Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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

Military Intelligence Section
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHINESE NAVAL INFORMATION

SPOT INTELL
16 Mar49

SECRET

TA13-1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET
SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1200
DATE: 16 March 1949

SUBJECT: Civil War in Burma

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference State Dept radio 150341 Z which contains a delayed report of the civil war in Burma. This report initiated by the MA Rangoon is as follows:

b. Karen insurgents have captured three towns in the Mandalay area and the Burmese War Office concedes the fall of Mandalay probably imminent. Press reports state Mandalay is in the hands of insurgents. Capture of the above towns liberated an estimated 1,000 interned Karen military personnel and increased insurgent funds, arms, prestige and strategic position.

c. Government Forces in Rangoon are contained by Karens who also surround or immobilize Government garrisons at Thazi, Nyamglebin, Pegu, Thaton, and Moulmein.

d. If Government persists in refusal to mediate Karen demand for separate state within the Burma Government, strong well led Karen Forces in Central Burma will probably overrun Rangoon and surrounding area. Some observers believe Karens are reluctant to capture Rangoon because of bloodshed involved and also they desire to have a government with which to negotiate.

e. Burmese Regular Army estimated at 18,000 disposed as shown on map (Tab 1). National Police Force (NPC) estimated at 9,000 are disposed in detachments usually company size distributed in larger towns with at least two battalions in Rangoon area. Union Auxiliary Military Police Forces (UAF) and their reserves totaling an estimated 30,000 are distributed under limited Army control with locations undetermined.

f. Some members of the wartime Peoples Volunteer Organization (PVO) resisted the Karens however this action has ceased and the PVO itself is resisting the Government and has taken over almost complete control of that portion of Burma along the east side of the Irrawaddy River between Zigon and Myingyan.

g. Despite assertions of the Ministry of Information that the Karens are collaborating with Communists, this cannot be confirmed and is not believed to be true, except possibly in a local area for expediency.

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g. Despite assertions of the Ministry of Information that the Karens are collaborating with Communists, this cannot be confirmed and is not believed to be true, except possibly in a local area for expediency.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. The Burmese Government is not believed capable of a military victory. The Karens could probably be quieted by granting them an autonomous state but the PVO and Communists are collaborating and could keep the war going indefinitely. British sources in Malaya are of the opinion that Burma is not capable of a military victory.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: JSPOG, G-3, Diplomatic, FEAF, and COMNAVFE.

1 Incl: (Attached to C/S copy only)
1 - Map "A" (Tab - 1)

JTB/for
C. A. W.

SECRET

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

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MILITARY SITUATION BURMA

BAY OF BENGAL

ANDAMAN SEA

ANDAMAN ISLANDS

Port Blair

AKYAB

3rd CHIN

6TH BURM

6TH BURM

Kyaukpyu

Minbu

Thayetmyo

Prome

GURKHA RIFLE (½ STRGTH)

ZIGON

HENZADA

4TH BURMA RIFLE (LESS 2 CO.)

PEGU

HLEGU

BASSEIN

MAUBIN

RANGOON

4TH BURMA RIFLE

4TH BURMA RIFLE

IRRAWADDY ESTUARY

BURMA (½ STR

BURMA

1 BURMA (½ STR

3 BURMA (½ STR

5 BURMA (LESS

2 KACH (LESS 2

P(4 GU

P

UAF

20 0 20 40 60 80 MILES

SCALE

92°

94°

96°

20°

18°

16°

14°

12°

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Military Intelligence Section

General Staff

MILITARY SITUATION

BURMA

TAB-1

PDM MAP NO 67 17 AUG 1948

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



MAP "A"

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION GENERAL STAFF

CAW/RSB/CFG/mll

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

Hour: 1345
Date: 15 March 49

07446

SUBJECT: Rally Scheduled in Imperial Palace Plaza on Tuesday

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. Reference is made to Spot Intelligence Report, subject as above, dated 1750 hours, 14 March 49, which reported that a mass meeting would be held in the Imperial Palace Plaza, Tokyo, under the sponsorship of the Executive Committee of the Peoples' Rally for Protecting the Right to Live.

b. Approximately 150,000 people assembled in the Palace Plaza this morning for the purpose of participating in subject meeting but before the meeting got underway, rain began to fall and the crowd dispersed. At 1230 hours, it was decided to abandon the meeting.

2. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff SCAP and FEC, G-3, ESS, Tokyo PM, CPM, CG Hq & Sv Gp, G-4, and GS.

C. A. W.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION GENERAL STAFF

CAW/RSB/HVH/eb

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 14 March 1949
TIME: 1750

SUBJECT: Rally Scheduled in Imperial Palace Plaza on Tuesday.

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. CIC reports that a mass meeting will be held in the Imperial Palace Plaza, Tokyo, beginning at 1000 hours, tomorrow, under the sponsorship of Executive Committee of the Peoples' Rally for Protecting the Right to Live. Sponsors estimate attendance will reach 300,000. Following the meeting three demonstrations will be organized at 1330 hours, to follow different routes of march through central Tokyo.

b. The purpose of the meeting is to protest high cost of living and high taxes and to express opposition to current Governmental economic programs.

c. The group sponsoring the gathering is composed of representatives of the following organizations:

(1) National Liaison Council of Labor Unions.
(2) National Council of Industrial Unions.
(3) Tokyo Regional Council of Labor Unions.
(4) Democracy Protection League.
(5) Japan Young Men's Council.
(6) League of Koreans Residing in Japan.
(7) Tokyo Council of Commerce and Industry.

2. G-2 Comment: G-2 does not expect the strength of meeting to exceed 75,000 even with good weather prevailing.

3. Action:

a. CIC will cover the meeting and demonstrations and any untoward developments will be promptly reported.

b. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff SCAP and FEC, G-3, ESS, Tokyo PM, CPM, CG Hq & Sv Gp, G-4 GS.

C. A. W.

073557

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET
SPOT INTELLIGENCE

noted @ 3/13

HOUR: 1600
DATE: 13 March 1949

SUBJECT: Border Incidents

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference USAFIK Radio ZGBI 196 (AG No. 48369) 12 Mar 49, which contains delayed reports of 38th Parallel Border incidents occurring during the period 3-8 Mar 49. These reports are as follows:

b. North Korean troops advanced on South Korean police station at Kachun 7 Mar; police fire forced North Koreans to withdraw. On following day, eight North Koreans crossed into South Korea near Kachun and were fired on by North Korean patrol; South Korean police opened fire on North Korean patrol; civilians escaped into South Korea. (1)

c. Small group of North Koreans attacked police station at Changtan, South Korea 6 Mar; South Korean police repulsed attack; no casualties. (2)

d. North Korean patrol kidnapped two civilians at Chukwa, South Korea 8 Mar. (3)

e. Group of North Koreans attacked village northwest of Chongdan, South Korea 3 Mar; kidnapped mayor and a school teacher. South Korean policemen forced North Koreans to withdraw; one South Korean policeman killed and one wounded; seven North Koreans killed. Approximately 100 North Koreans violated boundary near Chongdan 5 Mar; engaged in fight with South Korean police; one North Korean killed before group withdrew. (4)

f. Thirty North Koreans attacked police box at Yango Hung, South Korea 8 Mar; South Korean police repelled attack; no casualties reported. (5)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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f. Thirty North Koreans attacked police box at Yango Hung, South Korea 8 Mar; South Korean police repelled attack; no casualties reported. (5)

g. North Korean troops attacked South Korean police box north of Kaesong 8 Mar; South Korean troops forced North Koreans to withdraw; one South Korean soldier killed. (6)

h. North Korean troops violated boundary and captured one South Korean soldier near Songamri, 3 Mar. (7)

i. Fifty North Korean troops attacked South Korean outpost at Chujon 9 Mar; North Koreans equipped with automatic weapons; South Korean troops forced North Koreans to withdraw; no casualties reported. (8)

j. U.S. officer on patrol along border was fired on from North Korea at point northeast of Chunchon 5 Mar; officer withdrew without injury. (9)

2. G-2 Comments/Deductions:

a. Border incidents continue to occur at widely distributed locations and no change in this pattern is evident. A majority of the incidents reported above are of a minor nature and casualties were few. However they indicate that tension along the 38th Parallel remains high.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: JSPOG, G-3 and Diplomatic.

1 Incl: (Attached to C/S Copy Only)
1 - Map "A" (Tab - 1)

for C. A. H.

SECRET

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

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

MAP "A"

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

CENTRAL KOREA

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

BORDER INCIDENTS

PDM. MAP NO.16 12 FEB.49

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

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

TAB 1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET
SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1630
DATE 10 March 1949

SUBJECT: Current Developments in the China Situation

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference ALUSNA, Nanking radio 080410-2 (AG No. 47105), 10 March 1949.

b. The defected Chinese light cruiser "Chungking" was last sighted and photographed on 3 March 49 while at anchor about two miles northeast of the Chefoo breakwater. Unconfirmed report indicates possibility that ship ("Chungking") is now located off the northern tip of the Shantung Peninsula between Tengchou (Penglai) and the southernmost island of the Miao Tao Archipelago.

c. Vice-Admiral KUEI Yung-chin, C-in-C of the Chinese Navy, is considering the withdrawal of all Nationalist Naval Vessels and personnel from the Miao Tao Archipalago as soon as the location and planned employment of the "Chungking" has been determined.

d. Vice-Admiral KUEI states that the only other naval defection in that area was a gunboat which was taken over by a portion of the crew and then taken to Chefoo.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. The Chinese Navy has apparently lost contact with the "Chungking" and is obviously concerned over the use to which the Communist might put the vessel. As previously mentioned (G-2 Daily Intell Summary 2366), the "Chungking" was the most capable fighting ship in the Chinese Navy, being the former British "Aurora", manned by British-trained officers and crew.

b. Use of the vessel by the Communists could definitely interfere with the freedom of action of the Chinese Navy, a factor which is probably prompting the Navy's contemplated withdrawal from their Miao Tao Island

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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b. Use of the vessel by the Communists could definitely interfere with the freedom of action of the Chinese Navy, a factor which is probably prompting the Navy's contemplated withdrawal from their Miao Tao Island Group Base at this time.

c. In contrast to Vice-Admiral KUEI's statement, previous reports have indicated the defection of two other Chinese Naval vessels in Northern Shantung waters - the icebreaker "Chang Pai" and the coastal vessel "Huang An" (G-2 Daily Intell Summary 2372). The "Huang An" has been sighted at Chefoo but the "Chang Pai" remains unlocated.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: G-3, JSPOG and FEAF.

1 Incl: (Attached to C/S Copy Only)
Map "A" (Tab - 1)

for C. A. W.

SECRET

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

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MAP "A" TAB "1"



TAO (Island Group)

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

PDM MAP NO 10

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

DAIREN

Military Intelligence Section
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY SITUATION
CHINA MANCHURIA
10 March 1949
Location of Defected Chinese
Naval Vessel "Chungking."

CRET

TAB "1"

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

07225

NOTED

SECRET

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1630
DATE: 12 March 1949

SUBJECT: Current Developments in the China Situation

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference COMNAVWESPAC radio 100043 Z (AG No. 47664), 11 Mar 49; SANA, Nanking radios 110400 Z and 110415 Z (AG Nos. 47852 and 47873), 11 Mar 49; and SANA, Nanking radio 110450 Z (AG No. 47943), 12 Mar 49.

b. Reference radios summarize military, political and economic developments during the past week.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. Political highlight of week was resignation of Premier SUN Fo. If appointment of new Premier and formation of truely representative and loyal cabinet is not delayed, Acting-President LI Tsung-jen's hand will have been strengthened. Delay, however, will prevent concrete developments in Government's peace program. In the formation of new cabinet, LI will still have to reckon with the Generalissimo, whose power and influence is being increasingly felt and HO Ying-chin's acceptance of positions of Premier and Minister of National Defense is still believed dependent upon the Generalissimo's concurrence.

b. Peace negotiations made little visible progress and Communist broadcasts still contained no hint of relaxing MAO Tse-tung's eight point peace demands.

c. Of particular significance is the gradual tightening of anti-foreign controls in Peiping and increasing evidence of Chinese Communist orientation toward the USSR. Evidence points to reconstructions of educational system along Soviet lines with the Russian language being substituted for "English" as a required subject in Peiping Universities. In three lectures to low ranking workers, LI Li-san, Communist Political Commisar in Manchuria, reportedly lauded Soviet contributions of technicians and machine tools to rapid industrial recovery of Manchuria, described the important role being played in Japan by Chinese Communist and Soviet indoctrinated former Japanese POWs, and spoke of Chinese Military, political and cultural personnel being

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d. The military situation remains relatively unchanged. The consensus of reports indicate that top Communist Military leaders, including LIN Piao, CHEN Yi, NIEH Yung-chen, CHEN Keng and LIU Po-cheng, are opposed to peace; that their power derived from their troop command positions makes them difficult to control; but that an agreement has been reached whereby peace talks are to continue for one month and no Yangtze River crossing is to be made prior to 1 Apr 49.

e. Reported Soviet activities in Manchuria include the movement of a "large" contingent of Soviet troops through Mukden presumably to Dairen; the presence of 1,000 Soviet troops (possibly rail guards) in Mukden; the movement into Manchuria of six Soviet-trained divisions known as the "Manchu Army" which allegedly consists of Mongolian, Korean and Japanese troops. These reports are from varied sources and, although evaluated C-3, are unconfirmed. Reports concerning the "Manchu Army" are viewed with reserve, pending further confirmation.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified; G-3, JSPOG; Diplomatic and FEAF.

C. A. W.

SECRET

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

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

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MAP "A" TAB "1"

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PDM MAP NO. 98 16 NOV 48

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TAB "1"

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

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MAP 'A'



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

CENTRAL KOREA

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

BORDER INCIDENTS

PDM. MAP NO.16 12FEB.49

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



SECRET

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TAB 1

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C/S BJ 2 (1)
ADC
D C/S FEC (2) Gen Almond has seen.
C/S SCAP
(3) — G-2

OK
SM

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

NOTED BY C/S

HOUR: 1630
DATE: 9 March 1949

SUBJECT: Current Developments in the China Situation

TO: Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference ALUSNA, Nanking radio 0809012 (AG No. 46537), 8 March 1949.

b. KAN Chieh-hou, personal advisor to Acting President LI Tsung-jen, confirms the resignation of Premier SUN Fo, 7 March 1949.

c. SUN reportedly resigned under threat of being exposed to embarrassing questioning at the Legislative Yuan meeting on the morning of 8 February.

d. HO Ying-chin, former Minister of National Defense, is most likely successor to SUN Fo. May concurrently hold post of Minister of National Defense.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. SUN Fo has been under pressure to resign as Premier for several weeks. His resignation is interpreted as another victory for LI Tsung-jen in his struggle to unite all factions of the government behind his peace effort.

b. The possibility of HO Ying-chin becoming Premier and concurrently Minister of National Defense has several implications. HO, a former Minister of National Defense under the Generalissimo, has remained personally loyal to the Generalissimo and exercises considerable influence over Nationalist Military, Naval and Air forces. He was recently brought to Nanking for the purpose of reorganizing the Defense Ministry and reportedly was under the Generalissimo's orders to cooperate with acting-President LI Tsung-jen. Despite his past record as a weak and poor administrator, HO's support of LI Tsung-jen would probably aid LI materially in gaining the support of the "CHIANG" faction and may be

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of 8 February.

d. HO Ying-chin, former Minister of National Defense, is most likely successor to SUN Fo. May concurrently hold post of Minister of National Defense.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. SUN Fo has been under pressure to resign as Premier for several weeks. His resignation is interpreted as another victory for LI Tsung-jen in his struggle to unite all factions of the government behind his peace effort.

b. The possibility of HO Ying-chin becoming Premier and concurrently Minister of National Defense has several implications. HO, a former Minister of National Defense under the Generalissimo, has remained personally loyal to the Generalissimo and exercises considerable influence over Nationalist Military, Naval and Air forces. He was recently brought to Nanking for the purpose of reorganizing the Defense Ministry and reportedly was under the Generalissimo's orders to cooperate with acting-President LI Tsung-jen. Despite his past record as a weak and poor administrator, HO's support of LI Tsung-jen would probably aid LI materially in gaining the support of the "CHIANG" faction and may be the factor influencing LI in considering the appointment. However, HO's appointment to the dual positions would concentrate considerable military and political power in the hands of one individual, presumably still under the Generalissimo's influence, a factor which may not work entirely to the advantage of LI Tsung-jen.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: G-2, JSPOG, Diplomatic and FEAF.

for C. A. W.

SECRET

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SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CAW/RSB/CFG/amh

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 9 March 1949
HOUR: 1040

SUBJECT: Developments in the Investigation of the Assassination of the Rightist Korean Leader

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. Reference is made to Spot Intelligence Report, subject as above, dated 1230 hours, 1 March 1949, which reported the arrest of a minor Korean leftist leader, KIN Mei Gyoku, in connection with the murder on 13 January 1949, of GEN Ko Sho.

b. KIN Mei Gyoku told Japanese police on 7 March 1949, that the murder of GEN Ko Sho was committed by KIN Jin Shu. KIN stated he was in the vicinity at the time the murder was committed together with KAN Ki Ei who had previously offered him ¥ 100,000 to kill GEN Ko Sho.

c. Police are now seeking KIN Jin Shu on a charge of murder and KAN Ki Ei on a charge of instigation of murder.

2. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, SCAP and FEC, DS, CPM, Tokyo PM, G-3.

for C. A. W.

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET
SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1700
DATE: 8 March 1949

SUBJECT: Current Developments in the China Situation

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference USMILAT, Nanking radio 46148, 7 March 1949.

b. G-2 of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense corrects a previous erroneous report that two of Gen LIN Piao's columns had been identified in Central China. A Communist work detail on the lower portion of the Pinghan (Peiping - Hankou) Railroad included light wounded from LIN Piao's Units and had resulted in a Nationalist agent making the erroneous report.

c. U.S. sources in Peiping report that two of LIN Piao's Columns have returned to Manchuria. The report is confirmed by the Ministry of National Defense.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. The erroneous identification of two of LIN Piao's Columns in Central China, as reported by AMMILAT, Nanking "Weeka" dated 5 March 49, led to the belief that at least elements of Gen LIN Piao's forces were moving from North China to reinforce Central China Communist Forces.

b. It is considered questionable that any of LIN Piao's units are presently south of the Yellow River, although one Column has been reported at Tsinan. The return of LIN's forces to Manchuria has been previously indicated (G-2 Spot Intell Report, 27 Feb 1949), but identifications of units involved are still lacking. The latest reported dispositions of his forces are indicated on Map "A" (Tab - 1).

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: JSPOG, G-3 and FEAF.

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2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. The erroneous identification of two of LIN Piao's Columns in Central China, as reported by AMILAT, Nanking "Weeka" dated 5 March 49, led to the belief that at least elements of Gen LIN Piao's forces were moving from North China to reinforce Central China Communist Forces.

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3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: JSPOG, G-3 and FEAF.

1 Incl: (Attached to C/S copy only)
1 - Map "A" (Tab - 1)

for
C. A. W.

SECRET

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SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTHS

LIN Piao's
CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES
MANCHURIA-NORTH CHINA

Unit and Location	Strength (Brig)	Strength (Div)	Strength (Colm)	Strength (Area)
Changchun Area:				31,500
1st Ind Division		5,000		
4th Ind Division		2,500		
6th Ind Division		5,000		
T 5th Ind Division		4,500		
7th Ind Division		4,500		
10th Ind Division		5,000		
1st Ind Division		5,000		
Liaoyuan Area:				4,000
3d IMPSPA		4,000		
Ssupingchieh Area:				14,000
8th IMPSPA Division		4,000		
9th IMPSPA Division		6,000		
9th Ind Division		4,000		
Hsian Area:				13,000
SK Column			13,000	
Liuho Area:				13,000
KC Column			13,000	
Chingyuan Area:				8,000
17 KVA Column			8,000	
Mukden Area:				37,500
EMAN Army			27,000	
3d Ind Division		4,500		
7th IMPSPA Division		6,000		
Yingkou Area:				16,500
S-2 Ind Division		4,500		
L Ind Division		4,500		

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9th IMPSPA Division	6,000		
9th Ind Division	4,000		
			13,000
Hsian Area:			
SK Column		13,000	
			13,000
Liuho Area:			
KC Column		13,000	
			8,000
Chingyuan Area:			
17 KVA Column		8,000	
			37,500
Mukden Area:			
EMAN Army		27,000	
3d Ind Division	4,500		
7th IMPSPA Division	6,000		
			16,500
Yingkou Area:			
S-2 Ind Division	4,500		
L Ind Division	4,500		
5th Ind Division	2,500		
6th Ind Division	2,500		
7th Ind Division	2,500		
			2,500
Chinhsien Area:			
W 4th Ind Division	2,500		
			5,000
Hsiawa Area:			
10th IMPSPA Division	5,000		
			12,000
Tiehling Area:			
2nd IMPSPA Division	9,000		
S Ind-4th Division	3,000		
			105,000
Tientsin-Taku Area:			
11th Column		15,000	
7th Column		15,000	
1st Column		15,000	
2d Column		15,000	
12th Column		15,000	
9th Column		15,000	
8th Column		15,000	
			75,000
Peiping Area:			
3rd Column		15,000	
4th Column		15,000	

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SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTHS

LIN Piao's
CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES
MANCHURIA-NORTH CHINA

Unit and Location	Strength (Brig)	Strength (Div)	Strength (Colm)	Strength (Area)
Peiping Area: (con't.)				
5th Column			15,000	
10th Column			15,000	
Loting Area:				9,000
6th Ind Division		5,000		
8th Ind Division		4,000		
Tsinan Area:				15,000
6th Column			15,000	

Total LIN Piao's Regular Forces 346,000
(One Army, 15 columns - 24 divs)

Note: Units and strength figures shown above represent the latest identification and strength estimates of regular units under Communist Gen LIN Piao's Command. In addition, it is estimated that LIN Piao has approximately 185,000 irregular troops and/or troops in a training status dispersed throughout Manchuria, making a grand total of approximately 530,000 troops taking orders from LIN.

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Total LIN Piao's Regular Forces (One Army, 15 columns - 24 divs)	346,000

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

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PDM MAP NO 99 16 NOV 1948

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CENTRAL CHINA

0 50 100 200
MILES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

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

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MAP "A"

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

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

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-1948)

DISPOSITION OF COMMUNIST
FORCES
UNDER THE COMMAND OF
GENERAL LIN PIAO

TAB-I

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1630
DATE: 6 March 1949

SUBJECT: Current Developments in the China Situation

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference ALUSNA, Nanking radio 040400Z.

b. Unofficial Nationalist peace seekers were received by top Communist leaders MAO Tse-tung and CHOU En-lai who left impression with the Nationalist delegates that they were willing to modify the original "eight demands" somewhat (Intell. Summary 2324).

c. Unofficial Nationalist peace seekers reveal that top Communist leaders demand arrest of the "Big Four Families" (CHIANG, KUNG, SOONG and CHEN) as well as Kuomintang severance from U.S. imperialism as requirement to achieve peace.

d. Communist leader MAO Tse-tung agreed to official peace talks but stressed necessity of a secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to be held in an attempt to convince leftist elements of the CCP that peace short of unconditional surrender is desirable.

e. Arrival of LI Li-san in North China from Manchuria expected to strengthen the leftist elements of the CCP directorate in future peace negotiations.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. Hopes for immediate peace in China are somewhat dimmed by an apparent split in the policy making elements of the Chinese Communist Party. The arrival of Moscow indoctrinated and radical leftist LI Li-san

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e. Arrival of LI Li-san in North China from Manchuria expected to strengthen the leftist elements of the CCP directorate in future peace negotiations.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. Hopes for immediate peace in China are somewhat dimmed by an apparent split in the policy making elements of the Chinese Communist Party. The arrival of Moscow indoctrinated and radical leftist LI Li-san is expected to stiffen rather than modify the Communist demands for peace. MAO's decision to attempt to convince leftist CCP elements of the desirability of peace, other than unconditional, possibly indicates that MAO does not consider himself beyond political reproach and deems it necessary to follow the policies of the Central Committee. It can be expected that acting President LI Tsung-jen will take measures to meet the Communist demand of Kuomintang severance from U.S. military aid and possibly will make some movement to affect compliance with the demand of arrest of the "Big Four Families" if and when he feels sufficiently strong politically. Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek's continued interference in National Government Affairs combined with the difference of opinions within the Communist Central Committee is expected to further complicate an already complex situation. Even though hostilities have been suspended there is evidence of a lack of substance in the peace proposals offered by the Communists and a unified China continues to remain a remote desire of a peace hungry nation.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: G-3, JSPOG, and Diplomatic.

Noted @ 3/6

M.S. for C. A. W.

SECRET

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1415
DATE: 6 March 1949

SUBJECT: Border Incidents

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference USAFIK Radio MR ZGBI 184 (AG No. 45837) 5 Mar 49, which contains delayed reports of 38th Parallel incidents. These reports, which were obtained from South Korean police, are as follows:

b. South Korean police at Hanam involved in fire fight with a superior force of North Koreans 24 Feb. North Koreans had crossed 38th Parallel and stolen four cows; police pursued North Koreans into North Korea. One North Korean killed, one South Korean policeman wounded. (1)

c. Six North Koreans crossed 38th Parallel and fired on South Korean soldiers at Sosong 25 Feb. North Koreans withdrew after two-hour attack; no casualties reported. (2)

d. An estimated 40 North Koreans attacked a police box near Paekchon 27 Feb; attack was repulsed; no casualties reported. (3)

e. Detachment of North Koreans crossed the border 1 Mar near Taewon and fired on South Korean police. North Koreans withdrew after 30 minute fire fight. No casualties reported. (4)

f. Approximately 30 North Koreans crossed 38th Parallel 2 Mar and fired on 11 South Korean policemen stationed at Tumae; policemen returned fire. North Koreans withdrew after a one-hour fire fight. (5)

g. Ten North Koreans crossed the border 26 Feb and attacked a police box in vicinity of Inpung; approximately 20 rounds expended. South Korean police drove the North Koreans north of the 38th Parallel. One North Korean reported wounded. (6)

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g. Ten North Koreans crossed the border 26 Feb and attacked a police box in vicinity of Inpung; approximately 20 rounds expended. South Korean police drove the North Koreans north of the 38th Parallel. One North Korean reported wounded. (6)

h. North Korean force of undetermined strength occupied defensive position on hill 275 and fired at South Korean police south of the 38th Parallel. North Koreans reportedly used machine guns and sub-machine guns. South Korean police returned fire; no casualties reported. (7)

i. Group of North Koreans crossed 38th Parallel 26 Feb and raised flag of the "People's Republic" over building near former U.S. outpost 23. Three South Korean police fired on by North Koreans as they attempted to remove flag; firing lasted two and one-half hours. Flag removed, no casualties reported. (8)

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. The incident at Hanam is an example of how many of the border incidents are initiated. As in the past, few casualties occurred although both forces presumably expended a large quantity of ammunition, considering the duration of the fire fights. There are no indications that U.S. troops investigated any of the above incidents.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: JSPOG, G-3, and Diplomatic.

1 Incl: (Attached tc C/S Copy Only)
1 - Map "A" (Tab - 1)

SECRET

C. A. W.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

NOTED
BY C/S

HOUR: 1115
DATE: 5 March 1949

SUBJECT: Significant Political Changes in Moscow

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference WVTR news broadcast 1000 hours, 5 March 1949.

b. Broadcast stated Molotov has been reassigned and Vyschinsky has been appointed in his place as Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.

2. G-2 Comment:

a. Local news services have confirmed the above report and have announced that Vyschinsky has returned to Moscow.

b. Andrei Vyschinsky, long an associate of Stalin, first came to world notoriety as prosecutor in the Soviet purge trials in 1937. Vyschinsky has been deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR and represented the Soviet Union at several international diplomatic conferences. He is generally considered strongly anti-U.S. and his statements have indicated that he is more of an obstructionist than Molotov.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: JSPOG, G-3, Diplomatic, COMNAVFE and FEAF.

for
C. A. W.

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2. G-2 Comment:

a. Local news services have confirmed the above report and have announced that Vyschinsky has returned to Moscow.

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3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: JSPOC, G-3, Diplomatic, COMNAVFE and FEAF.

for
C. A. W.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET
SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1645
DATE: 4 March 1949

3/4

SUBJECT: Current Developments in the China Situation

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference COMNAVWESPAC, China radio 020751Z (AG No. 44803).

b. Nationalist forces in Tsingtao are reportedly to be strengthened by the 70th and 43d Armies, possibly newly designated units, when shipping becomes available. (1)

c. A large house has been made ready for occupancy by Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek on Kulangsu Island where 70 per cent of gold bullion of the National Bank of China is alleged to be presently stored. (2)

d. Chinese Nationalist Naval Academy is now functioning on limited scale at Amoy with remainder of the equipment still enroute from Tsingtao (Intell. Summary No. 2351). (3)

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. The previously reported evacuation of the 32d Army and elements of the 50th Army from Tsingtao was considered indicative of a general Nationalist withdrawal from the Tsingtao base (Intell. Summaries 2364, 2353 and 2341). The decision reached by representatives of acting President LI Tsung-jen and YEN Hsi-shan, commander of troops at Taiyuan, to test an airlift from Tsingtao to Taiyuan (Intell. Summary 2368) has possibly proven the necessity of retaining Tsingtao as an airlift base regardless of future movements of the U.S. Navy. LI's decision to operate an expensive air lift from either Shanghai or Tsingtao to Taiyuan is considered indicative of LI's determination to retain Nationalist controlled areas as bargaining points with the Communists.

b. The readying of a house for the Generalissimo on Kulangsu [illegible] indication that the Generalissimo might be considering a

d. Chinese Nationalist Naval Academy is now functioning on limited scale at Amoy with remainder of the equipment still enroute from Tsingtao (Intell. Summary No. 2351).

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. The previously reported evacuation of the 32d Army and elements of the 50th Army from Tsingtao was considered indicative of a general Nationalist withdrawal from the Tsingtao base (Intell. Summaries 2364, 2353 and 2341). The decision reached by representatives of acting President LI Tsung-jen and YEN Hsi-shan, commander of troops at Taiyuan, to test an airlift from Tsingtao to Taiyuan (Intell. Summary 2368) has possibly proven the necessity of retaining Tsingtao as an airlift base regardless of future movements of the U.S. Navy. LI's decision to operate an expensive air lift from either Shanghai or Tsingtao to Taiyuan is considered indicative of LI's determination to retain Nationalist controlled areas as bargaining points with the Communists.

b. The readying of a house for the Generalissimo on Kulangsu Island is an indication that the Generalissimo might be considering a haven other than Taiwan (Formosa). Kulangsu is the location of the majority of foreign consulates for Amoy, and if also the location of China's gold bullion stocks, would place the Generalissimo in position to retain economic control of China thus influencing the efforts of Acting-President LI Tsung-jen.

c. The Chinese Naval Academy moved from Tsingtao in anticipation of complete Nationalist evacuation of that city. Its reactivation at Amoy is an indication that present Nationalist plans do not call/relaxing defensive preparations.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: G-3, JSPOG, Diplomatic, FEAF and COMNAVFE.

1 Incl: (Attached to C/S copy only)
1 - Map "A" (Tab 1)

C. A. W.

SECRET

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PDM MAP NO. 38 FEB. 9, 1948

TAB I

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



TAB I

PDM MAP NO. 38 FEB. 9, 1948

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EASTERN CHINA

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION
GENERAL STAFF
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
CHINA SITUATION
4 MAR 1949

MAP "A"

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CAW/RSB/CFG/ab

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 2 March 1949
TIME: 1445

SUBJECT: Strikes of Electric Power Workers

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. CIC reports that All Japan Electric Industry Workers' Union (Densan) has launched a full scale offensive against the power companies' management, which has to date failed to carry out wage payments which it agreed to make late in 1948. The present Densan offensive is based on "Struggle Instruction #24" which was issued by the national headquarters of Densan on 20 Feb 49 and ordered all Densan branches to conduct strikes in order to press the union's demands.

b. Strikes have already taken place in the Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Hokuriku (North Central Honshu) regions, with branches in Shikoku and Hokuriku conducting office strikes, and branches in Hokkaido conducting both office strikes and power transmission stoppages. So-called "unlimited power transmission tactics" are also being used by Hokkaido branches, according to CIC.

c. Densan branches reported to be planning strike tactics for the near future are as follows:

(1) The Aichi Prefectural headquarters of Densan has instructed all of its chapters to conduct a series of blackout strikes after 1 Mar 49, with power stoppages to be directed primarily at large industrial consumers. Further details are presently being worked out, it is reported.

(2) The Iwate Prefecture branch of Densan is planning a series of brief blackout strikes to take place on 3, 5 and 8 Mar 49. Power stoppages will be of five-minutes duration and will occur at intervals throughout the day on each of these dates, CIC learned.

(3) The Kansai (Kobe, Osaka area) Regional headquarters of Densan has instructed all branches under its jurisdiction to conduct blackout and office strikes; details have not been released, however.

(4) On 28 Feb 49, the Tokyo Branch Headquarters of Densan ordered all employees of its 15 locals to take two days "rest leave" with pay, during the week beginning 28 Feb 49. In accordance with these instructions, CIC reports that 1,200 workers in the main office chapter of the Kanto Electric Power Distribution Co. will take simultaneous leave on 3 and 4 Mar 49. The other 14 locals have no plans for such action at present. It was also learned that the Tokyo District headquarters of Densan plans to stage blackout strikes in the near future.

2. Action:

a. CIC continues to observe and any developments of consequence will be reported.

b. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff SCAP and FEC, CCS, CTS, ESS, G-3, G-4, CPM, CG Hq & Sv Gp, G-2 8th Army, Tokyo PM.

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C.A.W.

Dep Chiefs of Staff, SCAP

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CAW/RSB/CFG/ab

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 2 March 1949
TIME: 1330

SUBJECT: Assassination Plots Against Japanese Government Leaders

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. CIC reports that a number of rumors of possible violence against key Japanese Government officials are currently being investigated. No important disclosures or leads have been developed to date.

b. Rumors of assassination plots have been prevalent since the purge of MATSUMOTO Jiichiro, former member of House of Councillors. Supporters of MATSUMOTO are seeking to have him reinstated and some of these people are considered to be responsible for the reports of possible violence against high government officials.

2. Action:

a. CIC and Japanese police are in possession of all known leads and are pursuing a full investigation. Reports of any developments will be forwarded.

b. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff SCAP and FEC, CPM, GS, DS, Tokyo PM.

for C. A. W.

CONFIDENTIAL

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SECRET
SPOT INTELLIGENCE

HOUR: 1630
DATE: 1 March 1949

SUBJECT: Current Developments in the China Situation

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Essential Elements of Information:

a. Reference ALUSNA, Nanking radio 261201 Z (AG No 43495).

b. Chinese Navy Light Cruiser Chungking, former Aurora of the British Navy, departed Wusung 25 Feb 49 without authority.

c. Vice Admiral KUEI, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Navy, unaware of the Chungking's destination or present position, states the vessel is fully fueled and is possibly proceeding to a Communist port.

d. Vice Admiral KUEI, in soliciting U.S. air search, states that the Chinese Air Force (CAF) will sink the Chungking if it is located north of Shantung.

2. G-2 Comment/Deductions:

a. This is the third possible defection of Chinese Naval vessels to the Communists in recent weeks. The icebreaker "Chang Pai" has been missing since 7 Feb and the coastal ship "Huang An" has subsequently disappeared; both vessels are believed to have defected to the Communists at North Shantung Peninsula ports.

b. The "Chungking" is the former British light cruiser "Aurora". It has a displacement of 5,000 tons, a British trained crew, and is the largest and most able fighting vessel in the Chinese Navy. The "Chungking's" armament consists of a main battery of six, six-inch guns, eight four-inch AA guns, two batteries of three-pounders, seven smaller caliber weapons, and six torpedo tubes.

c. Loss of the "Chungking" to the Communists would present a serious threat to future Nationalist military and/or naval operations.

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d. Vice Admiral KUEI, in soliciting U.S. air search, states that the Chinese Air Force (CAF) will sink the Chungking if it is located north of Shantung.

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c. Loss of the "Chungking" to the Communists would present a serious threat to future Nationalist military and/or naval operations. The serious blow to the prestige and morale of the Chinese Navy must be considered as well as the vessel's actual combat capabilities. The vessel's armament would prove a deterent to sinking by the Chinese Air Force, particularly in view of the CAF's bombing inaccuracy and general ineffectiveness in combat.

3. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: G-3, JSPOG, Diplomatic and FEAF.

J. C. A. W.

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SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

GSB
CAW/RSB/CFG/amh

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 1 March 1949
HOUR: 1230

SUBJECT: Developments in the Investigation of the Assassination of Rightist Korean Leader

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. Reference is made to Spot Intelligence Report, subject, as above, dated 1415 hours, 8 Feb 49, which reported additional developments in the case of the assassination of GEN KO SHO, prominent Korean Rightist leader, who was shot on 13 Jan 49.

b. Japanese police arrested a key suspect, KIN MEI GYOKU, on 28 Feb 49. Subject is being detained at the Ueno Police Station.

c. Results of Japanese police interrogation of KIN MEI GYOKU, who is a resident of Utsunomiya, Tockigi Prefecture, and a minor leftist leader in Korean circles, will be reported as soon as available.

2. Action:

a. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, SCAP and FEC, DS, CPM, Tokyo PM, G-3.

C.A.W.

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