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SWN-4818  
12 October 1946

HWK:do

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC

Subject: United States Strategic Interest in  
Iran

Reference is made to the State Department memorandum dated 26 September 1946 which transmitted a series of questions prepared by the Department of State concerning United States strategic interest in Iran.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these questions and have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:

"It is apparent that the questions propounded by the Department of State are based on an assumption that a war with Soviet Russia is a possibility. On that assumption the following replies based on military considerations are an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a consideration apart from such assumption, it must be realized that the interests of the United States and its military capabilities would be adversely affected by loss of Middle East oil occurring through possible Soviet domination of Iran by means other than war.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that as a source of supply (oil) Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States. From the standpoint of defensive purposes the area offers opportunities to conduct delaying operations and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil resources in Saudi Arabia. In order to continue any military capability for preventing a Soviet attack overrunning the whole Middle East including the Suez-Cairo Area, in the

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first rush, it is essential that there be maintained the maximum cushion of distance and difficult terrain features in the path of possible Soviet advances launched from the Caucasus-Caspian area. Otherwise the entire Middle East might be overrun before sufficient defensive forces could be interposed. As to counteroffensive operations, the proximity of important Soviet industries, makes the importance of holding the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area obvious. This is one of the few favorable areas for counteroffensive action. Quite aside from military counteroffensive action in the area, the oil resources of Iran and the Near and Middle East are very important and may be vital to decisive counter-offensive action from any area.

"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that United States strategic interest in Iran is closely related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East area as a whole as follows:

"Our best estimates indicate that the USSR does not now derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war. The objective of the fourth Soviet five-year plan is 35,000,000 metric tons production annually. Again, our best estimates indicate this tonnage is only sufficient to meet the total Russian peacetime needs upon the expiration of this fourth five-year plan. The USSR and Iran have formed a joint Russian-Iranian oil company to develop oil resources in northern Iran, an area geologists consider an improbable source of large oil production, a fact which must be well known to the Russians. Hence, her motives in forming this Russian-Iranian oil company are subject to suspicion. Loss of the Iraq and Saudi Arabia sources to the United States and her allies would mean that in case of war they would fight an oil-starved war. Conversely, denial of these sources to the USSR would force her to fight an oil-starved war. However, due to Russia's geographic position, great land mass, and superior manpower potential, any lack of oil limiting air action by the United States and her allies or hampering their transportation ability or their war production would be of great advantage to the USSR.



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It is therefore to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East.

"3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

"a. A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south would enhance the ability of the Soviets to achieve their 'security' ends in this area by political means while having the effect of serving notice to other countries that the western democracies admit their inability to protect their strategic interests in this area. Further, it would give the Soviets opportunity to perfect transportation facilities in northern Iran, to organize northern Iran for defense, and to prepare northern Iran as a possible base for operations against British and/or American oil resources in southern Iran and Saudi Arabia. It would allow the Soviets to move their forces half way to these sources of oil without serious opposition. It would, for all practicable purposes, nullify any ability the British may have at present to protect the oil fields in Iraq and, finally, it would be another step in the encirclement of Turkey.

"b. Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan would, from the strategic point of view, be the least objectionable of the four situations propounded in question three. It nevertheless would be a permanent penetration into Iran and thus permit movement of Soviet forces close to the oil fields of Iraq.

"c. The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq would adversely affect United States strategic interests by introducing into the area a state owing its existence to the USSR, and therefore strongly influenced by the Soviets and hence



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probably a willing instrument of the USSR for the creation of discord, dissent, and revolt in the Near and Middle East. Such a state would very probably include the sources of British oil in the Kirkuk area. In this case the revenue now derived by Iraq from Britain for the use of these oil resources would revert to the newly created Kurdish state. Such a situation would probably cause the dissolution of the present government of Iraq and a subsequent chaotic condition from which might arise a new government oriented toward the USSR instead of toward the western democracies. Since Iraq stretches to the head of the Persian Gulf and the Abadan oil refineries are practically on the border of Iraq, our strategic resources in the area would be endangered.

\*d. Soviet domination of the whole of Iran would entail all of the objections raised in a, b and c above but with the possible adverse effects on United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East greatly intensified.

\*d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that token assistance by the United States to the Iranian military establishment would probably contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East by creating a feeling of good will toward the United States in the central government of Iran and would tend to stabilize and strengthen that government. They are informed that the immediate security objective of United States policy toward Iran is to prevent civil disturbances which might invite intervention by powerful neighbors and which might endanger United States economic interests in the Persian Gulf area. They feel that, in support of this objective, the United States should accede to Iranian requests for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they have no established sources for security supplies. They consider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to maintain its



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independence in the community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area. United States military missions now in Iran should remain there, but any additional military mission to Iran would be inadvisable at this time.

"The military implications in the existing international situation concerning Iran are closely related to the military implications of the current Turkish situation, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished their views to the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 24 August 1946."\*

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,  
Secretary

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\*Note: Copy forwarded to State Department in letter to Acting Secretary of State from Secretaries of War and the Navy dated 31 August 1946.

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SWN-4816  
11 October 1946MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNC SC FOR THE RELEASE  
OF STATE PAPERSWAR MEMBER, " " "  
NAVY MEMBER, " " "Subject: Request by the Kilgore Committee for Titles  
of Approved SWNC Papers Relating to the  
Occupation of Germany.

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the State Member, is referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Release of State Papers for study and recommendation.
2. A list of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and Informal Policy Committee on Germany documents which deal with the occupation of Germany is enclosed for ready reference by the Subcommittee.
3. In view of the urgency attached to this matter by the State Department, it is requested that the recommendations of the Subcommittee on the question of releasing titles of the papers to the Kilgore Committee be forwarded separately and as a matter of priority.
4. For convenience of the Subcommittee Members, a copy of the memorandum appointing the Subcommittee and a copy of SWNC 200/5 are attached.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,  
Secretary

## Enclosures:

- 12/
- \*A\* Memorandum by State Member
  - \*B\* List of SWNC & IPCOG Documents
  - \*C\* SWN-3451 dated 27 October 1945
  - \*D\* SWNC 200/5, Copy No. 39 - State Mbr
  - 42 - War Mbr
  - 58 - Navy Mbr ✓

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**SECRET**THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 10, 1946

MEMORANDUM BY THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC

In connection with the investigation of Military Government in Germany, the Kilgore Committee asked the State Member for the titles of all approved SWNCC papers relating to the occupation of Germany. It is requested that the SWNCC Secretariat take the appropriate steps to obtain the Committee's permission to make this information available as soon as possible.

It is anticipated that upon receipt of the titles of SWNCC papers on German occupational matters, the Kilgore Committee may also ask for the papers themselves. Accordingly, it is requested that the SWNCC Secretariat request the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Release of State papers to determine whether approved SWNCC papers on German occupational matters may be released to the Kilgore Committee upon its request.

Enclosure "A"

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## SECRET

BWNGG PAPERS DEALING WITH OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

<u>Title</u>	<u>BWNGG No.</u>
Disarmament of German Armed Forces and Disposal of Enemy Equipment	11/5/D, 11/6
Proposals Regarding French Participation in Certain Tripartite Plans for the Occupation of Germany	12/1
Agreement for Control Machinery for Germany	15/1, 15/5, 15/9, 15/11, 15/14
Control of Aviation in Germany	31/3, 31/13
Draft Agreement on Status of Press, Radio and Other Foreign Correspondents in Germany	40/1
Protection of United Nations' Nationals in Germany and Questions Arising in German-Occupied Territories After Surrender	41/2
Interpretation of United States-Soviet Reciprocal Agreement on Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians	45/8, 45/12
Restitution of Articles of Cultural Value	51/1
Use of German Labor by the Allies After the Surrender of Germany	52/1
Displaced Persons Operations in Germany and Austria	80/3
German Church Affairs	105/1
Disposal of War Material	113/5, 113/13, 113/17, 113/18, 113/19
Cession of German Territory to Belgium	116

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Enclosure "B"



## SECRET

<u>Title</u>	<u>SWNGC No.</u>
U.S. Draft Directive on Control of Works of Art and Monuments	118/1
Treatment of German Archives, Records and Documents	122/3, 122/5/D
Disposal of Chetaks and German Coast Troops in Austria	173, 173/3, 173/5
Application of American Friends Service Committee to Operate in Germany for Benefit of German Nationals	174
French Position Relative to the Division of German Naval and Merchant Ships	185/1, 185/2
Evacuation of Germans from United States Zone, Austria	198
Directive to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Zone of Occupation Austria (Germany) on Restitution	204/2, 204/5, 204/10, 204/12, 204/15
Division of German Naval Vessels	208 Series
Release of Information Concerning German Military or Naval Equipment to Nations other than the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and France	229
Announcement Regarding Sinking of Ex-German Submarines	230
Destruction of German Inoperable Warships in Poland, Norway and Denmark	233
Evacuation of Catholic Missionaries, Priests, Sisters and Brothers from the Mission Fields Because of Their German, Spanish, or Italian Nationality	254/1 (Rev.)
German Property in Japan	255/5, 255/12

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<u>Title</u>	<u>SWNCC No.</u>
Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in U.S.	257/5, 257/22
Establishment of Reichsmark Foreign Exchange Rate	257/4
Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-education	289
Policy on Restitution of Seagoing Vessels Acquired by Germany	277
Exports from U.S. Zone, Germany	295
Measures to Restore Financial Stability in Germany	303
Limitations on Access by other Nations to Intelligence Targets in the U.S. and British Zones in Germany	309
Revision of Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany	327/D

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IPCOG PAPERS DEALING WITH OCCUPATION  
OF GERMANY

<u>Title</u>	<u>IPCOG No.</u>
Instructions for U.S. Representative on the Reparation Commission	2/2
<del>Plans for Disposal of German Prisoners of War and Disarmed Forces</del>	<del>4 (no action)</del>
Status and Treatment of German Merchant Seamen After the Surrender of Germany	5/1
Representation of Foreign Countries in Germany After Surrender	6/1
Price Control in Germany	7/1
Russian Ruble Currency Uncovered by Allied Forces	8/2, 8/3, 8/4, 8/5, 8/6
French Memorandum on War Criminals	10
Agreement Between Governments of the United Kingdom, United States of America, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany	12
Directive on the Identification and Apprehension of Persons Suspected of War Crimes or Other Offenses and Trial of Certain Offenders	13

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**SWN-4815**  
**11 October 1946**

HWK:aj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNGO  
WAR MEMBER, SWNGO

SWNGO 328/1 dated 11 October 1946 is circu-  
lated for consideration by the Committee.

It is requested that you indicate your comment  
or concurrences hereon and return to the Secretariat,  
SWNGO.

A. D. REID,  
Secretary

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

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**SECRET**SWN-4814  
10 October 1946

VFF:aj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Information on Japanese Scientific Research.

Reference is made to SWN-4746 dated 17 September 1946 which transmitted Copy No. 10 of SWNCC 216/4 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view.

It has been determined by the members of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee that reconsideration by the Committee of this paper is necessary.

It is therefore requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff defer consideration in this matter and, at the request of the originator, return Copy No. 10 of SWNCC 216/4 to the Secretary, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,  
Secretary

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VFF:bjh

SWN-4813  
10 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT SECURITY CONTROL:

Subject: Downgrading of Joint Security Control  
Code Word

By informal action on 9 October 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee agreed to downgrade Appendix "B" of SWNCC 257/22 from "Top Secret" to "Restricted" to facilitate implementation of this policy. This policy contains the code word "PAPER-CLIP" which was assigned to this project by the Joint Security Control.


It is therefore requested that the Joint Security Control downgrade the code word and its meaning to "Restricted" to enable the Secretary, SWNCC to publish this Appendix in a restricted document.

A copy of SWNCC 257/22 is attached herewith for ready reference.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,  
Secretary

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Enclosure  
Copy No. 76, SWNCC 257/22

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~~SECRET~~SWN-4012  
9 October 1946

ADR:aj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING  
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL:Subject: Release of U.S. Classified Research and  
Development Information to Canada.

Reference is made to the report of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Military Information Control, subject as above, in which is contained the recommendation "that SWNCC transmit the 34th and 35th Recommendations (of the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense) to SWNCC-MIC with its interpretation thereof for information and guidance."

As set forth in Memorandum for Information No. 55 dated 27 August 1946, the Subcommittee for Military Information Control is designated as the agency of SWNCC to set upon requests for the release of classified military information. Therefore, it is believed that the report of the Subcommittee should contain its detailed recommendations regarding its interpretation of the 34th and 35th Recommendations of the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense. The Subcommittee's recommendations, as finally approved by SWNCC, would then provide the policy guidance desired by the Subcommittee.

Accordingly, the Subcommittee report is returned herewith for expansion as indicated in paragraph 2 above. Copies of the 34th and 35th Recommendations of the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense are attached for information only (Enclosures "A" and "B").

In order that the Committee may be advised of this action, a copy of the Subcommittee report (less Appendix) and a copy of this memorandum are being furnished to each member.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,  
Secretary

## Enclosures:

- \*A\* - 34th Recommendation
- \*B\* - 35th Recommendation
- \*C\* - Subcommittee Report

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority U.S. 740132  
By CDH/m JAN 25 1976  
NARS, Date



United States of America Canada

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

American Section

Office of the Secretary  
Room 308, Department of State Bldg.  
Washington

THIRTY-FOURTH RECOMMENDATION

The Board considered its first recommendation made August 26, 1940, approved by the two Governments and now in effect between the two sections of the Board and through them transmitted to the Armed Forces of the two countries. This recommendation reads as follows:

"It was agreed that there should be a full and complete exchange of military, air and naval information between the two sections of the Board, with the understanding that each section would be free to convey to its Government any information they received."

The Board decided that it was advisable to substitute for the first recommendation the following recommendation:

Subject to the national policies of the two Governments, there shall be a free and comprehensive exchange of military information in so far as it affects the security of the two countries, the circulation of which shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country.

/s/ Approved 6/6/46

Harry S. Truman

Enclosure "A"



United States of America Canada

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

American Section

Office of the Secretary  
Room 388, Department of State Bldg.  
Washington

THIRTY-FIFTH RECOMMENDATION

Discussions which have taken place in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, established on August 17th, 1940, have reaffirmed the importance of continuing to maintain in peacetime a close relationship between the Armed Forces of Canada and the United States. It is submitted that the obligations of the Governments of Canada and the United States under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security would be fulfilled more effectively through such a relationship. The Board, accordingly, makes the following recommendation:

In order to make more effective provision for the security of the northern part of the western hemisphere, Canada and the United States should provide for close cooperation between their Armed Forces in all matters relating thereto, and in particular, through the following measures:

(a) Interchange of personnel between the Armed Forces of both countries in such numbers and upon such terms as may be agreed upon from time to time by the respective military, naval, and air authorities.

Enclosure "B"



(b) Adoption, as far as practicable, of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments to be encouraged, due recognition being given by each country to the special circumstances prevailing therein.

(c) Cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest to the armed services to be encouraged.

(d) Reciprocal provision of its military, naval and air facilities by each country to the Armed Forces of the other country; each country continuing to provide reciprocally for transit through its territory and territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.

(e) Allocation of responsibility to each country for mapping and surveying its own territory and providing maps to the other country in accordance with agreed needs.

/s/ Approved 5/6/46

Harry S. Truman

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October 3, 1946.

MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL SUBCOMMITTEE

RELEASE OF U. S. CLASSIFIED RESEARCH  
AND DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION TO CANADA

The enclosed memorandum, prepared by the Military Information Control Subcommittee, is submitted for the consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

The members of the Subcommittee for Military Information Control concur in this memorandum.

Frederick Exton  
Chairman

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Enclosure "C"



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RELEASE OF U.S. CLASSIFIED RESEARCH  
AND DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION TO CANADA

THE PROBLEM

1. To request a statement of policy on release of U.S. classified research and development information to Canada.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 206/16 permits the release of U.S. classified information on research and development projects to Canada, provided Canada has contributed or is contributing to the projects.

3. SWNCC 206/16 has not yet been approved by SWNCC.

4. The 34th and 35th Recommendations of the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense, as approved by the President, 6 May 1948, provide for the free interchange of information between the U.S. and Canada insofar as is necessary for the defense of North America.

5. The 34th and 35th Recommendations have not yet been referred by SWNCC to SWNCC-MIC for implementation.

6. Canada has requested information concerning U.S. Guided Missiles development projects. (See Appendix)

DISCUSSION

7. The requested information exceeds the provisions of paragraph IIIa SWNCC 206/16 in that Canada has not contributed and is not contributing to the concerned research and development projects.

8. This information may be releasable under the 34th and 35th Recommendations.

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Enclosure "C"



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CONCLUSION

9. Since the 34th and 35th Recommendations have not been officially transmitted to SWNCC-MIC by SWNCC, SWNCC-MIC is unable to determine what action is indicated with respect to Canadian requests for information concerning research and development projects to which Canada has not contributed and is not contributing.

RECOMMENDATION

10. It is recommended that SWNCC transmit the 34th and 35th Recommendations to SWNCC-MIC with its interpretation thereof for information and guidance.

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