




SECRET//NOFORN//20310115

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

15 January 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000290DP (S)

### JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

#### 1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bacha
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Slim Antar; Suliman Antar; Salim Antar
- Place of Birth: Algiers, Algeria (AG)
- Date of Birth: 13 November 1969
- Citizenship: Algeria
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AG-000290DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. His in processing<sup>3</sup> Body Mass Index on 09 FEB 02 was 24%. He has latent TB and is noncompliant with treatment. He went on a hunger strike in November 2002 and August 2005. He is not on any chronic medications. He has no known drug allergies.

#### 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). **If a satisfactory agreement can be reached that ensures continued detention and allows access to detainee and/or to exploited intelligence, detainee can be Transferred Out of DoD Control (TRO).** JTF GTMO

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REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)  
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previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 10 September 2004.

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** Detainee is assessed as a probable member of Al-Qaida who attended an Al-Qaida supported training camp and had direct associations with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for the Call and Combat (GSPC).<sup>1</sup> Detainee's travel to Afghanistan was facilitated through the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, United Kingdom (UK), a location known for its ties to Islamic extremists. While in Afghanistan (AF), detainee affiliated with known GIA, GSPC, and Al-Qaida members and associated facilities. Detainee admits to receiving weapons training in Afghanistan, and was identified as having attended an Al-Qaida training camp. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value.

#### **4. (S//NF) Detainees Account of Events:**

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** From January 1990 to September 1991, detainee completed mandatory service as a military policeman, rifleman, and cook in the Algerian Army and Army Reserves.<sup>2</sup> He later worked as a secretary for the Algiers city government and in the contracting department for Sonatrach, a petroleum company for which his father had also worked. He was re-hired by the city government in 1997 as a security guard. In March 1999, after he claimed to have received repeated and escalatory threats from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), detainee left Algeria for France to start a new life.<sup>3</sup> Upon his arrival in Paris, he purchased a false French passport with the name of Slim Antar.<sup>4</sup> In May 1999, detainee traveled to the UK to apply for political asylum.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> (S//NF) The GSPC and GIA are part of the Al-Qaida Global Jihad Support Network, an IICT Tier 0 target. Tier 0 targets are defined as terrorist groups that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests.

<sup>2</sup> IIR 6 034 0357 02, IIR 6 034 0356 02, 000290 KB 02-13-2002

<sup>3</sup> (S//NF) The GIA reportedly tried to coerce detainee into quitting or causing critical errors at his job to embarrass the Algerian government. The first contact occurred in 1995 and the last contact was after he had left Algeria in 1999. See 000290 MFR 16-APR-2002

<sup>4</sup> TD 314/12791-02, 000290 SIR 16-APR-2002, 000290 MFR 16-APR-2002, 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002, (S//NF) (Analyst Note: Detainee states that the availability of forged passports in the Paris suburban area of Barbes is well known among Arabs. See IIR 2 340 6379 02)

<sup>5</sup> 000290 MFR 16-APR-2002, 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002

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**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Upon arrival in London, UK, he proceeded to the Finsbury Park Mosque, where he had heard he could stay for free. Detainee listened to lectures from Abu-Hamza (Analyst Note: Abu-Hamza likely refers to Sheik Abu Hamza Al-Masri) and watched jihad recruitment videos about Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Bosnia.<sup>6</sup> Detainee then moved to Portsmouth, UK, where he worked for about two years in a hotel.<sup>7</sup> Detainee claimed his asylum application was ultimately rejected, so in 2001 detainee returned to the Finsbury Park Mosque for assistance in requesting an appeal.<sup>8</sup> While at the mosque, Mohammed Al-Masri reportedly recommended detainee travel to Afghanistan (AF) for training and to avoid deportation to Algeria. (Analyst Note: Sheik Abu Hamza Al-Masri is also known as Muhammad Al-Masri. While its inconclusive from the detainee's reporting, it is probable that he is referring to the same man.): Al-Masri told detainee that entering Afghanistan was easy, as proper documentation was not required.<sup>9</sup> In July 2001, with the assistance of Al-Masri, detainee departed the UK for Afghanistan. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Peshawar, Pakistan (PK). Once in Peshawar, detainee claimed he used contact information provided by Al-Masri to contact Mohammed Al-Afghani. Al-Afghani allegedly met detainee at his hotel and then assisted in detainee's travel to Jalalabad, AF. On 29 July 2001, detainee arrived in Jalalabad and stayed for three and a half months at the Algerian guesthouse owned and operated by Abu Jaffar.<sup>10</sup> (Analyst Note: Muhammad Al-Afghani is likely Muhammad Shah, known to have assisted Jaffar in transporting recruits across the border. Jaffar is assessed to be deceased North African Extremist Network facilitator Abu Jaffar aka Omar Chabbani.)

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** During detainee's stay at the guesthouse, he reportedly trained on small arms (including Kalashnikov and Simonov rifles) under Abu Jaffar. Detainee stated he traveled once to the Derunta training camp but did not attend training.<sup>11</sup> In November 2001, due to the impending attacks on Jalalabad by coalition forces, detainee fled to the Tora Bora mountains with other residents of the guesthouse.<sup>12</sup>

## 5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

**a. (S//NF)** Detainee claimed his group from the guesthouse hid in the caves for approximately twenty days. He denied witnessing any combat, only aircraft flying

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<sup>6</sup> 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002

<sup>7</sup> TD 314/12791-02,

<sup>8</sup> 000290 SIR 16-APR-2002, 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002

<sup>9</sup> 000290 KB 02-13-2002, IIR 2 340 6292 02, TD 314/12791-02, 000290 MFR 16-APR-2002, 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002

<sup>10</sup> 000290 302 30-MAY-2002

<sup>11</sup> 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002

<sup>12</sup> 000290 KB 02-13-2002

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overhead.<sup>13</sup> From the encampment area in Tora Bora, detainee fled to Pakistan on foot with a group of approximately 100 individuals. They hoped to contact Pakistani government representatives for refugee assistance. On 18 December 2001, Pakistani villagers reportedly led the group to a Pakistani Army unit, who took them into custody.<sup>14</sup> Detainee was then transferred to US custody on 4 January 2002.<sup>15</sup> (Analyst Note: Given the detainee's extended presence in Tora Bora, and the period and location of his capture, it is probable that detainee was involved in combat action against US/coalition forces in the Tora Bora region.) (Analyst Note: Detainee probably fled Tora Bora as a member of the large group of fighters led by senior Al-Qaida member Ibn Sheikh Al Libi. The group traveled through the Nangarhar Province and was convinced by their Pakistani host to gather in a mosque where the Pakistani forces captured them.)<sup>16</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:**

- 1 x 1000 Pakistani Rupee note
- 1 x 500 Pakistani Rupee note
- 5 x 10 Pakistani Rupee notes
- 2 x Pakistani Rupee notes
- 1 x 20 British Pound note
- 5 x 10000 Afghani notes
- 3 x 1000 Afghani notes
- 1 x Ehsan Optics glasses in a black glasses case
- 1 x Orange covered book with Arabic writing.
- 1 x Silver ring

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO:** 9 February 2002.

**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- Leaders of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, UK
- Obtaining false passports in France
- A training camp close to Jalalabad, AF, called Dar Wanta (Derunta)

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<sup>13</sup> 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002

<sup>14</sup> TD 314/00949 02, IIR 6 034 0356 02

<sup>15</sup> TD-314/00845 02

<sup>16</sup> TD-314/14605-04

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**6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account:** There are various gaps in detainee's story due to his inconsistency and evasiveness during interrogations. His route of travel parallels that of other detainees who were recruited through the Global Jihad Support Network to receive training in Afghanistan. Detainee claims to have fled Algeria to avoid death threats from the GIA, and denies knowledge of GIA or GSPC. However, throughout his travels, he associated with reported members and facilities known to be actively involved with both groups. He never identified who told him to proceed directly to the Finsbury Park Mosque to seek assistance in obtaining political asylum. He claims not to have participated in any combat against US or coalition forces, yet was present in the Tora Bora region and captured with a large group of mujahideen.

**7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is assessed as a probable member of Al-Qaida who attended an Al-Qaida supported training camp and had direct associations with GIA and the GSPC personnel. Detainee possibly attended advanced explosives training while residing in the Jalalabad guesthouse. Detainee likely participated in hostilities against US and coalition forces at Tora Bora.

- (S//NF) Detainee has received various types of jihadist/military training, and assessed to have possibly received advanced explosives training.
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted to training under Abu Jaffar while residing in the Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad, AF.<sup>17</sup> (Analyst Note: Jaffar is assessed to be Omar Chabani, aka Abu Jaffar Al Jazeeri, a senior GIA and Al-Qaida member with affiliations to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). Abu Jaffar, a principal associate of senior Al-Qaida facilitator Abu Zubaydah, operated guesthouses for extremists traveling to Afghanistan for training at Al-Qaida camps in Jalalabad and elsewhere.)<sup>18</sup>
  - (S) Detainee admits receiving training at a camp near Jalalabad on the Kalashnikov, Makarov, and other weapons.<sup>19</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee probably trained at Al-Qaida's Derunta training camp near Jalalabad.)
    - (S//NF) Assessed Al-Qaida member Abdelli Muhammad Feghoul, ISN US9AG-000292DP (AG-292), recognized detainee from the Algerian guesthouse

<sup>17</sup> IIR 6 034 0266 05, IIR 6 034 0356 02, IIR 2 340 6213 02

<sup>18</sup> TD 314/19998-02, IIR 6 832 0132 02, IIR 6 853 0137 02, IIR 6 034 0265 05, IIR 2 340 6384 02

<sup>19</sup> IIR 6 034 0356 02

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in Jalalabad. (Analyst Note: AG-292 had also been identified at Al-Qaida's Derunta training camp at the same time as detainee.)<sup>20</sup>

- ◆ (S//NF) Former detainee and assessed explosives trainee Mousa Zemmouri, ISN US9MO-000270DP (MO-270), reported seeing both detainee and AG-292 at the Derunta camp.<sup>21</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee's residence at the Jalalabad guesthouse coincides with the period that Younis Abdurrahman Chekkouri, ISN US9MO-000197DP (MO-197), conducted explosives training. MO-197 is an explosives trainer and admitted head of the military commission of the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM).<sup>22</sup> MO-197 has also been identified as a chemical and electronics specialist who, between late 2000 and September 2001, had been responsible for providing training on the use of electronic components for fabricating explosive devices at the Algerian house, assessed to be the Algerian guesthouse run by detainee's associate, Abu Jaffar.<sup>23</sup> (Analyst Note: It is possible detainee attended explosives training; however, there is no additional reporting to support that assessment.)
- (S) Detainee received basic military, weapons and military police training during his conscription with the Algerian Army in 1990.<sup>24</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee's prior military training would make him an attractive candidate for recruitment and may have permitted him to proceed through basic training faster than inexperienced recruits. This could have provided the opportunity for the detainee to attend advanced training, such as explosives training.)
- (S//NF) Detainee was recruited and facilitated through the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, UK, a known Al-Qaida/extremist center for jihadists.<sup>25</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted that the Finsbury Park Mosque also facilitated movement of persons wishing to wage jihad in Afghanistan.<sup>26</sup>
  - (S//NF) Sheik Abu Hamza Al-Masri recruited detainee, and arranged for his travel and training in Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup> (Analyst Note: Sheik Abu Hamza al-Masri is the former Imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque and currently in British custody. He

<sup>20</sup> IIR 6 034 1162 03, IIR 2 340 6213 02, TD-314/39402-02

<sup>21</sup> IIR 6 034 1338 03

<sup>22</sup> (S//NF) (Analyst Note: The GICM, like the GIA, is a member of the Global Jihad Support Network, a Tier 0 Counterterrorism Target.)

<sup>23</sup> TD-314/01037-03, TD 314/19998-02, TD 314/39932 02, TD-314/06092 02, TD-314/01038-03, TD-314/40214-02, TD-314/31852-03, TD-314/39402-02, IIR 6 034 0300 02

<sup>24</sup> KB 132022ZFEB02, IIR 6 034 0356 02

<sup>25</sup> IIR 6 034 0752 02, IIR 6 034 0200 03, IIR 6 034 0200 03, IIR 6 034 0842 02, IIR 6 034 0053 02, IIR 6 034 0843 02, IIR 6 034 0081 03

<sup>26</sup> IIR 2 340 6379 02

<sup>27</sup> 000290 KB 02-13-2002, IIR 2 340 6292 02, TD 314/12791-02, 000290 MFR 16-APR-2002, 000290 FM302 30-MAY-2002, TD-314/00949-02

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reportedly has close ties with the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)<sup>28</sup>, Al-Qaida, and other extremists groups.<sup>29</sup>

**c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct:** The detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and occasionally hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 23 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 2 December 2005 when he began calling a guard derogatory names during a waist line check as part of a search. The detainee assaulted a guard on 17 March 2005 by throwing his shoe and hitting a guard in the face. Earlier that same day the detainee said to a guard, "Sh-t on America" and "Death to the United States." Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined for include using provoking words and gestures with the guards, failure to follow instructions/camp rules, assault, cross block talking, damage to property, and possession of non-weapon type contraband. The detainee has 6 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2005, which include 2 threats towards guards and a major assault. He was a major participant in the voluntary total fast, missing over a hundred meals according to guard notes in DIMS. On the morning of 24 November 2005, AG-290 declared a voluntary total fast. However, his fast lasted less than two hours as the detainee later claimed that guards had helped him so he would eat.

#### 8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- a. (S) Assessment:** JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value.
- b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee was recruited and facilitated through the Finsbury Park Mosque and its Imam, Sheik Abu Hamza al-Masri, who is currently in British custody. Detainee admittedly trained under Omar Chabani, a senior GIA and Al-Qaida member with affiliations to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). He admittedly resided at an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad known for facilitating trainees to Derunta training camp. His placement at the Jalalabad guesthouse would have given him access to the students and trainers of the explosives course. Detainee was captured in the Tora Bora region.
- c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee claims he left Algeria to due to pressure from the GIA, but his facilitation and travel suggest he was already affiliated with North

<sup>28</sup> (S//NF) The IAA is an IICT Tier 1 counterterrorism target. Tier 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.

<sup>29</sup> IIR 1 663 5269 02, IIR 6 044 4225 05, IIR 2 340 6044 02

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
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African Extremist groups, like GIA and GSPC. He has provided very little information on his contacts and activities prior to leaving Algeria. It is possible detainee used an alias in Afghanistan that has not yet been identified. Identification of detainee's alias is likely to yield additional details regarding detainee's activities, such as advance training, and associations in Afghanistan. Due to the various gaps and inconsistencies in detainee's account, his intelligence value and role within the Al-Qaida network is difficult to assess. Detainee is probably a committed, trained mujahid but unlikely to have served in a critical or significant role for Al-Qaida.

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Algerian safe houses in Jalalabad, AF
  - Omar Chabani aka Abu Jaffar
  - Personnel staying at safe houses
- Guesthouse in Jalalabad known as the House of the Algerians
- Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
- Finsbury Park Mosque and its connections to the GSPC and GIA.
- Training camps in Afghanistan

**9. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 24 February 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

  
JAY W. HOOD  
Major General, USA  
Commanding