

1500-2-1

辯護圖書類

三三三〇四七N-11

Translation
STATE, Kihai

Chadley Yoshida

旗
守
紀
斗

司令官書翰

米田 子文

亞米利加合衆國海軍艦隊

亞米利加合衆國軍艦 旗艦

海上ニ於テ

一九四〇年九月十二日

海軍大臣爲シ

覚書

以下ノ事

主官ニ就テ知ラントシテ

艦船ニ就テノ事

助
力
カ
シ
テ

吾人ガ
議
論
ニ
對
シ
テ
請
書
ヲ
送
リ
テ

提出
サレタ

一人員

(イ) 將校

(1) ~~...~~ 拔擢昇進が從來考案サレタ中テ最良ノ方法。
~~...~~

(2) 乗員ノ事情ニシテ適当ナル ~~...~~ 時ハ連 ~~...~~

二航海勤務ヲ許可サルハナコト

(1) ~~...~~ 合ニヨル変更ヲ必要トスル

(1) 海上勤務 指定 能力ヲ基礎トスベキコト

最モ有望ナル士官ハ其 ~~...~~ 優先 ~~...~~ 權ヲ附セ

ナルヘキコト。コノ結果將校ヲ最有望及最劣等即チA表
及B表ノ二種ニ分ワコトニナロウ。

(2) 身体的不能ニ因ル退役及ヒ 身体的不適格者

現役勤務 ~~...~~ 退職及ヒ 退役 ~~...~~ 遅延

此由ハ是正サルハキコト

(D) 徴集兵員

徴集(兵員) 五月二十三日ヨリ八月十五日間ニ於テ

Translated by
HATATE

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HATATE

一、二、三、四、九名ヲ増員サレ^{タカ}也 太平洋ニ於ケル

艦隊ハ僅クニ六〇〇ノ実益ヲ獲タニ過キ又。

我カ方ノ 資材ニ対スル 巨額ノ費用ハ 迅速且^{釣合ノトシ}捕

人員・抗張ヲ^{ニナイ}限リ 無^シシト^ス

(D)

訓練所ノ隘路^ハ 新兵^{受入} 率ヲ制限

スルカラ 除去セネバナラヌ。

即刻撤去スルナラヌ 然レテ緊急抗張

不足額補充

道^ハ 金ヲ待ツコトナラ 又今 開始^{セネバナラヌ}

カ^カ 器材ノ 抗張準備ニ際シ、^{特定ノ}

是^ヲ 待タナカ^ク 何故ニ吾人ハ人員^{一層緊要トモイフベキ}

問題

新^機 場^ヲ 設^ク

ヲ準備スルコト

取^ニ 吾人ノ有^ル 及^ビ 訓練^員 準備

且^チ 吾人ノ有^ル 及^ビ 訓練^員 準備

且^チ 吾人ノ有^ル 及^ビ 訓練^員 準備

且^チ 吾人ノ有^ル 及^ビ 訓練^員 準備

之ヲ為セントシナイカノ理由ヲ

又ハ快~~ク~~ハ~~シ~~レ~~ル~~艦隊ニ~~對~~シテ諒解~~ヲ~~スル~~ハ~~セ~~レ~~キ

又ハ説明~~ハ~~スルコトハ困難~~ナ~~余ハ~~新~~式

軍艦ノ要員ヲ任セザル所要期間ヲ四年間

ト推算ス。貴下ハ此ノ訓練ヲ~~即~~時開始スルノ

必要~~ナ~~ト~~シ~~テ~~ハ~~即時~~ニ~~諒解~~ヲ~~スル~~ハ~~セ~~レ~~キ

(ハ) 分~~離~~セル航空部隊

(イ) 若シ總~~ヲ~~海軍部隊~~ト~~シテ~~ハ~~一體ノ海軍~~ト~~シテ~~ハ~~密接

ニ結束~~ヲ~~繼續~~シ~~テ~~ハ~~行クナラバ~~ハ~~我が海軍

航空~~ニ~~對シテ~~ハ~~他ノ海軍~~ニ~~對シテ~~ハ~~間ニハ

ヨリ高度ノ協力が存在スルデアラウ事ハ

疑~~ハ~~マ~~テ~~モ~~ナ~~ク~~シ~~。

Translated by
HATATE

(ロ)

航空部隊 海軍 対テヨリモムシロ部隊ニ

ラ分離シテ置クト

部

忠義ヲ~~示~~マウトスル様ナ気暉ヤ部隊ト他ノ海軍

ト同ノ快活ヤ補給、~~兼~~負、管理~~兼~~同キ

ニ関スル

多ク、~~面~~倒ナ~~損~~同題、~~就~~中、能率上ノ重大ナ損失が生ズルニ

キマツテナル。~~非~~常ニ~~指~~掌~~ノ~~存在

(二)

海軍航空部隊~~ノ~~創設スルコトカラ海軍又ハ國家ニ何ノ利益モ

齎スモノデナイト~~ハ~~知ソテナル

三 器材

(イ) 水上艦船

(イ) 新~~ノ~~建造ハ出来ル~~テ~~促進サレテナルト余~~ハ~~信~~ス~~シテナル

水雷敷設艦カ大西洋岸ニ必要ナル

(ロ)

航空機

(イ) 外國ノ註文並ニ我が國ノ需要トニ依ッテ複雑化サレタ此ノ

1)

分野ニ於ケル大擴張。販賣用又ハ訓練用航空機ハ

南洋ニ於テハ外國ニ注スルニシテ、^若艦隊ハ、^若飛行機ハ、^若航空機ハ

孰レモ、
トモ又訓練用航空機ハ、
現役艦隊ノ損失ガ

得ラルベキモノデハナイ。

一得、
艦隊機ハ、^若早ク、^若新機

ト取り替ヘラレ、

休業ノモトニ、^若ネバナラヌ。然レ、^若古い飛行機ハ、^若新機ノガ

年ニ入ル迄ハ、^若離コチハ、^若出来ヌ。

年ニ入ル迄ハ、^若離コチハ、^若出来ヌ。

(ハ) 彈藥

(1) 防空彈藥トシテ、
可能ナル最大限ノ豫備ヲ貯藏セヨ

トシテ、
最大限ノ貯藏



四 作戰

(1) ハワイ水域
艦隊備蓄メルコト

(1) 純然タル海軍的見地カラ、
此ノ水域ニ艦隊ヲ

留メテ、

トシテ、
オク、^若ニハ、^若多クノ利益ガアル、^若ソノ數

莫ハ即チ、

2)

(一) 非組員、軍需品、及び補給品 ~~其~~ 運搬 ~~に~~

~~其~~ 困難、降延、及費用、~~其~~ ムコト、

(二) 安全度ニ欠陥ガアル為、~~其~~ ハイナシガ作戦、
~~其~~ 投錨地

トシテ、~~其~~ 不直者ナルコト

(三) ~~其~~ 大艦、
~~其~~ 入港、碇泊、名港

ノ困難ガアル為、~~其~~ 眞珠湾ガ作戦、
~~其~~ 投錨地トシテ、~~其~~ 不直者ナルコト、

(四) 空中 ~~其~~ 水面、
~~其~~ 兵ニ作戦区域、
~~其~~ 混組ニ且制限サセテナルコト

(五) ~~其~~ 艦隊、勤務、訓練、保養、及び収容等ニ対シ

施設不充分、
~~其~~ ムコト

(六) 將校 ~~其~~ 兵、
~~其~~ 非組員 ~~其~~ 平時ニ陸 ~~其~~ ムコト、
~~其~~ 本國

長ク離レテキチガ為、~~其~~ 道徳ニ悪影響アリト

日、

(7) 戦事ノ際、艦隊カ、西岸、勤員港ニ

戻リ

的ナ、

~~帰着~~ ~~し~~ ~~た~~ ~~中~~ 又ハ ~~部~~ ~~分~~ ~~林~~ ~~目~~ 編輯サレ

テキナイ ~~指~~ ~~置~~ ~~ラ~~ ~~受~~ ~~ケ~~ ~~ル~~ ~~必~~ ~~要~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~ア~~ ~~リ~~ ~~之~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~ト~~
世 ~~動~~ ~~員~~ ~~半~~ ~~段~~ ~~下~~ ~~権~~ ~~者~~ ~~タ~~ ~~レ~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~キ~~ ~~カ~~ ~~混~~ ~~乱~~ ~~ナ~~ ~~リ~~ ~~ト~~

時間ノ純損失ヲ招ク結果トナルコト

正味 ~~外~~ ~~川~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~失~~ ~~フ~~ ~~コ~~ ~~ト~~ ~~ナ~~ ~~リ~~ ~~ト~~

4)

Translated by T. Kawamura

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(四) 若シ艦隊ノ處理ガ海軍ニコソテハ決定サレルヲバ、艦隊

トテノ考慮

其ノ

正常

ベキテアル

大部分ハ再々太平洋岸ノ基地ニ帰ルルヤ

何トナレバ

其ノ處ヲ根據トスレバ訓練ニモ亦戦争ニ対

宜シ

スル準備ニモ便アルカラテアル

純然然的要素

(五) 若シ海軍ノ要因以外ノ要因ガ現在艦隊

カ何處ヲ根據地トナスベキカトイフニトモ關スル決定ニ

及ボスモノデアレバ

的要素也

影響ヲ與ヘルハ海軍ノ要因トシテ

提出シテソノ決定ガ艦隊ノ準備ニ及ボスヤ

即應

スコトアルベキ

ハ悉ク提出サレ慎重ニ考テラレベキデアル

影響ヲ與ヘルハ同時ニ海軍ノ要因トモ

案ニ考テセラルベキナル。換言スレバ艦隊ノ大部分ヲ

ノ正常基地

太平洋岸ニ根據サセテ如何ニ水域ニ於テ戰

闘

容易ニ

ハワイ水域ニ艦隊ヲ根據サセルコトヨリ

対シテモ準備ガ出来ルヤウニスルニトヨリモ太平洋ニ於ケル外交陣

スコトアルベキ

強シク與ヘヤウト大切ナノデアラウカ

(一)

(二) 若シ太平洋岸ノ他ノ國家ト我が國トノ關係が悪化スレバ

ノカノ動キハ何デアルト

國務省ハ我々ノ次々如何キ動キヲモテハルニ考ヘルカ。

艦隊ハハワイウラ直接ニ戰場ニ開戦シ得トカ或

國務省ハ艦隊ガ直チニ動員サレ且我々ノ太平洋

平洋岸ノ^{正當}基地ヨリモ敵ノ^{水艦}基地ニ二千哩近イ

全^全錨地カラ

ライナニ於ケル不安ヲ~~維持~~シ必要ナ訓練ヲ

安全一行ヲコトガ出来ルト信ズルノタラウカ。

五、海岸施設

余

(イ) ~~ハ~~ 海岸施設ノ^{ノ占ムル地位}カ餘リニサレ過ギル

(貴下ガ)

コノナイ様^断ヘズ警戒セラレニコトヲ~~サ~~オ~~ト~~希望

スル。ソレハ唯一ノ目的ヲ有ラテ居ルニ過ギナイ即チ

其ハ其自身カテ

戦艦隊ノ^周維持又擴充デアル。

敵ヲ破碎出来んモノヲハナイ。ワシントンニ居ル~~兼~~

(特ニ參謀部隊)

↑~~ノ~~現役艦隊カラ^離スツト以前ニ~~平~~人々

(一) ~~海軍ノ~~ ^{公表} 公表 (即ち) 委員會ニ於ケル 審議、
 實際所總テノ海軍ノ軍傳事項ハ 委員會ニ於ケル 審議、
 實ニ於ケル演說又海軍省カラノ發表ハ ^{文書}
 次ノ觀念ノ中ノ一ツ或ハソレ以上ヲ強調ニテ來テ居ル。

(六) 海軍ノ軍傳事項 ^{公表}

(イ) 海軍ハ防衛ヲ為ニ設ケラレテ居ル。
 (ロ) 所謂 ^{充カナ} 通書 海軍ハ我々が戦争ヲシナイテ済
 ム様ニスルモノデアル。
 (ハ) ^{充カナ} 通書 海軍が在レバ、我々ハ戦争ニ捲キ込マレル
 危險無シニ ^{カ餘} 地球上ノ 國家ニ 我々ノ意志
 ヲ押ツケルコトが出来ル。

(ニ) 不幸ニテ戦争が起レバ、艦隊ハ ^{一種} 可動性アルマシノ給ル
 危險無シニ 地球上ノ 國家ニ 我々ノ意志
 ヲ押ツケルコトが出来ル。

(三) 不幸ニテ戦争が起レバ、艦隊ハ ^{一種} 可動性アルマシノ給ル

ノ様ナモノテ、ソノ後方ニ於テ國民ハ、自分等ノ子孫カ

他日海軍ニソノ償ヲスルトイフ約束スルガケテソノ外

(國家ニ対スル)

何等ノ義務モナク平穩ニ暮ヌコトガ出来ん。

完全ニ充員シ

by J. Kusano

(本) 陸隊ハ一ノ兵ヲ充員シ 完全ニ訓練サレ

即ち 戦ヲ用意カ出来テ居ル

(ハ) 海軍ノ比較的ナ實力ハ現在ノ物質的

ナ物ニ依リテ計ラレシ

(ト) 航空ハ必要ナ防禦手段アリ又多數ノ

飛行機ト操縦士ハ國家ヲ安全ナラシメル

(四) 遠隔ノ海軍基地及ヒ飛行場ハソレ自身

防禦ノ武器アリ

ニテ護ル安全

前記ノ宣傳採式ハ國民ヲ知マシメテ

感ニ陥レル思ハルヲ以テ 閣下ニテ平ル

ソレハ水事ニ短イ予告

ヲ戰事ニ引キ入レラシムカズ知レテ一國ニ於テ國民ノ

實際ニ

精神的事業ヲ弱クシ 不健全ナ國民士氣ヲ作り出シ

馬ノ 軍隊比較的時間ニ戰事ニ捲キ込メシムカ

又知レテ一國民ノ兩ツ方ニ危險ヲクシテ戰事ヲ賭ス

ルニトカ出来んトカ危險ヲクシ 戰事ヲ行フニトカ出来んト

教ヘラシ

其中心ニトハ、斯ル概念ガ必例的ニ導ク、ソノ戦争

ノ決然タル遂行ニ致命的ナ言ヲ及ボスコアラウ。現

佛蘭西

戦争ノ前ニ、日英人及ヒ英国人ハ印度コウ云フ

事ヘン持ツテ居ッタ、ソレヲ現至ノ如キ結果ヲ求メテ居ン

七、行政、國防、陸軍、海軍、同ノ協力

(イ) 二者ナリヤ不マハ別トシ、私ハ右、政府各都同ノ

共働

調整ト相互了解ガ効果的ナ活動ニ必要ナ程密接

ナリテ探ニ感ヒラシメナラナイ。

(ロ) 艦隊若クハソノ部隊ノ配置及ヒ行動ニ関スル決

定ニ至ル前ニ、海軍者ガ相談ヲ要スルカ、ソノ意見ガ

寧直ニ力強ク表明セタカ、ソノ主張ガ充分了解セシキ

意ヲタカク。

(ハ) ~~現至ノ政策ハ、~~ 経済的午後、建設全上ノ本質

大

艦的海軍、又ハ是ノ不足分ヲ現存艦隊ニ依リ支持

配置

的意志表示

他

サレタ外交(其)は(依り)我方ノ意志ヲ(其)ノ太平洋

國家ニ接セントスル方向ニ向ケラレテ居ル採ニ見奉レラレル

ハ爲シ得ルコトカ、

ニ於テ、

之ヲ成功シ得ルハ、又其コトハ、若シ成功セザル場合戦争

若クハ必然的ノ威信ノ失墜ニ迫ラスル申意カアルカ。

斯ル戦争ノ目的ガ公認化サレテ居ルカ、ソノ野申ハ考

犧牲

慮サレテ居ルカ、勝利ノ價値ト比較サレテ居ルカ、斯

ル戦争ガ防禦手段ニ依リ、或ハ海軍ハ唯防禦ノ

目的ノ存在スルト信ジ、又國民ノ國家ニ對スル義

ル標ニ教ヘ入コトヲ

務ノ凡テハ、健全ノ支拂ニ依テテ果シ得んト信ジテハ、

國民ニ依テテ勝テ得んカ。

樹立

(二) (d) 司令長官ハ國家ノ軍力ニハ責任ハナシガ、政

府ノ目的ガ外交手段ヲ達セシメナリ場合、國軍ヲ施行

スルガ政府ガ期待ノカケテ居ル片腕ノ有能性ニ付テハ

確然トシテ責任カアル。艦隊ノ實力ト純率ガ太平洋

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ニ於テハ 政府ノ侵略政策ト 釣合ヲ成ルカドウカ

問題ニ付キ 司令官ハ 閣下ヲ持ク 不心ナラヌ。若シ此ノ

政策ガ 遂行 ヲ 要求スルニ アラウト 云フ 可能性ノ 有

ル 場合ハ 特ニ 考ヘリ 可ク。

Translated by S. S. CHIA

(*) (H)

歐州、政府ニ請願シテ、自標カ

定トシテ、計畫カ樹ヲシテ居ルカ。

自標ニ對シテ、半分参加シ、半分ハ局外ニ在ル。

決意テ、長ク居ル事出来ナシ。

決定シテ、自標ヤ、計畫カ樹ヲシテ居ルヘキデアル。

ソレテ、自標カ、本據物ニ在ルカ、其ノ前ニ在ルカ、

自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

又、自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

ハ、自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

自標カ、自標ニ在ルカ、自標ニ在ルカ、

司令長官書類級

番号

亜米利加合衆国艦隊

亜米利加合衆国軍艦複艦「エリタイプライス」号

海上に於て

一九四〇年九月十二日

海軍大臣ノ為ニ覽書

以下ノ覽書ハ士官ニ對シテ知ラントシ又艦船ニ就イテ學バントシ艦隊戰ヲ準備ヲ援助シ得ルヲ存テ發見セントスル貴下ノ希望ニ副ハント努力シテ吾人ノ議論レル諸兵員ニ提メサレタモノデアル

人員

一將校

(1) 技擢昇進ハ從來考案サレタ中ニ最良ノ方法

(2) 兼領ハ予情ニシテ適當ナル時ハ連續的ニ航海勤務ヲ許可サルベキコト(議令ニヨル変更ヲ必要トスル)

(3) 海上勤務指定ハ能力ヲ基礎トスルコト最モ有望ナル士官ハ優先權ヲ附與サルベキコトコノ結果將校ヲ最有望及最劣等即チA表及B表ノ二種ニ分ソコトニナラズ

(4) 身体的不能ニ因ル退役ノ濫用及ビ身体的不通格者現役勤務ヲ持續スルハ是正サルベキコト

(5) 兵員

(1) 兵員兵力五月二十三日ヨリ八月十五日間於テ一三四九名ヲ増員サレタカ太平洋ニ於ケル艦隊ハ僅カニ六〇〇ノ実益ヲ獲タニ過ぎ我カテノ資料ニ對スル巨額ノ費用ハ迅速且鈞令ノトシタ人員擴張ヲレナイ限り無益トナルデアロウ

(2) 訓練所ノ隘路ハ新兵受入率ヲ制限スルカラ即刻除去セズハナラヌ然レテ緊急ニ擴張ハ不足額補充金ヲ待

ソコナク、天今開始セバナラヌ。吾人ニ器材、擴張準備ニ際シ、特定ノ經費ヲ待タカク。何故ニ吾人ハ一層緊要トモイフキ人員ノ問題(既ニ吾人ノ有スルモノヲ準備スルコト及ビ新構成ニ対シ人員ヲ訓練スルコトノ緊急ナル必要ヲモ含意)ニ等シク直接且有効ナル行動ヲ以テ対処スルコトが出来ヌ。又之ヲ爲サントシナイカノ理由ヲ艦隊ニ諒解セシメ、又ハ説明スルコトハ困難デアル。余ハ新式軍艦ノ要員ヲ任上カル所要期間ヲ四年間ト推算スル。責下ハ此ノ訓練ヲ即時開始スルノ必要ヲ諒解出来ヨウ。

ハ) 分離セル航空部隊

(1) 若シ總ヘテノ海軍部隊カ一作ノ海軍トシテ密接ニ結果ヲ繼續シテ行クナラバ我カ海軍航空部隊ト他ノ海軍部隊ノ間ニハヨリ高度ノ協力カ存在スル下ニヨリ疑ヲマテモ、航空部隊ヲ分離シテ置クト、海軍ニ対シテヨリモムレハ部隊ニ忠勤ヲ勵マラトスル様ナ氣運ヤ、部隊ト他ノ海軍トノ間ノ嫉妬ヤ補給人員ノ管理ニ関スル面倒ナ多ク、問題就中、能率上、重大ナ損失カ生ズルニキマツテナル。

(2) 海軍航空部隊ヲ創設スルコトカラ海軍又ハ國家ニ何ノ利益モ齎スモノテナイト云々ヨリ余ハ知ツテナル。

三) 器材

イ) 水上艦船

(1) 新建造ハ出来ルケ促進サレテナルト余ハ信シテナル。水雷敷設艦カ大西洋岸ニ必要デアル。

ロ) 航空機

(1) 外國ノ諺文並ニ我カ國ノ需要トニ依ッテ複雑化セシク此ノ分野ニ於ケル大擴張販賣用又ハ訓練用航空機ハ孰レモ現役艦隊ノ犠牲ニ於テ得ラルベキモノトハナイ艦隊機ハ未ルル早ク新レイ機ト取り替ヘラレネバラス。然レ古イ飛行機ハ新レイノカキニ入ル迄ハ離スルハ未ス。

④ 彈藥

(a) 防空彈薬トシテ可能ナル最大限ノ豫備ヲ貯藏セヨ

四 作戰

(1) コワイ水域ニ艦隊ヲ留メルコト

(1) 純然タル海軍的見地カラミレバ此ノ水域ニ艦隊ヲ留メテ

オクコトニハ多クノ不利益ガアルソノ數矣ハ即チ

(一) 人員軍需品及ヒ補給品ノ運搬ニ困難遲延及費

用ノ嵩ムコト

(二) 安全度ニ欠陥ガアル為ラハイナカ作戰投錨地トシテ

不適當ナルコト

(三) 大艦ノ入港碇泊出港ノ困難ガアル為真珠湾ガ作戰投

錨地トシテ不適當ナルコト

(四) 空中水面共ニ作戰区域ガ混雜シ且制限サレテナルコト

(五) 艦隊勤務訓練保養及ヒ收容等ニ對シ施設不

充分ナルコト

(六) 將校兵員カ平時ニ本國カラ長ク離レテキタ為道德ニ

悪影響ヲアルコト

(七) 戦争ノ際艦隊カ西海岸ノ勤員港ニ戻リ又ハ部分的

編制サレテキナイ動員措置ヲ受ケル必要ガアリ之ハ混
乱ト時間ノ純損失ヲ招ク結果トナルコト

(四) 若シ艦隊ノ処理カ海軍トシテノ考慮ニヨツテモ決定サ
レルナラバ艦隊ノ大部分ハ其ノ太平洋岸ノ正常基地ニ歸ル
ベキデアル 何トナレバ其処ヲ根據トスレバ訓練ニモ亦戦争
ニ対スル準備ニモ便宜デアルカラデアル

(五) 若シ純然タル海軍的要因以外ノ要因カ現在艦隊
カ何処ヲ根據地トナスベキカトイフコトニ関スル決定ニ影響
ヲ及ボスモノデアレバ海軍的要因並ニソノ決定カ艦隊ノ
即應準備ニ及ボスコトアルベキ影響ハ悉ク提表サレ慎重ニ
考究セラルベキデアル 換言スルハ艦隊ノ大部分ヲ太平洋
岸ノ正常基地ニ根據サセテ如何ナル水域ニ於ケル戦闘ニ対
シテモ準備カ容易ニ出来ルヤウニスルコトヨリモ「ハワイ」水域
ニ艦隊ヲ根據サセルコトヨリ太平洋ニ於ケル外交障ニ強ク
ヲ与ヘヤラトスルコトノ才ガ一層大切ナラデアラウカ

(六) 若シ太平洋岸ノ他ノ國家ト我が國トノ關係カ悪化スレバ
國務省ハ我々ノ次ノ動員ハ何デアルト考ヘルカ
國務省ハ艦隊カ直ニ動員サレ且艦隊ハ「パイ」カラ直接
ニ戦闘ヲ開始シ得トカ或ハ我々ノ太平洋岸ノ正常基地ヨリ
ニモ敵ノ潜水艦基地ニ二千哩近イ「ライナ」ニ於ケル不安全
ナ錨地カラ必要ナ訓練ヲ安全ニ行フコトカ出来ルト信ス
ルノカラウカ

五 海岸施設

(イ) 余ハ海岸施設ニ占ムル地位或ハ目的ガ餘リ強調ナレ過ギルニトシテ様貴下ガ折ヘズ警告セラレトヲ希望スル。ソレハ唯一ツカ目的ヲ有テ居ルニ過ギナイノ即チ戦闘艦隊ニ支援維持及擴充デアル。其ニ其自身ノカテ敵ヲ破砕出来ルモテナイ。ワシントンニ居ル現役艦隊(特ニ參謀部隊カラ)スツト以前離レタ人々ガ屢々目的物何レヲ先ニベキカラ認識シ損フハ全ク人同トシテ致方ナイコトデアル。

六 海軍ノ公表

實際ノ所感ニテ海軍ノ公表即チ委員會ニ於ケル審議議會ニ於ケル演説及海軍省カラ發表文書ハ次ノ觀念ノ中ノ一或ハソレ以上ヲ強調シテ末テ居ル。

(イ) 海軍ハ防禦ノ為ニ設ケラレテ居ル。

(ロ) 所謂充分ナ海軍ハ我々ガ戰爭ヲナイデ済ム様ニスルモテ居アル。

(ハ) 充分ナ海軍ハ在レバ我々ハ戰爭ニ捲キ込マレル危険ガ餘リ無シニ

地球上ノ國家ニ我々ノ意志ヲ押ソケルコトガ出来ル。

(ニ) 不幸ニシテ戰爭ガ起レバ艦隊ハ一種ノ可動性アル「マジ」ノ線ノ

様ナモノデ、ソノ後方ニ於テ國民ハ自分等ノ子孫ガ他日海軍ニ

ソノ補償ヲ受ルトイフ約束ヲスルガデ、ソノ外國家ニ對スル何等

ノ義務モナク平穩ニ暮スコトガ出来ル。

(ホ) 艦隊ハ完全ニ充員シテ充分訓練サレ即チ戰用意ガ出来

テ居ル。

(ヘ) 海軍比較的ナ實力ハ唯全ク物質的ナ物ニ依リテ計ラレル

(ト) 航空ハ安價ナ防禦手段デアリ又多數ノ飛行機ト操縦士ハ

國家ヲ安全ナラシムル

(4) 遂隔、海軍基地及飛行場ハソレ自身防禦武器ヲ
 前記ノ宣傳様式ハ國民ヲミテ誤ルル安全感ニ陷レル恐ラルヲ以テ、同達
 ニ年ルソレハ非常ニ短キ予告テ戰爭ニ引キ入レラレカモ知レナイ國ニ於テ
 國民ノ精神的素質ヲ弱クシ不健全ト國民士氣ヲ作り出シ易イ比較的
 短時間ニ實際ニ戰爭ニ捲キ込マレカモ知レナイ國民ニ取テ、危險
 ナクニテ戰爭ヲ賭スルトト出スルトカ危險ヲ冒スニテ戰爭ヲ行フコ
 トが出来ルト放シラレトハ、斯ル概念ハ必然的ニ導クスソノ戰爭ヲ決然ト
 逆行ニ致命的ノ害ヲ及ボステアラウ。現戰爭ノ初メニ佛蘭西人及ヒ英
 國人ハ丁度コト云フ考ヘテ居タリソレテ現在、如キ結果ヲ来クシテ
 居ル

七 行政 國務 陸軍 海軍 各省 同 協力

- (1) 正當ナリヤ否ヤハ別トシ、私右ノ政府各省同ノ共働ト相互了解カ
 效果的ノ活動ニ必要ト程及ニ密接ニテイ様ニ感シラレテアラナイ
- (2) 艦隊若クハソノ部隊ノ配置及ヒ行動ニ關スル決定ニ至ル前ニ
 海軍省ガ相談ヲ受ケカソノ意見ガ率直ニ力強ク表明
 サレカソノ主張ガ充分了解サレ考廣サレカカ?
- (3) 現在ノ政策ハ、經濟的手段建設途、實質的大海軍及ヒ人員
 不充分ヲ現存艦隊ノ配置ニ依リ支持サレテ外交的意見表示
 ニ依リ我方ノ意志ヲ他ノ太平洋國家ニ強キトスル方向ニ向ケレテ
 居ル様ニ見受ケラルル。之ハ為レ得ルニテカ吾々ハ若シ成功セバ、場合
 於テ戰爭若クハ必然的ノ威信ノ失墜ニ直面スル用意カアルカ
 斯ル戰爭ノ目的カ公式地サレテ居ルカ、ソノ犧牲ハ考慮サレテ居

カ又勝利の價値と比較サレテ居ルカ？ 斯カル戦争の防禦手段依リ式ハ海軍ハ唯防禦ノ目的ノ為存在スルト信シ又國民ノ國家ニ対スル義務ノ凡ハ税金ノ支拂ニ依テ果シ得ルト信シタル様ニ教ヘ込メタ國民ニ依テ勝ヲ得ルカ？

(二)司令長官ハ國策ノ樹立ハ責任ハナイカ政府ノ目的が外交手段ニ達セラレシ場合國策ヲ強行スル為政府が期待ヲカケテ片腕ノ有能性ニ付テハ確然タル責任がアル。

艦隊ノ實カト能率が太平洋ニ於ケル其政府ノ侵略政策ト約合ツテ居ルカトクハ問題ニ付キ司令長官ハ関心ヲ持タズトシ又若シ此ノ政策が遂行ヲ要ホスルテアラハト云フ可能性ナル場合ハ特ニ然リテアル。

(ホ)政府ノ戦争ニ積極的ニ参加スル為ニ目標が定メラレ計費が樹テラレ居ルカ。吾々ハ此ノ様ナ戦争ニ半合参加シ半合高外在ル様ナ状態ヲ長ク居ル事ハ出来ナイカ 吾々ハモウ

決定シテ目標ヲ計画ヲ樹テテ居ルニキテアル。ソシテ吾々カ前ニ為シテ様ニ積極的ニ参加ノ為ニ飛行隊ヲ輕巡洋艦隊ヲ派遣シテリ又本國ノ安全ヲ基地ニ於テ主トシテ訓練用船舶ト

シテ重艦艇ヲ用ヒタリシテ戦闘ヲヤルト云々様ニ裝スベキデホ此ノ様ナヤリ方デハ吾國ノ重艦艇ノ動員が出来ナラナルデアリ重艦艇ハ戦闘が進捗スルニワレニ大西洋ナリハ太平洋ナリガ

確カニ必要トナルデアリ。

シエーホーランドン署名

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
At Sea,
12 September, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

1. The following notes are submitted on the points which we discussed in my effort to meet your wishes to know officers, learn about ships and find out how you could assist the Fleet's preparation for war.

2. PERSONNEL

(A) Officers.

- (a) Promotion by selection best method yet devised.
- (b) Members should be allowed to serve on two successive boards if circumstances render it advisable (requires change by Congress).
- (c) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; the most promising officers should be given preference. This would tend to create a division of officers into two classes, the most promising and the least promising, or an A and B list.
- (d) The abuses of retirement for physical disability and the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of the physically unfit should be corrected.

(B) Enlisted Personnel.

- (a) While the enlisted strength increased 11,349 between 21 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expenditures for material may prove futile unless there is a prompt and commensurate personnel expansion.
- (b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the rate of acceptance of new men, should be eliminated at once and emergency expansion should begin now without awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not waited for specific appropriations in providing material expansion, and it is difficult to understand or explain to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet even more vital problems of personnel (involving the imperative necessity of making ready what we already have as well as training men for new construction) with equally direct and effective action. I estimate the time necessary to make a modern man-of-war's-man at 4 years. You can see the necessity of getting started on this training right away.

(C) Separate Air Corps.

- (a) Unquestionably a higher degree of cooperation will exist between our Naval air arm and other Naval arms if all of them continue to be intimately bound together in one Navy.

- (b) With a separate air corps there is bound to develop a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy, many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, administration, and above all a serious loss in effectiveness.
- (c) I know of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that would accrue from the creation of a Naval Air Corps.

3. MATERIAL

(A) Surface ships.

- (a) I believe new construction is being expedited as much as possible. Minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast.

(B) Aircraft.

- (a) A tremendous expansion in this field complicated by foreign orders as well as by our demands. Airplanes, either for sale or for training, should not be obtained at the expense of the active Fleet. Fleet planes must be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes, but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are on hand.

(C) Ammunition.

- (a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of anti-aircraft ammunition.

4. OPERATIONS

(A) Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

- (a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:
 - (1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
 - (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
 - (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.
 - (4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.
 - (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing.
 - (6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.
 - (7) In case of war, necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measures resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

- (b) If the disposition of the Fleet were determined solely by Naval considerations the major portion of the Fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.
- (c) If factors other than purely Naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the Fleet should be based at this time, the Naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?
- (d) In case our relations with another Pacific Nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the Fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary training from the inadequate anchorage at Lahaina which is 2000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases?

5. SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

- (a) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the position and purpose of the Shore Establishment over-emphasized. It has only one purpose - the support, maintenance and augmentation of the fighting Fleet. It cannot, of itself, damage an enemy. It is only human that some of those in Washington and long removed from the active Fleet (predominantly staff corps) frequently fail to visualize the correct priority of objectives.

6. NAVY PUBLICITY

Practically all Navy Publicity, hearings before committees, speeches in Congress and handouts from the Navy Department have stressed one or more of the following ideas:

- (a) The Navy is built for defense.
- (b) A so-called adequate Navy will keep us out of war.
- (c) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Nations of the earth with little danger of becoming involved in war.
- (d) In the unhappy event of war the Fleet is a kind of mobile Maginot Line behind which the people can reside in peace with no obligation to their Country except to promise that their descendants will some day pay for the Navy.

- (e) The Fleet is fully manned, fully trained and ready to fight at the drop of a hat.
- (f) The comparative strength of navies is measured solely by material things.
- (g) Aviation is a cheap means of defense and that large numbers of planes and pilots will render the nation secure.
- (h) Outlying Naval bases and air fields, in themselves are weapons of defense.

The type of publicity mentioned above is wrong in that it tends to lull the public into a false sense of security. It tends to weaken their moral fibre and to create an unhealthy national morale in a country which may be drawn into war on very short notice. For a people, who may actually be involved in war in a comparatively short time, to be told that they can risk war without danger or wage war without risk, may be fatally detrimental to the determined prosecution of the very war towards which such conceptions inevitably lead. At the beginning of the present war, the French and British had just these ideas, with the present result.

7. COOPERATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE, STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.

(a) Whether justified or not, I can not escape the feeling that the coordination and mutual understanding between the above departments of the government is not as close as is necessary for effective action.

(b) Before reaching a decision as to the disposition and movements of the Fleet, or units thereof, is the Navy Department consulted, are its views frankly and forcibly presented, and are its representations thoroughly understood and considered?

(c) Present policy appears to be headed towards forcing our will upon another Pacific Nation by diplomatic representations supported by economic measures, a large material Navy in process of construction, and the disposition of an inadequately manned Fleet in being. Can this be done and are we prepared to face war or the inevitable loss of prestige if it cannot? Have the objectives of such a war been formulated, and its costs considered and compared with the value of victory? Can such a war be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe that the Navy is for defensive purposes only, and that their whole obligation to their country can be met by the payment of taxes?

(d) The Commander-in-Chief has no responsibility for the formulation of National policy, but he has a definite responsibility for the efficiency of one arm upon which the government relies to enforce National policy, when its aims can not be secured by diplomatic means. He must be concerned over the question as to whether the strength and efficiency of the Fleet are commensurate with the aggressive policy of the Administration in the Pacific. Especially so if there is a possibility that this policy will require implementation.

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(e) Are objectives being formulated and plans made for our active participation in the European war? We cannot long remain half in and half out of such a war. We should decide now on definite objectives and plans and should not assume that we will fight this one like we did the last, i.e., by sending aviation and light forces for active participation and utilizing our heavy ships, in secure home bases, largely as training ships. Such a course would immobilize our heavy ships, which are most certainly going to be needed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, depending on the progress of the war.

/s/ J. O. Richardson