

No. 1078

Div-

14

1947

Subject 阿部信行供述書

Affidavit of ABE, Nobuyuki

Defense Counsel 神崎

Certificate

is attached to this,
will be lately complete.

Phase China

Priority II

(A) ~~Copy only~~

~~(The official translation is attached to this.)~~

(B) Translationed Copy

(Translation for reference is not attached to this.)

Sign

J. D. C.



Note:

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in
the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible
to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 17 April 1977

"Deposition of ABE, Nobuyuki"

I M T F E

The United States of America ^{et al} and
others.

versus
ARAKI, [Sadao] ^{et al} ~~and others~~

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent :

ABE, [Nobuyuki]

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed
in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Translated by R. Kataoka

1. My address is as follows:

No. 88, 1 Chome, Shimotakaido,
Suginami-^{KU}ward, Tokyo.

2. From June in the 5th year of Showa
(T.N. 1930) to December of the same
year, I served as the ^{Temporary} ~~proprietor~~
ally acting War Minister of the
HAYAGUCHI-Cabinet, ^{and} afterwards from
August in the 14th year of Showa (1939)
to January of the next year ~~as~~ Premier.

3. Concerning the China Incident ^{may} ~~been~~
~~Someone~~ might have ~~of the opinion~~
^{say} ~~and~~ that we Japanese were preying
upon ^{the} ~~simple~~ Chinese but ~~but~~ I
believe that the thoughtful Japanese

never had the idea to take an aggressive policy ^{towards} ~~against~~ China. They rather hoped to coexist with ^{the} Chinese for mutual prosperity ~~in~~ the continent. In short, no-

thing serious ^would have happened

probably if ~~the~~ ^a Chinese policy of China

had been taken to ^{steps} ~~consider~~ to

help Japan economically, directly or indirectly, ^{since} ~~because~~ ^{everything} ~~their~~ ^{opinion}

was based on the view that the continent was of ^{utmost} ~~great~~ importance

for the existence of Japan.

Of the China Incident; I believe

firmly, ^{would} ~~could~~ not have ~~happened~~, ^{occurred}

if ^{the true feelings of} ~~they had understood~~ ^{Japanese} ~~well~~ had been understood.

3.

If one but look at the
~~In view of the fact that~~ at the
 declarations of the government authorities,
 at the time of the beginning of the China Incident, the
 authorities government then, or the
 the leaders of the KONOE-Cabinet pro-
 claimed "non-expansion", "
 "no-reparation" or "no punishment
 whatsoever" and the like and ~~of~~ again when you
~~these~~ ~~and~~ ~~was~~ ~~going~~ ~~their~~ ~~way~~
 consider they said so with true intentions,
 in fact they did not think
 I believe ~~that~~ it can be said that the govern-
~~ment~~
 of ~~an~~ aggression-policy, I believe
 ment authorities never did think of aggression.

4.

I am convinced of the fact that
 the Wang Government was not a Puppet-

Government nor a special one, ^{From} ~~Accor-~~
~~my~~ ~~impressions~~ ~~from~~ ~~my~~ ~~contacts~~ ~~my~~ ~~knowledge~~
 thing ~~to~~ ~~my~~ acquaintance with each
~~one~~ ~~of~~ ~~them~~ ~~then~~ the officials of
 -the Government made me feel that
 they never had ^{the} ambitions to take
 the reins of government by means

of making such a government,
 which ^{was} ~~was thinking to do~~ always catering to the wish-
 es of Japanese, ~~and~~ contrary to
~~the~~ ^{those} ~~that~~ ^{the} of Chinese. In respect
 to particulars on the
~~of the organization-course of the Wang-~~
~~government, I had little knowledge~~ ^{knew very little of}
~~the details prior to its establishment~~
~~of it~~ because the Government had
 been ~~secretly~~ organized before we
 entered the Cabinet. ^{and as I had only} ~~Anyhow~~ a
 began to generally understand their intentions
~~chance to make such a government~~
~~just prior to my resignation.~~
~~was growing ripe and just be-~~
~~fore my resignation I first could~~
~~understand~~
~~the outline of their attemptation~~
~~Such being the case I can not~~
~~go into particulars of the organiza-~~
~~tion-course of it.~~ But I was
 when it was organized, I was

Told to go as Ambassador contrary
~~forced by order to my wishes and~~
~~ordered to go to China as the~~
so I went to China as Ambassador
~~Ambassador Extraordinary and Plen-~~

~~nipotentiary when the organization~~
~~had been finished.~~ ^{Giving them} ~~there~~

and observing their talks
at my new post I could have
on all kinds of problems, it
opportunities to ^{listen to} ~~their talks~~
seemed to me ^{in short} that ^{they felt} peace between
of every description. Judging

Japan and China was necessary
from those they were, in short, of
to be restored as speedily as possible
the opinion as follows: ^{it is} ~~must~~
and for China to ^{return to} ~~normalcy~~
be The peace must be rapidly re-

~~quired that the normal condition~~
~~of China should be restored,~~ ^{And} ~~For~~
if what Japan said says is unreasonable
this sake we had to be opposed to
concerning this she should be resisted
~~Japanese at any rate, if they were not~~
to the final end. But Japan has
reasonable. ~~But~~ ~~they have~~
declared ^{non expansion of the} ~~that they did not expecting~~

~~the expansion of the incident, and~~
 the taking of territory or collecting
~~they were not thinking of the extension~~
 of territories or any reparations.

This is so
 If ~~that~~ be the case, it ^{would be} rather
^{better} advisable to make peace with Ja-
 pan without ^{quickly} hesitation and to settle the

This, "let's hurry up and
 matter..." "~~in that case~~
 shake hands" was their thought
~~now~~ ~~then~~ it is necessary now
 apparently and in short the basis on
 to do a thing with promptitude," was

which
 I believe Wang Ching-wei ^{came} ~~opinion~~
 forth I believe
 that made him come to a reso-

~~lution to make his government~~

On the part of the Wang ^{regime,} ~~government~~

they were, therefore, ^{quite} ~~partly~~ earnest

in their assertions also when the so-called

"Fundamental Pact" was ^{made} going to be
 concluded ~~that~~ ^{and} there were always

7.

warm controversies among them
~~in~~ ^{on} the questions, on which
most Chinese were not easy
to be persuaded of.

I ^{myself only} attended the congress
~~myself only~~ ^{first} at the beginning and
the last meeting when the conclusion
was made. But ~~every~~ ^{all} reports of

the congress-course made me feel how
strongly ^{they on the Chinese side} ~~had~~ insisted on their opinion.

I ~~at least~~ believe that they ^{at least}
According to my opinion they
were not of the type who would become
~~never~~ were such people, who were
leaders of a government which was
dying for the political power to
but for the convenience of Japan
be leaders of a government which was
and used as a tool,
high in Japan's favour, being made

a cat's paw of them by Japanese.

I remember Wang Ching-wei's

proclamation^{ed} and declaration^{ed} of
many ~~several~~ times that he would not ob-
ject to the ~~disolution~~ dissolution of the Nanking-

government at any time ~~only~~ ^{provided} if

that the Chungking-government would
but fall in with ^{his views of} peace, To save the

~~crisis~~ of the country ^{was} their aim.

Chancellor Chiang Kai-shek's motto
motto was "Save the nation by resisting
the ^{Japanese} country", but Wang Ching-wei's
was "Save the nation ^{with} ~~in~~ peace".
~~say~~ "Peace for saving of the count-
ry".

Their mottos were of course
not the same, but even Chiang Kai-
shek must have been ^{convinced} ~~convinced~~ ^{aware} ~~aware~~ ^{believe} ~~believe~~ that

~~he~~ ~~ultimately~~ ~~make~~ ~~peace~~ ~~with~~ ~~Japan~~ ~~under~~ ~~certain~~
~~conditions~~ ^{had} ~~be~~ ~~made~~ ^{although perhaps}
peace with Japan under certain
conditions. It is not reasonable

9.

Think that
to say that he was thinking ~~the~~ ^{of} ~~country~~
~~between China and had to be fought without end~~
~~war with Japan forever.~~ I believe
It was only a matter of
~~course~~ ~~there may be a~~ difference of ~~the~~
opinion on the conditions.
~~conditions between them.~~ Wang
Ching-wei was of the opinion that

the Japanese Declaration was right
and ^{that} China would be saved ^{by allowing} ~~when~~
~~that~~ Japan to execute her
~~they kept their word with good~~
promise and it seems that he did
faith and he acted up to his idea,
lose this faith even to the end,
^{consequently}
which he never changed, I believe, to
the last. ^{people may have said} ~~Someone might denounce~~

after the Nanking government was formed that
~~was~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~new~~ ~~Nanking~~ ~~government~~
it had ~~very~~ little influence that
~~was~~ ~~too~~ ~~impotential~~ or, Japan always ^{made}
it move whichever way it pleased but
~~checked their activities in its fullness.~~
as for Wang, burning with a desire to
~~The~~ ~~Government,~~ however, hoped heartily
have the Chinese Government ^{in name} ~~act~~ ~~as~~
to carry out everything ~~true to the~~
worthily as the Chinese Government as possible
~~type of a Chinese Government~~ and
put forth every effort if possible it
seems.

~~likely~~
They were taking pain on these lines.

In ^{this} respect, of ~~it~~ Japan ^{too} ~~also~~ ^{tried to} consider
Wang Ching-wei's desires ~~as much as~~
~~to meet~~ their demands as well

as possible, ^{it seems} But their activities
were limited within the administration in

^{the} occupied districts as we were still
fighting with the Chungking Government.

and ^{I believe there no doubt were many} ~~sometimes~~ ^{likely} we were obliged to
~~of the Nanking government~~

check ~~the~~ activities in its fullness
instances of this sort due to
in order to meet the exigencies of
^{military} ~~the~~ operations. Consequently people

were easy to take ^{Nanking} the Government

~~too~~ weak-hearted, and as if it had

did ^{weak-hearted} nothing to do but to follow Japan

blindly. But I always thought that
~~they were wrong~~ that was not so.

With decrease of the demands regarding
I think with ~~the~~ gradual decrease
in demands from the standpoint

of operations in time the
to the operation the Nanking-government
could have ~~been~~ ~~not~~ ~~have~~ ~~been~~ ~~able~~ ~~to~~ exhibit its ~~strong~~ ~~points~~ ~~strength~~
as the Chinese government. Moreover,
in that case, ^{the separate existence of} ~~the~~ ~~both~~ ~~governments~~
(Chungking and Nanking) ~~would~~ ~~needed~~
no ~~more~~ ~~separated~~ ~~existence~~ ~~again~~.
at their will and ^{I felt} in time they
would have ~~been~~ ^{become} inseparably united
into ~~one~~ ~~body~~. ^{At that time,} Those days there
was ^{farther} a peace-move, the so-called
"Chungking-move" between the Chung-
king Government and Japan. We,
however, could not only be unfavourable to
such a move, but hoped that we
would be able to ^{between Japan and China}
should obtain ~~the~~ peace through ~~the~~ ~~co-~~
operation on ^{the two} both sides, ~~making~~ ^{through} the
Nanking-government, ~~bring about~~ ~~the~~

~~rapprochement between the both~~
~~Governments as well as possible.~~

In short, we always express
 ed our hope and acted ^{accordingly} ~~really~~ ^{itself} ~~but~~
~~based on the thought~~
 that the Nanking-government ~~should~~
 and Chungking ~~body government~~ ^{become}
 become ~~one~~ flesh with the Chungking
 one in accord ~~and~~ ^{to} do business with
~~one~~ in order to act toward Japan.

Consequently, just from this point
 one can think that the Nanking Government ^{did}
 not just follow Japan blindly and
 a mere puppet-government made
 again by Japan ^{we had no intention}
 of doing so ^{we did not hope}
 such a thing on our part too and
 associated ^{with her} on equal terms; ~~it~~
~~remember.~~

I ^{went to} ~~started~~ for my new post
 at Nanking in late April and

concluded The Pact on 30 Nov.

What we were doing ^{up to} that
 time was that after ~~reaching there~~
~~must be curious to hear for~~
 in late April, we ^{mutually} began ^{to}
~~everyone~~. In fact, I went
 make utterances ~~to~~ and ^{held discussions}
~~there~~ in late April as mentioned
 to conclude the ~~basic~~ basic treaty
 while we came to utter ~~mutually~~
 in early July. Preparations in the
 to negotiate ⁱⁿ order to conclude
 home country, however, were delayed
 the Fundamental Pact first in
 and instructions did not arrive
 early July, because the instructions
 for this reason we were forced
 of our Government were delayed as we
 to ~~wait~~ in idleness here.
 readiness of our ~~it~~ was not
 enough and a long time had been
~~wasted~~ in vain.

for the time being negotiations was ended
 Following this, however,
 afterwards, however, particulars
 revised at our Government's re-
 quest - ^{detailed changes were made until October}
 and this continued until

October and ~~yet~~ ^{a decision had not been} ~~was not~~ settled.
reached even then.

~~the~~ I came home once in October
and at ^{the} time thought that if the treaty could
~~to keep touch with the Government~~
not be concluded
~~and thought~~ that there ^{was} ~~were~~ no ~~an~~

alternative but to give up the
negotiations. ~~if the Government~~
~~could not be satisfied with our~~
~~endeavour to conclude the pact.~~

To do such a thing, however
~~It would be, however~~
would be a bad story. After
~~wrong done to them, we must~~
speaking well ^{about} ~~with Chinese~~ everything
~~have lost credit~~ when we could
to not go through with the treaty &
~~not conclude the pact at the last~~
the final moment would mean that the
moment ~~owing to our convenience~~
Chinese would lose faith in us,
in spite of the fact that we tickled
After sending all these the government
them ever so much for a long
sent all these people out for its pre
time. ~~How unfaithfully~~ all the
paration, an about face at the
world would ~~be taken~~ by Japanese
time of the signing would ^{have} meant
when we ~~had~~ ~~declined~~
an absolute loss of faith in

15. the Japanese internationally,
~~to sign the Pact whereas the~~
~~Government had despatched the~~
~~envoy so openly.~~ In late
November I was ~~put last~~ ready even to
resign my appointment ~~and was preparing for it.~~ ~~But~~

In a few days ~~the~~ ^{mere} circumstances ^{however} turned
out to conclude the Pact ^{was to be concluded} at
last ^{and} I returned to ~~my~~ ^{Chungking}

~~post~~ ^{and} to signed the Pact. The
reason ^{was} ~~why~~ ^{things turned out this way} was that someone ^{there}

^{was some} ~~was~~ ^{was} of the opinion, ^{that my} the negotiations
~~was too~~ ^{expedient} with the Chinese ^{gave too many advantages} or that there
to the Chinese. ^{likely} I also believe that there were
others too who felt it was better
with Wang Ching-wei because of his

"no influence" and they rather wished
to restore ~~the~~ negotiations with
the Chungking Government again. ^{have thought}
Some people might ^{like this} to negotiate with an ^{uninfluential}
party as Wang Ching-wei. ^{UNIN} So

there may have been people who
~~that our negotiation was mostly too~~
~~thought I was letting the Chinese have~~
~~expedient to them, the despatched~~
~~things too much to their own way but~~
~~army, however, fell in with my views~~
~~it seems ^{likely always} the army there agreed with~~
~~anyhow and sounded likely the~~
~~my thinking and supported me from ^{the} begin~~
~~Government's opinion, supporting my~~
~~bring to the end in its reports to Tokyo~~
~~policy.~~ I believe that Wang

Ching-wei was a ^{true} typical Chinese,

He was a Chinese true
~~to the type and had never been~~

a Japanese. He was desirous

at any rate to bring ^{to} China happiness
~~always and was willing to go to any end~~
~~at any rate or thinking to continue~~
~~to speedily save China he negotiated with~~
~~the negotiations with Japan in order~~
~~Japan and went all out~~
~~to save China before it had ^{been}~~

~~too late~~

I think, he was ri-
~~ght.~~ You cannot say that
~~It was not reasonable~~
~~he was impudent because he would~~
~~to say disagreeable if he could~~
~~not follow Japan's blindly. Con-~~
~~the tables were turned we would ~~to~~ feel~~

the same way. As a Chinese it was ~~considering~~ from the standpoint of Chinese only natural for him to do all he could ~~need~~, they were right. It was for the benefit of China.

~~natural that he used as a Chinese~~
~~his~~ all influence in favour of Chinese.

I always felt we must understand his standpoint as he differed he took which were different from ~~only~~ from Chungking in the way that of the Chungking government of means only.

Consequently I always was thinking

that it was necessary to understand

his standpoint, afterwards I had ^{later} ~~had~~ ~~wrote~~ in a ~~an~~ opportunity to contribute in a

magazine ~~once~~ but at any rate I said

It was summarized as that in settling the Chinese problem follows: ~~to settle it with~~ by Japanese ^{Japanese} morals don't.

Anyhow it is not advisable for ~~would~~ mean failure. The Chinese have to settle the China-affairs only on the Chinese morals and they have their base of the Japanese morality. As for own ~~stand~~ view points. Chinese they have their own morali-

~~ty and standpoint to go their way.~~ We must ~~keep it in~~ ^{understand this well}
~~mind~~ and ~~understand them well,~~ ^{keep in mind their feelings}
 and do negotiations ~~negotiation~~ ^{it probably}
~~otherwise~~ ^{of our endeavours,} will
~~not be all in vain.~~

~~I once wrote of such a thing Japanese~~
~~such a meaning~~ Japanese are
~~too often~~

Thinking that they ^{are doing the} have done. Child-
 were ^{a lot of favours,} ~~ever so much good,~~ They are,

^{said at the time that we are not}
 however ~~not grateful at all~~ for all
 grateful at all ^{too many} ~~of things~~ that
 Japanese have done kindly.

The Japanese feel they are doing out of
 kindness. ~~I thought,~~ ^{although} ~~must con-~~
^{That is because they may have}
 been done with good will ~~to~~ to them
~~side the fact that in spite of our~~
~~many things have not been beneficial~~
 good will they were ~~too often~~ little
~~used on this point I thought we must~~
~~favoured with everything we had done.~~
~~give a lot of thought and consideration~~
~~before carrying them out.~~ They ~~were~~ insist

Concerning
~~ing on the evacuation of the Japanese~~

they were downright insistent. Even
troops quite obstinately. ~~And even~~

in ^{the way} ~~order~~ ^{was written} to write a sentence / they ^{de-}manded revision.

To ~~revise~~, for instance, ^{as follows}, " We shall

~~begin~~ ^{note} the evacuation of troops

^{immediately} ~~just~~ after ^{public} the peace is restored" in-

stead of " We shall evacuate our

troops after the public peace is restor-

ed " ^{or again to} ~~and further required to co-~~
~~sist~~ ^{again} ~~it as~~ " simultaneous with the
~~at the same time~~

~~with the restoration of the public~~

peace ~~of~~ ^{troops} shall ^{be} evacuated ~~our~~ to.

~~or so~~

On this 25th day of Jan, 1947

At ^{SHIMODA} No 88 TAKAIDO 1-CHOME,
SUGINAMIKU, TOKYO

DEPONENT ABE Nobuyuki (seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoji
~~witness~~ hereby certify that the

above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed
his signature and seal thereto in the presence of
this witness.

On the same date

At TOKYO

Witness: (signed) KOKUBU Tomoji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding
nothing.

ABE, Nobuyuki (seal)

Although ^{we} said that the immediate withdrawal
^{was} the same as simultaneous withdrawal, the Chinese
 strongly insisted on ~~our~~ immediate withdrawal; otherwise
 they said that they would not assent. ~~to~~. As the Chinese
^{fleeing from Chungking,} were negotiating ^{with nothing and} naked without arms and ^{were} in ~~the~~
 region occupied by the Japanese at that, they must have
^{undoubtedly} felt ^{weak and} helpless. Despite ^{this} ^{we} all insisted on
 But ^{as} they ^{did} ~~maintain~~ various points,
 I think even now that they must have ^{had to} ^{put} forth ~~made~~ a consid-
 a great deal effort in doing so.
 erable ~~hard work.~~

As Regarding economic problems, too, the Chinese

(2)

could not be acquiesced on ~~the~~ ^{an} equal footing ~~as~~ ^{with} the Japanese.
even in the matter of investing ~~the~~ Capital. They insisted
on ~~the~~ ^a rate of 51 to 49 in their favour. ^{Their reasoning} What they insisted
was ^{all the} ~~that~~ ^{were} ~~as~~ ^{of the} things are of Chinese, they must have a
~~more than half the~~ ^{the Chinese must}
majority of shares.

As ~~the~~ ^a man like Mao Tse-ping was originally a
lawyer, ~~he~~ ^{it} ~~seemed~~ ^{that he} to have violently argued on ~~the~~ ^{my word is} point
that ~~might~~ ^{may} have turned to be disadvantageous to China.

For ~~a~~ instance, when a proposition was made to form
a company to ~~exploit~~ ^{develop} a mine, he claimed ^{that} more

than a half of the shares of that firm. ^{the} ~~must be in Chinese hands.~~ Again, on another ^{feeling it appropriate for Japan and China to get together in developing} ~~the continent and looking at the future~~ occasion ~~then~~ we proposed to invite Japanese capital

and techniques in order that Japan and China might ^{This works} ~~developing~~ cooperate in the work of ~~exploiting the continent~~ ^{not in} ~~an economic~~ ^{mean} ~~the sense of invasion but for the purpose of getting materials~~ ~~into China for supplies from military necessity. Even here~~ ~~for the present military necessity, she used to insist on~~ ~~being mentioned at every opportunity that China was the~~ ~~subject.~~ ~~the point of making China the subjective.~~

5. The Japanese army ^{was} ~~had~~ for a long time hardly ~~it~~ ~~just barely sufficient in~~ ~~but~~ ~~defending~~ ~~Japan~~ ~~only.~~ ~~been enough to protect herself.~~ ~~Up to the time of~~ ~~Sino-Japanese~~ ~~war~~ Japan had no other plan

but defense or in other words strategy for
~~than to defend herself, or in other words, to keep to her defense~~
defense
tactics.

And what is indeed ~~an~~ amusing is something which
~~Thus a funny thing about her army was, as I have~~
~~I too only learned later but it was with the beginning~~
~~found it out later on, that it began to write about the~~
of the Sino-Japanese war that a preparation for
expeditionary preparations for the first time when the
an expedition was first written up.

~~Japano-Chinese war broke out.~~

Some ^{units,} I heard, just barely finished
~~regiments were said to have mapped out~~

~~their plans of mobilization and operation at last.~~

So it was the condition of our army ^{the} ^{of} ^{was} at that time to
~~rely on~~ ^{for} ~~to~~ in times of invasion
protect against the ~~possible~~ invasion of foe should it

~~be placed in such a pass.~~

When, however, it was compelled to go out in order to settle the Korean problem, our army did so and won.

This gave us a good lesson that ~~the~~ war can not be ended so long as we remain in a passive state,

that we must ~~win~~ ^{win} after all if we wish to end the war,

and that in order to win we must take ~~an~~ ^{the offensive} active

step.

If a ~~is~~ thrust upon us,
In ~~the~~ war ~~challenged~~ we are losers so long

as we remain passive without striking ~~such~~ a single blow.

we began to feel that

So, we ~~must make ourselves ready to be able to meet the~~ ^{at least} had to be prepared to ~~strike back~~ if ~~attacked~~.

It and so plans for offensive warfare came about ~~challenge of any foe.~~ This sort of thinking us long and ~~such~~ thoughts and the necessity of setting forth ^{on} to afterward to a plan of active operation that would lead ~~event~~ came much, much later.

~~the army even to the continent at the time of our national~~

~~crisis.~~ Even ^{the} ~~that~~ Russo-japanese war was compelled

to be carried on on such an overnight plan. Such ^{thoughts} being the case, ^{up to this time} Japan had ~~never prepared at all for~~ ^{as making} ~~having made~~ an ~~arr~~

~~or~~ the purpose of territorial expansion ^{was indeed not in our} and the like.

~~made.~~ Just protecting ourselves was the most we ~~Her army was hardly enough to protect her land.~~ ~~could hope to do.~~

~~For instance,~~ ^{even in the way of fortifications we} ~~our forces have been trained~~

^{prepared} ~~for~~ nothing but ~~the~~ ^{those for} defense of ~~the land~~ ^{against} against the possible

landing of ~~the enemy~~ ^{from warship-borne enemies} brought aboard war ships. This ^{would} ~~will~~

not do; if we ^{were to wait for them to come} keep on the tactics of waiting for the attack of

the enemy, that ^{would be} ~~will result to~~ nothing but ^{more} ~~than~~ self-destruction.

^{although} ~~We~~ ^{we} do not ^{like to fight} want any sort of war, but when once it ^{has} ~~is~~ begun,

we must adopt ^a the plan of beating the enemy by ^{setting} ~~an~~

^{with and meeting him} active operation; the object of ~~war~~ ^{the battle} is of course to protect

our own country, but as a means of protection ~~we~~

we must beat down the foe. As a result of such

a tendency, our tactics underwent a change from

of stopping them around the surrounding area of the zone but ^{of}
merely a defensive one ~~to that of attacking the enemy on~~
~~stopping them from landing,~~

~~the surrounding sea so as to prevent it from landing, or~~
~~else to strike it on ^{their} land so that it will not be~~
~~able to land on our soil.~~ ^{ing further} ^{them} ^{their own soil.}

This change, however,

means ^{only a} ~~the~~ change in the method of fighting, ^{but} its aim still

remained ~~to be~~ the protection of the country. Later on

many theoretical arguments have been advanced in

favour of ^{military preparedness,} ~~war preparation.~~ Among them mention may be

made of the one that maintains its necessity as a diplomatic

background. Another maintained that it is necessary

for the protection of national interests; ^{or else} ~~while still another~~

claimed it for the development of national strength and

Be that as it may, there is no mistake
so on. But it is beyond all doubts that the Japanese

^{in its beginning} Army ^{extremely} was of very conservative one at first. The Manchurian

~~incident~~ incident is no exception; no one had intended or planned

^{beginning} it from the first. What Japan wished in the case of

Manchuria was ^{in the main} ~~to make~~ ^{to enable} our people ^{to} live ^{comfortably} ~~freely~~

~~at unprofitably~~ ^{by utilizing} ~~on her resources that Manchurian would give us~~ ^{resources}

~~exchange~~ ^{by} ~~the~~ ^{the} cooperation with Chang Tso-Lin

Government. ^{mainly,} What we needed ~~most~~ were

for the protection of national interests, ^{or else} ~~while still another~~

claimed it for the development of national strength and

Be that as it may, there is no mistake
so on. But it is ~~beyond all doubts~~ that the Japanese

^{in its beginning} Army ^{extremely} was ~~of~~ very conservative one at first. The Manchurian

~~incident~~ incident is no exception; no one had intended or planned

^{beginning} it from the ~~first~~. What Japan wished in the case of

Manchuria was ^{with the main} ~~to make~~ our people ^{to enable to comfortably} live ~~frugally~~

~~at unpretentiously~~ ^{by utilizing} ~~on her resources that Manchurian would give us~~ ^{resources}

exchange ~~the~~ ^{by} cooperation with ^{the} Chang Tsao-Lin

Government. ^{mainly,} What we needed most were

Manchurian Soy-beans and coal. We never
 entertained ^{in the slightest} any territorial ambitions, still less
 political ^{ideas}. Everyone thought ^{nothing could be better if} satisfied should
 Manchuria ^{would be able to maintain peace, not have} keep her peace without receiving
 any wars, receive no trouble from Chinese Headquarters
 and ^{any molestation from the Central China and} ^{live} there being able to ^{live}
 let the Japanese subjects enjoy their sojourn there,
 peacefully and comfortably carry on their business.
 However, as the years went by the Chungking
 Lin government ^{increasingly} would not cooperate.

They remonstrated that the railway under construction was different from that ~~was~~ ^{as} first promised, agreed. If constructed, a protest would be duly filed, saying it was ~~promised~~ ^{agreed} otherwise. Even a ~~single~~ ^{minor} quarrel regarding ^{their work} occupation between a Chinese and a Japanese, it will ^{invariably} ~~be made~~ ^{surely} become a problem between for the Consul and the MUKDEN regime.

In this way pending questions were accumulated to number from ~~above~~ ^{more than} ~~over~~ 200 to 300 and it caused ^{ing} ~~it~~ illfeelings and ^{was} gave rise to various affairs. But as for ^{there were none} the Japanese ^{who} at that time thought of an immediate seizure of Manchuria on ^{this} ~~that~~ account.

Only there were certain elements among the numerous Japanese at the outposts who ^{had} ~~harbored~~ (1)

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immediate seizure of Manchuria on ^{this} ~~that~~ account.

Only there were certain elements among the

numerous Japanese at the outposts who ^{had} ~~harbored~~

mistaken ideas and their attitude was ~~after all~~
~~infected~~ ^{affected by} with a sort of a national or racial
superiority complex, inherited from ~~after~~ the Russo-
Japanese war and they ^{sometimes} treated the Chinese in a
contemptible ^{more} ~~way~~ manner, calling them "CHANKORO" (~~TV~~ ^{the}
~~Chinese was contemptibly~~ ^{so called}), and ^{arousing} ~~excited~~
illfeelings among the Chinese. ^{concerning} ~~Respecting~~ this
matter, caution was ^{sometimes} requested to be taken in the
quarters concerned, as we ^{felt} ~~thought~~ they must be
careful not to commit misdeeds on account of
their cheap superiority complex. At ^{the} ~~that~~ time ^{we} ~~the~~ a
~~we were~~ ^{instructed} ~~to do this~~ ^{might} ~~to~~
~~guidance was~~ ^{thus} ~~made~~ on the principle that ^{saving}
their face as much as possible ^{and at the same} ~~favourable~~

Time: make things favorable for us by
circumstances were created for the benefit of the
doing so.

Japanese side. ^{How} what do the foreigners consider

~~about~~ This, I wonder? ^{As a matter of fact,}
To tell the truth, even if an

investigation is made in every detail, ^{as to} who ~~was~~

~~the author of~~ ^{the for started} this war, ^{when you get right down to it I suppose} ~~no one~~ can be accused of having

^{being} ~~the~~ real responsibility ^{for it}, I suppose. Therefore, ⁱⁿ the

^{analysis} final conclusion ^{is that it}
was the atmosphere that led up to the affair.

When we consider ^{now} ~~about~~ the set of persons, who ^{strutted}
~~appear to be proud of~~ ^{now} we know they were ^{all} breathing

that atmosphere and ^{and brought forth} ~~raised~~ on the stage as actors

amid that atmosphere. The atmosphere, in which

rumours prevail asserting that some said that and

some others said this; ^{thus its} brings forth its results.

^{I think even}
Therefore the foreigners will be surprised when
^{consider this} they come to this point. ^{the} Even Japanese, when they
^{look at} ~~know of it~~, will ^{probably} also be surprised, recognizing
^{anyway} its absurdity. I think it may ^{become indeed to} prove a very
^{be said a very foolish} trifling thing.

6. As for the problem of ^{military discipline} ~~obedience relationships~~
among the Japanese soldiers or how far superior
officers are responsible for the actions of their
subordinates, it is the Army Interior Affairs
Law, if stated precisely with legal exactness,
that regulates all behaviours and decides the
sphere of responsibility ^{within the army} ~~at~~ ordinary times.
How about privates, or non-commissioned officers?

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^{consider this} they come to this point. Even ^{the} Japanese, when they
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How about privates, or non-commissioned officers?

or what shall ^{company} ~~the~~ commanders of companies and
~~commanders?~~
battalions ~~do?~~ — concerning these, this sphere of
^{and what they are to do} responsibility ^{clearly} ~~is~~ defined. What ~~shall~~ battalion
commanders ^{are to} do ^{with} their subordinates and
what shall company commanders ^{are to} do ^{on} receiving
^{such orders etc.} ~~directions from above?~~ As for these, even ⁱⁿ at
war time, it is shown by order what the officers
directly beneath ^{are to} ~~shall~~ do ^{on} ~~at the receipt of~~ ^{when orders from}
^{above are given.} ~~orders from above.~~ Therefore, if the receiver of
^{the} orders has acted precisely as ^{he} has been ordered,
^{necessarily} the responsibility for his action rests with the
author of the orders. But if his action has
gone beyond what the orders implied, it is very

questionable whether the superior officer is responsible for it or not. When a subordinate violates the order he receives, he is punishable.

For lack of supervision on the part of superiors, ^{I think} they may be responsible to some extent, in consideration of the circumstances, but ^{I don't think one can say that} they ~~can never be~~ ^{ever} ~~inflicted~~ ^{they should be given} the same punishment as the violators themselves.

Among the soldiers, the ^{phrase} ~~words~~ "carrying out one's own arbitrary decision" ~~is~~ ^{is} used.

This applies when it is deemed necessary to act at one's own discretion. Cases may ~~traverse~~ ^{arise} when a subordinate carries out his own arbitrary decision, judging for himself ~~alone~~ that it will serve the purpose of the army, as if there were

an authentic order ^{to do so}. But, it must be so carried out that the result thereof constitutes the matters coming within the limits intended by his superior officer, — This is how the problem is understood. Therefore it is ^{just because} ~~not that~~, as action on an arbitrary decision is permitted, ^{doesn't} ~~for~~ ^{mean} ~~that~~ ^{can do as he pleases and then he} ~~everything done~~ by a subordinate, his superior officer ^{be held} ~~is~~ responsible. When anything unexpected happens, allowing no delay for ^{obtaining} ~~demanding~~ ^{orders} directions thereabout, a subordinate can act on his own responsibility. "Carrying out one's own decision" is concisely defined and ^{is with} ~~as~~ the responsibility ^{being assumed} by the doer, if ^{any error was made} ~~wrongly acted~~, ^{that of his} ~~not shifting it to his superior~~.

In other things, a subordinate is responsible for
doing what he is ordered, I think ^{ful.} ~~It is not that if~~ ^{Otherwise,}

it follows that superiors ^{would be} ~~are~~ responsible for
everything, and this is not so. ^{On the other hand} I think that it
is ^{clear cut} ~~obvious~~ that when superiors ^{have} ~~issued~~ ^{mistaken} ~~wrong~~
orders and their subordinates ^{in obedience} ~~obeying them~~,
committed misdeeds, the authors of the orders are
responsible.

7. As to ^{the} ~~atrocious~~ ^{atrocities,} actions, they are outside the
sphere of common sense, and if ^{the} soldiers had
been inculcated ^{with} the spirit of the military man, ^{an adequately} such
things would ^{not} have been ~~impossible~~. When such
atrocities are actually committed by them, their
directly superior officers may be responsible

for ^{their negligence in} watching against such misbehaviours, but-

it is questionable whether or not the officers, who instructed them ⁱⁿ at ordinary times, are responsible for such unexpected matters.

When they are instructed, ~~being~~ ^{and} warned against various kinds of misdeeds, should such cruel actions be referred to? In the documents

submitted by the prosecutors ^{these} ~~no~~-days, we find descriptions of extreme cruelties. We can not ^{imagine} but ~~wonder~~ ^{think} how Japanese could have done such ^{and is indeed unbelievable} things. If these are facts, we should be

ashamed to show our faces. ^{if such were so} ~~we shall then~~ ^{we} ~~would be~~ ^{mere non-} ~~speculation~~ ^{about} talking of a new order ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~speculation~~. Such things are committed, ⁱⁿ sense.

if ever, by the ^{uneducated} illiterate and there may have
been such elements. Just indeed all these examples are such
to make our faces red and our hearts of such extremes, ~~All things make us blush,~~
~~so that we doubt if we ought to warn against~~ ^{been} ^{have}
~~them by naming them.~~ ^{would have been able to avoid}
mentioning to do such things, ^{can} ^{when the}

soldiers were excited ^{during} ^(hitherto) at war times such
misdeeds as plundering or raping of women were
apt to happen, so that the soldiers ^{have been} ^{are} exactly
warned against such misdeeds. I think

It is a delicate question whether such misdeeds
ought to be warned against, naming them
one by one, even if such ^{unimaginable} ~~unaffected~~
cruelties are being committed. To tell the truth,
it would ^{be} tantamount to ^{extremely} ^{extreme} ^{an} ^{insult} to the
^{character} ^{our} personality of the soldiers. A long time ago,

I went out, at the time of the Siberian ^{expedition} campaign,
^{as} in ^{the} capacity of the commander of the NAGOYA
Regiment. At that time, I was a little inspired
with the situation, so I told my men as follows: -

"This time we are to go out amid the focused
attention of ^{the} various powers and, in particular,
we are to go to places where foreign soldiers
will ^{also} be found. There we are to discharge
openly and squarely the duties prescribed for
^{us} ~~top~~ Japanese soldiers, so that even a private is
requested to consider himself as ^{an individual} diplomat who
is responsible for the honor of his country.

For that purpose, his behaviour, in every detail,
must be such as will inspire admiration for
the Japanese soldiers. Although it may seem

a mere display, first, ^{shall} you must not put your hands in the pockets of your overcoats and trousers.

Straighten your posture and be decent in your demeanour. ~~you must salute with most~~ ^{strictness,}

seriousness. Ordinarily you need not salute your superiors who pass you when you are at rest, but this time, if you happen to see your superior, you must be ^{so} careful as to stand up and

salute him, even when you are permitted to rest.

And this does not apply to one superior only but observe the same spirit towards the Chinese and the others. I concluded.

~~While at the out post, I saw~~ ^{whenever}

^{Saw} some soldiers walking ~~in~~ the streets in an ⁱⁿ ~~an~~ attitude, shrinking ^{inward because of} with the cold, Then I cautioned

them with a ^{riding stick} whip — I had a long one when I was mounted — saying, "Hello,

you are in an abominable posture!" Even if it was an officer ^{not} belonging

to my regiment, ^{reprimanded} I ^{with} blamed him, "What a figure
you make!" ^{if his posture was bad} (when he looked funny in his
~~posture~~ ^{On the other hand,} I also had previously asked
the men of other detachments to catch
without hesitation any person belonging to
my regiment and rectify his misbehaviour
and ^{to later} afterwards to let me know about it
If we take ^{just rough} ~~pre-~~ ^{roughly} cautions, to that extent, the soldiers
will take care of themselves to a considerable
degree. ^{It is difficult to} ~~We cannot~~ bluntly warn them
against rape and what not. This ^{is just} may be
^{matter of the} a ~~way~~ superior officers ^{ability to handle} ~~can resort to~~, but
in case soldiers ^{do} ~~have~~ committed misdeeds, even

after such ^{precautions} trouble has been taken, it is
questionable, I think, ^{to have} whether their superior
officers are ^{given equal} to be inflicted with the same
punishment. I think it is unacceptable
to the minds of the Europeans ^{and Americans} that ^{for} everything
~~that~~ has been committed by soldiers in violation
of the orders, their superior officers ~~are~~ be
responsible. The apology that expresses the
regret of having had such subordinates, is
an excuse towards others, as it is ^{practised} ~~customary~~
in Japan. But if this excuse ^{were} directly
adopted, it would follow that parents should
be always punished when their children
quarrelled.

8. As for the education in the Army, the Inspector General of Military Education originally works out its ^{policy} principles, and as to ~~the~~ measures for its ^{enforcement} realization, Division Commanders and their ^{lower commanders} subordinates decide on them within the spheres respectively prescribed ^{to} ~~for~~ them. Therefore, if it is so interpreted that they are to fulfil their ^{respective} duties in their prescribed spheres, their scopes of responsibility will ~~become~~ ^{fixed} all ~~decided~~ with respect to the related matters, I ~~think~~ believe

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H. J. Wood 922

言 誓 書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ヘ何事ヲモ黙秘セ
ス又何事ヲモ附加セサルコトヲ誓フ

阿部信行



① 支那問題

神崎
Ref. No. 922

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓口供書

供述者阿部信行

自分儀我國ニ行ハル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ為シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス。

一 私ノ住所ハ東京都杉並區下高井戸一丁目八十八番地デアリマス。

二 私ハ昭和五年六月ヨリ同年十二月迄濱口內閣ノ陸軍大臣臨時代理ヲ勤メ昭和十四年八月ヨリ同十五年一月迄總理大臣ヲ致シマシタ。

三 支那事變ニツイテハ支那ヲ喰イ物ニシテイルダト言フ人モアルカモ知レナイガ、心アル日本人ハ支那ヲ侵略ニヨソトイフヨウナ考エデナク大陸ニ於イテ日本モ支那モ一緒ニ生キタイト云フ考ヘデアツタ。要スルニ日本が生キテ行クタメニハ大陸ハ非常ニ大事ナ所ダト言フコトニ總テ立脚シテアルカラ、ハシロ經濟的ニ支那ガ日本ヲ直接間接ニ援ケテクレルヨウニ仕組ガ出来テオツクナラバ何モ問題ハ起ラナオツクテラウト思フ。

日本ノ本當ノ心持ヲ諒解シテクレレバ支那事變ハ起ラナカッタ筈デアルト思フ。

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W. J. H. M. 1922

支那事変が始マツク時ノ政府當局近衛内閣ノ首脳部ノ者モアノ通り不擴大ト言イ、賠償モトラヌ、何モセヌト云フ風ナコトヲ明言シ、又其ノ心積^{ソモリ}デヤツテ居^ツクヲ見^テモ政府當局トシテハ侵略ト言フ事ハ方ヘテ居^ナカツタト私ハ思フ。

四.

汪政権ハ傀儡政権デナイ、又特殊ノモノデモナイト云フコトハ私ノ確信ニテ居^ルトコロデア^ル、事實汪政権ノ人々ハ日本ノ言フコトニ迎合ニテ支那國民本末ノ考ヘニ及^シク政府ヲクテテ自分ガ政権ヲ得^ヨウト云フ様ナ考ヘ方ハ毛頭ニテ居^ラナカツタト、

私ハ其ノ個人々々ニ接觸シタ感ジテハ思ツテ居^ル。汪政権ガ出来^ル経緯ニツイテハ我々が政府ニ入^ル以前ニ出来^タト言フカ、段々醞釀^シテオツテ、私ガ辭任スル直前ニ大体意向ガ分^ツクライノコトデア^ルカラ、出来^ル迄ノ細^カイコトハ私ハ知^ラナイガ

出来^テニマツク時ニ大使トシテ行^ケト無理ニ言^ワレテ、大使トシテ支那ニ行^ツクワケデア^ル。行^ツテ色々ノ問題ニ觸^レテ

話合^ツテオ^ルノヲ見^テオ^{ルト}、要スルニ日支ハ速^カニ和平ヲシテ支那ガ常態ニ復^スル様ニシ^テケ^レバナラヌ。ソレニハ日本ガ言^フコトガ無理ナラバ、ドコ迄モ反抗ニシ^テケ^レバナラヌガ、日本ハ事変ハ擴

大セヌト言^イ、領土ハトラスト言^イ、賠償モトラヌト言^フ、ソレナラバ日本ト早^ク手ヲ握^ツテ片附^ケクヲ良^イデハナイカト言^フノガ、向^クノ考ヘ方デ、ソレデハ手ツ取^リ早^クソウヤツタヲヨカラウト

言^フコトガ、結局汪精衛ガ東ノ出^シテ来^タ根本^ト思^フ、
ダカラシテ所謂^スル基本條約ヲコミテヘル時デモ汪政権側

3
Weyl 11/22/22

ノ主張ハ相當ニ眞面目デ、支那人ガコレデナケレバ納得シナイ
ヨウナコトニ就イテハ強ク意見ヲタカクワニテオツク様デアル。

私ハ一番初メト一番終ノ結末ヲツケル時ダケニカ直接會談ニハ
出マセンデシタガ、ソノ経緯ヲ聞イテミルト、支那側ハナカク強硬ニ

ヤツテ居タノデアツタ。

彼等ハ日本ノ道具ニ使レ、日本ニ都合ノ良イ様ナ政府ノ主班者
ニナルト云フ様ナ政權ニ恋々タルモノデハノモ頭ナイモノト思フ。

ダカラ重慶サエ和平ニ同意シテクレバ何時デモ南京政府ハ解
消シテ良ロシイト云フ事ハ汪精衛氏モ屢々言明シ又聲明

ニモ言ウテ居ツク様ニ記憶シテ居ル。要ハ國ヲ救ウニアル、
蔣介石氏ハ抗日救國デアルガ、汪精衛氏ノ方ハ和平救國デ

アツテ、旗印ハ違ツテ居ツク様デアルガ、蔣介石氏ト雖モ或ル
條件ノ下ニ結局日本ト和平ニナツテ行カネバナラヌコトハ悟ツテ

イタト思フ。未未永却日本ト支那トハ戰ヲシナケレバアラストハ
考ヘテヲラス。唯其処ニ條件ノ危ハアルダラウト思フ。ソレデ

汪精衛氏ハ日本ノ言ハ分デ良イデハナイカ、コレヲシツカリ
日本ニ実行ササセレバ、ソレデ支那ハ助カルト云フ考ヘカデ莫リ

出シテ未タダカラソノ考ヘカハ最後迄捨テズニ持ツテ居ツク様
デアル。従ツテ南京政府ガ出来テ、ソレガ微カデアルトカ、日本ガ

南京政府ヲシテ思フ様ニ働カセナカツタト云フ杯ナ人ガアルカモシナイガ
向ウトシテハ自分デ支那政府ハ支那政府ヲシクヤツテ行キタイト

3
云フ希望ニ燃エテ努力カヲシテオツク様ニ見ユル

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日本モ其ノ莫ニツイテハ汪精衛氏ノ希望ヲ出来ル丈ケテ容レ
ル様ニ考ヘテ居ツク様デアル。併シ重慶ト戦ヲニツツ其ノ
占領地内ニ於ル任事テアルカラ、作戦上ノ要ギガ自然、
南京政府ヲニテ思フ様ニ働カセ得ナクツク莫ハ澤山アツタと思フ。
ダカラ其レヲ見ルト如何モ南京政府ハ軟弱デアリ。唯日本ニ
盲従ニテ居ツク様ニ見エルケレドモ、其レハソウデハナクツタト私
ハ常ニ思ツテ居ツク。若シ作戦上ノ要ギガ段々ト減ツ
テ来レバ南京政府ハ本来ノ支那政府トシテノカラ發揮
ニ得テラウト思フ。又ソウフレバ強イテ重慶ト南京トガ別々
ニ居ル必要モナイデアツテ、漸^ヤテハクツ付クモト思フテ居ツク。
ソレカラアノ時分ハ重慶ト日本トノ間ニ所謂ニ重慶工作
ト言ツテ和平工作ガ横デ行ハレテ居ツクガ、私共ハソウイッ
筋デハナク、出来ル丈ケ南京政府ヲシテ重慶政府ニ働カ
シメ、コノ両方ノ合意ニヨツテ日支和平ニ持ツテ行ク。
要スルニ南京政府ソレ自体ガ重慶ト心ヲ同ジウシテ日本ニ
向ツテ任事ヲスル様ニ働イテモライタイト言フ希望ヲ常ニ
言イモシ。ソウイウ方ヘナクデヤツテオツタノデアル。
ダカラ其ノ莫カラ言ウテモ南京政府ハ唯日本ニ盲従スル
モノデハタイト方ヘ、又盲従サセルツモリデモナク、平等ニ扱ツテ
居ツクツモリデアル。

4
其レ迄何ヲシテ居ツクカト云フト、實ハ四月末ニ行ツテ七月初メニ
私ガ四月末ニ南京ニ行ツテ十一月三十日ニ條約ヲ結ビダ、

⑤
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基本條約ヲ結ボウト御互ニ言ヒ出シテ相談ヲ始メタノデア
ルガ夫レ迄内地ノ準備ガ達レテ訓令ガ未ナカッタ爲ニ
向ウデアムナシク待ツテ居ッタノデアアル。

彼我ノ話ハ一應八月末ニ終リ其後政府カラノ要キデ
細部ノ訂正ナドヲシテ十月ニ及ニダガ未ダ決定シナイ。
私ハ十月ニ歸京ニタ時ハ條約ヲ結ブコトガイカヌラバ止メル
外ナイト思ツテ居ッタ。

ニカシウスル事ハ義理ガ悪い話デアアル。良イ様ナ事許ソ言ッテ
居ッテラ愈タノ土壇場ニタツテ逃ゲテ條約ハ出来ナクソト云フ事
ニレバ支那人ハ信用シナイ。アレクニ政府ガ堂々ト人ヲ出シニヤラシ
テオイテ。調印ノ場合ニナツテ知ラシ願ヲシテシマウコトハ。

日本人ハ國際的ニ全然信義ヲナイモノニナル。十一月末ニ私ハ
評表ヲ出スツモリテ其準備迄ニシテケレドモ愈々條約ヲ結ブ
コトホシノ一兩日間ニ決定セラレノデ自分ハ支那ニ決ツテ
條約ニ調印シタノデアアル。ドウニテソレヲナツタカト云ヘバ私ノ

向ウトノ話合ガ余リニ向ウニ有利ダト云フ解釋ノ人モアツタ。
又或ル所デハ汪精衛ハ微カダカラアニア者ヲ相クニシテヤルヨリ
一層ノコトモウ一度重慶ト話合ツタラドウカト云フ様ナ考ヘ
方デ流ツテ居ッタ人モアツタノデアナイカト思フ。ソレナコトデ私ノ

ヤリ方ハ余リ向ウニ都合ガ良イコト許ソデアルト云フ考ヘカクシタ
者モアツタカ知レナイガ。出スノ單ハ兎ニ角私ノ考ヘニ共鳴
シテ東京ノ方ヘモ始終私ヲ支持スル様ナ意見ヲ具申シテ

①
U.S. Mar 9 1922

君様アアル。 汪精衛トイフ人ハ支那人ダト思フ。

決ニテ日本人デハナイ。 グラドドモ支那ヲヨクシヨウ。 日本ト話
合ツテ支那ヲ早く救ウトイフ頭デ何處迄モ来テイルンデアル。

ソレハ正當ダト思フ。 ソレヲ日本ノ言フ通りニナラヌカラ怪シカラヌトハ
言ヘナイ。 我々が主客ヲカモレバ矢張りソウナノデアル。 ドコモデモ
支那人トシテ支那ノ利益ノタメニ努メルノハ當然ノコトデアル。

手段が重慶ト違ウダケデアルカラ。 アノ人ノソノ立場ヲ諒トシテ
ヤラナケレバナラヌト思ツテオツタノデアル。 ソノ後雑誌ニ書イタ

コトガアルガ、兎ニ角支那ノ問題ヲ解決スルニ日本人ハ日本人
ノ道德ダケデ行ツタラダメダ。 支那人ニハ支那人ノ道德ガアツテ、

支那人ノ立場ガアル。 ソレヲ良ク解ニテ、彼等ノ心持ヲヨク容レ、

又夫レが入ツテ話合ヲニナケレバ役ニ立タシテラウト云フ事ヲハ釜シク

書イタコトガアツタガ。 日本人トシテハ支那ノ為ニ非常ニ良イ事ヲシテ

ヤツテイル心積ソテ居ルガ。 向テハ一寸モ有難クナイコトヲ非常

ニ親切ノ心積リデヤツテイル事ガ多過ギルト云フ事ヲ、夫時ニ言ツタ

夫レハ善意デハアルガ決ニテ向ラニ対ニテ恩恵ニテツテ居ラヌ事ガ

多イカラ、夫ノ長ハ矢張りソコカラモ良ク考ヘテヤツテヤラネバイカヌト

思ウテ居ツタ。

撤兵ニ就イテハ非常ニ手厳シク向ラニ主張ニテ居ツタ。 又句一ツ書

クニモ、例ヘバ「治安回復後ニ撤兵スルト言フヲ、治安回復後

直チニ撤兵ヲ開始スルト改メ又更ニシテ、治安回復ト同時ニ

撤兵スルト云フ風ニ訂ムヲ要求ニタノデアツタ。 直チニ撤兵スレバ

①
Def Nov 922

阿部信行

正：撤兵云々ハ


同時ニ撤兵スル事ト同様ガハナイカト言フテモ、支那側ハ同時
デオレバ困ルソレデオレバ支那ハ納得セスト云フ風ニ向ウハ躍起
ニオツテ居タ

唯向ウトミテハ重慶ト違ツテ、日本ノ占領ミテ居ル地ニテ保
武カモ何モナシテ談判スルテ非常ニ心細イ弱イモノナラズ
ソレデ色々主張スルテアルカラ向ウトミテハ相違ナ勉強ハシタ
モダト私ハ思ツテアル

経済上ノ問題デモ、資本ヲ出ス少合モ何ト言ツテモ日本ト
平等ハ嫌デアルト言フ。日本四九・支那五一デオレバドウニモ
聞カナイ。兎ニ角支那ノモラアルカラ、支那ガ過キ教ヲトラ
ナクバイカヌト言フ譯デアアル

梅思平ナント云フ人ハえ未法律家デアアルカラ支那ノ不利
益ニテ様ナ英ニ就イテハ一言一句随分手厳シク争ツタ
様デアアル

例ヘバ鉦山ヲ開発ニョウト云フ事デ会社ヲ招エルト云
フトソノ会社ノ株ハ必ズ支那ノカガキ人カ以上持ツト云フ
又コケラハ経済侵略ト云フ意味デハナク、危キソテ
軍事上ノ必要上、物資ヲ支那ニ仰ガネバナラヌガ、
将来日支ガ一纏ニオツテ大陸ヲ開発スルコトガ適キデアアル

ソノ為ニ日本ノ資本ヲ入レルナリ、日本ノ技術ヲ
入レルナリニテ協カニテヤロウト云フ様ア仕事ガ主張ナ
レルト、テモ兎ニ角支那ガ主体デアルト云フ事ヲ凡ソモ
言フニシタ

一訂正

7

⑧
W. J. D. 922

五、日本ノ陸軍ハ從來ハ自分ノ國ヲ護ルニ第一杯
テアツタ。

日清戦争迄ハ守勢作戰、詰リ防禦ヨリトニ
計畫ガナカツタ。

ソレデ実ニ消極ナハ、私モ後デ知ツタノデアルガ、日清戦争
争ガ始マレル時ニナツテ初メテ出師準備ヲ書キ始メ
テ在ル。

一字未消

勤員ノ計畫兼兼作戰計畫ト云フ様ヲモノヲ漸ク
コニラヘタ。部隊モアツタト聞キマシタ。

ダカラ改メテ来クノヲ獲ロウト云フ位ガンノ時今ノ軍ダ
ツタ。

ソレガ朝鮮ノ問題デドウニテモ出ナケレバナラタクナ
ツテ未テニムヲ得ズ出動シテ行ツテ勝ツテ漸ク片ガ
ツイタガ、良ク考ヘテ見ルニ受身デハ逆モ戦ハ始末ハ
ツカヌ。結局勝タナケレバ戦ノケリハツカヌ。

勝ツニハコケラガ攻勢ヲトラナケレバ勝テナイ。

仕掛ケラレク戦ハコケラガ殴ラナケレバ、只受テテ在ル大ケ
デハ喧嘩ハ負ケテアル。向ウガ殴ツテ未レバコケラモ殴
リ返ス大ケノ準備ヲミテオカナケレバナラヌト言フノデ、攻勢作戰計畫
ガ出来サアトナツタラ大陸ヘモ出ナケレバナラヌト考ヘルヨウニナツタノハ、ズツト
後デ日露戦争ナルモノモ、ホノノ一夜潰テ去ル得ヌア、ナ計畫ヲヤ
ツクケテアル。ダカラ此迄ハ領土拡張ノ為ニ軍ヲコニラヘルト云フ様ナ

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頭ハ毛頭ナカツタ。自分ヲ護ルノガタカクノナデアアル。例ヘバ

要塞ノ如キモ、**機密**ノ由見、**防禦**ノ由見、**東洋**ノ由見、**海軍**ノ由見、向ウノ軍艦

ガ未テ上陸スル場合ニ**防禦**スルコト許ツヤツテオツタ。ソレガコレデハイカス。

向ウガ来ルヲ待ツテオツタノデハ自滅ヨリ外ナイ。戦ソノモノハナルベクヤソ

クナイガ、戦ガ始マツタナラバ出掛ケテ向ウヲ叩ク方法デ行カケルバイカス。

戦ノ目的ハ國ヲ獲ルニアルガ、獲ル手段トシテハ相手ヲ段ラナケレバ

ナラヌト云フ事ニナツテ、今度ハ砲台ノ周圍ニ向ウガ上ツテ来ルヲ防グ

ヨリハ、向ウガ上ラヌ様ニシテ、ユケラガ海ノ中デ叩クカ、或ハモウ一步進ニ

デ向ウノ陸ノ上デ叩クカシテ、ユケラヘ上ツテ来ナイ様ニシテ、ヨウト云フ計畫

ニ戦法ガ変ツタ。コレハ戦法ノ变化テ目的ハドコモデモ自國ヲ安全

ニスルコトデアツタ。ソノ後外交上ノシリ押シトシテノ軍備トカ、自國ノ

利益ヲ擁護スル為ニモ必要トカ、或ハ國運ヲ伸展セル為ニモ

必要トカ、学理的ノコトハ色々アルガ、日本陸軍ノ當初ハ極メテ消極

的ナモノデアツタ事ハ間違イナイ。満洲事変ニシテモ満洲事変ヲ

最初カラ意圖シテオツタ者ハ殆ドナイ。満洲デハ張作霖ノ政權

トクヲ握ツテ、アソコノ資源ヲ融通シテモラツテ日本人ガコトニシテ生

キテ行ケルヨウニトイフ事ガ主クツタ。満洲ノ大豆ガ必要トカ、石炭ガ

必要トカ、トイフコトガ主クツタ。領土的トカ、政治的トカ云々考ヘカハ

毛頭ニテオラナカツタ。寧ろ滿洲ガ支那本部ヨリ禍ヲ受ケナイア

戦争モナク、安定ニシテ**強**態ニアツテ、日本人モ安居樂業ヲオシ得

レバコレニ越シクハナイト考ヘテ、トコロガ年ヲ経ルニ從ツテ張作霖ノ政

權ガ思ヘ様ニシテ呉レナカツタ。最初ノ約束ヨリ違ツタ鉄道ヲ

一字訂正

9.

1922. 10. 22
D. J. Moran

阿部信行

口に抑へた事ありて返す言はなし

架ケルトカ、架ケレバ當然約束が違ウト云フ抗議が出る。
又那人ト日本人トノ職業上ノ争ヒガ一ツアツテモ、必ず領事ト
奉天政權トノ間ノ問題ニナル。

ソコテ案件ハ積ソレ積ツテ二百何十件トカニ百件トナリ感情
ヲ悪クシタリソニテ、色々ノユトハアツタガ、併シ日本トニテハコレアル
ガ為ニ直ケテ滿州ヲコケラシモノニテニマヘト云フ様ナ者ヘカハ
當時准モニテ居ラナカツタ。

唯出先ノ多数ノ日本人中ノ部ハ間違ツタ者ヘラ持ツタ者モ居テ
其ノ態度ガドモ迄モ日露戦争ノ後ヲ受テク一種ノ民族的ト云フカ
人種的ト云フカソニテ優越感ガアツテ、ヤンコヨ拔イニスルコトガアル
ノテ向ウノ感情ヲ悪ルクスル事モアリ得タリテ此ノ英ニツイテハ安價
ノ優越感為ニ事ヲ誤ル様ナ事トガアツテハナラヌト思ツタ。夫々因係
者ニ注意ヲ促ガシクモアツタ。ソレ迄ニテ出来ルカケ向ウテ立テテコケ
ラモ都合イ良イ様ニヨウトイフ頭デ當時ハ指導サレテオツタニアル。此ノ英
ニ就イテ外國ノ人々ハドウイウ風ニ見テ居ルカ。實際言フト此ノ戦ヲ始
メタノハ誰カトソノツツヲ調ベテ見ルト、誰ガ本キノ責任者カ分ラシ
クドウト思フ。ガカラ結局空氣ガモラ拵ヘシタ。今テ偉ソウナ顔
ヲニテ居ツク連中ヲ考ヘテ見ルト、皆空氣ヲ吸ツテ、ソノ空氣ノ
中ノ役者ニナツテ舞台ヘ上ダレテ居タ。誰ガアア言フタ。コウ言フ
タト云フ空氣ガ結果ヲツクル。ガカラソノ英ハ外人ガ見テモ驚
クドウト思フ。日本人ガ見テモ何ニダイト喜フコトニナルダラウト
思フ。實ニ下ラナイモノハナイカト云フ事ニナルカモ知レヌト思フ。

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Ref. No. 922

六

日本陸軍ノ服役関係ニ下級兵士ノ行為ニシテ上官ハドモ其ノ責任
ガアルカト云フ事デアルガ、法的ニハ全クキナシト云ハバ、平常軍隊内
ニ於テ總テノ行動ヲ律ニテ責任ノ範圍ヲ決メルモノハ軍隊内務令
ニアツテ、兵隊ハドウ、下士官ハドウ、中隊長、大隊長ハドウスルト、責任ノ
範圍ハナクモ決マツテ、大隊長ハ部下ニ対シテ、ドウイウコトヲスル、ソノ下ノ
中隊長ハソレヲ受テドウスル。コレハ戦時デモ命令ガ上カラ出テ、
ソノ命令徒ツテ次ノ者ハ自分ノナスベキ事柄シイテ命令ニ依リ居ル
ガカラ命令ヲ受テテ者ゴソノ通り実行シテ居ル責任ハソノ命令
者ニアルモノト間違イナイ。併シテ命令ニ逸脱シタ事ヲシタ時ノ責任
ハ上ノ者ニアルガドウカ、コレハ余程問題ダと思フ。命令ニ及ミタコトヲヤフタ
場合ハ部下ハ罰セラルベキデアル。上官ノ監督不行店トイフコトハ或ル
程度ハ問題ニシテハ其ノ責任ヲ負フ事モアルケレドモ、命令違反ノ
行為者ト同非トイフコトハ何トモ言ハナイと思フ。唯軍隊ニハ**断**
断ト云フ言葉ガアル。コレハ断断デモトアルコトガ必要ダと思ウトキ

一字訂正

一字訂正

ニアルケレドモ、部下ガ自分ノ方デハ軍ノ命令ハナクモアツタト
同様ニ軍ノ目的ニ合スルモノト判断シテ断断專行ヲシナイト
モ限ラス、併シテ下ラシレハ結果ガ必ズ上官ノ意圖スル範圍内
於イテノ事柄デナケレバナラス、コウイウコトニ解釋サレテ居ル。



一字未消

ダカラ断断專行ヲ許サレテ居ルカラ何デモヤツテソレハ皆上官ノ責任
ニナルカト云フソウデナイ。命令ハ下ラナイガ、突如ノ出来事ガ起
ツテ命令ヲ受ケル間ガナイカラヤルト云フ場合ハ自分ノ責任デアルケレバ、若シ
間違イガアレバ上官ノ責デナク自分ノ責デアルトイフコト断断專行

Ref No 222



ガキヲ決メラレテ居ル。ソノ他ハ命ゼラレタコトヲヤルノ部下ノ責任
デアルト思フ。ソウブナイト何デモカデモ皆上ノ人が責任ヲ負フコトナル
ソウイウコトデハナイ。ソノ代リ上官が間違ツテ命令ヲ下シタキ部下ガソ
レニ從ツテ間違ツテコトヲシタキハ命ジテ人ガ責任ヲトルコトハハッキリミテ
認ルト思フ。

七.

残虐行為ノシイテハ常識カラ言フコト考ヘラナイコトハ。軍人精神ヲ

十分ニ兵隊ガトリ入レバソコトハアリ得ナイト思フ。残虐行為ノモガ
現場で行ワレルトキニハソノ直屬ノ上官ハ監視ノ責任ハ持ツカモ知ラズガ

平常ノ教育ハ思ヘイモヨラヌコトニ責任ヲ持タセレルカドウカ。アアアフ
コトモシテハオラヌ。ソウイウコトモシテハオラヌト教育スル中ニ残虐行為ノ

コト迄モ教育スベキカドウカ。コノ頃核事ノ書証ヲ見ルト随分非道イ
事ガ書イテアル。コノコトヲ日本人ガヤツタクト思フト實ニ不思議

デニヨウガナイ。ユレガ若シ事實デアツタラ顔ヲオウベキ事柄デアル。
ソレデハ新秩序モヘナマモアツクモノデハナイト云フ氣持ガスル。併シ下ラ

コレハドケラカト云フト知識ノナイ者ガヤルコトケカラソコトヲ有モアルカモ知レ
ナイカ實ニ赤面スルヨウナ事例バカリゲ。ソコトハヤツテハオラヌゾト言

ウベキコトカドウカト思フ位デアル。從未戰爭デ氣ノ五ツテイル時
ニハ稍々モスレバ「カツパイ」トカ婦女ヲ凌辱トイフコトガ有勝テテ事

デ。ソコトハマカシオラヌゾト云フトハ随分ハ釜シク言フテアルト
思フ。 事 東 以 ハ 八 條 ハ モ テ ハ シ カ ミ ア ノ ヨ ウ チ
思イモヨライ残虐ヲコトヲヤツテイルトミテモ。ソウイウコトニ就テ迄「々

列考ミテ注意セバオラヌカドウカ。ソノ邊ハ實ニ難カシイ。ソウイウコトヲ

13
July 1862

事實言フト兵隊ノ人格ヲ非常ニ無視シテユトシテ。古イ話シテ
 アルガ、私ハヨビソ出兵ノ時、名古屋隊隊長テ出テ行ツタ。ソノ時
 本ハ少シ感ズルトヨロガアツクカラテモアルガ、今度出テ行クハ列國
 環視ノ中テ、ニカモ外國ノ兵隊モ出テ居ル中へ行ツテ、正々達々ト
 日本軍隊ノミナケレバナラヌ任務ヲヤルノデアアルカラ、一兵卒ト雖モ
 國ノ名譽ヲ背負ツテ居ル外交官ト思ヘ。ソノタメニハ一歩一動ナル
 ホド日本ノ兵隊ト思ワレルヨウニシテケレバナラヌ。ソノタメニ多少ハ
 世間ヲ飾ルヨウニモ見エルガ、オ一外套ヤ、ズボンノポケットニチヲ入ル
 ヲトナラヌ。姿勢ヲ直シテ端々ノ動作ヲ持シテオシ。敬礼ハモツトモ
 嚴肅ニヤレ。普通ハ休ニテ居ル時ハ上官ガ通ツテモ敬礼セヌデモ
 良イ様ニツテ居ルガ、苟シクモ上官ヲ見タラバ、自分ガ休ムコトヲ許
 アレテ居ル時デモ立ツテ敬礼スル心掛ヲ細心テヤラケレバイカス。ソレハヒトリ
 上官許ソデナク、支那人ニモソノ他ノ者ヲ対シテモソノ心掛ヲヤラケレバナラヌ。
 ト言フタ。 向ヘ行ツテカラモ任来ヲ歩イテ居ル兵隊ノ中ニ寒シウナ
 カツユウヲシテ歩イテ居ル者ヲ見付ケルト、當時馬上デ長イムチヲ
 持ツテ居ルヨミシガ、コラ姿勢ガ悪イソトシテ注意ヲ與ヘタ。他ノ隊ノ
 將校デモ変テカツユウヲシテ居ルト、君ソノ形ハマズイソトヤツタ。
 ソノ代リ私隊ノ者デ不都合ナ者ガアツタラ、速慮ナク提ヘテ直シテ私ニ
 知ラセテモライタイト云フ事ヲ他隊ノ人ニモ申シ出テ置イタ。
~~本馬ノ見ルハ兵隊ノ直リ姿勢ヲ直シテ將校モ少シ姿勢ヲ直シ~~
~~君ハ横シテ居ルハ大休ハ掛ハソレ位ニシテ置イタ~~
 兵隊モ多クハ氣ヲツケルンデアアル。ソレ強女スルナ、ヤレ何ラスルナト

三字末消

一行末消

十七字末消

(17)
Ref. No. 922

ハ言ハナイモノテアル。コレハ上官ノツリカデソコ迄ニテモ悪イコトヲ
ミタ兵隊ガアツク場合ハソノ上官セ同罪ト云フノハドウカト思フ。
命令ニ及ニテ部下ガアツクコトニ対シテ上官ガ悉ク責任ヲ持タテ
ケレバナラヌコトハ欧米人頭カラ言ワララ受取レナイト思フ。右様ナ
部下ヲ持ツテ居ツクコトハ誠ニ相済ヌコトダトイウノハ、日本デ良ク
言ラ他ノ人ニ対シテスル一ツノ挨拶ナテアルガ、ソノ挨拶ヲ直チニト上
ゲルコトニレバ、子供ノ喧嘩デ何時モ親ガ罰セラレネバナラヌコトニル。
ハ、軍隊ノ教育ニツイテハ教育總監ガ方針ヲ発動ニテソノ實現
法ニツイテハ師團長以下ガソノ各々定メラレク範圍内ニ於イテ
ヤル。ソレデソノ定メラレク範圍内ニ於イテノ職責ヲ果スト云フ様
ニ解釋スド、責任ノ及ブ範圍ガ事柄ニヨツテ皆決ツテ来ル
ノテハナイカト思フ。

昭和二十二年一月二十五日

於東京都杉並區下高井戸一丁目十八番地

阿部信行



右ノ當田立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印
シタルコトヲ証明シマス

同日 於同所

立會人 國分友海



Def. Doc. # 922

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FAR EAST

The United States of America et al

Versus

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent : ABE, Nobuyuki

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My address is as follows:

No. 88, 1 Chome, Shimotakaido, Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

2. From June in the 5th year of Showa (T.N.1930) to December of same year, I served as temporary acting War Minister of the HAMAGUCHI-Cabinet and from August in the 14th year of Showa (T.N.:1939) to January of the next year as Premier.

Concerning the China Incident some may say that we Japanese were preying upon the Chinese but I believe thoughtful Japanese never had the idea, to take an aggressive policy towards China. They rather hoped to coexist with the Chinese for mutual prosperity the continent. In short, nothing serious would have happened, probably if the Chinese had taken steps to help Japan economically, directly or indirectly, since everything was based on the view that the continent was of utmost importance for the existence of Japan.

The China Incident, I believe firmly, would not have occurred, if the true feelings of Japan had been understood.

If one but look at the time of the declarations of the government Authorities, beginning of the China Incident, the leaders of the KONOE-Cabinet proclaimed "non-expansion", "no-reparation" or "no punishment whatsoever" and the like and again when you consider they said so with true intentions, I believe it can be said that the government authorities never did think of aggression.

I am convinced of the fact that the Wang-Government was not a Puppet-Government nor a special one. From my impressions from contacts with each of the officials of the Government I feel that they never had ambitions to take the reins of government by means of making such a government, which was always thinking about catering to the wishes of Japanese and contrary to those of the Chinese. In respect to the particulars on the organization of the Wang-Government, I knew very little of the details prior to its establishment, because the Government had been organized before we entered

the Cabinet and as I had only begun to generally understand their intentions just prior to my resignation. When it was organized, I was told to go as Ambassador contrary to my wishes and so I went to China as Ambassador. Going there and observing their talks on all kinds of problems, it seemed to me in short that they felt peace between Japan and China was necessary to be restored as speedily as possible and for China to return to normal^c. And if what Japan says is unreasonable concerning this she should be resisted to the end. But Japan has declared non expansion of the incident, the taking of territory or collecting of reparations. If this is so, it would be better to make peace with Japan quickly and settle the matter. This, "let's hurry up and shake hands," was their thought apparently and in short the basis on which Wang Ching-mei came on the part of the Wang-regime, therefore, they were quite earnest in their assertions when the so-called "Fundamental Pact" was made and there were always warm controversies among them on questions, on which most Chinese were not easy to be persuaded.

I myself only attended the first and last meeting when the conclusion was made. But all reports made me feel how strongly the Chinese side had insisted on their opinion.

I believe that they at least were not of the type who would become leaders of a government which was but for the convenience of Japan and used as a tool.

I remember Wang Ching-mei proclaimed and declared many times that he would not object to the dissolution of the Nanking-Government at any time, if the Chungking-government would but fall in with his views of peace. To save the country was their aim. Chiang Kai-shek's motto was "Save the nation by resisting Japan", but Wang Ching-mei's was "Save the nation with peace". Their mottos were of course not the same, but even Chiang Kai-shek must have been aware, I believe that ultimately peace had to be made with Japan although perhaps under certain conditions. It is not reasonable to think that he was thinking that war between China and Japan had to be fought without end of forever. I believe it was only a matter of difference of opinion on the conditions. Wang Ching-mei was of the

opinion that the Japanese declaration was right and that China would be saved by allowing Japan to execute her promise, and it seems that he did lose this faith even to the end. Some people may have said after the Nanking government was formed that it had but little influence or that Japan made it move whichever way it pleased but as for Wang, burning with a desire to have the Chinese Government act as worthily as the Chinese Government as possible put forth every effort possible it seems. In this respect, Japan too tried to consider Wang Ching-mei's desires as much as possible, it seems. But their activities were limited within the administration in the occupied districts as we were still fighting with the Chungking Government and I believe there no doubt were many instances of this sort due to the exigencies of military operations. Consequently people were easy to take the Nanking Government as weak-hearted and as if it did nothing but follow Japan blindly. But I always thought that that was not so. I think with gradual decrease in demands from the standpoint of operations in time the Nanking-government would have been able to exhibit its strength as the Chinese government. Moreover, in that case the separate existence of the two governments would no longer be necessary and I felt in time they would have become united into one. At that time, there was further a peace-move, the so-called "Chungking-move" between the Chungking Government and Japan. We, however, could not only be unfavourable to such a move, but hoped that we would be able to obtain peace between Japan and China through co-operation on the two sides, through the Nanking-Government.

In short, we always expressed our hope and acted accordingly that the Nanking-government itself and Chungking become one in accord to do business with Japan. Consequently one can think that the Nanking Government did not just follow Japan blindly and again, we had no intention of having her doing so and associated with her on equal terms.

I went to Nanking in late April and concluded the Pact on 30 Nov. What we were doing up to that time was that after reaching there in late April, we mutually began to make utterances and held discussion

to conclude the basic treaty in early July. Preparations in the home country, however, were delayed and instruction did not arrive. For this reason we were forced to wait in idleness here.

Our negotiations were ended for the time being in late August. Following this, however, at our Government's request detailed changes were made until October and a decision had not been reached even then. I came home in October and at the time thought that if the treaty could not be concluded that there was no alternative but to give up the negotiations.

To do such a thing, however, would be a bad story. After speaking well about everything to not go through with the treaty at the final moment would mean that the Chinese would lose faith in us. After the government sent all those people out for its preparation, an about face at the time of the signing would have meant an absolute loss of faith in the Japanese internationally. In late November I was ready to resign my appointment and was preparing for it. In a mere few days however circumstances turned out that the Pact was to be concluded at last so I returned to China and signed the Pact. The reason why things turned out this way was that there were some of the opinion that my negotiations with the Chinese gave too many advantages to the Chinese. I also believe that there were others too who felt it was better to restore negotiations with the Chungking Government again than to negotiate with an un-influential party as Wang Ching wei. So there may have been people who thought I was letting the Chinese have things too much to their own way but it seems the army then agreed with my thinking and supported me from the beginning to the end in its reports to Tokyo. I believe that Wang Ching-wei was a true Chinese.

He was never a Japanese. He was desirous of always bringing happiness to China and was willing to go to any end. To speedily save China he negotiated with Japan and went all out. I think, he was right. You can not say that he was impudent because he would not follow Japan's every whim. If the tables were turned we would feel the same way. As a Chinese it was

only natural for him to do all he could for the benefit of China.

I always felt we must understand his standpoint as he differed from Chungking in the way of means only. Later I wrote in a magazine once but at any rate I said that in settling the Chinese problem to go by Japanese morals alone would mean failure. The Chinese have Chinese morals and they have their own view points. We must understand this well ^{and} keep in mind their feelings and do negotiations, otherwise it probably will not work out. I emphasized and once wrote of such. The Japanese too often think that they are doing the Chinese a lot of favor. They however, said at the time that we are not grateful at all too many things that the Japanese feel they are doing out of kindness. That is because although they may have been done with good will to them many things have not been beneficial and on this point I thought we must give a lot of thought and consideration before carrying them out.

Concerning the evacuation of troops they were downright insistent. Even in the way a sentence was written they demanded revision. For instance, "We shall begin the evacuation of troops immediately after public peace is restored" instead of "We shall evacuate our troops after public peace is restored" or again to "Simultaneous with the restoration of public peace troops shall be evacuated"

Although we said that immediate withdrawal was the same as simultaneous withdrawal, the Chinese insisted on immediate withdrawal; otherwise they said that they would not assent. As the Chinese, differing from Chungking, were negotiating with nothing and without arms and were in a region occupied by the Japanese at that, they must have felt awfully weak and helpless. Despite this as they still insisted on various points, I think even now that they must have had to put forth a great deal effort in doing so.

Regarding economic problems, too, the Chinese could not be acquiesced on an equal footing with the Japanese even in the matter of investing capital. They insisted on a rate of 51 to 49 in their favour. Their reasoning was that as all the things were of the Chinese, the Chinese must have more than half the shares.

As a man like Mao Tzu-ping was originally a lawyer, it seems that he violently argued on my word or that may turn disadvantageous to China. For instance, when a proposition was made to form a company to develop a mine, he claimed that more than a half of the shares of the firm must be in Chinese hands. Again, on another occasion feeling it appropriate for Japan and China to get together in developing the continent looking at the future, we proposed to invite Japanese Capital and techniques in order that Japan and China might cooperate in this work. It was not meant as an economic invasion although for the moment we had to look to China for supplies from military necessity. Even here they mentioned at every opportunity that China was the subject.

5. The Japanese army was for a long time just barely sufficient in but defending Japan only. Up to the time of the Sino-Japanese war Japan had no other plan but defense or in other words strategy for defense.

And what is indeed amusing is something which I too only learned later but it was with the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war that a preparation for an expedition was first written up.

Some units, I heard, just barely finished their plans of mobilization and operation.

So the army of that time was merely one for protection in times of invasion.

When, however, it was compelled to go out in order to settle the Korean problem, our army did so and war. This gave us a good lesson that wars can not be ended so long as we remain in a passive state, that we must win after all if we wish to end the war, and that in order to win we must take the offensive.

If a war is thrust upon us, we are losers so long as we remain passive without striking a single blow. So, we began to feel that we had to be prepared to at least strike back if struck at and so plans for offensive warfare came about. And such thoughts and the necessity of setting forth on to continent came much, much later. Even the Russo-Japanese war was compelled to be carried on on such an overnight plan. Such being the case, up to this time thoughts as making an army for the

purpose of territorial expansion was indeed not in our minds. Just protecting ourselves was the most we could hope to do. For instance, even in the way of fortifications we prepared nothing but those for defense against possible landings from war ship-borne enemies. This would not do; if we were to wait for them to come the results would be nothing more than self-destruction. Although we do not like to fight, once it has begun, we must adopt a plan of beating the enemy by setting forth and meeting him; the object of the battle is of course to protect our own country, but as a means of protection we must beat down the foe. As a result, our tactics underwent a change from merely a defensive of stopping them around the surrounding area of the guns but of stopping them from landing, of attacking the enemy on the sea so as to prevent it from landing, or going further to strike them on their own soil. This change, however, meant only a change in the method of fighting, its aim still remained for the protection of the country. Later on many theoretical arguments have been advanced in favour of military preparedness. To back up diplomacy; necessary for the protection of national interests; or else for the development of national strength and so on. Be that as it may, there is no mistake that the Japanese Army in its beginning extremely conservative. The Manchurian incident is no exception, no one had intended or planned it from the beginning. What Japan wished in the case of Manchuria was in the main to enable our people to live comfortably but unpretentiously by utilizing Manchurian resources by cooperation with the Chang tsuo-Lin Government. Mainly, we needed Manchurian Soy-beans and coal. We never entertained in the slightest any territorial ambitions, or political ideas. Every one thought nothing could be better if Manchuria would be able to maintain peace, not have any wars, receive no trouble from Chinese Headquarters and the Japanese there being able to live peacefully and comfortably carry on their business. However, as the years went by the Chang Tso lin Government increasingly would not cooperate.

They remonstrated that the railway under construction was different from that as first agreed. If constructed, a protest would be duly filed, saying it was agreed otherwise. Even a minor quarrel regarding their work between a Chinese and a Japanese, invariably became a problem for the Consul and the MUKDEN regime.

In this way pending questions accumulated to number from more than 200 to 300 causing illfeelings and giving rise to various affairs. But as for the Japanese there were none at the time who thought of immediate seizure of Manchuria on this account.

Only there were certain elements among the numerous Japanese at these outposts who had mistaken ideas and their attitude was, affected by a sort of a national or racial superiority complex inherited from the Russo-Japanese War and they sometimes treated the Chinese in a contemptuous manner, calling them "CHANKORO" and arousing illfeeling among the Chinese. Concerning this matter, caution was sometimes requested to be taken in the quarters concerned, as we felt they must be careful not to commit misdeeds on account of their cheap superiority complex. At the time we were instructed to do this much to save their face as much as possible and at the same time make things favorable for us by doing so. How do the foreigners consider this, I wonder? As a matter of fact, even if an investigation is made in every detail as to who started this war, when you get right down to it I suppose no one can be accused of being really responsible. Therefore, in the final analysis it was the atmosphere that led up to the affair. When we consider now the set of persons, who strutted proudly, we know they were all breathing that atmosphere and brought forth on the stage as actors amid that atmosphere. The atmosphere, in which rumours prevail asserting that some said that and some others said this, brings forth results. Therefore I think even foreigners will be surprised when they consider this point. Even the Japanese, when they look at it, will probably feel, what is this, anyway." I think it may become indeed to be said a very foolish thing.

6. As for the problem of military discipline among the Japanese soldiers or how far superior officers are responsible for the actions of their subordinates, it is the Army Interior Affairs Law, if stated precisely with legal exactness, that regulates all behaviour and decides the sphere of responsibility within the army in ordinary times. How about privates, or non-commissioned officers?; or company commanders and battalion. Their sphere of responsibility and what they are to do clearly are defined. What battalion commanders are to do with their subordinates and what company commanders are to do on receiving orders etc. As for these, even in war time, it is shown by order what the officers directly beneath are to do when orders from above are given. Therefore, if the receiver of the orders has acted precisely as he has been ordered, the responsibility for his action necessarily rests with the author of the orders. But if his action has gone beyond the orders, it is very questionable whether the superior officer is responsible for it or not. When a subordinate violates the order he receives, he is punishable. For lack of supervision on the part of superiors, I think they may be responsible to some extent, in consideration of the circumstances, but I don't think one can ever say that they should be given the same punishment as the violators themselves. Among the soldiers, the phrase "carrying out one's own arbitrary decision" is used. This applies when it is deemed necessary to act at one's discretion. Cases may arise when a subordinate carries out his own arbitrary decision, judging for himself that it will serve the purpose of the army, as if there were an authentic order to do so. But it must be so carried out that the result thereof constitutes matters coming within the limits intended by his superior officer, this is how the problem is understood. Therefore just because action on arbitrary decision is permitted doesn't mean that a subordinate can do as he pleases and then have his superior officer be held responsible, when anything unexpected happens, allowing no delay for obtaining ⁱⁿ orders thereabout, a subordinate can act on his own responsibility. "Carrying out one's own decision" is concisely defined and the responsibility is with the doer, if any error arises and not that of his superior. In other things, a subordinate

is responsible for doing what he is ordered, I feel. Otherwise, it follows that superiors would be responsible for everything and this is not so.

On the other hand I think that it is clear out that when superiors issue mistaken orders and their subordinates in obedience commit misdeeds, the author of the orders are responsible.

7. As to atrocities, they are outside the sphere of common sense, and if the soldiers had been inculcated with the spirit of military men adequately, such things would not have been possible. When such atrocities are actually committed by them, their direct superior officers may be responsible for their negligence in watching against such misbehavior, but it is questionable whether or not the officers, who instructed them in ordinary times, are responsible for such unexpected matters. When they are instructed, and warned against various kinds of misdeeds, should such cruel actions be referred to? In the documents submitted by the prosecutors these days, we find descriptions of extreme cruelties. We can not imagine how a Japanese could have done such things and is indeed unbelievable. If these are facts, we should be ashamed to show our faces. If such were so talking about a new order was mere nonsense. Such things are committed, if ever, by the uneducated and there may have been such elements but indeed all these examples are such to make our faces red and are of such extremes that we have our doubts if we would have been able to even have dared to mention not to do such things. Hitherto, when the soldiers were excited during time of war such misdeeds as plundering or raping of women were apt to happen, so the soldiers were exactingly warned against such misdeeds. It is a delicate question whether such misdeeds ought to be warned against, naming them one by one, even if such unimaginable cruelties are being committed. To tell the truth, it would be tantamount to an extreme insult to the character of our soldiers. A long time ago, at the time of the Siberian expedition, I went in the capacity of the commander of the NAGOYA Regiment. At that time, I was a little inspired with the situation,

so I told my men as follows: —

"This time we are to go out amid the focused attention of the various powers and in particular, we are to go to places where foreign soldiers will also be found. There we are to discharge openly and squarely the duties prescribed for we Japanese soldiers, as that even a private is requested to consider himself as an individual diplomat who is responsible for the honor of his country. For that purpose, his behaviour, in every detail, must be such as will inspire admiration for the Japanese soldiers. Although it may seem a mere display, first of all you must not put your hands in the pockets of your overcoats and trousers. Straighten your posture and be decent in your demeanor. Salute with strictness. Ordinarily you need not salute your superiors who pass you when you are at rest, but this time, if you happen to see your superior, be so careful as to stand up and salute him, even when you are permitted to rest. And this does not apply to one superior only but observe the same spirit towards the Chinese and the others", I concluded. After I went there, whenever I saw some soldiers walking the streets in a shivering manner, because of the cold, I cautioned them with a riding stick — I had ^a long one when I was mounted — saying, "Hello, you are in an abominable posture!" Even if it was an officer not belonging to my regiment, if his posture was bad, I reprimanded him, with "What a figure you make!". On the other hand, I also had previously asked the men of other detachments to catch without hesitation any person belonging to my regiment and rectify his misbehaviour and to later let me know about it. If we take just rough precautions to that extent, the soldiers will take care of themselves to a considerable degree. It is difficult to bluntly warn them against rape and what not. This is just a matter of the superior officer's ability to handle but in case soldiers do commit misdeeds, even after such precautions have been taken, it is questionable, I think, to have superior officers given equal punishment. I think it is unacceptable to the minds of the Europeans and Americans that for everything committed by soldiers in violation of orders, their superior officers be responsible. The apology that expresses the regret of having had such

subordinates, is an excuse towards others, practised in Japan. But if this excuse were directly adopted, it would follow that parents should be always punished when their children quarrelled.

8. As for education in Army, the Inspector General of Military Education Originally works out its policy, and as to measures for its enforcement Division Commanders and their lower commanders decide on them within the spheres respectively prescribed to them. Therefore, if it is so interpreted that they are to fulfil their respective duties in their prescribed spheres, their scopes of responsibility will all become fixed with respect to related matters, I believe.

On this 25th day of Jan., 1947

At No. 88 SHIMO-TAKAIDO 1-CHOME,
SUGINAMIKU, TOKYO

DEPONENT ABE Nobuyuki (seal)

1. KOKUBU, Tomoji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the ^epresence of this witness.

On the same date

At TOKYO

Witness: (signed) KOKUBU, Tomoji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ABE, Nobuyuki (seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

対

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓口供書

供述者 阿部 信行

自分儀我國ニ行ハル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙通り宣誓言ヲ爲シタル
上ノ如ク供述致シマス。

一、私ノ住所ハ東京都杉並区下高井戸一丁目八番地デアリマス。

二、私ハ昭和五年六月ヨリ同年十二月迄濱口内閣ノ陸軍大臣

臨時代理ヲ勤メ昭和十四年八月ヨリ同十五年一月迄總理大臣ヲ

致シマシタリ。

三、支那事変ニツイテハ支那ヲ喰イ物ニシテイルヲト言フ人モアルカモ知

レナイガ心アル日本人ハ支那ヲ侵略シヨウトイフヨウナ考エテナク、

大陸ニ於テ日本モ支那モ一緒ニ生キタイト云フ考ヘテアツタリ。

要スルニ日本が生キテ行クタメニハ大陸ハ非常ニ大事ナ所ヲト言

フコトニ總テが立脚シテアルカラスムシロ經濟的ニ支那が日本ヲ

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日本ノ本當ノ心持ヲ諒解シテクレバ支那事変ハ起ラナカワ

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支那事変が始マシタリ時政府當局近衛内閣ノ首腦部ノ

者モアノ通り不拡大ト言イ賠償モトウヌ。何モセヌト云フ風ナコトヲ

明言シ又其ノ心積^{ツキ}デヤツテ居ッタリ見テモ政府當局トシテハ

極東國際軍事裁判所
五木利加合衆國其他

附

荒木貞夫其他
宣誓口供書

供述者 阿部 信雄

日本儀我國之行に於て之を以て被告とし其の罪状を以て之を以て
三次に於て供述致す之を以て

一、私、往所、ハ東京都杉並區下高井草一丁目八番地ニ於テ、
二、私、昭和五年六月ヨリ同年十二月迄、豫備兵期間、陸軍大臣
臨時代理ヲ勤メ、昭和七年八月ヨリ同年十月迄、陸軍大臣
代理ニシテ、

殺シシニシテ、

三、是、即、事、業、ニ、シ、テ、ハ、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、ニ、シ、テ、ハ、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、

トシテ、ハ、公、法、上、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、トシテ、ハ、公、法、上、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、

大陸、於、テ、日本、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、トシテ、ハ、公、法、上、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、

年、を、以、テ、日、本、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、トシテ、ハ、公、法、上、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、

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日本、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、トシテ、ハ、公、法、上、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、

ヲ、殺、害、シ、ス、ル、事、トシテ、ハ、公、法、上、支、那、人、殺、害、物、質、

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侵略ト言フ事ハ考ヘテ居ナカワット私ハ思フ。

四 汪政權僥倖ヲ得テ、又特殊ノモノデモナイト云フコトハ私ノ確信ニテ居ルトコロナル。予、實汪政權ノ人々ハ日本ノ言フコトニ迎合シテ支那國民本來ノ考ヘニ及シテ政府ヲタテテ自分ガ政權ヲ得ヨウト云フ様ナ考ヘ方ハ毛頭ニテ居ラナカワット、私ハ其ノ個人々々ニ接觸シテ感じテハ思ツテ居ル。汪政權ガ去来ル経緯ニツイテハ我々ガ政府ニ入ル以前ニ去来タト言フカ、段々醞釀シテオツテ、私が辞任スル直前ニ大体意向ガ分ツクライノコトデアルカラ去来上ル迄ノ細カイコトハ私ハ知ラナイガ出来テシマツタ時ニ大使トシテ行ケト無理ニ云ワレテ大使トシテ支那ニ行ツタワケデアル。行ツテ色々ノ問題ニ觸レテ詰合ツテオロシヲ見テオルト、要スルニ日支ハ速カニ和平ヲシテ支那ガ常態ニ復スル様ニシナケレバナラヌ。ソレハ日本ガ云フコトガ無理ナラバ、ドコ迄モ反抗シナケレバナラヌガ、日本ハ予、變ハ拡大セヌト云イ、領土ハトラヌト云イ、賠償モトラヌト云フ、ソレナラバ日本ト早クチヲ握ツテ片附ケテラ良イデハナイカト云フノガ向フノ考ヘ方デ、ソレデハ手ヲ取り早クソウヤツタラヨカラウト云フコトガ結局汪精衛ガ乗り出シテ来テ根本タト思フ。

優路ト事ハ考ヘテ居ラカフヲ私ガ思フ。

四 汪政權僥倖ヲ以テ又特殊ノモノナラシメテ云フコトハ私ノ確信ニテ居ルトコロナラズ。又實ニ汪政權ノ人々ハ日本ノ言フコトニ迎合シテ支那國民本來ノ考ヘニ及シテ政府ヲシテ自分ガ政權ヲ得テ下ト云フ様ナ考ヘ方ハ毛頭ニテ居ラカソク。私ハ其ノ個人ニモ接觸シテ感シテ思フ所居ル。汪政權ガ出来ニ懸緯ニツイテハ我々ガ政府ニ入ル以前ハ出来ラト云フカ。段々懸緯ニツイテオツテ。私ガ辭任スル以前ニ大體意向ガ分ツテ居ラシコトナラカラス。大體上ニ述ベテ細部ニツイテハ私ハ知ラズ。其ガ出来ラシコトナリ時ニ大使トシテ行ケト無理ニ云フコト。大使トシテ支那ニ行ケラフケテアル。行ケル色ニ内題ニ觸ラズ。話合フテオムルヲ見テオムル。要スルニ日英ハ速ニ和平ヲシテ支那ガ常態ニ復スル様ニシテオムルハナラス。ソレハ日本ガ云フコトガ無理ナラバ。ドウ迄モ反抗シナケルナラスガ。日本ハ速ニ支那ガ擴大スルコト云フ。領土ハトラスト云フ。賠償モトナラズト云フ。ソレ等ハ日本ハ早クテ片附ナリテ良シハナクカト云フ。其ノ向テ思ハ方ア。ソレハ手ニ取リ早クソレガウツテ。日英ハ速ニ和平ヲシテ。支那ガ常態ニ復スル様ニシテオムルヲ望ム。汪精衛ガ東ニ出テ来テ根本ナク思フ。

ダカラシテ所謂ユル基本條約ヲコシラヘン時デモ汪政權側ノ主張ハ相當ニ眞面目デ支那人ガコレデナケレバ納得シナイヨウナコトニ就イテハ強ク意見ヲタカカハセテ居ツタ様デアル。

私ニ一番初メト一番終リノ結末ヲツケル時ダケシカ直接會議ニハ出マセンデシタガソノ経緯ヲ聞イテミルト支那側ハナカク強硬ニヤツテ居タノデアツタ。

彼等ハ日本ノ道具ニ使ヒ日本ニ都合ノ良イ様ナ政府ノ主班者ニナルト云フ様ナ政權ニ惡クタルモノデハ毛頭ナイモト思フダカラ重慶サヘ和平ニ同意シテクレバ何時デモ南京政府ハ解消シテ良ロシト云フ事ハ汪精衛氏モ屢々言明シ又声明ニモ言フテ居ツタ様ニ記憶シテ居ル。要ハ国ヲ救フニアル。

蔣介石氏ハ抗日救国デアルガ汪精衛氏ノ方ハ和平救国デアツテ旗印ハ違ツテ居ツタ様デアルガ蔣介石ト雖モ或ル條件ノ下ニ結局日本ト和平ニナツテ行カネバナラヌコトハ悟ツテキタト思フ。未来永却日本ト支那トハ戦ヲシナケレバナラヌトハ考ヘテ居ラヌ。唯其処ニ條件ノ差ハアルカラウト思フ。ソレデ汪精衛氏ハ日本ノ言ヒ分デ良イデハナイカコレヲシツカリ日本ニ実行サヘサセバソレデ支那ハ助カルト云フ考ヘガデ棄リ出シテ来タ。ダカラソノ考ヘ方ハ最後迄捨テズニ持ツテ居ツタ様デアル。從ツテ南京政府ガ出来テソレガ微カデアルトカ日本ガ南京政府ヲシテ思フ様ニ働カセナカツタト云フ様ナ人ガアルカモ知レナイガ向フトシテハ自分デ支那政府ハ支那政府ランクヤツテ行キタイト云フ希望ニ燃

アカラレテ所謂ニ基本條約ヲコシラヘン時デモ汪政権側ノ主張ハ相當ニ眞面目デ支那人ガコレデテケレバ納得シテイヨウアコトニ就イテハ強ク意見見テアツカハシテ居ルノ様デアル。

私ニ番初ノト一番終リノ結末ヲツケル時テシカ直接會議ニ出マセンデシテケルノ経緯ヲ聞イテミルト支那側ハナカク強硬ニヤツテ居テアツタ。

彼等ハ日本ノ道具ニ使ヒ日本ニ都合ノ良イ様ヲ政府ノ主班首ニナルト云フ様ヲ政権ニ志コケルモノデハモ説クイモト思フアカラ重慶ヲへ和平ニ同意シテアレバ何時デモ南京政府ハ解消シテ良ロシト云フ事ハ汪精衛氏モ寧ニ言明シ又聲明ニモ言フテ居ツタ様ニ記憶シテ居ル。要ハ國ヲ救フニアル。

蔣介石氏ハ抗日救國デアラガ汪精衛氏ハ方ハ和平救國デアツテ、旗印ハ違ツテ居ツタ様デアラガ蔣介石ト雖モ或ル條件ノ下ニ結局日本ト和平ニナツテ行カネバナラヌトハ悟ツテキリト思フ。未來永却日本ト支那トハ敵ヨシナケレバナラヌトハ考ヘテ居ラテ、唯其處ニ條件ハ差ハアルデアラウト思フ。ソレデ汪精衛氏ハ日本ノ言ヒ分テ良イデハナイカ。コレヲシツカリ日本ニ実行テヘサセビソレデ支那ハ助カルト云フ考ハオチ東リ出レテ来テ、ダカラソノ考ヘ方ハ最後迄捨テズニ持ツテ居ツタ様デアラガ從テ南京政府ガ未來ニソレガ微力デアルトム。日本ガ南京政府ヲシテ思フ様ニ働カセナカソルト云フ様ヲ人ガアルカモ知レナイ。向テトシテハ自分デ支那政府ハ支那政府ヲシテヤツテ行キタイト云フ希フニ思

エテ奴カカヲシテ居ツク様ニ見ヘル。

日本モ其ノ一矣ニツイテハ汪精衛氏ノ希シキヲ出来ル丈ク各
 レル様ニ考ヘテ居ツク様デアル。併シ重慶ト戦フソツ其
 ノ占領地内ニ於ケル仕事デアルカラ、作戦上ノ要求ガ自然南
 京政府ヲシテ思フ様ニ働カセ得ナカフク矣ハ澤山アツト思
 フ。タカラ其レヲ見ルト如何ニモ南京政府ハ軟弱デアリ唯日本
 ニ盲從シテ居ツク様ニ見ルケレドモ、其レハソウデハナカフクト私ハ
 常ニ思フテ居ツク。若シ作戦上ノ要求ガ段々ト減ツテ来レバ南
 京政府ハ本来ノ支那政府トシテ、力ヲ發揮シ得テラウト思
 フ。又ソウナレバ強ヒテ重慶ト南京トガ別々ニ居ル必要モナ
 イノデアツテ漸テハクツ付クモノト思フテ居ツク。ソレカラアノ
 時分ニハ重慶ト日本トノ間ニ所謂ナル重慶工作ト言フテ和
 平工作ガ横リテ行ハレテ居ツクガ、私共ハソウイフハ助デハナク
 出来ル丈ク南京政府ヲシテ重慶政府ニ働カレテ、コノ両方
 ノ合意ニヨツテ日支和平ニ持ツテ行ク。

要スルニ南京政府ソレ自体ガ重慶ト心ヲ同ジワレテ日本ニ
 向ツテ仕事ヲスル様ニ働イテ世貴ヒタイト云フ希シキヲ常ニ
 言ヒモシ。ソウイフ考ヘハ方デヤツテ居ツクノデアアル。

タカラ其ノ一矣カラ言フテモ南京政府ハ唯日本ニ盲從ス
 ルモノデハナイト考ヘ、又盲從サセツモリデモナク対等ニ扱ツ
 テ居ツクツモリデアアル。

私ガ四月末ニ南京ニ行ツテ十一月三十日ニ條約ヲ結ンタ。

エテ奴カカラシテ居ツテ様ニ見ハル

日本モ其ノ失シキヲ正精衛氏、布シテ出未ル大々容
レル様ニ考ヘテ居ツテ様デアル併シ重慶ノ戦ヲシテ其
ノ占領地内ニ於ケル仕事ヲアテテ作戦ノ要ボク自ラ南
京政府ヲシテ思フ様ニ働カセ得テカフツ矣ハ薄ク思
フ。又ク其ノ見ルト如何ニ南京政府ハ軟弱テアリ唯日本
ニ自ラシテ居ツテ様ニ見シレドモ其レハソウテハカフテ私ハ
常ニ自ラシテ居ツテ若シ作戦ノ要ボク段々ト減ツテ来レバ南
京政府ハ本末ノ支那政府トシテカク發揮シ得テラウト思
フ。又ソウテハ極ニ重慶ト南京トカ別ニ居ル少要モテ
イテアツテ漸クハカフ付クモノト思フテ居ツテソレカラアノ
時分ニ重慶ト日本ト向テ所謂ニ重慶ニ作ト言フテ和
平工作ガ種テ行ハレテ居ツテガ私ハソウワイフイ助デテア
出未ル大々南京政府ヲシテ重慶政府ニ働カシテ、コノ兩方
ノ合意ニシテ日支和平ヲ持ツテ行フ。

要スルニ南京政府ソレ自ラ重慶ト心ヲ同レウレテ日本ニ
向ツテ仕事ヲスル様ニ働イテ昔ヒクイト云フテ布シテ常ニ
言ヒモレソウワイフテ考ヘカフヤツテ居ツテデアル
ツカラ其ノ失カラ言フテモ南京政府ハ唯日本ニ自ラシテ
ルモノテハナイト考ヘ又自ラサセツテモナク討撃ニ扱フ
テ居ツテモデアル

私ガ四月末ニ南京ニ行ツテ十一月三十日ニ條約ヲ結シテ

其レ迄何ヲシテ居ツタカト言フト實ハ四月末ニ行ツ
 テ七月初メニ基本條約ヲ結ボウト御互ニ言ヒ出シテ
 相談ヲ始メタリテアルガ夫レ迄内地ノ準備ガ遅レテ
 訓令ガ来ナカッタ爲ニ向フデハムナシク待ツテ居ツタゲアル
 彼我ノ話ハ一應八月末ニ終リ其後政府カラノ要求デ細部
 ノ訂正ナドヲシテ十月ニ及ニダガ未ダ決定シナイ。私ハ十月ニ
 歸京シタ時ハ條約ヲ結ブコトガイカヌテラバ止メル外ナイト
 思ツテ居ツタ。

シカシソウル事ハ義理ガ悪イ話デアル。良イ様ナ事許リ言
 ツテ居リナガラ愈々ノエ壇場ニテツテ逃ゲテ條約ハ出来
 ナカッタト言フ事ニテレバ支那人ハ信用シナイ。アレ又ケニ
 政府ガ堂々ト人ヲ出シテヤラシテオイテ、調印ノ場合ニナツテ
 知ラン顔ヲシテシマウコトハ日本人ハ國際的ニ全然信義ノ
 ナイモノニナル。十一月末ニ私ハ辞表ヲ出スツモリテ其ノ準備迄シ
 タケレドモ愈々條約ヲ結ブコトホテ一兩日同ニ決定サレタゲ
 自分ハ支那ニ戻ツテ條約ニ調印ニタリテアル。ドウシテソニテ
 ツタカト言ヘバ私ノ向テ話合カ余リニ向ウニ有利ダト言フ解
 釋ハ人モアツタ。又或ル所デハ汪精衛ハ微カダカラアンチ者
 ヲ相手ニシテマルヨリ一層ノコトモウ一度重慶ト話合ツタドウ
 カト言フ様ナ考ヘ方デ盡ツテ居ツカ人モアツタイデハオイカト
 思フ。ソシテ又私ノマリ方ハ余リ向ウニ都合ガ良イ事許リ
 デアルト言フ考ヘ方ヲシタ者モ多ク出ル先軍ハ兎ニ角
 私ノ考ヘニ共鳴シテ東京ノ方ヘモ始終私ヲ支持スル
 様ナ意見ヲ具申シテ居タ様デアル。

其の如何ヨリテ是ツカト言フト實ハ四月末ニ行ツ
 テ七月初ノニ基本條約ヲ結ボクト御至ニ言ヒ出シテ
 相談ヲ始メテアルガ夫レ迄内地ノ準備ハ遅シテ
 訓令ガ来テカツタ爲ニ向テハハテシク待ツテ是ツカトアル
 彼我ノ話ハ一應八月末ニ終リ其後政府カラ要求ヲ却却
 ノ訂正トドヨリテ十月ニ及ニゲガ不ク決定シナイ。私ハ十月ニ
 歸京シタ時ハ條約ヲ結ブコトガイカヌテラバ止ル外ナイト
 思ツテ居ツタ。

シカシソカスル事ハ義理カ悪ク話チアル。良イ様ニ事許リ言
 ツテ居リテガラ愈々ニ準備場ニテツク迷ブテ條約ハ出来
 ナカツタトモシラ事ニテハ又那人ハ信用シテモ、マレズ又ニ
 政府ガ堂々ト人ヲ出シテマラシメテイテ、調印ノ場合ニテチ
 知ラシテ頼ヲシテシカキトハ日本人ハ國際的ニ全然信義ハ
 ナイモノニテ。十一月末ニ私ハ辭表ヲ出スツテ其ノ準備迄
 タケレドモ愈々條約ヲ結ブコトハ同日同ノ決定サレテ
 自分ハ又那ニ戻ツテ條約ニ調印シタリテアル。トワレテシキテ
 ツタワト言ハル私ノ同ノ感念ハ余ノ同カニ有判ナク言テ解
 釋シムモノツラ。又或レ所チハ正精神ハ微クカカラ、アノ者
 ヲ相手トシキヤルヨリ一層ノモトモ、又一度重要ノ結合シタリ
 カト言フ様ヲ考ヘ方デ遊ツ。モシテ人モアツタリ、チハカ
 思フ。ソノ事トデ私ノヤリ方ハ余リ向カニ部會ガ長イヨリ、
 チアルト言フ考ヘ方ヲモシテモ、モシテモ、モシテモ、モシテモ、
 私ノ考ヘニ共鳴シテ東京ノ事ハモシテモ、モシテモ、モシテモ、
 様々意見ヲ具申シテモ、モシテモ、モシテモ、モシテモ、

汪精衛トイフ人ハ支那人ガト思フ。

決シテ日本人デハナイ。ダカラドコ迄モ支那ヲヨクシヨウ、日本ト話合ツテ支那ヲ早ク救ウトイフ頭デ何處迄モ来テオルデアル。ソレハ正當ダト思フ。ソレヲ日本ノ言フ通りニナラヌカラ怪シカラヌトハ言ヘナイ、我々が主客ヲカエレバ矢張りソウナデアル。ドコマデモ支那人トシテ支那ノ利益ノタメニ努ムルハ當然ノコトデアル。手段ガ重慶ト違フダケデアルカス、アノ人ノソノ立場ヲ諒シテヤラナケレバナラヌト思ツテオツタノデアル。ソノ後雜誌ニ書イタコトガアルガ、兎ニ角支那ノ問題ヲ解決スルニ日本人ハ日本人ノ道德ガケテ行ツタラダダ。支那人ニハ支那人ノ道德ガアツテ、支那人ノ立場ガアル。ソレヲ良ク了解シテ、彼等ノ心持ヲヨク容レヌ夫レガ入ツタ話合ヲシナケレバ役ニ立タシタラヌト言フ事ヲハ釜シク書イタコトガアツタガ日本人トシテハ支那ノ爲ニ非常ニ良イ事ヲシキマツテオル心積リデ居ルガ、向フデハ一寸モ有難クナイモトヲ非常ニ親切ノ心積リデマツテオル事ガ多ク過ギルト言フ事ヲ夫ノ時ニ言ツタ。夫レハ善意デハアルガ決シテ向ウニ対シテ恩惠ニナツテ居ラヌ事ガ多クイカラ、夫ノ莫ハ矢張りコナラモ良ク考ヘテマツテマラネバイカヌト思ウテ居ツタ。撤兵ニ就イテハ非常ニ手厳シク向フハ主張シテ居ツタ。文句ニ書クニモ例ヘバ治安回復後ニ撤兵スルト言フヲ「治安回復後直チニ撤兵ヲ開始スルト改メ又更ニソレヲ「治安回復ト同時ニ撤兵スルト言フ風ニ訂正ヲ要求シタノデマツタ。且ニ撤兵スルハ

汪精衛といふ人ハ支那人ゲト思フ。

沃シテ日本人デハナイ。ダカラドコレ迄モ支那ヲヨクシヨウ。
 日本ト託合ツテ支那ヲ早く救ウトイフ頭デ何處迄
 ミ来テオルデアル。ソレハ正當ダト思フ。ソレヲ日本ノ言
 フ通りニテラマカラ怪シカラヌトハ言ヘナイ。我ニガ主客ヲカエレバ
 兵張リソウニデアル。ドミデモ支那人トシテ支那ノ利益ノタメ
 ニ努ムルハ當然ノコトデアル。手段ガ重要ト違フダケデアル
 ルカラ。アノ人ノソノ立場ヲ諒シテヤラケレバナラヌト思ツ
 テオツターデアル。ソノ後雜誌ニ書イタニトガアルガ、鬼ニ
 向支那ノ問題ヲ解決スルニ日本人ハ日本人ノ道德ガケ
 デ行ツタラダタ。支那人ニハ支那人ノ道德ガアツテ支
 那人ノ立場ガアル。ソレヲ良ク了解シテ、彼等ノ心持ヲ
 ヨク容レヌ夫レが入ツタ話合ヲシテケレバ役ニ立タニダニウ。
 ト言フ事ヲハ釜シク書イクコトガアツタガ日本人トシ
 テハ支那ノ爲ニ非常ニ良キ事ヲシテマツテオル心積
 リデ居ルガ向ッテハ一寸モ有難クナイ。ニトヲ非常
 ニ親切ノ心積リデマツテオル事ガ多ク過ギルト言フ事ヲ
 夫ノ時ニ言ツタ。夫レハ善意デハアルガ沃シテ向ラニ対
 シテ良心惠ニマツテ居ラヌ事ガ多クカラ。夫ノ其ハ夫張リ
 コケラモ良ク考ヘテマツテマラネバムカマト思ウケラ居ツタ。
 撤兵ニ就イテハ非常ニ手嚴シク向ラハ主張シテ居ツタ。文句一
 ツ書クモ例ヘバ治安回復後ニ撤兵スルト言フヲ「治安回復後
 直ニ撤兵ヲ開始スルト改ム又更ニソレヲ「治安回復ト同時ニ
 撤兵スルト言フ風ニ訂正ヲ要求シタ」デマツタ。

直ニ撤兵スレバ同時ニ撤兵スル事ト同様テハナイカト云フ
テモ支那側ハ同時テナケレバ困ルソレテナケレバ支那ハ納得セヌ
ト云フ風ニ向ウハ躍起ニナワテ居テ

唯向ウトシテハ重慶ト違ワテ日本ハ占領シテ居ル地区テ裸テ
武力モ何モナシテ談判スルノテ非常ニ心細イ弱イモノナリテ
ルソレテ色々主張スルノテアルカラ向ウトシテハ相當ニ勉強ハシ
テモノゾト私ハ思ワテアル

經濟上ノ問題テモ資本ヲ出ス歩合モ何ト云フテモ日本ト平
等ハ嫌テアルト云フ。日本四九支那五一テナケレバトウシテモ
聞カナイ。兎ニ角支那テモノテアルカラ支那ガ過半数ヲトラ
ナケレバイカスト云フ譯テアル

梅思平ナント云フ人ハ元來法律家デアルカラ支那ノ不利
益ニル様ナ点ニ就イテハ一言一句随分手嚴シク争ツ様テ
アル

例ハ鈔山ヲ開發シヨウト云フ事テ會社ヲ拵エルト云フトハ會
社ノ株ハ必ず支那ノ方ガ半分以上持ワト云フ

又コナラハ經濟侵略ト云フ意味テハナク差當ワテ軍事上
ノ必要ナ物資ヲ支那ニ仰ガネバナラヌガ將來日支ガ一緒ニナ
ワテ大陸ヲ開發スルコトガ適當デアル

ソノ爲ニ日本ノ資本ヲ入レルナリ日本ノ技術者ヲ入レルナリ
シテ協カシテヤロウト云フ様ナ仕事ガ主張サレルトソレワラ
テモ兎ニ角支那ガ主体デアルト云フ事ヲ凡ニル機會ニ言ヒマ
シテ

直ニ撤兵スレバ同時ニ撤兵スル事ト同様ヲハナリカト言フ
テモ支那側ハ同時ニテアレバ困ルソレナクハ支那ハ納得ス
ト云フ風ニ向ハ躍起ニナリ居ル

唯向ワトシテハ重要ト違フヲ日本ハ占領ニテ居ル地ニテ謀
武カモ何モアテテ談判スルニテ非常ニ心細クシテモア
ルソレヲ色々主張スルニテモウラ向ワトシテハ相當ニ勉強ハシ
テモイテ私ハ思フヲモル

経済上ノ問題ヲモテ資本ヲ出ス步合モ何ト言フモ日本ト平
等ハ嫌ヲテルト言フ。日本四九支那五一テナケレバドウシテモ
聞カナシ。鬼ニ角支那ヲモイテアレカラ支那ノ過半救コトヲ
ナケレバイカスト言フ譯テアレ

梅思平ナント云フ人ハ元來法律家デアレカラ支那ノ不利
益ニル様ト点就テハ一言一句道介手厳シク争フ様ヲ
テレ

例ハ抄ムラ開発言ウト云フ事ヲ會社ヲ併エルト云フトソノ會
社ノ株ノ中ニ支那ノ方が半分以上持ツテト云フ

入コトニハ經濟侵略ト云フ意味ガハノ差當フテ軍事上
ノ必要ト物資ヲ支那ニ仰ガキバテラヌヲ將來日又ガ一掃ニ
ワテ大陸ヲ開發スルニトガ適當デアレ

ソノ爲ニ日本ノ資本ヲ入レルナリ。日本ノ技術者ヲ入レルナリ
シラハ協カシヤラント云フ様ト仕事ガ主張サレルトソレヲ
テモ兎ニ月支那ガ主体デアルト云フ事ヲ凡ニ機械會ニ言ヒ
シテ

五日本陸軍ハ從來ハ自分國ヲ護ルニ手一杯デアワタ。

日清戦争迄ハ守勢作戰詰リ防禦ヨリ外ニ計畫ガナカワタ。

ソレテ實ニ滑稽ナハ私モ後テ知ワタノテアルガ日清戦争ケ始

マル時ニナソテ初メテ出師準備ヲ書キ始メテ居ル。

動員計畫兼作戰計畫ト云フ様ナモノヲ漸クコシラヘテ部隊
モアツタト聞キマシタ。

タカラ改メテ来テノヲ護ラウト云フ位ガソノ時分ノ軍ゾワタ。

ソレガ朝鮮ノ問題デドウシテモ出ナケレバナラナクソワテ来テ已ハラ

得ズ出勤シテ行ツテ勝ワテ漸ク片ガツイタガ良ク考ヘテ

見ルニ受身テハ逆モ戦ハ始来ハツカヌ。結局勝ヲナケレバ

戦ノケリハツカヌ。

勝ワニハコナラガ攻勢ヲトラナケレバ勝テナイ。

仕掛ケラレタ戦ハコナラガ攻ラナケレバ只受ケテ居ル丈ケ

テハ喧嘩ハ負ケテアル。向ウガ攻ワテ来レバコナラモ攻リ返

ス丈ケノ準備ヲシテオカナケレバナラヌト言フ。テ攻勢作

戦計畫ガ出来サアトソワタラ大陸ヘモ出ナケレバナラヌト

考ヘルヨウニソワタハズト後テ日露戦争ナルモノモホニノ

一夜漬テ止ムラ得ズアンナ計畫ヲヤツタワケデアル。

アカラ此迄ハ領土拡張。為ニ軍ヲコシラヘルト言フ様ナ

日本陸軍ハ従来ハ自分國ヲ護ルニ于テ孤デナク

日清戦争迄ハ半勢作戰詰リ防禦ヨリ外ニ計畫デナク

ソレヲ貴シシ程ニハ私モ後ヲ知ソクテアルヲ以テ清戦争ヲ始

スル時ニソレヲ初メテ出師準備ヲ書キ始メテ居ル

動員計畫兼作戰計畫ト云フ様ナモテ漸クソレヲヘテ部隊

モテソレト聞キマシテ

ソレヲ改メテ未ダソレヲ護ラウト云ニ位グツノ時今軍ノソレ

ソレガ朝鮮ノ問題デドウシテモ出サケレバソレヲソレヲ未ダ己カラ

得ズ出動シテ行リテ勝ヲ漸ク片ゴソク良ク考ヘテ

見ルニ受身ヲハ逆モ戦ハ始メハソレ又結局勝ヲ得レバ

戦ノソレハソレ又

勝ソレハソレ又戦ヲソレトナレバ勝テナク

仕掛ケラレテ戦ハソレナカゲ改ラナケレバ只受身ヲ居ル又

テハ喧嘩ハ員ヲテアル向ウガ改ツテ未ダバニナラモ改メテ

スズクノ準備ヲシテモウケレバソレ又ト言フデ攻撃作

戦計畫ガ出来サトソレナラ大陸へモ出サケレバソレ又ト

考ヘヨウニソレハソレ後テ日露戦争ニモソレモホニ

一夜潰デ止ムヲ得ズトシテ計畫ヲソレナクテアル

ソレカラ此迄ハ領土拡張ニ爲シ軍ヲソレニラヘリト言フ様ナ

頭ハ毛頭ナカッタ。自分ヲ保護ルガタカクナシテアル。例
 ハ西女塞ノ如キモ向フノ軍艦が来テ上陸スル場
 合ニ防禦スルコト許リヤツテオワタソレガコレトハイカヌ。
 向フが来ルヲ待ツテオワタテハ自滅ヨリ外ナイ。戦ソ
 モハナルベクヤリタクナイガ戦ガ始マツタラハ出掛ケテ向
 フ叩ク方法デ行カサケレバイカヌ。戦ノ目的ハ國ヲ護ルニ
 アルガ、護ル手段トシテハ相手ヲ毆ラサケレバナラヌト云フ事
 ニツテ今度ハ砲台ノ周圍ニ向フガ上ツテ来ルヲ防クヨ
 リハ向フ上ラヌ様ニシテ、コチラガ海ノ中デ叩クカ、或ハ毛
 ウ一歩進ニテ向フノ陸ノ上デ叩クカシテ、コチラハ上ツテ来
 ナイ様ニシヨウト云フ計畫ニ戦法ガ変ワラコレハ戦法ノ
 変化デ目的ハトコマテ自國ヲ安全ニスルコトデアワカソノ
 後外文上ノシリ押シトシテノ軍備トカ自國ノ利益ヲ
 擁護スルガ爲キモ必要ダトカ或ハ國運ヲ伸展セルガ爲
 ニモ必要ダトカ、學理的ナコトハ色々アルガ日本陸軍
 ノ當初ハ極メテ消極的ナメデアワタ事ハ間違ヒナイ
 満洲事変ニシテモ満洲事変ヲ最初カラ意圖シテオ
 ヲタ者ハ殆ドナイ。満洲デハ張作霖ノ政權トチテ握ツテ、
 アソノ資源ヲ融通シテモラツテ日本人ガコゲンマリ生キテ
 行ケルヨウニトイフ事ノ主ダツタ。満洲ノ大豆ノ必要ガ、石
 炭ガ必要ダトイフ事ノ主ダツタ。領土的政治的
 上云フ考ヘオハ毛頭シテオラナカツタ。寧ろ満洲ガ支
 那本部ヨリ禍ヲ受ケナイデ戦ヲ止メテ、安定ニシタ

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頭ハ毛頭ナックル。自分ヲ以テ護ルカタクシクナリテモ例
 二西ヤ塞、如キモ向テノ軍艦ヲ来テ上陸スル場
 合ニ防禦スルニト許リヤクテオツクソカコレハイカス
 向テ来ルハ待テテオツクテハ自滅ヨリ外ニ戰ハ
 スハナルベクヤリタクアノ戰ハ始マツテハ出掛テ向テ
 ナクテ方法ヲ行カケレバイカス。戰ハ目的ニ國ヲ護ルニ
 アルヲ護ル手段トシテハ相手ヲ敵ラケレハラスト云フ事
 ニツテ今度ハ砲台ノ周圍ニ向テ上ツテ来ルヲ防クヨ
 ヲ向テ上ラス様ニシテコケラケ海ノ中テ叩クカ、或ハモ
 ウ一步進ニテ向テ陸ノ上テ叩クカシテコケラヘ上ツテ来
 テイ様ニシヨウト云フ 計畫ニ戰法が変ワリコレハ戰法ノ
 変化テ目的ハトラスニ自國ノ安全ニスルコトテアツカソノ
 後外交上ノシリ押シトシテノ軍備トカ自國ノ利益ヲ
 擁護スルニ必要ナルトカ、或ハ國運ヲ伸辰セラルニ爲
 ミ必要ナルトカ、學理的ノコトハ色々アルカ日本陸軍
 ノ當初ハ極メテ消極的ノコトデアツタ事ハ間違ヒナイ
 滿洲事変ニシテハ滿洲事変ヲ最初カラ意圖ニテオ
 ヲク者ハ殆ドテ。滿洲ドハ張作霖、政權トナリ握リ、
 アソコニ資源ヲ融通ニテモラテ日本人ガコケシヨリ生ヤテ
 行ケルヨリニトイフ事ノ主リツカ。滿洲ノ大星ノ必要ナル石
 炭ガ必要ナルトイフ事ノ主リツカ。領土的政治的
 ト云フ考ヘ方ハ毛頭ニテオラナカク。寧ニ滿洲ガ又
 那本部ヨリ禍ヲ受マナイテ戰ニキナラ。安定ニテ狀

能ニテワテ日本人ニ安居樂業ヲナシ得レバコレニ越シタ
 コトハナイト考ヘタトコロガ年ヲ經ルニ從テ張作霖政權カ
 思フ様ニシテ吳レカワタ。最初ノ約束ヨリ違フヲ鐵道ヲ架ケ
 ルトカ架ケレバ當然ノ約束カ違フト云フ抗議ガ出ル。支那人ト日本
 人トノ職業上ノ争ヒカソアワテモ必ズ領事ト奉天政權トノ
 間ノ問題ニナル。

ソコデ案件ハ積リニ積リテ二百何十件トカ三百件トナリ感情ヲ
 悪クシタリシテ、色々ナコトハアワタガ併シ日本トシテハコレアル
 カ為ニ直ニキニ滿洲ヲツケラノモニシテシラヘト云フ様ナ考ヘカハ
 當時誰モニテ居ラナカワタ。

唯虫先ノ多数ノ日本人ノ中ノ一部ニ間違フヲ考ヘテ持ツ者
 モ居テ其態度カトコ迄モ日露戦争ノ後ヲ受ケテ一種ノ民族的
 ト云フ人種的ト云フカソシテ優越感カアワテ、ヤヤシロ扱イニスルコトカア
 ルテ向テ感情ヲ悪クスル事アリ得タデ此ノ吳ニツイテハ安價ナ
 優越感ノ為ニ事ヲ誤様ナニトカアワテハナラヌト思ツタテ夫々間
 係者ニ注意ヲ促シタコトモアツタソレ迄ニシテ虫来ル天、向テテテコカラ

又都合ノ良シ様ニシテウツイテ頭テ當時ハ指導ヲサレテオツタケアル。此ノ吳
 ニ就イテ外國人々ハトウイフ風ニ見テナルカ。實際ニ云フト、此ノ戦ヲ始メタ
 ハ誰カトソノワテ調ベテ見ルト、誰カ本當ノ責任者カ分ランカラウ
 ト思フ。カカウ結局空氣カモテ拵ヘ上ゲタ。今偉ソウテ顔ヲニシテ
 居ツテ連中ヲ考ヘテ見ルト皆空氣ヲ吸フテ、ソノ空氣ノ中ノ役者ニ
 ナツテ舞臺ヘ上ケラレテ居ワタ。誰カアア云ツカモウ云ワタト云フ空氣ガ
 結果ヲツクル。カカラソノ大ハ外人ガ見テモ驚ウカラウト思フ。
 日本人ガ見テモ何ソカイト云フコトニナルカラウト思フ。而夫ニ
 下ラナイモノテハナイカトニ云フ事ニナルカモ知レヌト田心ス。