excepting that they always suppress everything disagreeable, they are, as stated, models of fairness which we believe have few precedents.

Returning to the question of the plan of battle, we note that, on the other hand, the one in Brassey's Naval Annual of this year, which evidently originated with one of the American captains, is on the whole, correct, except that the positions of the *Texas* and *Brooklyn* are shown too far forward; for, if they had been so situated, the *Iowa* and *Texas* could not have interfered with the *Teresa* as they did. Neither is position No. 2 of the *Brooklyn* correct, which makes her appear

to advance toward us. What she did do was to make a turn which brought us astern, as described by the chief engineer of the *Oregon*, on pages 544 and 545 of the Engineering Magazine for January of this year, and whose plans are perfectly correct as to the position of the American squadron.

We ought, however, to acknowledge the sincerity of all, since the differences acquire importance only through the difficult circumstances under which the battle took place.

Having returned to the flagship, I reported to the admiral the result of my reconnoissance, and that a battle ship of the type of the *Indiana* was absent from the enemy's line.

Immediately the admiral gave orders for hoisting the signal to weigh anchor, and when all the ships answered that the anchors were secured the signal for the sortie, "Viva España!" was given, which was answered with enthusiasm by all the crews and the troops of the army, who, entirely ready to help us, stood on the high banks which form the shores of the harbor of Santiago.¹

With the battle flag hoisted the *Infanta María Teresa* advanced ahead of the other cruisers, which for the last time gave the honors due their admiral, saluting him with hurrahs that manifested the spirit of the crews, worthy of a better fate. The *María Teresa* continued to advance rapidly without being detected until she was abreast of the battery of the *Estrella*, whose evidently hurried signals and an alarm gun from the *Iowa* showed that the hostile ships were taking positions for battle.

We had just finished making the turn at Diamond Bank, amidst death-like silence, everybody awed by the magnificent spectacle of the ships issuing from the narrow passage between the Morro and Socapa. It was a solemn moment, capable of making the calmest heart beat faster. From outside the conning tower, which I did not want to enter, in order, if I should fall, to set an example to my defenseless crew, I asked leave of the admiral to open fire, and, that received, I gave the order. The bugle gave the signal for the commencement of the battle, an order which was repeated by those of the other batteries and followed by a murmur of approbation from all those poor sailors and marines who were anxious to fight; for they did not know that those warlike echoes were the signal which hurled their country at the feet of the victor, since they were to deprive Spain of the only power still of value to her, without which a million soldiers could be of no service; of the only power which could have weight in the treaty of peace; a power the destruction of which would place Spain at the mercy of her enemy—

¹It is not worth while to discuss the reports that the anchors were not ready and the guns not loaded, which interested Spanish writers in search of popularity have dared to surmise or invent.

the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba alone, as many ignorant persons believed.

The sound of my bugles was the last echo of those which history tells us were sounded at the capture of Granada. It was the signal that the history of four centuries of grandeur was at an end and that Spain was becoming a nation of the fourth class.

"Poor Spain!" I said to my noble and beloved admiral, and he answered by an expressive motion, as though to say that he had done everything possible to avoid it, and that his conscience was clear. And this was true. As to civil duties, no one could have done more than he did; for as concerns military duties they were so easy that they are not worth the trouble of discussing them.

As for me, what a strange coincidence! A few years ago I had the honor to represent in the caravel *Santa María*, which is an exact copy of that of Columbus, the glories of the fifteenth century, and on the 3d of July it fell to my lot to give the signal for the end of this greatness. But the first was only a representation, while this was a frightful reality.

The second gun of the deck battery was the first to open fire and brought us back to this reality, too dreadful to allow us to think of other things. Giving the cruiser all her speed, we poured out a frantic fire with our whole battery, except the forward gun, which we reserved to fire at close quarters. In compliance with the order received, I put our bow toward the armored cruiser *Brooklyn*, which, putting to starboard,¹ presented her stern to us and fired her two after turret guns, moving to southward. In the account of the battle given by the engineer of the *Oregon* he confirms the fact that the *Brooklyn*, seeing the intention of the *Teresa* to attack her, made the maneuver which we have indicated. The position of the *Brooklyn*, and the fact of her being close to the others, which advanced as she receded, caused the *Texas* and the *Iowa* to come between the *Teresa* and the *Brooklyn*; for this reason, as to keep on this course would have been to run the danger of being rammed by these two ships, the admiral consulted me, and we agreed that it was impossible to continue, so he ordered me to put her prow toward the coast. At that time the *Brooklyn* was about 5,416 yards and the *Texas* and *Iowa* about 3,250 yards from us.

Behind the *Teresa* came the *Vizcaya*, followed by the *Colón*, and then the *Oquendo*; but after the *Teresa* came out of the harbor she was entirely alone for about ten minutes, during which time she had to suffer the fire of all the batteries of the enemy. This formed, as we have said, the peculiar nature of that battle; that is to say, the American squadron was exposed to two guns of the *Teresa*, but she to all the guns of the enemy.

¹The turn was to starboard, although it would seem reasonable for it to have been made to port.

The *Vizcaya* and the *Colón* came out quite close to each other, increasing, consequently, the distance between them and the *Oquendo*; and as the enemy's ships continued to pick out the admiral's ship for their fire, and especially as our other ships had orders to follow inside, they were beyond the range of the 6 pounder rapid fire guns, so that in the beginning they suffered but little; and if their engines had been in good condition and the *Vizcaya's* bottom clean, they would have been able to make a much longer resistance.

In the meantime, continuing with the *María Teresa* in order not to lose the thread of the narrative, she was to run ashore. The *Brooklyn* ran parallel with her, without any manifest intention to approach. The *Texas*, after the first attack, had followed in the wake of her flagship, maneuvering apparently with indecision, but the *Iowa*, which forged ahead and consequently gained the distance she was obliged to run, which was for her less than half of that the *Teresa* had to make, was now about 2,166 yards from the stern of the Spanish flagship, when she lodged in us two 12 inch shells, which, exploding on the poop, burst the steam pipe of the main pump and broke some pipes of the engines, which was the decisive cause of the loss of that ship.

In the descriptions which the chief engineer of the *Oregon* has published he credits the *Oregon* with these shots, and while it is true that in the end it was she that decided the destruction of the *Vizcaya* and the *Colón*, nevertheless at the beginning of the battle there must have been much indecision, because, if she and the *Indiana* had advanced, the *Oquendo* would not have come out of the harbor. Be that as it may, we still believe that the hostile ship which dealt the deathblow to our cruiser *María Teresa* was the *Iowa*, as the captain of the *Oregon* himself speaks of the rapid advance of the latter battle ship.

What the captain of the *Indiana* says about the bursting of one of his shells on the *María Teresa*, I believe, can not be sustained, since the same captain states that he fired on the destroyers from a distance of 4,500 to 3,000 yards, and as these had come out of the harbor more than one-half hour after the flagship of Admiral Cervera the latter could not have been at a distance where the injuries inflicted by the last ship in the enemy's line could be seen. The distances as given by the commander of the *Indiana* himself indicate that he was at even a greater distance from the mouth of the harbor than we ourselves supposed, or that he did not make great haste to shorten it.

Every one knows how difficult it is to give a description of a naval battle, which consists of a number of rapid individual movements, and for that reason, before we proceed, we repeat that we do not propose to furnish a literary description, but an absolutely professional military study, which it is impossible to endow with the life to which a narrative of another kind lends itself.

It was at the moment the *María Teresa* received her deathblow that

the *Oquendo* came out of the harbor. But we will proceed with the former, in order not to lose the trend of the battle.

When the decks were strewn with dead and wounded and the gun crews had been relieved repeatedly: when various fires had broken out, some of which had been extinguished; when it seemed apparent that the *Brooklyn* alone would be able to keep up with us, as we could easily keep ahead of the battle ships, the distance from which we had had to shorten on account of the configuration of the coast, it was then that the two 12 or 13 inch shells which burst on the poop, or some other projectile, breaking one of our big steam pipes, caused our speed to be diminished immediately and visibly, and we knew that we were hopelessly lost. The steam permeated the poop, cutting it off completely, and invaded the turret, rendering it untenable. The fires increased, as we could not reach them. The crew of one of the small-caliber ammunition hoists were suffocated; a number of brave men who attempted to pass through the after gangways, led by a valiant officer, perished in the fire.

At this moment, while, from the bridge, I was addressing the men who were fighting furiously amidst the frightful chaos which the deck of the cruiser presented, and was trying to ascertain what had occurred on the poop, because from the bridge it was impossible to see what had happened, which seemed to me like the explosion of a magazine or a torpedo, I fell severely wounded, and with me the two officers of the squadron staff, we three being the only ones left standing of the many who had been stationed defenseless on the bridge.

During that furious struggle there was no time nor opportunity to call the executive officer, and therefore the admiral himself took command of the ship, while I was carried to the sick bay.

The fire on the after deck of the *María Teresa* grew more and more formidable, her speed diminishing every moment, and the havoc was constantly increasing, as we were within range of the rapid firers. The admiral therefore called the second and third officers and the lieutenants who were in his immediate vicinity, and it was agreed that there was no other recourse than to beach the ship, in order to prevent her from falling into the hands of the enemy and to save the crew, for which reason, putting her to starboard, the ship was run ashore about 5 miles from the mouth of the harbor.

We left the *Oquendo* coming out of the harbor; but at this juncture the *Indiana*, the *Oregon*, and the *Iowa*, having advanced with their unerring line of fire, our cruiser received the concentrated fire of the three powerful battle ships, which could fire at her with impunity, as if shooting at a target, so that she was completely destroyed before she came out.

The sortie of the *Oquendo* under these circumstances, coolly maneuvering to make the turn at Diamond Bank, is one of the grandest feats,

if not the grandest, performed in any navy, and the unfortunate captain, Juan Lazaga, who was killed in the battle, leaves behind him a record of honor and glory which coming generations should remember with respect. When the *Oquendo* came out of the harbor, she was already completely lost, and it is strange that the American battle ships, which ought to have surrounded her, did not capture or sink her then and there, because with the superiority they had they ought to have accomplished more than they did.

The *Oquendo* proceeded under full steam, passing very close to the *Teresa* as the latter ran toward the shore, and with her whole port side burning she was beached about a mile from the flagship, running ashore at full speed, harassed throughout her course by the whole American squadron, which was discharging but few guns at the *Vizcaya* and the *Colón* and no longer firing at the *Teresa*, and once more there was a battle of *all* the American guns against a *single* one of the *Oquendo*; for a shell from an 8 inch gun had burst under the gun of the forward turret, rendering it useless and killing an officer and the whole gun crew.

Before we follow the other cruisers which remained afloat we will occupy ourselves with the destroyers, *Furor* and *Plutón*, which came out after the *Oquendo*. These ships had orders to come out with the bigger ones and to put themselves under their protection until, by virtue of their speed, they were able to get out of the range of the fire, as we have stated in discussing the plan of battle. We are ignorant of the reasons which their brave commander, Captain Villaamil, may have had for issuing forth at such a great interval after the other ships. Perhaps he thought that all the battle ships would engage in the pursuit, not taking into account that there were many auxiliary ships which, for the destroyers, were more to be feared than the battle ships themselves. It was these auxiliaries which, at very short range, destroyed them, aided by the rapid-fire battery of the *Indiana*, which, as we have seen, was behind the others. These ships, so frail that they can not be struck by a shell without receiving their deathblow, were destroyed immediately at the sortie, the *Furor* going to the bottom and the *Plutón* dashing against the coast almost submerged, each of the boats having lost one-third of its crew, most of whom were killed.

We left the *Vizcaya* and the *Colón* steaming westward, after forcing the hostile line, followed closely by the *Brooklyn*, the *Texas*, the *Iowa*, and the *Oregon*, which last, forcing her draft, proved on that day to be the ship whose engines were the best managed. To add to her bad luck the *Vizcaya* was left behind by her companion; therefore, being nearer, she was instinctively attacked by all the ships of the enemy; the same circumstance of two of our guns pitted against all those of the enemy occurring again as before; and hardly had the

hostile ships gained in distance when fire broke out on the beautiful cruiser, which all the heroic courage of her defenders could not control, and at about half past 11 she ran ashore at Aserraderos, her flag consumed by the flames, like those of her two companions, so that not one flag was lowered.

In this chase, and about half past 10, the *Vizcaya* made for the *Brooklyn*, with the object in view of shortening the distance and attacking her, but the *Oregon* and the *Iowa* interfered in the same manner as the *Iowa* and *Texas* interfered with the *María Teresa* at the beginning of the battle, so that the *Vizcaya* had to put again to westward and to go on fighting with them all.

The *Vizcaya* carried a beautiful silk flag, the gift of the historical society of the ancient province of the same name, and knowing the ship lost Eulate had it lowered and burned, hoisting another one to the main truck, and this one was never lowered until the fire caused the whole mast to fall into the flames devouring the poop, their pointed tongues seeming to wait for the flag of our country to fall into them, that it might never serve the enemy as a trophy.

The crews of the three ships had to jump into the water and the wounded of the *María Teresa* and *Oquendo* were carried ashore by those who could swim. The *Vizcaya*, however, was fortunate enough to save a boat; but she had run aground quite a distance from shore and had there not been a reef close by the whole crew would have perished by being burned or drowned.

The *Vizcaya* being lost, the *Indiana* returned to her post off Santiago, the *Colón* being closely pursued by the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* and also by the *Texas* and the *New York*, which latter, upon hearing the cannonade, had forced her draft in order to take part in the engagement, and thus had a share in the destruction of the destroyers.

The *Cristóbal Colón* was about 6 miles ahead of the other ships, hoping to save herself. One may therefore imagine the despair of her captain when the chief engineer came up to report that the good coal had been almost consumed and that with what yet remained the revolutions would be considerably reduced and, consequently, her speed also after a further run of about 3 miles. Everything was done to stimulate the enthusiasm and interest of the firemen; but the battle ship *Oregon*, which forged ahead with a speed of 16 knots, according to the official reports, gained rapidly on our cruiser, and she was irredeemably lost.

The situation of the *Cristóbal Colón* could not possibly have been more critical. She was closely pursued by the *Oregon*, which could sink her without herself receiving the least injury, and the *Brooklyn*, an armored cruiser of more speed and better armament, and the *New York* and the *Texas* steadily gaining on her—a powerful combination, from which it was impossible to escape; and to make the situation still

more difficult, the *Oregon* was located in the dead angle of the guns on the upper deck. As already stated the *Colón* did not have her 30 ton guns. Thus she could not fire without lying to, thereby losing her only chance of safety.

If the defense had been continued, there would have been more casualties, which appeals to that class of people who judge the actions in a war by the number of victims, while these very often represent only the incapability of the one who is in command. But the ship (*Colón*) would certainly have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and that is what the captain of the *Oregon* was trying to accomplish when he managed to put himself between the shore and our cruiser. One recourse, however, was left, and that was to sink the *Colón* before the arrival of the enemy; but that would have caused the whole crew to be drowned. Though this is so monstrous a proceeding that it does not deserve to be discussed, it is well to remind the Spaniards of the fact that it is prohibited by law, for, as the commandant of a fortress at the surrender has no power to order the whole garrison over the powder magazine and blow it up with all of its defenders, likewise a commander can not in cold blood give an order which will send 500 men to their death, though this may be considered a very natural act by the great admirals around the tables of the café; and, above all, this should not be done when it is of no advantage to the country.

The ship being lost beyond human help, just as Admiral Sampson states in his official report, Commodore Paredes and the captain of the *Colón*, inspired by a high sense of duty, and before the enemy was able to prevent it, ran the cruiser at full speed against the shore, ordered the valves to be opened, and prepared for the bitter task of lowering the flag—the last brave act in that bloody but fruitless drama.

The beaching of the ships took place under decidedly favorable conditions, because the coast is sandy, alternating with large groups of rock.

The most fortunate ones were the *Vizcaya* and the *Oquendo*, both of which ran upon rocks, so that, with their bottoms stove in, it was impossible for the enemy to pull off their hulls. The *María Teresa* struck only one rock on the starboard side, in consequence of which, and because she had but little speed, she did not receive all the damage that the admiral had intended. Moreover, I had arranged with the two principal engineers everything necessary for sinking the ship, feeling sure that it would be carried out. But as these worthy men were killed and I severely wounded, that which was a secret among us three could not be put into effect, nor could it be made public without jeopardizing the moral courage of the whole crew; and when, after beaching the ship, I was carried to the deck it was impossible to

go to the engine rooms, as the escaping steam and the conflagration in the battery made any attempt fruitless.

The *Cristóbal Colón* was less fortunate than any of the others, for, although going at a speed of 13 knots, she ran ashore on sand; and if Admiral Sampson, with a more seamanlike spirit, had ordered the divers to close the valves, he could most certainly have saved the cruiser, but with feverish impatience he towed her off with his own flagship, the *New York*. Hardly had the ship been floated when she began to list, at which moment, with great dexterity, he pushed the *Colón* back again with the ram of his own ship toward the sandy shoal; but it was too late, and, turning over, that noble and ill-fated cruiser went to the bottom of the sea forever. The few Americans and Spaniards who were still on board hastily saved themselves.

Admiral Sampson states in his official report that the valves had been opened *treacherously*, supposing that it was done after the flag was lowered; but this is not correct, not only because neither the distance nor the condition of the ship made any precipitation necessary, but also because the ship did not surrender until she was thought to be a total loss. And it is certainly a strange pretension on the part of the American people, not only in this but in other things, to attempt to give lessons in morality when that which they profess is of a peculiar kind, as the whole world knows.

Since, as we have said, we do not undertake to give a description having literary merit, but simply a serious and entirely impartial study, we will continue with the discussion of the battle before relating the incidents which followed thereafter, which discussion, added to the chapter which we will exclusively devote to professional observations, will complete a study in which we hope that at least the officers of the navies throughout the whole world will appreciate the spirit of loyalty in which it is written.

The first subject which presents itself is the question of armament, which in turn may be divided into three parts—training, distances, and vulnerability.

In regard to training, ours had the disadvantage that, as we defiled before the enemy, he passed rapidly from bow to stern before the muzzles of our guns, and this explains why the *Brooklyn*, which was the ship that virtually ran parallel with the *Teresa* and the *Vizcaya*, received 41 shells, certainly from these two ships, for she was never within range of the fire of the *Oquendo* and only for a short time of that of the best guns of the *Colón*.

As for the enemy, while his ships advanced toward ours, he kept his guns trained on us; so that, as regards the training, properly speaking, he was in a much more advantageous position than the Spanish squadron, as long as it did not leave the circle in which all the firing of the enemy converged. The superiority of the Ameri-

cans was due to the large amount of firing they had done, and even the *extremely prudent* bombardments of the Morro and Socapa, at Santiago de Cuba, had given them great practice in firing at long range. Our 5.5 inch guns were fired for the first time on this occasion!

In the descriptions which have been made *a posteriori* of the effects of the fire on our lost ships, they have even gone so far as to say to which hostile ship each one of the projectiles belonged; and from this, which seems to us ridiculous when we consider how difficult it is to be able to fix even the position of the ships themselves, the conclusion has been drawn that the Americans made 3 per cent of hits, which, although an acceptable percentage under these circumstances and when firing in actual war, we roundly deny, because the casualties were enormous in the upper batteries, where projectiles scarcely show, and it is certain that the number of hits made is perhaps more than double. But, in any case, this goes to demonstrate that we could not lessen the distances as we wished, especially as regards the ships in the extreme west of the enemy's line, since the great secret of good firing is to fire at short range, and the small number of hits in proportion to the number of shots fired goes to support what we have said about the distances in discussing the plan of battle.

On our part, we feel secure in asserting that the 41 hits in the *Brooklyn* were made principally by the *Teresa* and the *Vizcaya*; and if we take into consideration that at the end of fifteen minutes the *Teresa* was practically *hors de combat*, and soon afterwards the *Oquendo*, while the enemy during the *whole* of the action had *all* his guns in service, we see that the proportion is not so unfavorable as it appears, and perhaps superior to that of the American artillery.

During the whole battle, except at the sortie of the *Oquendo* and the destroyers, we were at too long range for our Nordenfolt 6 pounders, while the American batteries, situated in the high superstructures, were much better than ours, which were located on the lower deck for the sole purpose of defense against torpedo boats; and in order to give a convincing proof that the number of hits found on our ships is very much less than those which we actually sustained, we will state that on the bridge of the *María Teresa* all who were outside of the conning tower were killed or wounded, and I personally saw seven projectiles strike there, one of which, no doubt of large caliber, cut one of my orderlies in two, and another put me and the whole staff out of action.

The question of vulnerability was discussed when we compared the ships, and aside from our deficient armament the distance augmented the protection of the Americans, while our ships, neither at close nor at long range, had any protection whatever in the upper works. It appears from the American notes that there were found 27 hits in the *Teresa* and 26 in the *Vizcaya*, both of which ships were rapidly

consumed by fire, and the *Brooklyn*, which received 41 shells, though of smaller caliber, did not suffer much, owing to her protection. The cruiser *Almirante Oquendo* received, in all, 16 big projectiles and 46 6 pounders, and this is an additional proof of the absolute necessity for protecting the upper works, so that the accumulated damage may form no obstruction.

We repeat again and again that the shots which our ships received were much more numerous, because, if only those had hit which showed their marks, it would have been impossible for the conflagration to attain the proportions and rapidity that it did.

More than the casualties and damages—as the *Teresa* alone was injured by the bursting of a pipe in connection with the engines—it was the conflagration that determined the rapid destruction of the squadron; for it was impossible to remain any longer on board ship with the two upper decks converted into one immense blaze. The three cruisers were overburdened with timber, and the living spaces constituted the greatest danger. Furthermore, with fires under all the boilers ships attain a temperature so excessive that any combustible material will ignite with the greatest facility; and for this reason the greatest danger to these ships, and every one of their date, lay in conflagrations from the moment when the battle became so fierce that there was no time to extinguish them when they occurred.

In order not to interrupt our narrative we will reserve these details for another chapter of a purely professional nature, the contents of which will explain everything relating to the battle.

That which had been foreseen and which could not fail to happen had come to pass; the hour of the disaster had arrived to which the squadron had been doomed by the instructions of the 7th of April and of the 29th, the day of our departure from Cape Verde: as for the rest, it was only a question of the time and place when and where it was to occur. In this disaster were lost the four beautiful ships on which we founded the hopes of a powerful navy. Of their crews, some were on board the enemy's ships and others ashore, naked, starving, wounded, and dying under the cruel, tropical sun, while their comrades, drinking the unwholesome water of a near-by brook out of improvised cups made of the leaves of trees, were trying to quench the thirst of burning fever. And how terrible were the wounds! We still remember with horror the frightful havoc caused by the large fragments of the modern shells. A boatswain of the *María Teresa* had fourteen wounds; no one struck by American projectiles had less than two, and of such size and capricious frightfulness that not even the most hardened could view without pity.

Among the missing was the brave commander of the *Oquendo*, my beloved life-long companion, Juan Lazaga, who will ever leave as an example to all the seamen of the world the glorious memory of

his sally out of the harbor of Santiago and the turn at Diamond Bank, made as though it were an everyday occurrence, his ship already totally destroyed and after an 8 inch shell had exploded in the forward turret. Under these conditions he kindly dismissed the pilot and with great composure took out his ship himself. We consider this act one of the most admirable of the whole battle.

There were also missing his executive officer, Sola, who was cut in two by a shell; the third officer, Matos, the three lieutenants next in rank, and 121 men of that heroic crew, all killed.

There was missing the excellent Villaamil, the commander of the destroyers, killed by a shell on the bridge of the *Furor*; also five of the officers of the *María Teresa*, and four of the *Vizcaya*, whose survivors related how the poor gunner, Francisco Zaragoza, with gaping wounds, asked for a piece of the silk flag which the flames were devouring, and, wrapping it about him, gave up his soul to the Creator; and with tears in their eyes they told how the midshipman, Enrique Cheriguini, with both legs shot off close to the trunk, after making preparations to die like a Christian, wrote a letter to his parents, to whom he gave his last thoughts, knowing that God receives in His arms all good children, and that his soul would be united with Him, and with his last breath he wrote the last letter of his name. There was also missing the second surgeon of the *María Teresa*, who bravely and calmly had been attending all in that frightful sick bay, the awful aspect of which exceeded any horrors which man could invent in his imagination; also my two poor engineers, and Higinio Rodríguez, the captain of marines, all of whom had paid the frightful tribute to the errors of others, only to give an easy victory to the enemy and leave to him Cuba, the Philippines, and all Spain to do with as he pleased. Still, if this sacrifice had been for the good of our country, we should not have considered it too much if all had died for its greatness and prosperity.

The revised lists of casualties, made some months later, not counting those who had saved themselves through the woods and reached Santiago de Cuba, show a total of 323 killed and 151 severely wounded, for there were few slightly wounded; that is to say, 22 per cent of all the crews, an enormous number, especially taking into account the proportion of dead to the number wounded, which is quite different from what it usually is in a land battle; yet, though this number is large, we were convinced before the battle that it would be much greater, and that would have been the case if the fire had not hastened the destruction of the cruisers.

The fact that we were often fighting just within the limit of the range of the small-caliber guns caused many unexploded shells to fall upon the decks of our ships, and there were many and repeated acts of valor shown in throwing them into the water.

We could never complete this chapter if we were to undertake to relate the innumerable acts of bravery, generosity, and courage; but I can not do less than to mention one which I saw with my own eyes. The *María Teresa* had already been abandoned, the flames mounting up to the height of the funnels, and projectiles exploding on all sides—a spectacle capable of awing the stoutest heart—and when everybody thought that no living soul was left on the ship suddenly a man appeared there calling for help. Instantly, without being incited by anyone, the third boatswain, José Casado, cried out in a loud voice, “I will not let that man die!” and threw himself into the water. He climbed up the blood-stained sides of the ship with utter disregard of the danger to his life, seized the man in distress, carried him down on his shoulders, and, swimming with him to the shore, laid his precious burden on the beach. It was hardly possible to believe that that shapeless form was a man with fourteen wounds, who must have been left aboard as dead.

We have no doubt that the country will know how to reward this act of bravery, but if not, God, who sees and hears everything, undoubtedly heard the tribute of admiration of 500 men, who forgot their misfortune in order to admire the noble deed of one who shook off the water on the beach as if he had done nothing unusual.

Fortunately, and perhaps on account of the number of projectiles which passed through the water, we did not have to suffer from the attacks of sharks. The account written on this subject by one of the captains of the American battle ships is not correct, and when we afterwards exchanged our impressions it was found—strange, perhaps, but nevertheless true—that none of us remembered any such danger.

Thus ends this fatal expedition for Spain, and if the men who sent us on it could have seen on the shores of Santiago de Cuba the crews of the *Oquendo* and the *María Teresa* at the borders of the woods, and the crew of the *Vizcaya* abandoned on a reef, everyone almost naked, covered with blood, some breathing their last, looking over the sea with awful silence, as though looking for the road to Spain and inquiring, “Why has this happened?”—if those to whom the question was directed had been there, and who perhaps may dare to argue the subject before some assembly, being accustomed to have rhetoric serve them like the waters of the Jordan, I am sure that they would not have answered.

CHAPTER XI.

This chapter, of a purely professional character, should not be misunderstood by those who read it and who are not sailors experienced in matters of war.

Before concluding, we believe that all that has been written would be incomplete if we did not add a purely professional chapter, because up to date all the narratives which have been given of the battle of Santiago are based on conjectures, and hardly anybody has been bold enough to venture upon any further conclusions than those already deduced from the Chino-Japanese war, so that, as navy officers, we can not let the opportunity go by to give expression to the observations which the campaign in which we have taken part has suggested to us. Moreover, for those who study this book seriously, the observations which follow will complete the analysis of the naval battle of July 3.

We will leave aside the fact that ships should not contain wooden fittings, and that cruisers ought not to engage in battle with battleships, against which their guns are powerless, for nobody will do us the injustice to suppose that we did not know that. Moreover, we have proved that it was not Admiral Cervera who committed the error of going to the Antilles of his own free will.

We are convinced that in all battles of the future there is bound to occur what happened in this; that is to say, that for one of the combatants the casualties will be enormous and the destruction complete, while for the other it will result almost without harm. In fact, two ships equally protected can fight each other at long range, but from the moment when, on account of some damage or under certain conditions, an advantage be gained by one over the other, the repeated pounding of the rapid-fire guns increasing the damages without giving time for their repair, and securing the safety of the victor while the antagonist loses the means of recovery, it will happen that the battles will always present characteristics of inequality in regard to damages sustained which could not be explained in a land battle.

The weakest point in our squadron was undoubtedly the machinery, and especially its personnel. We remember having been impressed some time ago by an article written by Admiral Freemantle, who said

that on the day of battle neither the engines nor the firemen would give the results expected of them, a theory which was confirmed later by one of the chiefs of staff of the English squadron which bombarded Alexandria, who told me that in some of their ships it was necessary to put guards of marines at the hatchways in order to make the firemen stay below by force, where there was really no danger.

Not one of our firemen, fortunately, deserted his post; but with fires under the ten boilers the ships made less speed than they would ordinarily with only part of the generators in use. This involves great problems relating to the engine personnel, to whom the responsibility belongs, especially as there was a considerable number of them in each boiler room; therefore it becomes necessary to solve the problem of strengthening the morale without unduly increasing the number of officers, since the two engineer officers are indispensable for the principal engines; and though we recognize the fact that there is nothing which is more awe-inspiring than the boiler room, even including the ammunition rooms, and though there is nobody who needs more courage than a fireman, placed as he is in a coal bunker dark and silent as a tomb, we feel sure that if there is no solution found for this problem, many disillusionings will result, less, however, in cases of such immense superiority as the American ships undoubtedly had, under the protective decks of which there was no other danger to the life of a man than that of dying of old age. From this point of view, and others of which we will speak further on, it is indispensable that the ships should have certain coal bunkers so arranged that they can be kept as a reserve, so that, during battle, it would not be necessary to have anybody in them. In the report of the chief engineer of the *Oregon*, which we consider very sensible, he speaks of *fighting bunkers*; and if these existed, and, as he says, had a capacity of 700 tons of coal, the fact alone of having a reserve of coal within easy reach, so that it is not necessary to place anyone in the coal bunkers, and thus have all the firemen vigilant and available for the boilers, is so noteworthy an advantage that the constructors, for that circumstance alone, may lay claim to a principal part of the success of that ship. We, therefore, state our opinion on this subject.

In our war ships, as in all those of the world, the coal bunkers are sacrificed to theories of defense rather than to the service of the engine. There is no other way of taking out coal except at the rate at which it comes out of the bunker holes, and if it is necessary to reserve any it must be kept in sacks, because the coal bunkers above the protective deck usually have their opening below; moreover, as soon as the first fuel is consumed which is close to the outlet, it becomes necessary to carry it through sinuous coal bunkers, full of joists and angle irons, so that there are very few war ships, if any, which can sustain their maximum speed for twenty-four hours, because there is no arrange-

ment for taking out the necessary coal from the bunkers and putting it in sufficient quantity at the furnace doors.

Though we have had but little practical knowledge of the use of liquid fuel, it seems to us that it may offer a solution of the question of fuel during battle, which will do away with the labor of many hands and avoid the problem of ashes, with which we will occupy ourselves presently.

The naval constructors, whose companies usually exercise considerable influence over the parliaments and press of their respective countries, lay great stress upon the question of coal consumption, discoursing very opportunely about what is consumed per horsepower per hour. But this is a figure that to the public mind means nothing; therefore, we believe that from an instinct of self-preservation all navies should dispense with a classification so scientific, and simply say: For the development of 10,000 horsepower there are necessary, in theory about 220 tons of coal, and in practice at least 240, in order to maintain a given speed, and it will be more clearly seen that a ship whose bunker capacity is 600 to 700 tons can not sustain that speed more than a very few hours, for as soon as the coal recedes from the outlets to the fire room there is no way of keeping up the necessary supply. And we are not speaking of forced draft, because then the consumption in many cases is almost doubled. In a battle, therefore, the coal bunkers impose an additional difficulty to the many with which the unfortunate naval constructor already has to contend.

On account of their relation to the coal, we will now discuss the ventilators, which in practice have a very arduous duty to perform, for the fine coal and the ashes with which the air is impregnated make life in the boiler room impossible. The selected coal which is employed at trials is split into perfectly regular pieces which look as if made in a mold, and is not the ordinary coal which has to undergo two or three transshipments and which is afterwards thrown, trampled upon, and shifted from place to place before it reaches the fire room. There a good part of it becomes a mass of powder which the ventilators throw in the air, making life unbearable. When, moreover, the red-hot ashes have been drawn out, the ventilating system must be stopped or it becomes impossible to live in an almost solid atmosphere, a large part of which is on fire.

It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, that the ventilators should lead directly to the furnaces and that there should be automatic apparatus for drawing out the ashes, since coal inevitably contains dust and must be piled up in front of the furnaces before they are charged.

We shall be asked, as we have been asked different times before, "Did not the same thing happen on the *Oregon*?" We will reply simply that for the *Oregon* the battle was nothing more than an exercise; that the engines of the other big American armor clads behaved badly;

that the *Brooklyn*, whose speed should have been 22 knots, did not exceed 13.06 knots, and the *New York*, with a recorded speed of 21 knots, made only 11.06. Thus there was an enormous difference in the situation of both combatants; for on our part we could not draw out the ashes while the ships were in one immense blaze, to which we were also unable to attend. One of the chief defects of our ships was the joints of the pipes which wasted steam as soon as the pressure reached about 125 pounds. In order to go at full speed it was necessary to increase the pressure considerably beyond that point, and as a consequence cause damages and thus provoke a scandal (for as soon as a ship goes into dock public opinion immediately pronounces it a serious injury); therefore there was a circle of iron around us beyond which we could never pass and yet out of which it was necessary to go under the penalty when in front of the enemy of having to face the horrible alternative either of not forcing the draft or of exposing the ship to injuries which would render her useless. By this we mean to say only that it is necessary to force the draft and cause such injuries as are unavoidable. We should state, for the instruction of all, that the only ship of both hostile squadrons which did so was the *Orygon*, whose speed proved so fatal to us.

And even at the risk of appearing trivial it will do no harm to say that we were surprised in an extraordinary manner by the effect of a small escape of steam from a joint which for some little time rendered it impossible to see and to breathe under the protective deck, the steam being the dry steam of the modern boiler, which burns the lungs as if they were breathing flames, and is an enemy whose importance in many cases is not sufficiently recognized. For this reason said joints should all be elastic, or in order to avoid the danger referred to something better than anything we know of to-day should be invented.

Like many other ships which navigate the ocean, our cruisers had their auxiliary steam pipes so connected as to be without any other stop valve than that at the outlet from the boiler, so that if, for instance, the steam whistle should be damaged it became necessary to stop the turrets, the ammunition hoists, the capstans, the electric light, in fact everything except the steering gear, which had a special and independent pipe system. The only one of these pipes which had a stop valve was the steam pipe of the bilge pump; but instead of this valve being placed under the protective deck it was located a meter above it.

During our stay at Santiago blind covers were put on all the steam pipes which projected above the protective deck, so that we could not use the winch for the ashes, the whistles, the siren, nor even the capstans, and were without means of operating the searchlight, so that every time it was used it involved a great deal of labor not free from danger in uncovering its steam pipe. The result was that these ele-

ments were lacking when they were most needed, burdening the men with additional labor when it was most necessary for them to have some rest.

Consequently the main steam pipe of the big bilge pump remained as it was; but as it burst during the battle, it was undoubtedly the deciding factor in the loss of the *María Teresa*, since the escape of steam decreased her speed to such an extent that it was equal to an abandonment of our hope of safety. It is difficult to be able to explain the cause of the bursting of that steam pipe, for, according to the investigation which I caused to be made after the battle, it appears that it was from the effect of a shell; but this nobody could confirm, since all who were at the place at the time were killed by the two 13 inch shells which exploded there, or asphyxiated by steam. I was inclined to believe that the bursting of the pipe was due to the concussion following the explosion of these two shells, but from the above-mentioned investigation it rather appears that such was not the case and that the concussion, which from the bridge sounded like the explosion of a magazine, must have fractured some pipe of the starboard engine, because the steam issued directly from the engine room before the bursting of the steam pipe of the bilge pump so often mentioned, which may, perhaps, likewise explain the death of Chief Engineer Juan Montero, who was among the missing, and who must have perished by the steam from the pipes in the starboard compartment in which he was stationed.

There are many ships which are in the same condition, and it is indispensable that all men-of-war on which electric motors can not be used should have stop valves on all steam pipes, and that these valves should be under the protective deck, and also in each water-tight bulkhead, and in all connections of the various compartments, since it should not be forgotten that the mission of men-of-war is to destroy, and that, consequently, if this contingency is not provided for, the auxiliary engines become disabled just when they are most needed.

In connection with what we have said about steam and of the resulting accidents, the excessive temperature which exists within men-of-war when all the machinery is in operation is such that we believe that one of the most urgent problems to be solved is that of ventilation, because without it life is made impossible in many parts of the ship, and the life of the men should always be the first consideration everywhere. For this reason we believe that electromotors should be more generally used wherever it is possible to apply them. A central station could be placed below the protective deck, and here, the same as where there are steam pipes, means for lowering the temperature at any cost should be provided.

In this high temperature is to be found the first and great danger of fire; and since the diminution of combustible material has its limits,

as we shall see further below, we persist in what has been said about the dangers incident to this excessive heat.

Aboard our three cruisers and during the battle all the pipes for extinguishing fire were open, and the pumps made to work so that the decks could be completely inundated, until on the *María Teresa* and on the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* the fire main burst and a huge stream of water fell upon the boilers, causing alarm instead of extinguishing the fire raging above.

The investigation showed that it was a projectile which cut the pipe on the *María Teresa* in two, but we are inclined to believe, rather, that it was due to the lack of escape valves properly located and to an increase of the pressure caused by some incident, either the closing of the outlets or the flattening of various pipes through some accident. As to the *María Teresa*, it could also have been the concussion of the shells which burst on her deck; but we are rather inclined to believe that the lack of good and sufficient escape valves in the pipes was responsible, resulting in an excess of pressure.

The piping of ships presents to day a most difficult problem which requires the entire time of persons not occupied with other things, if only to ascertain where all the valves and registers are located. In our judgment, it is necessary once for all to do away with such complications, and although each thing serves only one purpose, it should have the simplicity required of everything destined to render service in the midst of destruction and death.

One of the first things to be disabled on the three cruisers were the 5.5 inch ammunition hoists, each of which could carry five projectiles at a time with their complete charges. These were very heavy apparatus and connected with each other in such a manner that, if one was rendered useless, its companion was also put *hors de combat*. On the *Teresa* every one of them was rendered unserviceable by the enemy's fire, and one fell while ascending loaded, which caused the bursting of one of our own shells, setting the place on fire; fortunately, however, without blowing up the magazine; and the miracle was repeated a few moments afterwards, when a 6 pound shell of the enemy fell in the same shell magazine where it exploded without doing any harm. The combination of the ammunition hoists, their ascent to the guns, and the passage from the magazines is such that, in an unprotected cruiser they can not be disabled by a projectile without rendering the guns unserviceable. A subdivision of the apparatus is therefore absolutely necessary, even at the cost of carrying less guns; if not, the ships will be powerless to fire after a single shell has struck. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the hoists should not be combined, but rather that each one should have a counterweight if necessary, in order to localize the damage.

There remains also without solution a practical method of handling

the metallic cartridge cases which come out hot from the guns. These, if they are allowed to remain on the deck, are a material which, coming in contact with a shell, could cause it to explode and thus become auxiliaries of the enemy.

On board our ships were placed wet bags with which the gunners could pick up these metallic cases; those of the 5.5 inch guns were thrown within the rails and some into the water, and on the *Colón* in the cofferdams, which were well located for that purpose; in the lower batteries they formed much of an obstruction, notwithstanding that many fell into the water. The disposal of these cartridge cases is a problem which, so far as we know, has not been solved on any man-of-war, but which, nevertheless, it is necessary to solve.

As it is not easy for the rapid-fire guns of small caliber of 2.9 to 2.2 inches (12 and 6 pounders) to be placed in casemates, nor to have hoists leading directly to the guns, nor to have the rounds of ammunition brought one by one instead of in boxes, we believe that it is necessary to have in a convenient place a kind of steel box of sufficient thickness in which to put the wooden boxes in which these projectiles come, and by so doing avoid the imminent danger of their bursting upon being struck by a fragment of shell. Perhaps one of the interior walls could be made thinner in order to direct the explosion toward the more suitable place, which it should not be difficult to ascertain by experiments, with the end in view, above all, to increase the morale of all persons whose place is in said batteries.

Likewise, it seems to us that in naval battles, when the enemy is more than 1,000 yards distant, the question of distances makes it necessary to return to broadside fire. It is not sufficient that the number of officers be increased, nor that, the enemy being seen, each one should have a small range finder to measure the distance of the enemy, for the quick movements in a naval battle, and the fact that there can not be an officer to each gun, renders necessary an organization of this service very different from that which exists to-day, for the situation in which a Barr and Stroud range-finder would have to be placed would allow it only a few seconds of life, as happened to the one on board the *Vizcaya*, the only one of the kind in the squadron.

Speaking of the batteries, we will state further that in ours all the men's mattresses were suspended so as to form a kind of parapet between each two guns, which, in our opinion, must have saved us many casualties.

One of the things that technical men will particularly look for in this chapter is probably the manner in which the torpedo problem was solved.

The admiral allowed each commander to solve the question according to his own judgment. With the exception of the *Colón*, whose torpedoes were protected by armor, and which we will not here con-

sider, each of the other three cruisers acted differently in this matter. One carried the torpedoes completely ready in the tubes with the war noses in position. Another carried the war heads of wet gun cotton and the torpedoes in the tubes, but without the igniters. The third had the war heads and noses, which can be put on in two minutes, in complete readiness outside of the torpedo rooms, but under the protective deck, while carrying the torpedoes themselves on the charging platforms.

This diversity of opinion in a matter of such vital importance is an additional proof of the fact that the question has many *pros* and *cons*, and as it has already been solved in every navy of the world by taking a decided stand in favor of under-water tubes, we will only say that for those ships which still carry torpedoes without proper protection for the launching tubes it would be advisable to reduce the number of tubes and utilize the weight gained thereby for strengthening the armor, especially as in our opinion torpedoes are suitable for torpedo boats, and for nothing else.

One question which requires urgent solution in connection with war ships is that of lifeboats in battle. It seems hardly possible that a large battleship full of men, many of them probably mutilated after an action, should have no other means of rescue except for the men to jump into the sea, which in some cases means seeking an even worse death. We believe that boats with substantial bottoms, either of cork or of light wood, which would continue to float even though the sides are torn open, and so placed that they can be let into the sea without the necessity of lowering them, would be an aid that every ship should have, as not a single one can be sure that it will not be placed under the most critical circumstances. These boats should be placed from port to starboard, so that by being raised at one end they can be rapidly *thrown* into the sea, in the literal meaning of the word.

Boats, like many other things, are not equipped with a view to war, and our ships do not have a single boat carrying ropes to enable the crews to reach the shore in a seaway, in spite of the example of our whole coasting trade, forgetting that as soon as war is declared ports and piers are but a myth for the ships of the navy.

At Santiago the *Vizcaya* kept one boat from being disabled by the enemy, which saved the poor wounded and many others who could not swim great hardships. The *Oquendo* saved two of the side cleaners' stages, by means of which it was possible to get a line to the shore, and thus rescue many men. I made the serious mistake of throwing our stages overboard when we went out, and, as the boats were literally nothing but splinters, no line could be run until a United States boat arrived, and in the meantime there was much suffering and anguish; for a steam launch which was apparently in good condition and was lowered into the water capsized and was the cause of further victims.

The boats mentioned above, though they were of little use, are nevertheless necessary, if only to keep up the moral courage of the crews, and we will add, in conclusion, that those of our boats which were located on the gallows frames do not appear to have been the cause of any special damage, although that is what we had feared.

Battle conning towers as now constructed are an admirable protection for attacking a city when it has no torpedo boats nor movable defenses of any kind, but in order to manœuvre a ship of large dimensions, followed by several others, with the prospect of being attacked by torpedo boats, and when one is in the habit of managing her from very high bridges, it is almost impossible to remain inside. When it is considered that the helmsman, two men for engine orders, officers for the speaking tubes and torpedo tubes, and the navigating officer are all inside it will be realized that with this mass of humanity it is impossible to move and that one is almost smothered, so that the commander, in view of the immense responsibility weighing upon him, has no recourse but to command the tower while walking up and down the bridge in order to be able to direct the battle.

This entails the serious danger and the almost certain destruction of the commander, when he should be protected as much as possible, for in the solemn moments of a battle a relief in itself is a disaster. It is therefore our opinion that, as has been done with the ships, the thickness of the armor of the turrets should be decreased and the turrets themselves increased in size, or at least armored parapets should be placed by the sides of the conning bridge. If the battle tower is made more habitable it will become a great deal more useful.

In any event, it is necessary to make it possible to observe the binnacle from the tower and to spread out charts, and especially should the towers be given sufficient dimensions so that the smokestacks and superstructures will not totally obstruct the view aft. We have seen in very modern ships a few towers that were larger than usual, but in our opinion even these are far from adequate.

In passing we will state that the superstructures require very essential modification, because they interfere more than anything else on board ship with military operations.

Speaking tubes and other devices for transmitting orders should be tested on days when target practice is held and when all the ships fire at the same time. It is on such occasions that it will become apparent of how little use they are.

For the batteries the bugle signals proved more useful than other means, but as to the engines we had to stop all communication for fear of orders being misunderstood.

In our opinion, even though all the tubes had to be sacrificed to one tube leading to the engine, it would be well worth while to have tubes

of larger diameter than those now in use, surrounded by some insulating substance which insures safe communication.

Great sacrifices are being made nowadays to remove all combustible material from on board ships: but the effects of the crews, which from the standpoint of inflammability represent an immense amount of danger, can not be dispensed with.

It should be remembered that the effects of a sailor are of greater bulk than those of any army general in a campaign, and those of the officers and petty officers, which are of course larger in proportion, constitute a mass of combustible material that is positively dangerous.

There are men who carry the argument so far as to want to dispense with cabins, berths, lockers, etc., under the impression that these are simply a luxury for the convenience of the crews, while as a matter of fact they are absolutely indispensable. The result of crowding together so large a personnel in one small space is the same as it would be in a store where it was necessary to keep thousands of different bottles without having the shelves required to put each one in its proper place; it would mean chaos, which is worse than anything else. Without entering into details that would lead us too far in this connection, we will mention that on a certain occasion when I was given command of a ship and the minister of marine, who honored me with his friendship, wanted to try an experiment of that kind—fortunately making an exception in my case and giving me a small cabin—the disorder created on board was such that, if we were to relate all that happened, it would seem like a farce unworthy of the good intention which had inspired the measure, especially when the object had been to make things easier for everybody. I will only add that circumstances made it possible for me to relinquish the command of the ship, and I did so until a place should once more be assigned to each man; for the disorder which resulted was such that not only the discipline but the safety of all was endangered.

We therefore deem berths absolutely necessary. But when a war is anticipated an order should be given to *lighten the effects*. Commanders and officers should keep only their undress uniform, with the exception of perhaps one or two staff officers, who may keep a second uniform. The necessary books and instruments should be retained. All citizens' clothing should be absolutely prohibited. In a word, the effects should be confined to a chest and a blanket. The same thing should be done in the case of all petty officers and, if possible, of the men. This should be made practicable by having at each naval arsenal a warehouse, in charge of a commissary or boatswain of the respective ship, if possible, where, simply by means of cards and without the formality of official papers, each man could dispose of his extra effects.

A measure of this kind is the more imperative as it frequently becomes necessary during operations to transship officers, sailors,

wounded and sick, and even the effects of the dead, and the result is much confusion, especially as the crews of torpedo boats have to keep most of their effects in the larger ships since their own do not have room for anything.

Such a measure should be obligatory and subject to strict regulations; otherwise it might seem as though each man wanted to save his own, and there would be no lack of evil tongues to make fun of it in the press and everywhere else. It might even seem like a herald of ruin, when, as a matter of fact, it is a strictly military measure to get rid of everything superfluous in anticipation of an engagement, for on board of modern ships there is absolutely no room for anything below the protective deck. We want to emphasize this for the benefit of those who have never seen war ships except in illustrated papers.

We will now speak of the question of coaling, which we omitted in connection with the engines, because in our opinion it has a different significance from a military point of view.

We already know that in other and more fortunate navies this matter has been more closely studied than in ours, although the ships which we purchased abroad have not brought us anything new, and the experiments hitherto made have borne mainly on the mode of shipping coal speedily. For our part we believe that it is imperative at any cost to take on coal through the ship's sides, even if it should thereby become necessary to modify the armor-plates. For when the coaling is effected through the decks, as it now is, the armament has to be protected, the guns and all delicate apparatus must be carefully covered up—that is to say, the batteries are rendered unserviceable for the time being and everything becomes impregnated with coal dust, so that many things do not function properly. And since in an active campaign ships have to be coaled every day, there results a constant fatigue and confusion which are opposed to all military principles.

While coaling is going on and immediately after it is finished the batteries are in poor condition for an immediate battle, and if they are to be washed after nightfall the men do not get the necessary rest. We therefore insist on what we have stated, believing that all naval officers will agree with us.

Moreover, modern ships do not have a sufficient number of cranes properly installed, not only to enable them to take coal rapidly from lighters, but also to obviate the disorder inside of the ship and keep the batteries clean and free from all obstruction.

In passing we will say that on board our ships we adopted the system of having one half of the mattresses serve as a parapet and the other half, without being unrolled, were used as pillows by the men off duty. In a cold climate this could not have been done without prejudice to the health of the crews.

On a former occasion we have already expressed the opinion

officially that it is necessary in time of war to give the men a meal at midnight. This is absolutely imperative for all firemen and for the crews of torpedo boats and destroyers, whose strength must be kept up by means of an extra amount of food.

During the late campaign the admiral obtained from the Government a small extra allowance for the firemen and they were given a meal at midnight.

This question can be easily solved, as there is no reason why the navy should not be given the same extra allowance during a campaign that the army enjoys; and it is our opinion that the whole crew should be included in this midnight mess, not excepting the officers. Boat-swains and others of similar rank, owing to their small pay, are especially badly off in time of war.

In connection with this question we will say further that the experience acquired at Santiago when the food supply had become scant, especially in view of our arbitrary way of organizing the messes of the lower classes, so that each man provides his food, so to speak, on his own account, leads us to advocate that the commander of a ship be given authority by naval ordinance to send anyone to the mess kettle as he may deem expedient—in extreme cases and when absolutely necessary, even officers. As it is now, the messes are very numerous, and as the men when their supplies are exhausted resort to the pantry, it is impossible to make any calculations as to the provisions on hand.

The only solution is to send them peremptorily to the mess kettle, for boatswains, for instance, could not possibly pay 20 or 25 pesos gold for a barrel of flour, which was the price to which it soon went up at Santiago, and they asked for help just when the struggle was at its worst, and made it still harder. Although they were preached to and told that we should die of hunger, still as we could not get away from there, and they had to be fed, the result was that the provisions in store represented hardly one-half the number of days they would have if they had been used only for the men for whom they had been calculated.

Other navies, we know, are differently organized in this respect.

The operating room! There is nothing more awe-inspiring and horrible than the operating room on board ship on the day of a battle. It required the whole extent of my authority, when I was carried down to it, to impose the order and silence which the valiant Ensign Ramón Rodríguez Navarro, who was down there in charge of the ammunition hoists, was trying in vain to enjoin. The wounded in all the ships refused to be taken to the operating room because of its being so difficult to get out of, they feared the most horrible death. On the *Vizcaya* some of the wounded had to be installed in the battery with no other protection than that afforded by the turret; they did not suffer much in

this spot, thanks to the fact that the bow remained comparatively free from injury. On the *Oquendo* they were installed on the orlop deck, and some of the dying men were left there when the ship filled with smoke. On the *Teresa* they were installed on the forward platform under the protective deck, but near the pumps and ammunition hoists, thanks to which circumstance and to the valor of the surgeons and the officer above referred to, only dead bodies were left below. In any event it is imperative to consider a question which has so much influence on the morale of the crew. The operating room should have a large hatch with a good ladder through which the wounded can be lowered without difficulty, which would at least inspire them with a hope of safety. If the operating room could be located on the protective deck of protected ships, even though the space is intended for other purposes and can be easily converted, the measure would no doubt be of great moral influence; for it is certain that, except during bombardments and cases which can not be designated as naval battles proper, the wounded will rather incur the risk of new wounds than to be buried without being able to move in that place where even those who are accustomed to live in those holes feel ill at ease in time of peace and in the full enjoyment of their health.

The *Cristóbal Colón* had her operating room well installed in what constituted the machinists' workshop in the battery, and that is about where it should be on board all our ships.

We will not conclude this chapter without expressing our opinion as to torpedo-boat destroyers; it is true that we have not been on board of them during a battle, but as these ships formed part of the squadron, we are sufficiently familiar with them to find the opinions we held concerning these vessels fully confirmed.

In the first place, torpedo-boat destroyers are what their name indicates and should not be employed for any other purpose, although the probability is that they will continue to be used for everything; for in time of war anything is used that is handy.

It should be taken into account that these vessels are in the same condition that a man would be whose whole body were heart and to whom any wound, therefore, would be mortal. And as these vessels present a large target, it is our opinion that torpedo-boat destroyers, whose unstable platforms render their fire very uncertain, will not often succeed in approaching larger ships; and even in the case of torpedo boats themselves we consider it doubtful whether they can do so if the gunners of the ship to be attacked have any presence of mind.

In any event, we are sorry to say it is our opinion that these vessels *will not be good for anything* unless for three months previous they have gone out of the harbor every single day, in all kinds of weather, until the crews, from the commander down to the last fireman, have become thoroughly familiar with their ship; and if in that space of

time her engines should be injured, it is better for an injured ship to be in a dockyard than to go to the bottom or fall into the hands of the enemy.

We do not share the opinion of those who believe that the crews of destroyers should be relieved by those of the larger ships, for the sailors of large ships are not fit to serve on board of torpedo boats until they have been navigating in them for some time; and those of torpedo boats, even if they were to sleep four days in succession, would consider that an injury was being done them; they would want to do nothing and only be in the way wherever they went.

Each one must fill the post where accident has placed him, and the crews of the destroyers and torpedo boats must not hope that, by means of a relief or feigned exhaustion, they can evade their destiny. Probably what occurs in our navy happens in others also, namely, as the torpedo boats in time of peace are stationed at navy-yards, a number of sailors, gunners, and firemen live in them year after year, taking part in all the exercises and becoming thoroughly familiar with them; but when it comes to going out to war and leaving their families, there is not a single one to be found, as though the earth had swallowed them up. It is our opinion that these vessels should in daytime be stationed at a distance from the firing and should be guarded, so that the crews may sleep quietly; but as for reliefs, we are of opinion that to substitute new men for the dead is all that is necessary.

We further believe, as experience has taught us, that the men serving on board of these vessels should not be more than 35 or, at most, 40 years old. It is sufficient for their commanders to have attained the rank of lieutenants, as long as promotion continues to be as slow as it unfortunately is in nearly all the navies of the world. Their crews should undergo an examination in swimming—we hardly dare say in gymnastics, although gymnastics, in connection with the study of war, geography, and military strategy and tactics, are more needful than the endless mass of useless mathematics required by our extensive programs. But in any event the personnel of these ships should be subjected to a rigorous physical examination and at all the navy-yards they should have a gymnasium for their exclusive use.

Relative to the subsistence in time of war we repeat what we have already said, namely, that the whole personnel, with the exception only of the officers, should be included in a single mess, so that there would not be more than two messes on board.

As for the hulls of these ships we will only state that they should be equipped with appliances both for towing and being towed, as it becomes frequently necessary for them to navigate in that manner. The fine lines of the bow make it very difficult to handle the towline, and it is therefore very necessary that it should be passed over a roller, so that it can be easily detached. Villaamil put a copper

sprocket wheel on his towlines to bear the strain, and while the vessels did not suffer, as the line terminated in a sprocket wheel 5 feet from the bow, it was at times impossible even to cut the stream cable in order to set the destroyers free.

It may also be well to consider the arrangement of which Yarrow made use in order to conduct the steam as much as possible outside of the space where the men are at work in case of an injury to the boiler; for in two of our ships the *whole* personnel in the engine rooms was killed. This is a sad experience which we should not forget, knowing that war is conducted with men and not with automata, as supposed in the romantic literature of those who know that they will never be shut in during a battle with a boiler under 200 or 300 pounds pressure. Nor can this experience ever be forgotten by an admiral who knows the danger which may arise when during operations in war *all* the firemen and machinists are killed.

In our opinion, one of the compartments should also have a hatch sufficiently large to make it possible to lower a wounded man through it, which is impossible with the hatches they now have and which are unnecessarily small and elaborate. Our torpedo boats built by Thornycroft did have such a hatch, which shows that it is by no means an impossibility and that we are not asking for anything new, especially as the elaborate construction has no other object than to impress the public and make the vessels more expensive, while the constructors do not trouble themselves about the manner in which those who will be called upon to handle them in battle are to manage them.

There is another matter we wish to mention, although not relating directly to the battle, and that is the absence of the cruiser and scouting service in the United States Navy. Although the latter had an incredible number of auxiliary vessels and almost fabulous means at its disposal and no enemy, properly speaking, since at the time the war broke out the island of Cuba was already lost to Spain, the scouting service was really effected by telegraph, and hence the intervention of the Secretary of the Navy at Washington and the minister at Madrid, although the latter from different motives. It appears from the Appendix to the Report of the United States Navy Department, page 33, that there was created a naval war board, which acted as an advisory board to the Secretary, and although in view of the immense disparity of forces and circumstances the Americans could not fail to succeed, they did what they wanted. It would be very desirable if some writer of another nation, who could not be accused of being prejudiced, would examine closely whether or not the United States, considering its situation at the time of the war, could not have done more than it did.

What we wish to point out by the foregoing lines is the danger with which in future all admirals will have to contend in time of war,

if the main operations are to be directed from a distance by factors and boards who will attribute to themselves the glory if such operations are successful, but who will not be placed before a court-martial if they are failures. Such boards do not have to contend with a thousand and one difficulties which arise everywhere when it comes to a practical execution of plans, especially in war when this must be done on the battlefield and not on paper. Even naval officers frequently forget these difficulties twenty-four hours after they have left the command of a ship.

This method of directing the war is nowadays inevitable; but it is our opinion that it can succeed only in a country like China, where, judging from the ideas we have of that nation, we presume a decree could be issued ordering that, if an admiral is rewarded for successful operations, the advisory board is to be rewarded likewise, but if, on the contrary, he deserves to be hanged, then those in charge of directing the war, telegraph in hand, should without further ceremony be hanged with him. And perhaps results will show that those whom we consider extremely barbarous do not reason so very badly.

Not as a question of policy, but as a military question, we believe that there is on board our ships an excess of portable armament for some of the personnel. Firemen, for instance, of whom there are 100 on board of each of our cruisers, do not need any armament, nor do some of the other contingents. By doing away with portable arms to a certain extent a great saving could be effected, and it would, moreover, remove one source of danger where there are so many.

If I had not been seriously wounded myself, I should add some observations on the question of wounded, which I deem of great importance; but under the circumstances they would appear too personal, and for that reason I leave them for some future occasion.

We will here terminate this chapter, which, in connection with the description of the fight, will help naval officers who may read it to form an idea of the battle. For those who do not belong to the profession we consider it of little interest; and we do not have much hope that it will be of service to our navy, which the country, with incomprehensible misinterpretation of the true situation, looks upon with a manifestly hostile spirit. But we hope, nevertheless, that our colleagues the world over will appreciate a few observations made on the battlefield and set forth in a simple manner by a man who knows that he is saying nothing new, but is confirming ideas which have everywhere been the subject of much discussion.

We will now return to our ill-fated crews, who, on the beaches and reefs of the southern coast of Cuba, with the burning ships before their eyes, were quietly waiting, in the consciousness of having done their duty, for whatever fate might have in store for them.

CHAPTER XII.

Although the treatment of the crews and the incidents which occurred while they were prisoners of war are a question of secondary importance in the drama in which Spain lost her colonial power, we shall speak of it briefly, not only as a matter of curiosity, but also because the fate of these valiant men who fought against impossibilities can not be indifferent to any good Spaniard.

The crew of the *Colón* was transhipped without difficulty to the United States ships. That of the *Vizcaya*, which, as stated, was on the reefs at Aserraderos, was promptly rescued by the *Jora* and some auxiliary vessels before the tide had time to endanger the lives of all those men cut off from the shore.

It was reserved to the crews of the *Oquendo* and *María Teresa* to further taste the bitter cup of that fatal day.

About a hundred men from these two ships, guided by the pilot of the *María Teresa*, fled through the woods until they reached Santiago; and during the march these men, naked and without weapons, fearful all the time of falling into the hands of some ferocious insurgent party, suffered the most terrible hardships, especially some of them who lost their way and spent three days in the woods without food, and having to climb trees to find out where they were, until they finally arrived at the Socapa.

The men of the *Oquendo* were, moreover, divided into two groups. One of them fell into the hands of a party of Cuban insurgents, who fired on them, killing two men, until they discovered that the fugitives had no weapons, when they conducted them to the camp of their leader, Cebreo. The other group, guided by officers, followed a path along the coast and joined the men from the *Teresa* about half a league from the place where they were shipwrecked.

The crew of the *Teresa* was grouped around the admiral on the beach. An attempt was being made to organize that camp of horror when a United States boat appeared with orders to pick up Admiral Cervera. To that end the admiral had once more to jump into the water with his aids, taking with him also Commander Mac-Crohon, executive officer of the *Teresa*, who was very ill, and myself, who, having been

placed on an improvised stretcher, unable to make the least motion except with my left arm, was thrown into the sea, which was breaking furiously on the beach, and I underwent the most excruciating suffering which it is within human power to endure.

The admiral left ashore the third officer of the *Teresa*, Lieutenant-Commander Juan B. Aznar, near that mass of wreckage of what only a short time before formed two handsome cruisers. This distinguished officer, who is an honor to the navy, had an opportunity to display his gifts under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. With large fragments of the masts stretchers were improvised for the wounded, who were placed under awnings of leaves made by the men without any tools but their hands. The surgeons and their assistants took the clothing from those who had any left and made bandages out of it to alleviate the suffering as much as possible. The men were organized in groups of 50, each with an officer at its head, and it must have been a deeply affecting spectacle to see them, without any tools, simply with dry branches, dig graves for the burial of the dead bodies that were thrown up on the beach, and to hear our priests pray to God to receive the souls of these martyrs to duty.

Among the dead bodies those of Chief Machinist José Melgares and Third-Class Gunner Francisco Martínez Cánovas were identified.

While this work was going on an insurgent appeared on the beach and invited Aznar to go with him and join the men who were at his camp in order not to become prisoners of the Americans. But Aznar, to whom the prospect of falling into the hands of the ferocious Calixto García was by no means pleasing, instead of consenting succeeded in getting the men from the camp who belonged to the crew of the *Oquendo* to come to the beach, which was facilitated by the fact that at 3 o'clock in the afternoon a United States lieutenant had landed with twelve armed men, no doubt at the suggestion of Admiral Cervera, in order to prevent any intervention on the part of the insurgents.

This officer brought with him large quantities of biscuit and cans of meat, which seemed like a blessing from heaven to our half-starved men. The embarkation was not commenced until nightfall, beginning with the wounded, who had to be thrown into the sea and picked up by the boats under the same frightful conditions as their commander had been, with the exception of a few who were placed in a boat which was run up on the beach for that purpose and which had then to be floated again by being pushed off by officers, both Spanish and American, who, the same as all the men, worked with the utmost zeal and energy. The work was continued until late at night, when all had been installed on board the auxiliary steamer *Harvard*. It is to be regretted that the men in charge of the boats of these auxiliary steam-

ers plundered the sailors, filching from these unfortunates whatever articles of value they had about them.¹

The boat carrying the admiral went alongside the yacht *Gloucester*, where we were received with full honors and great respect, passing almost naked in front of the guard which presented arms. When we had all been well fed and attended to as far as possible on that small yacht, the admiral was transferred to the *Louisa*, and the seriously

¹ When I entered the boat with Admiral Cervera my servant handed me in a handkerchief 300 pesos gold and my watch, which he had taken care of, saying that it was safer with me than with him, as they would take it away from him. When I went on board the *Gloucester* I left my jacket in the boat, and the handkerchief with all it contained was stolen from it. While I was lying on a stretcher and attended with unparalleled kindness by Mr. George Lynn, a steward, to whom I shall ever remain grateful, I asked him to look for my jacket, telling him that there was money in it, which they might have eventually if they would only leave me what I needed to telegraph to my family. But not until night was the jacket found, and it was then in an officer's cabin. To recover it (for I had been taken on board entirely naked, wrapped in a sheet) I had to say that they might cut off a sleeve because it was in my way, as I understood that they wanted a souvenir. And as already stated, neither the money nor anything else was left in the pockets.

I mention this incident because, in connection with another of a more serious nature, which also occurred on board the *Gloucester*, it was reported to the superintendent of the hospital at Norfolk. Wholly against my wishes and in spite of my entreaties, the estimable superintendent reported it to his Government and an investigation was instituted, a report of which has since been transmitted to me through diplomatic channels. From this it appears that nothing was found out, although Mr. Lynn's statement says that I had been looking for certain papers to telegraph to my family, as though I had forgotten the address of the house where my wife and children were languishing in the most cruel anxiety.

There is nothing of importance in this incident; it is simply one of those occurrences which are inevitable in any campaign, and it would not deserve the time devoted to it were it not for the pretense of an investigation of even such details, which is far from the actual facts.

NOTE BY O. N. I.—The matter of the alleged loss by Captain Concas of 300 pesos on the board *Gloucester* was investigated by a board ordered by Lieut. Commander Wainwright, consisting of Chief Engineer G. W. McElroy, Lieut. G. H. Norman, and Asst. Engineer A. M. Procter, who reported:

"We do not find from an examination of the evidence adduced that Captain Concas could have sustained any loss aboard the *Gloucester*, aside from the letters, which he stated were not important and which in all probability never came aboard the ship."

It will be noticed that Captain Concas connects the incident referred to "with another of a more serious nature which also occurred on board the *Gloucester*," but does not mention what it is. The incident referred to was the loss of a ring given by Lieutenant Ardurius to one of the officers of the *Gloucester* for safe-keeping. On the arrival of the *Gloucester* north this ring was promptly expressed to Lieutenant Ardurius at the naval hospital at Norfolk. It failed to reach him, due to his departure for Spain and delays in communication. The matter was investigated by the Navy Department, and the ring was subsequently forwarded through official channels to Lieutenant Ardurius in Spain.

wounded to the *Olivette*, an army hospital ship, where we were attended with admirable care by the surgeon, the captain, and the supercargo of that steamer. Personally I owe thanks for many kind attentions to Commander Gustaf Gade, of the Norwegian navy, attaché to the Norwegian legation in the United States, who was at that time discharging the duties of his office in the United States squadron.

Two or three days later we were transferred to the *Solace*, a hospital ship of the Navy, which was under the command of my old friend Mr. Dunlap, who greeted me like an old comrade. Unfortunately the hospital part was in the exclusive charge of Dr. Streets, of whom I regret not to be able to speak in such terms as I should desire, especially as he too was an old acquaintance. He did not show me any of the consideration due to my age, rank, and condition, and if I received the most careful medical attendance, it was due to one of the assistant surgeons, Dr. Stokes. The men were poorly installed, still more poorly fed, ill treated, and even robbed by the nurses, in spite of courteous remonstrances which I made about this matter, in conjunction with the captain of the ship himself. The unfortunate sailors, some of whom died for lack of care, arrived at their destination in a pitiful condition, although I must say that they were given clean clothes the last day before they were landed at the hospital in Norfolk.¹

To be just, however, it should be stated that there was not much preference shown, for it seems to me that the wounded Americans did not receive much better care than our men, nor was the extra time devoted to them which the circumstances required and which so much suffering made necessary. This must appear especially strange, as the number of wounded on both sides was not excessive, and there was on board an abundance of everything, which does honor to those who had organized this service and to the generosity of the country toward those who were to be victims of the war.

Upon our arrival at Norfolk, Va., on July 16, we were taken to the naval hospital. At my request, the commander of the *Solace* accompanied me ashore, in order to obviate the annoyances caused by curiosity. The reception accorded us at the hospital by the medical director, Dr. Cleborne, and his assistant, Dr. Kite, will always constitute one of the pleasantest remembrances of my life.

¹ Lieut. H. W. Harrison, who was a patient on board the *Solace* during the whole period that Captain Concas was on board that vessel, and who is now a staff intelligence officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence, states that Captain Concas and the Spanish officers and sailors were treated with the greatest consideration and afforded every luxury that could be expected under the circumstances; that they repeatedly so expressed themselves to him. He further states that on one occasion Captain Concas took offense at Dr. Streets' reply, when he made a request that the Spanish officers on board be furnished with electric fans. Dr. Street's reply was, "No, there are not enough to go around, and our own people must be supplied first."—O. N. I.

These gentlemen did all in their power to alleviate our physical and mental suffering. They treated us with the greatest kindness, showing us every attention and consideration, keeping from us with great delicacy everything unpleasant, saving us from importunate visitors, admitting those whom they thought we should be pleased to see, and sending at once without our request for a body of Catholic Sisters of Charity. All these attentions were not for me alone, whose rank might have justified some exception, nor for the officers, but for all; every sailor, as well as the captain, found kind brothers in these gentlemen from the first day to the last.

The medical care, the excellent diet, the avoidance of all conversation on the war, and the fact that the doors were closed to reporters were sufficient to further the rapid convalescence of all, especially the men whom the *Solace* had brought in such pitiful condition.

My first interview with Dr. Cleborne is worthy of mention, for no doubt there was between us a bond of sympathy, due to the fact that we had many ideas in common. When he had installed me in magnificent quarters he asked me whether there was anything he could do for me; I answered that he would do me a great favor if he would deliver me from the reporters, and the good doctor almost embraced me in his enthusiasm. I repeat once more, these worthy men of the United States Medical Corps, as physicians, gentlemen, and officers, left absolutely nothing undone. Their families also showed us the most affectionate hospitality and attention. We speak at length on this subject because it is a pleasure to express our gratitude for the favors received.

Unfortunately, the military part at Norfolk was not at the same standard, but affected an indifference which caused some slight trouble and compelled the admiral to go there at the last hour. If he had not done so, there would have been delay in the return of the wounded to the Peninsula.

We do not wish to leave Norfolk without mentioning Mr. Arthur C. Humphreys, who had been our consular agent there and who conducted himself toward us with great chivalry, stating when he came to see us that he had been our consul and that, while he knew his duties as an American, there was nothing to prevent him from being our friend; and such he proved himself indeed, not without some annoyance to himself, which was due to the attitude assumed by the commodore who was in command of that naval station.

We will leave this group of prisoners in the hot climate of Virginia and return to the larger group, which on the night of the 3d was embarked on board the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*.

The officers were well installed and treated kindly by the commander of the former of these two ships, Captain Cotton: but the petty officers and men were crowded together on the deck aft, with nothing to protect them from the burning rays of the sun in daytime and the damp-

ness at night except a thin awning. Owing to the inevitable disorder incident upon eating under these circumstances and the scarcity of water in such a climate the sight was a truly pitiful one, and at the end of a week malaria broke out among those sound and robust men and spread in an alarming degree, causing a number of deaths.

Unfortunately the garrison of this ship did not consist of regular troops, but of semisavage volunteers from the State of Massachusetts, without discipline or training and with all the drawbacks and dangers of new troops of that nature, who have an idea that to be soldiers means to commit brutalities, especially when they can do so without danger, and it was these troops that gave rise to the terrible incident which we are about to relate, and which occurred at 11 o'clock on the night of July 4.

It seems that one of our sailors, suffering from the suffocating heat in that place, rose from the deck and got on top of one of the boxes which were inside of the limit of the space in which they were confined. The sentinel told him in English to go back to his place, which the sailor, of course, did not understand, and without further ceremony the soldier raised his rifle and shot him dead. At the sound of the discharge that mass of wholly defenseless men became excited, the watch came running and, without motive or cause, commenced to fire into that limited space filled with defenseless men, and their officers did nothing to calm the insane terror of those Massachusetts volunteers until the officers of the navy arrived, who were able to put down those cowards carried away by their fear.

Many of the unfortunates jumped into the water, others were wounded and killed—how many it has been impossible to ascertain. A fireman who had jumped overboard and was trying to regain the steamer by mounting the ladder on the side was assassinated by one of the officers of the volunteers, who killed him from the gangway with his revolver. There were 5 dead and 14 wounded on the deck, a comparatively insignificant number in comparison with this horrible incident.

Our officers, who were forward at the opposite end of this large ship, knew nothing of what had occurred until 2 o'clock a. m., when the commander called the senior officer among us and told him about it. By way of reparation the dead were buried with full military honors, as though this were sufficient to make amends for the crime.

The admiral made two energetic complaints about this matter, without any further result than a statement that an investigation would be instituted.¹

The wounded and sick received poor care, not only because their

¹A day or two after the battle of Santiago the *Harvard*, formerly the American liner *New York*, arrived at Siboney with 1,500 men for the army, who disembarked, excepting two squads from the Thirty-fourth Michigan and the Ninth Massachusetts Volunteers which were left on board under charge of the regimental quartermaster to

number was very large, but also on account of the professional zeal of the United States surgeon, who would not permit any help on our part, though well aware that he and his assistant could not possibly attend to everything. The *Harrard* arrived at Portsmouth, N. H., on July 16 with a large number of sick, among them 51 seriously ill with fever.

The contingent from the *St. Louis* had arrived there on the 11th. I copy below a paragraph from a letter which Lieut. Fernando Bruquetas, formerly of the *Teresa*, wrote to me, telling me about my poor crew:

Two or three days after our arrival came the expedition of the *Harrard*, comprising almost the whole of the surviving crew of the *Teresa*. It was about 2 o'clock p. m. when they arrived under a scorching sun, half dead from hunger and thirst. There were not enough of us—officers, surgeons, attendants, and sailors—to carry those who could positively not move to a spot where there was a little shade to give them the first necessary aid. "Water! Water!" was the cry of anguish heard everywhere; but, following medical directions, we gave them only a little water and that hot, according to the condition of each. The majority of these unfortunates remained sick during the whole time, and 31 of them died, though this is due particularly to the ill-treatment they experienced subsequently, as you are aware.

The above is what my worthy officer said. We will now take up again the account of what occurred.

The prisoners were installed on an island in the center of the harbor of Portsmouth, N. H., where a few miserable wooden barracks had been erected and were guarded with great military display, as though the prisoners could have escaped by swimming to Europe.

The immediate chief of the prisoners was a low-born colonel of marine infantry who allowed himself all kinds of indignities toward the officers as well as the men, which was made possible through the weakness of a retired admiral who was in command. The result was that some of the unfortunate sailors, devoured by fever and not even permitted to go to the hospital, died without being given the necessary

look out for stores. On the night of July 3, 637 prisoners from the destroyed vessels of the Spanish fleet were placed on board, under guard of a few marines and the squads of the Michigan and Massachusetts regiments, the two regimental quartermasters and a young marine officer standing watch. About midnight of the 4th, the quartermaster of the Michigan regiment being officer of the day, it appears that there was trouble in keeping the prisoners within the prescribed lines. One of the prisoners climbed on top of a small deck house, where ammunition was stored, and when one of the sentries passed through the prisoners to make him get down they crowded around the sentry with menaces which made him think they were in open attack and he cried for help. The prisoners surged and forced their way past the sentries, knocking some of them down. The guard coming on deck, supposing this was a mutiny, opened fire with the sentries. The sad result has been much deplored by our Government and people, but in view of the circumstances all must see that the action of the guard is one for regret and not for condemnation. A special investigation was made by the War Department and a copy of the report and proceedings were furnished to the Navy Department, and on October 26, 1898, they were forwarded through the proper diplomatic channels to Admiral Cervera.—O. N. I.

assistance. Fortunately, all this came to the knowledge of Admiral Cervera, who obtained permission to visit the prisoners in that locality and at whose instance some of this was reported to the Government at Washington, which immediately relieved the admiral as well as the colonel.¹ Even then the proper conditions of peace were never fully

¹Captain Concas seems to have been incorrectly informed. The following correspondence refers to the subject here mentioned.—O. N. I.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION.

Washington, D. C., August 12, 1898.

SIR: Your attention is invited to the following quotation from a letter addressed to Admiral Cervera by Lieut. Don Antonio Magaz:

"The regulations have been complied with and are being complied with scrupulously, notwithstanding the fact that on two occasions American sergeants have notoriously abused their authority by raising their hands against our sailors, one of the former being on one of the occasions completely intoxicated. I reported these occasions to the officer of the guard, and the latter I also made known to the colonel, who offered to make a proper report, although I am unacquainted with the result; all I know is that said sergeant continues to perform his duties. If justice has not been done, I regret it, for the Americans have conducted themselves so correctly with respect to us."

The Department requests that you make immediately a complete report concerning this matter.

Very respectfully,

A. S. CROWNSHIELD,

Chief of Bureau.

The COMMANDANT, NAVY-YARD, *Portsmouth, N. H.*

MARINE BARRACKS.

Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., August 15, 1898.

SIR: 1. In obedience to the Bureau of Navigation's letter of August 12, 1898 (131968), concerning the striking of certain Spanish prisoners by noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps, I have to report as follows:

2. The only cases reported to me of the kind referred to in the Bureau of Navigation's letter were:

First. That of Corpl. James Barrett, who did not strike a man, but caught him by the neck and shoved him along rather roughly. In his defense Corporal Barrett claims that the prisoner was sullen, insubordinate, and used a threatening manner toward him. I reprimanded Corporal Barrett severely at the time, and afterwards sent him out of the camp and put him on duty at the marine barracks. No report was made to me that Corporal Barrett was under the influence of liquor. At this time Corporal Barrett was acting police sergeant within the stockade.

Second. The case of Private Patterson, who struck a prisoner with a musket while two prisoners were fighting. It was his only means of separating them, as the evidence upon investigation showed. The men were not hurt in any way.

3. I issued an order at that time that no one should strike a prisoner, and that any trouble should be reported to me at once and I would attend to it personally.

4. Almost all the reports made against Spanish prisoners in the camp have been made by the Spanish officers themselves.

5. Lieut. Antonio Magaz some time since objected to my mode of investigation. He said that in Spain when an officer reported a man that ended it. I told him that with us it was different, and that not only were witnesses summoned, but that the accused himself had a right to make a statement.

Very respectfully,

JAMES FORNEY,

Colonel, U. S. M. C., Commanding.

The COMMANDANT, NAVY-YARD, *Portsmouth, N. H.*

reestablished, but at least our physicians and priests were allowed to minister to the men, and Lieut. Antonio Magaz, of the navy, who was the senior officer there, was given proper authority, of which he made use with a tact, skill, and gift of command which many a diplomat might envy.

This is the more to be regretted as we know positively that the orders from the Administration at Washington were very different, and that neither pains nor expense was spared to make us comfortable so that upon our return we might be able to praise the American people. And thus it happened that while the unworthy colonel and some of his subordinates tried in every possible way to inflict hardships on the prisoners, the Administration furnished complete outfits of clothing to all the sailors and subaltern classes. The colonel referred to threw these articles of clothing, or had them thrown, one by one at the prisoners, and where they were hard articles, such as brushes for instance, they were thrown by the men as though firing at targets. They villainously disobeyed, in whole or in part, not only the instructions from the Government, but also the true wish of the American people.

Not wishing to dwell longer upon petty annoyances, although at the time they may be the cause of great suffering, we will now speak of the admiral, commanders, and officers who were taken to Annapolis and installed in the Naval Academy, all the pupils of which were on vacation. They were very well lodged at this place, as nothing had to be improvised and they had only to take possession of the apartments of the absent pupils. Admiral McNair, a very polished gentleman, who, fortunately for us, had been placed at the head of this establishment, pursued—in conformity with the orders of the Government, and furnishing an example to all—a proper and highly commendable course, which was equaled by that of the no less praiseworthy Dr. Cleborne, of Norfolk. The whole personnel, from the Admiral down to the last midshipman, deserve the highest praise.

In different ways, and sooner or later, all of our captains and officers were permitted to go out on parole from 8 o'clock in the morning until sunset, and it is a pity that the Government of the United States detracted from the merit of its conduct, to no purpose whatever, by establishing an inspection of our private correspondence, which could reveal no greater secrets than those furnished by the newspapers; and this was the more ridiculous and futile because, from the moment we went out and were able to post our own letters, all those of us whose correspondence might have contained something of importance wrote without the least interference, by way of England or France, where we had plenty of friends to whom such letters could be sent.

Thus the treatment we received in the United States was on the whole as humanitarian as possible, with the exception of the unworthy

colonel to whom we have referred, who is the only one of whom the Appendix to the Report of the Navy Department for 1898 makes mention in terms which are entirely incorrect. The treatment was especially kind on the part of the Government, whose orders, we repeat, we are sure were decisive to the effect that we should be well cared for, and it furthered this end with true generosity. But as to the dithyrambs on this subject in which the Americans themselves indulged, that old Europe might learn how prisoners were treated in civilized countries, there is much to be said; for comparing the treatment we received with that of Spain's Chilean prisoners in 1866-67, when the whole Peninsula was given to the officers for a prison, and allowances assigned to them that they might live as they desired; when those who asked to go to the Paris Exposition were permitted to do so on parole, while no one troubled himself as to whether they wrote to their children or to their grandmothers, we find that there is a difference between the treatment of prisoners by the civilizations of the Old World and that which we received in the United States, and that it is the latter who still have much to learn.

We are not complaining, far from it. We only wish to correct their exaggerated self-praise, which if it were not ridiculous would be insupportable on the part of the United States, where it never occurs to any one to ask if one likes a thing or not, but the classic "What do you admire more?" These exaggerations were the more insupportable since in this case they went so far as to take for history Zola's *Débâcle*, in which, although there is doubtless much that is true, for the great mass of prisoners makes the best intentions impossible, the innuendoes were against Germany, whose sympathy for us stirred up all the *jingoes* as well as those who were not.

The people in general could not have treated us better, and a great many persons showed us minor attentions; for instance, in accordance with the habit of that country, all the commanders received hundreds of letters from all classes of society, including the ladies, the greater part of which contained expressions of sympathy and disapprobation of the war, even those from many Protestant clergymen, while Admiral Cervera received not hundreds but thousands of letters and telegrams sent with the same object. These attentions were naturally accompanied by visits, during which expressions of courtesy were exchanged. Distorted versions of these appeared in the papers afterwards, attributing to both sides opinions they had never expressed, but which sounded fine to the American people, who constitute, as it were, a great mutual admiration society. But those civilities, which had no special significance in that country, and which all Americans understand, gave rise in Spain to very unfavorable comments against the admiral, for here also there are masters in the art of distorting facts, especially when there is something to be gained by so doing.

Fortunately it has come to the notice of no one, *and we mention it to-day with the greatest reserve*, that in consequence of my having one day remarked that I liked flowers a number of the ladies of Norfolk, who had already taken upon themselves the charitable mission of providing me with books, added that of making my room a veritable garden, without my thinking at the time that in consequence of this I was guilty of an act of high treason, or that my servant was when, to my great regret, he ate the ices which usually accompanied the flowers, as my serious condition did not permit me to relieve him of this task.

It seems impossible that serious-minded men in Spain should have given value and support to such newspaper stories from America, but, rightly regarded, this circumstance does have value, inasmuch as it shows the insignificance of those who talk thus, without, however, depriving themselves of the pleasure of being present at the opera on the very days of our two great naval disasters.

The hour of peace arrived, and the consequent return to Spain, and, although the three groups of prisoners were now suffering no hardship except the moral effect of their position, our eagerness to see ourselves once more free made the hours which separated us from liberty seem very long. To my amazement, and while various contested points were still under discussion, I saw with my own eyes, in the hands of the highest authority at Portsmouth, a telegram from the Secretary of the Navy, in which it was stated that the difficulties in the way of our liberty proceeded from Sagasta's cabinet.

Finally, after the unavoidable formalities had been disposed of, the arrangements for our return were completed, and a committee, appointed by Admiral Cervera and presided over by Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar, chartered the steamer *City of Rome*, which, after picking up at New York the prisoners from Annapolis and Norfolk, went to Portsmouth for the crews, and on the 13th of September the shores of the continent which Columbus had discovered, in an evil hour for Spain, faded from our view.

Where was the *City of Rome* to go? The admiral requested that we be permitted to go to some maritime departamento, and this is what all would have desired, as there were hospitals there in which immediate attention could be given to the many sick we had with us, and especially to the wounded, many of whom were not yet able to move. Moreover, at a departamento at least a third of the men could have been furloughed to go home, and almost all the officers, even if they had no families, would at least have friends and places where they could find a home. The steamer could have gone to Cádiz and Ferrol without increase of expense, but, as the Sagasta cabinet feared an ovation in each of the said departamentos, the ship was sent to Santander, whose hospitals were crowded with sick soldiers, and from where the

men had to be sent to the departamentos in military trains, at enormous expense and with the prolongation of the sufferings of the unfortunate sick and wounded, who did not want to be separated from their companions.

We arrived at Santander on the 21st of September, and one of the pleasantest experiences of our lives awaited us there. The first auxiliary steamer which arrived alongside brought a committee presided over by two admirals and consisting of 43 commanders and officers from all the corps of the navy, who came to express to us approbation of our conduct, of which they, better than anyone else, were able to judge. Their presence, their patriotic words of comradeship and counsel, and the messages sent by all the officers of the Armada were the most perfect balm to the aching hearts of all, from the admiral to the last sailor. And I must state for their honor and our own satisfaction that the Government did all it could to prevent this manifestation, and while it did not go so far as to oppose it openly it at least succeeded in depriving it of all significance.

This was the last public act in connection with our imprisonment, and it is not expedient for any one of us who know the details to state at this time how much was done to prevent these things being spoken or written about when the Spanish people were actually thirsting to know the truth, and not even to-day, perhaps, would it be possible to make the account any more complete than we have done because a number of proceedings and documents are not public property. And therefore, since "If a person does not find consolation it is because he does not seek it" (Spanish proverb), we are confident that if some day it occurs to someone to reply to this book these documents so carefully hidden away will become a magnificent theme for a patriotic panegyric.

CHAPTER XIII.

If Spain were as well served by her statesmen and public officials as she is by her sailors she might yet be a great country.—*The Spanish-American War, Engineering, July 21, 1899, p. 65.*

We will here close the description of the events in which we have taken an active part, which description we have given with the restrictions imposed by the recency of these occurrences, but also with the right to legitimate defense, which the country itself demands of us, and against the interested silence which those who have been the cause of all our misfortunes would like to impose upon us with an injustice for which we can only find compensation in the above lines of a European review of great weight, which, in commenting upon the opinions sustained on the subject of the disaster, makes outside of Spain a statement which history will make in our own country perhaps long before we dare hope for it.

The war was accepted by Spain when the island of Cuba was virtually lost, when in the Peninsula the sending out of one more man threatened an uprising more serious than any previous one, when our troops lacked the most indispensable necessities, when the arrears of pay were the principal cause of the inadequate nourishment and consequent deterioration, and when the greater part of the Spanish residents of Cuba, under the designation of reformers, autonomists, &c., made common cause with the insurgents while deriving fabulous profits from contracts for supplies and transports.

Under these circumstances it was madness on our part to accept a conflict with an immensely wealthy nation, having a population four times as large as ours and situated at a gunshot's distance from the future battlefield of its military aspirations, possessing an army and a navy anxious for easy victories to raise themselves in estimation and importance and acquire a place which they had not hitherto occupied in their country, and, in order to attain this, promoting that preeminently American spirit of hostility against Europe; a country in which every white man is the descendant of an immigrant and where every immigrant looks with grim envy upon the history of his native land, from which he believes himself excluded by privileges, by lack of prestige, or by fancies derived from novels, perhaps, which do not

acknowledge the all too prosaic truth that when a man emigrates it is simply because he does not have a dollar. Among the people of the United States the desire to make history stands above every other consideration, and we have been incredibly stupid when we offered it to them gratis and at our own expense.

When the war commenced the outcome was, as a matter of fact, already decided, even if a less powerful nation than the United States had taken part against us. Subsequent results only would have been different; we should probably not have suffered the loss, for the present at least, of the Philippines. That the island of Cuba was lost and would have to be conquered back and that it was impossible for us to do so was well known in Spain from the very beginning.

When nations go along without a political objective it does not make much difference whether their generals win battles or lose them; the latter is perhaps even preferable, because the solution is thus arrived at more promptly. It was because we had a political objective, even though we went from one defeat to another, that we succeeded in ejecting the invader from Spain at the beginning of the present century. It is thanks to her political objective that Italy has become a great nation, in spite of her lack of success in the battlefield. A nation only need show its determination to make an energetic resistance in order to weaken the tenacity of the aggressor, whose political ideal can never be as firm as that represented by a people with its army and statesmen who know how to fulfill their exalted missions. Sometimes a military genius, supported by revolutionary ideas like those which marked the last years of the previous century, may temporarily rule over all Europe; but when the armies and the people unite in a political ideal, all they need, even after a hundred defeats, is one successful encounter to send the victor to St. Helena.

Did Spain have a political objective, a policy, during the historical moments of which we are speaking?

Future generations will hardly believe it possible that the recent events actually occurred. The war was not desired, and yet nothing was done to ward it off. Peace was desired, but nothing was done to preserve it. With a loud voice our statesmen declared that they wanted peace at any cost, and yet they wanted it to cost nothing. They were well aware that the lack of men in the field had commenced to be felt, that the people complained of the redemption from service by purchase, and that it would be impossible to send any considerable contingent of troops to Cuba; but no thought was taken of what was to be done when it should become necessary to send such a contingent. Yellow fever, typhoid, and anæmia were rapidly decimating the contingent of our forces in Cuba, and nobody thought of who was to carry the guns when they were dropped by the soldiers who were taken to the hospital or the cemetery. The debt increased fabulously. Medieval

means were resorted to and fraudulent money was coined, for silver money deserves no other name. And still the pay of the troops was ever a year in arrears, and the poverty of the country increased the privations of all classes of people, and no solution was sought, except by criminal procrastination, of the problem as to what our forces on land and sea were to live on the following month. The conflict had become inevitable, and the country was assured that our relations were cordial and that there was no cause for alarm. It was well known that our proud enemy was making preparations, and we were not even permitted to think of what was to be done when the aggression should become a fact. Long before the beginning of the war it was decided to send the squadron to the West Indies, but only to recall it when the war broke out. There was some thought of concluding peace, and the only point on which any energy was shown was that the squadron should go out to certain destruction, and thus leave Spain wholly at the mercy of the enemy. When the squadron had been destroyed and when the whole world knew that there was no help for us, valuable time was lost, and Santiago and Manila fell, while absolutely nothing was done in the meantime.

Instead of making terms while the squadron was yet intact at Santiago, and when that city and Manila could keep up the defense for some time, they waited until all was lost, although they knew beforehand that all must thus be lost.

In this whole period may be seen the "to-morrow" which never arrives, for there is no to-morrow for him who loses his life to-day. Miracles do not descend from heaven to change the face of the earth upon the wish of an impossibility.

The political idea which ruled our destinies was one fearful denial, and by denials nothing can be attained. Was the object of our policy war?—No. Was it peace?—No. Resistance?—No. The relinquishment of Cuba?—No. Was it determination to defend ourselves?—Not either. To allow ourselves to be killed?—Still less. Was it believed that Cervera would be victorious in the West Indies?—No. Was it believed that he would be defeated?—No. Would he be believed from his command on account of his opposition to everything that was being done?—No. Finally, did we want battles?—No, a thousand times no. For we have been assured, though we have not been able to ascertain the source of the statement, that it was believed true in Madrid that Señor Moret, minister of colonies, had said that the war would not be of any importance, because as soon as the Americans had sunk three or four of our ships peace would be concluded. We recommend Señor Moret's theory to the statesmen of the great nations of Europe as something truly novel.

The only thing that comforts us is the fact that our brothers, the Cubans, and let us also call the Filipinos by that name, do not give

the lie to their race nor their education; for both believed that the United States was working solely *for love*, as subsequent events have demonstrated.

It may be said that all this is already a matter of history, although the wounds of all who feel themselves Spanish are still shedding blood, and their eyes tears; and if history teaches, will this history teach the Spanish? We do not dare hope so. The historically hostile attitude of the country toward the navy, the situation of our capital, the Mohammedan indifference of the nation regarding its international relations, due perhaps to the disenchantment of the policies of the houses of Austria and Bourbon, and the necessity, brought about by our disturbances, of withdrawing within ourselves—all these cause the ministries of state and navy, which in all civilized countries form the axis upon which rests their prosperity, to be in our country like two islands lost in the mist of indifference, of which public opinion takes no thought and which never excite the enthusiasm of the people except to destroy them.

It is, therefore, useless for us to think of alliances, of relations with other nations, of mutual guarantees which at least would render the ambitions of the powerful dangerous.

It is likewise useless to think of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo boats if, when the crisis comes, we are not permitted to make the least preparation for war, and if our ships are to be scattered over the whole world, as though the policy of the country sought in its own destruction the prompt solution of conflicts, which must always come in the nature of surprises in a country that has no international policy, and as the result our nationality goes to pieces.

It is useless also for us to have diplomats if they are not to be listened to and if, when they announce a storm threatening the country, they are to be treated with disdain as though they were making an unnecessary fuss about nothing. It is useless to send to these diplomats high-sounding documents, which in our country are the remedy for everything, instead of sending them battleships, which is the medicine employed by other nations, especially the most advanced, which by such arguments open markets for their products and take possession of archipelagoes owned by others, for no other reason than that *they have in a Christian and generous manner civilized* the Indian tribes of their country.

It was in vain that the navy in 1884 predicted the double cyclone that menaced Spain, in the Gulf of Mexico on the one hand, and in the Empire of the Rising Sun on the other, and that it urged the necessity of completing the fleet inside of four years. If that had been done the war would have been obviated, as our naval forces obviated it in 1870 at Habana, where they were efficiently represented by General Caballero de Rodas, Governor-General of the island of

Cuba, on the occasion of a visit similar to that of the *Maine*. It was in vain also that day after day, and step by step, the navy pointed out the recent danger, in every tone of voice, from every quarter, even as late as the eve of the disaster, July 2, 1898. And when the catastrophe came, the rôles were changed by the brutal law of the majority, and those who had refused to read and to listen proclaimed themselves fully informed and brought charges of ignorance and imprudence against us who had hazarded our very heads and reputations to declare officially and with the utmost energy that we ought not to go to war and that, if the squadron went to the West Indies, Spain would be left to the mercy of the enemy. And in view of this brutal law of the majority, who know nothing about the world in which they live and who drag the country to an abyss, at the bottom of which it will be dashed to pieces, it is useless to expect consideration, and still less justice. For the solace of our own consciences, even, we have to turn our eyes sadly to foreign countries to read, among others, in the foremost engineering review of the world, in an article on the Spanish-American War, these words: "*If Spain were as well served by her statesmen and public officials as she is by her sailors she might yet be a great country.*"





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