





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

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
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# MESSAGE

FROM THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,  
TRANSMITTING  
*A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR,*  
ACCOMPANIED WITH  
SUNDRY DOCUMENTS;  
IN OBEEDIENCE TO A  
RESOLUTION OF THE 31st OF DECEMBER LAST,  
REQUESTING SUCH INFORMATION AS  
MAY TEND TO EXPLAIN THE CAUSES  
OF THE  
FAILURE OF THE ARMS OF THE U. STATES  
ON THE  
*NORTHERN FRONTIER.*

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FEBRUARY 3, 1814.

Read, and ordered to lie on the table.

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**MESSAGE.**


*To the House of Representatives of the  
United States.*

I TRANSMIT to the house of representatives  
a report of the secretary of war, complying with their  
resolution of the 31st of December last.

**JAMES MADISON.**

January 31st, 1814.





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**REPORT.**  

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
January 25, 1814.

**SIR,**

IN compliance with the resolution of the house of representatives of the 31st of December last, requesting such information, (not improper to be communicated) as may tend to explain the causes of the failure of the arms of the United States, on the northern frontier, I have the honor to submit the following documents, and to offer to you, sir, the assurance of the very high respect with which I am

Your most obedient,

And very humble servant,

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

*The President.*

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Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major  
General Dearborn, &c.

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*Note presented to the Cabinet on the 8th February,  
1813, by the Secretary of War.*

THE enemy's force at Montreal and its dependencies has been stated at 16,000 effectives. It more probably does not exceed 10 or 12,000. The militia part of it may amount to one sixth of the whole. Is it probable that we shall be able to open the campaign on lake Champlain with a force competent to meet and dislodge this army before the 15th of May? I put the question on this date, because it is not to be doubted but that the enemy will then be reinforced, and, of course, that new relations in point of strength will be established between us. Our present regular force on both sides of lake Champlain does not exceed 2,400 men. The addition made to it must necessarily consist of recruits, who, for a time, will not be better than militia; and when we consider that the recruiting service is but beginning, and that we now approach the middle of February, the conclusion is, I think, safe, that we cannot move in this direction and thus early (say 1st of May,) with effect.

It then remains to choose between a course of entire inaction, because incompetent to the main attack, or one having a secondary but still an important object; such would be the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott, on the St. Lawrence and lake Erie, including the towns of Kingston and York, and the forts, George and Erie.

On this line of frontier the enemy have,

At Prescott,	800
At Kingston,	600
At George and Erie, &c.	1,200

Making a total (of regular troops) of . . . 2,100

Kingston and Prescott, and the destruction of the British ships at the former, would present the first object; York and the frigates said to be building there, the second; George and Erie the third.

The force to be employed on this service should not be less than 6,000 effective regular troops, because in this first enterprise of a second campaign nothing must, if possible, be left to chance.

The time for giving execution to this plan is clearly indicated by the following facts:

1st. The river St. Lawrence is not open to the purposes of navigation before the 15th of May: And

2d. Lake Ontario is free from all obstruction arising from ice by the 1st day of April.

Under these circumstances we shall have six weeks for the expedition before it be possible for sir George Prevost to give it any disturbance.

Should this outline be approved, the details for the service can be made and expedited in forty-eight hours.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary at War to  
Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

February 10, 1813.

"I have the president's orders to communicate to you, as expeditiously as possible, the outline of campaign which you will immediately institute and pursue against Upper Canada:

"1st. 4,000 troops will be assembled at Sackett's Harbor.

"2d. 3,000 will be brought together at Buffalo and its vicinity.

"3d. The former of these corps will be embarked and transported under convoy of the fleet to *Kingston*, where they will be landed. *Kingston*, its garrison, and the British ships wintering in the harbor of that place, will be its first object. Its second object will be *York*, (the capital of Upper Canada,) the stores collected and the two frigates building there. Its third object, forts *George* and *Eric*, and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last, there will be a co-operation between the two corps. The composition of these will be as follows:

1st. Bloomfield's brigade, . . . . .	1,436
2d. Chandler's ditto, . . . . .	1,044
3d. Philadelphia detachment, . . . . .	400
4th. Baltimore ditto, . . . . .	300
5th. Carlisle ditto, . . . . .	200
6th. Greenbush ditto, . . . . .	400
7th. Sackett's Harbor ditto, . . . . .	250

---

4,030

8th. Several corps at Buffalo under the command of colonel Porter and the recruits belonging thereto, . . . . . 3,000

---

Total, . . . . . 7,030

"The *time* for executing the enterprise will be governed by the opening of lake Ontario, which usually takes place about the first of April.

"The adjutant general has orders to put the more southern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. The two brigades on lake Champlain you will move so as to give them full time to reach their place of destination by the 25th of March. The route by *Elizabeth* will, I think, be the shortest and best.

They will be replaced by some new raised regiments from the east.

“ You will put into your movements as much privacy as may be compatible with their execution. They may be masked by reports that Sackett's Harbor is in danger, and that the principal effort will be made on the Niagara in co-operation with general Harrison. As the route to Sackett's Harbor and to Niagara is for a considerable distance the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders, that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at lake Champlain.”

---

ALBANY, February, 18, 1813.

SIR,

Your despatches of the 10th were received last evening. Nothing shall be omitted on my part in endeavouring to carry into effect the expedition proposed.

I fear the very large magazines of provisions on lake Champlain will be unsafe unless a considerable part is removed at some distance from the store, or a considerable force is assembled at Burlington and vicinity by the time the two brigades shall move. Another motive for having a large force on that lake, will be, that of preventing the enemy from sending almost his whole force from Lower Canada to Kingston, as soon as our intentions shall be so far known as to afford satisfactory evidence of our intentions in relation to the conquest of Upper Canada; and unless an imposing force shall menace Lower Canada, the enemies whole force may be concentrated in Upper Canada, and require as large a force to operate against them as would be necessary to operate towards Montreal. It may be advisable to draw out a body of New Hampshire militia to serve for a short time, in Vermont. You will judge of the expediency

of such a measure ; but I do not believe that there will be a sufficient body of new raised troops in season for taking the place of the two brigades.

I this day received a letter from colonel Porter, in which he informs me that general Winchester had arrived at Niagara, with such of his troops as had escaped the tomahawk, and that they were crossing over on parole ; he states that at the close of the action every man who by wounds or other causes were unable to march were indiscriminately put to death. Such outrageous conduct will require serious attention, especially when British troops are concerned in the action.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,  
H. DEARBORN.

Honorable John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
February 24, 1813.

SIR,

Before I left New York, and till very recently since my arrival here, I was informed, through various channels, that a winter or spring attack upon Kingston was not practicable, on account of the snow, which generally lays to the depth of two, and sometimes of three feet, over all that northern region during those seasons. Hence it is, that in the plan recently communicated, it was thought safest and best to make the attack by a combination of naval and military means, and to approach our object, not by directly crossing the St. Lawrence on the ice, but by setting out from Sackett's Harbor, in concert with, and under convoy of the fleet. Later information differs from that on which this plan was founded ; and the



fortunate issue of major Forsyth's last expedition shews, that small enterprises at least, may be successfully executed at the present season. The advices given in your letter of the instant, has a bearing also on the same point and to the same effect. If the enemy be really weak at Kingston and approachable by land and ice, Pike (who will be a brigadier in a day or two) may be put into motion from lake Champlain, by the Chateauge route, (in sleighs) and with the *two* brigades, cross the St. Lawrence where it may be thought best, destroy the armed ships and seize and hold Kingston until you can join him with the other corps destined for the future objects of the expedition; and if pressed by Prevost, before such junction can be effected, he may withdraw himself to Sackett's Harbor, or other place of security on our side of the line. This would be much the shorter road to the object, and perhaps the safer one, as the St. Lawrence is now every where well bridged, and offers no obstruction to either attack or retreat. Such a movement will, no doubt, be soon known to Prevost, and cannot but disquiet him. The dilemma it presents, will be serious. Either he must give up his western posts, or to save them, he must carry himself in force, and promptly, to Upper Canada. In the latter case, he will be embarrassed for subsistence. His convoys of provision will be open to our attacks, on a line of nearly one hundred miles, and his position at Montreal much weakened. Another decided advantage will be, to let us into the secret of his real strength. If he be able to make heavy detachments to cover, or to recover Kingston, and to protect his supplies, and after all maintain himself at Montreal and on lake Champlain, he is stronger than I imagined, or than any well authenticated reports make him to be.

With regard to our magazines, my belief is, that we have nothing to fear; because, as stated above, Prevost's attention must be given to the western posts

and to movements against them. He will not dare to advance northwardly while a heavy corps is operating on his flank and menacing his line of communication. But on the other supposition, they (the magazines) may be easily secured; 1st, by taking them to Willsborough; or 2d, to Burlington; or 3d, by a militia call, to protect them where they are. Orders are given for the march of the eastern volunteers, excepting Ulmer's regiment and two companies of axe men, sent to open the route to the Chamdiere.

The southern detachments will be much stronger than I had supposed. That from Philadelphia will mount up nearly to 1000 effectives.

With great respect,

Dear General,

I am yours faithfully,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General Dearborn.

HEAD QUARTERS, ALBANY,

February 25, 1813.

SIR,

I this day received by express from colonel Macomb, the inclosed account from major Forsyth. His known zeal for a small partizan warfare, has induced me to give him repeated caution against such measures, on his part, as would probably produce such retaliating strokes as he would be unable to resist; but I fear my advice has not been as fully attended to as could have been wished. He is an excellent officer, and under suitable circumstances would be of important service.

I have requested the governor to order general Brown out with three or four hundred of such militia as he can soonest assemble, to join Forsyth; and I

have ordered colonel Pike, with four hundred of his command, to proceed in sleighs by what is considered the shortest and best route, to the neighbourhood of Ogdensburg, or to Sacketts Harbor. On his arrival at Potsdam, or Canton or Russel, he will be able to communicate with Brown or Forsyth, or both, and act with them, as circumstances may require.

The affair at Ogdensburg will be a fair excuse for moving troops in that direction; and by this movement it will be ascertained whether the same route will be the best in future: the distance by that route from Plattsburg to Sacketts Harbor, is but little more than one half of what it would be by the route proposed, and I am assured by a gentleman, whom I can confide in, that there will be no difficulty by that route.

Chauncey has not yet returned from New York. I am satisfied that *if he had arrived as soon as I had expected him, we might have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice*, but his presence was necessary for having the aid of the seamen and marines.

From a letter received this day from colonel Porter at Niagara, it appears that the enemy were preparing to strike at Black Rock.

I can give him no assistance.

I am sir, with respect and esteem,

Your obedient humble servant.

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

February 22, 1813.

SIR,

I have only time to inform that the enemy, with a very superior force, succeeded in taking Ogdensburg this morning about nine o'clock. They had

about two men to our own, exclusive of Indians. Numbers of the enemy are dead on the field. Not more than twenty of our men killed and wounded; lieutenant Beard is among the latter.

I have made a saving retreat of about eight or nine miles. I could not get all the wounded off.

We have killed two of the enemy to one of ours killed by them. We want ammunition and some provisions sent on to us, also sleighs for the wounded.

If you can send me *three hundred men all shall be re-taken*, and Prescott too, or I will lose my life in the attempt. I shall write you more particularly to-day.

Yours, with due respect,

**BENJAMIN FORSYTH.**

*capt. rifle reg. commanding.*

Col. Macomb, Sackett's Harbor.

---

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary at War, dated*

ALBANY, February 26, 1813.

"Having received information that sir George Prevost was moving towards Upper Canada with considerable force, but not such as can be fully relied on, I have, however, ordered 400 more of Pike's command to follow the first detachment without delay."

---

HEAD-QUARTERS, SACKETT'S HARBOR,

March 3, 1813.

SIR,

Having been informed that sir George Prevost had adjourned the legislature at Quebec, assigning as

the motive that his majesty's service required his presence in Upper Canada, and having received certain information of his passing Montreal and having arrived at Kingston, I set out immediately for this place, having ordered the force at Greenbush, and part of colonel Pike's command in sleighs, for this place. I arrived here in fifty-two hours. I am now satisfied, from such information as is entitled to full credit, that a force has been collected from Quebec, Montreal and Upper Canada, of from six to eight thousand men, at Kingston, and that we may expect an attack within forty-eight hours and perhaps sooner.

The militia have been called in and every effort will, I trust, be made to defend the post; but, I fear neither the troops from Greenbush nor Plattsburgh will arrive in season to afford their aid. I have sent expresses to have them hurried on.

Commodore Chauncey has not arrived; he will be here to-morrow. The armed vessels have not been placed in the positions intended by the commodore.

Our total force may be estimated at nearly three thousand of all descriptions.

Sir George Prevost is represented to be determined to effect his object at all events, and will undoubtedly make every effort in his power for the purpose.

We shall, I trust, give him a warm reception; but, if his force is such as is expected and should make an attack before our troops arrive from Greenbush and Plattsburgh at Sackett's Harbor, the result may at least be doubtful.

I have the honor, sir, to be,  
With the highest respect and consideration,

Your obedient humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, March 9, 1813.

SIR,

I have not yet had the honor of a visit from sir G. Prevost. His whole force is concentrated at Kingston, probably amounting to six or seven thousand; about three thousand of them regular troops. The ice is good, and we expect him every day, and every measure for preventing a surprise is in constant activity. The troops from Greenbush (upwards of 400) have arrived. I have heard nothing from Pike: he should have been here yesterday. I have sent three expresses to meet him; neither has returned. I have suspicions of the express employed by the quarter master general to convey the orders to Pike: the earliest measures were taken for conveying a duplicate of his orders. I hope to hear from him to-day. His arrival with eight hundred good troops would be very important at this time. The enemy are apprized of his movement.

I begin to entertain some doubts whether sir George will venture to attack us; but shall not relax in being prepared to give him a decent reception.

I should feel easier if Pike should arrive in season. I am in want of officers of experience. My whole force, exclusive of seamen and marines, who will be confined to the vessels and have no share in the action until my force shall be worsted, amounts to nearly 3000, exclusive of 450 militia at Brownville, and on the road leading from Kingston by land. Within two or three days I may have 300 more militia from Rome and Utica.

The ice will not probably be passable more than from six to ten days longer; it is not usually passable after the 15th of March. This unexpected movement of the enemy will effectually oppose the movements contemplated on our part, and I shall not think it advisable to order general Chandler to move at present. As soon as the fall of this place shall be decided, we

shall be able to determine on other measures. If we hold this place we will command the lake, and be able to act in concert with the troops at Niagara, while Chandler's brigade, with such other troops as may assemble in Vermont, may induce a return of a considerable part of those troops that have left Lower Canada.

When I ordered Pike to move I directed general Chandler to have the provision at Plattsburgh moved to Burlington. There was but a small proportion of our magazines at Plattsburgh; they are principally at Burlington and White Hall.

Yours with respect and esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary at War, dated*

March 14, 1813.

“From the most recent and probable information I have obtained, I am induced to believe that sir George Prevost has concluded that it is too late to attack this place. He undoubtedly meditated a coup-de-main against the shipping here. All the apprehension is now at Kingston. Sir George has visited York and Niagara, and returned to Montreal. Several bodies of troops have lately passed up from Montreal; but such precautions have been taken to prevent their number being ascertained, as to render it impossible to form any accurate opinion of their forces, or even to imagine very nearly what they amount to. From various sources I am perfectly satisfied, that they are not in sufficient force to venture an attack on this place, knowing as they do that we have collected a fine body of troops from Greenbush and

Plattsburgh, and that the militia have been called in. We are probably just strong enough on each side to defend; but not in sufficient force to hazard an offensive movement. The difference of attacking and being attacked, as it regards the contiguous posts of Kingston and Sackett's Harbor, cannot be estimated at less than three or four thousand men, arising from the circumstance of militia acting merely on the defensive. I have ordered general Chandler with the 9th, 21st and 25th regiments to march for this place; Clark's regiment and a company of artillery to be left at Burlington for the present, where the regiment will be filled in a few weeks. I have ordered the recruits for the three regiments that will march for this place to be sent to Greenbush, and colonel Larned is ordered there to receive them with Bachus's dismounted dragoons and other detachments from Pittsfield."

---

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary at War, dated*

SACKETT'S HARBOR,

March 16th, 1813.

"It was yesterday unanimously determined in a council of the principal officers, including commodore Chauncey, that we ought not, under existing circumstances, to make an attempt on Kingston, *before the naval force can act*. The harbors in this lake will not probably be open so as to admit of the vessels being moved until about the 15th of April."

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*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary at War, without date; proposing to pass by Kingston, and attack York, &c.*

"To take or destroy the armed vessels at York, will give us the complete command of the



lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him ten or twelve hundred troops, to be commanded by Pike; take York, from thence proceed to Niagara, and attack fort George by land and water, while the troops at Buffalo cross over and carry forts Erie and Chippewa, and join those at fort George; and then collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature deliberation, the above was considered by commodore Chauncey and myself as the most certain of ultimate success."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary at War, to Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

March 29, 1813.

"Your despatches of the 11th and 14th instant, from Sackett's Harbor, and one of the 22d, from Albany, have been received. The correspondence between you and major Murray, in relation to an exchange of prisoners, has been referred to the department of state. The alteration in the plan of campaign, so as to make Kingston the last object, instead of making it the first, would appear to be necessary, or at least proper; but the force assigned to the attack of the upper posts, is believed to be too small.

"Accident may prevent a co-operation of the corps at Buffalo. That sent from Sackett's Harbor should have in itself the power of reducing forts George and Erie, and holding in check the militia who may be sent to support them. The ships can give little aid in the business, except merely in covering the landing. Double the number you purpose sending,

would not be too many. Various considerations recommend the employment of a large and decisive force, and none, that I can think of, dissuade from it. If our first step in the campaign, and in the quarter from which most is expected, should fail, the disgrace of our arms will be complete. The public will lose all confidence in us, and we shall even cease to have any in ourselves. The party who first opens a campaign, has many advantages over his antagonist, all of which, however, are the result of his being able to carry his whole force against a part of his enemy's. Washington carried his whole force against the Hessians in New Jersey, and beating them, recovered that moral strength, that self-confidence, which he had lost by many preceding disasters. We are now in that state of prostration that he was in, after he crossed the Delaware; but, like him, we may soon get on our legs again, if we are able to give some hard blows at the opening of the campaign. In this we cannot fail, provided the force we employ against his western posts be sufficiently heavy. They must stand or fall by their own strength. They are perfectly isolated and out of the reach of reinforcements: send therefore a force that shall overwhelm them—that shall leave nothing to chance. If I had not another motive, I would carry my whole strength, merely that their first service should be a successful one. The good effects of this will be felt throughout the campaign.

“I have hastened to give you these thoughts, under a full conviction of their usefulness; and shall only add, that there is no drawback upon this policy. When the fleet and army are gone, we have nothing at Sackett's Harbour to guard, nor will the place present an object to the enemy.

“How then would it read, that we had lost our object on the Niagara, while we had another brigade at Sackett's Harbour doing nothing?”

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to  
the Secretary at War, dated*

ALBANY, April 5, 1813.

"I have this day been honored with your letter of the 29th ultimo. As troops cannot with safety be transported from Sackett's Harbor to York or Niagara in *batteaux* or flat bottomed boats, I must depend on commodore Chauncey's armed vessels, with one or two other sloops, for the transportation of our troops, and it was considered doubtful whether more than twelve hundred men could be so conveyed, which number I considered amply sufficient for the two first objects contemplated; but as many as can be transported with safety shall be sent. The co-operation of the troops under general Lewis may be relied on. Boyd and Winder are with him, and nothing but outrageous gales of wind can prevent success.

"The troops from Maryland and Pennsylvania arrived last evening. They, with the other detachments at Greenbush, will proceed towards lake Ontario within two or three days. As soon as practicable, after sending off the troops, I shall move westward."

WAR DEPARTMENT,

April 19, 1813.

SIR,

Taking for granted that general Prevost has not been able, or willing, to reinforce Malden, Erie, and George, and that he has assembled at Kingston a force of *six or eight thousand* men, (as stated by you) we must conclude that he means to hazard his more western posts, shorten his line of defence, and place his right flank on lake Ontario.

This arrangement is, no doubt, in consequence of our preparations at Sackett's Harbor. These gave

firm reason to fear that we meant to cut his line of communication at that point, which, so long as he has a hope of keeping the command of the lake, is one of infinite importance to his views.

The danger, however, now is, that in the event of the success of our present expedition, he may lose this hope, abandon Kingston and concentrate his forces at Montreal.

This event is, in my opinion, so probable, as to render necessary a communication of the views of the president, in relation to the movements on your part, (which shall be subsequent to those now making) on two suppositions:

- 1st. That the enemy will keep his ground at Kingston; and
- 2d. That he will abandon that ground and withdraw from Montreal.

On the first supposition, there is no difficulty in either selecting our object, or the means of pursuing it. We ought to destroy the communication between Kingston and Montreal, by interposing a competent force between the two, and assailing the former by a joint operation of military and naval means.

Local circumstances favor this project. A few armed boats on lake St. Francis, stops all intercourse by water; in which case, cannon, military stores and articles of subsistence in *bulk*, cannot be conveyed between Montreal and Kingston.

From lake Ontario to Ogdensburg we command the navigation of the St. Lawrence by our armed vessels, and under their protection, our army can be passed over and established on the Canada side at the point deemed most proper for attack.

On the other supposition, that the British garrison is withdrawn from Kingston to Montreal, the old question of approaching him by lake Champlain, or by the St. Lawrence, recurs, and ought now to be settled, so that there should be no unnecessary pause in

our operations at a later and more momentous period of the campaign.

The circumstances in favor of the St. Lawrence route, are these :

1st. Our force is now upon it.

2d. It furnishes a conveyance by water the whole distance.

3d. The enemy is not fortified on the St. Lawrence side, and has on it no strong out-posts, which must be forced, in order to secure our flanks and rear, while engaged in the main attack ; and

4th. By approaching his *flank*, (as this route enables you to do) instead of his *front*, we compel him to change his position, in which case, he must do one of four things : either he must occupy the north side of the river and give up the south, or he must occupy the south side and give up the north, or he must confine himself to the island and give up both sides ; or lastly, he must occupy both sides, and in this case expose himself to be beaten in detail.

None of these advantages are to be found in approaching him by the other route. Our troops are not upon it ; we cannot move by water ; his out-posts are fortified, and must be carried by assault ; his front is the only assailable point, and that is covered by the St. Lawrence ; our attack must be made exactly where he wishes it to be made ; all his arrangements and defences are, of course, in full operation, nor is he compelled to disturb them in the smallest degree. In a word, we must fight him on *his* previous dispositions and plans, and not on *any* of *our own*.

These reasons are deemed conclusive for preferring the route of the St. Lawrence, and your measures (subsequent to your present expedition) will, therefore, be conformed to this view of the subject.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General Dearborn.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to  
the Secretary at War, dated*

SACKETT'S HARBOR,

April 23, 1813.

"The troops embarked yesterday. Every vessel is crowded with as many men as possible; the total number 1600, of the best men. I trust we shall sail within one or two hours. If the sails for a new vessel arrive within a day or two, and a small sloop from Oswego, which ought to have been here five days since, 150 more men will go in them. The ice did not move out until the 19th; I arrived on the 20th."

HEAD QUARTERS, YORK, UPPER CANADA,

April 28, 1813.

SIR,

After a detention of some days, by adverse winds, we arrived here yesterday morning, and at 8 o'clock commenced landing our troops about three miles westward of the town, and one and a half from the enemy's works. The wind was high and in an unfavorable direction for our boats, which prevented the troops landing at a clear field (the ancient site of the French fort Tarento.) The unfavorable wind prevented as many of the armed vessels from taking such positions as would as effectually cover our landing as they otherwise would have done; but every thing that could be done was effected. Our riflemen under major Forsyth first landed, under a heavy fire from Indians and other troops. General Sheaffe commanded in person. He had collected his whole force in the woods near where the wind obliged our troops to land, consisting of about 700 regulars and militia, and 100 Indians. Major Forsyth was supported, as

promptly as possible, with other troops ; but the contest was sharp and severe for near half an hour. The enemy was repulsed by a far less number than their own, and as soon as general Pike landed with 7 or 800 men, and the remainder of the troops were pushing for the shore, the enemy retreated to their works ; and as soon as the whole of the troops had landed and formed on the clear ground intended for the first landing, they advanced through a thick wood to the open ground near the enemy's works, and after carrying one battery by assault, were moving on in columns towards the main works ; when the head of the columns was within about sixty rods of the enemy, a tremendous explosion occurred from a large magazine prepared for the purpose, which discharged such immense quantities of stone as to produce a most unfortunate effect on our troops. I have not yet been able to collect the returns of our killed and wounded, but our loss by the explosion must, I fear, exceed one hundred ; and among them I have to lament the loss of the brave and excellent officer brigadier general Pike, who received such a contusion from a large stone as terminated his valuable life within a few hours. His loss will be severely felt. Previous to the explosion the enemy had retired into the town, excepting a party of regular troops, which did not retire early enough to avoid the shock ; it is said that upwards of forty of them were destroyed. General Sheaffe moved off with the regular troops and left directions with the commanding officer of the militia to make the best terms he could. In the mean time, all further resistance on the part of the enemy ceased, and the outlines of a capitulation were agreed on. As soon as I was informed of general Pike's being wounded, I went on shore. I had been induced to confide the immediate command of the troops in action to general Pike from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being deprived of the honor, which he highly appreciated. Every move-

ment was under my view. Our troops behaved with great firmness and deserve much applause, especially those who were first engaged, under circumstances that would have tried the firmness of veterans. Our loss in the action in the morning and in carrying the first battery, was not great, probably about 50 killed and wounded; among them were a full proportion of officers; and although the enemy had a decided advantage in point of numbers and position at the commencement, their loss was greater than ours, particularly in officers.

It was with the greatest exertion that the small vessels of the fleet could work into the harbor against a gale of wind directly ahead; but as soon as they got in contact with the batteries a tremendous cannonade commenced from 24 and 32 pounders, and was kept up without intermission under a heavy fire from two batteries until the enemy's batteries were carried or blown up by the explosion, which undoubtedly had a powerful effect on the enemy. I am under the greatest obligations to commodore Chauncey for his able and indefatigable exertions in every possible manner that could give facility and effect to the expedition. He is equally estimable for deliberate, sound judgment, bravery and industry. The government could not have made a more fortunate selection for the important trust he holds. Unfortunately, the enemy's armed ship the "Prince Regent" left this place for Kingston four days before we arrived. A large ship on the stocks, and nearly planked up, with a large store of naval stores, were set on fire by the enemy soon after the explosion of the magazine. There are no vessels fit for use in the harbor. A considerable quantity of military stores and provisions remained. We shall not possess the means of transporting the prisoners from this place, and must of course leave them on parole. I hope we shall so far complete the necessary measures at this place in the course of this day as to be able to sail to-morrow for Niagara, by which



route I send this by a small vessel, with notice to general Lewis of our approach.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Honorable John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA,

May 3, 1813.

SIR,

I arrived at this place last evening with commodore Chauncey in his fast sailing schooner, the *Lady of the Lake*: we left the fleet with the troops on board in York road. The wind has been so unfavorable as to render it impracticable to come to this place with any prospect of effecting a landing.

I have had a conference with generals Lewis, Boyd and Winder, at which commodore Chauncey was present. I did not find the preparations at this place as complete as could have been expected; but as soon as the wind will permit, we shall make a descent. Commodore Chauncey has returned to the fleet, and will sail for this place as soon as he shall judge the wind favorable for crossing and landing the troops. In the mean time we shall be preparing to act in concert. General Boyd will take command of the brigade lately commaded by general Pike. We find the weather on this lake at this season of the year, such as to render naval operations extremely tedious and uncertain, especially when we have to debark troops on the shore of the lake, where there are no harbors. Westerly winds are necessary: we have none but easterly. I have no doubt of ultimate success, unless harrassed and dispersed by the elements.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded. You will observe the loss was very small excepting that produced by the explosion. As nearly as I have been able to ascertain, the loss of the enemy amounted from ninety to one hundred killed, two hundred wounded and upwards of three hundred prisoners. I have not been able to ascertain precisely the number of the militia put on their parole; I presume it could not be less than five hundred. There was an immense depot of naval and military stores. York was the principal depot for Niagara and Detroit; and notwithstanding the immense amount which was destroyed by them, we found more than we could bring off. General Sheaffe's baggage and papers fell into my hands. These papers are a valuable acquisition: I have not had time for a full examination of them. A scalp was found in the executive and legislative chamber, suspended near the speaker's chair, in company with the mace and other emblems of royalty. I intend sending it to you with a correct account of the facts relative to the place and situation in which it was found.

With great respect,

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary at War.

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA,

May 13, 1813.

SIR,

Commodore Chauncey with the fleet and troops arrived here on the evening of the 8th, and in the

course of the night the troops were debarked in a very sickly and depressed state. A large proportion of the officers and men were sickly and debilitated. It was deemed expedient to give them time to recruit their health and spirits, and in the mean time for the fleet to return to Sackett's Harbor, and take on board one thousand additional troops;—and orders were despatched to Utica, Rome and Oswego, to have the troops at those places forwarded here in boats from Oswego. Backus's corps of light dragoons, about four hundred, principally dismounted, and five hundred of the 11th regiment from Burlington, have been ordered to Sackett's Harbour. These, with three hundred volunteers, and a full company of artillery, are to form a garrison at that place. Additional cannon will be mounted. General Brown of the militia has been requested to hold three or four hundred men of the immediate vicinity, in readiness to aid the garrison, in the event of any attack. My intention is to collect the main body of the troops at this place, and as soon as commodore Chauncey returns, and the forces from Oswego arrive, to commence operations in as spirited and effectual a manner as practicable. This change in the proposed system of operations, has been rendered necessary by a long series of the most unfortunate winds and weather that could have occurred at this season, and such as could not have been contemplated.

Colonel Scott reached this yesterday in boats from Oswego, with three hundred men. He was seven days wind bound in different places, and narrowly escaped the loss of his boats and men. I had expected him on the 3d. I had almost given him up for lost.

General Harrison is invested; and presuming on the uncertainty of events, I shall make calculation of a reinforcement to the enemy of British and Indians from Detroit. We shall be prepared for them:

and I shall consider a concentration of their force rather as a fortunate circumstance than otherwise.

I observed in a former letter, that on my arrival here on the evening of the 2d, the preparations for an immediate co-operation, were not as complete as could have been expected. General Lewis was at 14 miles distance. Winder, with his command, was at Black Rock. The boats had not been transported from Schlosser; not one of the scows completed; the heavy guns and mortars not placed in the batteries; two 18 and two 12 pounders not mounted; but with all these defects we should have made an attack on the 4th or 5th, if the fleet had arrived with the troops in health, on the 3d, as was expected.

I have the honour to be, sir,

Most respectfully, your

Obedient and humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, UPPER CANADA.

May 27, 1813.

SIR,

The light troops under the command of colonel Scott and major Forsyth landed this morning at 9 o'clock. Major general Lewis's division, with colonel Porter's command of light artillery, supported them. General Boyd's brigade landed immediately after the light troops, and generals Winder and Chandler followed in quick succession. The landing was warmly and obstinately disputed by the British forces; but the coolness and intrepidity of our troops soon compelled them to give ground in every direction.

General Chandler with the reserve (composed of his brigade and colonel Macomb's artillery) covered the whole. Commodore Chauncey had made the most judicious arrangements for silencing the enemy's batteries near the point of landing. The army is under the greatest obligation to that able naval commander, for his indefatigable exertions, in co-operation in all its important movements, and especially in its operations this day. Our batteries succeeded in rendering fort George untenable; and when the enemy had been beaten from his position, and found it necessary to re-enter it, after firing a few guns, and setting fire to the magazines, which soon exploded, moved off rapidly by different routes. Our light troops pursued them several miles. The troops having been under arms from one o'clock in the morning, were too much exhausted for any further pursuit. We are now in possession of fort George and its immediate dependencies; to-morrow we shall proceed further on. The behaviour of our troops, both officers and men, entitles them to the highest praise; and the difference in our loss with that of the enemy, when we consider the advantages his positions afforded him, is astonishing. We had seventeen killed and forty-five wounded. The enemy had ninety killed and one hundred and sixty wounded, of the regular troops. We have taken one hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded. Colonel Meyers of the 49th, was wounded and taken prisoner. Of our's only one commissioned officer was killed, lieutenant Hobart, of the light artillery. Inclosed is the report of major general Lewis.

I have the honor to be, sir,

With great consideration and respect,

Your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

ON THE FIELD,

One o'clock, 27th May, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

Fort George and its dependencies are ours. The enemy, beaten at all points, has blown up his magazines and retired. It is impossible at this moment to say any thing of individual gallantry. There was no man who did not perform his duty in a manner which did honor to himself and his country. Scott and Forsyth's commands, supported by Boyd's and Winder's brigades, sustained the brunt of the action. Our loss is trifling—perhaps not more than twenty killed, and twice that number wounded. The enemy left in the hospital one hundred and twenty-four, and I sent several on board the fleet. We have also made about one hundred prisoners of the regular forces.

I am, dear sir, most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

MORGAN LEWIS.

Major General Dearborn,

Commander in Chief of the Northern Army.

HEAD-QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,

May 29, 1813.

SIR,

General Lewis was ordered to march yesterday morning with Chandler and Winder's brigades, the light artillery, dragoons, light infantry and riflemen, in pursuit of the enemy by the way of Queenstown. I had received satisfactory information that the enemy had made a stand on the mountain, at a place called the Beaver Dams, where he had a deposit of provi-

sions and stores, and that he had been joined by three hundred regulars from Kingston, landed from small vessels, near the head of the lake. I had ascertained that he was calling in the militia, and had presumed that he would confide in the strength of his position and venture an action, by which an opportunity would be afforded to cut off his retreat.

I have been disappointed. Although the troops from fort Erie and Chippawa had joined the main body at the Beaver Dams, he broke up yesterday precipitately; continued his route along the mountain, and will reach the head of the lake by that route. Lieutenant colonel Preston took possession of fort Erie and its dependencies last evening. The fort had been abandoned and the magazines blown up. I have ordered general Lewis to return without delay to this place, and if the winds favor us, we may yet cut off the enemy's retreat at York: but unfortunately we have plenty of rain but no wind; it may, however, change for the better in a few hours. I shall afford commodore Chauncey every facility in my power in his preparations for commanding lake Erie. He is very anxious to return to Sackett's Harbor; for until his other ship is fitted, *it is not certain* that he can continue in the command of lake Ontario. I was the last evening honored with your despatches of the 15th instant. I have taken measures in relation to the twenty-three prisoners who are to be put in close confinement.

I have the honor to be, sir,

With high consideration and respect,

Your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. General John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn  
to the Secretary at War, dated*

NEWARK, UPPER CANADA,

June 4, 1813.

“Chandler and Winder are in pursuit of the enemy who has halted about fifty-five miles from here. I am still very feeble and gain strength but slowly.”

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,

June 6, 1813.

SIR,

I have received an express from the head of the lake this evening, with the intelligence that our troops were attacked at two o'clock this morning, by the whole British force and Indians, and by some strange fatality, though our loss in numbers was small, and the enemy was completely routed and driven from the field, both brigadier generals Chandler and Winder were taken prisoners. They had advanced to ascertain the situation of a company of artillery, where the attack commenced. General Chandler had his horse shot under him and was bruised by the fall. General Vincent, their commander, is supposed to have been killed. Colonel Clark was mortally wounded and fell into our hands, with sixty prisoners of the 49th. The command devolved on colonel Burn, who has retired to the Forty-mile Creek. If either of the general officers had remained in command, the enemy would have been pursued and cut up; or, if colonel Burn had been an officer of infantry. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and prisoners, must exceed two hundred and fifty. The enemy sent in a flag next morning, with a request to bury their dead. Generals Lewis and Boyd set off immediately to join the advanced



army. I never so severely felt the want of health as at present, at a time when my services might, perhaps, be most useful. I hope general Hampton will repair here as soon as possible.

With great respect,

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. General John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

June 8, 1813.

There was a mistake in the arrival of the express mail. Since writing the above the enemy's fleet has passed, consisting of two large ships and four heavy schooners. I have consequently deemed it prudent to *concentrate the forces at this point.*

H. D.

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HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,

June 8, 1813.

SIR,

I have been honored with your letters of the 26th and 27th ult. and a duplicate of one of the 19th of April. My ill state of health renders it extremely painful to attend to the current duties; and unless my health improves soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire to some place, where my mind may be more at ease, for a short time. Colonel Maccomb proceeded with two hundred men, with the commodore, to Sackett's Harbor. Lieutenant colonel Ripley has also gone, by the way of Oswego, to the Harbor, with his regiment, where he will be joined by several hundred recruits. He took charge of the provisions to Oswego. The commodore will not probably venture out until

his new ship is fit for sea. The enemy has now the command of the lake, and as long as that is the case, any offensive operations below this must be suspended. I had intended placing a small garrison at fort Erie, and a stronger one at fort George; but as you have directed otherwise, I shall select fort George as guarding the only harbor on the southern shore of the lake. Detroit will be the safest harbor on lake Erie. I have, by the request of commodore Chauncey, detached 200 men to aid captain Perry in removing his armed vessels from Black Rock to Presque isle. Commodore Chauncey is unwilling to approach Malden, unless he can have a reinforcement to general Harrison, of our regulars. As my command does not extend to Malden, I ask your directions on this subject. The commodore is anxious that his fleet on lake Erie should proceed with troops to Michilimacinae and St. Joseph, as soon as the business shall be decided at Detroit. On taking possession of this place, the inhabitants came in, in numbers, and gave their paroles. I have promised them protection. A large majority are friendly to the United States, and fixed in their hatred against the government of Great Britain. If they should generally be made prisoners of war, and taken from their families, it would have a most unfavorable effect on our military operations in the provinces. The whole country would be driven to a state of desperation, and satisfy them, beyond a doubt, that we had no intention of holding the provinces. The same effect would be produced on the Indians, who are now principally quiet, for fear of losing their valuable tract of land on Grand river. I had authorized the civil magistrates to combine in the *due* exercise of their functions, and cannot, with propriety, revoke this authority, unless specially directed.

The whole of our troops, officers and men, in the action of the 27th, discovered a degree of ardor and readiness for action, which evinced a determination

to do honor to themselves and country. The animating example set by colonel Scott and general Boyd, in landing and repulsing the enemy, deserves particular mention. I am greatly indebted to colonel Porter, major Armistead and captain Totten, for their judicious arrangements and skilful execution in demolishing the enemy's fort and batteries, and to the officers of the artillery generally, who had the direction of the guns.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Your most obedient servant,

**H. DEARBORN.**

Hon. General John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Morgan Lewis, to the Secretary of War, dated*

NIAGARA, June 14, 1813.

“ You will perceive by the enclosed copy of orders, marked 1, that general Dearborn from indisposition, has resigned the command, not only of the Niagara army, but of the district. I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit for service. He has been repeatedly in a state of convalescence; but relapses on the least agitation of mind.

“ In my last, I mentioned the unfortunate circumstance of the capture of our two brigadiers, Chandler and Winder. The particulars are detailed in the report of colonel Burns, marked 2, which he gives from the best information he could collect. His corps lay a considerable distance from the scene of active operation, as you will perceive by the enclosed diagram. The light corps spoken of, were captain Hindman's, Nicholas's and Biddle's companies of

the 2d artillery, serving as infantry. These three gentlemen, and captain Archer and Towson of the same regiment, and Leonard of the light artillery, are soldiers who would honor any service. Their gallantry, and that of their companies, was equally conspicuous on this occasion, as in the affair of the 27th ult. A view of general Chandler's encampment will be sufficient to show, that his disaster was owing to its arrangement: its centre being its weakest point, and that being discovered by the enemy in the evening, received the combined attack of his whole force, and his line was completely cut. It is said, though I cannot vouch for its truth, that general Winder saw this, and remonstrated against it. The gallantry of the 5th, 25th and part of the 23d and light troops, saved the army: of the 5th, it is said, that when the day broke, not a man was missing; and that a part of the 23d, under major Armstrong, was found sustaining its left flank. Their fire was irresistible, and the enemy was compelled to give way. *Could he have been pressed the next morning, his destruction was inevitable.* He was dispersed in every direction, and even his commanding general was missing without his hat or horse. I understand he was found the next evening almost famished, at a distance of four miles from the scene of action.

“Lieutenant M'Chesney's gallantry recovered a piece of artillery and prevented the capture of others. He merits promotion for it.

“On the evening of the 6th of June, I received the order, No. 4, and joined the army at five in the afternoon of the 7th. I found it at the Forty-mile Creek, ten miles in the rear of the ground, on which it had been attacked, encamped on a plain, of about a mile in width, with its right flank on the lake, and its left on the creek, which skirts the base of a perpendicular mountain of considerable height. On my route, I received No. 5 and 6, enclosed:

“ At 6 in the evening the hostile fleet hove in sight, though its character could not be ascertained with precision. We lay on our arms all night. At dawn of day struck our tents, and descried the hostile squadron abreast of us about a mile from the shore. Our boats which transported the principal part of our baggage and camp equipage, lay on the beach; it was a dead calm; and about six, the enemy towed in a large schooner, which opened her fire on our boats. As soon as she stood for the shore, her object being evident, I ordered down Archer’s and Towson’s companies with four pieces of artillery, to resist her attempts. I at the same time sent captain Totten, of the engineers. (a most valuable officer) to construct a temporary furnace for heating shot, which was prepared and in operation in less than thirty minutes. Her fire was returned with a vivacity and effect (excelled by no artillery in the universe) which soon compelled her to retire. A party of savages now made their appearance on the brow of the mountain (which being perfectly bald, exhibited them to view) and commenced a fire on our camp. I ordered colonel Chrystie to dislodge them, who entered on the service with alacrity, but found himself anticipated by lieutenant Eldridge, the adjutant of the regiment, who, with a promptness and gallantry highly honorable to that young officer, had already gained the summit of the mountain, with a party of volunteers, and routed the Barbarian allies of the defender of the Christian faith. This young man merits the notice of government.

“ These little affairs cost us not a man. Sir James L. Yeo being disappointed of a tragedy, next determined, in true dramatic style, to amuse us with a farce. An officer with a flag was sent to me from his ship, advising me, that as I was invested with savages in my rear, a fleet in my front, and a powerful army on my flank, he, and the officers commanding his Britannic majesty’s land forces, thought it a duty to demand a surrender of my army. I answered that the

message was too ridiculous to merit a reply. No. 7 was delivered to me at about 6 this morning. Between 7 and 8 o'clock, the few waggons we had being loaded, first with sick, and next with ammunition, &c. the residue of camp equipage and baggage was put in the boats, and a detachment of two hundred men of the 6th regiment detailed to proceed in them. Orders were prepared to be given them to defend the boats, and if assailed by any of the enemy's small vessels, to carry them by boarding. By some irregularity, which I have not been able to discover, the boats put off without the detachments, induced probably by the stillness of the morning. When they had progressed about three miles, a breeze sprung up, and an armed schooner overhauled them. Those who were enterprising kept on and escaped; others ran to the shore and deserted their boats. We lost twelve of the number, principally containing the baggage of the officers and men.

“At ten I put the army in motion on our return to this place. The savages and incorporated militia hung on our flanks and rear throughout the march, and picked up a few stragglers. On our retiring the British army advanced, and now occupies the ground we left.”

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*Papers referred to by General Lewis.*

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA,

June 6, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

You will please to proceed, with as little delay as may be, and take command of the advanced army. Brigadier generals Boyd and Swartwout, and colonel Scott, will accompany you. I have ordered an additional escort of light artillery to be equipped as caval-

ry to attend you. You will attack the enemy as soon as practicable ; your force will ensure success ; every possible effort should be made for preventing the enemy's escape.

May success and glory attend you.

Yours with esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

Major General Lewis.

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NIAGARA, June 6, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

A ship having appeared this morning steering towards the head of the lake, which is undoubtedly one of the enemy's ships ; others are appearing ; you will please to return with the troops to this place as soon as possible.

Yours with esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

P. S. The object of the enemy's fleet must be intended to cover the retreat of their troops or to bring on a reinforcement.

H. D.

Major General Lewis.

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June 6, 1813.

It is possible the fleet in sight may be our own ; a few hours will probably enable you to determine and act accordingly.

H. DEARBORN.

General Lewis.

DEAR GENERAL,

I am induced to suspect that the enemy's fleet have an intention on this place. Two small schooners have been examining the shore very minutely for three or four hours this afternoon. They have gone on towards the head of the lake, and their ships appear to have taken the same course; they may take on board additional troops near the head of the lake and be here before you reach this place. You will please to send Milton's detachment and 500 of Chandler's brigade, and colonel Burn's light dragoons with all possible despatch; they ought, if possible, to be here some time to-morrow forenoon. You will follow with the remainder of the troops as soon as practicable. It will be necessary to take care that your boats are not taken or lost. General Swartwout and colonel Scott should return as soon as they can.

Yours with esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

General Lewis.

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**ORDERS.**

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,  
June 10, 1813.

By reason of the temporary indisposition of major general Dearborn, the command of the troops on this frontier and of the ninth military department of the United States, devolves on major general Lewis. All persons concerned are notified accordingly.

By command,

W. SCOTT,  
*Adjutant General.*



*Extract of a letter from Colonel James Burn, 2d light dragoons, to Major General Dearborn.*

“ In the afternoon of the 5th our advance-guard, consisting of the light infantry, under the command of captains Hindman, Biddle and Nicholas, a part of the rifle corps under captain Lytle, and a detachment of the 2d dragoons under captain Selden, commenced a sharp skirmish with the advance of the enemy, said to be a detachment of the 49th regiment, which soon retreated, covered by a thick woods, having, however, several wounded on both sides, and one dragoon horse killed. In the evening our advance returned behind Stony Creek, where the army took a position for the night. The light infantry, and part of the rifle corps on the right of the 25th regiment, formed the right wing. The artillery, under captains Towson and L. Leonard, the centre. The 5th, 16th, 23d, and some riflemen, the left wing, and the cavalry in the rear. A strong picket guard was posted some distance in front, also strong flank and rear guards in such manner as to surround the whole encampment with centinels—the troops lay under arms without any covering. Our numbers in the field did not exceed one thousand. Three hundred effectives of the 13th and 14th regiments having encamped on the borders of the lake, about three miles distant, for the protection of the boats. The enemy forced our picket and attacked us about two o'clock in the morning (which was very dark) with their army and Indians, expecting, no doubt, to throw us into confusion. Their views were, in this instance however, completely frustrated, and when the day dawned, none were to be seen except their killed and wounded, who covered the field of battle. The attack began on our right, and was gallantly repelled by the fire of the light troops and 25th regiment, commanded by major Smith. In a few minutes it became

general along the whole line, and was nobly returned by the artillery of the centre, commanded by captains Towson and L. Leonard, and again by the troops of the left wing, viz. the 5th, under lieutenant colonel Milton, the 23d, commanded by major Armstrong, and the 16th. The fire continued with little intermission for one hour, during which time the enemy attempted, by frequent charges, to break our line, but without effect, being obliged to give way by the well directed fire of our brave troops.

The 13th and 14th regiments (which had been detached the preceding evening) were active in making prisoners, and advanced with much ardor to the field in hopes of sharing with the gallant 5th and 25th, 23d and light troops, the glory of another combat. But the unfortunate capture of brigadier generals Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action unknown to any part of the army and hurried into the enemy's lines, prevented the future operations from being carried into effect with the promptitude which would assuredly have taken place had either of these officers been present to command.

You will be surprised to find our loss so small—that of the enemy exceeds ours much; they lost in killed about sixty, many wounded, and upwards of seventy prisoners, all regulars and principally of the 49th regiment. Several of their officers were killed, wounded and missing. A flag was sent by colonel Hervey, asking permission to make inquiries for them; also to be allowed to send a surgeon to attend their own wounded, which I readily granted. On the return of day-light I found the command of the army had devolved on me, and being at a loss what steps to pursue in the unpleasant dilemma, occasioned by the capture of our generals; finding the ammunition of many of the troops nearly expended, I had recourse to a council of the field officers present, of whom a majority coincided in opinion with me that we ought to retire to our former position at the Forty-

mile Creek, where we could be supplied with ammunition and provisions, and either advance or remain until further orders.

Every aid was afforded by the staff. The assistant adjutant general major Johnson, and brigade majors Jones and Wartenby exerted themselves in rendering all the assistance in their power.

The army on this occasion has proved its firmness and bravery, by keeping its position in a night attack, in which the yells of the Indians mingled with the roaring of cannon and musketry were calculated to intimidate. The enemy charged repeatedly, and so dark was the night that our army could not distinguish friend from foe; in one of those they succeeded in carrying off a six-pounder, a howitzer and a caisson, to the great mortification of our brave artillery. I presume it was on that occasion also that we lost our generals, who were distinctly heard encouraging our men to fight. The squadron of dragoons remained formed and steady at their post, but could not act on account of the darkness of the night and the thickness of the adjacent woods. Much credit is due to the troops generally, but too much praise cannot be said of the conduct of the 5th and 25th regiments."

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MONTREAL, June 18, 1813.

SIR,

I deem it my duty to improve the earliest opportunity possible, to give you a more detailed account of the affair of the 6th instant, near Stony creek, than I have before had it in my power to do.

On the morning of the 5th I arrived at Forty-mile Creek. The detachment under general Winder was then under marching orders for Stony creek. After

a short halt the whole marched for that place, and arrived there between five and six o'clock P. M. at which place a small picket of the enemy was posted, but retired on our approach. The advanced guard pursued, and soon fell in with a picket of about 100 strong, under colonel Williams. A skirmish ensued. I hastened the main body. Williams retreated, and our advance pursued. The pursuit was continued rather longer than I could have wished, but returned to their proper position in the line of march, not far from sun set. I had ordered the 13th and 14th, who were in the rear, to take a position for the night near the mouth of the creek, to cover the boats, (should they arrive) which would be on the route which I intended to pursue the next morning, and a favorable position presenting itself, I encamped with the residue of the troops (except captain Archer's company of artillery, which accompanied the 13th and 14th on the spot where we had halted, with an advanced picket from half to three quarters of a mile in front, with express orders for them to keep out constantly a patrol. A right and left flank guard and a rear guard were also posted. I gave positive orders for the troops to lay on their arms. Contrary to my orders fires were kindled; but there are doubts whether this operated for or against us, as the fires of the 25th, which were in front, and by my orders had been abandoned, enabled to see a small part of the enemy, while the fires on our left enabled the enemy to see our line. On the whole, I think it operated against us. I did expect the enemy would attack us that night, if he intended to fight; but perhaps this was not expected by all. I had my horse confined near me, and directed that the harness should not be taken from the artillery horses. I directed where and how the line should be formed, in case of attack. About an hour before day light, on the morning of the 6th, the alarm was given. I was instantly up, and the 25th, which lay near me, was almost as instantly formed, as well as the 5th and

23d, which was on the left, under the immediate eye of general Winder. Owing to the neglect of the front picket, or some other cause, the British officers say, that they were not hailed, or an alarm given, until they were within three hundred yards of our line. The extreme darkness prevented us from seeing or knowing at what point they intended to attack us, until an attack was made on our right. A well directed fire was opened upon them from the 25th and from nearly the whole line. After a few minutes I heard several muskets in our rear, in the direction of the rear guard, and then expected that the enemy had gained our rear by some path unknown to me, and were about to attack us in rear. I instantly ordered colonel Milton, with the 5th, to form in our rear near the woods, to meet such circumstances as might take place, knowing that I could call him to any other point, if necessary, at any moment. I had observed, that the artillery was not covered, and directed general Winder to cause the 23d to be formed so far to the right, that their right should cover the artillery. At this moment I heard a new burst of fire from the enemy's left on our right, and not able to see any thing which took place, I set out full speed towards the right, to take measures to prevent my right flank from being turned, which I expected was the object of the enemy. I had proceeded but a few yards, before my horse fell under me, by which fall I received a serious injury. Here was a time when I have no recollection of what passed, but I presume it was not long. As soon as I recovered, I recollected what my object was, and made my way to the right, and gave major Smith such directions as I thought proper, to prevent his right from being turned by surprise. I was then returning toward the centre, and when near the artillery, heard men, who, by the noise, appeared to be in confusion, it being the point at which I expected the 23d to be formed. I expected it was that regiment. I approached them, and as soon as I was near enough,

I saw a body of men, who I thought to be the 28d, in rear of the artillery, broken. I hobbled in amongst them, and began to rally them, and directed them to form; but I soon found my mistake; it was the British 40th, who had pushed forward to the head of their column and gained the rear of the artillery. I was immediately disarmed and conveyed down the column to its rear. It was not yet day, and the extreme darkness of the night, to which was added the smoke of the fire, put it totally out of our power to see the situation of the enemy. This was all that saved their columns from sure and total destruction, of which some of their officers are aware. After seeing the situation of the column as I passed, I did hope and expect that general Winder, on the first dawn of light, would see their situation, and bring colonel Milton with the 5th, (who I had still kept in reserve until I could have day-light to discern their situation) to attack this column, which, I am sure, he would have done to advantage; but, to my mortification, I soon learned that he had fallen into the same mistake with myself; and by endeavoring to learn what was taking place in the centre, he was also taken, as well as major Van De Venter. To the extreme darkness of the night, the enemy's knowledge of his intended point of attack, and our not knowing at what point to expect him, must be attributed his partial success, and not to a want of strength or bravery in our troops, who, generally, behaved remarkably well under all the circumstances; and however unfortunate the event, as it relates to myself, I only ask that all the circumstances may be taken into consideration, in making up your opinion upon the conduct of general Winder and myself in this affair; which I am sure you will do, and I flatter myself you will see no cause of censure. I regret that my decrepid situation; and the rapidity with which we have been brought to this place, has put it out of my power to give you a

detailed account of the affair earlier. I am now able to walk some with the aid of a cane, and hope I shall continue to recover.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

**JOHN CHANDLER,**  
*Brigadier General.*

Major General Dearborn.

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HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,  
June 12th.

SIR,

As the general is unable to write, I am directed by him to inform you, that in addition to the debility and fever he has been afflicted with, he has within the last twenty-four hours experienced a violent spasmodic attack on his breast, which has obliged him to relinquish business altogether, and the command is given over to major general Lewis, who will in future make the necessary communications to the department of war. The British fleet still rides triumphant in this section of the lake.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

With great respect and consideration,  
Your obedient and humble servant,

**SAMUEL S. CONNER,**  
*A. D. C. to general Dearborn.*

Hon. General John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary at War to  
Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
June 19, 1813.

“Your letters of the 6th and 8th instant have been received. There is, indeed, some strange fatality attending our efforts. I cannot disguise from you the *surprise* occasioned by the *two escapes of a beaten enemy*; first on the 27th ultimo, and again on the 1st instant. Battles are not gained when an inferior and broken enemy is not destroyed. Nothing is done, while any thing that might have been done, is omitted. This maxim is as old as the profession of arms, and in no walk of life applies with as much force as in that of a soldier.

“Should Proctor have retired from Malden, and been able to effect a junction with Vincent's corps at the head of the lake, it has been done for one of two purposes; either to dispute with you the possession of the peninsula, or more securely to effect their general retreat to Kingston. The latter is the more probable conjecture of the two, and is strengthened by the appearance of Yeo on the upper part of the lake, and by the position which Vincent has taken there.”

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EXTRACT.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,  
June 20, 1813.

SIR,

I have been so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. Brigadier general Boyd is the only general officer present, and from resigna-



tions, sickness, and other contingencies, the number of regimental officers present fit for duty are far below what the service requires. A considerable proportion of our army being composed of new recruits, and the weather having been extremely unfavorable to health, the sick have become so numerous, in addition to the wounded, as to reduce the effective force far below what could have been contemplated; but if the weather should become favorable, which ought to be expected, a great part of the sick will probably be fit for duty in a short time. The enemy have been reinforced at the head of the lake with about 500 men of the 104th regiment. A vessel carrying ammunition and other munitions of war, bound to the head of the lake, was captured four days since by one of commodore Chauncey's schooners, from which I conclude, that the enemy will endeavor to keep up such a force at or near the head of the lake, as to prevent any part of our force in this quarter from joining or proceeding to Sackett's Harbor for the purpose of attacking Kingston; and such is the state of the roads in this flat country, in consequence of continual rains, as to render any operations against the enemy extremely difficult without the aid of a fleet for the transportation of provisions, ammunition and other necessary supplies. The enemy would probably retreat on our approach and keep out of our reach, being covered by one or more armed vessels, which remain on this part of the lake. The whole of these embarrassments have resulted from a temporary loss of the command of the lake. The enemy has availed himself of the advantage and forwarded reinforcements and supplies."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary at War to  
Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

July 1, 1813.

"The leisure you now have offers a fine opportunity for the adjutants and inspectors general to attend to their particular duties. Some of the parties of which you speak from the enemy, may practice a trick on those who follow them. *These last ought to be very circumspect.* Chauncey will, I hope, soon re-appear on the lake. A battle will then decide which of us shall be victor for the campaign. I am afraid that we have all along acted on a belief, very pleasing, but ill founded, viz. that we were ahead of the enemy as to naval means and naval preparation on the lakes. Are we sure that our calculations with regard to lake Erie have been better than those with regard to lake Ontario? A week or two will decide this question."

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,

June 25, 1813.

SIR,

I have the mortification of informing you of an unfortunate and unaccountable event, which occurred yesterday. On the 23d, at evening, lieutenant colonel Boerstler with 570 men, infantry, artillery, cavalry, and rifle men, in due proportion, was ordered to march, by the way of Queenstown, to a place called the Beaver Dams, on the high ground about eight or nine miles from Queenstown, to attack and disperse a body of the enemy collected there for the purpose of procuring provisions, and harassing those inhabitants who are considered friendly to the United States; their force was, from the most direct infor-

mation, composed of one company of the 104th regiment, above 80 strong: from 150 to 200 militia, and from 50 to 60 Indians. At eight o'clock yesterday morning, when within about two miles of the Beaver Dams, our detachment was attacked from an ambuscade, but soon drove the enemy some distance into the woods, and then retired to a clear field, and sent an express for a reinforcement, saying, he would maintain his position until reinforced. A reinforcement of 300 men marched immediately under the command of colonel Chrystie, but on arriving at Queenstown, colonel Chrystie received authentic information that lieutenant colonel Boerstler with his command had surrendered to the enemy, and the reinforcement returned to camp. A man who belonged to a small corps of mounted volunteer rifle men, came in this morning, who states, that the enemy surrounded our detachment in the woods, and towards 12 o'clock commenced a general attack; that our troops fought more than two hours, until the artillery had expended the whole of its ammunition, and then surrendered, and at the time of the surrender the informant made his escape. Why it should have been deemed proper to remain several hours in a position surrounded with woods without either risking a decisive action, or effecting a retreat, remains to be accounted for, as well as the project of waiting for a reinforcement from a distance of fifteen or sixteen miles.

No information has been received of the killed or wounded. The enemy's fleet has again arrived in our neighbourhood.

With respect and esteem,

I am, sir,

Your humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 6, 1818.

SIR,

I have the President's orders to express to you his decision, that you retire from the command of district No. 9, and of the troops within the same, until your health be re-established, and until farther orders.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

With very great respect,

Your most obedient

And very humble servant,

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Major General Henry Dearborn.

Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Brigadier General Boyd.

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*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Brigadier General Boyd, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

July 30, 1813.

“The restriction put upon you with regard to the enemy, was but commensurate with their command of the lake. So long as they had wings and you had only feet; so long as they could be transported, supplied and reinforced, by water and at will, common sense, as well as military principles, put you on the *defensive*. These circumstances changed, the reason of the rule changes with them; and it now becomes your business, in concert with the fleet, to harass and destroy the enemy, wherever you can find him. Of the competency of your force there can be no doubt, provided your estimate of his be but tolerably correct.”

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WAR DEPARTMENT,

July 30, 1813.

SIR,

I have this moment received information that fort Meigs is again attacked, and by a *considerable regular force*. This must have been drawn from De Rottenberg's corps. His late insolence in pushing his small attacks to the very outline of your works, has been intended to mask the weakness produced by this detachment. If (as you say) you can beat him, do

it without delay; and remember, that if you beat, you must destroy him. There is no excuse for a general who permits a beaten enemy to escape and to rally. These remarks grow out of some recent events in your quarter, and require no explanation. It is the president's wish that you should communicate fully and freely with brigadier general Williams. It is only by this kind of intercourse that the efforts of all can be united in promoting the public good.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General Boyd,  
Fort George.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General John P. Boyd to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,

July 27, 1813.

" I had the honor to address you last on the 24th instant. On the 22d instant, general Lewis and commodore Chauncey were advised by me that from intelligence received from major Chapin and deserters, most of the enemy's captured ordnance and their principal depot of ammunition, stores, &c. are at the head of the lake. It was suggested that a small force might surprise, take, destroy, or bring them off, if part of the fleet might be allowed to assist in moving our troops.

Yesterday the Lady of the Lake brought me a letter from commodore Chauncey, stating that he approved of the enterprise and *would go himself with his fleet to the head of the lake*, and requested guides, information, &c. I have deemed it proper

to detail a number of troops under the command of colonel Scott, which will embark on board the *Lady of the Lake*, with directions to join the squadron, which is believed to be now somewhere near Little York."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Boyd to the Secretary at War, dated*

FORT GEORGE,

July 31, 1813.

"I had the honor to address you on the 27th instant. Agreeably to the plan therein suggested, commodore Chauncey arrived here on the 28th instant and received on board the fleet a body of men under the command of colonel Scott. Light and contrary winds retard their progress up the lake, but ere this the attack has probably been made on the head of the lake. No information has as yet been received.

"The enemy has lately kept his Indians so constantly scouring the woods of our vicinity, that we gain no deserters nor intelligence of his movements."

*Colonel Scott's Report.*

FORT GEORGE,

August 3, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honor to report, that in obedience to your orders I proceeded on board the fleet with the detachment of troops under my command, destined to act against the enemy's post at the head of Little Lake, or Burlington bay; in sight of which place I arrived

late in the evening of the 30th ultimo, the fleet having been greatly delayed by the almost constant calm which has prevailed since we sailed.

This delay of forty-eight hours, after our destination became obvious to the enemy, enabled him to anticipate our arrival by a reinforcement of 200 men from the nearest posts on this side of the lake, of which we were early apprized. Nevertheless, commodore Chauncey, with my concurrence, thought it advisable to land the detachment from the army, together with about 250 marines and seamen from the fleet, (making a total force of about 500 men) the better to enable us to ascertain the exact force and position of the enemy's camp. The landing was made on the neck of land which nearly cuts off the Little lake from lake Ontario. From this point we could plainly discover the enemy's position on Burlington heights, surrounded on three sides by a creek, and in front by an entrenchment and a battery of seven pieces of cannon. The Little lake or bay is between those two points, six or seven miles across.

Perceiving the strength of the enemy's position, and learning from the inhabitants, that the force on the heights, independent of the reinforcement above mentioned, was nearly equal to our own, the commodore determined not to risk an attack, especially as our boats would have been greatly annoyed in the ascent towards the head of the bay, by a small schooner of the enemy's, having on board one 18 pound carronade. The channel connecting the two lakes did not afford water for the passage of either of our schooners. In the above opinion I fully concurred with the commodore. It may be added, that the enemy received a further reinforcement of 400 men the same evening by land from Kingston.

On our return to this harbor the fleet put into York, at which place we burnt the barracks and public stores, and brought off one piece of ordnance, (24 pounder) eleven batteaux, and about 400 barrels of



flour and hard bread. The barracks and stores had been repaired since the 27th May. Thirty or forty sick and wounded in hospital, were paroled, and four prisoners (regulars) brought off. There had been no garrison at the place for the few days previous.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

W. SCOTT,  
Col. com. detachment.

Brigadier General Boyd,  
Commanding, &c. &c.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General John P. Boyd to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, U. C  
August 8, 1813.

“By Tuesday’s mail I had the honor to receive your commands of the 30th instant, and yesterday a number of letters enclosed, which were delivered as directed.

“Conceiving myself at liberty to act offensively on the arrival of the fleet, an expedition was immediately concerted against the enemy, and acceded to by commodore Chauncey. One thousand was to embark on board the fleet, under the command of brigadier general Williams, to land at the head of the lake. The army at this place was to move in two columns against the enemy’s front, while general Williams assailed his rear and cut off his retreat. Yesterday morning, the time when the troops were to have embarked, the enemy’s fleet was discovered off this place.

“Commodore Chauncey weighed anchor, approached him, and by every indication, that a leeward position would admit, offered to engage.”

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Return of the killed and wounded  
general James W.

**Return of the killed and wounded of a detachment of the army of the United States, under the command of general James Wilkinson, in an action fought at Williamsburg, on the 26th of August, 1813.**

KILLED.							WOUNDED.						
Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Total.	Aggregate.	Brigadier general.	Assistant adjutant general.	Aid de camp.	Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Subalterns.
3	7	3	1	88	99	102	1	1	1	1	1	5	6

**Names of the commissioned officers.**

**KILLED.**

Lieutenant William W. Smith, of the light artillery.  
 David Hunter, of the 12th regiment infantry.  
 Edward Olmstead, of the 16th ditto

**WOUNDED.**

Brigadier general Leonard Covington, mortally, (since dead.)  
 Major Talbot Chambers, assistant adjutant general, slightly.  
 Major Darby Noon, aid-de-camp to brigadier general Swartwout, slightly.  
 Colonel James P. Preston, of the 23d regiment infantry, severely, his right arm broken.  
 Major William Cummings, 8th ditto, severely.  
 Captain Edmund Foster, 9th ditto, slightly.  
 David S. Townsend, 9th ditto, severely. *Taken prisoner.*  
 Mordecai Myers, 13th ditto, severely.  
 John Campbell, 13th ditto, slightly.  
 John B. Murdoch, 25th ditto, slightly.  
 Lieutenant William S. Heaton, 11th ditto, severely.  
 John Williams, 13th ditto, slightly.  
 John Lynch, 14th ditto, severely. *Taken prisoner.*  
 Peter Pelham, 21st ditto, severely. *Taken prisoner.*  
 James D. Brown, 25th ditto, slightly.  
 Archibald C. Crary, 25th ditto, severely in the skirmish the day before.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

*Head Quarters, Military District of the South.*

N. B. Colonel Preston commanded the 13th regiment of infantry during the action; and major Cummings commanded the 25th ditto.

13 pg. 60

army of the United States, descending the St. Lawrence, under the command of major  
ght at Williamsburg, in Upper Canada, on the 11th of November, 1813.

WOUNDED.												REMARKS.
Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Total.	Aggregate.	Grand total.	Grand aggregate.	
1	1	5	6	9	13	1	198	221	237	320	339	

e commissioned officers killed and wounded.

**KILLED.**

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**WOUNDED.**

lly, (since dead.)  
eneral, slightly.  
er general Swartwout, slightly.  
ent infantry, severely, his right thigh fractured.  
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severely in the skirmish the day before the action.

**GENERAL'S OFFICE,**

ad Quarters, Military District No. 9, French Mills, November, 1813.

J. B. WALBACH, *adjutant general.*

the action; and major Cummings did duty with the 16th regiment of infantry in the action.

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under the command of major  
November 1840

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HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,  
August 12, 1813.

SIR,

I had the honor to address you the 8th instant. Unfavorable winds continued to thwart the wishes of commodore Chauncey to bring the enemy to action; and about the 9th instant he was so unfortunate as to lose, in a squall, two small schooners, which upset. On the night of the 10th a severe cannonade was heard on the lake, which we ascertained in the morning, resulted in the loss of two of our smallest schooners. Undiscouraged by these slight disasters, commodore Chauncey is still in pursuit of the enemy, resolved to bring him to a general engagement. These circumstances have necessarily delayed the attack upon the enemy, which was contemplated in my last letter. General Porter is assembling a body of volunteers and Indians at Buffalo, with a view to co-operate in this enterprise. He will probably join us soon. Any thing which can be done without the co-operation of the fleet, shall be attempted. To attack the enemy, without being able to cut off his retreat, would be only beating without capturing him.

I have the honor to be, sir,

With great respect,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD.

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE,  
August 15, 1813.

SIR,

I had the honor to address you on the 12th instant. Since which time nothing of importance has

occurred. Commodore Chauncey has left this part of the lake, and the enemy have now so far the ascendancy as to render the proposed enterprise against his land force impracticable. Yesterday general Porter arrived at this place with a body of volunteers and Indians, which had been previously assembled at Buffaloe. In the event of such an attack as was contemplated, this force would be of infinite service. At present they can only be employed to harass the enemy.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

**JOHN P. BOYD,**  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary at War.

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Letters from the Secretary at War to Major General Lewis, commanding at Sackett's Harbor.

*Extracts of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Lewis, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

July 9, 1813.

"An order was expedited to general Dearborn yesterday, permitting him to retire from the command of the army and district. Another was sent to Boyd forbidding him to engage in any affair with the enemy that could be avoided, and subjecting him to the orders of major general Hampton and of yourself. This last (for Hampton is now the oldest officer in the district) was intended to meet the contingency suggested in my last letter, viz. that if we regained the command of the lake, and Yeo retired under the guns of Kingston; that this moment of superiority must not be lost, and that bringing down Boyd's division a blow might be struck at that place. To favor this enterprise, orders will be sent to general Hampton to push his head quarters to the position held by our army the last campaign on lake Champlain; and a requisition for ten thousand militia from the states of New York and Vermont, in reinforcement of this part of the plan, will be superadded.

"The moment Chauncey goes out our stores along the south shore of the lake should be brought down to the harbor, and in that case, your small posts (consisting of regular troops) drawn into your main body."



WAR DEPARTMENT,

July 3, 1813.

SIR,

It is not merely possible, but probable, that the British fleet in lake Ontario may, upon the fitting out the General Pike, refuse a battle and take shelter under the guns of Kingston until their new brig shall restore to them the superiority. A question of much importance arises on this supposed state of things. What will be the best possible employment of our force during the period we may be able to command the lake? Shall we reinforce the troops at fort George from Sackett's Harbor and cut off Vincent, or shall we bring from fort George the mass of the division there, and uniting them to your present command, attack the enemy at Kingston? If the latter part of the alternative be adopted, two things must be done. A heavy body of militia should be assembled at Ogdensburg to draw to that point the enemy's attention, and general Hampton should move rapidly and in force against Montreal. Our assembled force at Sackett's Harbor would amount to seven thousand men, independently of the naval means. The enemy's land force at Kingston is about four thousand. Could a successful attack be made here, the fate of the campaign is decided—perhaps that of the war. The object is great; but in proportion as it is so, the means of effecting it ought to be well considered. From the sketches I have been able to procure of Kingston and its vicinity, I have no doubt but that the attack should be made on the works which cover the battery on Navy Point. These gained, town, battery, and harbor are all at your discretion. Beware of dividing your attack. Confine it to a single point, but let that point be a commanding one.

Believe me, general,

Very respectfully and faithfully yours,  
**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Major Gen. Lewis, Sackett's Harbor.

1813.

Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major  
General Harrison.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to  
Major General William H. Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
March 5, 1813.

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 11th and 20th ultimo.

“The suspension of your movement in advance, appears to have been necessary; but though this may be the case, your demonstrations against Malden should not cease. These you will make in such way as shall be best calculated to keep up the enemy’s alarm for the safety of that post, and of the ships of war wintering there. You will be more able to appreciate the value of this policy when I state, that we shall very soon be in motion on the Niagara and St. Laurence.

“You did well in stopping the march of the two regiments from Ohio. To have added to your force so long as your object is restricted to the maintenance of your present position, would have been a very useless expenditure of both public spirit and public money.

“As your campaign is now at an end, and yet nearly approached to that which is coming, it may be proper to communicate to you the president’s views in relation to your subsequent movements.

“It would appear that Malden can only be successfully approached by the route you are now upon, at two seasons of the year—mid-winter and mid-

summer. The former is gone, and to wait for the latter, would be hardly less disastrous than defeat itself. What remains for us to do is to keep our present ground till the lake opens, and then to approach our object by water, and under convoy of the vessels of war building at Presque Isle. These will be afloat and ready to operate by the middle of May. By the same time boats for the transportation of the troops, a train of artillery, baggage, &c. may be constructed. Cleveland is believed to be the place best fitted for this purpose. It will also be made the depot for the troops to be employed on the expedition, which will be the 24th regiment now at Massac; and three of the twenty new regiments provided by an act of the session of congress which closed yesterday. Two of these will be raised in the state of Ohio, and the third in that of Kentucky.

“Whatever these troops may fall short of the number and strength contemplated by the laws under which they shall be raised, must necessarily be made up from *militia and volunteers*; whence will arise the necessity of strictly attending to the progress of enlistments, so that in the event of their failure, which may be readily foreseen, time may be left for resorting to the other expedient.”

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WAR DEPARTMENT,

March 7, 1813.

SIR,

Your letter of the 18th of February was, from some cause, delayed much beyond the usual course of the mail, and even some days after the receipt of your despatch of the 20th.

You will find by my letter of the 5th instant, the plan prescribed for your part of the ensuing campaign;

and to prevent any ill effect arising from its miscarriage, a second copy is herewith inclosed. It is probable that colonels M'Arthur and Cass will both be promoted to the rank of brigadier, and will be assigned to the command of the two brigades intended to form your division of the army. In the enumeration of corps making parts of this division, I did not mention the two regiments of the line, the 17th and 18th, parts of which are already with you. The filling up of these would be an important service, and you are requested to promote it. If you are at ease with regard to the safety of your present post, against the attacks of the enemy, and have secured to yourself the means of subsisting it, there can be no motive for either reinforcing it by new drafts from the militia, or retiring from it. If, on the other hand, your force should be so reduced as to make your stay perilous, without a further reinforcement, you may employ the two regiments raised in Ohio, or so many of them as may be necessary to your object. If again, the policy of adding to your force be forbidden, by the difficulty of subsisting it, and there arises a combination of both facts, viz: a want of force to maintain your present position, and a want of means to subsist a larger one, in that case, and in that alone, you will retire to the frontier settlements, and interpose the wilderness between you and the enemy.

These directions have not grown out of any suggestions to be found in your letters, but have been produced by a circumspection which it is always proper to extend beyond the mere limits of existing circumstances.

I am, sir, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General William H. Harrison,  
Franklinton, Ohio.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

March 9, 1813.

SIR,

The government have the intention of building a number of boats on lake Erie, for the purpose of transporting troops on that lake. Cleveland is the point farthest west, where any portion of these can be made with sufficient expedition. If the whole could be made there the better. These boats will be of the kind known by the name of Schenectady boats, narrow, and sharp a-head, and flat-bottomed. They will carry from forty to fifty men each, with their baggage, arms and accoutrements, and provision for the voyage. It is proposed to commit the superintendance of this service to you, and to bestow upon you, pro hac vice, the staff appointment of deputy quarter master general. If workmen cannot be found at Cleveland and other places on the lake, you will take them from Pittsburg. Such materials as you may want, other than those produced by the country itself, you will provide at Pittsburg and have sent on without delay. Funds, for this purpose; will be put under your control, and you will be careful to make reports weekly of your progress.

Very respectfully, I am, sir,  
Your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Captain Jessup, Washington.

*Extract of a letter from Major General William H. Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, CHILICOTHE,

March 17, 1813.

"The known candour of your character is a sufficient security for my receiving your pardon for the

liberty I take in making objections to the plan of operations communicated in your letter of the 5th instant. If there is a positive certainty of our getting the command of lake Erie, and having a regular force of three thousand five hundred, or even three thousand, well disciplined men, the proposed plan of setting out from Cleveland, and landing on the northern shore, below Malden, would perhaps be the one by which that place and its dependencies could be most easily reduced. I am unacquainted with the extent of the preparations that are making to obtain the naval superiority upon lake Erie; but, should they fail and the troops be assembled at Cleveland, it would be difficult to get again upon the proper track for making the attack round the head of the lake. The attempt to cross the lake from Cleveland should not be made with any other than well disciplined troops. A comparatively smaller number of men of this description could effect the object, and for those the means of conveyance might be obtained; but the means of transporting such an army as would be required of militia, or undisciplined regulars, could not be procured. I can see no reason why Cleveland should be preferred as the point of embarkation for the troops, or the deposit of provisions and stores. These are already accumulated at the rapids of Miami, or in situations to be easily sent thither to an amount nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted campaign. Although the expense and difficulty of transporting the provisions, artillery and stores for an army, round the head of the lake, would be very considerable, the lake being possessed by our ships, and the heavy baggage taken in boats along its margin, the troops would find no difficulty in the land route. The force contemplated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to secure success. Admitting that the whole should be raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little superior to militia; the officers having, with scarcely an exception, to learn their duty before they

could instruct their men; we have, therefore, no alternative but to make up by numbers the deficiency in discipline.

“I am well aware of the intolerable expense which attends the employment of a large militia force. We are now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors, which made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our supplies are procured, and so deposited that the period for the march of the army from the advanced posts can be ascertained to an hour, and of course the troops need not be called out until the moment they are to act. Experience has convinced me that militia are more efficient in the early than in the latter part of their service. Upon the whole, it is my decided opinion that the rapids of Miami should be the point of rendezvous for the troops, as well as the principal depot. Indeed it must necessarily be the first deposit—the provisions for the army be so placed that they can be taken to the lake in no other way. The artillery and a considerable supply of ammunition are already there. Boats and perouges have been built in considerable numbers on the Auglaize and St. Mary’s rivers; and every exertion is now making to increase them, intended for the double purpose of taking down the provisions to the rapids, and for coasting the lake with the baggage of the army in its advance. I had calculated upon being able partially to use this mode of transportation, even if the enemy should continue their naval superiority on the lake; but, with this advantage on our side, the whole baggage of the army could be safely and expeditiously carried along the coast in the boats and perouges, which could be taken into the strait to transport the army to the Canada shore.

“As I have before observed, the army, unincumbered with heavy baggage, would find no difficulty in marching round the lake at any season, but what the enemy would create, and we have the means of subsisting a force that would be irresistible.

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"The objections to proceeding this way, stated in my letter to colonel Monroe, arose from the time that would be necessary to construct boats after we should have arrived at the strait; but this objection is entirely obviated by our obtaining the command of the lake, as the boats and perouges built upon the Miami will answer the purpose. With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion is, that not only the regular troops, designated in your letter, but a large auxiliary corps of militia should be employed. The only objection arises from the expensiveness of troops of that description. This, however, could not be an object, considering the very short time that it would be necessary to employ them. Let the moment for the commencement of the march from the rapids be fixed, and the militia might be taken to that point, proceed and accomplish the object, and return home in two months.

"Amongst the reasons which makes it necessary to employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail in the western country; numbers must give that confidence which ought to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a superior degree, than amongst the greater part of the militia which were with me through the winter. The new drafts from this state are entirely of another character, and are not to be depended upon. I have no doubt, however, but a sufficient number of good men can be procured, and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Kentucky would furnish some regiments that would be not inferior to those that fought at the river Raisin, and they were, in my opinion, superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times. Eight troops of cavalry have been formed in Kentucky, to offer me their service; and several of them were intended for twelve months volunteers. Governor Shelby has some thoughts of taking the field in person—a num-



ber of good men will follow him. He thinks that an address from me to the people of the state would produce a good effect: I have strong objections to those addresses, but will nevertheless have recourse to one, should other means fail of bringing forward a sufficient force.

“Every exertion shall in the meantime be used to forward the recruiting service: for a few weeks I think that my services would be more useful in that than any other employment.”

WAR DEPARTMENT,

April 4, 1813.

SIR,

Your despatch of the 17th ultimo, from Chillicothe, has been received, and I hasten to repeat to you the views of the president, in relation to the next campaign, and the injunctions growing out of these, with regard to the employment of militia, &c.

Our first object is to get a command of the lakes. Means to accomplish this object have been taken, and we have the fullest assurance, that by the 1st day of June it will be accomplished.

This fact assumed, there can be no longer a doubt by what means, or by what route, the division of the army assigned to you, ought to approach Malden. A passage by *water* will carry you directly to the fortress you would attack, without impairing your strength by fatigue, or diminishing it by battle. A passage by *land* will, on the other hand, call for great efforts, and expose you to great losses, which, if they do not destroy, will at least cripple you. The former will be easy, safe, and economical; the latter difficult, dangerous, and enormously expensive.

On the other supposition, that we fail to obtain the command of the lake, a new question will arise: whe-

ther the campaign shall take an offensive or defensive character? Be this question determined as it may, the utmost extent which can be given to the force employed, will be seven thousand effectives.

Various reasons determine this point. The enemy have never had in the field, for the defence of Malden, more than two thousand men. Their number has no doubt been hitherto limited by their means of subsistence, and this cause is not likely to suffer any very material change in their favor during the ensuing campaign. More than seven thousand men, therefore, would be unnecessary on our part. Again: to maintain a greater number, would be impracticable, in the present state of the treasury.

It now remains only to signify to you, clearly and distinctly, the kind of force the government mean hereafter to employ in offensive operations, if it can be obtained.

When the legislature, at their last session, adopted the measure of augmenting the army to fifty-two regiments of the line, it was expressly in the view of superceding hereafter the necessity of employing militia, excepting in moments of actual invasion. In obedience to this policy, the president assigned to the 8th military district of the United States four of these new regiments, which, if filled, and superadded to the two regiments of the line now in that district, and the 24th in march for it, will give a total of seven regiments, or seven thousand men. This number forbids the belief, that any employment of militia drafts will be necessary, when it shall have been collected. Till, however, this be done, or at least till time be given for the experiment, so many militia only are to be called out, as shall be necessary for the *defence* of your posts on the Miami, and of your depots of provision on the lake. And should the recruiting service go on less fortunately in the patriotic states of Kentucky and Ohio, than in other parts of the union, you are in that case, and in that case only, authorized to

call out so many militia drafts as will make good the deficiency; and organizing these under the rules already prescribed, await the farther orders of the president in your camp at the Rapids.

To these orders I have to add, that you will regard it as your duty to keep this department regularly and frequently informed of the actual condition of the troops under your command; as well in regard to equipment and supplies of provision and ammunition, as to number, discipline, and health; and that your weekly and monthly reports shall include also the state of the ordnance and quarter master's departments, noting particularly the number of horses and oxen employed by both. You will readily perceive the necessity for giving this order, when I state, that no return of any description from your division of the army has ever been received at the adjutant general's office. Your proportion of the new staff has been given to you. Captain Adams has been appointed assistant adjutant general, and Mr. Bartlett deputy quarter master general of your division. The brigadier generals M<sup>c</sup>Arthur and Cass are employed in superintending the recruiting service. A letter from the latter gives reason to believe, that this will go on well in the state of Ohio.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Major General Harrison,  
Com. the 8th Military District, U. S.

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*Extracts of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP MEIGS,

April 21, 1813.

“The plan for future operations, as laid down in your letter of the 4th, is no doubt the best that

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could have been devised in the event of the promised naval success, and a prosperous issue to the recruiting business. My measures will therefore be entirely directed to the prosecution of the campaign in that way.

“There is nothing to be feared as to the ulterior operations of the campaign.

“I shall cause the movements of the enemy to be narrowly watched; but in the event of their landing at Lower Sandusky, that post cannot be saved. I will direct it, in such an event, to be evacuated. The stores there are not of much consequence, excepting about 500 stands of arms, which I will cause to be removed as soon as the roads are practicable—at present it is impossible.”

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*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to  
Major General William H. Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

May 8, 1813.

“Your letters of the 21st and 25th ultimo have been received. I never meant that you, or your artillery, or stores for the campaign, now collected at fort Meigs, should be brought back to Cleveland for embarkation. My intention was, that the boats built there should move along the coast in the wake of the fleet to Sandusky, or to the very foot of the rapids, if that were practicable and expedient, taking in on the route what was wanted. The boats building and built by major Jesup are not decked, but strong and high sided, and very competent to the navigation of the lake, particularly between the chain of islands and the west shore.”

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to  
Major General William H. Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

May 21, 1813.

“Your future requisitions for ordnance stores will be governed by the quantity on hand at fort Meigs and Franklinton, and by the number and calibres of the pieces you propose to take with you against Malden. Your whole train, if I am well informed, amounts to thirty-five pieces, of which nine are eighteen pounders.

“The 24th regiment was, on the 10th instant, at Lexington, (Kentucky) on their way to Cleveland. You will give it any other point of rendezvous you may think proper, and adopt such means to assemble the other parts of your division as will be most advisable. On this head, I would but suggest, that the arrangement which shall best mask your real design and most impress the enemy with a belief that your march to Malden will be by land, will be the best.

“Clothing for the 26th, 27th and 28th regiments has been forwarded from Philadelphia.

“The last accounts of the boats preparing by major Jesup were favorable. That officer will necessarily report to you and take your orders.”

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to  
Major General Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

July 14, 1813.

“Orders have been sent to captain Perry to communicate to you the naval movements, and to concert with you the necessary co-operations.

"Of the militia, you are authorized to take what in your judgment will be necessary. Such of the Kentucky militia as are in service would be better than a new draft. There is (of the Pennsylvania militia) one regiment at Erie armed, equipped, &c. These are subjected to your command."

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WAR DEPARTMENT,

August 5, 1813.

SIR,

The best interpretation of the late movements of the enemy in your quarter is, that De Rottenberg has detached to the aid of Proctor between four and five hundred men, and that with these he is attempting to save Malden by attacking fort Meigs. If this conjecture be well founded, it suggests the true policy on our part, provided the flotilla was over the bar. Go directly to Malden and leave Mr. Proctor to amuse himself with fort Meigs. There is no objection to your appointing the serjeants to other offices pro tempore. Captain Butler has been appointed major of the 32d regiment and lieutenant M'Gee captain in the 42d.

I am, sir,

Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General Harrison.

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*Extract of a letter from Major General William H. Harrison to the Secretary at War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, SENECA TOWN,

August 22, 1813.

"I am exerting every nerve to complete my preparations for crossing the lake, as soon as I am rein-

forced by two thousand of the Kentucky militia. That number is indispensable, from the sickly state of the regular troops, of whom I shall think myself fortunate to take with me two-fifths of the aggregate amount."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, SENECA TOWN,  
August 29, 1813.

"I shall be able to embark some day between the 10th and 15th proximo, with upwards of 2000 regular troops, and 3000 militia. Every exertion has been, and is continued to be made, to prepare for the contemplated offensive operations; but, as we could not navigate the lake until our flotilla came up, nor accumulate at any point on its margin, the stores that were at Upper Sandusky and fort Winchester, during Proctor's late invasion, it will take the time I have mentioned before the embarkation can be effected. It might be facilitated by moving the troops that are here immediately to the lake, and then waiting for the Kentucky militia. But so extremely unhealthy is the whole of the southern shore, from Huron to the river Raisin, that the most fatal effects would follow the keeping the troops upon it, even for a few days. You can form a correct estimate of the dreadful effects of the immense body of stagnant water, with which the vicinity of the lake abounds, from the state of the troops at Lower Sandusky. Upwards of ninety are this morning reported on the sick list, out of about two hundred and twenty. Those at fort Meigs are not much better."

*Extract of a letter from Major General William  
H. Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, BASS ISLAND,

September 22d, 1813.

"The greater part of the troops are here with me, and the whole will, I believe, be up by twelve o'clock. I shall proceed as far as the Middle Sister in the course of to-night and to-morrow, and in the following night get so near the enemy's coast as to land two or three miles below Malden by eight o'clock in the morning. These prospects may, however, be retarded by adverse winds. Commodore Perry gives me every assistance in his power, but his crews were so much cut up in the late action, that he cannot navigate his vessels without the aid of my men."

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WAR DEPARTMENT, SACKETT'S HARBOR,

September 22, 1813.

SIR,

Information has reached me through various but unofficial channels, that commodore Perry had captured the whole of the British fleet on Lake Erie. If this be true, it is matter of much personal and public congratulation. It enables you to make sure of Malden, and as a subsequent measure, to carry your main body down the lake, and by throwing yourself into De Rottenberg's rear, to compel him to quit his new positions before fort George. After general Wilkinson shall have left that place, there will be found on the two sides of the Niagara, a force amounting to three thousand men, who will be subjected to your orders. By giving this new direction to your operations, you will readily perceive of how much more importance it is, in the opinion of the executive, to be



able to expel the enemy from the country lying between the two lakes Erie and Ontario, than to pursue the Indians into their woody and distant recesses. A few days will put us in motion from this point.

Accept my best wishes, &c.

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

General Harrison.

HEAD QUARTES, AMHERSTBURGH,  
September 27, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform you, that I landed the army under my command about three miles below this place, at three o'clock this evening, without opposition, and took possession of the town in an hour after. General Proctor has retreated to Sandwich with his regular troops and Indians, having previously burned the fort, navy yard, barracks, and public store houses. The two latter were very extensive, covering several acres of ground. I will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of overtaking him, as he has upwards of 1,000 horses, and we have not one in the army. I shall think myself fortunate to be able to collect a sufficiency to mount the general officers. It is supposed here that general Proctor intends to establish himself upon the river French, 40 miles from Malden.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Your most obedient humble servant,

**WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.**

John Armstrong, Esq.  
Secretary of War.

*Extract of a letter from Major General William H. Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS,

*Near Moravian town, on the river Thames,  
80 miles from Detroit,*

October 5, 1813.

"I have the honor to inform you, that by the blessing of Providence, the army under my command has this evening obtained a complete victory over the combined Indian and British forces under the command of general Proctor. I believe that nearly the whole of the enemy's regulars are taken or killed; amongst the former are all the superior officers, excepting general Proctor. My mounted men are now in pursuit of him. Our loss is very trifling."

*Extracts of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, DETROIT,

October 16, 1813.

"A detachment of the army, under the command of brigadier general M'Arthur, has been for some days waiting at this place for the necessary provisions to proceed to lake Michigan. I am sorry to inform you, however, that from the effects of a violent storm, there is now no prospect of accomplishing that desirable object, the reduction of Michilimackinac, this season. It is with the greatest regret I inform you, that it is almost reduced to a certainty, that two of our schooners have been lost on lake Eric, the Chippewa and Ohio; the former loaded with the baggage of the troops from Bass island, the latter with flour and salt provisions from Cleveland."

“Upon a consultation with the two brigadiers and commodore Perry and captain Elliott, it was unanimously determined, that the season is too far advanced to attempt an expedition to Maccinac, if it were not commenced in two or three days, and there was no hope of the supplies being obtained in that time.”

“It is generally believed here, that general Proctor despatched an order to the commanding officer at Maccinac to destroy the post and retreat by the way of Grand river. At any rate, it is not a matter of much importance to have that place in our possession during the winter, cut off as it is from a communication with the rest of the world.”

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SACKETT'S HARBOR,

October 20, 1813.

SIR,

The enemy's corps before fort George broke up their cantonments on the 9th, and marched rapidly for Burlington bay, which he reached on the 11th. By taking this route he may intend to reinforce Proctor on the river French, or Kingston, at the head of the St. Lawrence. He was apprized of the abandonment of Malden on the 5th.

We are perhaps too remote to profit by each others suggestions; but it does not appear to me, that Sandwich is the point at which Proctor will stop, if you pursue him. From Point aux Pins, on lake Erie, there is a good road to Chatham, on the Thames, the distance not more than twenty-four miles. Were this gained, and travelled back to Sandwich, the enemy's means of subsistence might be destroyed, and himself compelled to surrender. But of the practicability of this, you are the best judge. My opinion is suggested by the map.

The first division of this army sailed two days ago.  
The second and the reserve follow to-day.

Yours with great respect,  
J. ARMSTRONG.

Major General Harrison.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Harrison to  
the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, ERIE, PA.

October 22, 1813.

"Soon after my letter to you of the 16th instant was written, I was informed that a special messenger, with despatches from you, had left Bass island in the schooner Chippewa, which had been driven from the mouth of the Detroit river in a violent storm; and from the circumstance of a quantity of baggage belonging to the officers, which was known to have been on board, being found on the lake shore, she was believed to have been lost. As I had nearly completed the arrangement for a suspension of hostilities with the Indians, although I had no information as to the movement of the army on lake Ontario, I determined to embark general M<sup>c</sup>Arthurs brigade and the battalion of the United States riflemen, and proceed with them down the lake until I could receive some certain information of the movements of the army under general Wilkinson, and what was expected from me. I arrived here this morning with commodore Perry in the Ariel, having left the remainder of the fleet at Bass island. It is probable they will be here this evening, when we shall immediately proceed to Buffaloe."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Harrison  
to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, BUFFALOE, N. Y.

October 24, 1813.

"I have this moment landed at this place, from on board the schooner Ariel, which is one of seven vessels, with which I left Detroit, having on board the greater part of M'Arthur's brigade, and the detachment of the United States' rifle regiment, under col. Smith. The other vessels are all, I believe, in sight, and will be up in a short time. The aggregate number of troops with me, is about thirteen hundred, but not more than one thousand fit for duty. Before this reaches you, you will no doubt be informed of the loss of your messenger, captain Brown, with the despatches that were entrusted with him. Not having received your directions, and being entirely ignorant of the state of our military operations in this quarter, I was much at a loss to know how to proceed; but believing that general Cass with his brigade would be able to secure Detroit and our adjacent conquests, after having concluded an armistice with the greater part of the hostile tribes, I concluded that I could not do better than to move down the lake with the remaining part of the troops. A part of M'Arthur's brigade is still at the Bass Islands, where they were left for the want of the means of conveyance; and a considerable portion of their baggage was also left from the same cause. Means, however, have been taken to collect and bring them on.

"I shall move down the troops immediately to fort George, where I shall await your orders, unless an opportunity should previously occur of striking at the enemy. The information I have received here of the situation and movements of the enemy on the head of lake Ontario, is vague and contradictory."

WAR DEPARTMENT, WILNA,

October 30, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 5th and of the 24th instant.

The despatch by captain Brown, and which with him was lost in lake Erie, suggested, as an ulterior movement, the coming down to the Niagara river, and putting yourself on the right and rear of De Rottenberg's position before fort George; while general McClure, with his brigade of militia, volunteers and Indians, should approach them in front. The enemy seems to have been aware of this, or of some similar movement, as he began his retreat on the 9th and did not stop until he had gained the head of Burlington bay, where I understand, by report, he yet is. This is his last strong hold in the Peninsula. Routed from this, he must surrender or make his way down lake Ontario to Kingston. His force is estimated at twelve or fifteen hundred effectives. The capture or destruction of this corps would be a glorious *finale* to your campaign. Our operations in this quarter are but *beginning*, at a time when they ought to have *ended*.

I shall go on slowly towards Utica, where I may have the pleasure of seeing adjutant general Gaines.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major Gen. Harrison.

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*Extract of a letter from the Secretary at War to General Harrison, dated*

BOONSVILLE, November 3, 1813.

"I have fortunately met colonel Gaines on the way to his regiment. The deputy pay master shall

have orders to attend to the brigade you have brought with you. Captain Butler will act as your assistant adjutant general, and shall receive an appointment as such. The officers of the several corps composing your division (as well those at fort George as of general Cass's brigade), not indispensable to the command of the troops now in the field, should be immediately despatched on the recruiting service. I need not invoke your attention to a subject so important to the early and successful opening of the next campaign, and to the extent and character of your particular command. Will the whole of Cass's brigade be wanted to the westward? In the event of a peace with the savages a less force would be sufficient; and, to hasten and secure this event, the present moment and present impressions must be seized. Of the warriors, sueing for peace, one or more should be sent by the nearest route, and by the most expeditious mode, to the Creek nation. The story of their defeat by you, and subsequent abandonment by the British, communicated by themselves, would probably have a decided effect on their red brethren of the south, and save us the trouble and expense of beating them into a sense of their own interest. When I wrote to you from Wilna, it was doubtful whether our attack would be made directly upon Kingston or upon Montreal. Reasons exist for preferring the latter course, and have probably determined general Wilkinson to go down the St. Lawrence. In this case, the enemy will have at Kingston, besides his fleet, a garrison of twelve or fourteen hundred men. Had we not a corps in the neighbourhood, these might do mischief, and even render insecure the winter station of our fleet. To prevent this it is deemed adviseable to draw together at Sackett's Harbor a considerable military force. There are now at that post between four and five hundred men of all descriptions—sick, convalescent and effective. Colonel Scott's detachment (about 700) are on their march thither, and it is barely possible

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that colonel Randolph's (not arriving in time to move with the army) may be there also. This does not exceed three hundred and fifty. M'Arthur's brigade added to these will make a force entirely competent to our object. To bring this brigade down the lake you must have the aid of the fleet, which will be readily given by commodore Chauncey. On this point I shall write to him and suggest a communication with you in relation to

"This new disposition will render necessary the employment of so many of the militia and volunteers, now in service under general M'Clure, as you may deem competent to the safe-keeping of forts George and Niagara and their dependencies."

HEAD QUARTERS, NEWARK,

November 16, 1813.



SIR,

Commodore Chauncey with the fleet arrived here yesterday morning, and informed me that he was ready to receive the troops to convey them down the lake; and that the season was so far advanced, rendering the navigation dangerous to the smaller vessels, that it was desirable they should be embarked as expeditiously as possible. As a very small part of the militia and volunteers had arrived, and the situation of Sackett's Harbor appearing to me to require immediate reinforcement, I did not think proper to take upon myself the responsibility of postponing the departure of the troops for the lower part of the lake, conformably to the directions contained in your letter of the 3d instant.





"The information I received yesterday from two respectable citizens that were taken near to fort Meigs in June last, and who made their escape in an open boat from Burlington, confirms me in the propriety of







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[14]  
These men state, the troops were  
carrying to Kingston from York as fast as possible,  
the regulars going down in boats and militia bring-  
ing the latter back.

The troops are now all embarked and are under  
the command of colonel Smith, who is an officer in  
whose capacity and bravery the greatest reliance may  
be placed.

I shall set out this evening for the seat of govern-  
ment.

I have the honor to be,

With the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your humble servant,

**WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.**

Gen. John Armstrong, Esq.  
Secretary of War.

Correspondence with Governor Shelby, in relation to the  
north-western Campaign.

NEWPORT, August 1, 1813.

SIR,

A few days ago I was honored with a letter from  
general Harrison, under date of the 30th ultimo, by  
his aid-de-camp, major T. H. B. In it he says, that  
"he had just received a letter from the secretary at  
war authorizing him to call from the neighboring  
states such numbers of militia as he might deem requi-  
site for the ensuing operations against Upper Ca-  
nada." In pursuance of that power, he has made a  
requisition on the government of Kentucky for rein-  
forcements, and has referred me to Major T. H. B. for  
information, &c. &c. and has in warm terms solicited  
my taking the field in person. Much delay would  
have been the inevitable consequence of ordering out  
the militia as *infantry* in the ordinary mode, by draft.  
As *mounted volunteers*, a competent force can, I feel  
confident, be easily raised. I have therefore appoint-  
ed the 3d of this month, at Newport, in this state,  
for a general rendezvous of mounted volunteers.

I have the honor of inclosing, for the information of  
the president, a copy of my address to the militia of  
this state on the occasion.

The prospect of acting efficiently against Upper  
Canada will, I have no doubt, call forth a large force  
to our standard, and they will be immediately march-  
ed to the head quarters of the north-western army, in  
such bodies as will best facilitate their movements;  
when there they can act as foot or mounted, as cir-  
cumstances may require.

I shall take great pleasure to hear from the presi-  
dent on this subject previous to my departure from this

[54]  
please, and I request the favor of you to lay this letter  
immediately before him for his consideration, and that  
you will be pleased to advise me of the result by the  
next conveyance.

I have the honor to be,

Most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

ISAAC SHELBY.

The honorable

The Secretary of War.

RED HOOK, NORTH RIVER,

August 31, 1848.

SIR,  
I had the honor of receiving your excellency's  
letter of the 1st of August by the southern mail of yester-  
day, and of learning from the war office that a copy  
of it had been forwarded to the president for his con-  
sideration and orders. These will be communicated  
to your excellency as promptly as possible.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c. &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Mia Excellency

The Governor of Kentucky.

NOTE.—It is understood that it was not till the receipt  
of the above at the war office, for transmission to Ken-  
tucky, that governor Shelby's letter was sent to the presi-  
dent.

WAR OFFICE,

September 27, 1848.

SIR,

In the absence of the secretary of war, I have  
the honor to inform your excellency, that the presi-

dent has been pleased to approve your arrangements in substituting volunteers for the detached militia required by general Harrison.

The term of service for the detachment under your excellency, must depend on the arrangements of the commanding general, to whom you are referred for the necessary information relative to their duty, and the points where your troops will be expected to operate.

It will be proper for your excellency to keep up a correspondence with general Harrison. This is rendered the more necessary, as the several requisitions which have been made by him for volunteers and militia have not been accurately reported to the war office; and it is possible he may find it advisable to discharge a part of your force before they reach the frontier.

In the present critical period of the campaign it seems advisable to submit all further arrangements to general Harrison, under the instructions he has received from the president through the secretary of war.

With perfect respect,

I have the honor to be,

Your excellency's

Most obedient humble servant,

DANL. PARKER, C. C.

War Department.

His Excellency Isaac Shelby,  
Governor of Kentucky.

[144]  
Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major  
General Hampton.

September 1, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

Prevost has gone up to the head of the lake; Yeo has followed him. The object is either to attack Boyd, or to draw Wilkinson to the west, and spin out the campaign, without either giving or receiving blows of decided character. In either case, his [Prevost's] rear is manifestly neglected, and we must not lose the advantage he presents for attacking it. Wilkinson has gone on to fort George to baffle Prevost, (if the former be his object) and to bring off the army, should the other be manifestly his intention. If Oranucey beat Yeo, sir George's case will be desperate. This is the pivot on which the issue of the campaign turns.

I am, dear sir, yours, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

CAMP, NEAR BURLINGTON,

September 7, 1813.

SIR,

Your letter of the 1st instant came to hand, by express, the last evening. My dispositions for a movement had been shaped to meet the arrangement communicated in my letter of the 31st ultimo; but I called together the heads of departments this morning to know how far it would be practicable to anticipate that which you had indicated in your despatch of the 29th, and it was found impracticable.



Learned's regiment has not arrived. The ordnance and fixed ammunition belonging to the artillery were only to leave Albany on the 5th, and the letter for the infantry is not yet on its way, notwithstanding my order to major Bumford, as early as the 14th or 16th of August; and without it I shall be fifty rounds a man short, having now less than fifty, including those in the cartridge boxes. But what is worse than all, the quarter master general's arrangements, for the land transportation, is shaped to the 20th, and cannot be met at an earlier day.

A descent by water, and direct attack on the Isle aux Noix, is out of the question. It is a place of immense strength, and cannot be approached, but by a decided superiority of naval strength. This commodore M'Donaugh does not pretend to assume in the narrow waters. He has this morning been explicitly consulted upon that point. Our approach must be by the Plains of Acadia. I have directed a monthly return to be inclosed. Our strength will be less than 4,000 effectives. Lane and Leonard's regiments have come on, with mumps and measles upon them, and totally destitute of the least instruction. Too much must not be expected from us. All accounts concur in representing the force of the enemy at more than 5,000, exclusive of three battalions of incorporated militia (twelve months men) stationed at the *Cedars* and *Cascades*, some distance up the St. Lawrence. If any have gone to Kingston, they have been detached from these points. These battalions consist of 400 men each.

I shall expect information from you respecting the state of things above, but shall not wait a moment for it, after I am ready.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary at War.

SACKETT'S HARBOUR,

September 18, 1812.

SIR,

Your letter of the 7th instant has been received. Chauncey probably fought a battle on the 11th instant. A heavy cannonade was distinctly heard at this place for several hours, and a boat from Great Sodus states, that an engagement between the fleets took place off *Presque Isle* on the northern shore of the lake. (*Presque Isle* is nearly opposite to Great Sodus.) We are anxiously looking for the result. Had Chauncey been beaten, or so crippled as to make it necessary for him to go into port, we should have seen him here before to-day. His absence and his silence give us, therefore, an assurance that whatever may have been the issue of the battle, it has not disabled him from covering the intended movement of the troops.

Our information differs widely from yours as to the strength of the enemy at Montreal and its dependencies. A deserter from a British detachment of 300 men, moving from Montreal to Kingston, and who left them near the head of the rapids, came to this post the day before yesterday. He states that the whole regular force near Montreal does not exceed one thousand effectives, and that but three hundred invalids have been left at Quebec. This agrees with information received through other channels less direct, and perhaps less correct, than yours.

From general Wilkinson I have not heard a syllable since his arrival at fort George, which was on the 4th instant. He must now be on the point of moving.

The 10th and 32d regiments are in march for Plattsburg. The latter was destined for this place, but learning that it could not leave Philadelphia before the 12th, I have given to it the shorter march and nearer scene of action.

It is much to be regretted that our naval means on lake Champlain should have fallen so far short of

their object. To our operations an ascendancy in the narrow parts of the lake is of infinite moment. A well chosen position on the plains is the alternative of most promise. It may keep the different corps of the army in a state of separation.

With great respect, I am, sir,

Your most obedient, and

Very humble servant,

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Major General Hampton.

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HEAD QUARTERS, CUMBERLAND HEAD.

September 15, 1813.

SIR,

I have got my forces nearly concentrated at this point; and, with M'Donough's aid have put a stopper on the lake which ensures tranquillity while my preparations are going on. All now depends on the quarter master general, and I believe he will surmount every obstacle. I shall soon be ready.

I am, &c.

**WADE HAMPTON.**

Secretary of War.

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SACKETT'S HARBOUR,

September 19, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

Chauncey has chased Yeo round the lake and obliged him to take shelter in Kingston. The commodore has now gone up to fort George to bring down the troops. We are ready at this point to embark. It may, perhaps, be the 20th before our forces will be

is believed in Kingston that sir George has not  
is about going to Quebec. Will he not stop at Montreal?

Yours faithfully,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General Hampton.

HEAD QUARTERS AT LITTLE CHAZY,

September 22, 1813.

SIR,  
At 5 o'clock P.M. on the 19th, I dropped down with the army from Cumberland Head for the shore near this place, and landed at 12 o'clock at night, and an hour after had the light corps of the army in action against the advanced posts of the enemy. Snelling's command against a post a little over the line, on the lake shore, and Hamilton's against Odle town. The blow was to have been struck at the dawn, and the corps were to unite at the latter place, twelve miles distant. Both corps were misled by their guides. Snelling finding himself out of his way for the first point, pushed for the second, and as Hamilton had taken a circuit to get below it, Snelling arrived first and fell upon the picquet in a house, which he killed or took, except two or three, and the main body escaped.

Hamilton arrived soon after; the army joined them a little after nine. A few desperate Indians continued to lurk about the distant bushes, and frequently crawled up and fired upon our sentries during the day and the succeeding night.

One was killed upon his post in the dark, and two or three others wounded. They were frequently drove off and the thickets scoured, but they continued

to hover round as long as we staid. The army had on their backs five days provisions, and my intention was to push through the wood, remove all obstructions, and repair the roads for our supplies, artillery, baggage, &c. which was to follow; but an insurmountable difficulty occurred which at once defied all human exertion. The drought had been uncommon, and I had some doubts of the practicability of procuring water for the troops, horses and teams; but the points of Odletown, La Cole, and the river La Cadia were represented to me as a sure resource.

The troops, however, soon dried up the wells and springs of Odletown, and the beds of La Cole and La Cadia are represented, from authority not to be questioned, to be dry. The troops began to suffer extremely, and the few cavalry and artillery horses that arrived were obliged to be sent back to Champlain, a distance of four miles, for water. The difficulty began to produce effects the most to be dreaded.

It was not a time to hesitate: the general staff and commanding officers of corps were called together, and there was but one voice.

The *Chataugy route* was adopted. It was circuitous, but afforded water, and was practicable in less time, all obstructions in the other considered.

The army fell back in the afternoon of the 21st and encamped at Champlain. The Chataugy road takes off near this place, and the army will advance on it seven miles this afternoon. The baggage is now advancing on it. I hope to arrive at Chataugy on the evening of the 24th. I can from thence join you at any point you may advise on the St. Lawrence. My object is *Cognawanga*, opposite to La Chine, about forty miles from Chataugy and ten from Montreal. I have my guides and information I can rely upon. This position will present three points. If I do not hear from you I can take either or hold fast, as circumstances shall indicate.

My first movement was unexpected to the enemy;

must draw him into some confusion, and will pass as a feint, so soon as he hears of my route to Chataugy. My force is less numerous than I expected. It is raw and of a description that will be forever falling off. All I can say is, it shall have all the capacity I can give it.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

P. S. Since writing I find all the corps cannot leave this ground before the morning, and that it will be the 25th before we reach Chataugy.

W. H.

The Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

JACKETT'S HARBOR, Sept. 25, 1818.

SIR,

Your letter of the 22d instant, was delivered to me last night. Commodore Chauncey left this place on the 18th, in the intention of running up to fort George, and covering the transportation of the troops from that point to this. On the 21st he had not arrived there; the effect, as I suppose, of adverse winds. This circumstance will necessarily bring after it a delay in the execution of our joint operations, and will indicate the propriety of your not advancing beyond Malone or the *Four Corners*, until you have advice of our movement. The distance from this place to Malone is about 130 miles. An express can reach you in 30 hours, and will, of course, enable you to gain the village of *Cognowaga* as early as may be proper. You will give such direction to the militia corps assembling or assembled at Plattsburg, as you may think most advisable.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSRONG.

Major Gen. Hampton.

HEAD QUARTERS, POMEROY'S,  
13 MILES FROM CHATAUGY,

September 25, 1813.

SIR,

I had this morning, at 8 o'clock, the honor to receive your letter of the 19th, and finding so much time on my hands, the idea has occurred, that a great advantage may arise from a closer view of our means, and the clearest possible concert and understanding in their application. Of every matter and thing relating to mine, colonel Atkinson will give you as full an idea, as if you had been with me for the last five days. When you shall have reflected fully upon them, my arrangements and ideas, your indications can be made with more precision and confidence.

The perfect *rawness* of the troops, with the exception of not a single platoon, has been a source of much solicitude to the best informed among us. This solicitude has not been removed by the first experiment. Every thing was done, to be sure, that ought to have been done; but not in that *style* which the example of a Snelling, a Hamilton, &c. ought to have inspired in the movements of even the light corps. We want a little more mercury, in the ranks at least. Can you not let me have the 1st dragoons, and one more veteran battalion? At all events let me have Hane and Haig, that I may have their local as well as their constitutional ardour.

But the great object of this letter is, a full and distinct view and understanding on both sides. All I need say is, that whatever part shall be assigned me in the general plan, shall be executed to the utmost extent of my ability and power.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obed't. and very humble servt.

W. HAMPTON.

Hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary at War.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to  
Major General Hampton, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

September 28, 1813.

"The position you have taken is better calculated to keep up the enemy's doubts with regard to your real point of attack than any other. *Hold it fast till we approach you.* In the present state of the campaign we ought to run no risks by *separate* attacks when *combined ones* are practicable and sure. Had you been able to have broken down the head of their defences and seized the bank of the St. John's at the Rapids, you would have bothered his knightship considerably; but, on the whole, the western movement is to be preferred; because in it there is *safety and concert*, and in the mean time, enough to render his attention to different points necessary, and of course to keep his forces in a state of division.

"The moment the enemy left the upper parts of the Chesapeake, I ordered Pickens with his battalion of the 10th to join you. A battalion of the 32d had similar orders."

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HEAD QUARTERS, CHATAUGAY,

October 4, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

No change of importance in my affairs has occurred since my last, by colonel Atkinson; but, as there are several of minor consideration, I have judged that a detailed view of them might be of some use, at the moment of your arranging with the commanding general the main course of the proposed operations.

The road to Plattsburg will be completed to-day, and is a perfect *turnpike*. The artillery, consisting of 3 six-pounders, 1 twelve, and 1 howitzer, tolera-



bly appointed and found, is arrived. I have but a small stock of provisions on hand, but have the most pointed assurance from colonel Thomas, the quarter master general, that a supply of sixty days of bread and flour will arrive at once, in the course of three or four days. I have only from forty to fifty rounds of musket cartridges with me, but this convoy will make the supply an *hundred*, and give to the artillery all it requires in reserve. The supply of salted provisions will not exceed a fourth of the proportion of flour; but we have, and can have, an unlimited supply of good beef cattle. Brigadier general Parker is at Plattsburg hastening my supplies, and presiding over some arrangements that were thought necessary. I have directed the commencement of a *petty war*, or invasion of the lines, at and near lake Champlain, by colonel Clark, who has some volunteers, and brigadier general Fasset, (our colonel) who has, at my instance, called out his brigade of militia. The latter, I understand, turn out but badly, but they will make together, I suppose, from 600 to 1000 men. There has been inculcated by the artifices of the British, a shameful and corrupt neutrality on the lines, for the purposes of gain. I have directed these officers to break the truce. And should other means fail, to act the part of the mischievous urchin, who, to get two peaceable *tabbies* at "*making the fur fly*," hold them up together by the tail. To be serious, it is really time each individual should take his side, and that traitors to either, should meet their due reward. What I am aiming at, however, is tranquillity on the road, by kicking up a dust on the lines. It will also create a division at a proper point. Of Hopkins's militia, but about 250 have arrived, and not more than 50 or 60 of them have consented to pass the line. Such as refused, general Parker was authorized to keep on the lines below, and to excite all the *alarm* he could with them and the Vermonters. The change of habit has produced more sickness

among my raw soldiers than I expected. I believe the number has accumulated at this place to 300; and, I am afraid will increase. The enemy is in considerable force about 12 or 14 miles distant. He made an attack on one of my out-posts with 300 or 400 regulars, and as many Indians, on the afternoon of the first instant, but he fell into bad hands. He found Snelling well posted with his own and Wool's corps. The attack was made with Indians, and the regulars lay in ambush. But Snelling dashed upon them with such rapidity upon their flanks, that they all scampered away together. Lieutenant Nash, of the 33d regiment, and one man was killed, and one wounded. If the Indians lost any they carried them off.

The Indians still hover about us and shoot at our sentries. The St. Regis people are poor d—ls.

I have written in much haste, and have neither time for correction nor copying. You must take it for better for worse. I will only entreat you to regard it in any other light rather than that of an official communication. You may, however, no less rely upon all the information it conveys.

I am, sir, very respectfully and truly,

Your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

The hon. John Armstrong,

HEAD QUARTERS, CHATAUGY,

October 12, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

My solicitude to know your progress, and the real state of the *grand army*, is extreme. It is perhaps not less *necessary* for both, that I should be constantly informed. Implicit faith, cordiality, and concert ought to unite our efforts. These have formed the basis of our exertions so far, and promises, more than our numbers, the result so much desired. I

have no reference to individuals; but to the *heart* of every man. The point and movement of our junction is all important; and that, and not the moment of my departure from hence, ought to be indicated; because I ought to be the best judge of the *time* necessary to surmount the obstacles in the way. Between this and *Cogswononga* much work on the road is necessary, and I ought to advance upon it two or three days earlier than might be judged necessary upon a smooth and solid road. By seizing and holding strong positions in my front, the work could progress in my rear without incurring risk, until I arrive within a striking distance. You have said "hold fast," and it might be considered precipitate to advance before I hear, at least, that the *Rubicon* is passed above. These are points for your consideration, and those with you who guide the general movement. You have not sent me the 200 mounted dragons. Their presence, on ground, the possession of which I do not despair of gaining, added to a force of 4,000 effective infantry, and a well appointed *train*, ought to inspire you with some reliance upon our army, new as it is. High pretensions have been avoided; but the moment has arrived when it is perhaps necessary for us to be estimated at as much as we are worth.

The 10th is at hand, and is included in the estimate. It is believed the militia may serve for escorts to what must follow us.

Colonel Clark is carrying on his small war on the lines with all the effect contemplated. The enemy's motley force have every where nearly disappeared. He is concentrating, no doubt, on points in my way, or on the river.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very respectfully and truly,

Your obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

The Hon. General Armstrong,  
Secretary at War.

We have had an intelligent deserter of the regiment of Canadian fencibles. He states the enemy's force near us at 8,000 men; but when put to the detail, gave it as follows:

18th regiment—two flank companies and part of a battalion,	300
Muron's French regiment, two flank companies,	200
Canadian fencibles, colonel Robinson,	150
Colonel Shaburly's command, voltiguers and Indians and some fencibles,	700
Two battalions incorporated militia,	750

The whole commanded by colonel Williams, 3,100  
 Sir George had gone along to Montreal. He brought down thirty-six boats and about 600 troops, included in the above.

SACKETT'S HARBOR,

October 16, 1812.

DEAR GENERAL,

Your favor of the 12th ultimo has been handed to me by major Parker. The Niagara division has been slow in its movements. It has at length reached Henderson's harbour, and moves this day to Grenadier island, whither the division here is moving also. From this point (Grenadier island,) we take our departure either for Kingston or for Montreal. The enemy broke up his positions before fort George on the 9th, burned his surplus stores, arms, &c. and moved rapidly for Burlington bay, which he reached on the 11th instant. Advices from the bay of Cantata, that he is coming down to Kingston, and that his sick and convalescent, to the number of 1200, had already arrived there. He will bring with him about 1500 effectives, and thanks to the storm and our snail-like movements down the lake, they will be there before we can reach it. The *manœuvre* intended is lost,

so far as regards Kingston. What we now do expect  
 that place must be done by hard blows and at some  
 risk. The importance of the object may, however,  
 justify the means. In the other case, (an immediate  
 descent of the St. Lawrence) the army will make its  
 way to the isle Perrot, whence we shall immediately  
 open a communication with you. Under these cir-  
 cumstances you will approach the *mouth of the Cha-  
 teaugay or other point which shall better favor our  
 junction, and hold the enemy in check.* Your known  
 vigilance and skill make it unnecessary to suggest  
 any measure of precaution against the enterprises of  
 the enemy while you remain within stroke of him.  
 The dragoons will pass the St. Lawrence near the  
 Coteau de lac.

Yours, &c.

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Major General Hampton.

HEAD QUARTERS, FOUR CORNERS,

November 1, 1813.

SIR,

On the morning of the 21st ultimo the army com-  
 menced its movement down the Chateaugay, for the  
 purpose of placing itself in a situation which would  
 enable it to fulfil its parts of the proposed combined  
 operations on the St. Lawrence.

An extensive wood of eleven or twelve miles in  
 front, blocked up with felled timber, and covered by  
 the Indians and light troops of the enemy, was a se-  
 rious impediment to the arduous task of opening a  
 road for the artillery and stores. Brigadier general  
 Izard with the light troops and one regiment of the  
 line, was detached early in the morning to turn these

movements in flank, and to seize on the more open country below, while the army, preceded by a strong working party, advanced on a more circuitous but practicable route for a road. The measure, as will be seen by the report of brigadier general Izard, which I have the honor to inclose, completely succeeded, and the main body of the army reached the advanced position on the evening of the 22d. The 23d and 24th were employed in completing the road and getting up the artillery and stores.

I had arranged, at my departure, under the direction of major Parker, a line of communication as far up the St. Lawrence as Ogdensburg, for the purpose of hastening to me the earliest notice of the progress of our army down. I had surmounted twenty-four miles of the most difficult part of the route, and had in advance of me seven miles of open country, but at the end of that distance commenced a wood of some miles in extent, which had been formed into an entire abatis and filled by a succession of wooden breast-works, the rearmost of which were supplied with ordnance. In front of these defences were placed the Indian force and light corps of the enemy, and in the rear all of his disposable force. As the extent of this force depended upon his sense of danger on the St. Lawrence, it was a cause of regret that all communication from yourself or major Parker seemed to be at an end. As it was, however, believed that the enemy was hourly adding to his strength in this position, if free from the apprehension of danger from above, an effort was judged necessary to dislodge him, and if it succeeded, we should be in possession of a position which we could hold as long as any doubts remained of what was passing above, and of the real part to be assigned us.

Our guides assured us of a shoal and practicable fording place, opposite the lower flank of the enemy's defences, and that the wood on the opposite side of

the river, a distance of seven or eight miles, was practicable for the passage of the troops. Colonel Purdy with the light corps, and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached at an early hour of the night of the 25th to gain this ford by the morning, and to commence his attack in rear, and that was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front, and it was believed the pass might be carried before the enemy's distant troops could be brought forward to its support.

I had returned to my quarters from Purdy's column about 9 o'clock at night, when I found a Mr. Baldwin, of the quarter-master general's department, who put into my hands an open paper containing instructions to him from the quarter-master general, respecting the building of huts for the army in the Chateaugay, below the line. This paper sunk my hopes, and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support which had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable. I could only go forward. The army was put in motion on the morning of the 26th, leaving its baggage, &c. on the ground of encampment.

On advancing near the enemy, it was found that the column on the opposite side was not as far advanced as had been anticipated. The guides had misled it, and finally failed in finding the ford. We could not communicate with it, but only awaited the attack below. About 2 o'clock the firing commenced, and our troops advanced rapidly to the attack. The enemy's light troops commenced a sharp fire, but brigadier general Izard advanced with his brigade, drove him every where behind his defences and silenced the fire in his front. This brigade would have pushed forward as far as courage, skill and perseverance could have carried it; but on advancing, it was found that the firing had commenced on the opposite side, and the ford had not been gained.

The enemy retired behind his defences, but a renewal of his attack was expected, and the troops remained some time in their position to meet it. The troops on the opposite side were excessively fatigued. The enterprise had failed in its main point, and colonel Purdy was ordered to withdraw his column to a shoal four or five miles above, and cross over. The day was spent, and general Izard was ordered to withdraw his brigade to a position three miles in the rear, to which place the baggage had been ordered forward.

The slowness and order with which general Izard retired with his brigade, could but have inspired the enemy with respect. They presumed not to venture a shot at him during his movement; but the unguardedness of some part of Purdy's command exposed him to a rear attack from the Indians, which was repeated after dark, and exposed him to some loss. These attacks were always repelled, and must have cost the enemy as many lives as we lost. Our entire loss of killed, wounded and missing, does not exceed fifty. In its new position within three miles of the enemy's post, the army encamped on the night of the 26th, and remained until 12 o'clock of the 28th. All the deserters, of whom there were four, having concurred in the information that sir George Prevost, with three other general officers, had arrived with the whole of his disposable force, and lay in the rear of these defences, and a letter from major Parker (by express received on the evening of the 26th) having informed me that no movements of our army down the St. Lawrence had been heard of at Ogdensburg, and for some distance above; the following questions were submitted to the commanding officers of brigades, regiments and corps, and the heads of the general staff, in a council convened for the purpose: "Is it advisable, under existing circumstances, to renew the attack on the enemy's position, and if not, what po-



sition is it advisable for the army to take, until it can receive advices of the advance of the grand army down the St. Lawrence?" The opinion of the council was expressed in the following words:

"It is the unanimous opinion of this council, that it is necessary, for the preservation of this army and the fulfilment of the ostensible views of the government, that we immediately return by orderly marches to such a position (Chateaugay) as will secure our communications with the United States, either to retire into winter quarters or to be ready to strike below." In pursuance of this opinion the army has returned by slow marches to this place, and now awaits the orders of the government. Its condition will be stated by the bearer, colonel King, who can give you, upon every point, more full and perfect information, than could be contained in a written detail.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

The hon. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

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HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*District No. 9, seven miles above Ogdensburg,*  
November 6, 1813, in the evening.

SIR,

I address you at the special instance of the secretary of war, who, by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp on the 29th ultimo.

I am destined to and determined on the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and

to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous in the circumstance of greatest interest to the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routes on which you must march, make it necessary that your own judgment should determine that point. To assist you in forming the soundest determination and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in one or two respects of first importance. I shall pass Prescott to-night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it; shall cross the cavalry at Hambleton, which will not require a day, and shall then press forward and break down every obstruction to the confluence of this river with Grand river, there to cross to the Isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal island, at about twenty miles from the city; after which, our artillery, bayonets and swords must secure our triumph or provide us honorable graves. Inclosed you have a memorandum of my field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own, but we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found. On the subject of provisions, I wish I could give as favorable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about 15 days, and our meat at 20. In speaking on this subject to the secretary of war, he informed me that ample magazines were laid up on lake Champlain, and therefore I must request you to order forward two or three months supply by the safest route in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should

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not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion, that if you are not in force to face the enemy you should meet us at St. Regis, or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from, if not to see you, at that place on the 9th or 10th instant,

And have the honor to be respectfully, &c.

JAS. WILKINSON.

To Major General W. Hampton, &c.

P. S. I was preparing an express which I should have despatched to-morrow but for the fortunate call of colonel King.

A copy,

JOHN HOOMES, *Aid-de-camp*.

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HEAD QUARTERS, FOUR CORNERS,  
November 8, 1818.

SIR,

I had the honor to receive, at a late hour last evening, by colonel King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed of deciding upon the means of our co-operation.

The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being the most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provision. Colonel Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried upon his back; and, when I reflected that, in throwing my

Upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, where all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburgh to Cognawaga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success than by the junction at St. Regis.

The way is, in many places, blockaded and abandoned, and the road impracticable for *wheels* during winter; but, by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving.

I have ascertained and witnessed the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance.

My troops and other means will be described to you by colonel Atkinson. Besides their rawness, and sickness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but, upon this subject I must refer you to colonel Atkinson.

With these means what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt, with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

W. HAMPTON.

A copy,

JOHN HOOMES, *Aid-de-camp*.

To Major General Wilkinson.

SIR,

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HEAD QUARTERS, PLATTEBURG,

November 12, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honor to inclose the copy of a letter I have received from general Wilkinson, and of my reply. The forage at Chateaugay had been nearly consumed before the expedition down the river; and in the return of the army, enough only could be found to subsist the horses and teams two or three days. All accounts concurred in the report, that general Wilkinson had not commenced his operations against Kingston, and that no descent down the river was intended. Hence, the necessity for sending off the cavalry, artillery, and provision teams to Plattsburgh for subsistence; and hence also, the impossibility of a junction at St. Regis with more provisions than must have been consumed on the march to that place. General Wilkinson had no spare transportation for us; and the junction would have reduced the stock of provisions to eight or ten days for the whole. The alternative was adopted under the impression of *absolute necessity*.

The army has approached on this route to the road leading to Chazy, a few miles from the lines, where I shall join it to-night. I can only repeat what I said in my letter to general Wilkinson, "that what can be accomplished by human exertion shall be attempted to meet the objects of the campaign." But I should be uncandid not to own, that many circumstances are unpropitious. The force is dropping off by fatigue and sickness to a most alarming extent. My returns yesterday, report the effectives at little more than half their original state at Chateaugay; and, which is more discouraging, the officers, with a few honorable exceptions, are sunk as low as the soldiers, and endure hardship and privation as badly. In a word, since the shew, produced by clothing, movements, &c. has worn off, all have

assumed their native *raibness*. Fatigue and suffering from the weather have deprived them of that spirit, which constituted my best hopes. What confidence can the best officer (and I have a few surpassed by none) feel under such circumstances? It is painful to hold up to you this picture, but it is but too faithfully drawn.

The quarter master general has been ordered to procure on hire 400 waggons, and I shall attempt to open a communication on the direct route from the town of Champlain. Success, under the circumstances I have mentioned, must depend upon the efforts and force opposed to me. The *demonstration*, however, can but produce a partial good.

On the route I took, the enemy burnt and consumed every thing before him, and this I understand to be his general plan. If the same course precede the advance of general Wilkinson, and my feeble force should be foiled, the consequences are much to be dreaded. But the Rubicon is now passed, and all that remains is to push for the capitol.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

Gen. John Armstrong,  
Secretary of War.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Hampton  
to the Secretary of War, dated*

CHAZEY, November 15, 1813.

"I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a letter I received the last evening from general Wil-

kinson, by colonel Atkinson, whom I had sent to him for the purpose of settling the plan of our proposed joint operations. Of the consistency of this letter with that of the 6th instant, and my answer, or of the insinuation it contains, I shall say nothing. Upon so plain a case, and an attempt so unworthy the occasion, common sense will afford every explanation I could wish. I shall make the necessary arrangements for placing the troops in winter quarters, and commence my journey to the southward."

HEAD QUARTERS, NEAR CORNWALL, (U. C.)

November 12, 1813.

SIR,

I this day had the honor to receive your letter of the 8th instant by colonel Atkinson, and want language to express my sorrow for your determination not to join the division under your command with the troops under my immediate orders.

As such resolution defeats the grand objects of the campaign in this quarter, which, before the receipt of your letter, were thought to be completely within our power, no suspicion being entertained that you would decline the junction directed, it will oblige us to take post at the French Mills, on Salmon river, or in their vicinity, for the winter.

I have the honor to be,

Respectfully, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. WILKINSON.

Major General Hampton.

1813.

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[The main body of the page contains several paragraphs of text that are extremely faded and illegible due to the quality of the scan. The text appears to be a formal document or report.]

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Correspondence between the secretary of war and major general Wilkinson.

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Submitted to the president by the secretary of war, on the 23d July, and communicated to general Wilkinson on the 5th of August, 1813.

The time at which we have reason to expect an ascendancy on lake Ontario has arrived. If our hopes on that head be fulfilled, though but for a short period, we must avail ourselves of the circumstance, to give to the campaign a new and increased activity.

For this purpose our forces on the Ontario should be *concentrated*, because neither section of them, as they are now divided, is competent to any great object.

The point of concentration is more doubtful:

- 1st. If at fort George, our utmost success can but give us the command of the peninsula, which, if general Harrison succeeds against Malden, will be of diminished interest, both to us and to the enemy: to us, because Malden will more completely cover our western frontier and control the savages than forts George and Erie: to the enemy, because Malden lost, our inroad upon the peninsula, will but have the effect of *shortening*, not of *dividing*, the enemy's line of operations; in a word, success at this point will not give to the campaign a character of *decisive advantage*.
- 2d. If, on the other hand, we make Sackett's Harbor the point of concentration, *Kingston* may become the object of our attack, which by the way, will but be returning to the original plan of campaign, prescribed to general Dearborn.

This place is of much importance to the enemy, and will no doubt be defended by him with great obstinacy, and with all the resources which can be safely drawn from other points. That it may be taken by a joint application of our naval and military means, is not however to be questioned. The enclosed diagram will show the number and character of the enemy's defences. His batteries on No. 1, cannot be sustained but by his fleet. These carried, he is open to a descent at No. 2 and 3. If he divides his force between both, we oppose one half of his strength with the whole of ours. If he concentrates at No. 2, we seize No. 3, and command both the town and the shipping. If he concentrates at No. 3, we occupy No. 2, and with nearly the same results.

Cotemporary with this movement, another may be made on the side of lake Champlain, indicating an intention of attacking Montreal and its dependencies, and really attacking them, if to save Kingston, these posts have been materially weakened.

3d. Another and different operation, to which our means are competent, would be a movement from Sackett's Harbor to Madrid on the St. Lawrence. At this place the river may be most easily crossed: The ground opposite to it is a narrow bluff, skirted by the river on one side and a swamp of great extent and of difficult passage on the other. This gained and fortified, our fleet continuing to command the water-line from the head of the river to Ogdensburg, and lake St. Francis occupied with a few gun boats and barges, the army may march against Montreal, in concert with general Hampton. The only natural difficulty to the execution of this plan,

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would be presented by a branch of the *Grand* river which must be crossed; but at this season, though deep, it is believed to be fordable.

Under the preceding supposition it is respectfully submitted, whether it will not be most advisable to make *Sackett's Harbor* the point of concentration and leave to the commanding general an election (to be determined by circumstances) between the two plans suggested under the 2d and 3d heads.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Approved and adopted 23d July, 1813.

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Washington, August 6, 1813.

I have examined the projects of the campaign, intended for the past and ensuing stages of it, on the side of Canada, which you put into my hands yesterday. The novelty of the subject to me, and the pressure of time, will prevent the deliberate consideration of it which its importance merits; and therefore I shall confine myself to a few brief observations touching the project of the 23d ult.

1st. If we command lake Ontario (without which the project is impracticable), and our force be competent to carry Kingston, the incorporation of our troops should take place at Sackett's Harbor, and the attack be made as promptly as possible.

2d. On the contrary, should our combined disposable force be deemed incompetent to the certain and speedy reduction of Kingston, then it may be preferable to strengthen our force at fort George, cut up the British force in that quarter, destroy the Indian establishments, and (should general Har-

rison fail in his objects) march a detachment to capture Malden.

While these operations are pending, a bold feint or provisional attack on Montreal, by major general Hampton, will certainly call sir George Prevost to that place; and it is presumable, that seeing our movements directed towards Erie, he may carry his best troops with him from Kingston.

These suggestions spring from my desire to hazard as little as possible in the outset, and to secure infallibly whatever may be attempted, with the intention to increase our own confidence, to diminish that of the enemy, and to *popularise* the war.

After our operations on the peninsula have been closed, we may raze the works there under your provisions, leave our settlements on the strait in tranquillity, and like lightning must direct our whole force against Kingston; and having reduced that place, and captured the shipping, we may descend the stream, and form a junction with the column of general Hampton in the neighborhood of Montreal, should the lateness of the season permit, by which all our movements after the conquest of Upper Canada must be governed.

To give general Hampton's movements a menacing aspect, and to enable him to profit by events, he should take with him a heavy train of battering cannon and mortar pieces, which will be found indispensable in the attack of Montreal; and to weaken that place, and to favor a protracted season, I would advise that a heavy column of militia or volunteers, if engaged for three months only, should be put in motion from the vicinity of lake Memphramagog, to descend the river St. Francis, and take post on the right bank

of lake St. Petre, with a battering train of traveling carriages, organized and equipt either to keep post or retire when the season or other circumstances should render expedient.

Before I close this letter, I will beg leave to call your attention to several specific points, on which I require information and authority, which I deem essential to the salutary discharge of the high and solemn trust about to devolve upon me.

1st. A copy of the instructions to major general Hampton, for my government in the correspondence to ensue between us.

2d. Shall I be allowed a private secretary, which is necessary, and of right belongs to the command on which I am about to enter?

3d. I require permission to take for my aids de camp such officers as are best fitted to discharge the important duties of the station.

4th. I ask authority (or is it understood that I possess it) to supply every defect of the munitions of war and transport by land or water by means of the authorised agents.

5th. I entreat that ample funds may be deposited in proper hands, to give effect to the department of intelligence, without which the chief will find himself hood winked.

6th. I trust no order of whatever nature will be passed to any officer under my command, but through my hands. This is not only necessary to the regular conduct of the public service, but it is vitally essential to the preservation of sound subordination, and is conformable to the rules of service in all armies, inasmuch as he who is responsible for all should have the control of all.

7th. I hope I may be expressly authorised to detach from my command all persons who may manifest a temper or dispositions to excite discon-

tents, to generate factions, or imbitter the service. This is indispensable to put down seditious spirits, and to harmonise the corps.

8th. Should we move against Kingston in the first instance, the withdrawal of our force from fort George will enable the enemy to re-occupy that point, and for a brief period to harass our frontier on that strait. May not the militia or a body of volunteers be called forth to relieve the regular troops at that place, and prevent discontents and complaints.

9th. For the maintenance of the necessary authority of the chief, it is hoped the secretary of war will decline and forbid all correspondence with his subordinate officers, except in cases of personal grievance.

10th. I beg to be advised of the means of communication between our military positions, and particularly from Sackett's Harbor to Burlington, which should be rapid and infallible.

11th. I ask authority to equip the whole of our horse artillery, and to mount the whole of our dragoons, because these arms will be found all important in every combat which may ensue.

A serious impression of the dread responsibility which awaits me, and a correct sense of the public expectation which accompanies me, must be my apology for giving you so much trouble.

With perfect respect,

I have the honor to be,

Sir, your obedient servant,

J. A. WILKINSON.

Honorable John Armstrong,  
secretary at war.

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## WAR DEPARTMENT.

August 8th, 1813.

SIR,

I have given to your observations of the 6th instant all the consideration they so justly merit.

The main objection to any plan, which shall carry our operations wide of Kingston and westward of it, is, that in the event of its success, it leaves the strength of the enemy unbroken; it but wounds the *tail* of the lion, and of course, is not calculated to hasten the termination of the war, either by increasing our own vigor, or by diminishing that of the enemy. Kingston is the great depot of his resources, and so long as he retains this and keeps open his communication with the sea, he will not want the means of multiplying his naval and other defences, and of reinforcing or renewing the war in the west. *Kingston* therefore, as well on grounds of policy as of military principle, presents the *first* and *great* object of the campaign.

There are two ways of approaching this; by *direct*, or by *indirect* attack: by breaking down the enemy's battalions and forcing his works—or by seizing and obstructing the line of his communication, and thus drying up the sources by which he is nourished and maintained. Circumstances must govern in choosing between these different modes. Were our assembled land and naval forces competent to the object, a *direct* attack would no doubt be the shorter and better way; but if, on the contrary, our strength be inferior, or hardly equal to that of the enemy, the *indirect* attack must be preferred. These considerations have suggested the third plan, to be found in my note of the 28d ul-

time. To give execution to this, I would collect my force at the head of the St. Lawrence, make every demonstration of attacking Kingston, proceed rapidly down the river, seize the northern bank at the village of Hamilton, leave a corps to fortify and to hold it, march upon Montreal with the main body, effect there a junction with Hampton, and take a position which shall enable you to secure what you gain. On this plan, the navy would perform its part by occupying the mouth of the river, and preventing a pursuit by water; by clearing the river of the armed boats of the enemy; by holding, with its own, the passage at Hamilton, and by giving support to that position. If the enemy pursues, it must be by land, without subsistence, (excepting what he carries on his back) and without artillery. If he remains stationary, his situation must soon become even more serious, as the country in which he is cannot long subsist him. It will then but remain for him to fight his way to Quebec, to perish in the attempt, or to lay down his arms. After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that in conducting the present campaign, you will make *Kingston* your *primary object*, and that you will *choose* (as circumstances may warrant) between a *direct* and *indirect* attack upon that post.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Sir, your most obdt. servt.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major general Wilkinson,  
commanding district No. 9.

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## WAR DEPARTMENT,

August 9, 1913.

SIR,

In answer to that part of your letter of the 6th instant, which calls for information, &c. on certain enumerated points, I have the honor to state:

- 1st. That general Hampton's instructions go only to assemble and organize his division at Burlington. It is intended that he shall operate cotemporarily with you, and under your orders, in prosecution of the plan of campaign which has been given to you.
- 2d. The senior major general commanding the principal army is entitled to the services of a private secretary.
- 3d. The ordnance and other departments of supply within the district (No. 9) are subject of course to your orders.
- 4th. The quarter-master general of the army will supply the funds for secret service.
- 5th. All orders to subordinate officers pass from the war department to the adjutant general, to be communicated by him to the general commanding the district in which such subordinate officer may serve.
- 6th. No specific permission is necessary for removing factious or disorderly men. All such will properly become subjects of the confidential reports to be made by inspectors. To detach such men from one district to another, is only shifting the evil; the better way is to report them for *dismissal*.
- 7th. If the corps at fort George be recalled, the works should be razed or occupied by a force competent to hold it against an *assault*. There

is a corps of militia and volunteers (to whom the Six Nation Indians have associated themselves) at Black Rock, which may be kept in service. They are commanded by general Porter and Mr. Parrish. [See the confidential letter of general Porter enclosed.]

8th. The secretary of war will decline and forbid all improper communications, and particularly such as may bear any color of insubordination.

9th. Besides the ordinary mode of communication by mail, expresses may be employed in extraordinary cases.

10th. The dragoon and light artillery corps shall be made efficient. Horses may be bought for both. An officer from each corps should be directed to superintend the purchases. Price (average) not to exceed 120 dollars.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Sir, your most obdt. servt.

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Major general Wilkinson,  
commanding the northern army.

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Sackett's Harbor, August 21st, 1813.

**SIR,**

I arrived here yesterday: my machinery is in motion, and I have strong hopes of giving the change to sir George which will lead directly to the object of first importance.

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Commodore Chauncey is in port here and his antagonist, sir James Yeo, at Kingston: In the late interviews between these naval commanders the first has zealously sought a combat, which the latter has cautiously avoided; the superiority on the lake therefore remains still to be settled; but I have Chauncey's assurance for it and place much confidence in his word; it is obviously sir James' plan to decline a conflict; but on what ground I cannot determine.

Our schooner here will be equipt and manned by Wednesday, and I shall sail with the squadron for fort George probably the day after; I am endeavoring to draw sir George after me; but whether I succeed in this attempt or not, should our men and means answer report, and Heaven favor me, I will be in possession of Kingston, or below that place, on the 26th proximo.

Major general Hampton must not budge until every thing is matured in this quarter, and we have either got possession of Kingston or have cut its communication with Montreal, of which I shall give him seasonable advice, via Plattsburgh, where I shall calculate on his arrival the 20th of the ensuing month completely equipt for a forward movement. If he changes his position and shows his column west of the lake sooner, it may carry sir George to Montreal and produce precautions which might otherwise be neglected until too late for any salutary effect.

The militia called forth by governor Tompkins, of which by the bye you gave me no information, should not be arrayed before he hears from me at fort George, because the assembly of such a body would increase the alarm and put all Canada in counter motion, while incidents beyond the control of man may intervene to procrastinate my move-

ments and thus baffle the effects of the proposed co-operation on the side of Vermont: should a corps of militia be drawn from thence, no movement should be made by them, until general Hampton has crossed Champlain.

It would be highly interesting to the public service and extremely acceptable to me to see you at Niagara, from whence, should I find it practicable, it is my intention to commence my movement down the lake, about the 15th of the next month; the best possible disposition for the safety of that frontier, and for the security of the vast mass of ordnance and stores which I must leave there, may render your advice and authority indispensably necessary to avert clamors and prevent any obstruction to my prompt movement.

With high consideration and respect,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

Hon. John Armstrong, secretary of war.

Sackett's Harbor, August 26, 1813.

SIR,

Chauncey will go out, he says, to-morrow or next day to seek sir James. I see the necessity of settling the point of *naval superiority* before we commit ourselves, and therefore, the decision cannot be had too soon. In the mean time the essential arrangements progress, and if the means can be mustered, they will ensure the end.

I fear Yeo will avoid a contest to spin out the campaign, and gain time for reinforcements, and the organization of militia; but if he will not come

out, we must blockade him. I go for Niagara the moment our arrangements are matured here. Sir George has actually gone for the head of the lake with a reinforcement. To prevent his playing tricks with Boyd, I have sent him (Boyd) the note of which you have a copy.

On Saturday, 21st, one hundred and sixty regular troops ascended by Ogdensburg to Kingston, and on the 23d and 24th, they were followed by five hundred highlanders in their kelts, who conducted up one hundred boats: thus we see that this quarter attracts chief attention. All my efforts will be made to induce sir George to draw after him a chief part of the garrison of Kingston, which must now be near five thousand strong. The situation of Proctor and the irruption of our Indians have gone far to excite these dispositions. Meet me at Niagara, if possible, and for God's sake press on the recruits from Albany and the southward, and send me Wadsworth, Swift, Fenwick, and Izard. All things go well here, and thank God, the men are recovering rapidly. I hear not a word from Hampton. I hope he does not mean to take the stud; but if so, we can do without him, and he should be sent home.

Truly yours,

J. A. WILKINSON.

General Armstrong, secretary of war.

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Sackett's Harbor, August 30, 1813.

Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war.

SIR,

With every exertion he could make, it was not until the last evening, Chauncey got under way,

and the weather being calm, he must be now off this harbor.

Agreeably to my information, sir James Yeo sailed for the head of the lake the 22d inst. with the two captured schooners in addition to his squadron, no doubt to co-operate with sir George, but did not get clear of the ducks before the 25th.

Brigadier general Boyd is warned of this movement, and being placed on his guard, he ought to baffle every enterprise of the enemy—what an awful crisis have I reached. If sir George beats Boyd, and sir James, Chauncey, my prospects are blasted, and the campaign will, I fear, be lost. If sir George beats Boyd, and Chauncey beats sir James, Kingston yet may be ours; but should both the knights be beaten, and our quarter-master can find transport in season (of which I have fears, as I found next to none here) then we shall certainly winter in Montreal, if not discomfitted by some act of God. If I could have mustered three thousand combatants on this ground, with transport to bear them, I would now have been before Kingston, where sir George has left only one thousand five hundred regular troops, and about five hundred militia; but our utmost force is short of two thousand five hundred, as you will perceive from the enclosed return, and we could not have found boats to transport one thousand.

The enemy having determined to change his system of operations from defence to offence, is assembling his whole disposable force at the head of the lake to attack fort George; thus placing himself at too great a distance from Montreal to give seasonable succor to that city; he certainly presumes on our imbecility and we as certainly should take advantage of his presumption

The militia called for should therefore be imme-

diately arrayed and marched to this frontier, and major general Hampton should without delay cross the Champlain, and commence his movement towards St. Johns, taking the Isle au Naux in his route or not, as circumstances may justify.

Four thousand of the best appointed yeomenry should be ordered to rendezvous at Hamilton, on the St. Lawrence, for eventual operations with this division; and the residue may accompany or follow Hampton, to draw the militia of Montreal and the disposable force of the lower country to the east of the St. Lawrence, and thereby make the island an easy conquest from this quarter.

Sir George Prevost it would seem has taken his part, and deluded by the hope of reconquest, has abandoned his rear to our enterprise, and we might now without the co-operation of our squadron, safely occupy Madrid, and cut the communication of the two provinces with this division only, if we had transports; but of this we are totally destitute, every boat we command here being at this time absent with a detachment of eight hundred men, ordered to make a feint to the westward under pretence of reinforcing Niagara before I was apprised of sir George's movements.

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Sackett's Harbor, Aug. 30, 1813, 5 o'clock P. M.

SIR,

I have commenced, barely, the arrangement of the department of intelligence; an intelligencer left Kingston or its vicinity, last evening, to tell me that sir George Prevost had commenced his operations against Boyd, and had driven in his picquets and taken sixty or seventy prisoners, but had

been repulsed from his line of encampment. The militia of Montreal are at Kingston, and reinforcements by single hundreds are arriving frequently; four hundred men are expected in the course of the week.

The force at Kingston is 2000 men (regulars 1500, militia 500) Major general Darrach commands, and they are assiduously strengthening their works. Sir James Yeo sailed with six weeks provisions, expressly to co-operate with sir George at the head of the lake; a double battle and a double victory offer a strong temptation; but I will not be diverted from my course.

I have written governor Tompkins on the subject of a draft of militia for the strait of Niagara, to supply the absence of our troops of the line and prevent clamor, but have not been so happy as to receive an acknowledgment of my letter.

With perfect respect,

Your obedient servant,

J. A. WILKINSON.

The honorable John Armstrong,  
secretary of war.

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War Department, Sept. 6, 1813, Sackett's Harbor.

DEAR GENERAL,

I arrived here yesterday. Nothing new, excepting that Prevost has returned to Kingston. Gen. Hampton will go through the campaign cordially and vigorously, but will resign at the end of it. He will be ready to move by the 20th with an effective regular force of 4,000, and a militia detachment of 1,500. On the supposition that sir

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George had decidedly taken his part, and had chosen the peninsula as his champ de bataille, I had ordered Hampton to move immediately against the Isle aux Noix. 2,000 militia will be promptly assembled at Champion, twenty-four miles from this place, and on the route to the St. Lawrence. The place was selected, as offering *two* objects, and of course leaving his knightship to guess. To have pushed them directly to Ogdensburgh, would not have had that advantage. A larger draft would have been difficult. Another view of the subject is that this part of the plan cannot be confided to militia exclusively; they must be propped by a regular corps, otherwise the back door may not be sufficiently closed and barred.

The battle on the lake! Shall we have one? If Yeo fights and is beaten, all will be well. If he does not fight, the result may also be favorable.

Yours cordially,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General Wilkinson.

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Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated fort George, 11th Sept. 1813.

"I have indulged the hope for several days past that I should have been enabled to address you in propria personæ, but in this I have been baffled by a severe and unremitting malady which obliges me to resort to the pen of a common friend.

"I reached this place the evening of the 4th. Commodore Chauncey at that time occupied the harbor; and sir James Yeo with the British squadron was vaboring in front of it. This state of things continued without any material change, until the evening of the 7th, when a light land breeze

gave to the commodore an opportunity of standing out to meet the enemy. The two squadrons were about two leagues asunder, of consequence an action appeared inevitable: yet so it has happened, that, since that period, until about five o'clock, yesterday, P. M. these two naval armaments have kept from 4 to 8 miles distant, without having exchanged a single shot, or done to each other the smallest visible damage. The British uniformly on the retreat, and the American in pursuit.

“General Peter B. Porter left me to day, properly authorised and instructed to bring into operation a corps of the Six Nation Indians, which he proposes to increase to 1000 men, by volunteers from the militia, and is disposed to be busy and active wherever he may be directed.

“I hear nothing of brigadier general M'Clure, and the New York militia. I shall mature my plans for embarkation, as rapidly as the difficulties which may oppose me can be matured; but we are greatly deficient in transport, and have not received a single boat from Oswego or any other place. Strong shallops and slip-keels are necessary to the transport of the heavy cannon, ordnance stores, ammunition, clothing, &c. &c.

“I am writing to Bomford for many things which I was assured I should find here; and I pray you to put him on the alert, or I may be caught in the snow. I dictate this under much depression of head and stomach; and am,

With great respect and esteem,

Your most obedient servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

Extract of a letter from general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated fort George, Sept. 16, 1813.

"I have escaped from my palet, and with a giddy head and trembling hand will endeavor to scrawl you a few lines, the first I have written since my arrival here.

"With respect to the advance squadrons, we are still without one word of authentic information, but we are entertained by daily rumors as wild and extravagant as they are inconsistent and contradictory. I hope we may soon have an end of this state of uncertainty, which damps our exertions, and retards our measures.

"The removal of the main body of the troops from this position is an operation of great delicacy and interest; and it was therefore your presence here would have been more important than elsewhere.

"I am not authorised to abandon this useless occupancy, and therefore it must be maintained against the united British force in its vicinity; to secure the end, and nothing must be hazarded, will require a serious drain from our best troops, which enfeebles our too feeble force for the main attack. The head of the militia under M'Clure has not yet shown itself: when it does (if in any reasonable time), and we have conferred, I shall be better enabled to developethe intricate path before me. But in the mean time, alas! sir, the season will, I fear, be lost.

"The Indians enter into our views with great zeal, and I look for a corps of at least five hundred men in eight days; whether to relieve De Rottenberg of five or six hundred of his effective men, before I turn my back on him, will be determined by considerations of policy in relation to our red allies and the militia, and the fate of

our squadrons. The enemy profess to day a total ignorance of the occurrence of an action between the squadrons.

“ In the course of sixteen days the enemy have lost sixty five men by desertion, we barely six. We count 4,600 on paper, and could show about 3,400 combatants. The enemy, from the best information we have, have about 3,000 men on paper, of whom 1,400 are sick. Shall I make a sweep of them or not, at the hazard of our main object? Not unless that main object is jeopardised by the fate of our squadrons—it would require an operation of three weeks; but my views are forward, and I shall not abandon the prospect while a ray of hope remains.

“ I have received your letters to the 6th from Sackett's Harbor, and thank you for them. For your comfort, the men here are gaining health, and, with their officers, breathe an ardent spirit for combat.”

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Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated fort George, Sept. 18, 1813.

**DEAR GENERAL,**

Accident detained the express last evening, and gives me an opportunity to drop you another line.

Not a word more of Chauncey; what has become of him? I pray you to decide, whether I am to move, with or without any further knowledge of the squadron.

From the enclosed No. 2, it would appear that the enemy expect tranquil winter quarters in this neighborhood, for the number of barracks proposed to be built will not receive more than 1,400 or 1,600 men, including guards, ordinary and extra-

ordinary, stow them as you can; but shall I have the enemy within four miles of this place, making a wide investiture of it from Queenstown to Four Mile creek; or shall I break him up? with our prospects the decision is embarrassing; change them to the abandonment of the chief design, and our course is direct, viz.: to take possession at Burlington bay, and cut up or capture the whole division in this quarter, which may be estimated at 3,000 regular troops. I pray you to deliberate on these points and give me your advice without delay.

I have despatched an express to \_\_\_\_\_ for general McClure, of whom I have heard nothing since my last; but to supply the defect of his silence, the enclosed copy of a communication from a committee of which P. B. Porter is chief, will fully suffice. I have responded in the most courteous terms, making reference to you for your determination on the momentous occasion, as you will perceive from my answer. Now let me intreat you to weigh these propositions, to take into consideration the possible failure of the militia and the substitution in such case of these volunteers; for in the present crisis, we should, if possible, render "assurance doubly sure." The letter of David Rodman (a stranger) is also transmitted for consideration: let me have your answer, and tell me how to act as speedily as possible, I beseech. The boats from Oswego have not yet arrived.

I am feeble to childhood, but shall look at the troops in battalion on Tuesday.

Truly yours,

J. A. WILKINSON.

The honorable John Armstrong, secretary of war.

Fort George, September 18, 1813.

SIR,

I am ordered by general Wilkinson to forward the enclosed papers. One, a letter from a committee of three, of which P. B. Porter is the first; and the other a letter from Daniel Rodman, the organ of an association of residents in and near Canandaigua.

I have the honor to be,

Your most obedient servant,

H. LEE, jr.

major of infantry and aid de camp to  
major general Wilkinson.

The honorable J. Armstrong,  
secretary of war.

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Black Rock, September 17, 1813.

SIR,

In consequence of encouragements from general Boyd, that a general and decisive movement was about to be made by the army, and that an additional force was desirable, we repaired to fort George about five weeks ago with 500 men, consisting of volunteers, militia, and Indians. Most of us remained there for twelve or fourteen days, but our hopes not being realized, the men continually dispersed and went home, not however without expectations, again encouraged by generals Boyd and Williams, that we should be shortly called on again to aid in operations, which the people in this part of the country, so long harrassed by the calamities of war, feel so strong an interest in forwarding. Under similar expectations,

many of our friends in the interior have intimated to us their readiness to join with respectable reinforcements on the shortest notice: and we are informed that one company, about 70 strong, is actually on its march, and will arrive here to day or to-morrow.

We are at this moment much at a loss how to act, and our difficulty is increased by the various rumors and conjectures circulated by the different officers daily arriving from head quarters, some of whom represent that no offensive operations are to be undertaken on this frontier, but that the regular army is immediately to be marched, either to the east to attack Kingston, or to the west to join general Harrison. Others state that an attack is to be made on the British forces in the vicinity of this place.

Under these circumstances, we are induced to inquire of you whether such a force as we have it in our power to raise is desired by you to effectuate your plans, and if so, in what numbers, and at what time? If your object be to sally out upon the enemy at fort George, we could bring you a respectable force. But, on the contrary, if you meditate an attack at some other point, and the withdrawal of the regular troops from fort George, and placing this frontier on the defensive only, by means of militia, we would observe that our prepared force is of such a character as could not be engaged in this service.

Upon the supposition that you intend to withdraw the regular troops from this frontier, we beg leave to submit a proposition for your consideration.

We believe we are not incorrect in saying that it would require nearly quite as great a force to defend this line of frontier against a given force

of the enemy, as it would to attack and subdue that enemy. Sir George Prevost has ordered the militia of the upper province to be called out en masse. They are to assemble on Saturday next. And if, after your departure, the enemy opposite here should take it in his head to retain all his regular force, and play off his skill against the inexperience of our militia, we might have occasion to fear a repetition of former scenes in the present war.

Our proposition (in case of your leaving this place) is, that we be permitted to raise between this and the first of October a volunteer force of from 1,000 to 1,200 men, exclusive of Indians. That we add to it as many of the militia stationed on the lines as may be willing to join us. That we be furnished with a small train (say 4 pieces) of field artillery, with experienced officers and men to fight them; and that with this force we be authorised to invade the enemy's country.

Should you think proper to confer such an authority on us, and direct that the volunteers shall be furnished with arms, ammunition, provisions, &c. and receive pay while in actual service, we pledge our lives that before the close of the season we will occupy the whole of the valuable and populous peninsula opposite this river, and either capture, destroy, or disperse all the enemy's force in this quarter.

You may perhaps make it convenient to send an answer by the bearer, captain Hall.

We are, sir, most respectfully,  
Your obedient servants,

PETER B. PORTER,  
CYRENIUS CHAPIN,  
JOSEPH M. CLUER.

Major general Wilkinson.

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Canandaigua, Sept. 14, 1813.

SIR,

A large number of patriotic citizens of this and the adjacent towns, anxious to do their duty in a crisis so interesting to the nation in general, and to this part of the country in particular, have associated themselves to volunteer their services to the United States for the *residus* of the campaign *at least*.

In order to effectuate their intentions however, it will be necessary that their movements should receive your approbation and sanction, and that they should be assured of, that the corps, whether a company, battalion, or (as is possible) a regiment, should be received, organized, and countenanced by your order and authority. The lateness of the season and the anxiety of the members induce us to request an early and authoritative reply, that the association may be equipped according to law, and be useful to their country this season. It may not be hardly decorous for us to say it, but we must observe that the subscribers will prove to be obedient and brave soldiers.

In their behalf,

I am, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

DANL. RODMAN.

Major general Wilkinson,  
or officer commanding fort George.

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Fort George, Sept. 18, 1813.

GENTLEMEN,

Your letter of yesterday which reached me last evening, gives you a claim to my acknowledg-

ments, and to those of your country. But as I am altogether unauthorised by law or instruction to sanction your plan for the levy of a body of volunteers, and as your anticipations, propositions, and suggestions embrace a range and a character upon which I have neither right nor authority to deliberate, I have considered it my duty to transmit a copy of your letter to the secretary of war, now at Sackett's Harbor, by express, for his deliberation and decision.

I hope he may find it convenient and proper to meet your views, and have only to add, that you shall be advised of his answer without a moment's delay, after it may reach my hands.

With high consideration and respect,  
I have the honor to be, gentlemen,  
Your most obedient servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

To Peter B. Porter, major Cyrenius Chapin,  
and Joseph M. Clure.

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Sackett's Harbor, September 18, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

Our information from the other side of the lake amounts to this: Prevost goes to Montreal. The whole regular force in Kingston consists of ten companies of De Waterville's regiment, that at Prescott of two companies of the same corps, and about forty artillerists.

De Waterville's regiment was made up in Spain, is composed of Poles, Germans, Spaniards, and Portuguese, and completely disaffected. What a precious moment my friend is this.

The commodore was brought back to us yester-

day by adverse winds. He goes this morning—let not the great objects of the campaign be hazarded by running after Yeo: these accomplished, his race is run. Kingston, or the point below seized, all above perishes, because the tree is then girdled.

In speaking of your artillery you do not include the guns taken at fort George, and which will be necessary for its defence. A small garrison will be sufficient against *assault*: siege we need not dread. It is already too late to live in trenches. Porter (of the artillery) would do well to command the place. Tell him from me he is a brigadier by brevet.

The means of transportation are now with you, hasten your march, and may God bless you in all your enterprises.

Yours truly and always,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General Wilkinson.

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Extracts of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated September 20th, 1813.

I am well again, and that's a good thing, for I have been during my sickness somewhat of a *smell-fungus*.

Now indeed would be a fine time to slip into the St. Lawrence if Chauncey could keep sir James blockaded above Kingston and command the river below at the same time, and our preparations were completely matured, but it is an herculean task to extract order from chaos. No time has or shall be lost on my part; but we cannot, when prepared at all points, control the winds.— It was last night only the transports from Oswego

rrived; and if I am not hardly opposed by weather, I hope I shall have 1000 men afloat by the 26th, and complete my embarkation on the 30th, after which until we reach Grenadier Island, I must look to our squadron and the heavens for safety.

Chauncey tells me he is liable to be blown off from his station, and in such case Sir James may slip out by him, but promises to follow him. It is material, to prevent the enemy from following and cutting our rear, that some competent force should take post on the St. Lawrence below Kingston; and I pray of you to make this arrangement with Chauncey. Before I left Sackett's Harbor, I ordered a dozen slip keeled boats, to carry 50 men each, and to row 30 oars, to be armed with a light cannon in their bow.

This armament is to sweep the St. Lawrence of the enemy's gun boats, and to take post in advance when and wherever it may be advisable. I beg you, if necessary on your part, to give effect to this order.

We have just received advice confirmatory of a naval combat on lake Erie, in which it is said Perry has taken the whole British squadron on the 10th instant, and brought the vessels into "Putney harbor at the islands"—his own vessel, the Lawrence, barely capable of being floated. The action lasted six hours. This will cancel your news from our commodore.

The enclosed letter from general M'Clure breathes a good spirit, but he will not be up for several days. In the mean time I shall prepare his orders, to be ready to give him the command.

A body of horse, a small one at that point where the fate of the island is to be decided by combat (for believe not that we shall get possession of Montreal without a battle) will be invaluable.

Burn has been ordered hence some time before my arrival, to recruit his cavalry and prepare them for action, and I shall order him by express tomorrow to incline by indirect dilatory marches towards Hamilton, there to look for further orders, somewhere about Antwerp or that quarter. From Denmark or Champion he is to advise the commanding officer at Sackett's Harbor of his movements.

De Rottenberg is under the full belief that I mean to attack him, and I shall keep up the delusion as long as possible.

The snail's pace of the reinforcements approaching this division, and pardon me, their direction and route occasion me surprise. Of what avail will be the detachments under colonels Randolph and Coles,\* which are, I learn from Washington, on their march to this place, where they cannot, or will not arrive before the 15th proximo. If these detachments had been ordered on by all the available water communications from Annapolis to Albany, they could have reached Sackett's Harbor in season, and a column of 800 men would have been found an important desideratum in our impending operations. Where also are the 1000 men reported to me by colonel Duane as being ready for march before I reached Philadelphia? I must hope near Sackett's Harbor. I put these questions to you that I may apprise you of facts, that you, with whom it rests, may apply the remedy, for I find we possess little military subordination or respect, and that a chief of an army is obeyed more from courtesy than principle or professional obligations.

I send this by the privateer Fox to commodore Chauncey, with a request that he accelerate its progress to you. *This place* neither stops a gap, ex-

\* These corps arrived in time.

tends our possessions, nor covers or protects a country; it is good for nought, but to command the ground it occupies, and therefore I shall dismantle and abandon it.

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Extract of a letter from the secretary of war to major general Wilkinson, dated Sackett's Harbor, September 22, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

Your letters of the 16th, 17th, and 18th instant have been this moment received; I hasten to answer them. The main object must be prosecuted; Chauncey is not broken down; he can and will command the lake, and while he does so, our position at fort George may be maintained. If the enemy's sick list amounts to one thousand four hundred out of three thousand, the enemy can undertake nothing with effect. In this view of the subject, *close with P. B. Porter's proposition*, made in the following words, viz.: "Our proposition (in case of your leaving this place) is, that we be permitted to raise, between this and the 1st of October, a volunteer force of from one thousand to one thousand two hundred men, exclusive of Indians; that we add to it as many of the militia stationed on the lines as may be willing to join us; that we be furnished with a small train (say four pieces of field artillery with experienced officers and men to fight them) and that with this force we be authorised to invade the enemy's country.

Rodman's corps may join Porter. Any volunteers you may have with the army, whose times are near expiring, and who are desirous of continuing in service, may do so also. We will cover the whole by a requisition upon governor Tompkins for additional militia.

The enemy's fleet have left the Chesapeake, I believe for Halifax, whence the land troops are to be sent into Canada: another motive for quick movements:

My last letters by Chauncey of the 18th or 19th gave you all we yet know. Prevost has left Kingston, it is said, for Quebec; more probably for Montreal.

Yours faithfully and ever,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

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Niagara, September 27, 1813, 6 o'clock, A. M.

DEAR SIR,

I received at eight o'clock last evening, your interesting letter of the 22d, and shall employ its authorisations to the best possible effect.

Fifteen hundred men were embarked with orders to sail the day before yesterday, but a strong easterly wind has made it impossible to move.

The whole force, say three thousand combatants, after deducting the garrisons of fort George and Niagara, were ready for embarkation yesterday, and as the weather is serene at this moment, I hope the whole may be able to move at dusk this day: I say at dusk because I am desirous to keep my neighbors under a delusion as long as possible; they are perplexed as to my intentions, and will not be able to penetrate them before they have discovered the course of my flotilla.

I have authentic information from York the evening of the 24th inst. The brigade of militia in the vicinity were required to assemble the 25th, and six hundred men of the 41st and 49th regiments, second battalion were daily expected there on

their route to this neighborhood; this is good; and still better three spacious block houses are ordered by sir George to be erected at York.

But sir, here is one drawback; the tantalizing sir James Yeo was in shore with his fleet on the evening of the 24th, (Friday) about twenty-eight miles east of York. Where he is now, we know not, for he has not since been heard of, and Chauncey is just sending out the Lady of the Lake and the Neptune to reconnoitre York and the coast in that quarter. What may be the views of the knight? to gasconade, to retard my movement, or to enable De Rottenberg to follow me? I am unable to divine, but will not be longer delayed; and, therefore, shall be twenty miles to the eastward before to-morrow morning, should the weather permit. If sir James can be discovered, Chauncey will seek him, otherwise he will sail with me to cover my left flank.

As we have not a moment to loose, I shall proceed directly to Grenadier\* Island, writing you and sending orders to the commanding officer by a despatch boat, en passant.

After all we are so straitened for transport, that we shall not find room for more than fifteen days' provisions; indeed, we have little more to spare from this position, and therefore, our sole dependence must be on the magazines at Sackett's Harbor, of which the contractor should be personally advised. Heaven protect you.

Truly yours,

JA. WILKINSON.

Honorable John Armstrong, secretary of war.

\* I had determined on this point of rendezvous before I heard from general Brown.



Fort George, October 2, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

Since my last of the 17th inst. I have had difficulties, perplexities, and anxieties sufficient to discompose a saint.

Commodore Chauncey having ascertained that the British squadron was on the opposite coast agreeably to the information I had given him, left port on the evening of the 27th to look for it; on the morning of the 28th we discovered our squadron off this place about mid channel, and standing for the York shore; about 12 o'clock, though very distant, we discovered it was warmly engaged, the enemy to leeward and scarcely discernable; we could, with our glasses, distinguish the Pike firing both her batteries, and frequently enveloped in smoke. The enemy were forced towards the head of the lake, and about 3 o'clock we lost sight of our sternmost vessel, the action still continuing. From that period until yesterday morning I was kept in suspense as to the issue of the action, the wind blowing a gale from the south east, and producing such a swell as made it impossible for our privateers to keep the lake, and of course my flotilla was confined to port with the troops, either on board or encamped on the beach. The evening before the last, our whole fleet (alone) were discovered beating down the lake: in the course of the night they came to off Four Mile creek, and yesterday morning the commodore presented himself. Our observations on the action were in the main correct, except that the battle was fought by the Pike alone (or next to it) who having carried away sir James' mizzen and main top masts, his squadron bore up to protect him, and Chauncey was engaged with the whole. Unlucky fellow, he could have taken a schooner and a brig, but his eyes be-

ing fixed on the commodore, he would not look at smaller game. Finally, sir James, as usual, ran away; was chased to the head of the lake, came to anchor close in shore; and the gale and tremendous sea threatening, in case of a continued action, to put both squadrons on shore, sir James with the British force assembled there, and Chaucey into the hands of the enemy, he clawed off and came down to confer with me; he has my opinions in writing, and I expect his answer this morning.

Early yesterday, before I had heard from the commodore, the wind, for the first, becoming favorable, I despatched all my batteaux, and as soon as I had ascertained sir James Yeo's situation, our sail boats followed; but, alas, before 1 o'clock the wind again came round to the south east, and several of our schooners returned, though a majority of them, and the whole of the batteaux proceeded, and I hope reached Eighteen Mile creek.

I have been detained by the arrival of about 350 Indians, to whom I was obliged to give an audience and a talk, and I lodged in this place to see whether the enemy might look at it, and what would be the conduct of the garrison of 690 militia and 800 regular troops, under the command of colonel Scott. We have just had an alarm, and being myself among the first on parade, I have witnessed a scene by which I shall profit Scott, before I leave him, which will be in a couple of hours, as, thank Almighty God, the wind again breezes, though it has rained all night, and still continues to rain. Oh, if it may please God to favor us with this breeze we shall soon be near you, but it is in his power, by adverse winds to delay, and by tempests to destroy us. I move with about 3,500 men. Farewell, and God preserve you.

JA. WILKINSON.

The honorable John Armstrong.

Extract from the journal of the secretary of war.

"4th October, 1813. General Wilkinson arrived at Sackett's Harbor on this day from Fort George. He immediately visited the secretary of war, in company with generals Lewis and Brown, and in the presence of these officers remonstrated freely and warmly against making an attack on Kingston—urging the propriety of passing that post and of going directly to Montreal.

"The secretary of war differed from general Wilkinson in opinion, but thought his objections worthy of consideration, and proposed a meeting on the day following for that purpose.

"The meeting took place accordingly, when general Wilkinson presented the paper marked No. 1. That marked No. 2, was presented by the secretary, and the opinion with which it closes was adopted as that which should regulate the movements of the army."

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No. 1.

Reasons for attacking Kingston *anterior* to a descent upon Montreal.

1st. We shall capture a garrison of 800 or 1000, and demolish a strong hold of the enemy.

2d. We shall destroy his naval depot and magazines of every species.

3d. We shall by this operation diminish his force, destroy his resources, and place the division at the head of the lake, under De Rottenburg, in great difficulty and distress; and

4th. We shall destroy every naval resource, and of consequence prevent the building, equipping, and even repairing a single vessel.

*Against* this attack it may be urged:

1st. That the reduction of the place may cost more time than we calculate on.

2d. It may encumber us with wounded and sick; and

3d. It is possible the British squadron may as heretofore elude commodore Chauncey, and find us before Kingston, or overtake us on the St. Lawrence.

In the first place, from the lateness of the season, the loss of a few days may expose us to the autumnal rains, and jeopardise the chief object of the campaign. In the second place, our own force will be diminished and our movements retarded; and

In the third place, the chief object of the campaign, *the capture of Montreal*, will be utterly defeated, and our own army subjected to great difficulties, losses, and perils. Submitted to the honorable the secretary of war.

JA. WILKINSON.

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No. 2.

1st. The Niagara division will probably arrive here in a day or two.

2d. The weather is yet good, and the lake navigable by scows and boats.

3d. The enemy's main force is in the neighborhood of fort George and his fleet at the head of the lake.

4th. The garrison of Kingston does not exceed 800 or 1,000 men.

5th. If we effect a landing at M'Pherson's farm, on the eastern side of Kingston, a point may be

seized, which will command the town, the forts, and the harbor; and within seven hours after the landing is effected a sufficient battery may be erected and in operation.

6th. 9 and 12 pounders will be sufficient for burning block houses, &c. and may be dragged by the men.

7th. The time necessary to reduce the place will not exceed a single day, and of course will not materially interfere, on that account, with our object below.

8th. The loss we may sustain can only be conjectured. Judging from that at fort George, where the enemy were more numerous, it will be inconsiderable.

9th. The advantages of taking Kingston are two: you sever the enemy's line of communication, and you expel him from his only secure harbor.

The premises assumed under the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th heads may change, and our conclusions with them. The only safe decision therefore is, that if the British fleet shall not escape commodore Chauncey and get into Kingston harbor; if the garrison of that place be not largely reinforced; and if the weather be such as will allow us to navigate the lake securely, *Kingston* shall be our first object, otherwise, we shall go directly to *Montreal*.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Sackett's Harbor, 5th October, 1813.

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War Department, October 9, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

Does there exist between you and the commodore a clear and distinct understanding on the sub-

ject of our plan of operations, and the kind and degree of assistance he will be able to give to its execution? Can he take a position which shall have the effect of shutting up Yeo, and of covering our descent upon Kingston, and our subsequent movement down the St. Lawrence? Is it not probable that a part of the enemy's fleet will, immediately on our appearance at Grenadier Island, occupy the passages of the river? If we can be covered in going to our first object, and should attain that, we may be able to dispense with further naval assistance; but should we fail (a contingency, which being possible, ought to be regarded) naval aid will be necessary to the prosecution of the second part of the plan. As the fleet is wind-bound, and the commodore here, explanations on these points may be readily and conveniently given. Let me know the result, and believe me

Yours truly,

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Major general Wilkinson.

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Head quarters, Sackett's Harbor, October 9, 1813.

**DEAR SIR,**

The commodore and myself have hitherto understood each other perfectly, and I think we shall harmonize to the end. He is ready to sail the moment the wind serves; and you may rest assured that nothing essential to give effect to the operations of the army under my command, and to accomplish the views of the government, has been or shall be omitted.

Respectfully and truly yours,

**JA. WILKINSON.**

Honorable John Armstrong, secretary of war.

Extract of a letter from general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated Head quarters, Sackett's Harbor, October 18, 1813.

"The diminution of our force by disease and various casualties, and more especially, the uncertainty of the period of our movement against Montreal, render it necessary, in my judgment, that you should revoke the order of march you have given to major general Hampton, and that he should be directed to march for Morrisville, as rapidly as may be consistent with the health of his troops. This proposition is founded on the presumption, that we make the reduction of Kingston and the conquests of the upper provinces, the first objects of our operations."

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War Department, October 19, 1813.

SIR,

I received your letter of yesterday, and should have answered it more promptly, but that business of the south and west required my immediate attention.

When on the 4th instant you returned from fort George, we had the prospect of a speedy concentration of our forces at this point; the Niagara division had sailed on the 30th ult. the enemy's principal force occupied a cantonment between lakes Erie and Ontario; his fleet was at the head of the lake, and his garrison at Kingston, reduced to seven or eight hundred men. *Under these circumstances*, it was no doubt wise to decide as we did, that our first attack should be carried against that place: but do these circumstances any longer exist? The expected concentration is but now effected,

(18th of October) a reinforcement of 1,500 men has been thrown into Kingston; the British fleet has got into port there, and our force, from disease and other casualties, is, according to your statement, diminished and diminishing. To reinstate and augment this, it is now proposed to order general Hampton from his present position at Chatauge to Morrisville, on the St. Lawrence. These places are distant upwards of one hundred miles. A march of such length at this season of the year, and in the present condition of the roads, loaded as he is with a train of artillery, with means of subsistence, and with tents and baggage, cannot be performed under fifteen days, to which must be added the time necessary for giving the order, for making the arrangements preliminary to such a movement, and for making also the subsequent one from Morrisville to the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river; all of which would probably protract the moment of junction till the 15th of November.

Admonished as we are by the storms which have assailed us for ten days past, and which have not yet ceased, I cannot but think that a period so late would of itself be fatal to the project.

Other circumstances lead to the same conclusion. Beginning our operations from the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river, we shall have a march of twenty-four miles to Kingston, and through a country covered with woods, destitute of inhabitants, and pervious only by two roads, which, without any interruption from the enemy, are represented as nearly impassable at present. This movement (unlike that originally projected)\* cannot be made without the aid of horses, and a less number of these than six hundred,† including the

\* A descent at M'Pherson's farm two miles and a half below Kingston.

† Forage for this number was required by the general.

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2d regiment of dragoons, is, I understand, deemed insufficient. Now these must be fed, and their provender drawn from *this place*, as the country between Gravelly point and Putneyville, affords none, and interposes a swampy desert which shuts us out from the supplies of Rossie and Rayville, &c. An important question arises here—can the necessary forage be obtained from this neighborhood? the quarter-master general says “it cannot, that it must be carted from Lowville (40 miles distant) and transported hence by water.” These facts, on your plan, menace our operations against Kingston with a delay, which would probably surround us with all the embarrassments of a Canadian winter, and extinguish every hope of grasping the other, the safer and the greater object below. I call it the safer and greater object, because—

At Montreal, you find the weaker place, and the smaller force to encounter: at Montreal, you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient reinforcement of four thousand men: at Montreal, you approach your own resources, and establish between you and them an easy and expeditious intercourse: at Montreal, you occupy a point which must be gained in carrying your attacks home to the purposes of the war, and which if seized *now*, will save one campaign: at Montreal, you hold a position which completely severs the enemy's line of operations; which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him, and which, while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself.

These general, are the thoughts which present themselves on your proposition, and which I understand as abandoning, for this campaign, the proposed attack on Montreal. I am entirely disposed to listen to all that can be said on the other side of the question, but at present, the reasons

assigned, leave me no doubt of the policy of pursuing, promptly and firmly,\* the plan already indicated, and which, besides the approbation of the president, has received the sanction of a council of war.†

I am, very respectfully,

Sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major general Wilkinson.

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Head quarters, Sackett's Harbor, October 19, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

I was about to embark for Grenadier Island, when I received your letter of this morning, which I will endeavor to answer; my very feeble condition and the want of time for reflection, disqualify me from doing full justice to my opinions.

You will recollect that in my letter of the 6th of August, I proposed to take Kingston, as prelimi-

\* This refers to the preceding plan, approved by the president on the 23d July, and communicated to general Wilkinson on the 5th of August.

† This council consisted of generals Wilkinson, Lewis, Brown, and Swartwout, and commodore Chauncey. The opinion was unanimous.

Note.—Before the secretary of war left Sackett's Harbor, and while it was deemed practicable, and was intended to carry our attacks against both Kingston and Montreal, he had one or more conversations with commodore Chauncey, on the general subject of naval co-operation.—

These had particular reference to two points, the place of landing (in case Kingston was the object of attack) and the *degree of protection* which the fleet could be able to render to the debarkation of the army.

The places of descent indicated by the secretary were three:

1st. M'Pherson's farm, two miles and a half below Kingston.

2d. The mouth of the Little Cataraqui, four or five miles above Kingston; and,

3d. The mouth of the Gananoqui river, twenty-four miles below Kingston.

The commodore's answer was substantially as follows: that he would not take upon himself the responsibility of covering the landing of the army at the *first* of these points, but that he would cover its landing at either of the other two.

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nary to an attack on Montreal; you offered a different opinion in your letter of the 8th, and on my arrival here, I submitted the alternative to a council of war, which decided in favor of your plan, to leave Kingston untouched, and proceed directly against Montreal; but ulterior considerations and *information\** have induced me to adhere to my original plan.

Permit me, previous to the discussion of the grounds of my opinion, to submit a few incidental remarks.

It is extremely doubtful what may be the present force of the enemy at Kingston, and very uncertain how much our own force may have been diminished by disease, and the casualties attending our movements.

From the retreat of Proctor before general Harrison, and the information received from colonel Scott, I think it probable that De Rottenberg, with the effectives of his division, has gone to reinforce Proctor, and that the troops which have descended to Kingston consisted only of the sick of that division.

My idea of recalling general Hampton to reinforce us, was produced by an alarm with respect to the insufficiency of our force, which I found spreading; and the direction which I suggested was founded on your own proposition of the 13th instant, at which time I understood you to offer the opinion, that the march from Hampton's encampment to Morrisville might be accomplished in six days, and my own opinion is, that by disem-

\* This ulterior information was not communicated to the secretary of war.

† What is here called a *proposition* was but a question, *whether the march could be performed in six days?* General W. answered in the negative, and advised that general Hampton should be ordered to go on to Cogswaga.

barrassing himself of his artillery and its attirail, perhaps he might be able to make the march in that time, or a few days more.

My reasons for preferring the attack of Kingston to that of Montreal, are these:

By the reduction of that place, we conquer a province, not only of great importance to the enemy, but a valuable acquisition to ourselves; we capture or destroy four thousand of his best troops; we put an end to the Indian war, and by the destruction of his naval force, establish our command of the lake, and permit a respectable part of our naval force to be employed elsewhere.

On the contrary, leave Kingston, its garrison, and the British squadron in our rear, and proceed to Montreal, none of those important objects will be gained. The enemy will remain in undisturbed possession of the province, at liberty to exercise his enterprise against this frontier at discretion; for it is a fact, however, opinions may vary, the resources of the province are adequate to the subsistence of his army. His naval superiority on the lake will be re-established by the opening of the spring, the Indian depredations may be encouraged and continued; or should he prefer it, he may, on the opening of the campaign, leaving sir James Yeo triumphant on the lake, with a suitable garrison for the protection of Kingston, descend the St. Lawrence with his main force and fall upon our rear, while we shall be engaged in front, admitting we succeed in establishing ourselves at Montreal.

Having passed Kingston, the fortifications at Prescott may present such an obstacle to our further progress, as to compel us to land and reduce it by force; an operation which may consume more time than can be spared at this advanced season. I speak conjecturally, but should we surmount

every obstacle in descending the river, we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having no retreat, the army must surrender at discretion.

I will barely add, that as the winter commences at Montreal by the 20th of November, should we be delayed on the route by any untoward incidents, our embarrassments and perils will be greatly multiplied.

I offer these results of my frail judgment with a conscientious regard to the public good. I am bigotted to no project, and therefore am willing to yield my own judgment to that of others.

Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is *necessary to my justification*, that you should by the *authority of the president*, direct the operations of the army under my command, *particularly against Montreal*. With my earnest wishes for the successful issue of whatever may be undertaken, I am, dear sir, with much respect and esteem, truly yours,

JA. WILKINSON.

The honorable John Armstrong, secretary of war.

N. B. All the objections which apply to the landing below Kingston may be obviated by landing above it. My sole motive for suggesting the idea of landing below, was to prevent the *garrison's escape*. If there be a deficiency of forage on our part, it is the fault of the quarter-master general, who was instructed as early as August, to lay in a supply of twelve thousand bushels for the subsistence of the cavalry.

JA. WILKINSON.

Honorable J. Armstrong, secretary of war.

Endorsement on the preceding letter, by the secretary of war.

NOTE. If we look at the plan of campaign of the 29d of July, we find that it proposed an attack on Kingston, and even indicated the mode of that attack. If we examine general Wilkinson's letter of the 6th of August, we find that he provisionally adopted that opinion; and if we refer to the letter of the secretary of war of the 8th, so far from expressing a *different opinion*, we discover that it instructed the general to *choose* between a *direct* and an *indirect* attack on that post. It was not therefore any *difference* of opinion between the secretary and the general that was submitted to the council of war, as stated in the preceding letter, but the mere *alternative* presented by the instructions of the letter, the simple *choice* between the two modes of attack.

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War department, October 20, 1813.

SIR,

I received your letter of yesterday by major Lee. You appear to have written it under an impression, that your instructions of August last made a direct attack upon Kingston unavoidable. A copy of these instructions is before me, and in the last paragraph of them we find a summary of their substance. It is as follows: "After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that in conducting the present campaign, you will make *Kingston* your principal object, and that you will *choose*, as circumstances may indicate, between a *direct* and an *indirect* attack on that post." Both modes of attack are slightly detailed in these orders, and a preference given to the latter, but without at all

infringing your right of choice, or in any degree lessening your responsibility. *Nor am I now at liberty to change the ground of these instructions, since the only effect of this would be, to substitute my opinion for yours.* The former has not however been withheld; it has been given freely and fully, and is yet unshaken by any consideration presented to my mind.

As we are now about to part, it may be proper that I should subjoin to what I have said in favor of a movement on Montreal, a short statement of my objections to a direct attack on Kingston.

1st. If its garrison consists of *four thousand* of the best troops of the enemy (as you suggest) your attack will fail.

2d. If your attack fails, your retreat is impracticable.

3d. Your descent must necessarily be made above or below the town, on the water's edge, and within a short distance of your object. If made *below* the town, your fleet cannot cover it;\* if made *above* the town, it must be done in presence of the enemy, and within stroke of his fleet, and that he will think the object sufficient to justify the risk cannot be doubted. Besides, an approach on this side, however successful, leaves to the enemy the means of escaping.

4th. The experiment already made of the lake navigation is not encouraging. Though pressed by no enemy other than the weather, the army has not been able to reach Grenadier Island, but in broken order, and with considerable loss. On your plan, they have eighteen other miles to go on the open lake, and much of this distance under the eye of the British fleet. Is it probable that

\* Com. Chauncey declared he would not take the responsibility of covering the descent of the army if made at M'Pherson's farm, *below* the town.

our ~~scow~~ will be able to navigate this remaining distance (at a season and under circumstances so unfavorable) in better order, or with less loss?

These are the best thoughts I can offer, and it only remains to add to them my best wishes for your army and for yourself.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major general Wilkinson.

Lady of the Lake, off Sackett's Harbor,

October 24, 1813.

SIR,

I was at Grenadier Island the day before yesterday, and found the troops dropping in so slowly, that I determined to return, hunt them up, and quicken their movement. My presence at the Harbor was also necessary to have clothing selected to cover numbers of our naked men.

I will say nothing of the horrid condition in which that place was left. Colonel Coles has arrived with upwards of two hundred good men, and expects about eighty more to-day. Randolph and Scott are expected at Oswego, nine hundred strong. I have contrived to rig and send off vessels to bring up six hundred of them in season for my movement from Grenadier Island, which will not be delayed one instant unnecessarily. The people at Kingston appear to be much affrighted, firing their alarm guns on the slightest appearance. J. N. has returned, and if he may be credited, De Rottenberg has not arrived, and all the force they can spare is sent down the river to take possession of, and fortify some critical passes. My health continues, unfortunately, bad.

I have the honor to be,

Most respectfully, Sir,

Your obdt. servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

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Extracts of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated Grenadier Island, October 28, 1813.

"I send you this by an extra aid de camp, captain Nourse, to relieve the anxiety to which you must be subject, in the impending eventful moment."

"The extent of the injuries to our craft, the clothing and arms of the men, and to our provisions on the passage from Sackett's Harbor to this place, greatly exceeded our apprehensions, and has subjected us to the necessity of furnishing a supply of clothing, and of making repairs and equipments to our flotilla generally. In fact, all our hopes have been very nearly blasted; but thanks to the same providence which placed us in jeopardy, we are surmounting our difficulties, and, God willing, I shall pass Prescott on the night of the 1st or 2d proxo, if some unforeseen obstacle does not present to forbid me. I shall expect to hear from you at Morrisville, where colonel Swift is to meet me, and to guard against chance shots, I wish wagons would be held in readiness to receive our powder and field ammunition, at a suitable distance above Prescott."

"I keep up the delusion here; and the enemy, about sixteen hundred strong, exclusive of five hundred militia, are in daily expectation of a visit at Kingston, yet they have taken post, I understand, at Cornwall and the coteau de La... No matter: once passed Prescott, and our bayonets and sabres shall remove all impediments."

"The inexorable winds and rains continue to oppose and embarrass our movements; but I am seizing on every moment's interval, to slip into the St. Lawrence corps and detachments, as they can be got ready. Our rendezvous will be in Bush

creek, about twenty miles below, and nearly opposite to Gananoqui, which position menaces a descent on the opposite shore. I shall sail from that point at four o'clock of the morning, and will pass Prescott about the same time the ensuing morning."

"We have had such a fluctuation of sick and well between this place and Sackett's Harbor; that it is impossible to say in what force we shall move; but I calculate on 6000 combatants, exclusive of Scott and Randolph, neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season, notwithstanding all my arrangements and exertions to accelerate their march: they are both under provisional orders for Ogdensburg."

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#### WAR DEPARTMENT,

Denmark, October 30, 9 o'clock, P. M.

DEAR GENERAL,

I this moment received your despatch by captain Nourse. I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted as to enable you to say with assurance when you will pass Prescott. I should have met you there; but bad roads, worse weather, and a considerable degree of illness admonished me against receding further from a point where my engagements call me about the 1st proximo. The resolution of treading back my steps was taken at Antwerp, and communicated in a letter from that place by major Lush. I wrote a single line to you to-day, giving the fortunate issue of Harrison's business, and his arrival at fort George with M'Arthur's brigade. If Vincent be within the peninsula, Harrison will root him out. It remains with you to sweep the rest of the line before you. Montreal taken, what are

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Prescott and Kingston? Give Hampton timely notice of your approach, and of the place and hour of junction.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major general Wilkinson.

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Extracts of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated Grenadier Island, Nov. 1, 1813.

"You will perceive from the duplicate under cover (letter of the 28th of October) what were my calculations four days since; but the winds and waves and rains and snow still prevail, and we have made several fruitless attempts to turn Stoney point, one of them at great peril to three thousand men, whom I seasonably remanded to the harbor without the loss of a life. Our sick, one hundred and ninety-six in number, have not fared as well: they were embarked in stout comfortable vessels, and sailed the day before yesterday morning for Sackett's Harbor, but they were driven on shore by a storm, which continued with unremitting violence all night; and as no exertion could relieve them, I anticipated the loss of the whole; but the tempest having abated, and the wind shifted from S. W. to N. E. boats were sent out yesterday morning, and Dr. Bull reports the loss of three men only. Other means of transport will be provided to-morrow, and these unfortunate men will be sent to the hospital at Sackett's Harbor."

"Brigadier Brown with his brigade, the light artillery, the riflemen, the volunteers, the gun boats, Bissel's regiment, and a part of Macomb's are, I

expect, safe at French creek, with the artillery and ordnance stores. These corps have made the traverse of the arm of the lake under circumstances of great danger, though fortunately without the loss of a life, but at the expense of some boats."

"I shall wait one day longer, and if the passage should still continue impracticable to the troops, I will land them on the opposite shore, march them across the country to the St. Lawrence, and send the empty boats round to a given rendezvous."

"As major general Hampton is under your orders, permit me to suggest to you what is worthy of reflection—whether he should take a position and wait the arrival of my command near the confluence of the St. Lawrence and Grand river, or whether he should move down the St. Lawrence and menace Chambly? If he is strong enough to meet sir George, the latter will be the preferable plan, because it will have the effect to divide the enemy's force; otherwise he should adopt the first idea, hazard nothing, and strengthen my hands."

"The enclosed copy of a memorandum from colonel Swift will show you what he is about, I flatter myself, to your satisfaction. The sole unpleasant circumstance before me, is our total ignorance of the *preparations* of sir George, and what we may expect to meet on the island. I fear no consequences; but it must be painful to lead more than six thousand men to battle hoodwinked; and yet all my efforts to procure intelligence from Montreal have proved fruitless."

Extract of a letter from the secretary of war to general Wilkinson, dated War Department, 1st November, 1813.

"Prevost will perhaps be found between the coteau de Lac and the Isle Perrot. If wise, he will attempt to fight you before your junction with Hampton. Avoid this, leave nothing to chance that you can settle on your own terms. A junction with Hampton enables you to give the law."

Extract of a letter from general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated Grenadier Island, November 3, 1813, 7 o'clock, A. M.

"The troops and squadron are at last in the river; excepting Macomb's regiment, with which I shall join them by 10 o'clock, as the weather is propitious. Extreme illness, and the arrival of colonel Randolph with 230 men, kept me here last evening. We shall be encamped at French creek to-night; will take to-morrow for final organization and arrangement and the next day either pass or prepare to take Prescott; by preference I shall not disturb the place, because I have not time to spare."

(Extract.)

Albany, 12th November, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL,

My accounts from and of you are of the same date. Neither come down lower than the 3d instant. These left you with the reserve at Grenadier Island.

General Hampton has made a movement towards the St. Lawrence. After feeling and skirmishing with the enemy, he retired again to the Four Corners, until he had notice of your approach.

I hastened to inform him by express (who would reach him in 48 hours) that you were in motion; that on the 5th you would pass or take Prescott, and that on the 8th you would be at Hamilton, whence he might expect to hear from you; that he must put himself again in motion, and take a position which would enable him to join you, or which should detain the enemy on the south side of the river. If Prevost, on learning your approach, quits his present position, and re-occupies the north bank of the St. Lawrence, Hampton goes on and joins you. If he remains on the south bank, he abandons Montreal and even the road to his capital. In the fulness of my faith that you are in Montreal, and that you have both seen and seized on all the advantages that the errors of an enemy may have given you, I am,

Dear general,

Cordially yours,

J. ARMSTRONG.

Major general Wilkinson.

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Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated French Mills, Nov. 15, 1813.

It is a fact, for which I am authorised to pledge myself on the most confidential authority, that on the 4th of the present month the British garrison of Montreal consisted solely of four hundred marines and two hundred sailors, which had been sent up from Quebec. What a golden, glorious opportunity has been lost by the caprice of major general Hampton.

Head quarters, French Mills, adjoining the province of L.  
Canada, November 16, 1813.

SIR,

I beg leave to refer you to the journal which accompanies this letter, for the particulars of the movement of the corps under my command down the St. Lawrence, and will endeavor to exert my enfeebled mind to detail to you the more striking and important incidents which have ensued my departure from Grenadier Island, at the foot of lake Ontario, on the 3d inst.

The corps of the enemy from Kingston, which followed me, hung on my rear; and, in concert with a heavy galley and a few gun-boats, seemed determined to retard my progress. I was strongly tempted to halt, turn about and put an end to his teazings; but alas, I was confined to my bed. Major general Lewis was too ill for any active exertion; and, above all, I did not dare suffer myself to be diverted a single day from the prosecution of the views of the government. I had written major general Hampton on the 6th inst. by his adjutant general, colonel King, and had ordered him to form a junction with me on the St. Lawrence, which I expected would take place on the 9th or 10th. It would have been unpardonable had I lost sight of this object a moment, as I deemed it of vital importance to the issue of the campaign.

The enemy deserve credit for their zeal and intelligence, which the active universal hostility of the male inhabitants of the country enable them to employ to the greatest advantage. Thus, while menaced by a respectable force in rear, the coast was lined by musquetry in front at every critical pass of the river, which obliged me to march a detachment, and this impeded my progress.

On the evening of the 9th instant, the army halt-

ed a few miles from the head of the longue saut. In the morning of the 10th, the enclosed order was issued. General Brown marched agreeably to order, and about noon we were apprised, by the report of his artillery, that he was engaged some distance below us. At the same time the enemy were observed in our rear, and their galley and gun boats approached our flotilla and opened a fire on us, which obliged me to order a battery of eighteen pounders to be planted, and a shot from it compelled the vessels of the enemy to retire, together with their troops, after some firing between the advanced parties. But, by this time, in consequence of disembarking and re-embarking the heavy guns, the day was so far spent, that our pilots did not dare enter the saut, (eight miles a continued rapid) and therefore we fell down about two miles, and came to for the night. Early the next morning every thing was in readiness for motion; but, having received no intelligence from general Brown, I was still delayed, as sound caution prescribed I should learn the result of his affair before I committed the flotilla to the saut. At half past ten o'clock A. M. an officer of dragoons arrived with a letter, in which the general informed me he had forced the enemy, and would reach the foot of the saut early in the day. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to sail, at which instant the enemy's gun boats appeared, and began to throw shot among us. Information was brought me at the same time, from brigadier general Boyd, that the enemy's troops were advancing in column. I immediately sent orders to him to attack them. This report was soon contradicted: Their gun boats however continued to watch us, and a variety of reports of their movements and counter-movements were brought to me in succession,

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which convinced me of their determination to hazard an attack when it could be done to the greatest advantage, and therefore I determined to anticipate them. Directions were accordingly sent by that distinguished officer, colonel Swift, of the engineers, to brigadier general Boyd to throw the detachment of his command, assigned to him in the order of the preceding day, and composed of men from his own, Covington's and Swartwout's brigades, into three columns, to march upon the enemy, out flank them if possible, and take their artillery. The action soon after commenced with the advanced body of the enemy, and became extremely sharp and galling; and with occasional pauses, was sustained with great vivacity, in open space and fair combat, for upwards of two and a half hours, the adverse lines alternately yielding and advancing. It is impossible to say with accuracy what was our number on the field, because it consisted of indefinite detachments taken from the boats to render safer the passage of the saut. Brigadier generals Covington and Swartwout voluntarily took part in the action at the head of the detachments from their respective brigades, and exhibited the same courage that was displayed by brigadier general Boyd, who happened to be the senior officer on the ground. Our force engaged might have reached sixteen or seventeen hundred men, but certainly did not exceed eighteen hundred. That of the enemy was estimated at from twelve hundred to two thousand, but did not probably amount to more than fifteen or sixteen hundred, consisting, as I am informed, of detachments from the 49th, 84th, and 104th regiments of the line; with three companies of the voltigeur and Glengary corps and the militia of the country, who are not included in the estimate.

It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to

give you a detailed account of this affair, which certainly reflects high honor on the valor of the American soldier, as no example can be produced of undisciplined men, with inexperienced officers, braving a fire of two hours and a half, without quitting the field, or yielding to their antagonists. But, sir, the information I now give you is derived from officers of my confidence, who took active parts in this conflict; for, though I was enabled to order the attack, it was my hard fortune not to be able to lead the troops I commanded.— The disease with which I was assailed on the 2d of September, on my journey to fort George, having, with a few short intervals of convalescence, preyed on me ever since; and at the moment of this action, I was confined to my bed, and emaciated almost to a skeleton, unable to set my horse, or to move ten paces without assistance.

I must, however, be pardoned for trespassing on your time a few remarks in relation to the affair. The objects of the British and American commanders were precisely opposed; the last being bound by the instructions of his government, and the most solemn obligations of duty to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means; because this being effected, one of the greatest difficulties opposed to the American army would be surmounted. And the first, by duties equally imperious, to retard, and if possible, prevent such descent: He is to be accounted victorious who effected his purpose. The British commander, having failed to gain either of his objects, can lay no claim to the honors of the day. The battle fluctuated, and triumph seemed, at different times inclined to the contending corps. The front of the enemy was at first forced back more than a mile, and, though they never regained the ground thus lost, their stand was permanent, and their charges

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resolute. Amidst these charges, and near the close of the contest, we lost a field piece by the fall of the officer who was serving it with the same coolness as if he had been at a parade of review; this was lieutenant Smith of the light artillery, who in point of merit, stood at the head of his grade.

The enemy having halted, and our troops being again formed in battalia front to front, and the firing ceased on both sides, we resumed our position on the bank of the river, and the infantry being much fatigued, the whole were re-embarked, and proceeded down the river without further annoyance from the enemy or their gun boats, while the dragoons, with five pieces of light artillery, marched down the Canada shore without molestation.

It is due to his rank, to his worth and services, that I should make particular mention of brigadier general Covington, who received a mortal wound directly through the body, while animating his men and leading them to the charge. He fell where he fought, at the head of his men, and survived but two days.

The next morning the flotilla passed through the saut and joined that excellent officer, brigadier general Brown, at Barnharts, near Cornwall, where he had been instructed to take post and wait my arrival, and where I confidently expected to hear of major general Hampton's arrival on the opposite shore. But immediately after I halted, colonel Atkinson, the inspector general of the division under major general Hampton, waited on me with a letter from that officer, in which, to my unspeakable mortification and surprise, he declined the junction ordered, and informed me he was marching towards lake Champlain, by way of co-operating in the proposed attack on Montreal.

This letter, together with a copy of that to which

it is an answer, were immediately submitted to a council of war, composed of my general officers, and the colonel commanding the elite, the chief engineer, and the adjutant general, who unanimously gave it as their opinion, that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present season, and the army then near Cornwall should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters, and that this place afforded an eligible position for such quarters."

I acquiesced in these opinions, not from the shortness of the stock of provisions (which had been reduced by the acts of God) because that of our meat had been increased five days, and our bread had been reduced only two days, and because we could, in case of extremity, have lived on the enemy; but because the loss of the division under major general Hampton, weakened my force too sensibly to justify the attempt. In all my measures and movements of moment, I have taken the opinions of my general officers, which have been in accord with my own.

I remained on the Canada shore until the next day, without seeing or hearing from the "powerful force" of the enemy in our neighborhood, and the same day reached this position with the artillery and infantry. The dragoons have been ordered to Utica and its vicinity, and I expect are fifty or sixty miles on the march.

You have under cover a summary abstract of the killed and wounded in the affair of the 11th inst., which shall soon be followed by a particular return, in which a just regard will be paid to individual merits. The dead rest in honor, and the wounded bled for their country and deserve its gratitude.

With perfect respect I have the honor to be, sir,  
your obedient humble servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

The honorable John Armstrong, secretary of war.

October 21st. Boisterous weather; left Sackett's Harbor; at night arrived off Grenadier Island.

October 22d. Called for a return of the troops on the island; found a large body to be still in the rear wrecked or stranded; returned in quest of them, and to order from the harbor a supply of winter clothing and shoes for the troops on the island, who were nearly destitute; observed at night, on our way up, many fires on different points of the coast; wind so high could not call at them; reached the harbor at midnight.

October 23d. Orders given for the shipment of the clothing; many stragglers picked up and embarked for Grenadier Island; col. Coles arrived with two hundred men of the 12th regiment, and sailed for the same place; the Growler equipped, manned, furnished with a skipper, and sent to Oswego for colonels Randolph and Scott (who were expected at that place) and as many men as she could carry. We sailed for Grenadier Island; arrived about 8 o'clock at night off the island; weather blustering, with frequent rain. All this time the general's illness continued without abatement.

October 24th. Hard rains with heavy gales. Still at anchor off the island.

October 25th. The general landed; and measures were immediately taken to seize every pause of the prevailing storms to slip the flotilla into the St. Lawrence by small detachments. In these deceitful momentary calms we found it impossible to traverse in safety the arm of the lake to Gravelly point, though distant only nine miles. In the several attempts made, many boats driven ashore, and much provision and clothing lost. French creek, nearly opposite the point where the enemy expected we should land to attack Kingston, was

made the general rendezvous of the troops, and brigadier general Brown ordered on to take the chief command. The expedition of the Growler was so far successful, that on the 31st colonel Randolph, after a perilous voyage, reached Grenadier Island with two hundred and thirty men of the 20th regiment. On the 2d November commodore Chauncey, by concert, entered the St. Lawrence, fell down nearly to French creek, and took a position to command the north and south channels. In the evening of the 1st November our vigilant enemy having observed, even amid the storms, our movement and position at French creek, attacked the detachment at that place under general Brown, about sun-set, with a squadron of two brigs and two schooners, with many boats loaded with infantry for landing, should their cannonade make a sufficient impression. Very soon captain M'Pherson of the light artillery erected a battery of three 18 pounders, and returned their fire with such spirit and effect that they fell down to a harbor below, beyond its range. Next morning the attack was renewed and repelled, and one of the brigs was with great difficulty towed off by the squadron, which put into Kingston channel, behind Grand Island. We lost two killed and four wounded. The enemy were supposed to have suffered severely, from the evident disabled state of their brig, and the deliberate and well directed fire of the gallant captain M'Pherson.

November 3d. The rear of the army, with the general more and more sick, sailed for the general rendezvous, where the chief part arrived in the evening. The general was carried on shore, and lodged in a tent, his malady increasing in violence.

November 4th. This day was devoted to final

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arrangements for the sailing of the flotilla. Weather moderating.

November 5th. Charming day. The flotilla got under way, and without accident fell down and landed early in the night below Morrisville. The general suspecting he would be followed by the enemy, as in the morning his course had been discovered by three of their look-out gun boats and a gig, and knowing that two of their armed schooners could jeopardize his movement, gave orders for the flotilla to pass Prescott, then seven miles below him, in the course of the night. But some confusion occurred arising from the novelty of the movement, and the order was countermanded.

November 6th. This morning the health of the general appeared better; he ordered the flotilla to descend to a point within three miles of Prescott; and the day being fine, got into his gig, and proceeded to reconnoitre the place. In the mean time, the powder and fixed ammunition were debarked and placed in carts, to be transported by land, under cover of the night, beyond the enemy's batteries. As soon as the general returned, orders were issued for the debarkation of every man (except so many as were necessary to navigate the boats) who were directed to march, under cover of the night, to save useless exposure to the enemy's cannon, to a bay two miles below Prescott; and arrangements were made at the same time for the passage of the flotilla by that place, the superintendency of which devolved on brigadier general Brown, the general officer of the day. About 8 o'clock P. M., we had so heavy a fog, that it was believed we could pass the British fortress unobserved, and orders were accordingly given for the army to march and the flotilla to get under way.

The general in his gig proceeded ahead, followed by his passage boat and family; but a sudden change of the atmosphere exposed his passage boat to the garrison of the enemy, and near fifty twenty-four pound shot were fired at her without effect, while the column on land, discovered by the gleam of their arms, were assailed with shot and shells without injury. General Brown, on hearing the firing, judiciously halted the flotilla until the moon had set, when it got in motion, but was perceived by the enemy, who opened upon it, and continued their fire from front to rear for the space of three hours; and yet, out of more than three hundred boats, not one was touched, and only one man was killed, and two were wounded; and before 10 next morning the whole of the flotilla (except two vessels) reached the place of rendezvous. About noon this day colonel King, adjutant general of the army of general Hampton, arrived and waited on the commander in chief whom he informed, that he had been to Sackett's Harbor with a despatch from general Hampton to the secretary of war; that he had no communication, written or verbal, from major general Hampton to him (the commander in chief), but that not finding the secretary of war at Sackett's Harbor, he had thought proper, on his return, to call for any communication he (general Wilkinson) might have to make to general Hampton. The general had intended, in the course of this day, to send an express to general Hampton, with an order to him to form a junction of his division with the corps descending the St. Lawrence, and availed himself of the opportunity presented by colonel King to send the order.

November 7th. The general having been exposed to the open air all last night, in consequence



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



found himself ill. In passing Prescott, two of our largest vessels, loaded with provisions, artillery, and ordnance stores, either through cowardice or treachery, had been run into the river near Ogdensburg, and opposite Prescott. The enemy kept up so constant a cannonade on them, that we found it difficult, and lost half the day, to get them out. We perceived the militia regiments at Johnson, directly opposite us, and several pieces of field artillery in motion. Understanding that the coast below was lined with posts of musquetry and artillery at every narrow pass of the river, colonel Macomb was detached about one o'clock with the elite corps of about 1200 men, to remove these obstructions, and the general got under way about half past three o'clock. Four or five miles below we entered the first rapids of the river, and soon after passing them, two pieces of light artillery, which had not been observed by colonel Macomb, opened a sharp fire upon the general's passage boat, but without any further effect than cutting away some of the rigging. Lieutenant colonel Eustis, with a part of our light gun barges, came within shot of the pieces of the enemy, and a cannonade ensued, without injury on either side. In the mean time major Forsythe, who was in the rear of the elite of colonel Macomb, landed his riflemen, advanced upon the enemy's guns, and had his fire drawn by a couple of videttes, posted in his route, on which their pieces were precipitately carried off. The general came to at dusk about six miles below the town of Hamilton, where he received a report from colonel Macomb, who had routed a party at a block-house about two miles below, and captured an officer.

November 8th. This morning the flotilla fell down to a contraction of the river at a point call-





**IMAGE EVALUATION  
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



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ed the "White house," were the dragoons were assembled to be crossed. Brigadier general Brown was ordered this morning to reinforce colonel Maccomb with his brigade, and to take the command; and the whole day and following night were devoted to transporting the dragoons. About noon this day we received advice that two armed schooners and a body of the enemy in batteaux, estimated at 1000 or 1500 men, had descended the river from Kingston and landed at Prescott; that they had immediately sent a flag across the river to Ogdensburg, and demanded the delivery of all public property there, under the penalty of burning the town. Not long after, information was received that the enemy had re-embarked at Prescott in their batteaux, and were following us with seven gun boats.

November 9th. This morning very early the enemy menaced our rear, and a slight skirmish took place between our riflemen and a party of their militia and Indians, in which we had one man killed and the enemy were driven back. The cavalry, with four pieces of light artillery, under the command of captain M'Pherson, were attached to the command of brigadier general Brown, and he was ordered to march to clear the coast below us as far as a point near the head of the "longue saut." The rapidity of the current obliged us to halt the flotilla several hours, to enable general Brown to make good his march in time to cover our movement. During this period the enemy frequently threatened our rear, but never indicated an intention to make a serious attack. About three o'clock, P. M. the flotilla got under way and came to, about five o'clock, at the yellow house, having floated near eleven miles in two hours, where we encamped for the night.

November 10th. This morning the following order was issued:

"Morning general orders.

"Head quarters, Tuttle's Bay, Nov. 10, 1813.

"General Brown will prosecute his march with the troops yesterday under his command, excepting two pieces of artillery and the 2d dragoons, who with all the well men of the other brigades, except a sufficient number to navigate the boats, are to march under the orders of brigadier general Boyd. This precaution is enjoined by regard to the safety of the men in passing the longue saut; and as this rapid is long and dangerous, the general earnestly requests the commanding officers of regiments and corps to examine the boats and see them properly fitted, in order to avoid accidents as much as possible. Brigadier general Boyd will take the necessary precaution to prevent the enemy who hangs on our rear from making an advantageous attack, and if attacked is to turn about and beat them. The boats are to resume the station assigned them in the original order respecting the flotilla, and for this the commanding officers of regiments and brigades will be held responsible. The movement of yesterday was a reproach to the service. The flotilla will come to to-day at Barnharts near Crab Island, and two guns from the front will be the signal for landing. In case of an attack in force beyond all expectation, the corps under brigadier generals Boyd and Brown are to co-operate with each other promptly and with decision. The general officer of the day will strictly attend and see that the flotilla puts off and moves in the prescribed order, and will arrest any officer who presumes to deviate therefrom."

Brigadier general Brown marched, and about

noon was engaged by a party of the enemy near a block house on the saut, erected to harrass our flotilla in its descent. About the same time the enemy were observed to be advancing on our rear, and their galley and gun boats hove in sight, approached our flotilla then at shore and began to cannonade it. The slender structure of our gun barges made it impossible for them to resist the long twenty-four pounder of the enemy's galley; this obliged the general to order two eighteen pounders to be run on shore and formed in battery, a single shot from which gave such an alarm to the enemy's vessels that they retired up the river accompanied by their troops. But these slight operations so far wasted the day that our pilots were afraid to enter the saut (a continued rapid of eight miles) with the flotilla; we therefore fell down within two or three miles of the head of it and came to for the night. By this time the general had become so extremely ill as to be unable to set up and was confined to his bed in a small birth under the quarter deck of his passage boat.

November 11th. Having heard the firing of the cannon yesterday between general Brown and the enemy, being still unapprised of the result, it became necessary that we should hear from him before we committed ourselves to the saut, which allows no retreat, no landing, no turning to the right or left but where the impetuosity of the current impels. About 10 or 11 o'clock A. M. the commander in chief received advice from general Brown that he had forced the enemy to retire before him, and had arrived near the foot of the "saut." Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to prepare to sail, and for general Boyd and his command to commence their march, when some firing took place from the gun boats,

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and a report was brought to the commander in chief that the enemy was advancing in column; on this he ordered general Boyd to attack them, and the flotilla was directed not to leave the shore. But the report was soon after contradicted. A variety of reports respecting their movements and counter movements were, after this, successively brought to the general, which impressed him with the conviction that the enemy had determined to attack his rear as soon as the flotilla should put off and the troops commence their march; he resolved to anticipate them. He therefore sent colonel Swift of the engineers with instructions to brigadier general Boyd, who had been directed by the order of the preceding day to take command of the detachment on shore, to form that detachment into three columns, to advance upon the enemy, to endeavor to outflank them, and to take their artillery. Soon after this the action commenced, and for the numbers engaged was extremely warm and bloody for upwards of two hours, during which time, in open space and fair combat, the raw undisciplined troops of the United States braved, and frequently drove the best troops of the British army. Descriptions of battles have become too subservient to the gratification of personal vanity and the acquisition of popular applause: yet every man who has taken part in a great action must know that there is nothing more difficult than to do justice to the merits of a battle in all its parts, where it is hard to find two officers, unless fighting side by side, who agree in opinion as to the propriety of measures and the conduct of men. The fortunes of this day were various; sometimes one line, sometimes the other giving way. Unfortunately, during the shiftings of the action, by the death of lieutenant Smith, a young officer of the highest



promise, the enemy got possession of a field piece; the only trophy they obtained. It is difficult to speak of the precise numbers engaged on either side, because the detachment under general Boyd consisted of an indefinite number of his own, Covington's and Swartwout's brigades, ordered from on board the boats to lighten them, and save the hazard of the mens lives in descending the saut. Neither Covington nor Swartwout were obliged to have take part in the action, with this detachment; yet they both entered the field, taking command of that part of it which belonged to their respective brigades, where they exhibited the same courageous conduct which distinguished general Boyd on the field; and to the great loss of the service brigadier general Covington received a mortal wound when encouraging and leading on his detachment. The numbers engaged on our side could not have exceeded sixteen or seventeen hundred men, while those of the enemy are reckoned, by spectators, at from one to two thousand; but 'tis probable did not exceed 1,500, consisting, as we are informed, of detachments of the 49th, 84th, and 104th, the voltigeurs, and Glengarian regiment.

With respect to the courage displayed by our officers, it would be useless to enter into details, since they all manifested in their respective stations equal intrepidity. The names of the meritorious dead and wounded will be recorded in another place. The firing ceased by common consent about 4 o'clock P. M., our troops were formed in battalia in front of the enemy, who were also in line, and they separated, the enemy to their camp, and we to our boats. The troops being much exhausted, it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that the dragoons with the artillery should proceed by land. The embarka-

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tion took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the flotilla made a harbor near the head of the saut, on the opposite shore. The views of the American and British commanders were, on this occasion precisely opposed. The first being bound by the instructions of his government, and the most solemn obligations of duty to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means, and the last by duties equally imperious to retard, and if possible to prevent such descent. If then he found himself victorious on this day, it was certainly in his power to have effected the one or the other object; and as he made no attempt to effect either, it follows incontestibly that he had no fair ground on which to claim a victory.

November 12th. The flotilla sailed early this morning, and passed down the saut without discovering either the boats or troops of the enemy, and arrived, in the course of the forenoon, at Barnharts, where the commanding general received a letter from major general Hampton, by the hands of colonel Atkinson, his inspector general, which blasted all his hopes and destroyed every prospect of the campaign. A council of war was called upon the receipt of this communication, which was submitted to their consideration, whereupon the council determined that the conduct of major general Hampton, in refusing to join his division to the troops descending the St. Lawrence to carry an attack against Montreal, rendered it expedient to leave the left bank of St. Lawrence, and to remove the troops to French Mills, on Salmon river; and on the 13th of November this recommendation was accordingly carried into effect; ample time having been given to the enemy to have tried a second action, if they had dared to run the hazard.

Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated French Mills, Nov. 17, 1813.

"After what has passed between us, you can perhaps conceive my amazement and chagrin at the conduct of major general Hampton. The game was in view, and had he performed the junction directed, would have been ours in eight or ten days. But he chose to recede, in order to cooperate, and my dawning hopes, and the hopes and honor of the army were blasted."

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Extract from the general order of general Wilkinson of November 13.

"The troops are to embark without loss of time; yet are not to be hurried in leaving the Canadian shore, from whence the commander in chief is compelled to retire by the extraordinary, unexampled, and it appears unwarrantable conduct of major general Hampton, in refusing to join this army with a division of 4,000 men under his command, agreeably to positive orders from the commander in chief, and as he has been assured by the secretary of war, of explicit instructions from the war department.

"Thus deprived of a large portion of his promised force, the commander in chief feels himself bound by a sense of regard to this meritorious corps, and of sacred duty to the United States to spare the lives of brave men, and not to hazard the character or interest of the nation, by an unequal conflict. He with lively regret and the deepest mortification, suspends the attack on Montreal. But he assures the army that it is not abandoned."

Colonel Purdy's report to Major General Wilkinson of the action at Chautaugay, N.Y. transmitted by the general to the secretary of war.

I arrived at Cumberland Head September 16th, 1819, and on the 18th took command of the 4th regiment of infantry, stationed at that place. The army, consisting of about four thousand men, was composed principally of recruits who had been but a short time in service, and had not been exercised with that rigid discipline so essentially necessary to constitute the soldier. They had, indeed, been taught various evolutions, but a spirit of subordination was foreign to their views. On the 19th, orders were issued for the whole army, except a squadron of horse and the artillery, to embark in batteaux. The army got under way, preceded by the light corps, and flanked on the right by the navy, and arrived at Chazy at 12 o'clock at night, lay on their arms, embarked again soon after sunrise the next morning, proceeded down the lake as far as Champlain, and up Champlain river the distance of four miles, where we landed, and immediately marched to Odletown. The light corps, who preceded the other troops some hours, surprised and defeated a guard of the enemy at that place. We remained at Odletown until the middle of the next day, during which time a want of system in the management of the army was readily discovered by every military man, that had to apprehensions for the safety of the troops, should the enemy oppose with any considerable force. The army returned to Champlain the 21st, the 22d to Chazy, and the day following commenced the route to Chautaugay. The whole of this march, a distance of more than seventy miles, was very disagreeable: the officers were not permitted to take with them the necessaries, much less the conveniences

of life, and were compelled to abandon clothing and other things essentially necessary to preserve the body in health. We forbore complaint, endured every privation, presuming the commanding officer had sufficient reasons for his conduct, and concluding it was pro bono publico. The scene has past, and time sufficient has elapsed to have discovered those reasons, had they existed: none have been found; on the contrary, circumstances have demonstrated that it was a useless and unnecessary sacrifice of both public and private property. The army remained at Chataugay twenty six days, and on the 21st October commenced an excursion into the enemy's country. The first brigade followed the course of the Chataugay river to Spears, the distance of 18 miles and upwards, and there met the second brigade, which had taken a nearer and more convenient route. The march was very fatiguing, equalled only by another that soon followed. Credit is due to both the officers and soldiers for their orderly conduct, patience, and perseverance, in surmounting the incredible obstacles the enemy threw in their way. On the 25th a difficult and very fatiguing expedition was planned, and the execution of it assigned to the first brigade, which had been for some time previous, and still remained under my command. The design was to cut off the retreat of a body of the enemy, supposed to be encamped on the banks of the Chataugay, six miles distance. With this intention the first brigade was ordered to cross the river at night, march silently down and reconnoitre at a ford two miles below the enemy and attack them in rear, giving a preconcerted signal, while the second brigade moved down the road in front. We commenced the march at sun-down, and by sunrise the next morning had gained only six miles.

Here we were discovered by the enemy and fired on from the opposite side of the river. During that night we were repeatedly misled by the guides who knew nothing of the country, having never been that way, and at the time we were attacked, they had led us into a thick cedar growth or swamp on the banks of the river and immediately opposite the enemy's position, and knew not how to extricate us. Incredible as it may appear, general Hampton entrusted nearly one half of his army, and these his best troops, to the guidance of men, each of whom repeatedly assured him that they were not acquainted with the country, and were not competent to direct such an expedition. At the same time general Hampton told me he had a man by the name of Smith, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, and whom he promised to send me, but which he neglected to do. The defeat of the expedition was the consequence of this neglect of the major general. About two o'clock, while receiving an order from colonel King, adjutant general, upon the opposite side of the river, to march back four miles and then ford the river and join the 2d brigade, the enemy made a furious attack on the column by a great discharge of musketry, accompanied by the yells of the savages. Unfortunately, the word "retreat," was heard, which, for a short time spread confusion among the several corps. A sufficient number, however, remained firm, and the enemy was soon compelled to retire. Towards sun-down I sent general Hampton a request that a regiment might be ordered down to cover my landing on the opposite side of the river; but judge my surprise, on receiving intelligence that he had retreated with the second brigade nearly three miles. Thus was I deserted without the smallest guard to cover my

landing. To what cause shall it be attributed, that the general ordered a retreat, and that too at the moment when the presence of the second brigade was required, or could be useful, as soon afterwards he declared "he should be willing to compound with the first brigade for 500 men." The wounded had previously been conveyed across on rafts, which made a removal of my brigade to that side absolutely necessary for their protection. An attempt was accordingly made, and a floating bridge soon constructed of old logs found on the margin of the river. The enemy discovering our disposition, commenced a firing from the opposite side, and killed several while crossing. Major Snelling, with about a hundred men effected a landing, and joined the main body. The remainder of my force, exhausted by the excessive exertions of the preceding night, and weary with the fatigues of the day, not having had a moment either for rest or refreshment, were compelled to endure the privation of sleep another night. We retired two or three miles and took a position. At about 12 o'clock the enemy came up and made an attack upon us, but were soon routed. The men at this time were formed and lying on the ground they were to occupy in case of an attack, and were ordered to and did immediately rise, seize their arms, and remain under them the residue of the night. An excessively heavy rain prevented the firing both of the enemy and ourselves, except occasionally a single gun from the former. Our troops were ordered not to fire, but in case of a repetition of attack to charge bayonets; this was accordingly done. The enemy charged several times, and as often were put to flight. It is observable in this place, that so greatly were the men overpowered by fatigue, tho' in a situation every way dangerous, and in which they

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had every reason to believe they should be relied upon by the enemy every moment, many were unable to conquer their disposition to sleep, and it was not in the power of the officers to keep them awake. It was on the morning of this last attack, that the general expressed his apprehensions for the first brigade, and made the declaration above quoted. The next morning we crossed the river and joined general Hampton; on the 28th the army retreated four miles, and on the 30th and 31st marched back to Chataugay. The troops at the times of the attack were not in a situation to endure further fatigue; and it is an indubitable fact, that many of them were so debilitated they were unable to proceed with the brigade on its march from the place of its last attack and actually did not reach the main body until the day after the brigade had joined it, and some not even until the army had reached the Four Corners of Chataugay.

Never to my knowledge, during our march into Canada, and while we remained at the Four Corners, a term of twenty six days, did general Hampton ever send off a scouting or reconnoitring party (except in one or two cases at Spear's in Canada, when he detached a few dragoons for this duty) nor did he, from the time we commenced our march from Cumberland head to our arrival at Plattsburg, ever order a front, flank, or rear guard to be kept up, though a great part of the time we were in situations which evidently required it. True it is, these guards were occasionally sent out, not, however, by his order, but by the orders of the officers commanding brigades.

By a general order, dated Chataugay, November 5, the general says he has paid the first attention to the sick, and has granted them indulgences which created murmurs on the part of some officers



at their posts. It is only necessary here to observe, that every officer of the army can testify that the sick were very much neglected as far as regards comfortable quarters and transportation, and that they were strewed along the roadstrough which we marched without care or attendance; and it is presumable that many have died in consequence of this, who might have been saved to themselves if not to the service. The general, indeed, at the time this order was issued, which was after our return to the Four Corners, did order transportation for the sick to Burlington, but this is the only instance to my knowledge.

The commissary's department is worthy of notice. My order for provision was not sufficient; nor could I obtain any but by special license of general Hampton. The commissary of issues has been constantly in the habit of selling the livers, &c. of the beeves to officers; and though I represented this to general Hampton as unusual and improper, he refused to take any other notice of it than saying, "the commissary is accountable for all parts of the beef, even to a pound or ounce of tallow;" nor did he take any notice of another piece of misconduct of the commissary, that of acting in the capacity of sutler, but sanctioned it by purchasing of him.

The common practices with general Hampton, of arresting officers and releasing them without their consent; of releasing arrested officers without the knowledge or consent of the officers by whom they were arrested (the case of lieutenant Morris, of the 33d regiment, who was arrested by me on the charge of cowardice and misconduct before the enemy on the 26th October, 1813, the time of the skirmish with the enemy at Ormstown, or Chataugay river, being an instance); of refusing to ar-

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rest officers whom I reported to him as having deserted their posts in time of action; of daily issuing orders and countermanding them, and of interfering in an improper manner with the subordinate commands of the army, as a reference to the orders issued by him will show, mark very strongly the capriciousness of his conduct and the total want of steadiness in his intentions.

Such has been the general's conduct on some occasions, that I have, in common with other officers, been induced to believe that he was under the influence of a too free use of spirituous liquors.

I must, in justice to general Hampton say, that the expedition he planned; and which I have called "difficult and fatiguing," did, at the time, it was suggested to me, by him, meet my full approbation, and that I have since seen no reason for changing my opinion of its practicability or usefulness; but I must also say that it required competent guides; and these (as I said before) he promised to furnish me, but did not.

I am of opinion no officer that has served under major-general Hampton, on the late campaign, can, or will contradict this statement.

(Signed)

ROBERT PURDY,

Colonel 4th infantry.

A true copy,

R. H. M'PHERSON,

Captain and secretary.

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Extract of a letter from the Secretary of war to major general Wilkinson.

Albany, Nov. 18, 1813.

\* My last advices from you are of the 3d inst. Report says that the garrisons of Kingston and

Prescott have found means to overtake your rear, to bring it to action, to handle it roughly, and to compel it to retreat to the main body. To this I give no credit:

"1st. Because moving with the celerity necessary to your objects, it is highly improbable that they could by any exertion, have been able to overtake you; and

"2d. Because it is quite incredible, that finding in your rear, a heavy corps capable of disturbing the main action of the campaign, you should not have taken effectual measures to beat and destroy it. If 1,600 men were not sufficient for this purpose, 3,000 were so; and the garrisons of Kingston and Prescott destroyed (though we failed of getting to Montreal), the upper province was won."

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Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated French Mills, Nov. 24, 1813.

"I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 15th instant from Albany, and hope my despatches have reached you which left this on the 17th.

"With respect to the unfortunate issue of the campaign, I disclaim the shadow of blame, because I know I have done my duty, and more than my duty, and so do those with whom I have acted. *To general Hampton's outrage of every principle of subordination and discipline may be ascribed the failure of the expedition*, and that I have not yet arrested him must be attributed to my respect for you, and my desire that the arrest should proceed from the highest authority; for if this act be suffered to pass unnoticed and unpunished it will establish a precedent to justify disobedience

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and subvert those obligations of blind obedience on which the efficiency of military institutions exclusively depend.

"After our losses by deaths, desertions, and discharges since we left Sackett's Harbor, I think we shall not be able to show you more than 5,000 men at this point, exclusive of the dragoons who have been ordered to Greenbush and Pittsfield for convenience and economy."

War Department, November 25, 1813.

SIR,

It is recommended to you to consolidate your infantry and artillery into complete regiments, or as nearly so as possible, for the winter, retaining a full complement of your most efficient officers to command them, and detaching all surplus officers immediately on the recruiting service, and to the several districts indicated by the rules and regulations. This regulation should extend to general Hampton's division.

An immediate inquiry into the terms of enlistment of the men composing your army should be instituted, and endeavors should be made to re-enlist all those whose terms of service are about expiring.

The most severe attention to discipline must be begun, and the slightest departures from it, whether in officer or soldier, noticed and punished. Clerks to the several companies must be appointed, and company books kept, showing every thing received by the soldier, and charging him therewith. If on the next or any future inspection it be found that any article of his clothing, or of his arms, has been lost or sold, the article is to be supplied, and

the price deducted from his wages. With regard to clothing and arms there have been the most shocking abuses.

Confidential reports are provided by the rules and must be made agreeably thereto. The inspector who neglects or refuses to perform this duty, shall be dismissed the service.

I am Sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major general Wilkinson.

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Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated Head quarters, Malone, military district No. 9, December 6, 1813.

"Your three letters of the 25th ultimo came to hand on the 30th; and I am happy to find that I had anticipated the views communicated in those letters, as far as respects the security of our flanks and centre. When I ordered major general Hampton to reinforce the post of the Four Corners, it was under the impression that Cumberland-head was guarded; but the moment I was undeceived and apprised of the exposed situation of our depot at Plattsburg, the order was countermanded, as you have seen from the documents which I have transmitted you. You must also have perceived from those documents, that I was not insensible of the importance of condensing our force, and that I had made a proposition respecting quarters preparatory to such event."

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Abstract from the report of the adjutant general of general Wilkinson's army, showing the whole number of non-commissioned officers, musicians, and artificers of the several regiments and corps, on December 1, 1813.

Light artillery . . . . .	478
2d regiment artillery . . . . .	117
3d ditto . . . . .	675
5th regiment infantry . . . . .	495
6th ditto . . . . .	549
11th ditto . . . . .	454
12th ditto . . . . .	500
13th ditto . . . . .	591
14th ditto . . . . .	295
15th ditto . . . . .	648
20th ditto . . . . .	336
21st ditto . . . . .	841
22d ditto . . . . .	455
25th ditto . . . . .	578
Riflemen . . . . .	208
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Adjutant and inspector general's office,  
January 27, 1814,

**A. Y. NICOLL,**

Inspector general.

NOTE.—The two regiments of light dragoons, which had made part of general Wilkinson's force in descending the St. Lawrence, are not included in this return, these corps having been detached to Utica.

Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated Malone, December 8, 1813.

"The unavoidable delay of the express (as no reliance can be placed in the mail from this place) enables me to send you the copy of a letter from

general Izard, dated the 6th instant, which exhibits additional expositions of the pernicious and unwarrantable conduct of major general Hampton. I will not charge this man with traitorous designs, but I apprehend, in any other government, a military officer who first defeated the object of a campaign by disobedience of orders, and then, without authority, furloughed all the efficient officers of the division he commanded on a national frontier, in the vicinity of an enemy, would incur heavy penalties."

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Extract of a letter from brigadier general Izard to major general Wilkinson, dated Plattsburg, December 6, 1813.

"There is an unavoidable delay in the returns of the regiments of this division, proceeding from the extreme inexperience of the officers of all grades, now with them; almost every efficient officer is either sick, or was furloughed by major general Hampton at the moment of his own departure; those that remain are barely enough to perform the routine of duty in this cantonment."

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Extract of a letter from major general Wilkinson to the secretary of war, dated Malone, Dec. 24, 1813.

"I believe I have not hitherto transmitted you a copy of a communication which took place between commodore Chauncey and myself, the day before I sailed from French creek, and I do it now to show you what were my anticipations of the movements of the enemy left behind me, and how delusive were all the promises made to me that my rear should be protected."

French Creek, Nov. 4, 1818.

DEAR SIR,

I was so ill yesterday I could not call to see you; and I now send up to say that I shall sail this evening; and if I am not obstructed by the enemy's armed vessels which may have slipped down the other channel, I shall pass Prescott tomorrow night, or land the next morning to take the place, if I cannot pass it without too great hazard. As this operation may require three or four days, it is not improbable the enemy's squadron may make some attempts to destroy my boats; and therefore I must intreat you to watch his every motion, and to give my flotilla every protection in your power.

We are a match for the gun boats of the enemy, but inferior to armed schooners, and therefore could you consistently spare us the *Pert*, or some armed vessel, to run down to the vicinity of Ogdensburg, and immediately return, it would add security to our movements.

Major Johnson will have the honor to deliver you this, and I will thank you for any information you can give me respecting the movements of the enemy.

I wish very much to say farewell to you, but I am sensible of the delicacy of your situation, and my disease having changed into a violent inflammation of the breast, I dare not get wet. If then it is destined that we are not to meet again, I will leave with you my prayers for long life and laurels in this world, and everlasting happiness in that which is to come.

Farewell, my friend, and may your country understand your skill and valor as well as does

J. A. WILKINSON.

Commodore Chauncey.



United States' ship General Pike, at anchor off  
east end of Long Island, river St. Lawrence,  
Nov. 6, 1815.

DEAR SIR,

Your favor of this days' date has this moment  
been handed to me by major Johnson.

From the best information that I can get, the  
enemy's fleet is at or in the vicinity of Kingston,  
and I think that you have nothing to apprehend  
from them, as I am in a situation to watch both  
channels.

I should deem it unsafe to separate any part of  
my squadron as long as the enemy remains above  
me: in fact, I am in hourly expectation of being  
attacked by sir James down the south channel;  
in that case I shall require all my force, as he has  
added a number of gun boats to his fleet. If how-  
ever, sir James should detach any part of his fleet  
down the north channel, I will send a sufficient  
force down to oppose him.

I will remain in my present station until you  
pass Prescott, but am anxious for that event to  
take place at as early a day as possible, as the  
fleet cannot move out of this river except with a  
fair wind. It is to be apprehended that after a  
few days a spell of westwardly winds will set in,  
which may detain us until the ice makes, which  
would endanger the safety of the fleet, and prob-  
ably lead to its final destruction. If it is possible  
for you to communicate to me in any way, when  
you pass Prescott, I should esteem it as a parti-  
cular favor.

May your present enterprise be crowned with  
all the success that you yourself can wish; and

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that your eminent services may be duly appreciated by your country is the prayer of,

Dear sir, your friend  
And humble servant,  
**ISAAC CHAUNCEY.**

Major general James Wilkinson, commander  
in chief of the American forces in and upon  
the St. Lawrence, &c. &c. &c.

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Correspondence between the secretary of war and colonel  
Porter and general McClure, &c.

**WAR DEPARTMENT,**

February 23, 1813.

**SIR,**

As the enemy's force and defences on the Canada side of the Niagara river are understood to be weak; as your force is respectable, and supposed to be competent to a successful attack of these; and as the season has now furnished you with a bridge, as well for retreat as for advance, it is thought advisable that you do not permit circumstances so favorable to escape without making a stroke on such points of the enemy's line, as may be most within your reach. If, after feeling the enemy at fort Erie, you should find yourself able to extend your attack to fort George, it will be desirable; but of this you can judge best after your first experiment. To an old soldier, like yourself, it is unnecessary to go more into detail. You know what you ought to do, and you will do it. Communicate this letter to lieutenant colonel Boerstler, and accept the assurances of my respect and good wishes.

(Signed)

**JOHN ARMSTRONG.**

Colonel Porter, light artillery, commanding  
the troops of the United States on the  
Niagara river.

Extract of a letter from major general Dearborn to the secretary of war, dated Albany, March 25, 1813.

"Colonel Porter informs me that he had commenced the necessary preparations for an attack on fort Erie, but the desertion of a serjeant prevented his carrying his intended attack into operation. Two officers with six men pursued the serjeant so far as to be surrounded on the ice, and were made prisoners. Fort Erie was immediately reinforced, and he had given over any immediate movement."

Letter from colonel Scott (3d artillery regiment) to major general Wilkinson.

Fort George, Monday, 7 o'clock, P. M.,

October 11, 1813.

SIR,

Within the last five minutes, I have had the honor to receive your despatch by "The Lady of the Lake."

The enemy has treated me with neglect. He continued in his old positions until Saturday last, (the 9th) when he took up his retreat on Burlington heights, and *has abandoned this whole peninsula.* Two causes are assigned for this precipitate movement; the succor of Proctor, who is reported to have been entirely defeated, if not taken; the other the safety of Kingston, endangered by your movement.

We have had from the enemy many deserters, most of whom concur in the latter supposition.

The British burnt every thing in store in this neighborhood, 3,000 blankets, many hundred stand of arms, also the blankets in the mens' packs, and every article of clothing not in actual use.

They are supposed to have reached Burlington heights last evening, from the rate of their march

the night before. I have information of their having passed "the 40," by several inhabitants who have come down. They add to what was stated by the deserters, that two officers of the 41st had joined general Vincent from Proctor's army with the information that Proctor was defeated 18 miles this side of Malden. I cannot get particulars.

From the same sources of intelligence, it appears that the 40th, a part of the 100th, and the voltigeurs, moved from this neighborhood the day after our flotilla left this, the 3d instant, but with what destination is not certainly known.

It was first reported (I mean in the British camp) that these regiments had marched to support Proctor, who it is said, wrote that he would be compelled to surrender if not supported.

I am pretty sure, however, that they are gone below. The movement of our army, *below*, seems to have been known in the British lines as early as the 3d instant, together with the immediate objects in view; hence I have no difficulty in concluding that all the movements of the enemy will concentrate at Kingston.

Chapin, who has been commissioned lieutenant colonel, marched late last evening up the lake, with about 100 volunteers under his command, and was followed this morning by generals M'Clure and Porter, with about 1000 men, Indians and militia included. There is no danger of their coming up with the enemy, or they would be in great danger of a total annihilation.

Vincent took hence with him about a thousand or eleven hundred regulars. Many of the militia left this with the avowed design of plunder; but I fear from reports, that the British have left the miserable inhabitants without any thing to be ravished. I expect general M'Clure back to-morrow evening.

as he only took with him supplies for two days; he will probably go as far as the 20."

On the 8th, Chapin went out with a small party and attacked one of the enemy's picquets, which brought on a skirmish, in which many of colonel Swift's regiment participated. After a great waste of ammunition, the parties retired to their respective camps with little loss on either side; we made and lost a prisoner, had two Indians killed, and two other men wounded. We hear the enemy had five men wounded.

I had this morning made an arrangement, on application of general M'Clure, to be relieved in the command of this post on the morning of the 13th instant, with an intention of taking up my line of march for Sackett's Harbor, according to the discretion allowed me in the instructions I had the honor to receive from you at this place. My situation has become truly insupportable: without the possibility of an attack at this post, and without the possibility of reaching you time enough to share in the glory of impending operations below. I am, nevertheless, flattered with the assurance that transport will be forwarded for my removal; and to favor that intention, I propose taking up my line of march on the morning of the 13th for the mouth of Genessee river, and there await the arrival of the vessels you are good enough to promise me. By this movement, captain Mitchell thinks with me, that I shall hasten my arrival at Sackett's Harbor, five, possibly ten days. Captain Camp has a sufficient number of wagons to take me farther: I can easily make that place by the evening of the 15th. I hope I shall have your approbation, and every thing is arranged with brigadier M'Clure.

Knowing your wishes respecting the invalids or

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subjects for discharge, and fearing that water transport might not be had till the season was too far advanced for their removal, I have ventured to send lieutenant Archer (paymaster of the 20th, who was left here without orders) on command to Greenbush, with 100 men of this description. It was a measure approved of by doctor Mann, and I hope not contrary to your wishes and intentions. Doctor Hugo, surgeon's mate of the 14th (also left here without orders) accompanied the detachment. The quarter-master's department furnished eight wagons on my requisition.

The sick list of the garrison is much reduced since your departure, (I have the honor to enclose my report of this morning) and doctor Mann has discharged many patients from his hospital: I also enclose you his last report. Those marked "subjects for discharge" are part of the number sent off to Greenbush.

Doctor Mann and captain Camp have concluded to remove the general hospital to "the Eleven Mile creek," near Buffalo, the barracks at which place will be sufficient for the reception of the whole of the sick, with some trifling repairs.

From the morning report enclosed, you will find 794, the "total," &c. present of the regulars of this garrison, including officers, &c. Transport will be necessary for about 850 persons. I wish also to take with me four iron 6's, one five and a half inch howitzer, and two cassoons, the whole on field carriages. This train will form no impediment in my march to the mouth of Genessee river, as I have horses belonging to the regiment sufficient to draw it. If it meet your approbation, I can send the horses thence to Sackett's Harbor by land.

I have, by working almost night and day, greatly improved the defences of this post, and nearly

filled up the idea of the engineer. I flatter myself that I have also improved the garrison in discipline.

I must apologise for the haste in which this is written, but captain Mix proposes to sail immediately, and I fear to detain him a moment. I think I shall certainly be at the mouth of the Genessee by the 15th inst.

I have the honor to be, sir,

With the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

W. SCOTT,

Colonel commanding

Major general Wilkinson, commanding, &c. &c. &c.

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Extract of a letter from colonel Winfield Scott to the secretary of war, dated Georgetown, (Col.) Dec. 31, 1813.

“At your desire, I have the honor to make the following report:

“I left fort George on the 13th of October last, by order of major general Wilkinson with the whole of the regular troops of that garrison, and was relieved by brigadier general M'Clure, with a body of the New York detached militia.

“Fort George, as a field work, might be considered as complete at that period. It was garrisoned with ten pieces of artillery, (which number might easily have been increased from the spare ordnance at the opposite fort) with an ample supply of fixed ammunition, &c. &c. &c. as the enclosed receipt for these articles will exhibit.

“Fort Niagara, on the 14th October, was under the immediate command of captain Leonard, 1st artillery, who, besides his own company, had captain Read's of the same regiment, together with

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such of brigadier general M'Clure's brigade as had refused to cross the river. Lieutenant colonels Flemming, Bloom, and Dobbins of the militia, had successively been in the command of this fort by order of the brigadier general, but I think neither of them was present at the above period.— Major general Wilkinson in his order to me for the removal of the regular troops on that frontier, excepted the two companies of the 1st artillery then at fort Niagara. And under the supposition that I should meet water transport for my detachment at the mouth of the Genessee river, I had his orders to take with me the whole of the convalescents left in the different hospitals by the regiments which had accompanied him. This order I complied with."

NOTE.—By the arrangements of the war department, brigadier general Porter, of the United States' army, was designated for command on the Niagara frontier, and particularly for that of fort George. In the latter trust, general Wilkinson substituted for him colonel Scott, of the 3d regiment of artillery, with provisional orders to join the army at Sackett's Harbor.

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War Office, Feb. 8, 1813.

*Ordered,* That captain Leonard (1st regiment of artillery) be *arrested*, and that his place be supplied by captain Armistead, of the same regiment.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Adjutant general Cushing.

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Extract of letter from adjutant general Thomas H. Cushing to captain George K. Armistead, dated at this office, Feb. 8, 1813.

SIR,

"You will please to proceed to Niagara, in the state of New York, and relieve captain Nathaniel



Leonard in the command of the company of artillerists now at that post; which company is to be returned and mustered in your name from and after the day on which you receive the command of it; and captain Leonard will be instructed to deliver the said company to you, with books, papers, clothing, and every thing appertaining to it.

"You will call on major general Dearborn at Albany, and receive his orders."

Adjutant and inspector general's office,  
Washington, Jan. 22, 1814.

The above is a true copy from the original, as recorded in this office.

J. B. WALBACH,  
Adjutant general.

Extract of a letter from adjutant general Thomas H. Cushing to major general Henry Dearborn, dated at this office 8th February, 1813.

"The conduct of captain Leonard at Niagara has been represented in a very unfavorable light to the secretary of war, who has instructed me to send captain George Armistead to relieve him in the command of the company at that post, and I have instructed captain Armistead to proceed on his journey immediately, and to wait on you for any instructions you may think proper to give. Captain Leonard must not exercise command until his conduct has been inquired into."

Adjutant and inspector-general's office,  
Washington, 22d January, 1814.

The above is a true copy from the original as recorded in this office.

J. B. WALBACH,  
Adjutant general.

Extract of a letter to the Secretary of War from major George Armistead. Fort M'Henry, January 19, 1814.

"Captain Leonard was not arrested or brought to trial during my stay on the frontier; nor was he ever instructed, to my knowledge, to give me the command of his company."

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War Department, October 4, 1813.

SIR,

Understanding that the *defence* of the post committed to your charge, *may* render it proper to destroy the town of Newark, you are hereby directed to apprise its inhabitants of this circumstance, and to invite them to remove themselves and their effects to some place of greater safety."

I am, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier general M'Clure,  
or officer commanding at Fort George, Upper Canada.

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General Harrison's orders to General M'Clure.

Head quarters, Newark, Nov, 15, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

Being ordered to return to the westward you will be pleased to resume the command which you received previous to my arrival at this place.

The *orders which you heretofore have received will govern you.* It will be necessary that you keep a vigilant eye over the disaffected part of the inhabitants, and I recommend that you make use of the zeal, activity, and local knowledge which colonel Willcocks certainly possesses to counteract the machinations of our enemy and ensure

the confidence of our friends amongst the inhabitants. It will, however, I am persuaded, be your wish, as it is your duty, to guard the latter as much as possible from oppression.

The volunteers which were lately called out will be retained as long as you consider their services necessary; the drafted militia, until further orders are received from the secretary of war.

There can be little doubt of its being the intention of the enemy to send the greater part of the troops which they have at Burlington and York to Kingston, and to make York the right of their line. They may, however, have a small command at Burlington, and those may be so securely posted as to render them safe from any desultory expedition you may set on foot; but it is desirable to have any supplies which they may have collected in the neighborhood destroyed; and should the success below be not such as to promise possession of the whole of the upper province, may be destroyed.

Captains Leonard and Reed, or either of them, are appointed to muster your troops when and where you think proper.

In closing this communication, I should not do justice to my feelings, if I were not to acknowledge the zeal and talents with which you have managed your command. Your conduct appears to me to have been extremely judicious and proper throughout, and your troops exhibit a state of improvement and subordination which is at once honorable to your officers and themselves.

I am, very sincerely,

Your friend and obedient servant,

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

Brigadier general George McClure.

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Fort George, Nov. 17, 1815.

DEAR SIR,

Major general Harrison embarked with his troops yesterday on board the fleet destined for Sackett's Harbor, leaving the command once more in my hands. Owing to continued opposing winds, the fleet has not yet gotten out of sight.

A correspondence which took place between the general and myself, copies of which are herewith sent, will at once explain to you my views and feelings relative to the operations proposed to have been effected on this frontier. I am confident that the expressions of regret made by general Harrison are equally sincere with mine, though we both acquiesce in the necessity which dictated his abandonment of the projected expedition against Burlington.

About 400 volunteers have repaired to this post under my late call, made in conformity with general Harrison's wishes and request. A few are still coming in. I shall take care that they shall not be unemployed. I am this moment sending out a detachment of 200 mounted volunteers, with directions to penetrate the enemy's lines as far as practicable with safety. In the mean time, I am making preparations for moving in force against them, unless the intelligence expected from this excursion should be such as to make it improper.

Accounts of the enemy's force still vary much. A deserter came in to day who represents their force to be 1,500 regulars and 800 Indians at Burlington and Stoney creek. The former I think is magnified.

It is impossible to form a correct opinion of their intended movements. At one time they appear to be sending down their stores and detachments of troops to York. At this time it is said

they are reinforcing, fortifying, and building barracks.

The term of service of my troops will expire on the 9th December. It can hardly be expected that many will willingly continue in service a longer time. Your excellency will at once see the necessity of prompt arrangements being made to supply their place, if it be contemplated to retain this garrison.

I enclose herein my late address, made under the sanction of general Harrison.

I have the honor to be your excellency's  
Obedient humble servant,

GEO. M'CLURE,  
brigadier general.

His excellency John Armstrong,  
secretary of war.

---

Fort George, November 15, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

The subject of our conversation this morning has occupied my most serious reflections. The deadly blow heretofore given to the patriotism of our citizens on this frontier, has prepared them for murmurs and complaints; those who are not on their march, have left their homes and their business under great sacrifices, with the moral certainty of being brought into action.

The last address which I issued under your directions, and which I am happy to find has met your approbation, gives them reason for indulging the expectation of service, and they are anxious to drive the enemy from their borders forever.— The high character of general Harrison, combined with these circumstances has excited strong interest in the public mind relative to our operations.

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In this peculiar situation of affairs, I feel it to be due to the gallant volunteers and militia, who are assembled and collecting, and to my own reputation, most respectfully to solicit, that if it is not incompatible with your instructions and your better judgment, you will not abandon our projected expedition against Burlington heights; such is the anxious wish of the militia, and I have no doubt the soldiers under your command are equally, if not more desirous of the employment.

My anxiety on the subject, I trust, will excuse the appearance of any disrespect in making this communication, which is certainly far from my feelings. My confidence in the valor, ability, and prudence of general Harrison, will dispose me most cheerfully to submit to any arrangements he may be bound to make, however great may be my disappointment in their result.

I have the honor to be,

With the utmost respect,

Your obedient servant,

GEO. M. CLURE.

Major general Harrison.

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Head quarters, Newark, Nov. 15, 1813.

DEAR SIR,

Your letter to me of this morning has been received. I feel most severely the weight of the reasons which you urge for the prosecution of the intended expedition to Burlington. The disappointment, however, to the brave and patriotic men, who have turned out under the expectation of serving their country effectually in the field at this inclement season, is the most painful circumstance attending it, as I am well convinced from the information received this morning and last evening that the enemy are removing as fast as pos-

sible from the head of the lake to Kingston, which has been left with a very small part of the force that was lately there, and it is more than probable that should we advance in force, the enemy having now none but effective men at Burlington, would destroy the stores which they have remaining there, and retreat too rapidly to be overtaken. There are considerations, however, which would make it extremely desirable to make an expedition of force in that quarter, but the orders I have received from the secretary of war leave me no alternative.

Commodore Chauncey is extremely pressing that the troops should immediately embark, declaring that the navigation at this season to small vessels is very dangerous. The force at Sackett's Harbor is ———. The troops at York are all hastening down to Kingston.

Sackett's Harbor may be endangered by even a delay of a few days; and should the troops that are here not get down before the lake is frozen, our fleet may be destroyed for the want of their aid. I cannot, therefore, take upon myself the responsibility of delaying their going down even a day. Will you be so good, at a proper time, as to explain the above circumstances to the patriots who left their homes with the intention of assisting me to drive the enemy far from our borders, and assure them that I shall ever recollect with the warmest gratitude, the partiality they have been pleased to express for me, and their preference of serving under my command.

I will direct payment to be made to the volunteers for rations and forage in coming out.

Accept my best wishes for your health and happiness, and believe me sincerely,

Your friend,

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

General McClure.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general McClure to the secretary of war, dated Fort George, Nov. 31, 1813.

"My mounted men have returned from the head of the lake, having progressed within sight of the enemy's pickets at Stony creek. Colonel Wilcocks, who commanded, reports, that from the best information he could collect, the enemy's force consists of from 12 to 15 hundred regulars, and nine hundred Indian warriors. They have discharged their teams, and apparently intend wintering there and at Burlington.

"It would be very desirable to dislodge them from their position, but I fear my force is insufficient for that object. At this inclement season it might be attended with serious consequences to attempt any thing more than desultory excursions. The volunteers who have lately come in, must, however, be actively employed, or they will return to their homes. The drafted militia on this side the Niagara are, perhaps, equal to any troops in the United States. I regret that their term of service will expire so soon. Permit me to suggest the propriety of offering a small bounty to such of them as will volunteer to serve a longer time after their present term of service expires; say for one or two months, or until other troops can be sent on to supply their places.

"Should I move with my troops towards the head of the lake, the greatest advantage I can promise myself, will be, to destroy some contiguous mills, and to bring off a quantity of flour, which is becoming scarce with us."

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Albany, 25th November, 1813.

SIR,

Your letter of the 17th instant has been received, and I hasten to inform you that a requisition

RISON.



for one thousand militia, to take the places of those now with you, has been made and will be complied with as promptly as possible by the governor.

You say nothing of the volunteer corps which general Porter engaged to raise, and which was long since authorised by me. If in this effort, he has failed, what are you to expect from militia drafts, with their constitutional scruples? On the other hand, should he have succeeded, and should general Harrison's opinion of the intentions and movements of the enemy be well founded, your force will be competent to somewhat more than defence.

The general was not under orders to quit the Niagara frontier at any particular time. His movement, in this respect, was matter of arrangement with commodore Chauncey, and this was necessarily subject to considerations arising from weather and season.

In the application of your present force, and in the means you take to enlarge and continue it throughout the winter, you will be guided by the orders received from the commanding general, at the time he left you, and by such others as he may give to you hereafter.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,  
Your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier general M'Clure.

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Extract of a letter from Mr. Parker, C. C. of the war department, to general M'Clure, dated War office, Nov. 27, 1813.

"In the absence of the secretary of war, I have had the honor to lay before the president your letters of the 19th and 21st instant, with their en-

closures. The measures which you have adopted to increase your command on the Niagara frontier are approved by the president.

"Should the men, whose term of service expires in December, withdraw from the frontier, there can be no impropriety in continuing the officers who compose the court martial, until they discharge that duty.

"Although there is no law authorising the president to give a bounty to such militia as will remain in service after their time expires, still, as it would render your force more efficient than a new draft, (even if the men could be obtained,) I have no hesitation in recommending that you adopt such further measures as will ensure the protection of fort George and the Niagara frontier, until other means of defence can be provided.

"For this purpose the paymasters, serving with your troops, may be required to make such payments or advances as you shall think proper to order."

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Extract of a letter from brigadier general McClure (N. Y. militia) to the secretary of war, dated Niagara, Dec. 10, 1813.

"This day found fort George left to be defended by only sixty effective regular troops, under captains Rodgers and Hampton of the 24th regiment of United States' infantry, and probably forty volunteers. Within the last three days the term of service of the militia has been expiring, and they have re crossed the river almost to a man. Foreseeing the defenceless situation in which the fort was left, I had authorised some of my most active subalterns to raise volunteer companies for two months, and offered a bounty in addition to the month's pay. It is with regret I have to say

that this expedient failed of producing the desired effect. A very inconsiderable number indeed were willing to engage for a further term of service, on any conditions.

“From the most indubitable information, I learn that the enemy are advancing in force. This day a scouting party of colonel Wilcocks’ volunteers came in contact with their advance at Twelve Mile creek, lost four prisoners and one killed; one of the former they gave up to the savages. This movement determined me in calling a council of the principal regular and militia officers left at fort George this morning. They all accorded in opinion that the fort was not tenable with the remnant of force left in it. I, in consequence, gave orders for evacuating the fort since dusk, and with but three boats have brought over all the light artillery, and most of the arms, equipage, ammunition, &c. and shall doubtless have time to dispose of the heavy cannon before the enemy makes his appearance. The village of Newark is now in flames—the few remaining inhabitants in it, having been noticed of our intention, were enabled to remove their property. The houses were generally vacant long before. This step has not been taken *without counsel, and is in conformity with the views of your excellency, disclosed to me in a former communication.*

“The enemy are now completely shut out from any hopes or means of wintering in the vicinity of fort George. It is truly mortifying to me that a part of the militia at least could not have been prevailed on to continue in service for a longer term; but the circumstance of their having to live in tents at this inclement season, added to that of the paymaster’s coming on only prepared to furnish them with *one, out of three months’ pay, has*

had all the bad effects than can be imagined. The best and most subordinate militia that have yet been on this frontier, finding that their wages were not ready for them, became, with some meritorious exceptions, a disaffected and ungovernable multitude.

"December 11. I have this moment received a communication from the governor of this state, covering a requisition on major general Hall for 1,000 men. It is probable that not more than six or seven hundred will rendezvous on this frontier, which will, in my humble opinion, be not more than competent to its proper protection, as some will have to be stationed at Black Rock, Schlosser, and Lewistown.

"I have written to general P. B. Porter, desiring him to employ the Indians for the protection of Buffalo until the detachment arrives. Our shipping is in danger. No exertion will be wanting, within the pale of our limited means, to afford the protection contemplated."

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Letter from the secretary of war to major Lee, of the 16th regiment of infantry, deputy paymaster of the army at Utica.

SIR,

You will immediately take measures to pay off the brigade of M<sup>r</sup> Arthur (1,300 men), at fort George, and the *militia, volunteers, and Indians* under general M<sup>r</sup> Clure. Send an assistant without loss of time on this business.

I am, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Shelden's, Nov. 4, 1813.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general George M. Clure to the secretary of war, dated Head quarters, Niagara, December 13, 1813.

" Since I last had the honor of writing you, the enemy has appeared in considerable force on the opposite shore; but having deprived them of a shelter, they are marching up to Queenstown, and appear to be fortifying on the heights. Several hundred Indians have appeared. I have prevailed on lieutenant colonel Greaves and about 100 of his regiment of artillerists to remain in the service one month longer, until the detachment of militia which I have ordered, arrives here. I have directed the colonel, with two pieces of artillery, to Lewistown, to open a hot shot on Queenston, and deprive them of quarters there also. You will observe from my despatch of yesterday, that every building in Newark is reduced to ashes. The enemy is much exasperated, and will make a descent on this frontier, if possible; but I shall watch them close with my handful of men, until a reinforcement of militia and volunteers arrive, when I shall endeavor to repossess myself of fort George, and drive them back to Burlington. I am not a little apprehensive that the enemy will take advantage of the exposed situation of Buffaloe and our shipping there. My whole effective force on this extensive frontier, including the garrison at fort Niagara, does not exceed two hundred and fifty men. I have sent an express to Mr. Granger, the Indian agent, to call out the Indians; an exhibition of two or three hundred of them will strike more terror in the British than one thousand militia. Permit me to observe to you, sir, that it is all important that payment should be made punctually to the Indians every month, or at the expiration of the term they may volunteer for. They are a people that can-

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not be made to understand the difficulty of having funds here at all times for that purpose. I would beg leave to mention that Mr. Granger has interested himself warmly in support of the government, by his endeavors to have the Indians join us on every occasion, and accompanied me himself on my late expedition to the twenty——.

“This day I start to Buffaloe, which place I shall make my head quarters. I will reinforce this garrison as soon as possible. In the mean time nothing shall be wanted on my part to promote the views of the government, and protect the defenceless inhabitants of this frontier.”

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Head quarters, Buffaloe, Dec. 22, 1813.

SIR,

I regret to be under the necessity of announcing to you the mortifying intelligence of the loss of fort Niagara. On the morning of the 19th inst. about 4 o'clock, the enemy crossed the river at the “Five Mile meadows” in great force, consisting of regulars and Indians, who made their way undiscovered to the garrison, which, from the most correct information I can collect, was completely *surprised*. Our men were nearly all asleep in their tents; the enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrid slaughter. Such as escaped the fury of the first onset, retired to the old mess-house, where they kept up a destructive fire on the enemy, until a want of ammunition compelled them to surrender.

Although our force was very inferior and comparatively small, indeed, I am induced to think that the disaster is not attributable to *any want of troops*, but to *gross neglect* in the *commanding officer of the fort*, (captain Leonard) in not preparing,

being ready, and looking out for the expected attack.

I have not been able to ascertain correctly the number of killed and wounded. About twenty regulars have escaped out of the fort; some badly wounded. Lieutenant Peck, 24th regiment, is killed, and it is said three others.

You will perceive, sir, by the enclosed general orders, that I apprehended an attack, and made the necessary arrangements to meet it, but have reason to believe, from information received by those who have made their escape, that the commandant did not in any respect comply with those orders.

On the same morning, a detachment of militia under major Bennet, stationed at Lewistown heights, was attacked by a party of savages; but the major and his little corps, by making a desperate charge, effected their retreat after being surrounded by several hundred, with the loss of six or eight, who doubtless were killed, among whom were two sons of captain Jones, Indian interpreter. The villages of Youngstown, Lewistown, Manchester, and the Indian Tuscarora village were reduced to ashes, and the inoffensive inhabitants who could not escape, were, without regard to age or sex, inhumanly butchered by savages headed by British officers painted. A British officer who is taken prisoner, avows that many small children were murdered by the Indians. Major Mallory, who was stationed at Schlosser, with about 40 Canadian volunteers, advanced to Lewistown heights, and compelled the advanced guard of the enemy to fall back to the foot of the mountain. The major is a meritorious officer. He fought the enemy two days, and contended every inch of ground to the Tantawanty creek. In these actions lieutenant Lowe, 23d regiment U. S. army, and eight of the

Canadian volunteers were killed. I had myself, three days previous to the attack on Niagara, left it with a view of providing for the defence of this place, Black Rock, and the other villages on this frontier. I came here without troops, and have called out the militia of Genessee, Niagara, and Chataugay counties, "*en masse*."

This place was then thought to be in most imminent danger, as well as the shipping, *but I have no doubt is now perfectly secure*. Volunteers are coming in in great numbers. They are, however, a species of troops that cannot be expected to continue in service for a long time. In a few days, one thousand detached militia, lately drafted, will be on.

I have the honor to be,

Your obedient humble servant,

GEO. M'CLURE,

brigadier general, comdg.

The honorable John Armstrong, secretary of war.

December 15, 1813.

*Abstract of the morning report of the garrison of Fort Niagara, commanded by captain Leonard.*

Captain Leonard's company, total present	74	absent	19
Captain Hampton's do.	88	do.	17
Lieutenant Peck's do.	118	do.	9
Lieutenant Frederick's do.	44		

Total present 324 absent 45

Aggregate 369

LOOMIS,

lieutenant and acting adjutant.

JOHN WILSON,

brigade major.



Extract of a letter from general George M. Clure to the secretary of war, dated Batavia, 25th December, 1813.

"It is a notorious fact, that on the night on which fort Niagara was captured, captain Leonard was much intoxicated and left the fort about 11 o'clock, P. M. I am assured that he has since given himself up; that he and family are now on the Canadian side of the strait. It was not without some reluctance that I left him in immediate command of the fort, but there was no alternative, as he outranked every other officer. His uniform attachment to British men and measures, added to the circumstance of his not effecting his escape, when in his power, strengthens me in a suspicion that there was a secret understanding with regard to this disgraceful transaction.

"Permit me to suggest to you, sir, that unless regular troops are sent to this frontier immediately, the enemy will penetrate into the interior of our country, and lay waste all before them. The militia will do to act with regulars, but not without them. In spite of all my exertions to insure subordination, my late detachment ultimately proved to be very little better than an infuriated mob. It was not, however, the fault of the privates, but of such officers as were seeking popularity, and who on that account were afraid of enforcing subordination and introducing strict discipline.

"I have collected from the different recruiting rendezvous about one hundred and twenty soldiers, and put them under the command of lieutenant Riddle of the 15th United States' infantry, an excellent and deserving officer.

"I cannot conclude this communication without reporting the conduct of doctor Cyrenius Chapin, (late lieutenant colonel of volunteers); to him in a great measure, ought all our disasters to be imput-

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ed. His publications in the Buffalo Gazette, that the enemy had abandoned Burlington, I fear had the desired effect. I have found him an unprincipled disorganizer. Since dismissing him and his marauding corps, he has been guilty of the most outrageous acts of mutiny, if not of *treason*. When I came to Buffalo, accompanied only by my suite, he headed a mob for the purpose of doing violence to my feelings and person; and, when marching to the Rock at the time of an alarm, five or six guns were discharged at me by his men!!"

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Extracts of a letter from general Lewis Cass to the secretary of war, dated Williamsville, 11 miles east of Buffalo, January 12, 1814.

"I passed this day the ruins of Buffalo. It exhibits a scene of distress and destruction, such as I have never before witnessed.

"The events which have recently transpired in this quarter have been so astonishing and unexpected, that I have been induced to make some inquiry into their causes and progress; and doubting whether you have received any correct information upon the subject, I now trouble you with the detail.

"The fall of Niagara has been owing to the most *criminal negligence*. The *force* in it was *fully competent to its defence*. The commanding officer, captain Leonard, it is confidently said, was at his own house three miles from the fort, and all the officers appear to have rested in as much security as though no enemy was near them. Captain Rodger and captain Hampton, both of the 24th, had companies in the fort. Both of them were absent from it. Their conduct ought to be strict-

ly investigated. I am also told that major Wallace of the 5th was in the fort. He escaped and is now at Erie.

“The circumstances attending the destruction of Buffaloe you will have learned before this reaches you. But the *force of the enemy* has been *greatly magnified*. From the most careful examination I am satisfied that not more than *six hundred and fifty* men of regulars, militia, and Indians, landed at Black Rock. To oppose these we had from *two thousand five hundred to three thousand* militia. All, except very few of them, behaved in the most cowardly manner. They fled without discharging a musket. The enemy continued on this side of the river till Saturday. All their movements betrayed symptoms of apprehension. A vast quantity of property was left in the town uninjured, and the Ariel, which lies four miles above upon the beach, is safe. Since the 1st instant they have made no movement. They continue in the possession of Niagara, and will probably retain it, until a force competent to its reduction arrives in its vicinity.”

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Robert Lee, late of Lewiston, in the county of Niagara, and state of New York, gentleman, of the age of forty two years, being sworn on the holy evangelists, deposeth and saith. that some seven weeks immediately preceding the 19th of December last, he, this deponent, resided in fort Niagara, for the purpose of attending to private business; that about four o'clock in the morning of the 19th, the said fort was attacked or entered by the British. The garrison was not alarmed when the enemy entered the gates of the fort. Some firing took place after they entered the works, particularly between the

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guard at the south east block house, and the sick in the hospital at the red barracks, on the part of the Americans with the enemy. This deponent is positive that there were about 400 men of all descriptions in the fort, immediately before taken, and that 350 of that number were capable and willing to bear arms in that way, viz.: firing on the enemy from the block houses, &c. The principal resistance the enemy met with, was from the sick in the red barracks, and the guard at the south east block house before mentioned. The sick in the red barracks, as this deponent is informed, and from what he saw, he believes were nearly all slaughtered. The British force that took possession of the fort were in number about 400; commanded by colonel Murray, who was wounded in the arm in entering the gate, and was succeeded in command by colonel Hamilton. From the British order of congratulation that issued on the same morning, it appeared that the Americans had lost 65 killed and 15 wounded, which wounds were principally by the bayonet, as expressed in the order; but the above order issued very soon after they took possession of the fort, and did not include a number that were afterwards found bayoneted in the cellars of the houses. This deponent thinks that our loss in killed in the whole amounted at least to eighty. It was a matter of frequent conversation and exultation among the British non-commissioned officers and soldiers, while this deponent was under guard, that they bayoneted the Americans, notwithstanding their crying out for quarters. A subaltern officer and about 20 privates made their escape from the fort by scaling the pickets. Captain Leonard, the American commander, was, at the time the fort was taken, at his farm, about two miles distant, and hearing the attack, made towards the fort, and at no great dis-

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tance from it, was made prisoner by the enemy, and was kept in close confinement for two days and a half, and how much longer this deponent does not know. The American soldiers were kept two days in close and miserable confinement, without the use of provisions, and with a very scanty supply of wood and water; at the expiration of which the citizens and soldiers were crossed over the river and lodged in a part of what had been the British magazine at fort George, the residue in open plank and board huts; in both situations it was impossible to lay down. The magazine was so filthy that many of the prisoners became infested with vermin, and in that situation remained seven days. The citizens were then removed to a brick building up near Queenston, where they were so much crowded that no kind of comfort was to be taken either by day or night. The supply of provisions was not only scanty, but of the very worst kind; beef of the most inferior and repulsive quality; and bread, the quality of which cannot be described. The water that they used, both there and at the magazine, they had to purchase. This deponent believes that through the influence of an individual in Upper Canada, himself, together with ten other American citizens, were permitted, on the 13th instant, to cross to the United States. The residue of the citizens, to the amount of about seventy, were marched, on the 12th, under a strong guard to Burlington heights; and this deponent was informed, that from thence they would be sent to Kingston. The women and children taken at and near Lewistown, were stripped of their clothing and taken across the river. And further this deponent saith not.

(Signed)

ROBERT LEE.

Sworn to and subscribed this 18th day of January, 1814, before me,


(Signed)

J. HARRISON,

master in chancery.

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