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外務省公表集


外務省情報文化局


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昭和六、七、八年

外務省公表集


第十二輯

外務省

東京千代田區丸の内二丁目十番館六号四二番
芳澤中國記念事業財團
電話(28)四一〇八番

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凡 公 例

- 一、本輯ハ昭和六年ヨリ同八年マテノ外務省公表ノ形式ニ據リ文書ヲ以テ發表セルモノヲ収録セルモノナリ
- 二、配列ハ公表時期ノ順序ニ據レリ
- 三、日支事變關係公表ハ別ニ「滿洲事變及上海事件關係公表集」トシテ編纂セリ
- 四、本輯附録ハ外務省公表ノ形式ニ據ラサル發表ヲ摘録セルモノナリ

昭和九年二月

外 務 省

外務省公表集 第十二輯

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外務省公表集 第十二輯

第一、三姓堡事件経緯

(昭和六年七月四日非公式發表)

客年中國官憲ノ壓迫ニ依リ吉敦線方面ヨリ長春滿鐵附屬地内ニ避難セル約二百名ノ朝鮮人ノ一團ハ西北約七里萬寶山麓三姓堡ニ約三百町歩ノ水田可耕地アルヲ見テ本年四月長春居住鮮人有力者ノ斡旋ニ依リ中國人地主トノ間ニ十年間ノ借地契約ヲ結ヒ附近ノ伊通河ヨリ引水ノ目的ヲ以テ同十九日ヨリ約一里半ニ亘ル灌溉水路工事ニ着手シ其ノ後工事モ半ハ完成シ播種期ヲ前ニ銳意續行中附近中國農民ハ一部地主ノ煽動ニ依リ水路ニ引水ノ爲ノ堰止工事ノ結果水嵩増シ兩岸ノ民田ニ侵水ノ虞アリトシテ反對運動ヲ起シ縣及省政府ニ運動シタル結果中國官憲ハ當初本件土地ノ借入耕作ニ付相當ノ諒解ヲ與ヘタルモノノ如ク何等干涉ヲ加ヘザリシニ拘ラス遽ニ工事差止メノ態度ニ出テタルヲ以テ在長春領事ニ於テ事件ノ圓滿解決方ニ付交渉中五月三十日長春縣長ハ吉林省政府ヨリノ命令ナリト稱シ突如約二百名ノ巡警及馬隊ヲ現場ニ派遣シ工事中ノ朝鮮人首領株十名ヲ

強制的ニ押送スルニ至レリ依テ在長春領事ハ現地朝鮮人ノ保護並調停ノ爲中國側諒解ノ下ニ私服及護照持參ニテ警部一名逡巡五名ヲ急派スルト共ニ不取敢堰止工事ヲ中止セシメテ事態ノ惡化防止ニ努メ他方在奉天及吉林總領事トモ連絡シ種々省政府及地方官憲ト交渉ノ結果中國側派遣警察隊ハ一部撤退シタルヲ以テ本件ノ圓滿解決ヲ計ル見地ヨリ更ニ彼我調査隊ヲ組織シ九日十日ノ兩日ニ亘リ實地調査セル處調査ノ結果中國側ニテハ朝鮮人カ善意ニテ工作ニ從事セル事實ハ承認セルモ借地契約ニ手續上缺陷アルコト及地元農民ノ反對強硬ナルコト等ヲ理由トシテ朝鮮人カ現地ニ定著シテ水田ヲ經營スルコトヲ肯セス堰止工事ニヨリ生スルコトアルヘキ中國側ノ損害ニ對シテハ相當ノ補償ヲ與フヘシトノ我方提案ニモ應セス談判行詰リトナレリ爾來奉天、吉林兩地ニ於テモ銳意交渉ヲ續ケタルニ拘ラス中國側ハ毫モ誠意ヲ示サス徒ニ時日經過シ播種期ヲ失スル恐アルニ至レルヲ以テ在長春領事ハ中國側農民反對ノ緩和ニ努ムルト共ニ地方官憲トノ交渉ヲ促進スル一方堰止工事ヲ續行スルニ決シ工事ヲ再開セル處七月一日約四百名ノ中國農民ハ暴力ヲ以テ水路破壞ヲ企ツルニ至レルヲ以テ同領事ハ直ニ暴民鎮壓方市政籌備處長ニ申入レタルモ今トナリテハ到底農民ヲ鎮壓スルノ見込ナシトテ明白ニ責任ヲ回避セルニ付鮮人對農民ノ衝突ヲ防クカ爲相當數ノ警察官ヲ増派スヘキ旨通告シタル上警部以下八名ヲ増派(後十名追加)シタルカ翌二日暴民

約五百名ハ更ニ長銃約二〇拳銃約一〇ヲ携行シ遂ニ發砲スルニ至リタルヲ以テ我警察官モ已ムヲ得ス水路ニ散開シ之ニ應射セリ

右ノ報ニ接シ長春領事館ニ於テハ急遽應援隊十名騎馬逡巡三名ヲ派遣スルト共ニ中國官憲ニ對シテ危急ヲ告ケ善處ヲ申入レタルモ日本警察官ノ撤退ヲ見ルニ非サレハ暴民鎮壓ノ見込ナシトテ依然埒明カス一方暴民ハ應援警察官ノ到着ニ依リ午前十一時頃漸ク沈靜セリ(七月二日迄ノ經過)

第二、朝鮮騷擾事件ニ關スル國民政府王外交部長ノ

重光臨時代理公使宛公文要旨(七月七日附)

(昭和六年七月十七日公表)

在京城總領事館及元山副領事館等ヨリノ累次電報ニ依レハ朝鮮人ハ在鮮中國人ヲ敵視シ數日來暴動ヲ起シ我在留民ノ生命財產ハ之カ爲屢危害ヲ蒙リ形勢極メテ重大ナルモノアルニ拘ラス貴國官憲カ事前ニ之ヲ制止スルコト能ハス事後ニ於テモ亦切實ニ保證セサルハ國民政府ノ深ク遺憾トスル所ナリ依テ今回中國在留民ノ蒙リタル損害ニ關シテハ追テ取調ノ上更メテ交渉スルコトヲ留保スルモ差當リ貴代理公使ヨリ至急貴國政府ニ電報シ以テ此ノ種不法行爲ヲ切實ニ抑制シ適當ナル措置ヲ講セラルル様御取計相成度シ

第三、朝鮮騷擾事件ニ關スル重光臨時代理公使ノ國

民政府王外交部長宛公文內容(七月十五日附)

(昭和七年七月十七日公表)

- (一) 今回朝鮮内ニ起リタル事件ノ爲在留中國人中尠カラサル犠牲者ヲ出シタルコトハ該事件ノ動機如何ヲ問ハス帝國政府ノ深ク遺憾トスル所ニシテ他方朝鮮總督府官憲ニ於テ全力ヲ擧ケテ暴行ノ豫防鎮壓ト中國人ノ保護ニ膺リタル結果今日ニ於テハ既ニ鮮内各地ヲ通シ事態殆ト平穩ニ歸シ避難中國人モ漸次其ノ業ニ復歸シツアルハ帝國政府ノ私カニ意ヲ安ニスル所ナリ
- (二) 中國人ノ被害狀況ニ付テハ往々甚シキ誇大ノ報道行ハルル處朝鮮總督府公報ニ據レハ平壤其ノ他ノ被害地ヲ通シ又加療中死亡シタル者ヲ加ヘ死者一百名負傷者一百二十名ナルカ帝國政府トシテハ國法ニ從ヒ加害者其ノ他ノ暴行ヲ嚴正ニ處斷スヘキハ勿論ナルト共ニ被害者ニ對シテハ深ク同情ヲ寄セ法理又ハ實例ノ見地ニ拘泥セスシテ速ニ救恤ノ途ヲ講セムカ爲既ニ其ノ手配中ナリ

- (三) 朝鮮總督府ニ於テハ萬寶山事件ノ反映トシテ鮮内人心動搖ノ氣配見ユルヤ曩ニ昭和二年滿洲

ニ於ケル鮮人カ中國官憲ヨリ種々ノ壓迫ヲ受ケタル際鮮内各地ニ騷擾ヲ惹起シタル事例ニ鑑ミ當初ヨリ其ノ成行ヲ重大視シ外務當局ニ對シ萬寶山事件ノ至急解決方ヲ電請スルト同時ニ鮮内各道當局ニ對シテ再三嚴重警戒方ヲ通牒シ京城、仁川等ニ於テ鮮支人ノ衝突起ルヤ直ニ特別警戒ヲ施シ京畿道ニ對シ警察官二百二十名ヲ増派シ必要ニ應シ之ヲ武装セシメテ極力其ノ鎮壓ニ當ラシメ又平壤ニ對シテハ應援警察官百五十名ヲ急派シ武装警察官三百五十名ヲ以テ警戒及防禦ニ當ラシメタルノナラス同地駐屯聯隊ヨリ將校以下五十一名ヲ補助憲兵トシテ出動セシムル等萬全ノ措置ヲ執リ事件後負傷者ニ對シテハ應急加療ヲ施シ中國避難民モ夫々警察署其ノ他ノ安全場所ニ收容シテ出來得ル限リノ保護ヲ加ヘタリ其ノ間京城ニ於テ警察官派出所カ鮮人群衆ノ爲ニ破壊セラレ仁川ニ於テ警察官三十五名負傷シ又平壤ニ於テ警察官カ已ムヲ得ス發砲シテ鮮人群衆ヲ退散セシメ爲ニ鮮人一名射殺セラレ警察官ニモ三十五名ノ負傷者ヲ出スニ至レル等ノ事實ニ徴スルモ日本官憲カ如何ニ全力ヲ傾ケテ暴民ノ取締及中國人ノ保護ニ努メタルカヲ知ルニ足ルヘク從テ我官憲ノ事前及事後ニ於ケル取締及保護措置ニ付間然スル所アリタリト爲スノ當ラサルコトハ國民政府ノ諒得セラルヘキ所ナリト信ス

(四) 國民政府ニ於テハ日華兩國國交ノ大局ヲ顧念シ中國内地ニ於テ中國人ニ不穩ノ言動無キ様嚴

重取締ラレ居ル越ノ處右國民政府ノ配意ハ帝國政府ノ全然感ヲ同フスル所ニシテ事態ノ再發ヲ防止スル爲帝國政府トシテ今後共最善ノ努力ヲ拂フヘキハ勿論ナルカ中國各地ニ於テ昨今頻リニ誇大且挑發的ナル新聞報道其ノ他ノ宣傳行ハレ居ルニ鑑ミ國民政府ニ於テモ此ノ上トモ適切ナル取締ヲ講セラレムコト希望ニ堪ヘス

RESUME OF THE NOTE ON THE KOREAN OUTBREAKS DELIVERED

BY MR. SHIGEMITU, JAPANESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, TO

MR. WANG, CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER AT

NANKING, JULY 15th, 1931.

I.

It is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government that, whatever their causes may be, the recent incidents in Chosen have produced not a few casualties among the Chinese. At the same time the anxieties of the Japanese Government have been considerably mitigated by the fact that, thanks to the utmost energies exerted by the authorities of the Government General of Chosen, for preventing further outbreaks and for protecting Chinese nationals, order has now been almost completely restored throughout the peninsula and the Chinese refugees are

gradually returning to their work.

II.

As to the losses suffered by the Chinese, reports, grossly exaggerated, have often been circulated. According to the official report of the Government General of Chosen, in all the localities affected, including Heijo, the total number of the killed, including those who died while under medical attention, is 100, and that of the injured 125. The Japanese Government will not only naturally deal with the culprits in strict accordance to law, but in sincere sympathy to the victims, is considering the means of rendering them speedy succor and assistance apart from all considerations of legal grounds or precedents.

III.

In view of the disturbances that occurred in various parts of Chosen in 1926 when Koreans in Manchuria were subjected to undue pressure from local Chinese authorities, the Government General of Chosen from the beginning looked with grave apprehension upon the signs of agitation perceivable in the peninsula as a reflection of the Wan Pao Shan Incident, telegraphed its request to the Foreign Office for a swift settlement of the said incident, and gave repeated warnings and instructions to local authorities. As soon as the collisions between Koreans and Chinese took place in Keijo and Jinsen, special police guard was instituted and

220 officers were added to the police force of the Keiki Province, who were directed to arm themselves, as occasion demanded, in order to quell disturbances. As for Heijo, a police reinforcement of 115 officers was despatched, and altogether 350 armed police officers were assigned to duty beside 51 military officers and men called forth from the local garrison. Every reasonable measure was thus taken to meet the situation. Moreover, as to the victims of the outbreak, the injured were promptly given emergency treatment while the Chinese refugees, being sheltered at police stations and other safe quarters, were accorded all protection possible under the circumstance. Meanwhile, in Keijo one of the police stations was destroyed by the Korean mob, and in Jinsen 35 police officers were injured, while in Heijo, where the police was forced to fire in order to disperse the mob, one Korean was shot to death, and 35 police officers were wounded. The Japanese Government believes that these facts are sufficient to show how the Japanese authorities have done everything in their power to restrain the rioters and to protect the Chinese, and that the Chinese Government will readily see the inadmissibility of any imputation of negligence on the part of our authorities in the performance of their duty either before or after the outbreak.

IV.

In this connection the Japanese Government is highly gratified that the Chinese Government in the interest of the general friendly intercourse between the two countries has strictly

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forbidden all untoward agitations in China. The Japanese Government, while it will exercise its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of such incident, desires to express its hope that the Chinese Government on its part will continue to exercise due precaution in view of the exaggerated and provocative newspaper reports which are being persistently circulated in various parts of China.

第四、中村大尉一行ノ洮索地方ニ於ケル支那兵

ニ依ル虐殺真相

(昭和六年八月十七日公表)

參謀本部員陸軍歩兵大尉中村震太郎ハ元騎兵曹長井杉延太郎及露國人、蒙古人各一名ヲ從ヘ支那官憲發給ノ護照ヲ携行シ六月上旬中東鐵路西線博克圖驛附近ヲ發シ濟泌川上流地區、蘇鄂公爺府ヲ經テ洮南ニ向ヒ旅行シ六月二十七日頃洮索地方蘇鄂公爺府(民安鎮)ニ達シ同地飲食店ニ立寄り喫食中ナリシカ同地駐屯奉天軍與安屯懇隊第三團所屬ノ官兵ハ突如之ヲ襲ヒ護照ヲ提示セルニ係ラス不法ニモ拉致暨禁シ所持セル金品護身用拳銃其ノ他貴重品一切ヲ掠奪シ何等ノ理由ナク遂ニ銃殺スルニ至レリ

七月上旬以來我方ニ於テハ極力調査ヲ進メ其ノ真相ヲ確認シ得タルヲ以テ支那側ニ對シ嚴重抗議シ陳謝、損害賠償、責任者ノ處罰、將來ノ保障等ニ就キ交渉ヲ開始スルコトナレリ

第五、東方賠償關係諸協定ノ公布

(昭和七年三月八日公表)

曩ニ昭和五年一月「ヘーグ」會議ニテ署名セラレタ獨逸國賠償ニ關スル諸協定ハ客年八月二十七日御批准アリ同九月四日官報ニテ公布セラレタカ今般所謂東方賠償即チ埃地利、「ハンガリー」及「ブルガリア」三國ノ賠償債務等ニ關シテ右「ヘーグ」會議及其ノ後「パリ」ニテ署名セラレタ左記内容ノ諸協定モ客月二十九日御批准アラセラレ其ノ内效力未發生ノ二協定ヲ除キ本月八日ノ官報號外ニテ公布セララルコトト爲ツタ

- (一) 埃地利國トノ協定
戰後領土ノ縮小及資源ノ減少ト財政ノ窮乏トノ爲事實上猶豫サレ居タル埃國ノ賠償債務ヲ全部免除シタモノテアル
- (二) 「ブルガリア」國トノ協定
大正十二年九月賠償委員會ノ承認シタ同國ノ賠償支拂計畫ノ一部ヲ拋棄シ同國ヲシテ昭和四年以降三十七年間毎年平均千百萬金「フラン」ヲ支拂ハシムルコトト爲ツタ

- (三) チェコスロヴァキア「國」トノ協定
同國ノ解放債務即チ同國カ舊埃洪國ノ領土ヲ取得シ當該地方ノ解放ヲ得タ代價トシテ負擔スル支拂義務ニ關スルモノテ同國ハ其ノ最終的決濟トシテ昭和五年以降千萬金「マルク」ノ年金三十七箇ヲ支拂フコトト爲ツタ
- (四) 債權國間ノ取極
新諸協定ニ基ク東方賠償金ノ債權國間ニ於ケル分配並舊埃洪國及勃國ノ領土割讓ニ伴フ讓渡財産及「チッコ」以外ノ諸國ニ關スル前途解放債務ノ整理ヲ目的トスルモノテアル
- (五) 「パリ」ニ於テ署名セラレタ「トリアノン」條約ヨリ生スル義務ニ關スル諸協定
「ハンガリー」國ノ賠償及「ハンガリー」國ヨリ隣接三國ヘノ割讓地方ノ「ハンガリー」人ニシテ「ハンガリー」ノ國籍ヲ選擇シタ者(「オブタン、オングロア」)ノ所有土地ニ對スル三國ノ強制收用ニ關スル損害補償要求問題ノ解決ヲ目的トスルモノテアツテ前者即チ「ハンガリー」國ノ賠償ニ付テハ大正十三年二月ノ支拂計畫ニ依リ繼續實行セシムルモ千九百四十三年迄ニテ之ヲ打切り其ノ翌年カラ千九百六十六年迄ハ平和條約上債權國ノ有スル對「ハンガリー」國特殊請求權ノ名義ニテ同國カラ年金千三百五十萬金「クローネ」ヲ支拂ハシメルコトトシ後者ニ付

テハ土地基金ナルモノヲ設立シテ同基金カラノ支拂ニ依ツテ當該「ハンガリー」國人ニ満足ヲ與フルノ方法ヲ講シタルモノテアル

以上諸協定ニ對スル帝國ノ批准ハ本月一日在佛栗山代理大使カラ佛國政府ニ通告セラレタ從テ此等諸協定ハ其ノ規定ニ從ヒ同日カラ帝國ニ對シ實施セララルコトト爲ツタ尤モ其ノ内「チッコスロヴァキア」國トノ協定及債權國間ノ取極ハ署名國全部ノ批准書寄託ヲ待ツテ效力ヲ發生スルモノテアル處未タ署名國全部ノ批准書寄託ノ運ヒニ至ラヌ爲追テ效力發生ノ曉ニ公布セララル筈テアル

如上世界大戰後ノ最大難案テアツタ賠償問題ニ最終的解決ヲ與ヘタ「ヘーグ」及「パリ」諸協定ハ今回全部批准ノ完了ヲ見タ次第テアルカ偶此等諸協定ノ成立後勃發シタ世界經濟恐慌ハ其ノ實施ヲ事實上不可能ナラシメタル結果客年六月二十日ノ米國大統領「フーヴァー」ノ賠償及戰債支拂一年猶豫ノ提議ト爲リ關係諸國ハ同年八月十一日「ロンドン」ニテ右提議ノ獨逸國賠償及「チッコスロヴァキア」國支拂金ニ對スル適用ニ關シ又本年一月二十一日其ノ「ハンガリー」國及「ブルガリア」國ノ賠償ニ對スル適用ニ關シ夫々議定書ノ署名ヲ了シ且右「フーヴァー」支拂猶豫期間經過後ノ此等賠償債務ノ處理ニ關シ來ル六月關係國間ニ國際會議ヲ開催シテ審議スルコトト爲リタ

欠

MISSING

第七、調停及仲裁裁判ニ關スル日蘭條約成立ニ

就キテ

(昭和八年四月二十日公表)

大正十四年中蘭國當局ハ我方ニ對シ仲裁裁判ニ關スル條約締結方ノ希望ヲ開陳シ來タリ爾來内交渉ヲ繼續シ來タリタル處最近雙方ノ意見大體一致ヲ見ルニ至リタルヲ以テ帝國ニ於テハ本月十四日閣議ニ於テ締結方針ノ大綱ヲ定メ蘭國政府ト正式交渉ヲ開始スヘキ旨ヲ決シ在蘭齋藤公使ニ對シ條約案ノ作成ニ付同國政府ト商議スヘキ旨ヲ訓電シタリ

右交渉ハ幸ヒニ齋藤公使ト蘭國當局者トノ熱意アル努力ニ依リ順調ニ進捗シ十九日齋藤公使ハ蘭國外務大臣「ベイラーツ、ファン、ブロックランド」氏ト調停及仲裁裁判ニ關スル條約ヲ訂立シ之ニ署名調印シタリ

本條約ハ三世記ニ亘リ存續スル日蘭兩國ノ交誼ニ鑑ミ其ノ國交ヲ一層敦厚ナラシムル表彰トシテ且兩國ノ誠意ノ結合トシテ締結セラレタルモノナリ其ノ大體ノ内容ハ左記ノ如シ

(一) 本條約ハ調停ト仲裁裁判トノ兩者ヲ規定シ先ツ日蘭兩國間ニ發生スル一切ノ紛争ニシテ外交

- 手段ヲ盡シテ尙解決セラレサルモノハ常設調停委員會ニ之ヲ付託シ解決案ヲ考案セシムルヲ原則トス尤モ兩國政府ハ右委員會ノ作成セル解決案ニ拘束セラルルモノニハ非サルナリ
- (二) 右常設調停委員會ハ五名ノ委員ヨリ構成セラレ條約實施後速ニ兩國政府商議ノ上委員ヲ任命シ條約實施中存續ス
- (三) 兩國間ニ發生スル紛争中法律的紛争ハ兩國ノ合意ノ上仲裁裁判ニ付託シ其ノ裁決ヲ求ムルモノナリ此ノ仲裁裁判ニハ海牙ノ國際司法裁判所カ又ハ兩國間ノ合意ヲ以テ各場合ニ設立スル仲裁裁判所之ニ當ルモノニシテ右仲裁裁判所ハ五名ノ裁判官ヨリ成ルモノトス
- (四) 右ノ外解決手續中事態變更ノ抑制、假措置等ニ關スル規定存ス
- (五) 本條約ハ批准書交換ニヨリ效力ヲ發生シ五年間存續ス

第八、日土間通商暫定取極ニ就キテ

(昭和八年四月二十一日公表)

昭和四年七月三十一日「アンカラ」ニ於テ日土兩國代表者間ニ成立セル通商暫定取極ハ先般土國政府ヨリノ通告ニ依リ昭和八年五月六日以後失効スルコトトナツタ次第ハ官報告示ノ通テアルカ右ハ曩ニ兩國間ニ成立シタ正式通商條約ノ批准交換ニ付テ目下交渉進捗中ナルコト及土國國內法制上前記暫定取極ヲ其ノ失効期日タル五月六日以後ニ迄存續セシメ得サルコトトニ因ルモノデアツテ五月六日迄ニ正式通商條約カ效力發生ニ至ラヌ場合ニモ兩國通商關係カ無條約關係トナラヌ様兩國間ニ諒解成立ノ見込テアル

第九、國際經濟會議及軍縮事業ニ關スル米國大統領 親電ニ關スル帝國政府ノ米國政府宛通告文

(昭和八年五月七日公表)

世界平和ノ確立ト人類福祉ノ増進トニ貢獻セントスルハ帝國國策ノ根本義ナルニ由リ國際經濟會議及軍縮會議ノ成功ニ付帝國政府ノ協力ヲ期待セラレタル今次米國大統領ノ勸誘ニ對シテハ帝國政府ノ誠意ヲ以テ之ヲ迎フルモノナリ

近ク倫敦ニ於テ開催セラルヘキ國際經濟會議ニ關シテハ帝國政府ハ世界ノ不況ヲ除却シ各國國民ノ福祉ヲ増進スル爲各國ト協力スルノ決意ヲ有ス

軍縮事業ニ關シテハ帝國政府ハ大ナル關心ヲ有シ之カ目的達成ニ出來得ル限りノ努力ヲ致シツツアル次第ナルヲ以テ帝國政府ノ意圖ハ世界平和確立ヲ目的トスル大統領ノ崇高ナル志望ニ合致スルヲ確信ス大統領ノ通牒中ニ列擧セラレタル諸段階ニ關スル我方具體的見解ハ必要ニ應シ隨時開陳スル所アルヘシ

帝國政府ハ以上二大世界會議カ成ルヘク速ニ公正合理的ナル解決ニ到達シ世界カ目下遭遇シツツ

ソレ難局ヲ脱スニ至ランコトヲ冀望スルモノナリ

COMMUNICATION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONCERNING PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE.

It being the fundamental aim of Japan's national policy to contribute toward the establishment of universal peace and the promotion of the common well-being of mankind, the appeal of the President of the United States for co-operation towards the success of the World Economic Conference and the Disarmament Conference finds a hearty response on the part of the Japanese Government.

As regards the World Economic Conference shortly to be convened in London, the Japanese Government are fully resolved to collaborate with other governments with the aim of delivering the world from the prevailing depression and of bringing prosperity and happiness to all nations.

The Japanese Government take the utmost interest in the work of disarmament, and are exerting their best efforts towards its accomplishment. They are confident that their objective in this is in harmony with the noble desire of the President, which aims at securing a firm

assurance of peace throughout the world. Their views upon the different steps detailed in the President's message can if necessary be presented as occasion offers.

It is the sincere hope of the Japanese Government that these two great conferences will as speedily as possible arrive at fair and reasonable solutions of all the problems they have to consider, and thus eliminate the difficulties now confronting the entire world.



欠

MISSING

ルコトヲ確信シ共同ノ合意ニ依リ規定セラルヘキ關稅休戰ヲ會議ノ開始ニ當リ採用スルノ緊要ナルコトヲ認ム

前記諸政府ハ更ニ即時ノ措置カ極メテ重要ナルコトヲ確信シ六月十二日前及會議ノ繼續中現在國際通商ヲ阻害シ居ル諸種ノ困難ヲ増加セシムルコトアルヘキ如何ナル新ナル「イニシアチヴ」ヲモ執ラサルヘキコトヲ約シ且本會議ニ參加スル一切ノ他ノ政府ニ對シ右約束ヲ爲サシムルコトヲ切ニ要請ス尤モ諸國政府ハ會議ニ對スル一月ノ豫告ヲ以テ一九三三年七月三十一日以後何時ニテモ右約束ヨリ脱退スルノ權利ヲ保有スルモノトス

本會議ニ諸國政府ヲ會同セシムル主要動機ノ一ハ前記國際通商ノ障害ヲ克服セントスルニアリ仍テ上記諸政府ハ會議ニ列席スル他ノ一切ノ政府ニ對シ右目的ノ精神ニ合致スル様行動セシムルコトヲ要請ス

(備考) 準備專門家委員會提出ノ註釋付議案(C、四八、M、一八、一九三三)第一部B第二節ニ掲ケル考慮ニ從ヒ執ラレタル措置ハ本決議ニ照シテサレモノト諒解セラレ

議長ハ國際經濟會議ニ參加スル他ノ政府ニ對シ右決議ヲ議事録ト共ニ送付シ之ニ遲滯ナク加入セシムルコトヲ要請スルコトニナツテ居ル

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第十二、東支鐵道車輛問題ニ關聯スル「ソヴィエト」
聯邦政府ノ四月十六日附申出ニ對スル帝
國政府回答

(昭和八年五月二十六日公表)

滿洲事變後日本軍ノ行動北滿ニ展開スルニ及ンテ帝國政府ハ東支鐵道ニ對スル「ソ」聯邦ノ權益ヲ尊重スル旨一再ナラス聲明シタルカ其ノ間日本軍隊及出先官憲ハ北滿諸地方ニ於ケル匪賊討伐上諸般ノ困難アリタルニ拘ラス同鐵道ノ利益ヲ毀損セサルコトニ萬全ノ注意ヲ拂ヒタルハ顯著ナル事實ニシテ右ハ「ソ」聯邦政府ニ於テモ充分諒承セラルヘキ所ナリ然ルニ「ソ」聯邦政府ハ最近數ヶ月ニ於ケル滿洲國官憲及同國ノ日本人顧問ノ行動並直接出先日本官憲ノ行動カ東支鐵道ニ於テ重大ナル事態ヲ生シタリト爲シ同鐵道ノ正常ナル運行カ阻害セラレタルコトニ付テノミナラス此等行動カ右鐵道ニ關スル事態ノ尖銳化ヲ目的トスルコトニ付テモ憂慮シ居レリトテ「ソ」聯邦ノ利益侵害ナリトスル若干事例ヲ指摘シテ帝國政府ニ對シ右利益擁護ノ爲有效ナル手段ヲ採ラシコトヲ要求セリ

右指摘セラレタル事項中ニハ事純然タル滿洲政府ノ管轄ニ屬スルモノアリ右ハ帝國政府ノ關知セサル所ニシテ假令之ニ日本人タル滿洲國政府官吏又ハ顧問ノ關與シタルコトアリトスルモ右日本人官吏又ハ顧問ハ自己ノ自由意志ヲ以テ滿洲國ノ勤務ニ入り専ラ同國政府ノ指揮監督ノ下ニ行動スルモノナルニ付此等官吏又ハ顧問ノ行爲ニ付帝國政府ニ於テ責任ヲ負フヘキ筋合ノモノニ非サルヲ以テ此ノ種事項ニ關シテハ茲ニ回答ノ限ニ在ラス

指摘事項中帝國政府ノ關係アルモノニ關シテハ出先官憲ヲシテ慎重調査セシメタル結果左ノ通ナ

(イ) 日本軍人ノ哈爾濱埠頭事務所占有云々ノ問題ニ付テハ哈爾濱ニ於テハ一九三二年ノ大洪水以來建築物極度ニ不足シ居ルヲ以テ日本軍碇泊場司令部ハ本年松花江開航期ニ際シ第八區埠頭内ノ建物ヲ滿洲國交通部東北江運處ヨリ臨時借入レタルモノナルカ同埠頭ニ付テハ江運處ト東支間ニ之カ使用問題ニ付交渉懸案中ナルニ鑑ミ日本軍ノ右借入ニ付テハ同交渉解決ノ際ハ直ニ明渡スヘキ條件ヲ附シアリテ右ノ趣ハ江運處ヨリ東支側ニ通告濟ノ趣ナリ事情右ノ如クナルヲ以テ本件ハ東支及江運處間ノ前記交渉トハ無關係ニシテ且現ニ右交渉案件中ノモノヲ日本官憲ニ於テ奪取シタリト云フカ如キ事實ナシ又日本軍ノ借入レタル建物ハ現ニ東支カ日常營業ヲ行ヒ

ツツアル埠頭背後引込線區域ト離隔シ毫モ其ノ作業ヲ妨害スルモノニモ非サルヲ以テ日本軍ニ於テ何等東支ノ利益ヲ毀損シタルモノニモ非ス

尙埠頭問題ニ關シテハ嘗テ在本那「ソ」聯邦大使ヨリ日本側ノ好意的斡旋ヲ得度キ申出アリタルニ對シ本件ハ「ソ」滿兩國間ノ問題ニシテ帝國政府ノ關知スル所ニアラサル旨ヲ明カニスルト共ニ好意的ニ出先官憲ニ就キ事情問合方取計ヒタルコトアルモ帝國外務省ハ未タ嘗テ「ソ」側ニ本問題ノ急速解決ノ援助ヲ約シタルコトナシ

(ロ) 日本軍輸送運賃問題ノ交渉ニ關シテハ一般運賃率ニ付テハ五割引ヲ適用スルコトニ略協議纏リ目下右運賃率ヲ適用セラルヘキ貨車ノ等級及其ノ積載量並裝甲列車ノ運賃率等ニ付商議繼續セラレツツアリ右諸事項ニ關スル關東軍ノ具體的意見ハ東支側ニ詳細申入濟ニシテ東支ヨリノ回答ヲ俟チツツアル實情ナルヲ以テ帝國軍部カ本件交渉ヲ故意ニ遷延セシメ其ノ結果東支ノ財政ヲ惡化セシ居レリト云フハ當ラス本件ハ互讓ノ精神ヲ以テスレハ遠カラス解決ヲ見ルヘキ問題ニシテ尙又關東軍ハ東支ノ要請ニ應シ右交渉未成立ニモ拘ラス前後五回ニ互リ既ニ二百二十萬圓ヲ前渡シタリ

(ハ) 東支東部線方面ニ於テハ山間ニ分散遁入セル匪賊カ今春一時出沒シ時ニ列車ヲ襲撃シ又ハ鐵道從業員若クハ附近住民ヲ拉致セル事件アリタルコトハ事實ナルモ右ハ一時的ノ現象ニシテ其ノ間日滿兩國人モ「ソ」聯邦人ト共ニ危害ヲ蒙リ居リ特ニ「ソ」聯邦人ノミヲ目標トセルモノト認ムル能ハス尙右東部線ハ本年一月日本軍ノ兵匪掃蕩ニ依リ開通シタル以來今日迄運行ヲ停止シタルコトナシ

(ニ) 在滿帝國官憲ハ東支鐵道ニ關スル最近ノ滿「ソ」間紛議ニ關與シタルコトナシ從テ「ソ」聯邦政府カ右帝國官憲ニ於テ「ソ」聯邦内ニ在ル機關車及貨車問題ヲ人爲的ニ捏造シツツアリト云フカ如キハ事實アリ得ヘカラサル所ニシテ右ハ「ソ」聯邦側ノ邪推ニ非サレハ故意ニ事實ヲ捏造セルモノト云ハサルヲ得ス反テ最近「ソヴェト」通信機關タル「ロスタ」カ在滿日本軍憲及出先官憲ノ行動ニ關シ事實無根ノ誹謗的報道ヲ屢傳フルハ我方ノ頗ル迷惑且遺憾トスル所ナルヲ以テ「ソ」聯邦政府ニ於テ速ニ此ノ種報道ノ取消及取締方ニ付適當ナル手段ヲ講セラレンコトヲ要望セサルヲ得ス

尙「ソ」聯邦政府ハ「ソ」側ノ東支ニ對スル車輛返還ノ遷延ニ日滿軍ト支那軍トノ軍事行動ノ爲東支兩端カ閉塞シタル結果ナリト爲セル處右兩端ハ反滿匪賊ノ蟠踞ニ因リ一時閉塞シタルコトアルハ事實ナルモ間モナク匪賊討伐ニ關スル日本軍ノ努力ノ結果東支西部線ハ既ニ客年十二

月東部線ハ本年一月以來開通シ居レリ從テ車輛返還ノ遲延ヲ日本軍等ノ軍事行動ニ因ル東支兩端ノ閉塞ニ藉口スルハ事實ヲ誣フルノ甚タシキモノナリ

(ホ) 客年四五月ノ交滿洲國側ニ檢舉セラレタル「ソ」聯邦人相當多數ニ上レル處右檢舉ハ同年四月十二日ノ東支東部線成高子ニ於ケル日本軍隊輸送列車顛覆事件(右事件ニ依リ數十名ノ日本軍將士死傷セリ)ヲ始メ之ト殆ント前後シテ發生セル雙城堡日本軍入城妨害事件(未遂)、「バザノフ」ノ爆破物搬入事件、第二松花江鐵橋爆破計劃事件(未遂)、舊哈爾濱ニ於ケル鐵道破壞計劃事件(未遂)等直接間接日本軍ニ對スル危害ヲ目的トセル事件ニ關聯スルモノニシテ日本官憲モ必要ノ程度ニ於テ滿洲國官憲ニ助力シ事件ノ調査ニ一時關與シタルカ本件カ日本軍ニ對スル危害ヲ目的トシタル關係上右ハ當然ノコトナリ而シテ其ノ間日本憲兵カ被檢舉「ソ」聯邦人ヲ拷問シタリト云フカ如キ事實ナシ

以上述ヘタル所ニ依リテ「ソ」聯邦政府ハ帝國軍隊及官憲ノ行動ニシテ「ソ」ウヰエト」政府ノ憂慮スルカ如ク東支鐵道ニ關スル事態ノ尖鋭化ヲ目的トシ又ハ同鐵道ニ於テ重大ナル事態ヲ生セシメタルカ如キコト絶對ニ無之コトヲ十分諒解セラルヘシト信ス

尙最後ニ現ニ東支鐵道ノ經營ニ關聯シテ惹起セラレタル紛争ノ解決ハ同鐵道共同管理ノ責任者タ

ル「ソ」滿兩國當局間ノ折衝ニ待ツヘキ所ナルモ「ソ」滿兩國間ニ於ケル平和的秩序ノ維持ハ重要ナル極東平和ノ基調タリ而シテ帝國政府ハ日滿議定書ノ規定ニ基ク責務ニ鑑ミ滿洲國ノ治安維持ニ付不斷ノ關心ヲ有スルカ故ニ該紛争ノ推移ニ關シテハ深甚ノ注意ヲ怠ラサルト共ニ紛争カ一日モ速ニ公正妥當ナル解決ニ到達セムコトヲ冀望シテ已マサルモノナリ

第十三、營口英船員人質救出ノ経緯

(昭和八年九月八日公表)

一、英國太古洋行所有汽船南昌號昭和八年三月二十九日正午頃遼河口約二哩ノ沖合ニ於テ水先案内人ヲ待合セ中二隻ノ大型舢舨ニ分乗セル十數名ノ匪賊來襲セリ當時船員ノ大部分ハ甲板ニ於テ麻雀遊戲中ナリシ處船長ハ匪賊ノ襲撃ト見ルヤ急遽出帆命令ヲ發シタルモ船員等カ船室ニ逃ケ込ミタル爲出帆不能トナレル由ニテ匪賊等ハ發砲掠奪ヲ行ヒタル上英人船員四名ヲ拉致シテ何レヘカ逃走セリ

急報ニ接シ滿洲國海邊警察隊ハ奉天省警務廳指導ノ下ニ急遽搜索ヲ開始セルカ四月三日ニ至リ船員中ノ一名ハ匪賊ヨリノ書狀(本書狀ニハ百萬元ノ身代金及多量ノ武器彈藥ノ提供ヲ要求スル旨記載シアリ)ヲ携ヘ營口ニ歸來セリ

二、我方ニ於テハ滿洲國側ニ協力シテ極力前記英人人命ノ救助ヲ行フコトトシ不取敢驅逐艦一隻ヲ營口ニ派スルト共ニ滿洲國側ノ救出措置ヲ援助セシムル爲營口憲兵隊分隊長大畑憲兵大尉ヲシテ右ノ任務ニ當ラシムルコトトセリ

曩ニ英人船員ヲ拉致セル匪賊ハ四月中旬他ノ優勢ナル匪賊團ニ襲ハレ人質三名モ後者ニ奪ハルルニ至レルカ滿洲國側及大畑大尉ハ引續キ救出ニ腐心シ或ハ使者ヲ間斷ナク派出シテ匪賊トノ接洽ヲ試ミ或ハ匪賊ノ縁戚ヲ人質トシテ英人人質ノ釋放ヲ促ス等凡ユル方法ヲ用ヒタルモ匪賊ハ盤山灣ノ葦深キ地帯ヲ日々轉々シ居ルヲ以テ彼等ノ居所ヲ突止ムルコトノミニテモ極メテ困難ナルノミナラス一旦彼等ト接洽シ得タル場合ト雖百萬圓ノ身代金其ノ他法外ナル要求ヲナス有様ニテ匪賊トノ交渉ニ依ル救出ノ目的ヲ達スルコト至難ト認メラレタルニ付滿洲國側ニテハ四月下旬ニ至リ武力奪回ヲ決意シ六月初旬使者ヲ派遣シテ匪賊トノ間ニ最後ノ交渉ヲ行ヒ決裂ノ場合ニハ愈武力奪回ヲ決行スルコトトセリ

然ルニ右計畫ハ不幸ニシテ事前ニ匪賊ノ探知スル所トナリ直ニ該計畫ヲ實行セハ人質ヲ殺害セララル虞アリタルヲ以テ滿洲國側ニ於テハ右計畫ヲ一時中止シ引續キ使者ヲ匪賊ノ許ニ派シテ救出ノ端緒ヲ得ルニ努力セリ

然レ共匪賊トノ交渉ニ依ル救出ノ目的ハ依然トシテ達成セラレサリシニ付七月中旬ニ至リ滿洲國側ニ於テハ愈討伐ヲ決行スルコトトシ海邊警察隊員三百名ヲ警備艦艇五隻戎克十隻ニ乗船セシメ盤山灣ニ向ケ出動セシメ又陸上部隊トシテ警察隊及自衛團ノ聯合部隊ヲ出動セシムルト

共ニ日本守備隊數百名モ之ニ協力出動シ且飛行機二臺ヲ以テ匪情偵察及海陸戰隊ノ連絡ニ當ルコトトシ七月十五日拂曉ヲ以テ總攻撃ヲ開始シ匪賊ニ多大ノ損害ヲ與ヘタルモ遂ニ人質ヲ救出スル能ハス且匪賊ノ行衛一時不明トナレルヲ以テ十七日一先ツ討伐ヲ中止スルト共ニ其ノ後ハ五日乃至一週間ニ一回宛使者ヲ派シテ執拗ニ人質ノ釋放ヲ勸告シ來レルカ匪賊等ハ依然トシテ巨額ノ身代金ノ要求ヲ續ケタリ然ルニ滿洲國側ハ更ニ討伐計畫ヲ立直シタル處匪賊ニ於テモ解決ヲ長引カシムルノ不利ヲ悟リタルモノト見エ遂ニ日滿雙方ノ強硬ナル態度ニ屈シ人質ヲ投出スニ至リタルヲ以テ九月三日營口地方警察署長ハ大畑大尉ヲ同道装甲車ニ乘シテ匪賊代表者ノ滯在地ニ出發シ無事人質ノ身柄ヲ引取り八日營口ニ於テ英國側ニ引渡ヲ了セリ

三、事件發生後六ヶ月ニシテ今回漸ク救出措置ニ成功セル次第ナル處右成功ハ前述ノ通滿洲國側ノ異常ナル努力ノ結果ニシテ主任者タル奉天警務廳長ノ苦心ハ固ヨリ海邊警察隊及關係各縣警察カ現地ニ於ケル救出作業ニ際シ拂ヘル異常ナル努力ト其ノ經驗セル辛酸トハ到底筆紙ニ盡シ難キモノアリ又前記滿洲國側作業ノ援助ニ當レル在滿日本文武官憲特ニ大畑營口憲兵分隊長ノ勞苦モ亦忘ルヘカラサルモノアル次第ナリ而シテ此等ノ努力ハ滿洲國ノ治安維持ヲ計ル一面高潔ナル人道上ノ見地ヨリ爲サレタルモノナルコト勿論ナリ

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE CONCERNING THE
RELEASE OF THE BRITISH CREW TAKEN IN HOSTAGE AT
NEWCHANG. (SEPTEMBER 8, 1933)

At noon of March 29th this year the Steamship, Nanchang, owned by the Butterfield and Swire Company was lying some two miles off the mouth of the Liao River pending the arrival of the pilot, when suddenly there appeared brigands who came in two large sampans. The ship's officers and crew were mostly playing *ma jong* on the deck. The Captain, noticing the marauders, immediately ordered to set sail. But the ship could not be moved owing to the fact that the frightened sailors took refuge in their cabins. After shooting and looting, the brigands vanished, taking 4 British officers with them as hostages.

On receiving the report of the outrage, the coastal guards of Manchoukuo under the direction of Mukden Police Office began at once to hunt for the bandits. On April 3rd, while the search was going on, one of the kidnaped men returned to Newchang carrying a note from the captors, in which the demand for one million dollars and a huge quantities of arms and ammunition was made as price for the release of the remaining captives.

2. The Japanese Authorities, decided to take, in cooperation with those of Manchoukuo, every possible measure for the rescue of the victims. They despatched a destroyer to Newchang and placed the matter in the charge of Captain Ohbata, Chief of the Newchang Station

of the Military Police.

Toward the middle of April the three British hostages were found in the hands of another and stronger band of brigands who had attacked, and robbed them of, their original captors. Negotiations conducted between the bandits and the agents sent out by the Manchoukuo authorities from time to time produced no results. Such tactics as of holding the relatives of some of the bandits as hostages in order to induce the latter to release the Britishers proved of no avail. The work of rescue was continued in the face of well-nigh insuperable obstacles. In the first place, it was extremely difficult to locate the bandits who daily moved their camp in the thick marsh-land near the Bay of Panshan. When contact was finally established, the bandits asked for one million dollars or made other impossible demands. The Manchoukuo authorities, in despair of reaching a settlement through negotiation, resolved to take back the hostages by force of arms. They planned, however, to send negotiators in June once more and for the last time.

The bandits quickly got wind of the plan, and sent notice saying that the hostages would be killed the moment the authorities tried to carry out their scheme. Accordingly the scheme had to be dropped, and negotiations were resumed with no better prospects of success than before. Finally in the middle of July the Manchoukuo authorities decided upon a punitive expedition. Three hundred coast guards in five police boats and ten junks were sent out to the Pan

Shan Bay while a land force consisting of members of the police and volunteer corps were organized. The Japanese Military Authorities also mobilized a contingent of three hundred soldiers and two aero-planes for reconnoitring purposes to act in conjunction with the Manchoukuo forces. All preparations having been completed, a general attack was launched in the early morning of July 15th. The expeditionary forces inflicted a heavy loss upon the bandits, but were unable to recover the hostages. The military operations were suspended on July 17th as it became temporarily impossible to track the fleeing bandits. Thereafter, once in every five days, or week, messengers were despatched to the bandit headquarters to urge the release of the captives. The bandits persisted obstinately on their exorbitant price. With, however, the preparation for a renewed expedition on the part of the Manchoukuo force, the bandits seem to have awakened to the disadvantages of putting further off the settlement of the case and losing heart in face of the determined attitude of the Manchoukuo and Japanese authorities, they finally showed their willingness to surrender the prisoners. Accordingly, the local police chief of Newchang, accompanied by Captain Ohbata, went out, on September 3rd, in an armored car to meet the representatives of the bandits at their headquarters and safely recovered the hostages who were turned over to the British authorities at Newchang on September 8th.

3. It took altogether six months to save the three British since they were kidnapped. The rescue work entailed extraordinary patience, tact, and hardship on the part of the Chief

of Mukden Police Office as well as of the coastal guards and the local police force on the spot. Nor should the efforts devoted to the affair by the Japanese authorities—especially Captain Ohbata—be forgotten. It is needless to say that these men took the pains willingly and unselfishly according solely to the dictates of humanity.

第十四、日本印度間ノ通商ニ關スル條約ノ

效力存續ニ關スル暫定取極

(昭和八年十月九日公表)

本年四月十日英國政府ハ印度政府ノ希望ニ依ル趣ヲ以テ明治三十七年八月二十九日調印ノ日本印度間ノ通商ニ關スル條約ヲ同條約第四條ノ規定ニ基キ本年十月十日以後失效セシムヘキ旨在英松平大使ニ通告シ來レルヲ以テ帝國政府ハ右通告ニ接スルヤ同條約失效ニ依ル日印間無條約狀態ノ發生ヲ極力防止スル爲爾來銳意英印兩國政府ト新條約締結ノ爲ノ商議開始方ニ關シ折衝ヲ重ネ來レル處六月六日英國政府ハ印度ニ於テ本件會商ヲ行フヘキコトニ同意ナル旨ノ印度政府ノ希望ヲ傳達シ越セリ然ルニ其ノ後同月末ニ至リ印度政府ヨリ八月十四日ヨリ九月二十日迄印度議會開會中ハ本件會商ハ困難ナル旨申出テタル結果右會商ノ開始ハ九月二十一日後ニ非スンハ之ヲ行ヒ難キコトト爲リタルカ九月二十一日以後現行條約失效期間日タル十月十日迄ノ短期間ニ本件交渉ノ妥結ヲ見ルコト到底不可能ナルニ鑑ミ帝國政府ハ現行條約ノ失效ヨリ新條約ノ效力發生ニ至ル迄ノ間ノ無條約狀態ヲ避クル爲日英兩國間ニ暫定取極締結方ニ關シ在英松平大使ヲシテ英國政府ト

交渉セシメ居リシ處今般右取極案文ニ關スル協議調ヒ十月七日「ロンドン」ニ於テ松平大使ト英國外務大臣トノ間ニ公文ノ交換ヲ了シタリ本取極ノ要旨ハ(一)本年十月十日ヨリ効力ヲ失フヘキ日印間現行條約カ右期日ヨリ一月ノ期間効力ヲ存續スヘキコト(二)右期間中日印兩國ハ對手國ヨリ現ニ輸入セラルル物品ニ對スル關稅ヲ据置クコト(三)日印間通商關係ニ關スル新ナル協定カ本年十一月十日ニ至ル迄ニ締結セラレサリシトキハ「シムラ」ニ於テ兩國代表者間ニ取極メラルヘキ條件ニ從ヒ適當ノ期間之ヲ延長スルコトヲ約スルニアリ

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE
PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE CONTINUANCE
IN FORCE OF THE PRESENT COMMERCIAL CONVENTION
BETWEEN JAPAN AND INDIA.

On April 10 this year the British Government notified Ambassador Matsudaira at London that on account of the wishes of the Indian Government the Convention Regarding the Commercial Relations between Japan and India, signed on the 28th of August, 1904, would be terminated in accordance with the stipulation contained in Article 4 thereof. On receiving the notice the Japanese Government, desirous of forestalling the eventuality of Japan and In-

dia ceasing to have any treaty relations at all, at once proposed that Great Britain and India and Japan enter upon negotiations with a view to concluding a new convention. On June 6 the British Government communicated to the Japanese Government the readiness of the Indian Government to accept the Japanese proposal. However, toward the end of the same month the Indian Government sent notice that it would be difficult to hold a conference between August 14 and September 20 while the Indian Parliament was in session, of which the consequence was that no conference could be called until after September 21.

In view of the obvious impossibility of concluding a new Commercial treaty in the brief time available before October 10, the date of the expiration of the present convention, the Japanese Government instructed Ambassador Matsudaira to negotiate with the British Government a provisional Agreement that will serve to bridge over the period after the present convention expires and before a new one comes into force. This agreement has now been reached, the exchange of notes between Ambassador Matsudaira and Sir John Simon, British Foreign Minister, having taken place on October 7 at London. The following is the gist of the agreement.

1. The Japanese-Indian Convention which is to expire on October 10, shall remain in force for a period of one month from that date.
2. During that period the customs duties on goods at present imported into either coun-

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try from the other shall remain at the present level.

3. In the event that a new commercial convention between Japan and India is not concluded by November 10, 1933, the arrangement above shall be extended for a further reasonable period on terms to be agreed upon between the representatives of the two countries now meeting at Simula.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. I.

7th October, 1933.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India propose that the Convention signed on the 29th August 1904 regarding commercial relations between Japan and India, which is to cease to be in force from the 10th October 1933, shall remain in force for a period of one month from that date, and that during that time the customs duties on goods at present imported into either country from the other shall remain at their present level.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India farther propose that in the event of a new agreement affecting the commercial relations between Japan and India not having been concluded by November 10th 1933, an arrangement on the

lines proposed above shall be extended for a further reasonable period on terms to be arranged by negotiation between the representatives of the Japanese Government and the Government of India now engaged in discussing the terms of a new commercial agreement.

If these proposals are acceptable to the Japanese Government I would suggest to Your Excellency that the present Note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall be understood as bringing this arrangement into force.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

Signed: John Simon.

Mr. Teunoo Matsudaira,

His Imperial Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary at the Court of St. James.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note dated October 7th, 1933, in which you are good enough to inform me as follows:—

“I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India propose that the Convention signed on the

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29th August 1904 regarding commercial relations between Japan and India, which is to cease to be in force from the 10th October 1933, shall remain in force for a period of one month from that date, and that during that time the customs duties on goods at present imported into either country from the other shall remain at their present level.

“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India further propose that in the event of a new agreement affecting the commercial relations between Japan and India not having been concluded by November 10th 1933, an arrangement on the lines proposed above shall be extended for a further reasonable period on terms to be arranged by negotiation between the representatives of the Japanese Government and the Government of India now engaged in discussing the terms of a new commercial agreement.

“If these proposals are acceptable to the Japanese Government I would suggest to Your Excellency that the present Note and Your Excellency’s reply to that effect shall be understood as bringing this arrangement into force.”

In reply thereto, I beg to state that the Japanese Government agree to these proposals and to your suggestion that the present exchange of Notes shall be understood as bringing this arrangement into force.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Signed : T. Matsudaira.

The Right Honourable Sir John Simon, G. C. S. I., K. C. V. O.,
His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

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一、第五十九回帝國議會ニ於ケル幣原外務大臣兼 内閣總理大臣臨時代理演說

(昭和六年一月二十二日)

諸君濱口内閣總理大臣ハ昨年十一月十四日不慮ノ難ニ遭ハレ目下療養中テアリマスカ幸ニ經過良
好テアリマシテ遠カラス當議場ニ出席シ御目ニ掛ルコトカ出來ルテアラウト存シマス私ハ内閣官
制第八條ニ依リ内閣總理大臣臨時代理ヲ仰付ラレ本日茲ニ第五十九回帝國議會ニ臨ミマシテ政府
所信ノ概要ヲ陳述致シマスルコトハ私ノ最光榮トスル所テアリマス

過去一年間ヲ通シテ國際政局上最重要ナル出來事ハ倫敦海軍條約ノ締結テアリマス同條約ハ昨年
四月二十二日日、英、米、佛、伊ノ五國全權委員ノ間ニ調印ヲ終リ日、英、米三國ノ關スル限リ
批准全部ノ寄託ヲ了シ舊臘三十一日ヨリ完全ニ其ノ效力ヲ發生スルコトトナツタノテアリマシテ
世界三大海軍國ノ協力ニ依リ茲ニ國際平和ニ新タナル保障カ加ハルニ至リマシタコトハ洵ニ慶賀
ニ堪ヘヌ所テアリマス

御承知ノ如ク倫敦條約ハ大正十一年ノ華府條約ト相俟ツテ外ハ製艦競争ニ伴フ危險ヲ防止シ以テ主要海軍國間ノ友交關係ニ新生面ヲ開クト共ニ内ハ國費ヲ輕減シ以テ民力ノ休養ニ資スル所尠ナカラサルモノアルコトハ今更申ス迄モアリマセヌ此ノ條約ノ物質的並精神的の效果ヲ永ク維持シ更ニ進ンテ之カ擴充ヲ圖ルコトハ關係列國ノ重要ナル責務テアリマシテ將來ニ對スル全世界ノ希望モ亦繁ツテ此ノ點ニ存スルモノト信シマス

隣邦中華民國ノ内亂ハ昨秋漸ク終局ヲ告ケ目下同國政府ハ銳意國內秩序ノ恢復ト諸般施政ノ刷新トニ努力致シテ居ルモノト認メラレマス民國ノ和平統一ハ獨リ同國民ノ幸福タルノミナラス列國ニ於テモ亦齊シク歡迎スル所テアリマス帝國政府ハ夙ニ日華兩國ノ親交ニ重キヲ置キ其ノ關係ノ愈圓滿ニ伸展センコトヲ期シテ居ル次第テアリマス

帝國ト歐米各國トノ關係ハ満足ナル狀態ニ在リマシテ今後益密接鞏固ヲ加フヘキコトハ確信ヲ以テ期待シ得ラルル所テアリマス

昭和六年度ノ豫算ニ付キマシテハ財界並國庫歳入ノ情況ニ顧ミ既定經費ニ對シテ極力整理節約ヲ加フルト共ニ新規事業ハ眞ニ緊急已ムヲ得サルモノヲ除クノ外一切之ヲ認メナイコトニ致シタノテアリマス斯クシテ編成セラレタル昭和六年度總豫算ハ歳出十四億四千餘萬圓之ヲ昭和四年度總

豫算歳出ニ比較スルトキハ三億二千餘萬圓ノ減額トナルノテアリマス斯ノ如ク財政ノ調理困難ナル時テハアリマスカ我カ國防ニ遺憾ナカラシムル爲昭和六年度以降數年ニ互ル海軍兵力ノ整備計畫ヲ樹テタノテアリマス斯ノ計畫ハ眞ニ緊要ナル事項ノミヲ整備セントスルモノテアリマシテ之ニ依リ國防ノ骨幹ハ一先ツ整フ次第テアリマス

尙政府ハ民力ノ涵養ヲ圖ルノ急務ナルコトヲ認メマシテ海軍條約ノ成立ニ伴ヒ豫テ軍艦建造ノ爲ニ留保セラレタル財源ノ内ヨリ昭和六年度以降昭和十一年度ニ至ルマテ初年度九百餘萬圓平年度約二千五百萬圓ノ減稅ヲ行フコトニ定メタノテアリマス

公債ニ關シテハ獨逸賠償金ヲ國債整理基金ニ繰入ルルコトヲ當分ノ内中止シタル外大體前年度ノ方針ヲ繼續セントスルモノテアリマス併ナカラ失業者ノ救濟ハ刻下緊切ノ要務テアリマシテ夙ニ地方ニ於テハ之ニ關スル事業ニ付起債ヲ緩和スルノ途ヲ開イタノテアリマスカ國家ニ於テモ相當ノ計畫ヲ樹ツルノ必要ヲ認メマシテ一般特別兩會計ニ於テ既定ノ起債額以外ニ相當額ノ公債ヲ一年度限リ發行スルコトト致シタノテアリマス但シ之ニ依テ財界ヲ壓迫スルコトヲ慮リマシテ之ヲ公募ニ待ツコトヲ避ケタノテアリマス金解禁決行以後ノ經濟狀況ヲ概觀致シマスルニ我財界ハ建直シノ中途ニ於テ世界的ノ不景氣ニ遭遇シタル爲朝野ヲ擧ケテ一時ハ不安ノ氣分ニ襲ハレタノテ

アリマス。其ノ間ニ於テ産業ノ合理化、國產愛用ノ獎勵、金融ノ調節、失業ノ救済等種々ノ對策ヲ講シタル結果人心ハ漸次安定スルニ至ツタノテアリマス。顧ミマスレハ昭和五年ノ一年間ハ財界一般ニ多難ノ時テアリマシタカ全世界ヲ通スル不景氣ノ中ニ於テ我國獨リ其ノ例外タルコトヲ得マセヌ。此ノ際朝野共ニ堅忍不拔ノ精神ヲ以テ此ノ難局ニ處スルノ覺悟カ特ニ肝要テアルト考ヘマス。我國ノ歴史ニ鑑ミマスルニ國民ハ從來幾度カ今日以上ノ艱難ニ逢著シテ能ク其ノ試鍊ニ耐ヘ來ツタノテアリマス。斯カル國民ノ元氣ハ今尙決シテ衰ヘテ居ナイコトヲ信シテ疑ヒマセヌ。

續ツテ廣ク行政財政ノ現状ヲ看マスルニ急激ニ減少シタル國費ト國務執行トノ調和ヲ圖リ今日ノ行政組織ヲ改正シテ國民經濟ノ現状ニ適合セシムルコトハ極メテ必要テアルト考ヘマス。又稅制ニ付テモ改正ヲ要スル點カアルト思ヒマス。仍テ政府ハ將來ニ向ツテ行政ヲ刷新シ財政ノ基礎ヲ一層鞏固ナラシメ國民負擔ノ公正ヲ圖ランカ爲來年度早々行政、財政及稅制ニ關スル調査會ヲ設ケ速ニ整理ノ實ヲ舉ケンコトヲ期スル次第テアリマス。茲ニ整理ト申スノハ單ニ緊縮節約ノミヲ意味スルノテハアリマセヌ。調査檢討ノ結果冗ヲ省キ要ヲ存シ或ハ産業ノ振興ニ或ハ社會政策ノ實行ニ全力ヲ傾注シ由テ以テ時代ノ要求ニ對應セントスルノ趣旨テアリマス。

恩給制度ノ改正ハ多年ノ懸案テアリマシテ最早久シク放任スヘキモノテハアリマセヌ。此ノ問題モ政府ノ速ニ解決セントスル行政整理ノ主要ナル一項目テアリマス。

陸軍軍制ノ改革ニ關シテハ一昨年八月以來陸軍當局ニ於テ軍制調査會ヲ設ケ講究中テアリマシタカ最近ニ至リ國際聯盟ニ於テ陸、海、空ノ三軍ヲ通スルノ軍縮本會議ヲ召集スルノ機運モ熟シテ參ツタノテ之ヲモ考量シテ審議スルノ必要ヲ生シ目下其ノ趣旨ニ於テ引續キ研究ヲ進メテ居ルノテアリマス。

之ヲ要スルニ今日ノ時勢ハ漫然諸種ノ經費ヲ膨脹セシメテ事業ヲ濫興セシムヘキ秋テハアリマセヌ。一ニハ民力ヲ培養シテ他日ノ伸展ニ備ヘ一ニハ財政經濟ノ基礎ヲ鞏固ニシテ國力ノ充實ヲ期スルコトカ刻下ノ急務テアルト確信スルノテアリマス。政府ハ以上ノ方針ヲ以テ豫算ヲ編成シ諸法案ヲ提出シ又今後二期セントスル次第テアリマス。カ何卒政府ノ意ノ存スル所ヲ諒トセラレ慎重審議各案ニ協賛ヲ與ヘラレンコトヲ望ム次第テアリマス。

是ヨリ私ハ外務大臣トシテ外交問題ニ關シ所見ヲ申述ヘタイノテアリマス。過去一年間ニ於テ我カ對外關係ニ最重要ナル影響ヲ及ホシタル出來事ハ倫敦海軍條約ノ締結テアリマス。同條約ハ昨年十

月二十七日愛蘭自由國ヲ除クノ外全英聯盟ノ各邦並日米兩國ノ批准書寄託ヲ了シ十二月三十一日ニハ愛蘭自由國ノ批准書モ寄託サレマシタカラ日、英、米ノ關スル限リハ愈效力ヲ發生スルコトトナツタノテアリマス其ノ全文ハ既ニ公布セラレ又各條項ノ内容ニ付テハ前議會ニ於テ仔細ニ論議サレマシタカラ茲ニハ繰返シマセヌ唯同條約ノ齎ラシタル精神的效果ニ至ツテハ一言附加ヘタイコトカアリマス倫敦條約ハ補助艦ニ關シテ近年主要海軍國ノ間ニ漸ク萌シツツアリタル造艦競争ノ勢ヲ絶チ華盛頓會議以來各國ノ政治家ヲ惱シタル懸案ヲ一舉ニシテ解決シタノテアリマスルカラ其ノ成立カ國際政局ノ安定ノ爲ニ如何ニ重大ナル意義ヲ有スルカハ申スマテモアリマセヌ又現ニ是カ爲關係列國ノ間ニ各般ノ方面ニ互ツテ著シク相互ノ信賴同情ヲ深ウスルニ至ツタコトモ内外ノ輿論ト不斷ノ接觸ヲ持ツ者ノ一樣ニ感スル事實ヲアルト信シマス其ノ結果ハ昭和十年ヲ以テ更ニ開カルヘキ海軍會議ノ事業ニ良好ナル影響ヲ與ヘルモノテアリマシテ世界ノ平和進歩ハ結局斯カル人心ノ道德的ノ自覺ニ依ルノ外カナイノテアリマス

中華民國ノ内亂ハ昨年五六月ノ頃ニハ山東省ニマテ波及シ濟南並其ノ以東ノ膠濟鐵道ノ沿線一帯ニ在留スル本邦人ハ幾度カ危險ニ曝サレタノテアリマスカ同地方ニ於ケル我カ官民一致ノ努力其

ノ宜シキヲ得タル爲又交戰軍隊モ雙方共本邦人ノ保護ニ嚴密ナル注意ヲ加ヘタル爲幸ニ本邦人中一名ノ死傷者ヲモ出サス財産上ノ損害モ極メテ輕微ニ止マツタノテアリマス是ト同時ニ民國ノ各地方殊ニ中部並南方ノ諸省ニハ所謂共匪横行シテ遂ニ長沙事件ヲ惹起シ一時ハ容易ナラサル混亂狀態ニ陥リマシタカ八月ニ入ツテ形勢一變シ國內ノ平和統一カ再ヒ其ノ緒ニ就クニ至リマシタコトハ隣邦ノ爲將タ又東亞ノ大局ノ爲洵ニ慶賀ノ至リニ堪ヘマセヌ

固ヨリ民國ノ前途ニハ今後尙幾多ノ難關カ横ハツテ居ルノヲ認メラレマス之ヲ逐次突破スルニハ同國政治家ニ於テ如何ニ忍耐ト勇氣ト而シテ列國ノ友情トヲ必要トスルカヲ諒察スルニ難カラヌノテアリマス唯茲ニ民國ノ爲ニ人意ヲ強ウスルモノカアリマスノハ最近民國首腦部ノ言動カ著シク國內政治ノ建設事業ニ重キヲ置イテ居ルコトテアリマス即チ蔣總司令ハ過般南京ニ凱旋スルヤ否ヤ全國民ニ通電シテ地方匪賊ノ掃蕩ヲ圖ルノ急務ヲ唱フルト共ニ財政上ノ整理、綱紀ノ肅正、經濟開發ノ爲ニスル外資ノ吸收、地方自治ノ勵行等ヲ高調セルノミナラス昨年十一月ノ第四回全體會議ノ決議ニ依リマスレハ今年五月初期シテ國民大會ノ開催ヲ豫定シ且ツ政治ノ當面ノ目標ヲ秩序安定、民力培養並教育普及ニ置キ又對外關係ノ事項トシテハ釐金ノ撤廢、内外債ノ整理等

ニ對スル決心ヲ示シテ居リマス
 之ヲ以テ觀レハ國民政府ハ今ヤ内亂ノ終局ト共ニ政治ノ現實ナル建設的革新ニ依ツテ國家ノ基礎ヲ樹立シ之ニ依ツテ列國ノ間ニ其ノ當然ノ地位ヲ確保セントスル方針ノ實行ニ歩ヲ進ムルニ至ツタモノト推測シ得ラレルノテアリマス果シテ然ラハ此ノ方針ハ我國カ曾テ國際的不平等ノ地位ヨリ躍進シタルト同様ノ經路ヲ履ムモノテアリマシテ吾々ハ衷心ヨリ斯カル努力ノ成功ヲ祝福セサルヲ得マセヌ是カ爲ニ政府ハ及フ限リ協力ヲ吝マサル覺悟テアリマシテ現ニ國民政府ノ各部ヨリ教育、軍事、警察、交通、自治行政、其ノ他諸般ノ事項ニ互ツテ我國ニ研究員ヲ派遣シ又ハ資料ヲ求ムルコトハ最近頻繁トナルニ至ツタノテアリマスカ吾々ハ其ノ要望ニ應ジテ廣ク門戸ヲ開キ一切ノ便宜ヲ供シツツアル實況テアリマス民國カ眞面目ニ國內政治ノ建設ニ努メ殊ニ内外人ノ生命財產並ニ正當ナル經濟的活動ニ對シテ有效適切ナル保護ヲ與ヘ又列國トノ關係ニ於テモ民國ノ負擔スル義務カ圓滿ニ履行セラレマスルニ至リマスルナラハ所謂列國トノ不平等條約ハ自然ニ其ノ存在ノ理由ヲ失ヒ何レノ國モ欣然之カ撤廢ニ同意スヘキコトハ一點ノ疑ヲ容レマセヌ
 抑日華兩國ハ久シキ歴史ヲ背景トシテ今日ノ如キ密接複雜ナル政治的並經濟的ノ關係ヲ築キ上ケテ居ルノテアリマス其ノ關係ヲ構成スル各種ノ分子中如何ナルモノカ我國國民の生存ノ必要上變改

ヲ許ササル性質ヲ有スルカ又如何ナルモノカ世界ノ變遷殊ニ日華間ノ新事態ニ應ジテ調整シ得ラルヘキモノテアルカ而シテ之ヲ調整スルニハ如何ナル順序方法ニ依ルヘキカ此等ノ問題ニ付テハ我カ國論ハ根本ニ於テ其ノ判斷ヲ一ニスルモノト信シマス此等ノ問題ヲ處理スル上ニ於テ兩國孰レノ一方モ宣傳ヤ威嚇ヲ以テ他ノ一方ニ對スルカ如キコトカアリマシテハ徒ラニ事態ヲ紛糾セシムルノミテアリマシテ何等有益ナル目的ヲモ達シ得ラレルモノテハアリマセヌ互ニ寛大ナル精神ト理解アル態度トヲ以テ共存共榮ノ途ヲ講シテコソ諸般ノ交渉案件ハ解決セラレ雙方ノ真正ナル利益ハ増進シ得ラレルモノト考ヘマス吾々ハ常ニ此ノ信念ヲ以テ事ニ當ツテ居ルノテアリマス數年間ノ懸案タル南京事件並漢口事件ノ損害賠償問題モ最近兩國當局者間ニ意見ノ一致ヲ見ルニ至リマシタ日華兩國間ノ重要通信機關タル上海、長崎間並青島、佐世保間ノ海底電線問題モ數ヶ月ニ互ツテ困難ナル交渉ヲ重ネマシタカ途ニ舊約定期間ノ滿了ト共ニ新約定締結ノ議カ纏マリマシタ滿洲ニ於ケル鐵道問題ニ付テモ數年來未決ニ屬スルモノカ尠クナイノテアリマスカ政府ハ以上ノ方針ニ依ツテ適當ニ之ヲ調整センカ爲ニ切角努力中テアリマス吾々ハ固ヨリ民國ノ正當ナル立場ヲ無視シテ妄リニ利己的ノ要求ヲ爲スカ如キ意思ヲ有スルモノテハアリマセヌ同時ニ民國側ニ於テモ我カ南滿洲鐵道ノ地位ヲ危クセントスルカ如キ計略カアリ得ヘキモノトハ信セラレマセ

又斯カル企カ容易ニ實現シ得ラレルモノテハアリマセヌ尙朝鮮ニ隣接セル間島地方ハ從來屢不逞ノ徒ノ巢窟トナリ而モ民國ノ地方官憲ニハ豫テ我國ノ眞意ニ誤解カアリ是カ爲ニ同地方ノ治安維持上頗ル憂慮スヘキ情態ヲ呈シ在留鮮人中ニモ被害續出致シタノテアリマスカ吾々ハ胸襟ヲ披イテ民國官憲ト接衝シタル結果相互ノ意思疎通シ今ヤ民國官憲自ラ吾々ト同シク匪賊取締ノ必要ヲ切實ニ感スルニ至リマシテ同地方ノ情勢ハ著シク改善セラレ在留鮮人モ漸次其ノ緒ニ安ンスルコトトナツタノテアリマス

帝國ト「ソヴイエツト」聯邦トノ關係ニ於テハ貿易額モ近年急激ナル増加ノ勢ヲ示シマシテ既ニ國交恢復當時ノ三倍ニ達スルニ至リマシタコトハ悅フヘキ傾向テアリマス目下兩國政府間ニ交渉中ノ若干懸案カアリマスカ吾々ハ「ソヴイエツト」政府カ吾々ト等シク兩國ノ親交ニ重キヲ置キ此ノ大局上ノ見地ヨリ各般ノ問題ヲ解決セントスル用意アルモノト信シマス固ヨリ此等ノ問題ヲ解決スルニハ等シク雙方ノ立場ヲ考量シテ其ノ間ニ公正ナル一致點ヲ見出サナケレハナリマセヌ極東露領方面ノ漁業問題ニ至ツテハ本邦人ノ漁業權ハ「ポーツマス」條約ニ根源ヲ發スルモノテアリマシテ同條約カ現ニ效力ヲ有スルコトハ大正十四年ニ調印サレタル日露國交基本條約中ニ明

文カアリマス又「ソヴイエツト」政府ニ於テモ事實上本邦人ノ漁業權行使ヲ不可能ナラシメントスルカ如キ意圖アルモノトハ認メラレマセヌ從テ此ノ問題モ亦必ス相當ナル解決ニ達シ得ラレルモノト期待致シテ居ルノテアリマス

帝國ト歐米諸國トノ關係ハ一般ニ極メテ満足スヘキ情態テアリマシテ今後モ亦益順調ニ發展スヘキコトハ吾々ノ確信スル所テアリマス過去七年間絶ニス我カ國論ニ刺戟ヲ與ヘタル米國移民法ノ問題ニ付テモ同國ニ於テ國民ノ多數カ最近如何ニ能ク我國ノ立場ヲ諒解スルニ至ツタカハ最早疑ヲ容レマセヌ吾々ハ深キ興味ヲ以テ靜カニ此ノ問題ノ推移ニ注目スルモノテアリマス

一、第六十回帝國議會ニ於ケル芳澤外務大臣演說

(昭和七年一月二十一日)

帝國目下ノ外交問題ノ内重要ナル案件ニ付テ茲ニ所見ヲ陳述致シマスルハ私ノ欣幸トスル所テアリマス

外交案件中我國ニ取り最重要ニシテ同時ニ世界ノ耳目ヲ聳動シタルモノハ申ス迄モナク滿洲事變テアリマス

元來支那ハ我隣邦タル關係上我國ニ取り政治上、經濟上及社會上頗ル重要ナル關係ヲ有スル次第テアリマスカ殊ニ滿洲ニ付テハ過去ノ歴史及接壤關係等ヨリ政治的考量ヲ要スルコト頗ル大ナルモノカアリ又滿洲ニ於ケル治安ノ消長カ我國ニ對シ極メテ緊切ナル影響ヲ與フルコトハ論ヲ俟タサル所テアリマス加之日本ハ滿洲及內蒙古ニテ百萬以上ノ居留民ヲ有シ又租借地、鐵道、炭坑等ニ關シ條約上乃至契約上幾多ノ重要ナル權益ヲ有シテ居リマス

然ルニ近年支那官憲ハ滿洲カ日本ノ努力ニ依リ今日アルヲ得タル歴史ヲ藐視シ我方ノ寛大ナル態度ニ狃レテ帝國臣民ヲ迫害シ我條約上乃至契約上ノ權利利益ヲ蹂躪シタル實例類々トシテ起リ我

國ハ之ニ對シ屢抗議ヲ提出シ警告ヲ與ヘタノテアリマスカ殆ト何等ノ效果ナク之カ爲日本ノ同地方ニ對スル政治的關係ニ頗ル不安ヲ加ヘタノミナラス我權利利益カ頗ル危殆ニ陥リタルコトハ否ムコトカ出來マセヌ其ノ結果我朝野ノ感情次第ニ刺戟セラレタル際偶九月十八日夜鐵道爆破事件カ突發シテ日支兵ノ衝突トナリ事態發展シテ滿洲ニ於ケル政情モ亦一變スルニ至ツタ顛末ハ既ニ御承知ノ通テアリマス

抑滿洲ハ極東治安ノ關鍵トモ稱シ得ルモノテアリマシテ日露戰爭以前ニ於テモ既ニ左様テアリマシタカ今日ニ於テハ其ノ一層適切ナルヲ覺ユルノテアリマス殊ニ我國トシテハ絶大ナル權益ヲ有スルカ故ニ從來支那本部ニ於ケル内亂ノ滿洲ニ波及セムトシタル場合我國ハ極力之カ防遏ニ努力シマシタ之畢竟滿洲ニ於ケル治安ノ維持ハ我國ニ取り絶對ニ必要ナルカ爲ニ外ナリマセヌ幸ヒ過去ニ於テハ我方ノ努力ニ依リ支那本部ニ於ケル内亂ニ拘ラス滿洲ノミハ殆ト別天地ノ如ク其ノ影響ヲ受ケナカッタ次第テアリマス若シ近年ニ於ケルカ如ク支那側ノ不法行爲ナク我方ノ條約上乃至契約上ノ權利ニシテ尊重セラレテ居タナラハ假令九月十八日ノ事件カアルニシテモ今日ノ如キ紛糾ヲ見ルコトハナカッタモノト信シマス

前述ノ如ク過去ニ於ケル滿洲ノ治安ハ主トシテ我國ニ依リ維持セラレタノテアリマスカ將來ニ於

テハ此ノ點ニ關スル我國ノ責任ハ加重スルモ輕減スルコトハナイト考フルノテアリマス日本ノ滿洲ニ對スル立場ハ右ノ如クテアリマスカ茲ニ一言ヲ要スルハ日本ハ滿洲ニ於テ領土の企圖ヲ有スルモノテハアリマセヌ又既存ノ諸條約ハ申スニ及ハス門戶解放、機會均等ノ主義ヲ尊重スルコトモ勿論テアリマス日本ノ滿蒙ニ對シテ要望スル所ハ同地方ノ治安ノ確保及經濟的開發ニ依ツテ内外人安住ノ地トナルコトニ存スル次第テアリマス

額テ支那本部ノ狀況ヲ見マスルニ排日運動ハ過去多年ニ互リ殆ト繼續的ニ行ハレテ來タモノテアツテ或ハ一時緩和スルコトカアツテモ忽チニシテ再ヒ猛烈深刻ナル狀態ヲ呈スル次第テアリマスカ之ハ單ニ日貨排斥等所謂經濟絕交運動タルニ止ラス諸學校ノ教科書ニ種々ノ排日教材ヲ採録スル等精神の半面ヲモ有スル次第テアリマス而シテ此ノ運動カ支那官憲ノ直接間接ノ指導獎勵ノ下ニ反日會等私的團體ノ壓迫強制ニ依リ一般商民ノ自由意思ニ反シテ行ハレテ居ルモノテアルコトハ確實ナル證據カアリマス尙其ノ間排日ヲ以テ營利的職業ト爲スモノスラ尠カラサル實情テアリマス然ルニ昨秋滿洲事變發生以來該運動ハ又復非常ニ險惡ナル情勢ヲ示シ幾多ノ暴虐ナル所爲發生シタルハ甚タ遺憾トセサルヲ得マセヌ日本ハ其ノ領土内ニ於テ支那人ニ對シ完全ナル保護ヲ與ヘテ居ルニ拘ラス支那ニ於ケル我同胞カ名狀スヘカラサル虐待ヲ受ケツツアルコトハ非常ニ懸隔

セル對照テアリマス

由來支那ニ於テハ比年内亂又ハ黨派間ノ爭鬪絶ユルコトナク之カ爲内政上ノ事情カ對外關係ニ影響ヲ及ホスコト頗ル大ナルモノカアリ排日運動モ亦内政關係ニ基クモノアル次第ハ申上クル迄モナイ所テアリマシテ滿洲事變發生以前ニ於ケル同地地方官憲ノ排日態度等モ亦同様ノ事情ニ依ルモノカアツタコトト信シマス之ヲ要スルニ内亂若クハ黨派間ノ爭鬪ナルモノカ支那ノ對外關係ニ多大ノ影響ヲ及ホシタコトハ否認シ難イ事實テアツテ我日本ハ支那ノ隣邦タルカ爲列國中最大ナル影響ヲ蒙リツツアル次第テアリマス

不幸ニシテ日支間ノ關係ハ目下ノ所前述ノ如ク支那ノ對内對外關係等複雜ナル事情ノ影響ヲ受ケテ居ルノテアリマシテ兩國ノ關係ヲ改善シ國交ヲ常軌ニ復歸セシメムカ爲ニハ相當ノ時日ヲ要スルコトト考ヘマス滿洲事變ハ日本ノ正當防衛ニ基クモノテアリ排日運動ハ支那側ノ謬見ニ基クモノテアツテ要スルニ兩者トモ支那側ニ於テ反省シテ其ノ態度ヲ徹底的ニ改ムルコトヲ必要トスルモノテアリマス尤モ支那一般人民及有識者ハ我ヲ敵視スルモノテハナイノミナラス其ノ衷心ニ於テハ我ニ對シテ寧ロ友好的テアルト信シマス從テ兩國間ニ於ケル通常關係ノ恢復ニ付テハ必スシモ悲觀ヲ要シマセヌ日支兩國ハ相互ニ敬愛シ不良ノ關係ハ之ヲ除外例ト爲シ原則トシテ親善ナル

ヘキテアツテ此ノ事カ兩國ニ利益テアルコトハ申ス迄モアリマセヌ
 滿洲事變ハ當時壽府ニ開催中ノ國際聯盟總會及理事會ニ可ナリノ衝動ヲ與ヘマシタカ支那代表ハ
 九月二十一日聯盟規約第十一條ニ基イテ本件ヲ理事會ノ問題トシテ審議ヲ要求シマシタノテ茲ニ
 本問題ハ正式ニ聯盟理事會ノ審査ニ附セラルルコトナツタ次第アリマス爾來聯盟理事會ハ本
 件審議ノ爲三回ノ會議ヲ重ネ前後二回ノ決議ヲ採擇スルニ至ツタ次第ハ既ニ世間周知ノ事實デア
 リマス又一方米國政府ハ國際聯盟ノ一員テハアリマセヌカ大體ニ於テ聯盟側ト歩調ヲ合セテ來タ
 次第デアリマシテ之ハ不戰條約及九國條約ノ締約國ノ一トシテ極東ノ事態ニ付多大ノ關心ヲ有シ
 タルカ爲ト思ハレマス帝國政府ハ聯盟ニ對シマシテモ米國ニ對シマシテモ常ニ滿洲事變ニ關スル
 我方ノ立場ヲ明カニシテ來タノデアリマス今回ノ事變中對聯盟並對米國ノ關係ニ於テ時ニ機微ニ
 互ルカ如キ狀況ノ發生ヲ見タコトカナイテモアリマセヌカ我々ハ常ニ懇切丁寧ニ之ト折衝ヲ重ネ
 我立場ヲ明カニシ我權益ニ關スル諒解ヲ明確ナラシムルニ努メマシタノテ兩者共ニ漸次我方ノ態
 度ヲ諒解シテ來タ次第デアリマス將又滿洲事變ニ際シ「ソヴィエト」聯邦政府カ中立不干涉ノ態度
 ヲ持シテ變ラサルコトハ帝國政府ノ満足トスル所デアリマス
 來ル二月二日ヨリ開催セラルヘキ軍縮會議ニ關シテハ帝國政府ハ既ニ其ノ方針ヲ決定シテ之ヲ我

全權委員ニ授ケマシタ此ノ會議ハ陸、海、空軍ニ互ル最初ノ大會議デアリマスカラ世界ノ之ニ期
 待スル所ハ尠クナイノデアリマス帝國政府トシテハ固ヨリ我方ノ主張ノ貫徹ヲ期スルト共ニ此ノ
 會議カ公正且合理的ノ結果ヲ齎シ以テ恒久的世界平和ノ確立ニ寄與スルニ至ラムコトヲ切望スル
 次第デアリマス

惟フニ開國進取ハ維新以來渝ラサル日本國民ノ精神デアリマシテ智識ヲ世界ニ求ムルハ明治大帝
 ノ御誓文ニ基ク日本國民ノ大方針デアリマス從テ飽ク迄我權益ヲ擁護スルト同時ニ廣ク世界各國
 ト相協力シテ文明ノ惠澤ニ浴セムコトハ帝國外交ノ思想トスル所デアリマシテ私ハ此ノ理想ノ下
 ニ國利民福ノ増進ヲ計ラムコトヲ期スルモノデアリマス

THE ADDRESS OF MR. YOSHIZAWA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
 AFFAIRS, AT THE 60TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL
 DIET, JANUARY 21ST, 1932.

It gives me much pleasure to lay before you my views on the outstanding diplomatic
 questions that confront the Government today.

The most important of these questions, one which not only affects this country profoundly,

but has engaged the attention of the entire world, is the Manchurian Affair.

China, being our neighbor, always stands, both economically and politically, in intimate relationship with this country. In regard to Manchuria, in particular, through historical and geographical reasons, political considerations must become of preponderant interest. It is of course beyond argument that the welfare of Manchuria is of the greatest consequence to Japan. There are more than a million Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria, and we possess in that region, in connection with leased territories, railways, mines, etc., numerous rights and interests of vital importance, secured either by treaty or by contract.

In recent years the Chinese authorities, ignoring the historical fact that the present development of Manchuria is entirely due to Japanese efforts, and taking advantage of our complaisance, have pursued a policy of oppression towards our countrymen, and have again and again set at naught their treaty rights and interests. The protests and warnings of our government, despatched from time to time, were of little avail. Thus the situation became politically more and more disquieting, and the menace to our position increasingly grave. The patience of our people was tried to breaking point, when there suddenly exploded the Railway bombing incident of September 18th, precipitating a collision between Japanese and Chinese soldiers, the later developments of which occurrence are well known to all.

Manchuria holds the key to the peace of the Far East. That was true before the Russo-

Japanese War; it is even more true at the present time. In the past the Japanese Government have always done everything in their power to prevent the civil commotions of China from spreading into Manchuria, because we possess there important rights and interests rendering the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria a matter of absolute necessity to Japan. Thanks to these untiring efforts, Manchuria was kept free from the constant turmoil of China Proper, and has been turned into a land of peace and prosperity. But for the Chinese misconduct of late years and the Chinese disregard of treaty and contractual obligations, I believe that the incident of September 18th would never have resulted in the present complications. At any rate, as we have been chiefly accountable in the past for the maintenance of peace in Manchuria, so will our responsibilities in this respect be enhanced rather than lessened in the future.

I desire to add a word in this connection to make it clear that Japan harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria and that she will uphold the principles of the open door and equal opportunity as well as all existing treaties relating to that territory. What Japan desires is only to secure peace and order for Manchuria, and to make that region safe both for Chinese and foreigners and open to all for economic development.

Now let me turn to the conditions which prevail in China Proper. There, for these many years past, anti-Japanese agitation has been carried on without intermission except for brief

intervals of comparative calm, which were only followed by agitations of increased violence and intensity. It should be noted that these agitations represent not only an economic movement, as in the case of the boycott of Japanese goods, but bear a psychological aspect, as may be inferred from the insertion of anti-Japanese matter in various textbooks for the use of public schools. However, there exists unmistakable evidence that this movement is being actively promoted by unofficial organizations such as the various anti-Japanese societies, under the direct or indirect direction and encouragement of the government, but quite against the free will of the Chinese merchants and people in general. Besides, we know for a fact that there are no small number of individual Chinese who actually make a profession of agitating against Japan. Since the advent of the present situation in Manchuria the anti-Japanese movement has begun to display unpleasant symptoms, and a number of regrettable outrages have been committed. Compared with the complete protection which persons of Chinese nationality are afforded within our borders, the indescribable persecution to which our fellow-countrymen are being subjected in China presents, indeed, a glaring contrast. The truth is that the foreign relations of China have often been made a sacrifice to the machinations of domestic politics, during these years of continual civil wars and factional strifes. The anti-Japanese movement undoubtedly derives its origin from the internal politics of China, and I believe that the hostile attitude of the Manchurian authorities in the period immediately pre-

ceding the recent incident may also be traced to the same source. In short it is an undeniable fact, that the civil wars and domestic politics of China have exerted a most harmful influence upon all her foreign relations, and Japan, her nearest neighbor, has had to suffer from that more than any other Power.

Thus, unfortunately, our relations with China have for the moment come under the influence of the complex internal and external relations of that country, and it is to be apprehended that it will be some time before we shall be able to effect the necessary readjustments and to bring back the relations between the two countries to a normal footing. The Manchurian incident was caused by our being compelled to resort to immediate measures of self-protection and the anti-Japanese Movement is due to the misguided views entertained by the Chinese. Solutions of the issues involved must therefore await a complete change of heart and reversal of policy on the part of China. However, I am convinced that the Chinese people as a whole and their enlightened leaders are not hostile but, on the contrary, are in their hearts amicably disposed toward this country, and we need not be over-pessimistic as to the prospect of the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China. Undoubtedly it is to the best interests of the two countries that they should love and respect each other and that between them friendliness should be the rule and any strained relationship merely a passing phenomenon.

The Manchurian Incident at the outset caused a considerable shock to the Council and

the Assembly of the League of Nations then in session at Geneva. On September 21st the Chinese delegate having requested the Council, in accordance with Article 11 of the League Covenant, to take cognizance of the matter, the question was officially made the subject of investigation by the League Council.

Since then, the Council, as is well known, held three sessions and passed two resolutions. On the other hand, the United States, though not a member of the League, acted generally in concert with that body, evidently because, as a Signatory to the Anti-War Pact and to the Nine Power Treaty, that Power felt deep concern in the Far Eastern situation. Our government exercised the utmost efforts to make their position clear both to the League of Nations and to the United States. Although there have been occasions when the present incident seemed to lead our country into more or less delicate relations with the League and with the American Government, we have succeeded through a careful and complete presentation of our case in bringing them both to a better appreciation of the position of Japan and of the vital interests she possesses in Manchuria.

Towards the Government of the Soviet Republics, which has steadily maintained an attitude of impartiality and non-interference throughout the present affair, I desire to express the satisfaction of the Japanese Government.

With regard to the disarmament conference to be opened on the 2nd of February, I

wish to say that this government have formed definite plans, and have given instructions accordingly to the Japanese Representatives. This most momentous conference being the first to be held whose deliberations will cover the entire field of armament, involving land, sea and air forces, the world is looking eagerly forward to its outcome. As far as concerns this government, we will, of course, strive to carry our points, but at all events we earnestly hope that the coming Conference will bring forth tangible results which shall be alike rational and equitable, and so contribute to the establishment of permanent peace throughout the world.

The spirit of progress manifested when our country was first thrown open governs as ever our national policy. To "seek knowledge in the wide world," as it is expressed in the oaths taken by the Great Emperor Meiji, is the living creed of our people. The ideal of our diplomacy is, while maintaining our just rights, to work in harmony with all countries and to give our nation its share in the benefits of universal culture and enlightenment. It is with that ideal that I hope to work and help to promote the interests of the nation and the happiness and welfare of our people.

三、第六十一回帝國議會ニ於ケル芳澤外務大臣演說

(昭和七年三月二十二日)

帝國ノ重要外交案件ニ付キマシテハ去ル一月ノ通常議會ニ於テ御説明申上ケテ置キマシタカ茲ニ其ノ後ノ事態ニ關シ報告ヲ兼テ所見ヲ陳述致シマスノハ私ノ欣幸トスル所テアリマス

支那本部ニ於ケル排日運動ニ付キマシテハ其ノ後モ機會アル毎ニ支那側ニ對シ之カ徹底的停止ヲ要求シテ來タノテアリマスカ支那側テハ何等反省ノ跡ナク該運動ハ却テ益深刻執拗ヲ加フルノ狀況テアリマシテ上海地方テハ其ノ勢最甚シカツタノテアリマス殊ニ一月九日上海民國日報ノ我皇室ニ對スル不敬記事事件及同月十八日支那暴民ノ我日蓮宗僧侶等殺傷事件ノ發生ヲ見ルニ及ヒマシテ過去長日月ノ間排日運動ノ爲ニ苦ミ殊ニ最近其ノ最惡辣ナル情勢ニ對シ隱忍ニ隱忍ヲ重ネ來ツタ我居留民ノ憤懣ハ其ノ極ニ達シ事態極メテ重大化スルニ至リマシタ

此ノ情況ニ於キマシテ在上海帝國總領事ハ政府ノ訓令ニ基キ上海市長ニ對シ右兩事件ニ關シ嚴重抗議スルト共ニ數項ノ要求ヲ提出シマシタ處前者ニ付テハ間モナク同市長ニ於テ我カ要求ニ應シマシタ又後者ニ付テハ種々曲折カアリマシタカ結局二十八日午後三時ニ至リ同市長ヨリ我方ノ要

求ヲ容レタ回答カ接到致シマシタカラ我方トシテハ之ニ依リ事態ノ緩和ヲ期待スルト同時ニ支那側約束ノ履行ヲ監視スルノ地位ニ立ツニ至ツタノテアリマス

然ルニ之ヨリ先第十九路軍ハ租界附近ニ集中シ各種ノ戰鬥準備ヲ行ヒ甚タ不穩ナル態度ヲ示シテ居リマシタカ共同租界工部局當局ハ無節制ナ支那軍隊及極端分子ノ使喚スル支那暴民ノ爲租界内ノ秩序カ紊亂サレルコトヲ慮ツタモノノ如ク二十八日ノ參事會ニ於テ同日午後四時ヨリ戒嚴令ヲ施行スルコトニ決定致シマシタ結果列國軍ハ豫テノ協定ニ基キ各其ノ受持區域ノ警備ニ就イタノテアリマスカ我陸戰隊カ其ノ受持區域テアル開北地方ノ警備ニ就カムトスル際支那側ヨリ我軍ニ向テ發砲シマシタノテ我軍ハ止ムナク之カ對抗手段ヲ執ツタノテアリマス世上往々支那側カ我方ノ要求ヲ承認シタルニ拘ラス我陸戰隊ニ於テ自ラ求メテ攻撃ヲ開始シタルカ如ク傳フルモノモアリマスカ事實ハ全ク右ノ通テアリマス

我方ニ於テハ事態ノ惡化ヲ妨クニ全力ヲ盡シ二度迄モ支那側トノ間ニ戰鬥中止ノ協定ヲ成立セシメタノテアリマスカ該協定ハ其ノ都度支那軍ノ破棄スル所トナツタノテアリマス次テ二月十八日我方ヨリ改メテ支那軍ノ一定距離外撤退其ノ他ヲ要求致シマシタ處支那側ニ於テ遂ニ之ニ應シナカツタノテ二月二十日豫テ増援ノ爲派遣セラレテアツタ我陸軍ハ海軍ト協力シテ支那軍ノ一定距

離以外撤退ヲ強制シ三月三日完全ニ右撤退ヲ實現セシメタノテアリマス

上海事件ノ發生ヲ見ルヤ支那政府ハ日支ノ紛争ニ付聯盟規約第十五條ノ適用ヲ先ツ聯盟理事會ニ提起シ次テ本件ハ支那側ノ要求ニ依リ聯盟總會ニ移付セラレタノテアリマス我カ我方トシテハ上海事件ハ單純ナル地方的事件テアツテ所謂國交斷絶ニ至ル虞アルモノニ非ス又滿洲問題ニ付テハ最近同地方ニ於テ新規ノ戰鬪行爲モナク且規約第十一條ニ基キ理事會ニ繫屬中ニシテ既ニ委員カ支那ノ實情ヲ調査スル爲極東ニ向テ出發シタル事實ニモ顧ミ右兩者共第十五條ノ適用ヲ見ルヘキ問題ニ非ストノ見解ヲ執ルモノテアリマシテ帝國政府ハ當初ヨリ此ノ趣旨ニ基ク明確ナル留保ヲ聲明シタル上理事會及總會ノ討議ニ參加シタノテアリマス然ルニ聯盟總會ハ三月十一日一ノ決議ヲ爲シタノテアリマス該決議ハ我方ニ於テ受諾シ難キ幾多ノ點ヲ含ンタモノテアリマス帝國代表ハ政府ノ訓令ニ基キ我方ノ立場ヲ闡明スルト共ニ前述ノ第十五條適用ニ關スル異議ヲ留保シテ投票ニ參加シナカツタ次第テアリマス

次ニ滿洲ニ於キマシテハ昨年秋舊東北政權倒壊ノ後ヲ受ケ同地方支那側要人ニ依リ行ハレタ局地的治安維持ノ努力ハ其ノ後支那本部ニ對スル滿洲ノ特殊性及從來同地方ニ行ハレタル軍閥政治ニ對スル滿洲一般人民ノ反感ト相俟テ次第ニ滿洲獨立運動ニ轉向シタ模様テアリマシタカ最近前省

長等主唱ノ下ニ獨立ヲ宣言スルニ至ツタノテアリマス

次テ三月十二日新政府外交總長ハ帝國政府ニ宛テ滿洲國ノ創立ヲ通報シ來ツタノテアリマスカ右通報ニ對シテハ非公式ニ之ヲ領承スルニ止メタ次第テアリマス私ハ新政府ニシテ右通報ニ記載シテアル通既存ノ條約及外國人ノ權益ヲ尊重シ且門戶開放ノ原則ヲ遵守シマスナラハ之ハ新政府ノ前途ノ爲ニモ甚タ歓迎スヘキコトト思考スルノテアリマス

將又北洋漁業問題ニ關スル日「ソ」間ノ諸懸案ニ就テハ昨年來「モスコ」ニ於テ銳意商議ヲ繼續中テアリマスカ未タ解決ヲ見ルニ至リマセヌ然シナカラ之カ適當妥結ニ達スルコトハ兩國國交ノ大局ヨリスルモ極メテ望マシキ所テアリマシテ又解決ヲ計ラムトスル大體ノ方針ニ就テハ既ニ彼我ノ意見ノ接近ヲ見テ居リマスカ政府トシテハ今後共我主張ノ貫徹ニ努メ條約ニ基ク正當ナル權益ノ確保ヲ期スル考テアリマス

以上ハ外交經過ノ大體テアリマスカ帝國ハ滿洲ニ於テハ甚大ナル政治的利害關係ヲ有スルコト勿論ナルモ支那本部ニ對シマシテハ政治的關係ヨリモ寧モ經濟的利害ノ方多分テアリマス從而南京政府及黨部カ從來ノ排日政策ヲ拋棄シ内部ノ和平統一ヲ圖リ資源開發等ノ經濟的發展ニ努力スル場合ニハ日支ノ國交和衷融合ニ至ルヘキコト疑ヲ容レサル所ト考フルノテアリマス

尙茲ニ一言スヘキハ滿洲事變殊ニ上海事件發生以來歐米諸國ニ於ケル空氣ハ我國ニ對シ好意的ナラサルモノアリタルモ右ハ事實ニ即セサル支那側ノ宣傳又ハ種々ノ誤解ニ基ク次第テアツテ時日ノ經過ト共ニ此等諸國ニ於ケル對日感情ノ漸次好轉スルヲ期待スル次第デアリマス

THE ADDRESS OF MR. YOSHIZAWA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, AT THE 61ST SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET,
MARCH 22ND, 1932.

At the last session of the Diet I had occasion to discuss the more important of the foreign questions confronting this country. Today I have the pleasure of reporting, and of stating my views, on the various phases that have since developed.

As regards the Anti-Japanese movement in China Proper, the Japanese Government seized every opportunity to urge upon the Chinese authorities the thorough-going suppression of the same. However, China failed to respond, and the movement continued with increasing intensity and persistence. In Shanghai, where the agitation was conducted with especial vigor, the Minkuo Jihpao, a vernacular journal of that city, published on January 9th an article highly abusive of our Imperial House, and on the 18th of the same month a Japanese priest and his companions were murdered or wounded by a Chinese mob. The two incidents were sufficient

to inflame the Japanese residents, who had long endured the ceaseless Anti-Japanese movements and whose patience had been well-nigh exhausted under the trying conditions of more recent months. The situation thus came to assume a grave aspect.

The Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, acting under the instructions of the Government, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai strong protests regarding these two incidents, and at the same time made various demands for the settlement of the affairs. The Mayor complied without much demur with our demands relating to the first incident, and after some delay and much conversation, in the end accepted our terms regarding the second. On receipt of the Mayor's reply, at 3 o'clock on the 28th, the Japanese authorities, anticipating that the situation would improve, adopted an attitude of watchfully awaiting the fulfilment of their promise on the part of the Chinese. In the meantime, the 19th Rout Army, then concentrated in the vicinity of Shanghai, having assumed a disquieting attitude and making a display of warlike preparations, the Shanghai Municipal Council had decided to take due precautions against the possibility of disturbances being created within the Settlement by undisciplined Chinese soldiers, or by mobs and radical elements. Accordingly, the Council, meeting on the 28th, declared a state of siege, to commence that day at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. As a result, the garrisons of the Powers were assigned to duty at their respective sectors in accordance with a pre-arranged plan of common defense. It was while the Japanese marines were proceeding to take up their

post in the Chapei district, their allotted sector, that the Chinese fired upon our forces, and compelled them to take measures of defense. Reports are sometimes circulated making it appear that it was the Japanese marines who commenced the fighting, in spite of the Chinese acceptance of our terms of settlement. But the facts of the case are precisely as I have just stated.

Moreover, we exerted every effort to prevent any aggravation of the situation, and upon two occasions we entered into agreements with the Chinese authorities for a truce. But each time the agreement was rendered nugatory by the action of the Chinese army. Our demand, presented on the 18th of February, that the Chinese army should withdraw to a certain distance, was rejected by the Chinese. Thereupon, on the 20th, our troops which had been dispatched as a reinforcement, acting in concert with the navy, undertook to compel the withdrawal of the Chinese forces outside the prescribed area, and completed the task on March 3rd.

As soon as the Shanghai Incident occurred, the Chinese Government proposed to the Council of the League of Nations to make application of Article 15 of the League Covenant to the Sino-Japanese conflict, and later, upon the request of China, the case was transferred to the Assembly of the League. The Japanese Government took the view that the Shanghai Incident was a merely local affair which was not of a nature likely to lead to a rupture, while as regards the Manchurian Incident, not only had there been no renewal of hostilities, but the matter was already pending in the hands of the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant

and, moreover, the commission of inquiry had indeed left for the purpose of conducting investigations on the spot into the actual conditions prevailing in China; there was therefore no legitimate ground for applying Article 15 to either of these cases. It was with an unequivocal reservation based on that view that our government participated in the deliberations of the Council and the Assembly. However, the Assembly passed a resolution on March 11th, which was in more than one respect unacceptable to our government. On account of this unacceptability, our representatives under the instructions of the Government, expounded the Japanese position, declared a protest embodying our contention with regard to the application of Article 15 of the Covenant, and abstained from voting.

In Manchuria, by reason of the special position it occupies in relation to China Proper, and the inveterate antagonism of the Manchurian people towards the militarist rule to which they had been subjected, it appears that subsequently to the downfall of the erstwhile Manchurian authorities last autumn, the efforts of the local leaders for the maintenance of peace and order in their respective districts gradually assumed the form of a movement for autonomy. A declaration of independence was made a short time ago by former provincial governors and other Manchurian leaders. Our government received a communication under date of March 12th from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new government, announcing the establishment of a new independent State of Manchuria. As regards this communication, we have gone

no further than unofficially to acknowledge its receipt. I am certain, however, that it will be in accordance with the best interests of the new state if its government will, as the announcement says will be the case, really respect existing treaties and the rights and interests of foreigners, and faithfully adhere to the principle of the Open Door.

As regards the various questions pending between Japan and the Soviet Union in connection with the fisheries in northern waters, the negotiations assiduously conducted at Moscow since the end of last year have so far failed to bear fruit. From the broad stand-point of friendly relations between the two countries it is most desirable that we should arrive at a fair and suitable settlement. In fact, the difference in the views of the two governments concerning the basis of settlement is gradually narrowing. It is the intention of this Government to continue their efforts towards carrying our points and so to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests secured to us by treaty.

I have now given an outline of the latest developments in the foreign affairs of Japan. While the interests of this country in Manchuria are certainly of paramount importance from a political view-point, those in China Proper are in the main economic rather than political. Consequently, if the Nanking Government and the Nationalist Party abandon their Anti-Japanese policy and direct their energies towards achieving internal unity and peace, and economic prosperity and progress, there is no room for doubt as to the possibility of restoring complete

friendship and concord between the two countries. I may add on this occasion a word about the atmosphere of Europe and America, which has not always been sympathetic to Japan since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, and especially since the Shanghai Affair. That atmosphere was created simply through misrepresentations of facts emanating from Chinese sources or through misunderstandings of various kinds. I am confident that in time the sentiment of the Western Powers will turn gradually in favor of Japan.

四、第六十二回帝國議會ニ於ケル齋藤外務大臣演說

(昭和七年六月三日)

最近ニ於ケル帝國ノ重要外交案件ニ關シ茲ニ報告ヲ兼テ所見ヲ開陳致シマスルハ私ノ欣幸トスル所テアリマス

先ツ日支關係ニ付キマシテハ上海方面ノ情勢ハ五月五日上海ニ於テ日支兩軍ノ停戰協定成立シ同地方平靜恢復ノ緒ニ就キマシタノハ御同慶ノ至リテアリマス本協定ノ調印ヲ見マスル迄ニハ種々ナル迂餘曲折カアツタノテアリマスカ幸ニシテ其ノ成立ヲ見ルニ至リマシタノハ我方ノ公正ナル態度ニ加フルニ英國公使ヲ始メ友好的の代表者ノ非常ナル盡力カ多大ノ貢獻ヲナシタノテアリマス尙此ノ機會ニ私ハ上海方面ニ於テ奮闘シ克ク其ノ大任ヲ全ウシタル我陸海軍將兵ニ對シ衷心感謝ノ意ヲ表スルモノテアリマス又四月二十九日同地ニ於ケル爆彈事件ノ爲危禍ニ遭遇セラレタル我陸海軍及外務官憲並民團關係等ニ對シ深厚ナル同情ノ意ヲ表スルモノテ殊ニ白川派遣軍司令官ノ薨去ハ寔ニ痛恨ニ堪ヘナイ次第テアリマス

今次ノ停戰協定ニ依リマスレハ支那軍ハ上海ヨリ一定距離ニ止マルノミナラス上海ノ周圍ニ於テ

其ノ統制ノ及フ限り總テノ敵對行爲ヲ停止スルコトトナツテ居リ且支那軍ノ行動ニ關シ疑ヲ生スル場合ニ於テハ英、米、佛、伊四國代表者カ之ヲ確カムルコトトナツテ居ルノテアリマスカ右規定カ能ク守ラルル限り差當リ支那軍隊ニ依ツテ上海附近ノ治安ノ擾亂サルカ如キコトハナイ筈テアリマス從テ我陸軍ハ五月十一日陸軍大臣聲明ノ通り本協定ノ運用ト上海地方平靜確立ニ關スル關係友好國側ノ今後ノ活動トニ信賴シ其ノ全兵力ノ内地歸還ヲ行ハシメラルコトトナツタノテアリマスカ右ハ上海附近ニ對スル皇軍ノ出動カ何等ノ政治的意圖ニ出ツルモノニアラストノ帝國政府累次ノ聲明ヲ如實ニ證スルモノテアリマス然シナカラ停戰協定ハ日支兩軍ノ停戰ヲ規定スルニ止マルノテアリマシテ上海附近ノ恒久的平靜ヲ恢復スル方法ヲ確立シタモノテハアリマセヌ從テ過去數十年ニ互ル外支人ノ平和的努力ノ結晶タル此ノ盛大ナル國際都市ノ繁榮ヲ維持スルカ爲ニハ一步進メテ内外人カ安全ニ居住圓滑ニ營業シ得ル状態ノ確立セララルコト極メテ肝要テアリマス斯クシテ上海地方カ過去十數年間屢各種ノ不祥ナル事件ヲ繰返シ來レル不安ナル状態ヨリ永久ニ脱却スルコトカ出來マスナラハ之ハ單ニ上海地方居住ノ外支人ノ幸福ノミニ止ラス實ニ支那ニ利益ヲ有スル列國ノ幸福テアリマス此ノ趣旨ニ於キマシテハ私ハ夙ニ帝國政府ノ希望セル所テアリ又本年二月二十九日支那側同意ノ下ニ成立シマシタ聯盟理事會決議ニ豫想セル所謂圓卓

會議カ速ニ開始セラレ且成功ヲ遂ケムコトヲ期待スルモノテアリマス
 滿洲ニ於キマシテハ滿洲國ハ鞏固ナル決意ト革新ノ思想ノ下ニ新國家トシテ徐々ニ發達ノ道程ヲ
 辿リツツアルモノト認メラルルノテアリマス私ハ我國民カ同國政府ノ前途ニ對シ多大ノ希望ヲ懸
 ケテ居ルコトヲ確信シマスルト共ニ滿洲事變ニ伴フ國際關係ノ處理ニ付キマシテ右新國家ノ存在
 ト云フコトハ現實ノ事實トシテ無視スルコトヲ許サナイモノト存スルノテアリマス同國カ今後益
 健實ナル發達ヲ遂ケマスコトハ當ニ同地方ノ治安及繁榮ノ恢復増進ノ爲ノミナラス東洋平和ノ確
 保ノ爲ニモ肝要ト思考スルノテアリマス同地方ニ於ケル兵匪等不逞分子ノ跳梁ハ外部ヨリスル煽
 動等モアリマシテ容易ニ鎮靜セヌノテアリマスカ新國家ハ創立早々ノコトニモアリ未タ十分ニ治
 安ノ恢復ニ當リ得ル状態ニ達シテ居ナイノテアリマス從テ在滿帝國軍ハ新國家ノ警備力ニ對シ必
 要ノ協力ヲ與フル外帝國臣民ノ生命財產カ危殆ニ瀕スルトカ又ハ一般治安ニ動搖ヲ來スト云フカ
 如キ事態ノ發生ヲ見マスル場合ニハ自ラ之カ鎮定ニ任セサルヲ得サル狀況ニアルノテアリマス私
 ハ滿洲各地ニ治安維持ノ爲日夜生命ノ危險ニ晒サレ絶大ノ犠牲ヲ拂ヒツツアル我將兵並警察官ニ
 對シ此ノ機會ニ衷心感謝ノ意ヲ表シタイト思ヒマス
 由來今次滿洲ニ於ケルカ如キ政治的變動ノ場合ニハ外部ヨリ煽動等カナクモ反動派又ハ不逞分子

等ノ跳梁ヲ免レナイノテアリマシテ新國家ノ庶政カ其ノ整頓ヲ見ルニ至ル迄ニハ相當ノ日時ヲ要
 スルコト諸外國ノ實例等ニ徴シマシテモ明カテアリマス從テ現下ノ滿洲ニ於ケル事態ノ成行ニ付
 キ素リニ燥急ナル態度ヲ以テ臨ムカ如キハ私ノ強ク反對セサルヲ得サル所テアリマシテ要ハ假ス
 ニ時ヲ以テシ堅實ニ問題ノ解決ニ向ツテ歩ヲ進ムルニアルト信スルノテアリマス
 滿洲事變ノ發展ニ伴ヒマシテ北滿ニ於ケル我居留民ノ保護ノ爲帝國軍隊ハ同方面ニ出動シテ兵匪
 ニ當ルコトトナリマシタカ其ノ間該地方ニ於ケル「ソヴイェト」聯邦ノ正當ナル權益ハ常ニ之ヲ尊
 重シ之ニ損害ヲ及ホスカ如キコトナキ様十分ノ注意ヲ拂ツタノテアリマス此ノ事實ハ我軍隊ノ行
 動ノ跡ニ徴スレハ明瞭ニ觀取セラルル所テアルト存シマス尙帝國政府ハ「ソヴイェト」聯邦政府ニ
 對シ我軍ノ北滿出動ノ目的ハ居留民ノ生命財產ノ保護テアツテ他ニ何等ノ意圖ヲ有スルモノテナ
 イト云フコトヲ屢聲明致シマシタカラ同聯邦政府ニ於テハ必スヤ帝國政府ノ眞意ノアル所ヲ諒解
 シテ居ルコトト確信スル次第テアリマス然ルニ世間滿洲事變ヲ契機トシテ日「ソ」兩國間ニ戰爭
 ノ危險アリ等ト誠シヤカニ吹聴スルモノノアルノハ甚ダ遺憾テアリマシテ我國民カ斯カル言說ニ
 迷ハサレサラムコトヲ希望スル次第テアリマス

國際聯盟ニ於キマシテ上海事件ノ推移ヲ注視シテ居タ次第ハ御承知ノ通テアリマスカ上海ニ於ケ

ル日支停戦交渉一時停頓ノ際支那側カ問題ヲ聯盟ニ提出シマシタ結果種々紛糾ヲ來タシタノテアリマスカ現地ニ於テ前述ノ如キ停戦協定成立ノ見込カ略付キマシタノテ聯盟ニ於テモ右ノ事實ニ即シテ其ノ難局ヲ切抜クルコトトシ四月三十日臨時總會開催ノ上上海ニ於ケル交渉ノ促進ヲ促進スルコトヲ大體ノ趣旨トスル決議ヲ採擇シ茲ニ一段落ヲ告ケルニ至ツタノテアリマス尤モ帝國政府ハ聯盟規約第十五條ノ適用ニ異議ノ留保ヲ致シテ居リマス關係上右決議ノ採擇ニ關シマシテモ我方ノ立場ヲ闡明シテ棄權シタノテアリマス

尙目下現地ニ在リテ調査ニ從事シテ居リマスル所ノ聯盟支那調査委員ニ對シマシテハ我方ノ其ノ任務ノ遂行ノ爲出來得ル限りノ便宜ヲ供與スルト共ニ同委員カ支那及滿洲ノ實情ニ付キ正確公正ナル認識ヲ把握セムコトヲ希望シテ已マナイノテアリマス

日支關係ノ重要外交問題ト致シマシテハ現下ノ世界的政治經濟ノ不安輕減ノ問題テアリマスカ軍縮會議ハ去ル二月以來開催中テアリマス該會議ハ陸海空三軍ニ互ル最初ノ大會議テアリ從テ會議ノ期間ハ相當長引クコトト思ハレマスカ帝國政府トシテハ既定ノ方針ニ基キ我主張ノ貫徹ヲ期スルト同時ニ本會議カ相當ノ成功ヲ收メムコトヲ禱ツテ居ル次第テアリマス

又國際經濟關係ニ付キマシテハ今ヤ世界ノ各國ハ何レモ自國産業保護等ノ見地カラ從來ニ見ナカ

ツタ種々ノ方策ヲ採用スルニ至リマシテ之カ爲國際通商上ニ於ケル支障著シキモノアル次第テアリマスカ政府ニ於キマシテハ出來得ル限り我對外通商上ノ支障ヲ少スルコトニ努力ヲ怠ラヌ次第テアリマシテ特ニ本年ニ入りマシテカラモ從來多年ノ懸案テアリマシタ我國ト葡萄牙國及佛領印度支那トノ通商協定又ハ稅率協定ノ成立ヲ見ルニ至ツタノテアリマス葡萄牙トハ明治四十四年以來無條約ノ狀態ニ在リマシタノテ我國ハ同國トノ通商上諸外國ニ比シ不利益ナル待遇ヲ受ケ來ツタノテアリマスカ種々折衝ノ結果本年三月兩國間ニ通商協定締結セラレ同協定ハ既ニ實施ヲ見ルニ至ツテ居リマス又佛領印度支那ハ御承知ノ通地理上我國トハ極メテ近隣ノ關係ニ在リ乍ラ同方面トノ通商貿易上重要ノ關係アル關稅問題ニ付キマシテ今日迄何等ノ取極カナク明治二十九年以來日佛兩當局ノ多年ノ苦心努力モ種々ノ事情ニ妨ケラレテ其ノ成果ヲ擧クルニ至ツテ居ナカツタノテアリマス然ルニ昨年頃カラ交渉ノ機運漸ク動キ遂ニ本年五月十三日協定調印ノ運ヒト相成リマシタ本協定實施ノ上ハ日本ト印度支那トノ通商貿易ハ從來ニ比シ容易トナリ彼我ノ經濟關係ハ漸次密接ヲ加フルコトト存シマス此等協定ノ成立ハ前記兩國トノ國交親善ノ爲ニモ誠ニ慶賀ニ堪エナイ所テアリマス

今ヤ世界ハ各方面トモ種々不安ナル狀況ニアリマシテ就中經濟上ノ不況ハ極メテ深刻ナルモノカ

アリマス我國モ列國ノ一員トシテ此ノ世界的狀勢ノ影響ヲ受クルコトヲ免レナイト同時ニ國際的ニ解決ヲ要スル幾多ノ重大案件ヲ有シテ居ル次第アリマシテ此ノ間ニ處スル帝國外交ノ前途ハ固ヨリ多事多難ナルヘキヲ豫期シナケレハナリマセム而シテ此ノ帝國外交ノ重大時期ニ善處スルカ爲ニハ國民的ノ一致團結カ最重要ナルハ申迄モアリマセム私ハ諸君ト共ニ全國民ノ支持ニ依リ此ノ難局ノ打開ニ向ツテ最善ノ努力ヲ盡シタイト思フノテアリマス

THE ADDRESS OF VISCOUNT SAITO, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
AT THE 62ND SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET,
JUNE 3RD, 1932.

I have the privilege of reviewing on this occasion the latest developments in the foreign relations of this country.

We are all gratified to watch the rapid restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area, following the conclusion on May 5th of the Sino-Japanese Agreement for the cessation of hostilities. I may say that in the course of the negotiations leading up to this Agreement we encountered not a few difficulties, and that the earnest labors of the British Minister to China and the representatives of other friendly Powers on the spot, as well as our own attitude of

fairness and rectitude, largely contributed to the final happy outcome. And I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the officers and men of our army and navy who fought in the Shanghai area and rendered signal service to our fatherland. I also desire to express my profound sympathy with the victims of the bombing incident of April 29th, and particularly my infinite grief at the death of General Shirakawa, commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary Force.

According to the terms of the Agreement the Chinese troops are to remain at a prescribed distance from Shanghai, and the Chinese forces are to cease as far as it lies within their power, all hostile actions in Shanghai and its vicinity. Should the action of the Chinese army give occasion for apprehension, the representatives of the four Powers, Great Britain, the U.S.A., France and Italy, are to ascertain the situation. As long as these terms of the Agreement are observed, there is little likelihood, for the present at least, that any fresh disturbances will be caused by Chinese soldiers in the Shanghai district. In these circumstances it has been decided to call home the whole of our military forces relying, as stated in the declaration by the Minister of War, published on May 11th, upon the operation of the Agreement and upon such action as the friendly Powers shall take in order to insure permanent peace at Shanghai. I am sure that the complete withdrawal of our troops will demonstrate, as nothing else could, the truth of the repeated declaration of our Government as to the absence of any political

design in our recent expeditions. However, it is only the terms for ending hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese forces that have so far been arranged. No measures have yet been taken to establish permanent peace in the Shanghai district. It is absolutely necessary to take further steps in order to establish such conditions as will enable both Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai to live in safety and to pursue their business in peace if the prosperity of this great international metropolis built up by their peaceful labors for many decades is to be maintained. Indeed, if that city could be freed from the menace of such sporadic disturbances of various kinds as have occurred time and again in the past, it would prove a boon not only to its residents Chinese and foreign, but also to China and all the Powers interested in China. I cannot therefore but look eagerly forward to an early opening and complete success of the Round Table Conference, which is desired by the Japanese Government and which was contemplated in the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations adopted with the concurrence of China on February 29th.

In Manchuria we note that the new state is making steady progress with fresh zeal and a resolute will. I am well aware of the great interest which is naturally manifested by our people in the future of Manchoukuo, and I believe that it is no longer possible to ignore the existence of that state in any international readjustments which may be made with reference to the Manchurian Incident. I believe that it is of the utmost importance for the tranquillity

of the Far East as well as for the restoration of peace and prosperity in Manchuria that the new state should attain a healthy growth. Only the new government has not yet reached the stage at which it can command sufficient resources for the restoration of order, while the activities of soldier bandits and other lawless elements, often instigated from outside, are extremely difficult to suppress. Consequently, our troops in Manchuria are compelled to extend their necessary co-operation to the protective functions of the new government and to guard against any eventualities that might endanger the lives and property of our countrymen or eventuate in general disturbances on a major scale. Our profound thanks are due to the military and police forces, serving in Manchuria in the face of constant danger day and night and at the risk of their lives.

Precedents can easily be drawn from the history of other countries to show that political changes such as have taken place in Manchuria are bound to be accompanied by activities on the part of malcontents and lawless elements, even where no external instigation comes into play, and it takes some time in such cases before the governmental machinery of the new state can be fully set in order. I am strongly opposed to any impatient and impetuous attitude toward the progress of events in Manchuria. It is essential to give it time, and to address oneself to effecting a sure solution of the problems with which we are confronted.

In the course of the present affair it became necessary for the Japanese army to operate

against soldier bandits in North Manchuria for the protection of Japanese residents there. That we have always paid due respect to the legitimate rights and interests of the Soviet Union in that region, and have taken scrupulous care not to infringe or injure them, is clearly proved by the conduct of our army. Moreover, the Japanese Government have repeatedly assured the Soviet Government as to the true motive of our advance to the North, which does not extend beyond the protection of Japanese life and property. I am certain that the Moscow Government fully appreciate our position. Nevertheless, there are some who talk as though there were danger of war between Japan and Russia as a sequel to the Manchurian Incident. I am sure I can appeal to the good sense and discernment of our people not to be misled by such rumors.

The League of Nations, as you know, maintained a close watch over developments at Shanghai. During a temporary deadlock in the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, the action of China, who laid the matter before the League, produced various complications. Nevertheless, as the success of the negotiations became practically assured, the League decided to tide over the crisis by relying upon the progress of affairs on the spot. On April 30th an extraordinary session of the Assembly was convoked, at which a resolution inviting a speedy settlement of the Shanghai negotiations was adopted, and the matters were brought to a close. The Japanese Government, as they had previously entered a protest with regard to the applica-

tion to the Sino-Japanese disputes of Article XV of the Covenant, expounded the stand thus taken up and abstained from voting on the resolution.

As regards the commission of the League which is engaged in conducting an investigation on the spot, we are extending to it all possible facilities at our disposal in order to help its members to fulfil their mission. I sincerely hope that the commissioners will form a correct and fair conception of the actual conditions of China and of Manchuria.

The outstanding issue, besides the Sino-Japanese Affairs, in our foreign relations to-day, is the matter of international political and economic readjustment. The Disarmament Conference which has been in session since last February, is largely concerned with this problem. This being the first great conference ever convened to deal with the problem of disarmament in general, covering land, sea and air forces, it is expected that its deliberations will last for some time. The Japanese Government intend to insist on their own points in accordance with their settled policy, and it is our sincere hope that the Conference will achieve the desired results in the interest of world economy and peace.

Finally, in regard to our economic relations with other countries, it cannot be denied that owing to the adoption by every country, in order to protect its own industries, of various measures without parallel in the past, serious obstacles have been put in the way of all international trade. The Government of Japan have spared no efforts towards removing in as

great a degree as possible the barriers to our foreign trade. I am happy to report that within the present year we have concluded a trade convention and a tariff agreement with Portugal and with French Indo-China respectively. Portugal is a country with which, since 1911, we have had no commercial treaty, and our trade with that country suffered accordingly, Japan being placed in a disadvantageous position as compared with other Powers. Arduous negotiations fructified at last in the trade convention of March this year, which has since come into actual operation. With French Indo-China, in spite of her being our very near neighbor, we had no agreement on customs tariffs—the most important key to trade—since as long ago as the year 1896. It was only in the course of last year that the various obstacles that had protracted the negotiations between the authorities concerned in Japan and France one by one began to be overcome, with the result that a convention was signed on May 13th this year which is calculated greatly to facilitate commerce between Japan and Indo-China and to strengthen the economic ties between the two countries. Both these conventions are to be hailed as signal contributions towards the promotion of international unity and friendship.

The world is suffering to-day from countless ills, of which economic depression is the most acute. Japan, undergoing the ordeal along with other Powers, faces many a problem which awaits an international solution. The future of our foreign relations is beset with grave difficulties, and national unity and solidarity are needed now more than ever before. In deal-

ing with this difficult situation, let me plead for the support and co-operation of you all, and I shall do the best I can.

五、第六十三回帝國議會ニ於ケル内田外務大臣演説

(昭和七年八月二十五日)

帝國ノ重要外交案件ニ付キマシテハ去ル六月ノ帝國議會ニ於テ前任者ヨリ報告ヲ兼ネ所見ヲ開陳シタル次第カアリマスカ其ノ後滿蒙問題ノ重要ナル發展ニ顧ミ滿蒙及支那本部ニ關スル帝國政府ノ所見並方針ニ付詳細申述ヘマシテ諸君ノ御清聴ヲ煩シタイト思ヒマス

滿洲國カ益健全ナル發達ノ道程ヲ辿ツテ居リマスノハ御同慶ノ至リテアリマス帝國政府ハ新國家ニ對スル承認ヲ以テ滿蒙ノ事態ヲ安定シ延テ極東ニ於ケル恒久的ノ平和ヲ招來スヘキ唯一ノ解決方法ト認ムルモノテアリマス仍テ政府ハ速ニ滿洲國ヲ正式ニ承認スル決意ノ下ニ目下着々準備ヲ整ヘテ居ルノテアリマシテ右準備整ヒ次第不日承認實行ノ筈テアリマス

然ルニ外國ニ於ケル一部人士中ニハ今尙支那ニ對スル帝國ノ態度殊ニ九月十八日事件ノ發生以來帝國ノ執リ來リシ措置ヲ十分ニ諒解セス又ハ滿洲國ノ成立ニ付正當ナル認識ヲ缺キ剩サヘ帝國ノ滿洲國ニ對スル承認ヲ以テ不法視スルカ如キ所説ヲナス者カアリマスルニ顧ミ私ハ此ノ機會ニ於テ從來政府ノ累次宣明シ來ツタ所ト重複スルヲ厭ハス此等諸點ニ關スル我方ノ立場ヲ明カニスル

ト共ニ前述ノ如ク帝國政府カ滿洲國ノ承認ヲ以テ滿蒙問題解決ノ唯一ノ方法ト認メマスル所以ノ梗概ヲ述ヘテ諸君ノ御諒解ヲ得テ置キタイト思ヒマス

抑近年極東ニ於ケル國際關係惡化ノ主要ナル原因カ支那ノ混亂セル状態ニ加フルニ過激思想ノ顯著ナル影響ヲ受ケタル排外的革命外交ノ遂行ニ存スルコトハ何人モ爭ヒ難イ所テアリマス而シテ右支那ノ異常ナル狀況ニ依ル最大ノ被害者カ日本テアルコトハ申ス迄モアリマセンカ其ノ他ノ列國モ亦忍フ可カラサル侮辱ト堪ヘ難キ災害ヲ蒙リ來ツタ次第テアリマス然ルニ斯ノ如キ事態ノ匡正ヲ聯盟規約其ノ他所謂平和維持機關ニ求ムルノ至難ナルコトハ苟モ支那ノ實情ニ通スル者ノ直ニ首肯シ得ヘキ所ト信シマス現ニ列國ハ其ノ在支權益ニ對スル侵害ヲ受クル虞アル場合ニハ此等ノ機關ニ依頼スルコトナク直接其ノ自力ヲ以テ之カ匡救又ハ豫防ヲ計ルコトヲ常トシテ居ルノテアリマシテ最近ノ事例ノミヲ數フルモ枚舉ニ遑ナキ有様テアリマス

我國ハ支那カ穩健着實ナル方法ニ依リ其ノ國運ヲ挽回シ進シテ極東ノ平和ニ對スル同國ノ使命ヲ果シ得ル日ノ速ニ到來セムコトヲ衷心希望シツツ二十餘年ノ久シキニ互リ極度ノ自制ト忍耐トヲ示シ來ツタノテアリマス而モ支那側ハ我カ寛大ナル態度ニ應セムトスル誠意ナク我方ニ對スル輕侮ト排斥トハ却テ益甚シキヲ致シタノテアリマス帝國政府ハ支那側ニ對シ日本國民ノ忍耐ヲ試サ

ムトスルカ如キ態度ノ極メテ危険ナルコトヲ幾度トナク警告シタノテアリマスカ毫モ改善セラルル所ナキノミラス却テ愈惡化シマスル一面忍耐ニ忍耐ヲ重ネ來ツタ日本國民ノ感情カ遂ニ極度ニ尖銳化スルニ至リマシタ折柄帝國ノ生命線タル滿蒙ニ於テ彼ノ九月十八日事件ノ發生ヲ見ルニ至リ我方ニ於テハ敢然トシテ正當防衛ノ行動ニ出ツルノ外ナカツタノテアリマス

然ルニ右帝國ノ行動ヲ以テ不戰條約ニ違反スルモノナルヤノ所說ヲナス者カアリマスカ斯ノ如キハ事實ニ即セサル主張テアリマス帝國ノ存立ト重大ナル關係ヲ有スル權益ニ對スル支那側ノ暴戾ナル侵害ニ對シ我方ニ於テ眞ニ已ムヲ得スシテ起チ之カ防止ニ必要ナル行動ニ出テタモノナルコトハ前述ノ通テアリマス不戰條約ハ此ノ種ノ場合ニ於ケル自衛權ノ行使ヲ制限スルモノテハアリマセヌ即チ同條約ハ締約國カ其ノ判斷ニ基キ自國ノ領土及一切ノ權益ニ對スル危險ヲ防止スル爲必要ト認ムル措置ヲ執ルコトヲ禁止シテハ居ラナイノテアリマス又右自衛權ノ行使ハ行使國ノ領土外ニ及ヒ得ルモノナルコト明カテアリマス帝國ノ行動ハ他ノ列國カ同様ノ場合ニ執リマシタ措置ト其ノ本質ヲ同ウスルモノテアリマス

右ノ如ク我方ニ於テ自衛行動ニ出テマスルヤ張學良政權ニ屬シテ居リマシタ官吏ノ大部分カ或ハ

逃亡又ハ辭職シ該政權ノ事實的解消ヲ見ルニ至リマシタコトハ御承知ノ通テアリマス

然ルニ滿蒙ニ於キマシテハ豫テ同地方ヲ以テ支那本部ニ於ケル内亂ノ渦中ニ投スルコトニ反對シ且累年ニ互ル張家ノ惡政ヲ憎惡スル有識人士ノ間ニ政治改革ノ機運カ醞釀シツツアツタノテアリマスカ此等人士ハ右張學良政權倒壞ノ機會ヲ利用シ現實ノ運動ニ着手シタノテアリマス即チ前述張學良政權ノ事實的解消ノ結果奉天、哈爾濱等ニ治安維持會カ成立シマシタカ我方トシテハ滿蒙ニ於ケル殆安維持ノ責任上此等維持會ニ對シ必要ノ援助ヲ各マナカツタノテアリマス然ルニ此等維持會關係ノ要人等ハ此ノ情勢ニ應シ驟然起ツテ遂ニ新國家ヲ創設スルニ至ツタノテアリマス要スルニ滿洲國ノ成立ハ同地方カ支那本部ニ對シテ有スル地理的、歴史的及住民心理上ノ特殊性ヲ背景トセル獨立運動ノ結果ニ外ナラナイノテアリマス

或ハ新國家ノ成立ヲ以テ我軍事行動ノ結果ナリトシ之ニ對スル責任ヲ帝國ニ歸セムトスル者モアリマスカ斯ノ如キハ前述ノ事情ヲ認識セサルニ基クモノテアツテ我方ノ容認シ得ヘキ限リテハアリマセヌ又滿洲國政府ニ多數本邦人ノ在職シテ居ル事實ヲ以テ新國家ノ成立ニ帝國カ何等カノ關係ヲ有シ居ルヤニ邪推スル者モアリマスカ建國草創ノ際外國人ノ技能ヲ利用スルコトハ幾多ノ先例カアルノテアリマス現ニ我國ノ如キモ明治維新後多數ノ外國人ヲ官吏又ハ顧問トシテ僱聘シテ

居ツタノテアリマシテ例へハ明治八年頃ニ於ケル此等外國人ノ總數ハ五百名ヲ超過シテ居タノテアリマス要スルニ個人タル本邦人カ滿洲國政府ニ在職セル事實ヨリシテ前述ノ如キ邪推ヲ爲スハ僻見モ甚シキモノテアリマス

滿洲國ノ成立カ支那内部ノ分離運動ノ結果ナルコトハ以上詳述ノ通テアリマス然ルニ斯ノ如クニシテ成立セル既存ノ新國家ニ對スル帝國ノ承認ヲ以テ九國條約ノ規定ト違反ストノ主張ヲナス者モアリマスカ右ハ甚タ不可解ナル議論テアルト思ヒマス九國條約ハ前述ノ如キ支那ニ於ケル分離作用即チ支那ノ一地方ノ住民カ自己ノ發意ニ依ツテ獨立國ヲ建設スルコトヲ禁止スルモノテハアリマセヌ從テ九國條約當事國タル帝國カ滿蒙ニ於ケル住民ノ發意ニ依リ成立シマシタ既存ノ滿洲國ヲ承認シマシテモ同條約ノ規定ニ牴觸スルコトハナイノテアリマス固ヨリ我方ニ於テ滿蒙ノ併合其ノ他同地方ニ對シ領土慾ヲ満足セシメムトスルカ如キ假定ノ下ニ於テハ問題ハ別テアリマス然シ乍ラ帝國カ滿蒙ニ對シ何等ノ領土の意圖ヲ有セサルコトハ今更多言ヲ要シマセヌ

以上ヲ以テ私ハ支那ニ對スル帝國ノ態度殊ニ九月十八日事件發生以來我方ノ執リ來リシ措置カ極メテ正當且適法ノモノナルコト滿洲國ハ其ノ住民ノ自發的意圖ニ依リ成立セルモノニシテ支那ニ

於ケル分離運動ノ結果ト見ルヘキモノナルコト及斯ノ如クニシテ成立セル新國家ニ對シ帝國ニ於テ承認ヲ與フルハ九國條約ノ規定ニ何等牴觸セサルコトヲ明カニシタ次第テアリマスカ更ニ進ンテ帝國政府カ滿洲國ノ承認ヲ以テ滿蒙問題解決ノ唯一ノ方法ト認メマスル所以ニ言及シタイト思ヒマス

滿蒙問題ノ解決ニ關シ帝國政府ノ最重キヲ置キマスル所ハ第一ニ其ノ住民ノ正當ナル要望カ充タナレ且帝國ノ權益カ確保サレルト共ニ苟モ舊來ノ排外的施設ノ再現ヲ防止シテ同地方ニ内外人安住ノ樂土ヲ築キ以テ滿蒙自體ノ安定ハ勿論進ンテ極東ニ於ケル恒久的平和ノ招來ヲ期スルコト及第二ニ感情論又ハ抽象論ヲ排シ滿蒙ニ於ケル現實ノ事實ヲ基礎トシテ問題ノ解決ヲ期スルコトノ二點テアリマス我々ハ滿洲事變ノ勃發ヲ見ルニ至リマシタ過去ノ經緯及從來滿蒙ニ對シ我國ノ拂ヒマシタ絶大ノ犠牲ニ顧ミ右二點ニ即シテ滿蒙問題ノ根本的解決ヲ計リ以テ日支間永年ノ禍源ヲ一掃スルノ要アルコトヲ痛感スルモノテアリマス然ルニ近時支那本部政權ヲシテ何等カノ形式ニ依リ滿蒙ニ關係セシムルコトトシ以テ一時ヲ糊塗セムトスル解決案ヲ考慮スル向モアル様テアリマスカスノ如キハ究極スル所九月十八日事件以前ノ狀態ヲ繰返ス結果ニ終ルヘキコト我々永年ノ經驗ニ顧ミ何等疑ヒナイ所テアリマシテ日本國民ハ右ノ如キ解決案ニ斷シテ贊成スルモノテハア

リマセヌ又支那本部政權ノ滿蒙進出ハ如何ナル形式ヲ以テスルヲ問ハス滿洲國政府ノ建國宣言及對外聲明等ニ表示セラレマシタ政治的信條ト全然相容レサルモノテアリマシテ滿洲國人ニ於テ之ヲ容認セサルヘキコト火ヲ賭ルヨリ炳テアリマス滿蒙ニ對シ其ノ人民ノ欲セサル所ヲ強制セムトスルカ如キハ正義ノ觀念ノ許ササル所テアリマスノミナラス同地方ニ新ナル紛亂ノ種ヲ播クニ外ナラナイノテアリマス要スルニ支那本部政權ノ滿蒙進出ヲ計ルカ如キ企圖其ノ他類似ノ不徹底ナル考案ハ前述ノ如キ滿蒙ヲ以テ内外人安住ノ樂土ト爲サムトスル目的ニハ副ハス又滿蒙ニ於ケル現實ノ事態ヲ基礎トスヘシトノ趣旨ニモ合ハナイモノテアリマシテ滿蒙自體ノ安定乃至極東ニ於ケル恒久的平和ヲ招來スル所以テハアリマセヌ

之ニ反シ滿洲國ニ於キマシテハ其ノ建國宣言及對外聲明等ニ内外ニ對スル極メテ公正妥當ナル政策ヲ掲ケテ居リ殊ニ對外關係ニ付キマシテハ正義ト平和ト親善トヲ主旨トスヘキコト國際法及國際慣行ニ照シテ既存條約上ノ義務ヲ繼承履行スヘキコト外國人ノ既得權益ヲ尊重シ其ノ生命財產ヲ保護スヘキコト外國人ノ來住ヲ歡迎シ且各民族ニ對シ平等公正ナル待遇ヲ與フヘキコト外國人ノ經濟活動ニ關シ門戶開放ノ主義ヲ遵守スヘキコト列國トノ通商貿易ヲ容易ナラシメ世界經濟ノ

發展ニ貢獻スヘキコト等ノ方針ヲ宣明致シテ居リマスノミナラス同國當局ハ右實行ノ十分ナル誠意ヲ有スルモノト認メラルル次第テアリマス從テ同國ニ對シ承認ヲ與ヘ此ノ上共同國カ前述ノ如キ健全ナル政策方針ノ實施ニ邁進シテ參リマス様援助シテ行クコトハ即チ現實ノ事態ニ基イテ滿蒙ニ内外人安住ノ樂土ヲ築ク所以テアリマシテ之實ニ滿蒙問題ノ恒久的解決ヲ齎ス唯一ノ方法テアルコトハ何人ニモ明カナル筈テアリマス

滿洲國ノ政策方針ノ公正妥當ナルコト右ノ如ク又同國當局ニ於テ之カ實行ニ關シ十分ナル誠意ヲ有スルコト前述ノ通テアリマスルヲ以テ同國ニシテ建國ノ純真ナル精神ヲ堅持シ努メテ已マナケレハ其ノ前途ハ實ニ洋々タルモノカアリマス世間或ハ同國ニ於ケル匪賊ノ跳梁ヲ過大視シ或ハ同國ノ財政難ヲ豫斷スルカ如キ者モアリマスカ斯ノ如キ悲觀論ニハ容易ニ左袒スルコトカ出來ナイノテアリマス新興國ニ於テ其ノ建國當初現下ノ滿洲國ニ於ケルカ如キ不逞分子ノ跳梁ヲ見ルコトハ世界ニ幾多ノ事例カアルノテアリマシテ而モ多數ノ場合ニ於テ之カ鎮定ニハ相當ノ年月ヲ費シテ居ルノテアリマス之ニ比較スレハ目下滿洲國ニ於ケル匪賊ノ討伐ハ良好ナル成績ヲ以テ進行シテ居ルモノト見ナケレハナリマセヌ又滿洲國ノ財政ハ同國當局カ其ノ建國當初ニ豫想シテ居リマシタ所ヨリモ遙ニ良好テアルト云フコトヲ聞キ及ンテ居リマス滿洲國ハ其ノ領域及人口殊ニ廣大

ナル富源ニ顧ミマシテ施政宜シキヲ得ハ必スヤ富裕ナル國家トナリ世界各國ニ取ツテモ有望ナル市場トナリマスコト疑問ノ餘地カアリマセヌ私ハ斯クシテ滿洲國カ健全ナル發達ヲ遂ケ雷ニ同國三千萬民衆ノ福祉ヲ招來スルノミナラス支那本部更生ノ好模範トナラムコトヲ期待スルモノテアリマス爾テ支那本部ノ狀況ヲ見マスルニ最近内政ノ紛亂ハ一層甚シキヲ致シタル一方共匪ノ跳梁ハ長江及南支一帶ノ廣大ナル面積ニ互ツテ居ルノテアリマシテ國民政府ノ前途ニ對シ重大ナル暗影ヲ投シテ居ル狀態テアリマス而モ排外殊ニ排日運動ハ依然トシテ止マナイノテアリマスカ斯ノ如クンハ支那本部ト外國トノ關係ハ愈紛糾ヲ加ヘ其ノ結果益國內ノ混亂ヲ誘致スヘキコト想像ニ難カラヌノテアリマシテ之ニ伴フ人民ノ窮苦ハ眞ニ同情ニ堪ヘナイモノカアリマス私ハ支那カ今日ノ狀況ヲ續ケテ行キマスルコトハ雷ニ同國自身ノ爲寒心ニ堪ヘナイノミナラス外國側ニ取ツテモ由々シキ形勢ヲ持チ來スノ危險ヲ包藏シテ居ルコトヲ痛感スルノテアリマス之ニ反シ支那側カ彼上ノ事態ニ深く思ヲ致シ速ニ其ノ誤レル對外政策ヨリ脱却スルト共ニ眞面目ニ其ノ内部ノ整頓ニ精進セムトスル建設的ノ態度ニ出テ來リマスルナラハ右ハ支那並諸外國雙方ノ爲眞ニ喜ハシキコトテアリマシテ我國民カ東洋ノ大局ニ顧ミテ出來得ル限リノ助力ヲ吝マサルヘキコト勿論テアリマス私ハ同文同種ノ日滿支三國カ各獨立國トシテ相倚リ相助ケ極東ノ安寧福祉ノ爲延テ世界平

和ト人類文化トノ爲努力邁進スル時期ノ一日モ速ニ到來セムコトヲ翹望シテ已マナイノテアリマス

THE ADDRESS OF COUNT UCHIDA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
AT THE 63RD SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET,
AUGUST 25TH, 1932.

At the June Session of the Diet my predecessor took occasion to report upon and discuss the outstanding foreign relations of this country. Today, in view of the importance of the developments in Manchuria that have taken place since then, I desire to review the questions of Manchuria and China Proper, and to describe in some detail the policy of the Japanese Government.

We are all gratified to note that Manchoukuo has entered upon a career of sturdy and healthy progress. The Japanese Government are convinced that the recognition of this new state is the only means of stabilizing conditions in Manchuria and of establishing a condition of permanent peace in the Far East. And it is with a view to the early extension of formal recognition to Manchoukuo that we are making various arrangements, upon the expected completion of which in the near future, our plan will be carried through.

However, there are those in other countries who do not fully comprehend the attitude of Japan toward China nor the measures she has taken since the Incident of September 18 of last year, and who, in default of a correct conception of the advent of Manchoukuo, look upon any recognition of Manchoukuo by Japan as an illegitimate procedure. In view of such misunderstanding as still persists, I avail myself of this opportunity to clarify Japan's position and to expound to you the reasons why the Government consider the recognition of Manchoukuo to be the only means of solving the Manchurian problem, although in doing so I may have to repeat what has already been set forth in the successive declarations and statements issued in the past by the Japanese Government.

It is an indisputable fact that the chaotic condition of China, and the so-called revolutionary policy carried on by China under the enthralling influence of an extravagant political dogma, have been principally responsible for the unfortunate turn that international relations have taken of recent years in the Far East. Although Japan has been the chief victim of the abnormal state of affairs in China, other countries have also suffered intolerable indignities and incalculable material loss. At the same time it is admitted by those conversant with the actual conditions in China that no remedy can be effected by having recourse either to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to any other organ of what may be termed the "machinery of peace". In fact, it has been the practice of the Powers, as has been demonstrated on in-

numerable occasions, to repair, or prevent, injuries to their important rights and interests in China by the direct application of force, without relying upon those instruments of peace.

For over twenty years Japan continued to exercise the greatest patience and moderation, in the hope that some day China might soberly undertake the task of rehabilitating her fortunes and playing her proper rôle in the maintenance of peace in the Far East. China failed, however, to show any sincere desire to reciprocate our good will and kindly sentiments, but increased more than ever in her arrogance and intolerance. Our Government took pains time and again to point out to China the danger she was running in trying too far the patience of the Japanese people. But China did not heed our warnings. The Incident of September 18 occurred in Manchuria, the very region regarded as the first bulwark of Japan, at the precise moment when the feeling of our people had been wrought up to the highest pitch by repeated provocations. We had no alternative other than to resort to measures of self-defence.

There are those who argue as though the action of Japan were a violation of the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Pact. But such a contention has no foundation in fact. As I have stated, Japan has been forced to adopt the necessary measures for the prevention of wanton attacks upon important rights and interests vital to her national existence. The Anti-War Pact does not put a restraint upon the exercise of the right of self-defence in such a case. The Pact does not prohibit a signatory Power from taking at its own discretion whatever steps it finds im-

perative in order to remove immediate menaces to its territory and its rights and interests of whatever kind. And obviously, the exercise of the right of self-defense may extend beyond the territory of the Power which exercises that right. Japan's action is essentially identical with the action that other Powers have taken elsewhere in similar circumstances.

Following upon this action legitimately taken by Japan in the face of the Chinese attacks, the officials of the régime presided over by Chang Hsueh-liang either fled or resigned, as you know, with the result of the practical extinction of that régime. In the mean time, among the leading people of Manchuria, who had long resented the tyranny of the Changs and were opposed to plunging their land into the civil turmoil of China Proper, a project for political reform was already under way. It is in every way natural that these leaders should have taken, as they did, advantage of the opportunity afforded by the downfall of Chang to launch out upon an active movement. A "Peace Maintenance Committee" was accordingly organized in Mukden, in Harbin, and in other centres. In view of our own responsibility in respect of the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria we extended the necessary co-operation to these committees. It was the Manchurian leaders connected with these committees who decided that the hour had struck for founding a new state. The establishment of Manchoukuo was an outcome of a separatist movement having for its background the geographic and historical peculiarities of Manchuria as the psychological characteristics of the Manchurian people.

Those who seek to place upon Japan the responsibility for the Manchurian revolution, by tracing the independence of Manchoukuo directly to our military operations, simply labour under an ignorance of the facts, and their opinions altogether miss the point. Again, as regards those who fancy they detect a secret connection of some sort on the part of Japan with the foundation of the new state, basing their suspicions on the fact that there are in fact a number of Japanese in the employ of the Manchoukuo Government, I need only point to the existence of many precedents for the enlistment by a young government or a newly founded state of the services of foreigners. Our own government, since the Meiji Restoration, have employed many foreigners as advisers or as regular officials; their number, for instance, in the year 1875 or thereabout exceeded 500. Those who misconstrue the presence of Japanese in the Manchoukuo Government in the fashion alluded to, are placing the responsibility where it does not belong.

Manchoukuo has come into being, as I have already remarked, as a result of separatist movements within China herself. Consequently, the view expressed in certain quarters that the recognition by Japan of the new state, thus created, would constitute a violation of the stipulations of the Nine-Power Treaty, is in my opinion incomprehensible. The Nine-Power Treaty does not forbid all separatist movements in China, or debar the Chinese in any part of the country from setting up of their free will an independent state. Hence, should Japan

extend recognition to the existing government of Manchoukuo, founded by the will of the people of Manchuria, she would not thereby, as a signatory Power to the Nine-Power Treaty, violate in any way the stipulations of that Treaty. Of course, it would be a different matter on the assumption that Japan was seeking to annex Manchuria or otherwise to satisfy a thirst for land. Only I hardly need to waste words in once more disclaiming at this juncture any territorial designs on our part in Manchuria or anywhere else.

Thus far, I have elucidated the theses that the attitude maintained by Japan toward China, and especially the measures we have taken since the Incident of September 18, have been just and proper, that the independence of Manchoukuo has been achieved through the spontaneous will of the Manchurians, and should be regarded as a consequence of the fissiparous movement in China, and that recognition by Japan of the new state thus created can not violate the stipulations of the Nine-Power Treaty. Now let me proceed further and dwell upon the reasons why the Japanese Government consider the recognition of Manchoukuo as the sole effective means of solving the Manchurian problem.

With regard to the question of finding a solution for the Manchurian problem, the Japanese Government attach the greatest importance to the following two points:—First, that in seeking a satisfactory solution we should aim at the fulfillment of the legitimate aspirations of the Manchurian people,—at adequate guarantees for the rights and interests of Japan,—

at the prevention, in order to make Manchuria a safe place to live in alike for Manchurians and foreigners, of any recrudescence of the erstwhile anti-foreign policy and movements, and finally at bringing not only stability to Manchuria but permanent peace to the Far East;—Secondly, that such a solution should be effected by rejecting all sentimental propositions and abstract theories and arrived at upon the solid basis of the realities of the situation. In view of the circumstances that led to the outbreak of last September and the immense sacrifices our country has been compelled to make in the past, the Japanese Government feel the imperious need of arriving at a fundamental solution of the Manchurian problem on the lines of these two propositions, and of eliminating for all time the causes of the secular Sino-Japanese conflict.

On the other hand, it appears that in certain quarters a plan is being considered to reach a solution by patching up matters for the moment by investing China Proper in one form or another with authority over Manchuria. That such a plan would only serve to reproduce the situation preceding the Incident of September 18 is only too plain to us who have been taught by bitter experience in the past. The people of Japan can never consent to a solution of that kind. Moreover, it is as clear as day that the investment of China Proper with power over Manchuria, under whatever guise, is totally irreconcilable with the political creed enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and other public statements of the Manchoukuo Government,

and therefore that the scheme in question has no chance of being accepted by the Manchurians. The imposition upon Manchuria of what is not wanted by Manchurians would be as unjust, as ill-advised, in that it would only end by sowing the seeds of future trouble in that land. The plan to invest China Proper with authority over Manchuria, and all measures of a similar temporizing kind, will never fulfil the object of making Manchuria a safe and happy land for both natives and foreigners, nor do they accord with our principle of finding a solution upon the basis of the realities of the situation. Certainly it is not the way in which to bring stability to Manchuria or permanent peace to the Far East.

Manchoukuo has set out upon an honest programme that is open and above-board. It has declared its intention to pursue a policy of justice, peace and friendship toward other countries, to take over the obligations of existing treaties according to international law and usage, to respect the vested rights and interests of foreigners, and to protect their lives and property, to welcome all aliens and to accord them equal and equitable treatment irrespective of their racial origin, to adhere to the principle of the Open Door, to promote international trade, and to contribute to the economic development of the world; and Manchoukuo's sincerity of purpose has been definitely established. It is plain, therefore, that to extend to Manchoukuo formal recognition and assist its government to carry on their sound policy above referred to, will be a notable step toward making Manchuria a happy and peaceful land for natives and foreigners

alike on the basis of the realities of the situation. And it is plain, too, that such is the only way to secure a permanent solution of the Manchurian problem.

As long as Manchoukuo retains the sterling spirit in which it was founded and perseveres in its high purpose, it is assured of a future full of promise. Here and there we find persons entertaining an exaggerated fear of the perils of banditry in Manchuria or making a gloomy forecast regarding the finances of the country. But we refuse to join the company of these pessimists. Uplheavals brought about by lawless elements are universal phenomena to be observed in newly established states anywhere in the world. Whereas in most of such cases it takes some considerable time to put the unrest down, it is only fair to say that in Manchuria the suppression of banditry is making comparatively rapid strides. As for the financial status of Manchoukuo, I have been told that it is good, really far better than was anticipated at first by the Manchurian authorities. In view of the vast territory, the thriving population, and the immense natural resources in its possession, there can be no doubt that, Manchoukuo, given a good government, will emerge as a rich and prosperous country and come to be a great market for the world. It is my hope that the healthy development of Manchoukuo will not only bring happiness and prosperity to thirty million inhabitants of the country but will serve as a good example for the rehabilitation of China Proper.

As regards the conditions prevailing in China Proper, I regret to say that the growing

disturbance in her domestic administration, coupled with the rampant activities of the communist bandits throughout an extensive area in the Yangtze Valley and South China, is casting a gloomy shadow on the path of the National Government. Besides, as the anti-foreign, especially anti-Japanese, movement still continues unabated, further complications are likely to arise in the foreign relations of China, which in turn will make her internal confusion worse confounded. Truly, our deep sympathy is due to the Chinese people, who have to suffer under these troubled conditions. To allow such conditions to persist as they are, I am firmly convinced, will not only be deplorable for China herself but will constitute a constant danger of bringing about a serious menace to the rights and interests of foreign Powers. On the contrary, the whole world will rejoice, should China realize the gravity of the situation, cast aside her ill-advised foreign policy and adopt in earnest a constructive programme of devotion to the task of internal re-adjustment. It goes without saying that Japan, always conscious of the general interests of the Far East, will spare no effort to afford all possible assistance to China. Indeed, it is my fervent hope that the day is not far distant when Japan, Manchoukuo and China, as three independent Powers closely linked together by the bond of cultural and racial affinities, will come to co-operate, hand in hand, for the maintenance and advancement of the peace and prosperity of the Far East as well as for the peace of the world and the civilization of mankind.

六、第六十四回帝國議會ニ於ケル内田外務大臣演説

(昭和八年一月二十一日)

私ハ茲ニ昨年八月臨時議會以後ニ於ケル帝國ノ重要外交案件ニ付テ御報告致シマスルト共ニ帝國政府ノ所見並方針ヲ申述ヘマシテ諸君ノ御清聴ヲ煩シ度イト存シマス

帝國政府ハ既定ノ方針ニ基キマシテ昨年九月十五日滿洲國政府トノ間ニ議定書ヲ調印致シ之ニ依テ帝國ハ滿洲國ノ獨立國タルコトヲ確認スルト共ニ滿洲國ハ同國內ニ於テ帝國及帝國臣民力從來條約其ノ他ノ約定ニ依テ有スル一切ノ權益ヲ確認尊重スヘキコトヲ約シ且日滿兩國ハ滿洲國ニ對スル一切ノ脅威カ同時ニ帝國ノ康寧ニ關スルニ願ミ共同シテ國家ノ防衛ニ當ルヘク之カ爲所要ノ帝國軍ハ滿洲國內ニ駐屯スルモノナルコトヲ規定シテ居ルノテアリマス即チ右議定書調印ノ結果帝國ノ在滿權益ヲ擁護スルト共ニ内外ノ脅威ニ對シ滿洲國ノ安全ヲ確保スルノ基礎カ確立セラレ東洋ノ平和維持ニ對スル有力ナル保障カ新ニ設ケラレタ次第デアリマス

滿洲國カ其ノ後益健全ナル發達ヲ遂ケ就中其ノ治安ノ狀況ハ集團的兵匪ノ逐次壊滅スルト共ニ著シク改善セラレテ居リマスコトハ寔ニ御同慶ノ至リテアリマス而シテ此ノ狀態カ同國ノ通商貿易

上ニハ勿論財政上ニモ極メテ好イ影響ヲ與ヘテ居リマスコトハ申ス迄モナク其ノ慶福ハ滿洲國人ハ固ヨリ在留邦人其ノ他諸外國人ノ上ニモ一樣ニ及ンテ居ル次第テアリマス此ノ事實ハ即チ新國家ヲ承認シ其ノ發展ヲ助成スルコトカ滿洲問題ヲ堅實ナル基礎ノ上ニ解決シ東洋ノ平和ヲ保全スル唯一ノ方途テアルト確信スル帝國政府ノ見解ノ誤ラサルコトヲ如實ニ示シテ居ルノテアリマス私ハ右ノ如ク滿洲國カ良好ナル状態ニ在リ其ノ慶福カ内外人一樣ニ及ンテ居ル事實ニモ願ミマシテ同國ニ對シテ帝國ノ採ツテ來タ態度カ極メテ公正妥當ノモノテアルコトヲ聯盟及列國ニ於テ必スヤ認識スルニ至ルヘキコトヲ確信スルモノテアリマス又窮極ニ於テハ支那國民モ日滿支三國カ各獨立國トシテ相倚リ相助ケテ行クコトカ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保スル最善ノ方法ナルコトヲ諒解スルニ至ルヘキヲ信シテ疑ハナイノテアリマス尙序ヲ以テ熱河ニ付テ一言附加ヘ度イト存シマス滿蒙ト支那トノ境界カ長城テアルコトハ歴史的ニ見テ議論ノ餘地ナキ所テアリ殊ニ熱河省カ滿洲國ノ一部タルコトハ同國建國ノ經緯ニ徴シマシテモ明瞭テアリマス然ルニ最近同省内ニ於ケル治安擾亂ノ策動顯著ナルモノアルノミナラス學良麾下ノ正規軍ニシテ國境ヲ越エ熱河省ニ侵入シ來ルモノカアル有様テアリマスカ滿洲國ノ領域ニ屬スル地方ノ治安ノ維持ハ日滿議定書ニ基キ兩國共同シテ其ノ責ニ任スルモノナルコト申ス迄モナク從テ所謂熱河問題ハ純然タル滿洲國內部ノ問題タ

ルト同時ニ我方トシテモ右條約上ノ義務ニ顧ミ多大ノ關心ヲ有スル次第テアリマス支那ニ於ケル政局ハ引續キ渾沌タルモノアル一方排日運動ハ依然緩和ノ兆候ヲ示サナイノテアリマス殊ニ昨年十二月南京ニ開催セラレマシタ國民黨中央委員全體會議ニ於テハ北支邊境ニ於ケル軍事行動、東北義勇軍ニ對スル援助及日貨排斥ノ三點ヨリ成ル積極抗日案ナルモノカ提出セラレタル旨ノ報道カアリマシタカ其ノ後政府ノ入手致シマシタ各種ノ情報ニ依レハ右積極的抗日案ナルモノカ同會議ヲ通過セルコトハ確實ト認メラルルノテアリマス而シテ近來支那軍隊カ支那ト滿洲國トノ境界附近ニ集中セラレ居ルノミナラス既ニ其ノ一部分カ熱河省内ニ侵入セルコトニ付キマシテハ前ニ一言致シマシタ通テアリマス帝國政府ニ於テハ斯ノ如キ支那ノ状態ヲ衷心重大視シテ居ルモノテアリマシテ此ノ事態ヨリ招來スルコトアルヘキ不幸ナル結果ニ付豫メ支那政府及國民ノ深甚ナル注意ヲ喚起シ其ノ反省ヲ促ササルヲ得ナイノテアリマス

日支問題ニ關スル所謂「リットン」委員會ノ調査報告書ハ昨年十月理事會ニ提出セラレ又之ニ對スル帝國政府ノ意見書ハ同十一月同シク理事會ニ提出セラレ且兩者トモ一般ニ公表セラレテ居ル

ノテアリマシテ諸君ニ於テ既ニ御承知ノ通テアリマスカ要スルニ我方ノ意見書ハ滿洲國ヲ承認シ
 之カ健全ナル發達ヲ助成スルコトカ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保スヘキ唯一ノ方途テアルト云フ帝國政府ノ
 基本的見解ヲ各方面カラ敷衍シテ居ルモノテアリマス政府ハ其ノ後聯盟理事會、總會、其ノ他諸
 列國トノ交渉ノ機會ヲ捉ヘテ此ノ意見書ノ趣旨トスル所ヲ懇切丁寧ニ説明シ來ツタノテアリマシ
 テ昨年十二月一旦休會シタル聯盟十九ヶ國委員會ハ本月十六日再開討議ヲ繼續シテ居リマスカ我
 方トシテハ右委員會ニ對シテハ素ヨリ今後聯盟ノ諸會議其ノ他凡ユル機會ニ於テ右意見書ノ趣旨
 ノ徹底ニ努力スル覺悟テアリマス

由來帝國政府ハ聯盟ノ事業ニ對シ誠實ニ協力シ其ノ權威ヲ増進スルニ努メ來ツタ次第テアリマシ
 テ聯盟ノ東洋ノ平和及福祉ニ貢獻セムカ爲ニスル努力ニ對シテハ十分ニ好意アル協力ヲ爲スノ用
 意ヲ有シテ居ルコト多言ヲ要シナイノテアリマス然シ乍ラ同時ニ帝國政府ニ於テハ聯盟カ支那ニ
 關スル問題ニ關與スルニ當リマシテハ前述ノ意見書ニ詳述致シマシタ如ク同國ニ於ケル事態ノ複
 雜難澁ニ變則的特色ノ甚タ濃厚ナルモノアルニ願ミマシテ聯盟規約ノ運用ニ十分ノ伸縮性ヲ有セ
 シムルコトハ必然ナリト考ヘルノテアリマス現ニ通常ノ諸國家間ニ一般ニ行ハレテ居ル國際法上
 ノ諸原則乃至慣行ハ支那ニ付テハ著シク變更ヲ加ヘテ行ハレテ居ルノテアリマシテ聯盟規約ノミ

カ之ニ對スル例外タルコトハ出來ヌノテアリマス即チ歐洲ニ於ケル先例若クハ事情ニ基キ規約ヲ
 其ノ儘右ノ如キ事態ニ適用セムト焦慮スル結果ハ實際ニ當嵌マラサルコトトナリ却テ事態ノ紛糾
 惡化ヲ來スノミナラス聯盟ノ權威ヲ無用ニ傷クルコトトナリ世界ノ平和ノ爲ニモ極メテ危険テア
 ルト考ヘラルルノテアリマス

東洋永遠ノ平和ヲ期スル爲ニハ一方ニ於テ日滿支三國間ノ協力提携カ必要テアルコトハ前述ノ通
 テアリマスカ又他方ニ於テ日滿蘇三國間ノ圓滿ナル協調カ甚タ望マシイノテアリマス

蘇聯邦政府ニ於キマシテハ滿洲事變ニ關シ當初ヨリ極メテ慎重ナル態度ヲ執リ來リマシタノテ幸
 ニシテ今日迄帝國トノ間ニ何等不愉快ナル經緯ヲ見ナカツタ次第テアリマシテ日滿蘇三國關係ノ
 爲慶賀致ス次第テアリマス

最近蘇支兩國間ニ國交ノ恢復ヲ見ルニ至リマシタ爲東洋全般ニ於ケル赤化運動カ今後一層活潑ニ
 ナル様ナコトハナカラウト懸念スル向モアリマスカ私ハ茲ニハ右見方ノ當否ニ付テハ暫ク論及致
 シマセヌ唯既ニ共產黨ノ活動ト共產軍ノ跳梁トノ爲ニ苦ンテ居リマスル揚子江沿岸並南支一帶ノ
 情勢ニ更ニ赤化ノ氣勢ヲ添ヘルカ如キ事態カ蘇支復交問題ニ伴フ一現象トシテ萬一ニモ發生スル
 様ナコトカアレハ之ハ東洋平和ノ爲由々シキ事柄テアリマス此ノ點ニ付帝國トシテ深甚ナル注意

ヲ怠ラヌノハ勿論テアリマス

尙此ノ機會ニ日蘇不可侵條約ノ問題ニ付テ一言致シマスレハ元來兩國相侵ササルコトハ先年北京ニ於テ調印セラレタル日蘇基本條約ノ精神テアリ又兩國共ニ調印シ居レル不戰條約ノ規定スル所ナルノミナラス其ノ後兩國間ニ於ケル實際ノ關係殊ニ只今述ヘマシタル最近ノ事態ニ徴シテモ何等疑ハナイノテアリマス唯此ノ精神、此ノ規定、此ノ實際關係ニ對シ更ニ兩國間ノ不可侵條約ト云フカ如キ形式ヲ與ヘルト云フ問題トナリマスルト其ノ時期方法等ニ付キマシテハ自ラ種々ノ見解カ有リ得ルノテアリマシテ現ニ昨春蘇聯邦政府ヨリノ提議以來各方面ニ各種ノ議論ヲ生スルニ至リマシタルハ御承知ノ通テアリマス

帝國政府ニ於キマシテハ本問題ニ關シ斯ノ如ク幾多議論ノ岐レテ居ル事實ニ顧ミマシテ結局現存條約以外改メテ不可侵條約ノ商議締結ヲ行フニハ時期未タ熟シナイモノト認メマシテ昨年末其ノ趣旨ヲ以テ一應蘇聯邦政府ニ回答致シタルテアリマス尤モ右様回答ヲ致シマシタルハトテ我方カ蘇聯邦ニ對シ聊カモ侵略ノ意圖ヲ有スルモノテハナイコトハ勿論テアリマシテ蘇聯邦政府ニ於テモ此ノ點ニ付何等誤解ナキコトヲ確信スルモノテアリマス

一般軍縮會議ハ昨年二月壽府ニ開會以來陸海空ノ三軍ニ互リ各種重要案件ニ付討議ヲ進メツツア

ルノテアリマスカ同會議ハ世界各國ヲ網羅セル未曾有ノ大會議テアリマシテ各參加國ハ各自ノ國防ノ安全ヲ庶幾シ自然其ノ間ノ利害關係モ亦極メテ複雑ナルモノカアリマスカラ今尙容易ニ一致ヲ見ルニ至リマセヌ然シ乍ラ元來軍縮事業ハ平和事業トシテ國際聯盟ノ重要ナル任務ノ一テアルノミナラス現下世界各國ノ最大關心ヲ有スル問題ノ一テアリマシテ該事業ニ對スル帝國政府ノ熱誠ナル寄與協力ニ至リマシテハ終始一貫動カナイノテアリマス從テ今次ノ會議ニ於キマシテモ我全權ハ各國代表者ト協力シテ專ラ會議ノ成功ニ努力ヲ傾ケツツアルノテアリマス舊臘帝國政府カ世界海軍軍備ニ對シ重大ナル縮減ヲ齎ラスヘキ提案ヲ進ンテ會議ニ提出致シマシタルハ此ノ目的ニ外ナラナイノテアリマス

右提案ハ各種艦船ノ艦型縮小、航空母艦ノ全廢、主力艦及甲級巡洋艦ノ隻數縮減、乙級巡洋艦及驅逐艦ノ總噸數縮減等ヲ主張スルモノテアリマシテ之ニ據リマスレハ航空母艦ノ全廢並主力艦及甲級巡洋艦ノ縮減ノミニテモ日英米佛伊ノ五箇國ヲ通シマシテ總計約百三十萬噸ノ縮減ヲ見ルニ至ル計算テアリマス我提案ハ今次ノ會議ニ於テ一般ニ承認セラレタル軍縮ノ各原則就中攻撃的勢力ヲ弱メ防禦的勢力ヲ強ムヘシトノ原則ヲ基礎トスルモノテアリマシテ此ノ原則ニ據リマスレハ優勢海軍國ハ劣勢海軍國ニ比シ一層大ナル犠牲ヲ拂フヘキハ當然テアリマシテ若シ右兩者ニ對シ

同一率ノ縮減ヲ行フトシマスレハ劣勢海軍國ノ安全感ハ著シク害セラルルニ至ルノテアリマス又一方ニ於テ我提案ハ關係各國ノ主張ヲ能ク限リ考量ニ入レテ居ルノテアリマスカラ各國ニ於テ我提案ヲ十分攻究シマスルニ於テハ我提案ノ極メテ公正合理的ニシテ且實際的ノモノテアルコトヲ克ク諒解スルニ至ルヘキコトヲ確信スルモノテアリマス

世界經濟界ノ趨向ヲ觀マスルニ四十餘ヶ國ニ互ル金本位制度ノ停止、銀價ノ暴落、爲替相場ノ混亂等ニ依ル貿易上ノ障礙以外ニ各國競ツテ高率關稅、輸出入ノ制限禁止等種々通商上ノ障壁ヲ設ケマシテ所謂產業貿易上ノ鎖國主義ヲ行フニ至リマシタ結果從來折角健全ナル發達ヲ續ケツツアリマシタ通商自由ノ大原則カ茲ニ一大逆轉ヲ見ルニ至リマシタコトハ誠ニ遺憾ニ堪ヘサル所テアリマス蓋シ各國間物資交易ノ自由ハ移住往來ノ自由ト相俟チマシテ世界各國民力有無相通シ共存共榮ノ理想ヲ達成スル所以テアリマシテ此ノ大原則ノ圓滑ナル運用カ妨ケラルルニ於キマシテハ國際間ノ共存共榮ハ之ヲ實現スルコト難ク眞ノ世界ノ繁榮ト平和トハ之ヲ期待シ得サルニ至ルノテアリマス

幸ヒ最近ニ至リ此ノ世界的經濟不安ヲ排除スル方策ニ就テ熱心ナル檢討ヲ行ハントスルノ氣運カ顯著トナルニ至リマシタコトハ誠ニ喜フヘキ現象テアリマシテ我國ト致シマシテモ此ノ種ノ國際

的努力ニ對シマシテハ進ンテ協力シタイ方針テアリマス現ニ近ク開カルヘキ世界經濟財政會議ノ如キモ亦上述ノ趣旨ニ基クモノト考ヘマスルカラ帝國政府ニ於キマシテモ既ニ同會議ノ準備委員會ニモ參加シ各國ト共ニ各種ノ豫備的研究ヲ進メツツアルノテアリマシテ今後トモ同會議ノ成功ニ對シテハ衷心ノ援助ヲ致シタイ意向テアリマス

以上當面ノ外交問題ニ付御清聽ヲ煩シタ次第テアリマスカ最後ニ私ハ右ニ述ヘマシタル所ノ根底ヲナス帝國政府ノ見解ニ關シ一言致シ度イト存シマス

帝國外交ノ根本義カ東洋ノ平和延イテ世界平和ノ確保ニ存スルコトハ多言ヲ要シナイ所テアリマス而シテ帝國政府ノ所見ニ依リマスレハ現下國際社會ノ實情ニ顧ミ眞實ノ平和ヲ招來セムカ爲ニハ平和ノ維持ヲ目的トスル諸原則ノ普偏性ヲ認メツツ而モ之カ運用ニ當ツテハ實際ニ適應シテ適宜伸縮性ヲ有セシムルト同時ニ世界各方面ニ於テ平和ノ維持ヲ現實ニ可能ナラシメツツアル勢力ヲ尊重スルコトカ極メテ肝要ナノテアリマス私ハ此ノ意味ニ於テ聯盟規約中ニ地方的諒解ノ尊重ヲ規定シテ居ルコトノ賢明ナルヲ認ムルト共ニ東洋ニ於テハ帝國ノ建設的勢力カ其ノ方面ノ平和ヲ現實ニ維持スル爲ノ支柱ナルコトヲ認識シ同方面ノ平和維持ヲ圖ルヘキモノト考フルノテアリマス帝國ハ世界ノ何處ニ對シテモ領土の野心ヲ有シマセヌ又世界ノ何國トモ事ヲ構ヘントスルモ

ノテハアリマセヌ帝國ノ企圖スル所ハ國際正義ニ基キ帝國ノ生命線ヲ確保スルト共ニ其ノ隣接諸邦ト協力提携シテ東洋ノ康寧ヲ確保シ依テ以テ世界平和ノ維持ニ貢獻セムトスル外ナイノテアリマス而シテ東洋ニ於ケル其ノ權威ト其ノ實力トヲ以テ右目的達成ノ爲貢獻セムトスルハ日本國民ノ信念テアリ又覺悟テアルノテアリマス明治以來ノ帝國外交ノ根本精神ハ實ニ茲ニ存スルノテアリマス前ニ述ヘマシタ滿洲問題乃至日蘇關係又ハ聯盟ニ對スル帝國政府ノ態度モ右精神ニ基キタルモノテアリマス將又軍縮會議ニ對スル帝國ノ提案ノ如キモ均シク同一ノ精神ニ出テ居ルノテアリマス帝國政府ハ敝上根本精神ノ下ニ何レノ國家トノ間ニモ最親善ナル關係ヲ保持シ以テ通商ノ圓滑ト文化ノ融合トヲ圖リツツ世界人類ノ一層崇高ナル理想ヲ實現スヘキ階程ヲ辿ラムコトヲ期スルモノテアリマス

THE ADDRESS OF COUNT UCHIDA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
AT THE 64TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET,
JANUARY 21ST, 1933.

I have the privilege now to report on the latest developments which have occurred in major foreign questions affecting this country since the Extraordinary session of the Diet in August

last and to state the views and policies of the Japanese Government concerning them.

In pursuance of their settled policy the Japanese Government signed a protocol concurrently with the Government of Manchoukuo on September 15 last year. By this instrument Japan has definitely recognized Manchoukuo as an independent state, while Manchoukuo is pledged to respect all the rights and interests of Japan and her subjects in that country secured either by treaty or through other agreements. Moreover, in view of the fact that any menace to Manchoukuo has of once a direct bearing upon the welfare of Japan, provisions are also introduced for the joint defense of that state and for the stationing in its territory of the Japanese troops necessary for that purpose. The protocol thus affords full protection to the rights and interests of Japan in Manchoukuo and insures the safety of that country alike from internal and external dangers. It means that a new and effective guarantee has been established for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

It is extremely gratifying that Manchoukuo has made rapid and healthy progress and especially that a marked improvement has been achieved in its internal peace and order consequent upon the successive annihilation or dispersal of the major hordes of bandits. This situation has naturally reacted favorably upon the commerce and finances of Manchoukuo and the resultant benefits have been shared by Japanese and other foreign residents equally with the Manchurians themselves. Here we have a concrete proof that the Japanese Government have

not erred in their belief that to recognize the new state and to assist its development is the only way for the solution of the Manchurian issue on a sound basis, and for the establishment of peace in the Far East. I am convinced that in view of the auspicious growth of Manchoukuo and the universal advantage thereby accruing to all the peoples of the world, the League of Nations and the governments of the Powers will eventually recognize the fairness and justice of the position we have taken up with regard to Manchoukuo. Nor have I any doubt that in the end the Chinese themselves will be brought to regard mutual aid and co-operation between Japan, China and Manchoukuo, each as an independent state, to be the best means of insuring peace in the Orient.

I may add at this point a few words with reference to Jehol. Viewed historically, there is no room for doubt as to the fact that the Great Wall marks the boundary separating China from Manchuria and Mongolia. Particularly in the light of the circumstances leading to the establishment of Manchoukuo, it is evident that the Province of Jehol constitutes an integral part of the new state. However, manoeuvres for creating disturbances in that Province have of late been notoriously rife, and some contingents of the regular troops under Chang Hsueh-liang have crossed the border into the Province. While the so-called Jehol question is purely a domestic affair for Manchoukuo, Japan is of course bound by the recent protocol to join forces with that country in the task of maintaining peace and order throughout its territory. The

question, therefore, in view of this treaty obligation, is a matter of serious concern to the Government of Japan.

As for China, the political confusion in that country continues as ever, while the anti-Japanese movement shows no sign of abatement. It was reported that during the plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, convened at Nanking in December last, a proposal for a positive campaign against Japan was submitted, which called for military operations along the North China frontier, support for the "Volunteer Armies" of the North East, and an anti-Japanese boycott. Information obtained from various sources since leads us to believe that this proposal for a positive anti-Japanese movement was actually adopted by the Kuomintang Congress. As a matter of fact, Chinese troops are of late in process of concentration near the borders of Manchoukuo, and some of them have, as I have already stated, invaded the Province of Jehol. The Japanese Government cannot look upon such a state of affairs in China without the gravest apprehension. We are compelled to warn the Government and people of China against the unfortunate eventualities that may arise from the situation, and to invite them to think seriously before proceeding further in that direction.

The report of what has come to be called the Lytton Commission on the Sino-Japanese question was submitted to the Council of the League of Nations in October last, and the "Observations" of the Japanese Government on the same report were submitted in November to

the same body. Since these documents were both made public, their contents are already known to you all.

Our Observations are simply an elaboration from different angles of the fundamental view of the Japanese Government that the peace of the Far East can be secured only by recognizing Manchoukuo and assisting it to achieve a healthy growth. Our Government have seized every occasion at the Council and the Assembly of the League and in the course of negotiations with other governments to expound this thesis of the Observations with the utmost care and thoroughness. We will persist in our endeavors not only as regards the special Committee of Nineteen which resumed the discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute on January 16 but at the various meetings of the League and at every possible opportunity until the above thesis is thoroughly elucidated and understood.

It is hardly necessary to say that the Japanese Government who have always extended their hearty co-operation to the League and devoted their best efforts to the enhancement of its prestige, are ready now as ever to collaborate fully and in the friendliest manner with that body in its efforts to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Far East. However, the Japanese Government believe that as long as the League is concerned with questions relating to China, a certain elasticity should be allowed in the operation of the Covenant in view of the exceptional and abnormal conditions of that country. In point of fact, various principles of

international law and usage, governing the ordinary relationships between different states, are in practice considerably modified when applied to China. The Covenant of the League cannot alone remain an exception to that rule. Any attempt to apply the Covenant to the abnormal situation in China on the analogy of an apparently similar case or situation in European affairs, is bound to fail. Such an attempt is vain and unrealistic. It will only complicate and aggravate the situation, and injure needlessly the prestige of the League, inflicting thereby a severe blow to the cause of universal peace.

For securing permanent peace in the Orient the co-operation, and united efforts, as I have said before, of Japan, China and Manchoukuo are essential. At the same time, harmony and collaboration between Japan, Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are equally important.

Fortunately, the Soviet Union Government ever since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident have maintained an attitude so cautious that nothing unpleasant has occurred to mar their relations with Japan. This is a matter for congratulation for the mutual relationship between Japan, Manchoukuo, and the Soviet Union.

There are those who fear whether the recent restoration of diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China might not add vigor to communist propaganda throughout the Orient. This is not an occasion for me to pass judgement upon this sort of

opinion. However, should the red movement in the Yangtze Valley and South China, which have long suffered from the activities of communists and the depredations of communist armies, gain in strength as a result of the Sino-Russian rapprochement, that would be a serious menace to peace in the Orient, against which Japan must certainly be on guard.

I may take this opportunity to say something on the question of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union. The principle of non-aggression between the two countries is not only embodied in the Russo-Japanese Basic Treaty signed some years ago at Peking and provided for in the anti-War Pact to which they are both signatories, but has shown itself to be a living force, as has been fully demonstrated by the actual relations between the two countries during past years and especially during the trying period of recent date. Only when it comes to the matter of clothing this principle and this actual relationship in a formal treaty of non-aggression, views vary as to time and form. You know how varied opinion has been on the matter since last spring when the proposal was first advanced by the Soviet Union Government.

In view of the divergent opinions stoutly maintained in different quarters the Japanese Government have concluded that time has not yet arrived for negotiating a non-aggression pact superimposed upon the treaties now in force. Our reply to that effect was sent to the Soviet Union Government toward the end of last year. That does not mean, of course, that

we entertain the remotest intention of aggression in the Soviet Union, but quite the contrary, and I am sure that our position is fully understood and appreciated by the Soviet Union Government.

The General Disarmament Conference, since it first met at Geneva in February last, has continued its deliberations on various important questions covering the land, sea and air forces. This is a conference of unprecedented magnitude, attended as it is by the representatives of practically all the nations of the world. Because of the natural solicitude of each and every participating Power for its own national defense, and the consequent complications and conflicts of varied interests which this entails, the Conference has as yet reached no general agreement. Disarmament, as an enterprise for peace, is not only one of the principal missions of the League of Nations, but it is a matter which is at present engaging the greatest attention on the part of the Powers. It has always been the policy of the Japanese Government to accord sincere co-operation and full contributions to the enterprise. It is in accordance with this policy that our delegates now at Geneva are exerting their best efforts in collaboration with their colleagues of other nationalities in order to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion, and that our Government have spontaneously submitted a proposal calculated to effect a drastic reduction in the naval armaments of the world.

This proposal of ours covers among other items a reduction in size of vessels of various

classes, the abolition of aircraft-carriers, a reduction in the number of capital ships and A-class cruisers, and a reduction of the total tonnage allotments of B-class cruisers and destroyers, according to which, through the abolition of aircraft-carriers and the reduction in the number of capital ships and A-class cruisers alone, it is calculated that a reduction amounting altogether to 1,300,000 tons will be realized in the navies of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy. Our proposal is based upon the principles of disarmament generally accepted at the present Conference, particularly the principle that power for attack should be reduced and power for defense increased. From the same principle it logically follows that greater sacrifices should be made by a superior naval Power than by an inferior one. If the two were both to reduce their navies in an equal ratio, the sense of security on the part of the latter would be unduly and unjustly diminished. I am confident that since our proposal takes into account as far as possible all the points insisted upon by the various Powers concerned, a thorough examination will finally convince them of its practicability as well as of its equity and reasonableness.

To turn to the economic field throughout the world, in addition to the obstructions to trade created by the suspension of the gold standard system by more than forty nations, the collapse of the price of silver, and the confusion existing in the exchange markets, we see that all countries are busily engaged in erecting artificial trade barriers by raising customs tariffs or by

putting limitations or prohibitions on exports and imports. It is to be greatly regretted that as a result of this policy of the closed door which is now practised everywhere in trade and industry, the universally cherished principle of the freedom of trade has been entirely reversed. The principle of free exchange of goods between nations constitutes along with that of freedom of travel and residence the very foundation of general progress and prosperity. Whenever this cardinal principle ceases to operate smoothly, there will be no means of realizing the common well-being and prosperity of all nations and no hope for the true progress and peace of mankind.

However, it is encouraging that the desire to conduct earnest investigations as to the best means of ridding the world of its economic ills is becoming more apparent everywhere. The Japanese Government are prepared to lend a willing hand in this kind of international undertaking. For instance, the World Economic and Financial Conference, to be convoked in the near future, is an expression of this universal aspiration, and our Government, participating in the conference of the Preparatory Committee, are proceeding in conjunction with other governments with various kinds of preliminary studies. We will do all in our power to make that conference a success.

Thus far, I have spoken on various aspects of the foreign questions confronting Japan. I desire to conclude my address with a few words on the basic ideas of the Japanese Government which underlie all that I have stated above.

七、滿洲國承認一周年ニ際シテ

外務大臣 廣田 弘毅

(昭和八年九月十五日)

二年前ノ今月十八日ハ滿洲事件ノ發生シタ日テアリ一年前ノ今日ハ帝國政府カ重大ナル決意ヲ以テ滿洲國ヲ承認シタ日テアル予ハ建國以來一年半ニ過キサル滿洲國ノ統治カ着々成績ヲ擧ケツツアルニ對シテハ深甚ノ敬意ト満足トヲ禁シ得サル所テソノ困難ナル環境ト短時間トニ於テ滿洲國カ示シタ治安、財政、産業ノ開發等ノ建設的事業ハ何人ト雖否認シ能ハサル具體的ナ事實テアル二個ノ獨立國日本ト滿洲トノ協調カ如何ニ相互ニ益スルカトイフコトハ今日ノ狀態ヲ以テ險惡ナリシ三年前ノ日滿關係ヲ回顧スル丈ケテモ十分テアル

百二十萬平方「キロメートル」ノ地域ト三千萬ノ人口トヲ擁スル滿洲國ノ獨立トイフカ如キ大事件カ單ナル陰謀トカ侵略トカニヨツテ他力的ニ發生シタト解スルカ如キモノアラハ其ノ解釋コソ誤謬中ノ最大ナルモノテアル要スルニ滿洲國ノ獨立ハ滿洲ノ社會的自衛ノ本能ノ發展ニ外ナラス支那ニシテ其ノ真意ヲ諒解スルニ於テハ日本ハ坦白ニ支那ト語リ且ツ手ヲ握ルノ用意ヲ有スル西

隣ノ隣國ト滿洲國トカソノ機微ナル期間ヲ通シテ友好關係ヲ維持シツツアルコトハ吾人ノ満足ト思フトコロテアツテ又一方太平洋ヲ隔テタル隣邦米國トノ親善カ益増進シツツアルハ現下ノ世界的要求ニ合致スルモノト云フヘキテアル獨リ此等ノ諸隣接國ニ止ラス總シテ諸友邦ニ對スル關係モ聯盟脫退ノ際賜ハリタル詔書ニ於テ儼然ト指示サレタル趣旨ニヨリ良好ニ進展シツツアルハ甚タ欣快トスル所テアル

八、廣田外務大臣ノ外國記者ニ與ヘタル

「インタービュー」

(昭和八年九月十六日)

世界ノ國際關係カ變動シ帝國ノ國際的地位モ亦變革ヲ受ケツツアル際ニ於テ内田大臣カ不幸病氣ノ爲ニ辭職ノ止ム無キニ至リ圖ラスモ其ノ後ヲ襲フコトナリタルカ今後我國ノ執ルヘキ根本方針ハ既ニ本年三月ノ御詔書ニ依ツテ明瞭ニ確立セラレテ居ル即チ滿洲國ノ獨立ヲ尊重シ健全ナル發達ヲ促シテ以テ東亞ノ平和ヲ確立スルト共ニ一般國際平和ノ爲平和各般ノ企圖ニ努力シテ益友邦トノ誼ヲ厚クスルニ在ル

昨日ハ我國カ滿洲國ヲ承認シタル一周年記念ノ日テアルカ滿洲國ノ狀態ヲ見ルニ其ノ治安秩序ハ漸次維持セラレ凡ユル方面ニ於テ健全ナル發達ヲ遂ケツ、アルコトハ期待以上テアル滿洲國ノ獨立カ世界ノ繁榮人類ノ福祉ニ寄與スル所以カ今後一層理解セラルルニ至ラハ從來稍モスレハ滿洲國ニ對シテ抱カレタル外界ノ誤解ハ自ラ氷解スルモノト確信スル

又諸外國ノ狀況ヲ見ルニ諸國間ノ政治的經濟的關係ハ益複雜トナツテ來タカ帝國トシテハ先ツ

我國ト善隣關係ニ在ル米國、露國及支那トノ關係ニ對シテハ大ナル關心ヲ以テ彼我ノ友誼ヲ益敦厚ニスル爲最善ノ努力ヲ爲スヘク又英帝國等トノ經濟關係ニ於テモ相互ノ利益ヲ調節シテ傳統的友誼ヲ確保スル爲努ム可ク其ノ他ノ諸國ニ對シテハ友好關係ヲ増進スル爲適當ナル措置ヲ講スヘキテアル

余ハ諸外國ノ帝國ニ對スル關係ヲ考察スルト同時ニ日本ノ國際間ニ於ケル地位ト其ノ使命トヲ考慮シ具體案ヲ定メントスルモノナアル

STATEMENT OF MR. KOKI HIROTA, FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE PRESS INTERVIEW, SEPTEMBER 16 1933.

At a time when the international position of Japan as well as the general situation of the world are being radically modified, it so happens that I have been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs as successor to Count Uchida who was unfortunately forced to resign on account of poor health. The fundamental policy which Japan should follow has been clearly and unequivocally set forth in the Imperial Rescript of March last. It is to respect the independence of Manchoukuo and to encourage its healthy growth and to lay, thus, a firm foundation for the peace of the Far East. It is also to cultivate more assiduously than ever friendly relations

with all the countries, and to take a full share in all undertakings looking towards the furtherance of world peace.

Yesterday was the first anniversary of Japan's recognition of Manchoukuo. The new State has gradually succeeded in restoring peace and order over its territory. In fact, the splendid progress it has made in a year in all directions has by far exceeded the most sanguine hopes. As the world comes to understand better the extent to which Manchoukuo is destined to contribute toward the universal prosperity and well-being of mankind, I am confident that outside misunderstandings, if any, will automatically disappear.

Today, the political and economic interrelations of the various countries of the world are becoming increasingly complex. While it goes without saying that we should continue to remain on the best of terms with all the Powers, particular attention must be paid to the relations with our three great and immediate neighbors—China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. An economic accord with Great Britain is also indispensable in order that we may strengthen the bond of the traditional friendship between the two empires.

A concrete programme of our diplomatic policy will be worked out upon a careful examination of our relations with other countries and also in accordance with the position and the mission of Japan in the family of nations.

九、滿洲事變二周年ニ際シテ

外務大臣 廣田 弘毅

(昭和八年九月十八日)

凡ユル問題ニ歴史的評價ヲ下スニハ常ニ若干時間ノ經過ヲ必要トスル一昨年ノ九月十八日柳條溝事件カ突發シ滿洲國ノ建設トナリ日本ノ聯盟脫退トナリ世界ノ注意ヲ惹イタ二箇年ヲ經テ自他共冷靜ニ歸ヘリ滿洲問題ヲソレ丈ケ切り離シタ單獨ノ問題トシテテナク目マクルシク繼リツツアル現世紀ノ諸問題ト併行的ニ全體ノ一部ノ問題トシテ考ヘル様ニナツタ若シ二年前ニ於テ世界ノ人カ今日ノ半分程ノ冷靜サヲ有シテ居タラ世界ハアンナ無駄ナ迂餘曲折ヲセスニスンタテアラウ

現狀維持カ國際間ノ最高ノ正義ヲ意味スル様ニ考ヘルノハ形式論テアル今日ノ現狀ハ昨日ノ現狀テナク又明日ノ現狀ヲモナイ内容カラ云ヘハ流轉スルノカ歴史ノ本質テアルコノ歴史ノ内容ヲソノ形式ト衝突セナル様自然ニ合法的ニ展開シ調和シテ行クノカ平和ヲ愛スルモノノ資格テアラネハナラヌ滿洲社會ノ自衛本能ニ端ヲ發シタル滿洲國ノ獨立ハ東洋ノ秩序維持ニ專念スル日本國家

ノ本能的支持ヲ得タノテアルコレハ久シク混沌ト頽廢ノ中ニ沈淪シタ東洋ノ全體トシテ大觀スレハ東洋全局ノ自己甦生ノ運動テアル從ツテ冷靜ナル歴史的眼孔ヲ以テ願望スレハ新興滿洲國ヲ挾ンテ日支兩國ハ長ク相爭フトキ何等ノ理由ハナイノテアル王道主義ノ大旗ヲ舉ケテ諸般ノ建設ニ當レル滿洲國ノ誕生ハ斷シテ日支兩國間ノ溝渠ヲナク寧ロソノ聯帶關係ヲ更ニ緊密ナラシメントスル所ノ橋梁テアラネハナラヌ

今日ノ問題ハ如何ニシテ形式的ナラサル眞實ノ國際主義ト國家主義トヲ調和スルカノ問題テアル聯盟脫退當時ノ御詔書ハ實ニ今日ノ日本ノ進路ヲ明示シタマフモノテアツテ同時ニ此ノ問題ニ對スル指針テアル友邦諸國モ亦漸次日本ノ平和的眞意ト其ノ使命トヲ諒解シツツアルハ欣快トスル所テアル

昭和九年

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
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第一、日印通商交渉本會議議事録要領

(一月七日公表)

印度「ニューデリー」ニ於ケル千九百三十四年一月五日ノ日印兩代表間本會議議事録要領
 出席代表

日本側	特命全權公使	澤田節藏
	商工省貿易局長	寺尾進
	總領事	三宅哲一郎
印度側	鐵道及商務長官	「サー、ジョゼフ、ポア」
	工業及勞働長官	「サー、フランク、ノイス」

澤田代表ハ左ノ通陳述セリ。
 日本國及印度間ノ通商關係ニ關シ、左記事項ヲ包含スル一切ノ重要問題ニ付日本國及印度代表間

ニ見解ノ一致ヲ見タルコトヲ陳述スルハ予ノ欣快トスル所ナリ。

- (一) 兩國ノ物品ニ相互的ニ與ヘラルヘキ最惠國待遇
- (二) 兩國ノ貿易上ノ利益ニ惡影響ヲ與フコトアルヘキ關稅變更ニ關シ行ハルヘキ商議
- (三) 爲替相場變動ニ依ル影響ヲ是正スヘキ措置
- (四) 印度ニ輸入セラルル日本綿布ニ適用セラルヘキ關稅
- (五) 右日本綿布ニ適用セラルヘキ割當量
- (六) 本協定ノ實施

予ハ右ノ諸問題ニ關シ兩代表間ニ到達シタル見解ノ一致ヲ左ノ如ク諒解ス。右ニ付テハ印度代表ニ於テモ之ニ贊同セラルルコトト確信スルモノナリ。

(一) 最惠國待遇

關稅ニ關シ、日本國及印度ハ他方ノ國ノ產物又ハ製造品タル物品ニ對シ最惠國待遇ヲ相互ニ許與スヘシ。

(二) 關稅ノ變更ニ關シ行ハルヘキ商議

日本國及印度ハ各自國ノ利益保護ノ爲必要ト認ムル關稅ノ變更ヲ爲スヘキ權利ヲ留保スルヲ條

件トシ、兩國ハ何レカ一方ノ國ニ依ル關稅ノ變更カ、他方ノ國ノ貿易上ノ利益ニ著シク惡影響ヲ與フル結果ヲ招來スルニ至リタル時ハ、右影響ヲ受ケタル國ノ要求ニ基キ兩國ノ貿易上ノ利益ヲ出來得ル限り調整スヘキ目的ヲ以テ商議ヲ開始スヘシ。

(三) 爲替相場變動ノ影響ヲ是正スヘキ措置

印度政府ハ日本國ノ產物又ハ製造品タル物品ニ對シ、別國ノ產物又ハ製造品タル物品ニ課セラルル所ト異ナルカ、又ハ之ヨリ高キ特別關稅率ヲ千九百三十三年十二月三十一日後ニ於ケル圓對「ルービー」ノ爲替比價ノ變動ノ影響ヲ是正スル爲ニ必要ナリト思考セラルルコトアルヘキ率ニテ時々賦課シ又ハ變更スルコトヲ得。右特別關稅率ヲ賦課シ若クハ變更スルニ當リ、又ハ之カ變更ヲ日本國政府ニ依リ要求セラルルニ當リテハ、印度政府ハ日本國ノ同國外市場ヨリノ原料品購入及日本國內物價ノ調整ノ如キ日本貨物ノ輸出價格ノ騰貴ヲ招來スルノ虞アル關係要素ニ付キ十分ノ考慮ヲ爲スコト、並右關稅率ヲ圓對「ルービー」ノ爲替比價ノ低落カ印度ニ輸入セラレタル日本貨物ノ關稅込價格ニ及ホス影響ヲ矯正スルニ必要ナル程度ニ局限スルコトヲ約ス。

尤モ右關稅率ノ變更ハ、右關稅率カ少クトモ五週間實施セラルル迄ハ之ヲ行ハサルヘキモノト

ス。

四

相互的ニ日本國政府ハ右第二項及第三項ニ定メラレタル所ト同様ノ事情及條件ノ下ニ、印度ノ產物又ハ製造品タル物品ニ對シ右第一項ニ規定セラレタル所ト同様ノ特別關稅率ヲ賦課シ又ハ變更スルノ權利ヲ有スヘシ。

尤モ右權利ハ「ルービー」對圓ノ爲替比價カ七十三錢二厘未滿ニ低落スルニ非サレハ日本國政府ノ爲ニ生スルコトナカルヘシ。

(四) 印度ニ輸入セラルル日本綿布ニ對スル關稅

印度政府ニ依リ日本綿布ニ賦課セラルヘキ關稅ハ左ノ率ヲ超エサルヘシ。但シ最惠國待遇及爲替變動ノ影響ヲ是正スヘキ措置ニ關スル合意ニ影響ヲ及ホスコトナシ。

平織生地 從價 五割又ハ一封度ニ付五安四分ノ一

其ノ他ノ綿布 從價 五割

但シ平織生地以外ノ日本綿布ニ對シテハ、印度政府ハ最惠國待遇ニ關スル合意ニ從ヒ一封度ニ付五安四分ノ一ヲ超ユル從價稅ヲ賦課セサルヘキモノト諒解ス。

(五) 印度ヘノ日本綿布ノ輸入

(A) 四月一日ヲ以テ始マルヘキ一年ノ期間中印度ニ輸出セラルヘキ日本綿布割當量ノ計算ハ、同年一月一日ヲ以テ始マルヘキ一年ノ期間中日本ニ輸出セラレタル印度棉花數量ニ基キ決定セラルヘキ割當量以內ニ限定セラルヘシ。

日本綿布割當量決定ノ目的ヲ以テ一年ノ期間(即チ綿布年度)ハ四月一日ヨリ翌年三月三十一日迄トシ、他方日本ニ輸出セラレタル印度棉花數量算定ノ目的ヲ以テ一年ノ期間(即チ棉花年度)ハ一月一日ヨリ十二月三十一日迄トス。

(B) 基準割當量及基準割當量ノ變更

(イ) 一綿布年度ニ於テ印度ニ輸出セラルヘキ日本綿布ノ基準割當量ハ之ヲ三億二千五百萬碼(三二五、〇〇〇、〇〇〇碼)トシ、且右ニ該當スル棉花年度ニ於テ日本ヘ輸出セラレタル印度棉花百萬俵(一、〇〇〇、〇〇〇俵)ト關聯セラルヘキモノトス。

(ロ) 何レカノ棉花年度ニ於テ日本ヘノ印度棉花ノ輸出カ百萬俵以下ニ減少シタル場合ハ、右ニ該當スル綿布年度ニ於ケル日本綿布ノ割當量ハ、右基準割當量ヨリ一萬俵不足スル毎ニ二百萬碼ノ割合ヲ以テ減スルコトニヨリ決定セラルヘシ。

(ハ) 然レトモ、何レノ棉花年度ニ於テモ右輸出カ百萬俵ヲ超過スル場合ハ、右ニ該當スル綿

五

布年度ニ於ケル日本綿布割當量ハ右基準割當量ヨリ一萬俵増加スル毎ニ百五十萬碼ノ割合ヲ以テ増加スルコトニ依リ決定セラルヘシ。但シ右割當量ハ如何ナル場合ニ於テモ四億碼ヲ超過セサルモノトス。

(ニ) 若シ何レカノ棉花年度ニ於ケル日本ヘノ印度棉花ノ輸出カ百五十萬俵ヲ超過スル場合ハ、右百五十萬俵ヲ超過シ輸出セラレタル數量ハ次年棉花年度ニ日本ヘ輸出セラレタル棉花ノ數量ニ加算セラレ、之ニ關聯スル日本綿布割當量決定ニ資セラルヘシ。

(ホ) 綿布及棉花ニ關シテハ、其ノ再輸出數量ハ輸入數量ヨリ控除セラルルモノトス。

(C) 二半年度ノ割當分量

(イ) 綿布年度ハ二ノ半年度ニ區分セラレ、第一半年度ハ之ヲ四月一日ヨリ九月三十日迄トシ、第二半年度ハ之ヲ十月一日ヨリ翌年三月三十一日迄トス。

(ロ) 第一半年度ノ割當量ハ二億碼タルヘシ。

(ハ) 第二半年度ノ割當量ハ、右ニ該當スル棉花年度ニ於ケル日本ヘノ印度棉花輸出豫想數量ヲ基準トシテ算定セラレタル一年度ノ割當量ヨリ二億碼ヲ控除スルコトニ依リ求メラルヘキ數量ニ暫定的ニ決定セラルヘシ。

印度ヘノ日本綿布輸出ノ調整ハ、之ヲ各期間ニ於ケル移讓規定ニ從ヒ當該棉花年度ニ於ケル日本ヘノ印度棉花輸出實量ヲ基準トシテ右期間ノ終ニ於テ行フヘシ。

(ニ) 第一半年度割當量ヨリ第二半年度割當量ヘノ移讓ハ、最高二千萬碼ヲ限度トシ許容セラ

ルヘシ。
第二半年度ヨリ次ノ綿布年度ノ第一半年度ヘノ移讓ハ、之ト反對ノ場合ト共ニ二千萬碼ヲ最高限度トシ之ヲ許容セラルヘシ。

(D) 綿布割當量ノ品種別區分

綿布割當量ハ左ノ比率ニ從ヒ左ノ品種別ニ區分セラルヘシ。

- 平織生地 四割五分
- 縁付生地 一割三分
- 晒 八分
- 色物其ノ他 三割四分

右各品種ニ對シ割當ラレタル比率ハ左ノ條件ニ從ヒ變更スルコトヲ得ヘシ。

(イ) 縁付生地又ハ晒ノ何レカノ品種ニ對スル増加ハ當該割當量ノ二割ヲ超エサルヘク、而シ

テ他ノ何レカノ品種ニ對スル増加ハ當該割當量ノ一割ヲ超エサルモノトス。
 (ロ) 縁付生地又ハ晒ノ何レカノ品種ヨリ移讓セラルヘキ數量ハ、當該割當量ノ二割ヲ超エサルヘク、又他ノ何レカノ品種ヨリ移讓セラルヘキ數量ハ、當該割當數量ノ一割ヲ超エサルモノトス。

(ハ) 何レカノ綿布年度ニ於ケル綿布割當總量ハ、當該割當量ノ變更ニ依リ何等増加ヲ來ササルモノトス。

(E) 本取極實施ト第一綿布年度開始トノ中間期間ニ於ケル割當量

(イ) 現行印度綿布課税ノ五割ニ引下ケラルヘキ日ト第一綿布年度ノ始マルヘキ四月一日トノ間ノ期間ニ對スル綿布割當量ハ、千九百三十三年(一月一日ヨリ十二月三十一日迄)ノ棉花年度ニ於テ日本ヘ輸入セラレタル印度棉花數量ヲ基準トシ、千九百三十三年四月一日ヨリ千九百三十四年三月三十一日ニ至ル全綿布年度ニ割當ラルヘキ數量ノ按分比率タルヘシ。

(ロ) 此ノ期間ニ對スル割當量及第一綿布年度ノ第一半年度ニ對スル割當量ハ、千九百三十四年九月末ヲ以テ終ルヘキ約九ヶ月間ノ割當量トシテ一括セラルヘシ。

(六) 新協定ノ實施

(イ) 「ビルマ」ノ分離

「ビルマ」カ分離スルト否トニ拘ラス、新條約ノ條項ハ其ノ全期間中引續キ效力ヲ有スヘキコトニ同意セラレタリ。

(ロ) 新條約ノ有効期間

新條約ハ日本政府及英國政府代表者ニ依リ成ルヘク速ニ「ロンドン」ニ於テ署名調印セラレヘク、又右條約ハ批准書交換後直ニ實施セラルヘク、且千九百三十七年三月三十一日迄引續キ效力ヲ有スヘキコトト諒解セラレタリ。

予ハ去ル九月以降商議中ニ於テ兩代表間ニ一致ヲ見タル見解ノ實質ニ付以上ノ通陳述セリ。而シテ予ハ印度代表ニ於テモ右妥結ニ至リタルコトニ同意スルノ用意アルコトヲ確信ス。
 「サー、ジョゼフ、ボア」ハ左ノ通答ヘタリ。

只今閣下ノ爲サレタル陳述ノ内容ニ付テハ、印度代表カ完全ニ之ニ同意ナル旨ヲ閣下並閣下ノ同僚ニ通告スルハ予ノ最欣幸トスル所ナリ。然レトモ予ハ閣下ノ言及セラレタルモノニ何等變更ヲ加フル次第ニ非サルモ、不明瞭ナル點ヲ明カニシ且矛盾セルカカ如ク見ユル個所ヲ除去セン

カ爲、左ノ説明ヲ加ヘントス。即チ右ハ綿布年度ノ最初ノ部分ニ對スル割當量ハ二億碼タルヘシトノ條項ニ關スルモノナリ。日本ノ棉花買付カ右數量ノ一ケ年ノ總割當量ヲ正當ナラシムル爲ノ數量ニ到達セサル場合ハ、閣下ハ次年度割當量ニ付必要ナル調整ヲ爲サルヘキコトニ同意セラルルコトヲ確信ス。

澤田代表ハ次テ左ノ通陳述セリ。

予ハ「サー、ジョゼフ、ボア」カ予ノ聲明ニ贊同セラレタルコトヲ欣快トス。依テ予ハ兩代表部カ其ノ間ニ合致ヲ見タル見解ニ基キ新協定ノ案文起草ニ速ニ著手スヘキコトヲ提議ス。予ハ印度代表カ右提議ニ同意セラルルノ用意アルコトヲ確信スルモノナリ。

「サー、ジョゼフ、ボア」ハ左ノ通答ヘタリ。

印度代表ハ閣下ヨリ提出セラレタル右提議ニ同意ス。勿論右起草セラルヘキ協定案ハ細目事項ニ關スル決定ニシテ更ニ本協定ニ挿入セラルヘキモノヲ包含スヘシ。

澤田代表ハ左ノ通陳述セリ。

只今本國政府ヨリ接受シタル情報ニ依レハ、日本紡績聯合會ハ一月四日大阪ニ於テ開催セル委員會ニ於テ、千九百三十四年一月八日ヲ以テ印度棉花買付停止ニ關スル決議ヲ撤回スルコトニ

決シタリ。

「サー、ジョゼフ、ボア」ハ左ノ通答ヘタリ。

閣下ノ言及セラレタル右決議ノ撤回並前述ノ兩代表間ノ見解ノ一致ニ鑑ミ、印度政府ハ一月八日即チ日本紡績聯合會ノ印度棉花買付停止決議撤回ノ日ヨリ兩代表間ニ見解ノ合致ヲ見タル率ニ迄印度ニ輸入セラルル日本綿布ノ關稅ヲ引下クヘク、且印度ニ輸入セラルル日本綿布ノ關稅ニ關シ最惠國待遇ヲ許與スヘシ。兩代表間ニ合意成立セルカ如キ諸條件ハ同日以降印度ヘノ日本綿布ノ輸入ニ適用セラルヘキモノトス。

雜貨從量稅ニ關スル日本代表部ノ聲明書要領

印度政府ニ依リ新ニ賦課セラレタル從量稅ハ各年十二月二十三日ヨリ實施セラレタリ。右從量稅ハ印度ニ輸出セラルル大部分ノ日本雜貨ニ適用セラルルノ事實ニ鑑ミ、日本政府關係當局ハ本關稅ノ賦課カ日印貿易關係ニ及ホスコトアルヘキ影響ヲ審査シツツアル次第ナリ。

今日迄我當局審査ノ結果ニ依レハ、右關稅ノ引上ハ全般ニ互リ甚タ重ク、日本ヨリ印度ヘノ雜貨ノ輸出ハ之カ爲大打擊ヲ受ケ、印度向日本ノ輸出貿易ハ著シキ減退ヲ見ルニ至ルヘキハ避クヘカラサルモノト思考セラレ居レリ。或種商品殊ニ莫大小、陶磁器、琺瑯鐵器及鉛筆ニ付テハ右新稅

ハ禁止的ト認メラレ、日本製造業者及輸出業者ハ何レモ印度トノ貿易上ニ於ケル此等關稅ノ影響ニ關シ不尠憂慮シ、日本政府及當地日本代表部ニ對シ右影響緩和ノ爲印度政府ト共ニ措置ヲ講スル様歎願シタリ。又他方印度ニ於ケル輸入業者ニシテ、本稅ノ賦課前ニ約定セラレタル日本品買入契約ヲ取消スノ餘儀ナキニ至リタルモノ多數ニ上リタル旨報セラレ、綿莫大小ノミニテモ斯クシテ解除セラレタル數量ハ千五百萬打ニ見積ラレ居レリ。此等不幸ナル事態ハ日印間ノ貿易關係ヲ甚タシク惡化スルノ惧アリ。而カモ斯カル憂慮カ日印貿易ニ關スル一切ノ懸案問題ニ付兩代表間ニ見解ノ一致ヲ見タル時ニ當リ發生ヲ見ルニ至リタルハ、殊更遺憾トスル所ナリ。日本政府ハ常ニ日本ヨリ印度向雜貨ノ輸出ノ重要性ニ顧ミ、此等從量稅ノ日本品ニ及ホス影響ニ關シ目下ナサレツツアル審査ノ基礎ニ依リ印度政府ニ申出ツルトコロアルヘシ。日本代表ハ印度政府カ現在ノ狀勢ヲ緩和スル爲、本問題ニ對スル右公式ノ申出ニ對シ慎重考慮ヲ與フヘシトノ趣旨ノ確言ヲ與フルノ用意アルヲ信スルモノナリ。

雜貨從量稅ニ關スル印度政府ノ聲明書要領

印度政府ハ何等日本品ノ輸入ヲ禁止セントスルノ意志ナシ。同政府ハ消費者ノ利益ノ爲ニ國內產物ニ直接又ハ間接ニ競争トナラサル輸入品ニ對シ、不必要ナル障害ヲ設ケントスルモノニアラ

ス。而シテ禁止的關稅ハ結局關稅收入ノ減退ヲ來スヘキコト、並外國競争ノ絶滅ハ必スシモ國內產業ノ有效ナル發達ヲ招來スル所以ニ非サルコトハ十分了知シ居ル所ナリ。雜貨ニ對シ新從量稅ヲ賦課スルニ當リ印度政府ハ公正ナル競争狀態ノ恢復ヲ希望シ、稅率ヲ印度產業保護ノ爲必要ト認ムル程度ニ局限シタリ。而シテ此等稅率ハ印度政府カ徹底的調査及熟議ノ後決定セラレタルモノナリ。同政府ハ右關稅ニ依リ單ニ國內產業ニ適當ナル保護ヲ與ヘントシタルモノニシテ、何等日本ノ貿易ニ對スル敵意ニヨリ左右セラレタルモノニアラス。然レトモ、若シ日本政府カ印度政府ノ執リタル措置ヲ以テ不必要ナルカ又ハ誤解ニ基ケルコトヲ示ス目的ヲ以テ、此等從量稅ニ關シ何等申出ヲナスコトヲ欲スルニ於テハ、印度政府ハ斯カル申出ニ對シ適當ナル考慮ヲ拂フノ用意アルヘシ。

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND INDIAN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE 5TH JANUARY, 1934, AT NEW DELHI, INDIA.

Representatives present:
for Japan

His Excellency Mr. Setsuzo Sawada,
 His Imperial Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
 Mr. Susumu Terao,
 Director of the Bureau of Foreign Trade, Department of Commerce and
 Industry
 Mr. Tetsuichiro Miyake,
 Consul General for Japan
 for India

The Honorable Sir Joseph Bhome,
 Member of the Executive Council, Railways and Commerce
 The Honorable Sir Frank Noyce,
 Member of the Executive Council, Industries and Labour

Sawada stated as follows:

I am happy to state that the agreement of views has been reached between Japanese and Indian delegations on all important problems relative to commercial relations between Japan and India, including: (1) most favoured nation treatment to be accorded reciprocally to goods of two countries; (2) negotiations to be held concerning modification of customs duties that may adversely affect trade interests

of two countries; (3) measures to be taken to correct the effects of the exchange fluctuations; (4) duties applicable to Japanese cotton piecegoods imported into India; (5) quota to be applicable to such Japanese goods; and (6) enforcement of the present agreements.

I take liberty to state my understanding of agreement of views arrived at between two delegations on these problems, which I trust will be concurred in by the Indian delegation.

(1) Most favoured nation treatment.

In respect of customs duties, Japan and India shall reciprocally accord most favoured nation treatment to any articles, produce or manufacture of other country.

(2) Negotiations to be held concerning the modification of customs tariff.

Subject to reservation by both countries of right to make such changes in their customs tariffs as may be necessary for protection of their own interests Japan and India agree that, should any modification of customs tariff by either country result in trade interests of other being adversely affected in any appreciable measure they shall upon request of country so affected either into negotiations with object of reconciling as far as possible trade interests of two countries.

(3) Measures to correct effects of exchange fluctuation.

Nothing in this agreement shall be held to prohibit the imposition or the variation from time to time by the Government of India of special rates of customs duty on articles, the produce or manufacture of Japan, other or higher than those levied on similar articles, the produce or manufacture of any other country, at such rates as the Government of India may consider to be necessary to correct the effects of any variation of the exchange value of the yen relative to the rupee subsequent to December 31st 1933.

Imposing or varying, or on being requested by the Government of Japan to vary, such special rates of customs duty the Government of India undertake to give full consideration to relevant factors which tend to raise export prices of Japanese goods, such as the purchase by Japan of raw materials in market outside Japan and the adjustment of internal Japanese prices, and to limit such rates to what is necessary to correct the effects of the depreciation of the exchange value of the yen relative to the rupee on the duty-paid value of Japanese goods imported into India.

Provided, that no change in such rate shall be made until it has been in force for at least five weeks.

Reciprocally the Government of Japan shall have the right of imposing or varying special rates of customs similar to those for which provision is made in para-

graph 1 of this article (3), on articles, the produce or manufacture of India, under similar circumstances, and subject to conditions similar to those provided for in paragraph 2 and 3 of this article (3).

Provided that the said right shall not accrue to the Government of Japan unless the exchange value of the rupee relative to the yen shall be depreciated below the value of .732 yen.

(4) Customs duties on Japanese cotton piece-goods imported into India.

Without prejudice to agreements concerning most favoured nation treatment and the measures to correct the effects of exchange fluctuation customs duties to be imposed by Government of India on Japanese cotton piece-goods should not exceed following rates.

Duty on plain greys50% ad valorem or 5.25 annas per pound.
Duty on others50% ad valorem.

It is understood that the Government of India shall not impose on Japanese cotton piece-goods other than plain greys a specific duty exceeding 5.25 annas per pound subject to agreement concerning most favoured nation treatment.

(5) Importation of Japanese cotton piece-goods into India.

(a) Calculation of quota of Japanese cotton piece-goods to be exported to India in period of one year beginning 1st April shall be limited within a quota which shall be fixed in accordance with quantity of Indian raw cotton exported to Japan in period of one year beginning 1st January of same year.

It is to be noted that period of one year for the purpose of fixing quota of Japanese cotton piece-goods (or piece-goods year) shall be from 1st April to 31st March of following year while period of one year for the purpose of calculating quantity of Indian raw cotton exported to Japan (or cotton year) shall be from 1st January to 31st December.

(b) Basic quota and modification of basic quota.

(1) Basic quota of Japanese cotton piece-goods to be exported to India in a piece-goods year shall be three hundred and twenty-five million (325,000,000) yards and it shall be linked with one million (1,000,000) bales of Indian raw cotton exported to Japan in corresponding cotton year.

(2) In case export of Indian raw cotton to Japan in any cotton year should fall below one million bales quota of Japanese cotton piece-goods for corresponding piece-goods year shall be determined by reducing above basic quota at rate of two million yards for every ten thousand bales of deficit.

(3) In case, however, such export in any cotton year should exceed one million bales quota of Japanese cotton piece-goods for corresponding piece-goods year shall be determined by increasing above basic quota at rate of one million and five hundred thousand yards for every additional ten thousand bales provided that quota should in no case exceed four hundred million yards.

(4) In case export of Indian raw cotton to Japan in any cotton year should exceed one million and five hundred thousand bales quantity thus exported in excess of one million and five hundred thousand bales shall be for purpose of determining relevant quota of Japanese cotton piece-goods added to quantity of raw cotton exported to Japan in following cotton year.

(5) In respect of both cotton piece-goods and raw cotton re-exported quantity shall be deducted from imported quantity.

(c) Two half-yearly instalments of quota.

(1) A piece-goods year shall be divided into two half-yearly periods first half-yearly period running from 1st April to the 30th September and the second half-yearly period from 1st October to 31st March of following year.

(2) Quota for first half-yearly period shall be two hundred million yards.

(3) Quota for second half-yearly period shall be provisionally fixed at quantity