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
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STRICTURES

ON THE CONDUCT OF

HEWETT WATSON, F.L.S.

IN HIS CAPACITY OF

EDITOR OF THE PHRENOLOGICAL JOURNAL;

WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING

A SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MENTAL
FUNCTIONS.

BY T. S. PRIDEAUX.

"NEMO ME IMPUNE LACESSIT."

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STRICTURES,

&c. &c.

MR. WATSON having taken the liberty of inserting in the *Phrenological Journal* an extract from a *private* letter of mine, not written for publication, and having not only refrained from stating this circumstance, but evidently endeavoured to convey a contrary impression* to his readers, besides indulging in very gross misrepresentations as to the cause in which the letter in question originated, I think it right to make public the correct facts of the case, in order that his conduct may receive that exposure which it so richly deserves.

It is with regret that I commence a personal discussion of this kind. I have always deemed it an indication of great weakness, if not littleness of mind in an individual, to take offence at the calm and dispassionate expression of an opinion at variance with his own; and consider that there are few spectacles more humiliating to human nature, than that presented by two professed followers of science taking umbrage at each other for not thinking alike, and turning aside from the pursuit of truth, to indulge in personalities.

Every one will I think assent to the proposition, that in all scientific discussions, the elucidation of truth should be the paramount object kept in view, and that all differences of opinion should be expressed in courteous language, and in the mode least

* He observes that he hopes his readers, after reading the extracts, will "be prepared to estimate any complaints made on the score of non-insertion"!!! Did Mr. Watson ever hear of an individual making complaints of the non-insertion of a *private* letter in a *public* journal?

likely to prove offensive to those from whom we dissent. Few, however, will deem it incumbent upon themselves to be particularly ceremonious towards those who respond to the language of courtesy with impertinence, and most assuredly every one will agree that it is not for the party who FIRST infringes the conditions laid down, and has recourse to rudeness and sarcasm, to grow '*querulous*,' and make complaints, because he receives that castigation which he has provoked, administered with his own weapons.

It is not to be expected that individuals will quietly submit to be visited with the petulances and impertinences of Mr. Watson without retaliating, neither is it desirable that they should do so ; indeed, allowing Mr. W. to indulge such a *penchant* unchecked, would be a great unkindness to him, as it would have a tendency to increase his naturally strong bias towards the belief, that he really is a very redoubtable personage, and thus prove the means of gravely misleading him as to a question of fact. I would hint to Mr. Watson that it is very unwise policy in an individual, whose egregious vanity and conceit render him so peculiarly sensitive, to commence a mode of attack, from which he shrinks when retorted upon himself ; and, it is to be hoped, that now he has tasted his own physick, and finds its flavour so very unpalatable, he will learn to be a little more sparing in dispensing it to others.

Having nothing to gain by the suppression of the truth ; and, even if the reverse were the case, being I trust *rather above*, acting so unfairly and cowardly as to suppress the statements of an antagonist to give a better effect to my own, I shall proceed to lay the facts of the case and the *whole* of the correspondence before the public, in order that they may have the opportunity of *forming their own judgment* on Mr. Watson's conduct.

Seeing in the 56th No. of the *Phrenological Journal* (page 276), an opinion given by the Editor, that '*loudness*' was appreciated by the Organ of Comparison, and finding it passed over without comment in the next No., I was induced, deeming the error an

important and fundamental one, to send a short communication to Mr. Watson expressive of dissent, and being already aware of his morbid sensitiveness* to any thing approaching to criticism on his personal opinions, I carefully endeavoured to put it in a form as little unpalatable to his self-love, as was compatible with the statement of an opinion opposed to his own. Whoever now refers to my letter, will not I think be surprised, at my imagining that I had so worded it, as to save the most sensitive vanity from a wound; but, alas! the measure of this quality in some defies calculation; and the animus which directed Mr. Watson's reply, at once convinced me how fruitlessly I had laboured. Equally disgusted with the quibbling character of this reply, and with its flippant rudeness, I immediately wrote a rejoinder, in which he was treated with as little ceremony as he deserved, though certainly with quite as much as he had any right to expect. This rejoinder, it is to be presumed, Mr. W. found himself *incompetent to answer*, since he has taken care not to allow it to meet the public eye. In his next Journal, the 7th, he thus alludes to it in his notice to correspondents—"The notes of Mr. Prideaux certainly cannot be printed in this Journal. If dissatisfied with this decision, we fear he must make the usual appeal to 'Prince Posterity.'" In the 8th No. the subject is not referred to, but in the last No. (the 9th), without any further allusion by me to the matter, he has thought fit to make the style of the letter a subject of formal complaint to the public, taking especial care, however, *to conceal the cause in which the letter originated*; (for the honour of 'John Bull' it is to be hoped that his notions of 'fair play' differ materially from those of Mr. Watson); and *quoting only the last sentence (one of three lines) which had not the slightest connexion with the subject matter of the rest of the letter*; a procedure, which, if I am not greatly mistaken, many will think more disgraceful than the direct employment of falsehood.†

* See Appendix, Note (a)

† Since the above was written, Mr. Watson has refused to allow an answer to his attack to be inserted in the journal as an advertisement: conduct, the motives of which the public will know how to appreciate, without any comment of mine.

Be it observed then, that Mr. Watson, in reply to remarks of mine, worded with studied civility, is the FIRST, to adopt a style devoid of courtesy—that he next, shrinks from fairly encountering the reply of his opponent—avails himself of his opportunities as conductor of a journal, to lay a one-sided view of the case before the public, in which he carefully and most disingenuously suppresses all reference to the origin of the correspondence, and quotes from a private letter, as if written for publication—and then, makes it a subject of public complaint that the courtesy of style he denied to another, was dispensed with in addressing himself. Let me inform him, for his consolation, that the public, when acquainted with the merits of the case, will laugh at his complaints, and rejoice to see that he has met with his deserts.

Assuredly it is not for the individual who replies to a calm expression of difference of opinion with a sneer and a pun, to appeal to the public for protection, and expect to enlist their sympathies in his behalf, because he gets rather roughly handled in return by his antagonist. *If the party first assailed with language wanting in courtesy is to be visited with reprehension, for dispensing with this ingredient in his reply, pray what judgment is to be passed upon the aggressor?* The truth seems to be, that Mr. Watson finding the shallowness and silliness of his pert remarks thoroughly exposed, raised this complaint of want of civility, as an excuse for suppressing my letter, and evading a reply; and, feeling a little mistrust as to the *prima facie* evidence afforded by so suspicious a procedure, he is at great pains to convey an exaggerated impression of the length of my communication to his readers, speaking of it as a sheet of manuscript, &c. It is certainly rather an amusing expedient for a journalist, who finds himself nonplused, to back out of a reply, and withhold his antagonist's article from his readers under the plea of its want of civility, and no doubt a *particularly convenient* one; but how far it is a creditable one, I will leave to the public.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the Phrenological Journal.

(VIDE P. J. NO. 59, P. 194.)

Sir,

It was with extreme surprise and much regret, that at the 275th page of No. 56 of the *Phrenological Journal*, I perused a note by the Editor referring "ideas of loudness to the Organ of Comparison." It is to me a far more pleasing task to express my accordance with the views of others, than to differ from them; but the opinion in question appears to me so fundamentally erroneous, and so altogether at variance with all analogical reasoning, from our existing knowledge of the physiology of the brain, that I feel it my duty to notice it; fearing lest, if not protested against, the high authority from which it emanates, may induce youthful phrenologists to suppose that the views of the Editor are generally acquiesced in. I will also take this opportunity of remarking, that the editorial opinion given at page 293 of the same Journal, that in the case recorded "pain in the region of Benevolence, or Cautiousness, might *à priori* have appeared equally likely," seems to me a very singular one.

T. S. PRIDEAUX.

Nov. 1838.

Reply.

We cannot here enter into a full explanation of the grounds upon which we *we did not refer* ideas of loudness to Comparison, but expressed a disposition to do so. This would not be stepping beyond the full scope of Spurzheim's definition, and we have seen a few cases quite corroborative of the suggestion. If Mr. Prideaux will refer to Combe's System of Phrenology, page 598, he will see that the opinion about Cautiousness is not singular.—EDITOR.

To the Editor of the Phrenological Journal.

Sir,

I wish to give you *all* the credit you are entitled to, for so clearly pointing out the great difference, between '*referring,*' and '*expressing a disposition to refer;*' your scrupulous attention to accuracy on this point, has reminded me of a slight want of precision I was guilty of in my communication, and being willing to profit by your example, with your leave I

will define my meaning with rather more exactness. I am then desirous to state that in using the expression 'high authority' with regard to yourself, I applied it to you solely with reference to your official capacity as Editor of the Phrenological Journal.

Your second sentence is obscure in meaning, and ungrammatically worded. If we ask the question, "What would not be stepping, &c.," the answer clearly is "entering into a full explanation, &c.," yet this cannot be what you intend to say. Again, if you mean to state, as I suppose you do, that "to refer ideas of loudness to Comparison, would not be stepping beyond the bounds of Spurzheim's definition;" and this statement with regard to the origin of this strange notion is correct; and there is really nothing new in it, why speak of it immediately afterwards as a "*suggestion*"?

I believe I should scarcely again have undertaken the unpleasant task of adverting to an opinion which I take the liberty of saying will prove a very unfortunate one for your credit and reputation, had you not attempted to saddle Dr. Spurzheim with the honour of its parentage. Justice to his memory compels me to meet your assertion on this point, with a direct negative.—I am tolerably well acquainted with his writings, and their general character is such, that, although it is possible he may have been the author of some fugitive papers which may have escaped my notice, I feel quite safe in affirming that he never made any statement which could give countenance to the extravagantly absurd opinion in question.

"If Mr. Prideaux will refer to Combe's System of Phrenology,* page 598, he will see that the opinion about Cautiousness is not singular."

The mode in which you, Mr. Editor, attempt to dispose of this subject is so curious, and so utterly irrelevant to the question at issue, and the *naiveté* and assurance with which you announce the luminous conclusion to be arrived at by consulting Mr. Combe, so laughable, as almost to lead one to suspect, that you are amusing yourself and your readers, by a play upon words.

It appears necessary for me to remind you, that the word *singular*, besides signifying *the quality of being single*, is also used as synonymous (or nearly so) with strange—extraordinary; and that it was used by me in the latter sense is clearly apparent from the adverb of comparison, *very*, being prefixed to it, for when used in the former sense, it is almost needless to say, that it admits not of comparison. By what logical process you deduce the sapient inference, that because your opinions are shared by a second party, they

* You do not mention which edition of Combe, and I have referred to one edition in vain. I think it highly improbable that your opinions on Cautiousness are shared by Mr. Combe; but the fact in itself is quite immaterial to the question at issue.

are necessarily not singular, (i. e. not strange, not extraordinary,) remains to be explained.

Before quitting the subject, I cannot help remarking that the editor of a journal, devoted to the subject of phrenology, ought to be the last person to shelter his opinions behind the authority of names, instead of either candidly retracting them, or manfully defending them on their inherent merits at the bar of reason.

I take this opportunity of correcting an expression, which is incorectly attributed to me in the last number, under the head of "Adhesiveness of Greenacre." I am represented as saying, "that Greenacre had the ability of expressing the natural manner of Amativeness and Adhesiveness." "*Natural language*," not "*natural manner*," was the term I made use of. The paragraph is also calculated to convey the impression that I called attention to the discrepaney in the estimates of Drs. Elliotson and Cargill, for the purpose of obtaining *your* opinion for *my own* satisfaction; whereas, the truth is, I not only called attention to the discrepaney, but gave a decided opinion in favour of Dr. Elliotson's estimate.

The remarks you have appended to my observations on Dr. Vimout's admitting separate organs for Size and Distance, are so evidently written with a goose quill as to deserve no comment.

T. S. PRIDEAUX.

May, 1839.

By reference to the article to correspondents in the last journal, it will be seen, that this last sentence of three lines, and having *no reference to the main subject of the letter*, was the only part quoted by Mr. Watson: and it was placed by him in juxtaposition with the two portions (enclosed within brackets) of the private letter printed below,* without any acknowledgment of the

Private to the Editor.

* Sir,—[I trust you will put in practice those principles on which, at the commencement of your editorship, you gave your readers to understand the journal should be conducted, (viz. John Bull's regard for fair play,) by inserting the accompanying letter, without any beautifying from your pruning hook. An assertion more injurious to the character of Spurzheim, as a profound and acute thinker, than that proceeding from your pen in the last journal—or remarks more silly and impertinent than those you have appended to my observations—it would, I conceive, be impossible to make.]

I am sorry to say, I have heard very great dissatisfaction expressed with regard to the recent numbers of the journal by all the phrenologists I have met with, and I am still more sorry to say that I think they do not complain without

fact. Had Mr. Watson been desirous of making the public believe that the length of my letter, or as he terms it "sheet of manuscript," was the true cause of its suppression, and not a mere subterfuge resorted to in order to wriggle out of the necessity of replying to it, he should have so selected his quotations as to have made the public acquainted with the *subject of the letter*, conversant with the real merits of the case—he should have put them in possession of facts, enabling them to *form their own opinions*; and not by artfully suppressing all mention of the origin of the correspondence, by making partial quotations and adapting comments accordingly, have endeavoured to convey a totally erroneous impression of the whole tenor of the transaction; such conduct must degrade any man, but in the editor of a magazine of moral science it becomes intolerably disgusting.

To enable the public to estimate *for themselves* the justice of my stricture, that Mr. Watson's remarks were "written with a goose quill," I here beg to quote them together with the observations to which they were appended, and they are so evidently written by a mind unable to grasp the consequences connected with these latter, that if I mistake not the verdict of the public will be, that, in addition to the words "with a goose quill," I might have safely added, "and by a goose."

Vimont's supposed Organ of Space or Distance.—Dr. Vimont,

cause; but that [the numbers of the new series have progressively deteriorated both in interest and value since the second number.]*

I endeavoured to fulfil what I imagined to be your desire with regard to the correspondence between yourself and Mr. Gisborne, by circulating your statement amongst the phrenologists of my acquaintance; and I am not aware that any report on the subject, through any other channel, has reached this part of the world.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

T. S. PRIDEAUX.

Hewett Watson, Esq.

May, 1839.

* By printing in the 9th No. my observations, written and forwarded in the interval between the appearance of the 6th and 7th Nos., without noticing the fact, Mr. Watson makes me pass an opinion on the relative merits of two journals I had never seen, and at the same time gives his readers the fruitless task of hunting in the 8th Journal instead of the 6th for the assertion said to be injurious to the character of Spurzheim. This may be inadvertence, but I confess it has very much the appearance of artifice.

in his "Traité de Phrénologie," has introduced an Organ of Distance, speaking of it as a primitive faculty, separate and distinct from Size. Now, Size appears to be neither more nor less than *the distance between the boundaries of bodies*; therefore, I regard it as incorrect to attribute perceptions of Size and of Distance to distinct organs.—MR. PRIDEAUX. [Function is ascertained by observation, but reasoning may be introduced in corroboration. We are not acquainted with facts sufficiently numerous to establish organs either for size or distance, or for both together: but, on theoretical grounds, it may be deemed probable that there does exist an organ for the appreciation of size. Dr. Otto's case, printed in the present number, is a valuable contribution in reference to the subject alluded to by Mr. Prideaux.—EDITOR.]*

Mr. Watson is pleased to record it as *his* opinion (*the opinion* of the writer of the leading article in Journal 59—of the phrenologist who could be deluded by the chimerical project for noting developement proposed by Mr. Nichol—of the "philosophical and scientific mind," which assigns the perceptions of *loudness* to Comparison !!!—of the editor scarcely capable of stringing two sentences together grammatically—*quantum valeat?*) that my lucubrations are not likely to confer "much benefit on the readers of the journal, or on its own credit, in the estimation of scientific or philosophical minds."† In making this announce-

* I beg the reader to observe that it is to these simple remarks, *simple* truly in every sense of the term, that Mr. Watson refers, when (taking especial care that the words *loudness and comparison* shall not escape his lips) he observes, "the charge of making assertions so injurious to the character of Spurzheim is merely a laughable ebullition of spleen—a very thin veil thrown over the real ground of offence, namely, the remarks 'on *my* observations,'" an insinuation, which the tenour of the remarks themselves shows to be sufficiently improbable.

† The lucubrations which, in Mr. Watson's opinion, are likely to produce this effect are, doubtless, such as his own on the function of Comparison, or such as those of Mr. Nichol for estimating developement, inserted in No. 60. In the example given (the developement of Greenacre) to illustrate this system, (and a most conclusive *illustration* it certainly is,) Amativeness, Combativeness, Destructiveness, and Secretiveness, which are among the largest organs in the head, are stated to be each three degrees *below* average !! Acquisitiveness, perhaps the largest, is stated to be four degrees *below* average !! Tune and Time, decidedly among the smallest

ment to the world, I am afraid Mr. Watson has for once given himself unnecessary trouble, for the public are too well acquainted with his character to be at any loss to what to attribute his impotent attack, and even had they no suspicion of his lacking the qualification of impartiality, the shallowness of his intellect, and his utter incapacity for the task he has undertaken, are sufficiently notorious, to render his mere *ipse dixit* on such a point, valueless : indeed, from his *unaccustomed* backwardness in not producing a single quotation in confirmation of his opinion, *it is possible* that it will be concluded, that he could discover none suitable to his purpose. It will, perhaps, be an act of kindness in me to inform him, that the ridiculous complacency and self importance with which he delivers his judgments, present such a striking contrast to the value set on them by others, that their oracular tone has at length become a subject of merriment to the phrenological community, so much so indeed, that the name of Watson bids fair to acquire a sort of generick character.

An editor of the Phrenological Journal ought to be an individual of capacious and comprehensive mind, and one at the same time sufficiently conversant with every department of the science over which he presides, to be competent to fix definitely its boundaries, uninfluenced by that source of erroneous judgment, the involuntary tendency of individuals to overvalue the suggestions, which, emanating from their own brains, necessarily harmonise with their own peculiar idiosyncrasy. His duty, in fact, requires that he should be qualified to act as umpire between the conflicting opinions of individuals,* and lay before the public

organs, are stated to be respectively one and two degrees *above* average !! and Ideality is made of the same development as Acquisitiveness !!! This is a precious specimen of the mischievous nonsense with which the pages of the once well conducted Phrenological Journal, are filled by the present ignorant editor.

* What has been effected by the journal towards determining the correctness of the views of Dr. Vimont, on the existence of an organ of "Marriage," or "Attachment to the opposite Sex;" or the value of those of J. K., with respect to an organ of "Love of the past"? Have not these views been long enough before the public, for the editor to be prepared to furnish something satisfactory on them? See Appendix, Note (b).

a clear and succinet analysis of their productions, culling the more valuable and rejecting the unprofitable and the crude, with an ability unquestioned, and an impartiality above suspicion; thus effecting for phrenology, what that ably conducted periodical the British and Foreign Medical Review effects for the science over whose progress it presides.

To what extent does the present editor possess these requisite qualifications? Mr. Watson is tolerably acute in a "small way," though certainly much less so in inditing his own compositions,* than in criticising those of others. On the latter occasions he can sometimes balance a straw, according to the most approved methods of logic, and even apply the line and rule to a definition, but his eye never pierces far below the surface; there is a sad want of depth and profundity about him, and a total absence of that intuitive sagacity (so indispensable to a discoverer) which enables its possessor to anticipate results, and then teaching him how to test the conclusiveness of the conceptions originated, bestows new principles on science. Had Mr. Watson never withdrawn the energies of his "philosophical and scientific mind" from compiling lists of reference for British plants, what department of phrenology would have suffered in consequence? Of the value of these botanical works, I presume not to give an opinion: probably, as a mere labourer, a mere carrier of the hod and mortar for master workmen, he may have been very useful "in his sphere:" and far, very far

* I wish to make an exception in favour of the leading articles in the 1st and 2nd Nos. of the new series, that in the latter especially, containing many valuable observations. The style is evidently Mr. Watson's, but, if the ideas are also, he appears to have entirely emptied himself in giving birth to them, for certainly nothing at all, comparable to these two productions, has appeared from his pen since.

Mr. Watson also deserves credit for having clearly stated in the journal the doctrine of mind being a *function*, and not an *entity*. It seems almost incredible that so many phrenologists should continue to speak of the mind as an individual being, using the brain as an instrument, in opposition to all sound philosophical reasoning, and so many years after Gall has written "Your understanding, your volition, your free will, your affection, your judgment, instinct, &c. will be no longer personified beings: they will be cerebral functions." The doctrine of mind being an entity, is one quite unworthy the present era, and fit only to be ranked with the "substantial forms" of the schoolmen.

be it from me, to undervalue even the lowest class of contributors to the march of science; but I think I may be excused for questioning the propriety of such persons putting themselves forward as the philosophic-minded '*par excellence*,' lest the title should also be laid claim to by all the almanack manufacturers, census takers, and directory compilers in the kingdom.

Let us now inquire, whether there is anything in Mr. Watson's moral and literary qualifications, to compensate for his other deficiencies. Can we commend the dignity of his character, or the equanimity of his temper? or is he distinguished for a single-minded love of truth and candour, which disregards in its pursuits all petty and selfish considerations? Alas! the readers of the Phrenological Journal, are unfortunately but too well aware, that the high tone of morality, by which it was once so honourably distinguished, vanished contemporaneously with its assumption of the title of "Moral." To persons conversant with the pages of the journal, any comment upon Mr. Watson's literary qualifications for the editorial office, would appear superfluous, and how admirably an editor, ignorant himself of the first principles of composition, must be qualified to pronounce an opinion on the writings of others, must be apparent to every one. There are individuals however, "whose ignorance and self-confidence run in large and harmonious proportions;" a trivial and occasional error is often attributed to inadvertency, but when parties *criticise* the writings of *others*, their opinions are known to be the result of deliberation, and to be indicative of the amount of their own actual knowledge, and perhaps it is not easy to conceive a more mortifying and humiliating position than that of an individual who finds that whilst labouring to magnify a supposed error of another, he has been in reality labouring to publish and display in their full proportions, his own ignorance and conceit. Behold the position of Mr. Watson, who, in his *celebrated* epistle to correspondents in the last No., observes, "the two words *for* and *hence* are printed in italics by way of giving examples of the defect, rendering* Mr. Levison's

* It seems almost impossible for this bright specimen of editorial ability

essays on philosophical subjects unsuitable for this journal; namely, the introduction of conclusions not in any wise resulting from his premises; in short, a deficiency in Causality." I beg leave to inform Mr. Watson that in the ease in point, the word "*for*," was used quite correctly; if, however, he really considers the inconsequential use of connectives an indication of deficient Causality, and would like to print a few specimens of this error for the benefit of his readers, I shall be happy to furnish him with one to begin with, of his own penning, and from the first page of the same "lucubration" in which Mr. Levison is so unmercifully and, in one of the two cases adduced, quite unfoundedly criticised for this fault. Really, I would advise Mr. Watson to clear his vision, by casting the beams out of his own eye, before he again essays to remove motes from the eyes of other people. The very first sentence of this same article is grossly ungrammatical, and would disgrace a third class boy in a village school, and I might go through every page Mr. Watson has ever contributed to the journal, and select from each, either some grammatical inaccuracy, or some singularly cumbrous, uncouth, and disjointed sentence, were not the task of wading through such lumber too insuperably tedious. Who that has read his leading article in the 6th Journal but must have exclaimed, "the force of dulness could no futher go"? Had this valuable "lucubration" appeared in any other publication, it might have been supposed to have been written with a view to ridicule the science it ostensibly espoused. By the aid, however, of "a gentle fillip to my organs of Benevolence," I beg to offer my congratulations to Mr. W. on the production of a *chef d'œuvre*, which must infallibly immortalise his name, and for ever maintain a prominent station amongst its compeers. In this epitome of twaddling, the elegance of the diction and the vigour of the arguments preserve a happy accordance, and

to write a sentence without blundering. Instead of *rendering*, read *which renders*, and you will have what Mr. Watson intended to say, but did not know how to express—

"Why will our critic, as it were in spite
Of Nature and his stars, presume to write."

the commencing words, "They who," form a fit prologue to the succeeding portions. Such modes of speech may be the phraseology of grooms and chambermaids, but the public really do expect something rather different from "philosophical and scientific minded" editors, who are supposed to be gentlemen of education, and capable of writing their native language correctly. Assuredly, after this, no one can feel surprised at the information Mr. Watson has perhaps superfluously furnished us with, viz.—that he was always considered a dunce at the grammar school.

In reviewing Mr. Watson's editorial qualifications, or rather his want of any, it strikes me very forcibly that if confirmatory evidence of the existence of a feeling of self-esteem were required, it might be found in the circumstance of an individual of his intellectual calibre and literary attainments, assuming the editorship of a scientific journal; and if self-esteem be not a very prominent organ in his head, I shall never more feel any confidence in estimating a man's organisation by his writings and conduct.

Were I to be guided by my own impressions, I should suppose it next to impossible that there could be a single individual competent to form an opinion on the subject, who must not be thoroughly convinced of Mr. Watson's incapacity for the office of editor: but, to discard the uncertain test of individual feeling and belief, *facts* have fallen within my own personal knowledge, which I think fully authorise the conclusion, that three-fourths of the subscribers to the journal are disgusted with its present management, and have lost all faith in the qualifications of the present editor; and, from the circumstance of his finding it necessary in the 9th No. of the new series of the Journal, to enter into a somewhat elaborate defence of the mode in which he conducts it, and to draw public attention to the many good qualities it possesses, there can be little doubt but that the dissatisfaction at his management, which is so generally felt, has been freely expressed;* but whether he

* To endeavour to strengthen himself in the eyes of the public, he has brought forward a complimentary opinion, passed on the article colonization

will profit by it, or whether he is capable of doing so, appears very doubtful. As an individual, I have no wish to deprive Mr. Watson of the pleasure of seeing his name on the cover of the Journal, provided he will furnish himself with competent assistance to conduct it, and confine his own labours to preparing the matter for the printer, with perhaps writing the statistical articles, which will be quite the utmost his capacities are equal to.

“Ne sator ultra crepidam.”

Should he, however, continue “to inflict upon us,” I would most certainly advise him to get a grammar and spelling book to place beside “The Polite Letter Writer” on the shelves of his library, and study them to a little better purpose than he appears to have done the latter.

Mr. Watson’s remarks relating to Spurzheim, are an amusing specimen of the round-about manœuvres had recourse to by those who have something to conceal. After attributing my statement (that he had made an assertion injurious to the character of Spurzheim) to spleen, he observes, “that the

in No. 3 new series, by “one of the first phrenologists :” whether *first* refers to period of embracing the science, or ability, he does not inform us, but I presume the latter is intended. To disprove *progressive* deterioration, commencing with the 3rd No., this quotation appears rather out of date; but however this may be, in reference to the article to which it relates, I will observe, that I can readily understand the commendation, if it emanated from an individual not acquainted with the writings of Mr. Wakefield and others on this subject, and who supposed the positions laid down by Mr. Watson, were deductions *he* had elicited by the application of the principles of phrenology; but, if after being acquainted with the real facts of the case, viz.—that certain writers, without the aid of phrenology, had spoken of man’s natural desire to accumulate property and acquire independence, &c., as being the cause of certain effects, and that Mr. Watson did little more than translate these ideas into phrenological language, and assign these effects to Acquisitiveness and Self Esteem; if, after being aware of this fact, any individual can still regard this article, with its serious sober dissertation, to convince *incredulous* phrenologists that their science *really has something to do with political economy* (a dissertation to prove the connection of light with the sun, would scarcely approach nearer the burlesque), with its “*ap-hazard*” spelling, and its uncouth and contradictory sentences, an indication of capacity for editorship!! there are many who would think his judgment to be pitied: however, *de gustibus non est disputandum*.

Journal has been sometimes accused, and perhaps not wholly without reason, of being too partial to Spurzheim." This circumstance, he appears to think, is quite decisive of the question at issue, and evidently flatters himself that he has disposed of the subject in a most conclusive and satisfactory manner, for he immediately proceeds to hint that I shall be left alone in my opinion. Mr. Watson then presumes, that because the Phrenological Journal, at a certain period of its existence, has been accused of being too partial to Spurzheim, no one will think it possible, that at a subsequent period, and under another editor, the Journal *could* make any assertion injurious to Spurzheim's reputation.* What admirable logic! Why not, instead of resorting to all this irrelevant matter, and studiously attempting to evade the facts of the case, have plainly stated the CAUSE on which I grounded my assertion, and at once enabled the public to *judge for themselves*, whether it was well founded or not? Would not the statement of the simple truth suit his purpose? Why not have informed his readers that my charge originated in his having attributed to Spurzheim the doctrine that "*loudness is appreciated by the organ of Comparison!*" and he might have added, that though incapable of supporting his assertion by a single quotation, he had not sufficient honesty and candour to retract it.

Mr. Watson is for once correct, in presuming that I shall be left in quiet possession of my discovery. I will tell him moreover that I shall not only be left in quiet possession of my opinion, but that it will be shared by the whole phrenological public, till he can advance something rather more pertinent in opposition to it, than the nonsense with which he insulted the understandings of his readers in the last Journal. If Mr. Watson does not like to lie under the imputation of having made an assertion injurious to the character of Spurzheim, in attributing to him the doctrine, that *Comparison takes cognizance of Loudness*, he

* Mr. Watson being much given to *close reasoning*, I should advise him to try his hand at throwing this into a syllogism.

has ONLY to support his statement by a quotation from Spurzheim's writings, and his character will be cleared: if he cannot do this, I call upon him to retract his assertion as publicly as it was made, under the penalty, if he refuse, of having his name become a bye-word amongst all those who have any feeling of propriety or sentiment of honour.

In attributing my defence of Spurzheim to spleen, Mr. Watson may be giving utterance to his own belief on the subject. I will not dispute but that it may surpass his comprehension, that an individual should concern himself about anything in which he is not personally interested; and if he takes himself as a standard by which to measure my motives, I am afraid there is but too much probability of his being sincere; but it is *possible* that the public will be of opinion, that an individual irritated by the exposure of his own fallacies, is not likely to prove a very impartial judge of the motives of the agent; and if I mistake not, there are many who will readily be able to account for my conduct, without Mr. Watson's exposition, and who will see nothing extraordinary in the circumstance of an individual interfering, to prevent the name of the illustrious* dead being

* Illustrious, not by being begotten by titled imbecility, nor through the gewgaw distinctions of wealth; not by reddening the sword with slaughter, nor elevating himself on a pyramid by trampling on the rights of the slaves that form its base; not '*by courtesy*,' but by an exalted, moral and intellectual organisation, and the deeds to which it gave birth, the only patent of nobility recognised by nature, the only claim to superiority worthy of respect from man.

[It is to phrenology that posterity will be indebted for the recognition of this maxim, which must one day take place, and the blessings which will flow from it. All false standards of merit, by diverting the impulses of Love-of-Approbation from their proper channel, must be productive of vast injury to society, and few have done more to dispel the existing errors on this point than Spurzheim and Combe: but instead of aiding the efforts of phrenologists, philosophers in other branches of science, whose knowledge ought to teach them how absolutely inane and senseless are all distinctions not founded on merit, and place them above the prejudices of the multitude, but too frequently lend a countenance to their folly. Men of science are, unfortunately to be met with, who allow their eyes to be diverted from the contemplation of the immutable laws traced by an Omnipotent hand for the government of a universe, by the glitter of a Star and Garter; who voluntarily descend from the pedestals on which their pursuits place them, to sink themselves to the level of the scrapers of mud by whom they are

defaced, by having affixed to it the paternity of the preposterous speculations of Mr. Watson—a mere man-milliner in phrenology, whose scientific productions, or rather preparations, (absurdities excepted,) might all be equalled in originality by an operation of Babbage's calculating machine.

Mr. Watson having been kind enough to endeavour to enlighten me, as to the phrenological organs which dictated my last communication to him, I feel that I cannot do less than return the compliment, 'albeit,' by no means certain that he will agree with me in opinion. To the best of my judgment, Mr. Watson's remarks, are the joint offspring of Self Esteem and Destructiveness, in a preternatural state of excitement, seeking their gratification through the medium of Secretiveness, and without allowing themselves to be enumbered by the *inconvenient* restraint, of attending to the dictates of Conscientiousness.

surrounded, and who are ever ready to cover the laurel wreath which decks the brow of the philosopher, with the cap and bells of the fool. Such men are grown-up children, who have discarded the rattles of the nursery, only to amuse themselves with still more empty and valueless baubles. Among the '*penchants*' of the philosophers of the present day, none perhaps is likely to afford more astonishment and amusement to posterity, (if accredited) than the strange infatuation which induces some to believe that they can obliterate their own insignificance, by the addition to their names of a few equally insignificant letters, to be obtained by purchase. By a statement of Mr. Babbage, in his "Decline of Science," it appears that those who are disposed to pride themselves upon such an acquisition, may have their names transformed into a species of comets, with a tail of forty letters, at the average price of 10*l.* 9*s.* 9½*d.** per letter (who will dare affirm that honour cannot be purchased?) provided they have the good fortune to be entirely unknown in the scientific world; in this case, they are never known to be refused the desired privilege: but, if they have already acquired some degree of philosophic reputation, they occasionally become the victims of the jealousy of their contemporaries, and have their applications rejected. Contrast the doings of these ephemeral insects, who spend their time in brawling in the portico, instead of worshipping in the temple of science, with the character of one whose name they repudiate—the great Gall. He justly regarded "the honours and distinctions that belong to merit as humiliations when lavished on insignificance," and contented himself with a simple M.D.; yet his name, indissolubly associated with his discoveries, and venerated for their sake, will be encircled with a halo of immortality, when the institutions for whose empty titles his contemporaries trafficked shall be forgotten; or if remembered, remembered only to be despised.]

* An F.R.S. costs 50*l.*, an F.L.S. 36*l.*

I have a very few more observations to trouble Mr. Watson with, and I will then leave him to the enjoyment of his "editorial eachinations" When are the phrenological public to be favoured with the "*few cases quite corroborative*" of his suggestion (*that loudness is appreciated by Comparison!!*) which he tells them he has SEEN? I can assure him that the bulk of the readers of the journal would deem its pages quite *as* profitably occupied in settling the function of Comparison, as in discussing the merits of his own portrait in the Naturalist—as in abusing Mr. Howitt*—or as in being made the vehicle of his ill-timed attempts to be facetious at the expense of his American brethren. The less Mr. Watson says about his "*corroborative cases*" the better; and, if he be wise, he will retrace his steps out of the mire and confess his errors; the latter, however, is too much to be expected from *him*, for "there is in little minds a *pertinacity* which elings to opinions once expressed, because the credit of the individual appears to be involved in maintaining them."

* See new series, No. 7, page 288. Are these remarks on Mr. Howitt's portrait intended as a specimen of the "*cautious induction*" so much insisted on by Mr. Watson? Can it be possible that he has placed himself amongst those who, he informs us, "bring a temporary discredit upon the science by venturing rash conclusions nominally on phrenological data, which they are unable to support?" A source of mischief Mr. W. thinks will be gradually removed, by the diffusion of sound knowledge, "increasing the number of competent persons, who will teach the public *that a man is not necessarily acquainted with the subject, because he chooses to call himself a phrenologist,*" (and I will add) nor even because he possesses duplicates of the casts and drawings used by Mr. Combe. [For the benefit of those who labour under the erroneous idea that miracles have ceased, I copy from Journal No. 3, new series, page 340, the following marvellous instance of the transfer of inspiration:—"The editor of this journal is willing to lecture on phrenology in places where his lectures may be deemed likely to prove useful in diffusing a *correct* knowledge of the science. He has much pleasure in stating that Mr. Combe *has enabled him to do this effectively*, by kindly obtaining for him duplicates and copies of the casts and drawings *used by himself* in his own lectures." If this law of inheritance should ever become general, how inestimable will be the value of the pencil of a Raphael, the violin of a Paganini, or the pen of a Byron. How will men strive for the possession of the telescope of a Herschel, or the voltaic battery of a Davy. How fiercely contest the right of succession to the wig of a Lord Chancellor, or the slipper of a Taglioni. Nothing parallel to the case of Mr. Watson has been known to occur since the servant of the Tishbite acquired a double portion of the spirit of his master from the possession of his mantle.]

I have now placed Mr. Watson in his true position; and as I conceive, that by his disingenuous conduct he has forfeited all *claim* to consideration, it is not my intention to notice or reply to any of his future attacks: indeed, convinced as I am, that he must speedily find his level, and that his petulance and ill regulated temper will speedily become so notorious, as to render their manifestations perfectly innocuous except to himself, I should scarcely have undertaken so unprofitable a task in the present instance, but for the purpose of punishing his delinquencies.

T. S. PRIDEAUX.

RYDE, ISLE OF WIGHT,
JANUARY, 1840.

APPENDIX.

(a) I acquired this knowledge in the following manner, and after Mr. Watson's remarks in the last number, perhaps some will be surprised to learn that my first communication to the editor of the Phrenological Journal was made at his own request. In the 55th No. of the Journal, page 214, appeared the following article :

“BLANDFORD.—Mr. Prideaux has lately delivered a short course of four lectures on phrenology, in the Town-hall, Blandford. The lectures are highly spoken of in the Salisbury and Wiltshire Herald, for January the 13th. Mr. Prideaux is stated to have ventured upon the experimental test of inferring the disposition of an unknown individual, from a skull presented to him by a gentleman ; a sealed note of the character being also delivered to a medical gentleman, who read it to the audience immediately after Mr. Prideaux's inference had been read to them. Where the peculiarities of disposition are strongly marked, the successful result of such a trial is a matter of course with a tolerably good phrenologist, although it may appear wonderful to an audience ignorant of phrenology ; but as, in such a trial, the skull of an ordinary individual might be brought forward, concerning which, the phrenologist could only speak in vague or negative terms, we are averse to the measure. The experiment should not be made, unless under a special understanding that the individual *had* some well marked peculiarities of disposition ; in this case, the successful result would be morally certain, and it would be felt as a much more severe test. If Mr. Prideaux will send us a note of the developement of this skull, in the same form

as that of Greenacre's is stated in page 137, we will copy the remarks from the Herald into our next, for the instruction of students of phrenology."

The note of the developement was accompanied with the following remarks in reply to Mr. Watson's.

"In alluding to the circumstance of the examination of the skull, you observe, that 'the experiment of passing an opinion on the character of an individual should not be made, unless under a special understanding that the person *had* some well marked peculiarities of disposition, lest the skull of an ordinary character should be brought forward, concerning which, phrenologists could only speak in vague or negative terms.' Now every phrenologist must admit that such information would be very desirable, (and I may remark, *en passant*, that it was furnished me on the occasion in question,) but, with great deference to your authority, I beg to observe, that I cannot subscribe in general terms to the doctrines you have laid down, because I think it may be sometimes advisable for a phrenologist to give an opinion, without being furnished with the information you have specified.

"It will I believe very seldom occur, that in these trials the skull of an ordinary individual will be brought forward, because it is felt that their object—to procure evidence as conclusive as possible—will be best accomplished by the selection of the most decided characters that can be obtained; and I may also remark, that I believe there are few heads so evenly developed as not to offer one or two points on which something determinate may be predicated. Supposing a phrenologist, publicly challenged to give an opinion on the disposition of an unknown individual, and all information relative to the character of the individual, whether decided or otherwise, refused; supposing even the skull or bust presented to him, of such equal developement as to afford no room for him to predicate anything determinate, the question is, whether would it conduce more to the interests of phrenology for him to decline to say anything respecting it, or for him to state, that in the individual in question, the different classes of

organs so nearly balance each other, that his character would most probably be determined by the circumstances in which he was placed; that if he had the benefit of moral training when young, though he would be never remarkable for the elevation of his sentiments, the strictness of his sense of justice, or the philanthropy of his views, he might yet pass through life without the commission of serious crimes; and that if on the other hand, he had the misfortune early in life to become associated with the vicious and depraved, he might probably be led into the commission of actions which would render him amenable to the criminal laws of his country, though he would never become so utterly depraved and abandoned as many criminals, and would be still further distinguished from them by the greater contrition and remorse he would evince for his crimes? It appears to me that such a description of his character would probably approximate so nearly to the truth, as to produce an impression favourable to phrenology; whereas, the former mode of procedure, that is declining to give any opinion at all, would not improbably excite suspicion. I am aware that it ought not to, but we must take the world as it is, and accommodate ourselves to its failings.”

This presumption of mine, in venturing to offer an opinion in opposition to that of so august a personage as the editor of the Phrenological Journal, was not to be tolerated, and accordingly the whole of my communication was suppressed.* Aware that this conduct must appear rather extraordinary, Mr. W. accounted for it some little time afterwards in a letter, by saying that it was caused by numbers being employed instead of the organs in stating the development, and his feeling doubtful as to what organs the respective numbers were intended to designate. Deeming that the numbering of the organs adopted by Spurzheim

* No one I think acquainted with the equitable spirit in which the Journal was conducted by the ex-editors, and the high moral tone which then pervaded it, can for a moment doubt but that after pronouncing an opinion condemnatory of the practice, or supposed practice of an individual, they would have deemed themselves bound to have given equal publicity to his explanation. Candour unfortunately appears to have no place in Mr. Watson's code of morality.

and Combe was the only one in vogue in this country, I confess I was rather surprised at this statement: the deficiency complained of was however immediately remedied, and the names of the organs forwarded to Mr. Watson, but the account never made its appearance. Mr. Watson having, in this instance, expressed his desire to print my remarks *after* reading them in the Herald, the motive which induced him to suppress them was, of course, too self-evident to be mistaken; and, had I been possessed with that great desire of figuring in the pages of his Journal, which Mr. Watson (judging others, it is to be presumed, from his own sensations) has attributed to me, most probably I should have addressed some remonstrance to him on the subject, instead of letting the matter rest: I could not, of course, help smiling at his weakness; but, deeming the subject would be rather a sore one to him, I have never alluded to it since.

Account of the Examination of the Skull referred to in the preceding observations, extracted from the Salisbury Herald, of the 13th of January, 1838.

“A course of four lectures has just been delivered in the Town Hall, Blandford, on Phrenology, by Mr. Prideaux. All who have attended have been highly gratified by the able and lucid manner in which the principles of the science have been explained by this gentleman. Mr. Prideaux having offered to put the truth of the principles of phrenology to the test, by giving the outline of the temper and disposition of any individual, whose bust or skull should be presented to him; a gentleman availed himself of this offer, and transmitted a skull to Mr. P. with a request to have the character of the individual delineated. At the conclusion of the last lecture, a paper describing the temper and disposition of the individual, as inferred by Mr. P. from his phrenological development, was laid on the table; and a medical gentleman present having produced a sealed letter from the owner of the skull, containing a brief account of the character of the individual who once tenanted it: they were both read

to the audience, when the coincidence in all the leading features between the two, was found to be truly astonishing. We regret that the length of Mr. P.'s observations precludes our inserting the whole of them, but as we have been favoured with a sight of the original documents, the correctness of the following extracts may be relied on.

“A glance at the lower outline of the skull reveals to the phrenologist a fearful preponderance of the lower propensities over the moral sentiments and intellect.

“The organ of Amativeness is large, and will probably be indulged in the coarsest manner. If this individual were ever married, he must have been induced to enter into the married state from pecuniary motives, or motives of convenience; he would not be greatly attached to his wife, and she would most likely frequently experience his brutality, for his utter want of refinement, and nobleness of character, *would render women peculiarly liable to his outrages.*

“*He possessed a great deal of low cunning.* There can be no doubt but he was a great liar, dishonest, and *very little accessible to feelings of pity.* He would care for no one but himself, and be quite indifferent to the sufferings of others. I have very little doubt but he was a man disliked by his fellows, who passed through life without making a single friend, and whose exit from it was regarded as a fortunate riddance by those best acquainted with him.

“If in society I were to meet with an individual whose head presented a similar configuration, I should most certainly refuse to trust him either with my life or property, because I am well convinced that neither considerations of justice nor benevolence, would restrain him from taking either the one or other, if it suited his purpose. The fear of punishment would be the only thing which would restrain this individual from the perpetration of crimes, and therefore, if placed in circumstances in which he thought himself sure of evading the arm of retributive justice, he would not hesitate to commit the most bloody.

“Phrenologists of course only speak of dispositions; they cannot speak of definite and positive actions, because these will ever be more or less under the influence of external circumstances. I cannot therefore take upon me to say that this individual was a murderer, though I confess I shall not be surprised to learn that such is the fact.

“On one point, however, I will speak very decidedly, viz., that if he ever committed murder, *the influence of his large Cautiousness will be conspicuous in the manner in which it was effected.* Some murderers recklessly attack persons their equals in physical strength, regardless of the risk to which they expose themselves by so doing; but this man, if he ever committed the crime, would probably select his victim from amongst the weak, aged, or infirm, or if he murdered a man, his equal in physical strength, he would take especial care to attack him under circumstances which precluded his own person from being seriously endangered by any resistance which his unfortunate victim might make.”

The following is a copy of the sealed letter referred to.

“John Gollop, the wretched occupant of this skull, was executed at Dorchester, for the murder of a woman with whom he cohabited. He was a seafaring man, verging on 40, of middle stature and apparently cheerful disposition, and much addicted to female society.

“He evinced great cunning in the method of destroying his victim, which was by suffocation, keeping the mouth closed by the thumb under the chin, and pressing the nostrils between the fingers, by which means there were scarcely any external marks of violence perceptible.

“It was given in evidence on his trial, that he had oftentimes said, ‘that he considered it no more harm to kill a person than an animal,’ and he frequently boasted of having killed many, when abroad, in the same manner.

“Although convicted on the clearest evidence, he pertinaciously denied being the perpetrator of the crime, yet admitted that he was present, and held the victim.

“This character was given me by an individual who was personally acquainted with the convict, and may be relied upon.”

“DECEMBER 29, 1837.

“CHAS. WARNE.”

NOTE (b)

Not a single tendency possesses more completely the attributes of a fundamental faculty, than the “*Tendency to live in pairs* ;” and it seems difficult to imagine how any one can contemplate the diversified and determinate instincts of animals in this respect, without admitting the innateness and speciality of the feeling. With regard to its seat, I believe Dr. Vimont to be correct in the locality which he has assigned to it, having seen many cases apparently confirmatory. In a bust in my possession, the organ presents the form of a long narrow oval, extended horizontally on the cerebellum, with an edge well defined at every part, except that in contact with Philoprogenitiveness, and the character of the individual indicated a high endowment of the feeling.

With reference to “Love of the Past,” I think it extremely probable that an attentive study of the heads of the members of the Antiquarian Society, by a competent phrenologist, would at once determine its seat. There are few points on which the characters of men present more marked and decided differences, than in their tendency to regard the *present*, *past*, and *future* ; and the cause of these differences of disposition must be sought for in varieties of organization. I think there is every reason to believe in the existence of a general disposition to regard the *future*, independently of the tendency to anticipate—the fulfilment of our desires (Hope), and independently of the tendency to anticipate their frustration, (probably the function

of a *portion* of Cautiousness;) and from many cases that have fallen under my own notice, I should be inclined to think it probable that some relation existed between this disposition, and the developement of the brain immediately above Caution, were not this appropriated (I am told on good grounds) to Conscientiousness.

I confess I regard it as very doubtful whether the whole of the space now assigned to Conscientiousness is occupied by this organ, and should be glad to see the evidence which is considered to have established its present bounds, in print. I have repeatedly met with the external part adjoining Caution, very moderately developed in individuals, whom, as far as I have had the opportunity of judging, I believe to be remarkable for the strictness of their sense of justice.

With respect to a "Disposition to enjoy the present moment," it may be said, that all the faculties desire present enjoyment; and that the indulgence of such a tendency is sufficiently accounted for, by supposing no restraint to be placed on the immediate desires, by an anxiety to make provision for the future. Something, however, beyond the mere absence of anxiety for the future, seems to be concerned in prompting the sentiment *dum vivimus vivimus*, and other similar aspirations. Possibly they may be referred to a 'Love of Pleasure,' *per se*, a tendency which certainly exists, and cannot be referred to any of the recognised faculties; these have a definite appetite for certain objects, and desire them simply in themselves, not as means to an end, and without reference to the pleasure which results from their obtaining them. Man is so constituted that the fulfilment of the desires of his faculties gives pleasure; but it is quite possible to conceive a being so organised, that the attainment of the objects sought by his faculties should produce pain, without his continuing to be the less attracted towards them. Such is the sort of being we might in fact imagine to be created by a purely malevolent principle.

I beg phrenologists to make observations on the developement

of the brain immediately anterior to Caution, (at the spot appropriated by Dr. Spurzheim in his later plates to Acquisitiveness,) with reference to the general fondness for pleasure, and disposition to present enjoyment.

With reference to the discussion which has already taken place on the existence of organs of "Attachment to opposite Sex," or "Instinct to Pair," and "Love of the Past," I beg to observe, that I conceive a number of persons agreeing as to experiencing a vivid emotion of a peculiar and definite character, exclusively in connection with the suggestion or presence of a certain idea, or class of ideas, to be an argument of great force in favour of the existence of a primitive faculty, and I would suggest to phrenologists not too hastily to commit themselves by opposing the existence of a faculty, proposed under these circumstances, because they may be incapable of recognising such an emotion, by appealing to their own consciousness; but rather to make a personal application of that precept of phrenology which teaches, that *ceteris paribus* an individual is best qualified to treat on the existence and nature of his largest organs, and *vice versa*: a reflection which may perhaps prevent some from putting themselves in the position of blind men denying the existence of colour. Individually, I annex very little importance to the opinion of a bachelor-disposed personage, on the non-existence of an "Instinct to Pair;" or to that of an individual to whose mind the *past* appears divested of the fairy and hallowed mantel, in which she presents herself to the eyes of others, on the non-existence of an organ of "Love of the Past"—a faculty which invests *by-gone time* with a certain attribute, which like every other primitive emotion, it is impossible to define or describe, and which is intelligible only to those endowed with the requisite organization.

SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS.

Preliminary Observations.

With regard to the "rejected addresses," it is my intention shortly to give them to the world, in conjunction with various other phrenological essays, some of which are not yet ready for publication; and I trust I shall be acquitted of presumption in making this announcement, notwithstanding *so great* an authority as Mr. Watson has pronounced them to be "lucubrations," not likely to confer "much benefit on the readers of the Journal or on its own credit, in the estimation of scientific and philosophical minds."

"A favourite employment of mine is to endeavour to analyse the various features presented by man's intellectual and affective nature, in search of some tendency or capacity, which cannot be referred to any single faculty or combination of faculties, at present recognised by phrenologists, and the existence of which would require, as a consequence, an addition to be made to the catalogue of primitive powers." I have long been imbued with the conviction, that many shades of character exist, which cannot be formed by any quantitative admixture of the known primitive powers, and that there necessarily exist faculties qualitatively different, from any of those yet admitted as fundamental. In prosecuting these enquiries, I believe myself so fortunate as to have succeeded in evolving several elementary faculties, which have hitherto eluded observation, and even in some cases to have succeeded in locating their seat. I am not ignorant of the extreme intricacy of such

pursuits, and of the many sources of fallacy which the analytical mode of studying mental science presents; neither am I unacquainted with the difficulty entailed upon all researches on the special functions of individual organs, by the impossibility of noting the manifestations of any one organ in an isolated state: and the amount of evidence I am at present in possession of, in support of many of my opinions, is very far from being sufficiently extensive and conclusive to satisfy my own mind. That future researches will show that many of my present views require much modification, or even that in some I am altogether mistaken, I have little doubt; indeed, from the nature of things, such *must* be the case; but I shall allow no ridiculous apprehension of being convicted of error to prevent my laying them before the public, accompanied with a simple detail of the evidence I possess in their favour, in which I shall cautiously abstain from giving any undue prominence or colouring to those facts which may be supposed to be of a confirmatory nature: a species of folly, not to say bad faith, which I am afraid some have pretty freely indulged in. To quote my ideas on the subject, from one of the “rejected addresses,” (pardon me, gentle reader, for again obtruding such “lucubrations” on your notice) “I conceive a free interchange of ideas amongst phrenologists to be calculated materially to accelerate the advance of Phrenology, without being productive of any attendant disadvantage, provided a *wide line of demarcation be preserved between the probable—and the ascertained*, and provided *only the latter* be given to the world as the *doctrines of Phrenology*; in this case, the science will, in a more rapid elucidation of its principles, reap all the advantages of having a number of labourers engaged in investigating the inferences of individuals, when such inferences prove well founded, whilst when they prove fallacious, the reproach, if any, will attach solely to their originators.”*

* This extract, together with the preceding one, are from an essay conjecturing the function of Concentrativeness to be the Love of Employment, *enabling the mind to employ itself on an object that affords no present gratification beyond the expectation of the result to be attained, without irksomeness*, and thus solacing the toils of tillage, and other monotonous

Gall probably acted wisely in withholding his inferences from the world till he had assured himself of their correctness by personal observation. Not to mention, however, that few possess his capacity for effecting this object, the position of phrenology is altogether changed since the period of his observations, and those precautions in promulgating opinions which the general distrust of the truth of the science then rendered necessary, may be no longer required; indeed, cultivated as the science now is, by a large number of persons, the expediency of continuing such a practice may justly be called in question; and the interests of science, and not the feelings of individuals, ought to be made the sole criterion for determining the plan to be pursued.

I am well aware that it is the fashion amongst many phrenologists of the present day, to decry and ridicule the *a priori* method of studying mental science; but are we hastily to conclude, that reasoning *a priori* should be altogether discarded because some individuals reason falsely, and announce very extravagant con-

occupations inseparable from a civilised life, in the same way as Destructiveness enlivens the fatigues of the chase, man's chief employment in a savage state. I suggested that this propensity probably performed an important part in leading men from the hunter to the shepherd, and from the shepherd to the agricultural state, whilst its great deficiency in a nation would incapacitate them for civilisation. I do not profess to be in possession of evidence *sufficient to establish* such an opinion, and it may very probably be an unfounded one; but as a suggestion, it is perhaps quite as worthy of attention as the greater number of those which appear in the pages of the Journal. Mr. Hancock's observations on Concentrativeness are valuable and deserving much consideration, and I am by no means convinced, that it may not be possible that the idle, desultory, and unsettled habits I believe myself to have recognised in many individuals, in whom the organ was deficiently developed, may be partly attributed to the deficiency of a fundamental faculty, *originating a susceptibility of attachment to impressions in relation to the frequency with which they have been experienced*. This I apprehend to be essentially the function attributed to this organ by Mr. Hancock, and I trust I am far from entertaining any indisposition to admit its correctness on account of having chanced to propose another. May that bigotry which clings blindly to opinions because originated by the individual, and that despicable littleness of mind which shrinks from acknowledging an error, and suffers the petty considerations of self to prevail over the love of truth, ever be amongst the last vices that can be laid to my charge. With reference to the *quasi* intellectual functions assigned to this organ I will observe, that it should never be forgotten that the imagination has sometimes a great influence on the aspect of *transmitted*—FACTS: a word constantly in the mouths of those *soi disant* philosophers who never collect any.

clusions? Some there are, I believe, who are disposed to reject it *in toto*, for the very sufficient reason of its being unsuited to their own taste and capacity; but such parties would do well to remember the maxim, *non omnia possumus omnes*, and not persist in erecting their own perceptions and capabilities, as a standard of human capacity—a species of dogmatism which phrenologists ought to be the last to fall into. If an individual by reasoning can succeed in developing the necessary existence of a certain primitive faculty, and then by taking a comprehensive view of its nature and relations, can conjecture with great probability the neighbourhood in which it must be sought, and thus by having a definite direction given to his observations, can succeed at arriving at a result (*viz.*, the discovery of an organ) which he would not otherwise have attained, is he not to be at liberty to do so? But why should I enlarge on this point? assuredly, no one who possesses sufficient vigour of intellect to effect such an object, will ever be induced to deviate for an instant from the path he has marked out for himself, by the verdict of these imbeciles; and whatever may be the fleeting opinions of the day on the subject, I am ready to maintain, not only that the *a priori* method of studying phrenology is a perfectly legitimate one, but that he who arrives at a conviction of the necessary existence of a faculty by reasoning, and then seeks for, and establishes its position on the brain, performs a much greater achievement, than he who discovers an organ, in consequence of having his attention arrested by meeting with an individual, in whom some startling developement is united with some equally startling manifestations of a particular mental function.

Gall, who was a philosopher and not a bigot, so far from indiscriminately condemning the *a priori* mode of studying the science, deems it necessary to apologise for not having had more recourse to it, by stating it to be one for which he had little aptitude; and finishes by observing, “it is possible nevertheless, very possible, that others have a more favourable organisation than I have to arrive at knowledge *a priori*; but you will do me the justice not to insist upon my entering the lists with other arms than my own.”

Those who regard the employment of this mode of philosophising as incompatible with common sense, and productive only of visionary ideas, are no doubt profoundly ignorant that it is one more or less had recourse to by all phrenologists. Observation, in a great number of cases, reveals only capacities and dispositions, formed by combinations of simple faculties, and it is only by the employment of analytical reasoning, that we can arrive at faculties really simple and uncompounded. We have cunning, bold, rash, and timid characters presented to us, but can we at once refer the causes of these differences to single primitive faculties, or are we not *necessitated* to resort to *analytical reasoning*, in order to reduce general, to special knowledge, and acquire precise ideas? In short, analytic or speculative reasoning is productive of an injurious effect, only, when it presumptuously disclaims the necessity, and discards the practice, of verifying its conclusions by observation. When employed as a guide to the latter, it becomes the most powerful of all agents in advancing the progress of science. Indeed, it is the capacity of being able to conjecture with great probability what particular path leads to the discovery of an unknown truth, enabling an individual to know to what exact point his powers of observation may be most profitably directed, which constitutes the characteristic difference, between those to whom sciences are indebted for their laws, and those who merely perfect their details, or study them only to gratify their love of knowledge. Had man never done more than classify and draw general inferences from the facts which *presented* themselves to his notice, had he never, from a profound contemplation of the qualities and relations of things known, made conjectures of the qualities and relations of the unknown, and then *applied* his observing powers in a *determinate direction*, to test their conclusiveness, what would be the present condition of science? Did a *casualty* show Franklin a kite-string bristling with electricity, or place before the eyes of Davy potash under the intense action of this agent?

As many causes may possibly intervene to delay the intended publication of my novel views in a finished state, and as in the

interim, many of them, if before the public, might possibly be either confirmed or proved unfounded by the labours of phrenologists, who possess greater opportunities, or powers of observation than myself, I shall proceed as concisely as possible to give a slight outline of a few of the principal.

In only two cases have my observations to determine the positions of the conjectured faculties, been yet sufficiently numerous and conclusive, to nearly satisfy my own mind, and in laying a brief sketch of these two proposed organs (hastily gathered from some detached memoranda) before the reader, I wish to premise, that I am far from flattering myself with having arrived at a knowledge of their essential nature. Gall observes, "It is much easier to discover the organ which determines a certain mode of action, than the fundamental quality or faculty itself. Actions that are the result of the extraordinary activity of an organ, are much more obvious than the primitive destination of that organ, and its ordinary mode of action. When faculties are once recognised as peculiar and independent, it is possible thence to infer by degrees, the primitive destination of an organ." This is a process which I believe has yet to be effected with by far the greater number of the organs; the actions which they induce being the extent of our present knowledge respecting them. Considered, in fact, in relation to our knowledge of precise function, the forehead is little other than a *terra incognita*, and if any phrenologist should be of a contrary opinion, let him explain the precise function of either Individuality, Eventuality, Comparison, or Causality. With regard to Individuality, it is *conjectured* to originate the conception of Existence, and it seems tolerably well ascertained that the organ gives the desire, and the ability, for becoming acquainted with a large number of individual objects; yet how little do we know of the office it performs, in achieving this result. It seems improbable that it effects it merely by acting as a stimulus to other faculties, and yet we find that every particular perception is furnished with a special organ for its appreciation; we are left then to conjecture that Individuality serves to supervise and combine in some way, the perceptions of the

organs taking cognisance of *external* qualities, but of the *manner* in which this is effected, we are profoundly ignorant. In fact, phrenologists are not yet even agreed, whether the impressions of each sense are cognised by a separate organ, or by one in common. Gall inclined to the former opinion, and Spurzheim to the latter; but it appears to me that a case, quoted by Spurzheim from Darwin's *Zoonomia*, is almost, if not quite, decisive of the impressions of each sense, being received by a separate portion of nervous matter.

The following is the anecdote alluded to.—“ An old man who had had a paralytic stroke preserved the senses of hearing and vision untouched; he, however, could only receive ideas by means of the latter; when he was told that it was nine o'clock and breakfast time, he repeated the words distinctly, yet without gaining any information from them; but if his servant put a watch into his hand and shewed the hour gone by, he said, ‘ Why, William, have I not my breakfast?’ ” In this case it is evident, that the impressions of the auditory nerve were recognised by an internal faculty, and also, that the connection of this faculty with certain idea-conceiving organs was interrupted; whilst it is equally evident, that the connection between these same organs, and the faculty which recognised the impressions of the optic nerve, remained unimpaired; and hence it follows, that the impressions of the auditory and optic nerves are recognised by distinct faculties.* This case is rendered the more interesting from the fact, that notwithstanding the individual was unable to translate words into ideas, no difficulty seems to have been experienced in translating ideas into words, and were Nature so obliging as to furnish us with such cases more frequently, we might soon hope to unravel much that is at present obscure in cerebral physiology.†

* Unless we resort to the improbable supposition, that although one organ is competent to receive the impressions, one set of fibres is not competent to transmit them; but if these impressions can reside in the same apartment without disturbing each other, surely they can travel by the same path.

† SUGGESTION.—May not this case be explained by supposing a derangement of the *afferent* fibres between Language and Eventuality, the *efferent* continuing to perform their functions unimpaired? Is not the loss of

Assuming that the impressions of each sense are cognised by a separate internal faculty, of what nature are we to regard the ideas conceived by these faculties? It appears to me that the impressions of each sense are conceived, and reconceived as wholes, with all their appreciable qualities, and that we have no consciousness of any impressions from the senses, anterior to their analysis or appreciation by the faculties which discern external qualities; and if so, it must be concluded that these have no consciousness, and that their function is confined to modifying the impressions of the senses, in such a way as to cause the idea of a particular quality to be conceived. To illustrate my meaning by analogy, I would compare the organ of colour to a prism, and the 'optic organ' (conceiving a mental picture of the field of view,) to the screen which receives the image of the colours, which the prism refracts. The presentation and recognition of a particular object which has anteriorly occupied a place in a field of view, seem to have a tendency to recall the whole of the picture; thus, on meeting with an individual whom we recollect to have seen once before, after a moment's pause, his image arises, seated on the top of the coach, or standing on the deck of the steam vessel, where we first saw him; and whoever attends to the mental operations, will discover, that we often recover knowledge, that as matter of fact—as appreciated by eventuality—had been entirely lost. For instance, if questioned as to the former existence of a particular sofa, table, &c., in a certain site, we are often quite unable to answer, till we have conceived a picture of the apartment, when it probably occurs with many other forgotten objects. *Ceteris paribus* those departments of a field of view will be most distinctly recalled, which received the greatest attention at the time. A field of view conceived from memory, compared with one arising from the immediate presentation of external objects, resembles a picture when contrasted with the landscape of which

the memory of proper names also much more satisfactorily accounted for, by supposing a derangement of the *efferent* fibres between Individuality and Language than by the improbable conjecture, that a particular portion of the organ of Language is appropriated to their cognisance?

it is a transcript. In Memory, the optic and other *organs* of the senses, receive no impressions from the organs which appreciate individual qualities; and the ideas they form, by a law of cerebral physiology are referred to internal reconceptions, and not to external objects. Here we have a most intelligible explanation of the hitherto inexplicable phenomena of spectral illusions, which never can be satisfactorily referred to organic actions, differing from common recollection or reconception, merely in degree. An artist's recollection of an individual may be so vivid and accurate, as to enable him to paint a miniature or portrait from memory, but he labours under no delusion as to the origin of his sensations, whilst another, refers an almost formless and colourless phantom, to an external cause. If this theory then be correct, it is only in sleep, and in disease, that the faculties which discern external qualities become active without the presentation of an external object, and convey impressions to the *organs* of the senses with which they are connected. The perceptions arising from the senses of smell and taste, seated in the *median line*, must perhaps be regarded as simple. In the same way as the presentation of a particular object, which has anteriorly occupied a place in a field of view, has a tendency to recall the whole of the picture, so probably the re-reception of an impression by Individuality from one of the *organs* of the senses, has a tendency to cause the recurrence of the impressions closely allied to it (in time), either as pre-existent or successive.

*Organ of Love-of-Liberty, or Independence of Controul.—
Sense of personal Rights.*

Before proceeding to treat of Love-of-Liberty as a primitive emotion, it becomes necessary to consider the correctness of the supposition, which attributes its origin to the joint operation of Firmness and Self-esteem, an opinion the source of which is probably to be traced to the want of clear and definite ideas as to the nature of these faculties, more particularly as to that of Firmness; and in order to effect the required object, a brief examination of these faculties themselves, becomes desirable.

A particular obscurity has been supposed to hang over the precise function of Firmness, with which to me it has never appeared invested. I regard its function to be the origination of a simple desire *to persist in all resolves*—and these as the only objects, or rather mental affections, with which it has any relation. When deliberating on an act, unconnected with any previous determination, Firmness is quite quiescent; but the moment the weight of the impulsions, *pro* or *con*, contributed by the faculties, whose desires are interested in the action under deliberation, are summed up, and the *balance* struck by the executive organ, the weight of Firmness is added to the *amount*; and in all future deliberations on the same question, Firmness is a party interested, and contributes its whole influence in favour of the original decision. Thus we often hear persons observe, “Had I known this before, it would have changed my decision, but having *once decided*, I shall not alter.”*

Self-esteem may be defined to be a faculty, which originates a “Sense of personal importance or superiority.” When small, *diffidence* is the result; when large, *self-confidence and conceit*.

To contrast my notions of Firmness and Love-of-liberty—Firmness desires to act in a certain way, *because it has been previously resolved to do so*—Love-of-liberty, *because the resolve emanates from the unrestrained deliberation of the faculties of the individual*. Firmness desires to adhere to resolves once taken, uninfluenced by changes which may subsequently take place in the desires of the other faculties, and which had they occurred anteriorly to the resolve being formed, would have modified its character. Love-of-liberty, on the contrary, rather desires to be always free to follow the impulses of the moment

Self-Esteem I regard as equally as incompetent as Firmness, to generate a Love-of-liberty *per se*; it may incline an individual to reject the advice of others, or even feel a sense of mortification at

* I need scarcely advert to the evils which would result, were man so constituted as to have no tendency to follow a particular line of conduct from having once determined on it, but to be perpetually ready to redeliberate; all persistency of conduct would be lost, and men would waver in their choice of two evils till they suffered both to overtake them.

being dictated to by another ; but this will be either from inferiority being thus implicated, or with reference to loss of rank, precedence, or power, and a great part of the irritation the loss of these occasions, must also be attributed to another organ. In short, I consider *the tendency to maintain the rights believed to be possessed, —and the tendency to believe the rights possessed, very extensive* to be essentially distinct faculties ; and if I mistake not, those who are conscious of aspirations for pure liberty, will decide that the emotion has no connection with wounded feelings of Self-Importance.

I have now passed in brief review the functions of the organs of Firmness and Self-Esteem, and as an individual I profess myself entirely unable to comprehend how a love of freedom of action *per se*, can be compounded out of any quantitative admixture of two emotions, so qualitatively distinct ; but if any one, by taking a more extended view, and comprehending considerations which I have omitted, can explain the (to me,) apparent anomaly, I shall gladly become a pupil.

The next department of the subject which presents itself to be considered is, how far that relation subsists between the *desire of liberty—and a sense of personal importance and disposition to firmness*, which ought to be met with, on the supposition that the former feeling, is the result of the two latter ; and as far as I am capable of appreciating character, there appears to be little, if any, proportion between them. Do we not see the most self-sufficient, conceited, and presumptuous individuals, become the most abject, cringing, and servile, when it suits their purpose, and ready to bow themselves in the dust, before those whom they regard as immeasurably their inferiors ; whilst the diffident and the unassuming, those who are distrustful of their own powers, to a failing, often manifest a noble sense of independence, which never allows them to debase themselves, or stoop even to those they regard as immeasurably their superiors in every respect but as free men ? I have not yet observed united in the same individual, such a broad and striking contrast between the activity of Firmness and Love-of-liberty, as between that of the latter and

Self-esteem, though I believe myself to have seen cases which presented very considerable differences of degree.

I believe the emotion of Love-of-liberty to be originated by the *middle third* of the portion of brain now assigned to Self-esteem and Firmness; thus separating these organs from each other; and have made an extensive number of observations on its development, confirmative of this opinion, without meeting with any opposed to it. As far as can be judged from a cast with the hair on, Self-esteem appears to have been *moderate* in Spurzheim, and Love-of-liberty, and Firmness *large*.

In this essay I have attempted to show (as clearly as the limits to which its length is necessarily confined will allow,) that the emotion of Love-of-liberty is essentially distinct in *kind*, from either that of Firmness, or Self-esteem,—and that observation proclaims, that the feeling is manifested without relation to the activity of these two faculties; and I have also recorded my belief, that a connection exists between the vigour of the manifestation of the feeling, and the development of a particular portion of the brain; but with reference to this opinion on the seat of the organ, as well as any other I may express, I have no desire that any weight should be attached to it, but rather, that it should be regarded as a mere suggestion, till confirmed by induction from an amply adequate number of observations. Those who choose to regard the conjectures of others as undoubted truths upon insufficient grounds, either from being too indolent to examine the evidence in their support—from an innate tendency to credulity—or from a weak and silly disposition to venerate authorities to the neglect of facts and arguments—have only themselves to blame for the errors they may fall into.

Internality, or Reflex Intellectual Consciousness.

There is not a single point of view under which we can compare the mental features of individuals, in which they present more striking points of contrast, than with reference to their tendencies and capacities, for occupying themselves with the consideration of *Moral, or Physical, Science*. Whilst some possess an active consci-

ousness of all that passes within them—make the operations of their own minds one of the principle objects of their attention—and often recur in conversation to their individual experience of emotions—the attention of others is wholly occupied with external things—they appear to require to have material objects as a *substratum for their ideas*—and to be almost incapable of separating a quality from the substance in which it inheres, and making the former *per se*, an object of contemplation. One class dwell, in short, in an *external*, the other in an *internal* world.

A distinguishing tendency in those in whom I suppose this faculty to be powerful, appears to me to be a fondness for analysis, and great facility in detecting errors of definition. All general, vague, and indeterminate notions, are a source of annoyance to them, they habitually take what appears to others, an almost unnecessarily, elementary view of things, and never lose sight of the fact, that the greater number of subjects on which men employ their minds, are complex ideas, made up of a number of simple ones comprehended under a general term, and by this habit of constantly regarding general terms, as bundles of simple ideas, rather than as homogeneous units, and endeavouring to resolve them into their ultimate elements, their thoughts acquire a precision, which saves them from entering into those fruitless discussions, which do not go beyond words. A large proportion of the most violent controversies which have distracted mankind, have arisen from the two parties of disputants not attaching the same ideas to the same word; for instead of clear ideas, the greater part of men possess only indefinite notions, concerning which, they nevertheless, make the most positive affirmations and negations, with a dogmatism, proportionate to their ignorance of the exact number, and precise value, of those primitive ideas, they intend to include, under the general terms they make use of.*

* After having sought in vain for two years to find a distinct acknowledgement of the particular species of capacity I believed myself to have noted, I was agreeably surprised to find the following satisfactory recognition of the faculty, by an author whose writings are *perfect* of their kind, and evince in every page most unequivocal indications of its activity.

“Although Mr. Ricardo possessed remarkable logical powers, he seems

In individuals who manifest the mental peculiarities referred to, I have observed a uniformly full development of that portion of the forehead on the medial line, which is now regarded as forming the upper part of Eventuality and lower part of Comparison. When very prominently developed, the centre of convexity appears to be about the level of the foot of Causality, and the lower edge describes a semicircle, the extremities of which overlap the inner third of the lower edge of Causality, and appear to lose themselves in that organ. I have never seen the upper edge of this organ defined, except negatively, by the angular outline of Comparison above it, or that portion of it in contact with Causality, except by this latter organ being singly prominent.

I wish particularly to remark, that the mental characteristics of which I have been treating, have been observed by me in individuals who have possessed Causality well developed, conjointly with the proposed organ of Internality, and that although I have seen cases in which this organ has been largely developed, and Causality but moderately, I have never had an opportunity of making myself acquainted with the mental peculiarities of the parties ; but nevertheless, having repeatedly seen Causality largely developed, without being able to recognise any determinate desire for metaphysical disquisitions, I conclude such desire to be specially connected with Internality. I do not impugn the utility of Causality to a metaphysician, because I regard it as an organ as indispensable to a philosopher, as Ideality is to a poet.

to have been less gifted with analytical subtilty ; and hence his writings furnish an instance of what the observer of the human mind must have frequently seen exemplified, that the strongest powers of reasoning are an insufficient security against gross error, if unaccompanied by that incessant analysis of terms and propositions, and that intense consciousness of intellectual operations, which are the properties of a metaphysical genius."—*"NATURE, MEASURE, AND CAUSES OF VALUE," by the Author of Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions.*

This same author, looking beyond the definition of value with which preceding political economists have contented themselves, viz., "the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of an object conveys," speaks of it as a mental affection, and not a quality of external objects.

It employs itself in drawing general laws, but the particular subject on which it employs itself, is determined by the development of other organs; combined with Language, it produces the philosophic philologist; with Individuality, the philosophic student of natural history; with Eventuality, the philosophic historian; with Individuality and Eventuality, the philosophic physiologist; and with Internality, the philosophic metaphysician, who will either test the conclusiveness of his speculations by an appeal to observation, or rely solely on his individual consciousness, according as the organ is associated with Individuality and Eventuality, or singly developed.

If it be said, that the function of the organ I have endeavoured to describe, may be resolved into the discrimination of differences; and that this has been long attributed to the organ of Comparison, of which my conjectured organ forms only the lower part, I shall ask whether—the tendency to suggest analogies founded on general and superficial resemblances, having no pretensions to a philosophical character—and that tendency which demands the most rigid precision, in the use of terms, takes an almost ultra-elementary view, of all propositions submitted to it, and never rests satisfied till it has acquired the most definite knowledge of the value of every complex idea, contained in them—can be referred with probability, to one and the same organ. When differences of function, so decided, exist, in union with differences in the development of separate portions of the brain, are the two portions to be confounded in one organ, because they happen to be placed in juxtaposition with each other?

Having now endeavoured, as fully as the limits to which I am necessarily confined on this occasion will permit, to describe certain mental phenomena, which appear to me to belong to a faculty, not at present recognised, I shall proceed to offer a few conjectures, though with great distrust, of their correctness, on the special function of the faculty.

I am disposed to regard it, as a faculty originating the *idea* of Perception—having for its object—the operations of the other powers—and recognising the existence of Emotions and Percep-

tions, and appreciating their qualities, in the same way as Individuality perceives the existence, and appreciates the qualities, of external objects.

The elements of all human knowledge, consist of a limited number of *particular* Emotions and Perceptions, each of a definite character—together with a capacity of considering these, under a limited number of *general* points of view, each of a definite character, viz. as Existing—as Singular or Plural—as Co-existing or Associated—as Wholes—as related in Time and Space—as undergoing Motion or Change—as Analogous (figuratively)—as having certain necessary Dependencies; and lastly as Perceived—Desired—Willed.* The faculties however which regard the impressions of others, under these definite points of view, (the three last excepted), appear to be exclusively occupied with their particular objects, to the exclusion of any attention to their own functions. They regard *external things*, as *Existing—Co-existing—Changing*, &c., whilst Internality regards *Existence—Co-existence—Change*, &c., as *Existing*. To illustrate my idea of the difference of function, I shall observe, that animals have, doubtless, perceptions of external objects, and seek, or reject them in consequence; but it may be questioned, whether they have any perceptions or conceptions, relative to the act, or mode, of perceiving. It appears to me, that the perceptions of Individuality, (for example,) with relation to an object, terminate with a knowledge of its outward presence, and that the idea of the act of perceiving, is framed by Internality, and strictly speaking, I

* The great error of metaphysicians generally, seems to have been in occupying themselves almost exclusively with the consideration of the *general* conceptions, to the almost total neglect of the *particular* Perceptions and Emotions. Different metaphysicians differ much in their enumeration of the primitive conceptions. Kant, who on many points, is considered to have taken a step much in advance of his predecessors; besides, many of the above, includes in his list of categories, Affirmation and Negation—Possibility and Impossibility—Necessity and Contingency, and some others, all of which appear to me to be capable of decomposition. May not *Affirmation*, for instance, be resolved into *Existence* on the part of the thing asserted, and an *Action* (Motion and Volition) on the part of the assertor; and does not a clear perception, that an Effect CANNOT exist without a Cause, necessarily include a conception both of Impossibility and Contingency, and consequently of their opposites.

regard the general idea of Existence, not as a conception of Individuality, but as a conception framed by Internality, from contemplating the mode of being affected of this organ;—a conception applied to that *general inseparable attribute* of all causes of affections of Individuality, by virtue of which attribute, such causes, have the power of producing such affections,—and extended afterwards by analogy to immaterial things. This definition is I am aware a very imperfect one, as all definitions of simple ideas necessarily must be, for definition being, properly speaking, the explanation of a term by an enumeration of the simple ideas of which it is composed, terms that stand for simple ideas, can only be adequately represented by synonymous words, which of course are insignificant to all those who have not already a knowledge of the idea.

To act aright, it is no less essential to see moral relations clearly and correctly, than to feel justly; and from the comprehensive and distinct view of all moral questions, which this faculty holds up before the minds of those who possess it large, I regard it as eminently conducive to the practice of morality. As a loadstone has a tendency towards iron, but is itself unconscious, so a large portion of mankind seem to resemble the loadstone, and to be swayed from the cradle to the grave by impulses of the existence of which they are unconscious. These are the individuals who suffer themselves to be attracted towards actions, on the qualities of which they never reflect. Those, on the contrary, in whom this faculty is powerful, have a more conscious exercise of the will, and *cæteris paribus* act less from instantaneous impulse. From being so constituted, as not to be able to avoid reflecting on the nature of their actions, when they do err, they generally err wilfully, and this perhaps explains why metaphysicians have been above the average of scientific men generally, in the rectitude of their conduct. The former class, also, from an insufficient appreciation of the character of their acts at the time of commission, are constantly subjecting themselves to remorse, from the condemnation which their actual organisation passes on their conduct, when its tendencies are

fully understood; whilst in the latter on the contrary, comparatively little change taking place, subsequently to commission, in the aspect under which they view their actions, they are less subject to feelings of remorse, because their conduct is much more seldom widely at variance, from that which their organisation sanctions. The influence of Cautiousness in *contributing* to produce these latter varieties of character, is not of course, intended to be denied.

It may be deserving of serious consideration, whether this faculty, has not some special connection with the will; the present assemblage of phrenological organs presenting the aspect of a republic without an executive. Although animals desire external objects, and seek them in consequence, may it not be questioned, whether they have any conception of the existence, of such desires, or of the act of volition. Query.—Does Eventuality, or a special faculty, recognise the impressions of the other powers, only through the volitions they occasion; or in other words, solely with reference to the acts towards which they tend, whilst the emotions themselves, as existences, are recognised by Internality—the faculty of Volition attending to the affections, of the afferent fibres, which arrive at it from the separate organs—the faculty of Internality, either to the subsequent and consequent affection of the faculty of Volition, or to direct impressions from the individual organs themselves? It appears extremely improbable that the summing up, and balancing the impulsions of the separate faculties, which is the act immediately antecedent to *willing*, and which, together with issuing the mandate to *act*, to the nervous and muscular systems, appears to be the only active function of the faculty of Volition, should be performed by more than one organ. WILL may be defined to be, a desire produced in the “Faculty of Volition,” by the sum of the impulsions of the organs, in favour of an act, or volition, preponderating over those opposed to it. When the sum of the impulses of the contending parties is equal, there is no Will, but a state of equilibrium and indifference; no preference for one act, or volition, beyond the other, but merely balanced desires existing for both.

The strength of the Will, will be exactly proportionate to the weight by which the sum of the impulses of one party, exceed those of the other—whilst the weight of the whole impulses, will be determined by the number, size, texture, and state of excitement, of the organs apprised through the intellect of being interested in the question under deliberation.

I am aware that it is usual with phrenologists to state, that “the Intellectual Faculties when acting together, constitute Will,” but this appears to me, rather a vague notion adopted in default of a better, and as preferable to an explicit avowal of ignorance, than a conclusion arrived at, from any philosophical consideration of the subject. I would wish to inquire, whether it is meant to be inferred that such organs as Colour and Form, have a more intimate connection with the Will, than such organs as Amativeness and Adhesiveness, Firmness and Destructiveness, Acquisitiveness and Love of Approbation, and if it is not meant to infer that *all* the intellectual faculties have a special connection with the Will, let those which have, and those which have not, be specified. Let not phrenologists suffer themselves to be lost in vague generalities, nor seek to blind themselves to their own ignorance; but let them require definite and exact ideas. In the absence of positive knowledge, conjectures are useful, when regarded as mere proposed explanations which appear probable to the individual mind of the originator, and which are laid before the public to be received or rejected, as new facts may be brought to light; but mischievous, when assumed to be true, without anything approaching to satisfactory evidence, and given out to the world as the principles of a science.

Query. Does Individuality, (combining the impressions of the *particular* percepts), cognise *physical* qualities, as *external* existences; Internality, *mental* qualities, (Sensations) as *internal* existences; and Eventuality, situated between the two, combine and register, the successive affections (changes) which take place in the two organs, with perceptions of Time and Place; thus forming by its connective links, an Event—and remembering, not the *affections* of Individuality, and Internality, but the *fact of* certain affections having been experienced?

Man being unable to present the patterns of the *ideas of his Sensations*, conceived by Internality, to his fellows, in the same way as he can refer to the external objects, which are the patterns of the ideas of Individuality, would have had, (with the exception of Natural Language, and resorting to acts themselves), no power to convey his emotions to his fellows, without a faculty which made him feel, according to definite laws, a certain relation of analogy, between the *ideas of physical existences, mental sensations*, together with their respective modes of change or action—the office* of the organ of Comparison, which originates all metaphorical language, and thus bestows wings on the poet, and imparts clearness to the voice of the teacher.

In the origin of language, comparisons would consist of the employment of the signs of ideas, derived from physical sources, to express those derived from mental ones; but as language became enlarged, the terms invented to denote internal feelings, would become applied to the external world, and men would speak of inanimate objects, *mourning, rejoicing, loving, fearing, &c.* as well as of the mind *soaring*, the heart *breaking*, the soul being *torn and rent* with *conflicting* emotions, &c.; and the very close

* It is surely scarcely necessary to state, that real resemblance and difference, or the agreement and disagreement, between individual qualities of the same species, is appreciated by the faculties cognising such species of qualities. Comparison, in this sense, is in fact inseparable from, and included in, every act of perception, performed subsequently to the first presentation of the quality to the organ. If any one is able to conceive, that an individual may possess an acute perception of colour, without being able to perceive the *difference* between red and brown, or between different shades of the same colour—or an acute perception of pitch, without being able to perceive the difference between G sharp and F flat, or the resemblance between two G's sharp to each other, it is not to be doubted, but that he has attained that high range of intellectual vision, which will enable him to comprehend the probability of *loudness being appreciated by the organ of Comparison!!!*

“We are disposed to refer ideas of loudness to Comparison.”—EDITOR. *Phrenological Journal, New Series, No. 3, p. 275.*

“We have seen a few cases quite corroborative of the suggestion.”—EDITOR. *Phrenological Journal, New Series, No. 6, p. 194.*

Mr. Watson's opinion and conduct in this matter of *loudness* and *comparison*, partake so strongly of the ludicrous, as to be highly amusing, were it not for the reflection, that the same excessive, and all but incredible obtuseness of intellect, which suggested such a notion, and the same despicable vanity, which, (preferring *self* to the interests of science) refused to examine or retract it, render him in his present position, a serious stumbling block in the path of phrenological science.

correspondence in the spirit of different languages, and the fact, that literal translations of the metaphorical language of one nation, are readily understood by another, more particularly if the customs, habits, and natural history of the country are known, shows the innateness of the disposition which produces it, and the invariableness of the general laws by which it is governed; whatever slight modifications and idiosyncrasies may exist in individuals.*

* Individuals with large Comparison sometimes feel very definite analogies between ideas not generally felt to have any resemblance, as between colours and sounds, &c. ; and members of the same family often *agree* in the most exact and astonishing manner, in these felt associations. The laws which guide the faculty of Comparison in its operations form an interesting object of inquiry, though one which want of space forbids my entering into on the present occasion. It is certain, that it frequently classes things the most intrinsically dissimilar together; and perhaps the most general principle that directs it, is, capacity for producing similar mental affections—thus causes of pleasurable surprise—of astonishment and terror—or of luxurious enjoyment, may each class be compared *inter se*, though differing most widely in all other respects.

Actions are either the movement of *physical bodies* in Space, (with various rates of motion) thus assuming different relations—or the succession of *mental sensations* in Time. Motion in Space, considered as swift or slow, produces a greater or less change in the relation of physical existences in a given time; and the succession of ideas considered as a longer or shorter period intervenes between each, produces a greater or less change, in the relations of mental existences in a given time. Here we see the principle on which is founded the *felt* analogy, between *motion* and *distance* in Space, and *succession* and *duration* in Time; an analogy which furnishes a very numerous class of comparisons, and words applied in common, to both species of perceptions.

It appears to me, that personification, whether of *emotions*—*inanimate objects*—or *actions*, if strictly analysed, may be resolved into a species of Comparison, and that it ought to be attributed to this faculty, and not to Individuality as it has hitherto been. Personification is in fact generally resorted to, as a preparatory step to the employment of a metaphor, and perhaps ought to be viewed as the most essential part of it. Let any one consider, for example, the following specimens of each of the kinds of personification alluded to, all three taken from a single page, in the writings of that most imaginative of poets, Shelly.

“ And Sorrow, with her family of Sighs,
And Pleasure, blind with tears, led by the gleam
Of her own dying smile instead of eyes,
Came in slow pomp ;”

“ Afar, the melancholy thunder moan'd,
Pale Ocean in unquiet slumber lay,
And the wild winds flew around, sobbing in their dismay.”

“ Grief made the young Spring wild, and she threw down
Her kindling buds as if she Autumn were,
Or they dead leaves.”

The organs we have hitherto examined, important as they necessarily are, from informing us of the exact value of every single idea, and thus furnishing the materials of all knowledge: yet still consider objects and sensations, as isolated individuals, or at most merely as associated in Time and Place, or allied metaphorically, and man abandoned to their guidance alone, might possess a perfect knowledge of the events of the past, without drawing one single inference with regard to the future. Man has not however, been so abandoned: he possesses in Causality, a faculty which imbues him with a comprehensive conviction—that nothing can begin to be of itself—that, therefore the character of every being depends solely upon the character of the cause that called it into being—that consequently, similar causes produce similar effects—and hence springs the conception of general laws, and the idea of producing effects by artificial causes—the former the parent of Philosophy—the latter of the Arts.*

* It is perhaps not a little extraordinary, that one of the most celebrated of recent British metaphysicians, Dr. Thomas Brown, has attempted to resolve our notions of *cause* and *effect*, into mere *invariable antecedence*, and *sequence*. Cause, he observes, is “only another name for the immediate invariable antecedent of any event;” and he defines power to be “immediate invariable antecedence.” It is not, however, *INVARIABLENESS* of *antecedence* and *sequence*, but *NECESSARINESS* which is at the basis of our idea of causation; and I presume most will agree, that the words invariableness and necessariness, are the representatives in their minds of two essentially distinct ideas; if not, and there be persons who differ on this point, discussion between them becomes a nullity, since those only who attach similar ideas to similar signs, can mutually interchange them. If we recur to ultimate causes, we must recur to the Volition of the Deity for the existence of those primary and probably simple laws, which govern the universe; a knowledge of the least of which, may never be arrived at by a being so short-sighted as man; but these primary laws being once instituted by *Volition*, subordinate ones flow from them, by virtue of *instituted relations*, and these subordinate ones become, to all intents and purposes, *causes* for us, furnishing the *relation*—the *adaptation*—the *point of contact*—by means of which, things *operate* on each other, and it has been the intuitive conviction of the necessary existence of such causes, (deriving the existence of their power from invariable laws,) furnished by Causality, together with the intense curiosity to discover them, which have given birth to the sciences.

Power may be defined to be, *an attribute, or capacity, which certain bodies possess, of effecting an event, or change, in something else, by virtue of a law of Nature*, and so far is *immediate invariable antecedence* from being equivalent to our idea of it, that it is possible to *conceive*, (and this is quite sufficient for the argument) one event immediately and invariably succeeding another for countless ages, without regarding the two, as having the relation of cause and effect to each other; namely, by supposing the subsequent one, produced on each occasion, by a direct act of Volition on the part of the Deity; whilst

From observation, I have come to the conclusion, that a fine development of the whole of the middle part of the forehead and Causalty, (or at any rate the inner portion of it,) may exist, accompanied with the highest powers of discrimination, and a decided tendency to attend to the connections of Cause and Effect, with a great deficiency for comprehending at *one general view* the several relations of the different propositions in a long argumentative sentence.

In the longest train of direct reasoning, from inference to inference, the result is of course always virtually included in the first proposition, and many, who, from considering a proposition, can intuitively perceive a result dependent on it, which the generality would never discover, unless led to it step by step, are yet slower than these latter, in connecting the relation of the separate steps of a train of reasoning with each other, and with the conclusion.

From these considerations I am induced to conjecture, that a portion of brain at the upper and outer part of the forehead, performs an important part in logical operations, probably that of enabling the mind to contemplate many ideas, and their mutual relations at one view; a capacity which certainly, as far as my observation extends, bears no relation in individuals, to their ability for accurately discriminating the precise value of the separate ideas, on the relations of which, an argument is built up.* In short, a faculty appears to me necessary, the office of which, in reasoning, may be compared to that of the organ

on the other hand, if we suppose the Deity to have just instituted a new law of Nature, which has established a necessary relation between two events, by virtue of which, one, *must* invariably succeed the other, as long as this law of Nature remains in force: we should regard the former, as the cause, and the latter, the effect, the *first* time of their occurrence. There is then in our idea of power, a notion, that according to the existing constitution of Nature, something is endowed with an inherent capacity of producing an effect, without the assistance, or intervention, of any other thing. In labouring to prove, that no *being*, or *entity*, interposes between a cause, and its effect, Dr. Brown is surely fighting with a shadow.

* In a syllogism three relations have to be suspended before the mind, and I have seen females, by no means deficient in general intellectual acuteness, scarcely capable of *rapidly* comprehending one.

of Number in calculating, and should such a faculty exist, it probably contributes to give a talent for wit.

I regard the outline of Causality, as very correctly delineated on the Edinburgh bust. Many heads, however, in which the organ is not developed in this form, present two little round prominences about the position occupied by the middle and outer portion of the organ, when developed as marked on the bust. In such cases, is it a portion of the convolution of Causality, which is prominent, or is this convolution narrowed in breadth, and included between the prominence and Comparison? In some individuals with heads so organised, I fancy myself to have detected a peculiar tendency to search for, and discern *unity* in every thing—to comprehend individuals in classes—and to reduce particular to general laws—such a tendency, in short, as might be supposed to have given so determinate a direction to the labours of anatomists, of the school of Dumeril, and Geoffroy, Saint-Hilaire. I should however, be sorry to draw any inference, from the limited and imperfect observations I have yet made on this point; and merely allude to it, for the purpose of inducing other phrenologists to direct their attention to the subject. A fact also worthy of observation is, that in cases of partial imbecility, the horizontal and perpendicular lines of the forehead are seldom, if ever, well arched, whilst the upper and outer portions are often particularly prominent. Probably a long period will elapse, before we shall know enough of the causes which influence the developement of the brain, and the intensity of its action, to be able to account for this phenomenon.

In considering the lamentably little progress which has been made of late years in phrenology, it naturally becomes a subject for enquiry, whether this want of progression is to be attributed to there being little left behind to be discovered, or to some defect in the ability or industry of the cultivators of the science, and the methods they have adopted for its extension. I believe that the former supposition, cannot be for a moment, entertained,

by any one who takes an enlarged and comprehensive view of the subject ; and individually, I do not hesitate to express a very decided opinion, that the chief cause of a stationariness, which all must regret, is to be traced to the false, and exaggerated notions entertained and promulgated by phrenologists, with regard to the present state of perfection of their science, and more especially, to the absurd, and insane practice, of appropriating the whole surface of the head to the organs at present discovered, by stretching one into the other, not only without a shadow of evidence, but absolutely in defiance of the outline presented by Nature, in those very cases of extraordinary development, which led to the discovery of the functions of the organs. A connection, for example was discovered, between the tendency to Fight, and a circular elevation, just behind each ear, and also between the fondness for children, and two rounded prominences, just above the occipital spine—a space of about two inches, intervened between the extreme edges of these separate organs ; and a maxim often stated by phrenologists is, that an organ, when prominently developed, occupies a larger extent of surface than usually belongs to it, yet in delineating these two organs on the bust, instead of slightly contracting their limits, in conformity with the above rule, with a consummate folly unparalleled in the annals of any other science, they were extended till they met, in order that philosophers might see no unsightly chasms and vacancies, in the heads of the little images with which they amused themselves. It is really difficult to treat of a proceeding, so preposterous, and so inimical to the progress of knowledge, with common patience ; the aspiration for completeness or perfection which has prompted it, may be a very laudable feeling in itself, but when it is so altogether outruns discretion, as to have recourse to means so absolutely suicidal of its own objects, it becomes a curse, to the science about which it employs itself.

I regard the present arrangement of the organs, not only as not warranted by observation, and opposed to the analogy to be drawn from their respective sizes, but also at variance with what *I believe* to be the fact, viz., that many more than are now

recognised, are required to account for the varieties of mental character exhibited by mankind, and considering the extent to which the practice of extending them has been carried, I think there is every reason to believe, that if they were reduced within proper limits, full one-fourth part of the surface of the head would be unappropriated, and were this accomplished, phrenologists having their attention attracted by the vacant spaces, would be much more likely to discover the functions connected with them, than at present; the first step to knowledge, is, to be sensible of the extent of our ignorance.

PHRENOLOGY MUST BE PERFECTED BY INDIVIDUALISING EACH CONVOLUTION OF THE BRAIN, AND ATTACHING TO IT ITS APPROPRIATE ORGAN OR ORGANS; a result which never can be expected to be effected, as long as phrenologists content themselves with examining the exterior of the head; and still less by inspecting casts taken with the hair on. Let phrenologists reflect on the fact, that the extent of the surfaces of the organs do not bear any invariable proportion to each other—that an organ, the development of which, is *large*, is often very slightly more prominent than its neighbour, which may be only *moderate*—the *large* size of the one, being principally shown by its surface being more expanded than usual—and the *moderate* size of the other, by its being more than usually contracted; let them consider, that in such cases in order correctly to estimate the development of the organs, it is necessary narrowly to notice the *degree* of convexity of their surfaces, and the situation of the point at which the greatest concentration of brain takes place, and *vice versa*—and they will be convinced, that except for demonstrating the intellectual faculties, and the relative development of the different regions of the head, casts taken with the hair on, are next to worthless. Notwithstanding the parade phrenologists make of the *number* of specimens contained in their museums, from the unsatisfactory and futile practice of taking casts with the hair on, together with the meagre details possessed of the conduct of the individuals, a very large proportion of the contents of existing phrenological collections,

are in reality little better than rubbish, and valuable only in the eyes of individuals of heated imaginations. One hundred casts of the brains and skulls of such individuals as Bentham, Napoleon, Shelly, Goethe, Fichte, or Schelling, whose names would constitute a sufficient description of their characters, would afford more materials for advancing the progress of phrenology, than all the present phrenological museums united, the skulls and casts of skulls they contain excepted.

MENTAL ORGAN.—A portion of cerebral matter, originating a sensation in common—a bundle of cerebral fibres, which jointly manifest a distinct species of mentation.

SPECULATIVE SYNOPSIS OF MENTATION.

AFFECTIVE.	INTELLECTUAL.
Amativeness	Organ and Nerves of Temperature
Love of Life	————— Tangibility
Selfishness	————— Resistance
Gustativeness	————— Odour
Impulse to Seize	————— Taste
————— Destroy	————— Hearing
————— Contend	————— Sight
————— Hoard	Perception of Intensity of Sound
————— Conceal (<i>a</i>)	————— Articulation
Attachment for Partner	————— Timbre
————— Children	————— Pitch
————— Friends	————— Natural Language, or
————— Residence	Expression of Sounds
————— Customary Impres-	————— Intensity of Light (<i>c</i>)
sions	————— Colour
Love of Approbation	————— Inclination of Right
Love of Distinction	Lines
Self Esteem	————— Curves of Curved Lines
Love of Liberty	————— Natural Language, or
Love of Power (<i>b</i>)	Expression of Forms (<i>d</i>)
Firmness	————— Distance

Conscientiousness	Sense of the Direction taken by the
Disposition to anticipate Misfortune,	Body during Locomotion (<i>e</i>)
to brood on the Melancholy and	————— Rate of Motion
Gloomy	Conception of Time
Love of Security, Certainty—Delibe-	————— Space
rateness	————— Order
Love of Pleasure, producing tendency	————— Number
to <i>present</i> enjoyment	Individuality
Disposition to regard the Past	Eventuality
————— Future.	Comparison
Hope	Causality
Marvellousness	Internality
Veneration	
Benevolence	
Constructiveness	
Love of Completeness, producing with	
good Intellect, Love of Knowledge	
Ideality	
Creativeness	
Imitateness	
Sense of the Incongruous	

NOTES.

(a) I think it may be questioned, whether the impulse to conceal, is the only element requisite to form a cunning, or would-be-cunning character. Some manifest an intense inquisitiveness, together with a very determinate disposition and capacity, to pry into the motives of others; and I doubt whether observation does not show, that this trait of character is not manifested exactly in proportion to the tendency to conceal; and also, whether the addition of intellect to the latter, is sufficient to account for it.

(b) Is Power, which is so manifestly pursued by mankind, sought solely as a means of distinction, or for the sake of the command which it gives over the comforts and luxuries of life? I am inclined to answer this question in the negative, and believe a love of power *per se*, to be discernible.

(c) All our knowledge of Form which we obtain (through

sight) without contemplating objects in profile, is obtained through the instrumentality of this faculty. A deficiency of it may very possibly have contributed to Gall's very weak memory of persons, though it can scarcely be doubted, but that he also possessed little power of recognising features seen in profile; or so acute an observer, could not have failed to have noticed, and drawn inferences from such a distinction. Vimont reproaches Gall, for employing so exclusively *outlines* in his delineations, to the exclusion of shaded plates; but it is highly probable that the latter, were unappreciable by his organisation. I have met with persons to whom such plates conveyed little or no information, and who have been at a loss to imagine how the development of organs could be represented in them; and who, even after this has been pointed out to them, have never been able to *see* the planes and convexities, but have merely learnt to regard the *light* shades as an indication of "*prominent*," and the *dark*, of "*depressed*," obtaining much the same ideas from a shaded drawing, as they would from an unshaded outline, with these words imprinted on different portions of its superficies. Such persons never regard shaded plates as satisfactory, and if not sufficiently imbued with a conviction of the allowance which must be made for the idiosyncrasies of individuals, to be too wise to require from others, an agreement in mental perceptions with themselves, would be disposed to retort Vimont's censure of Gall, upon its author; and for an opposite cause. I have observed a very full development of the portion of the brain at present assigned to Weight, more particularly the lower part of it, in many living artists, and in many portraits of painters; especially those of the Flemish school; and a defective development of this part, in one or two cases of defective perception of *light* and *shade*. Reasoning from analogy on its function, I should certainly never have conjectured, that the sense of Weight occupied its present locality; I fully however subscribe to the doctrine, 'that one fact is more decisive than one thousand speculative opinions,' and mine in this case, may probably be the result of ignorance. A delicate sense of *resistance*, seems also essential to artists; so that perhaps some

will regard my observations on painters, as confirmative of the correctness of the present locality assigned to Weight.

(*d*) I omit to speak of Form as a primitive faculty, because a Form may consist of right lines; and I have convinced myself, by repeated observations, that a great talent for portrait painting and sculpture may exist, with a very deficient perception of the shape of spaces enclosed by right lines.

There seems no difficulty in conceiving that a most acute perception of Form may exist, without an equal capacity for appreciating the expression resulting from certain combinations of Form; this appears a higher faculty, a *perception of relation*. A bad profile may be infinitely less like an individual than a good caricature, though having a much closer approximation in actual form. In short, I believe expression of Forms (constituting the talent for physiognomy) must be regarded as a perception altogether *sui generis*, and I am not aware that anything approaching to satisfactory *argument* or *evidence*, has ever been adduced in support of a contrary opinion. It certainly will be a very extraordinary fact, if it should prove, that the individual who first observed a relation between particular *forms* of the head, and particular mental capacities, was excessively deficient in the power of discriminating Form; and this must be admitted to be the case, if it be once decided, that the appreciation of the expression of the countenance, and of Form generally, are identical perceptions.

(*e*) The perception of the Inclination of right lines, (appreciating angles and triangles) — Distance — and Sense of the direction taken by the body during locomotion — with a general tendency to observe the relations of objects in space — seem to be the elements which go to form the complex capacity, attributed to the organ of Locality. Few intellectual tendencies, are more frequently determinately exhibited, than a disposition to observe the relative position of objects. Ferguson, when a farmer's boy, lying on his back in the fields, and taking the position of the stars by means of sliding glass beads on threads, is a striking and interesting example of its activity. In a case of very unusual development of the whole mass of brain in the region of

Locality, I heard the individual humourously observe, that if the stars were blotted out from the sky, and he could reach, he would undertake to mark out the correct situations of all the principal ones. Many persons are so defectively endowed with the 'sense of the Direction of the line described by the body, during locomotion,' as to be almost totally unconscious of any change in the direction of their route, without it describes an angle, or very abrupt curve; and may be led round a circle of two or three miles diameter, without discovering but that they are progressing in the direction in which they first set out, till they reach their journey's end. Having seen several cases in which the lower part of the organ of Locality, was *apparently* well developed, whilst the 'sense of the direction taken by the body during locomotion,' was very defectively possessed; I regard it as probable that this capacity, is seated in the upper portion of the organ.

To have local memory, in the highest state of perfection, comprehending the power of recollecting bushes, and other individual objects, when not isolated, a good endowment of the organ which receives the impressions of the optic nerve, and of Individuality, are, it may be presumed, also required.

Probably, it is by means of the 'sense of direction taken by the body during locomotion,' that animals are enabled to perform such astonishing feats, with regard to returning to their homes, from a great distance. Men possess this power in very different degrees; but all perceive the direction of motion when rapid, and from the law of motion, that moving bodies have a tendency to continue moving in right lines, such a capacity is indispensable for their safety. We have only then to suppose, this capacity possessed to a *much greater extent*, by animals, to account for their extraordinary talent just referred to. A sense of the direction of the line described by the body during locomotion—a sense of the rate of Motion, and of the elapse of Time, are all that are required, to give an animal the most exact notion, both of the relative position, and distance, of any two places, between which he may be conveyed; and when we reflect that the organ of Time performs its duty,

not only during the most absorbing attention to other ideas, but even in some individuals during sleep, such a supposition will perhaps appear less improbable. It seems more consistent with philosophy, to attempt to explain the phenomenon by analogy, and to refer it to a faculty possessed in common by man and animals, though differing greatly in *degree*, than to account for it by attributing to animals, a power differing in *kind*, from any with which man is endowed—such as a “sense of the direction of the poles of the earth, by the passage of currents of the electric fluid,” or any other conception adequate to solve the enigma. The supposition that there can be any gradual variation in quality, in the air of different districts, sufficiently permanent and appreciable, by the olfactory organs of animals, to enable them to travel long distances by its guidance, appears an explanation highly improbable.

T. S. PRIDEAUX.

RYDE, MARCH, 1840.

LAST OF THE REJECTED ADDRESSES, *vel* ‘LUCUBRATIONS’ SENT
TO THE JOURNAL, NOV. 1838.

Remarks on “Facts in contradiction to Mr. Hytch’s Views on
the Function of the Organ marked ‘?’”*

Mr. Combe observes, “The reverence for antiquities and the ‘love of the past,’ have already been referred, on good grounds, to Veneration, and Mr. Hytch does not mention the state of that organ in his cases.” Mr. Combe does, however mention the size of the organ in the examples he cites, and singularly enough, in his anxiety to attach the feeling of the sublime, to the portion of the brain marked ‘?’, he appears to overlook the fact, that the conclusion to be drawn from two of the three cases he refers to, is opposed to the opinion given immediately

* Should not this article have been headed, “Facts in contradiction to Mr. Hytch’s observations in support of J. K.’s views, on the function of the organ marked ‘?’”—See *Journal*, No. IV., *New Series*, p. 412.

before, as to the validity of the grounds for referring "love of the past," to Veneration. "In Bath," says Mr. Combe, "I met Dr. —, who has *large Veneration*, and the organ '?' large, with deficient Cautiousness, and moderate Ideality. He told me that he had little pleasure in the beautiful, but is entranced by the sublime. He is very strongly religious, but I heard *nothing of any distinguishing love of the past*. Yesterday, I met Dr. P., in whom Ideality is rather small, the organ '?' large, and Cautiousness not so large. He said, that he was deeply affected by the sublime, and not strongly by the beautiful. *Veneration was well developed, and he did not give any indications, in a long conversation, of a mind that dwelt on the past, but the reverse.*"

Considering the great latitude allowed by Mr. Combe, to the function of an individual faculty, as evinced in his assigning the "love of place," and the "desire and capacity for concentrating intellect, and feeling," to one organ, I am not surprised at his supposing the "love of the past," to be an appendage of the organ of Veneration. Such an opinion however, seems to me quite at variance with the special nature of the individual powers, a primary principle of phrenology; and in analysing mental manifestations metaphysically, there is scarcely a feeling, the independent existence of which, appears to me more clearly demonstrated, than that of the "tendency to dwell on the past."

As however, the conclusions of individuals are, and ought to be, regarded as most unsatisfactory evidence for others, let us examine for a moment the function of the organ of Veneration, supposing Mr. Combe's views to be correct. Veneration then, must be defined to be, "an organ, originating a disposition to Venerate, without directing this disposition to any particular object, except in one single instance, and this single instance of exception, is, that it gives the Venerative tendency, a determinate direction towards the past." Now I think it will hardly be necessary to peruse this definition a second time, to perceive that such a heterogeneous function, is quite inadmissible as the office of a primitive faculty. Facts, however, must decide the

question at issue, and Nature must be appealed to as the umpire, and I do not hesitate to say, that all except those, who “trouvent trop difficile l’abnégation de leurs opinions, et de leur savoir puisé dans l’instruction antérieure, pour se croire obligé de les soumettre à une expérience, mille, et mille fois répétée,” may readily convince themselves, that a powerful “tendency to dwell on the past,” is often coexistent with a small organ of Veneration, and *vice versa*.

With regard to the specific nature of the mental faculty in question, I was at one time disposed to think, that it partook decidedly of a poetic character, but from more extensive observations, particularly on individuals deficient in Ideality, and of mediocre intellect, I am inclined to believe, that its special function is limited to producing the “tendency to recur to, and dwell upon, the past, accompanied with an emotion of a peculiar character, which of course must be felt, to be understood. Acting however in combination with the “sense of the beautiful,” and the “disposition to the marvellous,” I conceive the “love of the past” to be, if not a necessary ingredient in the poetic talent, at least a most ornamental addition to it. If we suppose a poet indulging his favourite penchant on the site of a ruined castle by moonlight, after the first bursts of impassioned feeling called forth, by the beauty of the scene, have been given vent to, and the good and evil genii, with which his fancy has peopled the locality, severally apostrophised, we naturally expect to hear him recur to those by-gone ages, when the now deserted ruin which silently reposes in the moonlight before him, was the abode of gentle knights, and courtly dames, and when the deep stillness which now pervades its precincts, was broken by the measured tread of the warder, or the midnight revels of the stalwart baron, and his noisy retainers. Indeed, I believe it will be found, that many of the most admired passages of our best poets, have been penned under the joint influence, of this feeling and Ideality. The pages of Ossian teem with its manifestations; its activity is strikingly displayed in Scott, and Byron thus distinctly recognises its existence.

“ Hues which have words, and speak to ye of heaven,
 Float o'er this vast and wondrous monument,*
 And shadow forth its glory. There is given
 Unto the things of earth, which *time hath bent*,
 A spirit's feeling, and when he hath leant
 His hand, but broke his scythe, there is a power
 And magic in the ruined battlement,
 For which the palace of the present hour
 Must yield its pomp, and *wait till ages are its dower.*”

With regard to the seat of the feeling, which “disposes to dwell upon the past,” the evidence I have yet been able to obtain, is far from sufficiently conclusive, to enable me to speak with decision. I am, however, inclined to refer it to the portion of brain before, and above, the organ marked ‘?’†

* The Coliseum.

† With referenc to Mr. Combe's views on the function of the portion of the brain marked “?”, I may here observe, that I have now before me a cast of the head of a gentleman, which I took in consequence of the unusual developement of this organ, which it presents. Not only is there a decided protuberance at the part, but the head is considerably wider there, than at Cautiousness—a rather unusual circumstance. I am intimately acquainted with this individual, and during a long intimacy with him, have never heard him drop a single expression, which would induce me to suppose that he was much affected by the sublime, but quite the reverse. His Veneration is not by any means large, and I believe him to possess less than an average endowment of the feeling; he, however, possesses a more than ordinary disposition “to dwell on the past.” I have heard him say, that he never passes a day, without looking back on the events of his past life; and he has observed to me that he has often noticed, that whilst he was particularly fond of recurring to, and conversing on, the incidents of his early days, some amongst his friends scarcely ever adverted to the subject. This gentleman's perceptive organs are large, except Eventuality, which with Ideality, Marvellousness, and the reflective organs, are but smally developed. If he has any predilection for the dreary, and the lonely, I believe it is only when they are associated with the past, as I never heard him express any partiality for them, beyond once observing, that it would afford him great pleasure to explore the subterraneous passages of an old castle, that had not been opened for ages. His locality is very large. I have shown him the extracts from Mr. Combe's letter, and the accompanying remarks, and questioned him as to his feelings, and in reply he informs me that he takes little or no delight in the wild, solemn, vast, or dreary, which I fully believe to be the case. Notwithstanding the love of the past is quite a feature in this gentleman's character, yet I very much doubt whether the feeling is manifested by him, with an energy proportionate to the unusual developement his head presents anterior to Cautiousness. [I have recently been led to adopt some novel views with regard to the function of this portion of the brain, and am at present endeavouring to collect facts on the subject, and I shall be much obliged to any phrenologist who will have the courtesy to inform me, through the medium of the journal, of Sheridan's developement at this spot.]

Whilst reporting cases, I will take the opportunity of observing, that I

I will conclude these remarks by observing, that in considering the evidence in favour of the existence of a primitive faculty in

an acquainted with a gentleman whose head presents a decided hollow at Veneration, and who manifests a corresponding deprivation of the feeling, but who nevertheless certainly displays a more than average predilection for the past, and objects of antiquity. He is a great admirer of Ossian, and acknowledges that his partiality for this author is much increased, by the remote period in which the poems are supposed to have been written, and the frequent allusions to past time they contain. This individual possesses a good development of the reflective organs, Eventuality, and Ideality, with average “?”, and moderate Marvellousness. The part of the head before, and above “?”, is fully developed in both these gentlemen, but does not present a defined protuberance in either. A work which has lately appeared, entitled “Letters from Ireland, by Charlotte Elizabeth,”* affords evident marks of excessive activity of the “love of the past,” combined with Veneration, in its authoress, and should any phrenologist be on terms of intimacy with this lady, I would invite his attention to her cerebral conformation.

With respect to Mr. Combe’s views on the beautiful and the sublime, I take this opportunity of remarking, that I have never yet met with a case in which great emotion was excited by the sublime, when the development of Ideality was defective; neither reasoning *à priori*, can I see any good cause for believing that the rapturous emotions, occasioned by the beautiful, and the rapturous, but more thrilling sensations called forth by the sublime, are not the offspring of one, and the same faculty. There can be no doubt but that idiosyncracies of the mental faculties exist, or in other words, that the constitutions of the primitive organs are modified in individuals; and I conceive that the supposition of congenital differences, together with the mutual influence of the faculties, is quite sufficient to account for the Ideality of one individual being more affected by the sublime, and that of another by the beautiful. A definite relation exists between external objects and the primitive faculties, and as the faculty of Configuration (or sense of persons) is charmed in one man, by a female figure, of an outline so softened as to partake of a languid character, and in another by a form more clearly defined, and an expression at once vivacious, and commanding; so I conceive that the Ideality of one individual may reap delight from the contemplation of a placid lake, and the grateful curves of the weeping willows which shade its margin; whilst that of another will derive more gratification, from the contemplation of a mountain torrent, and the rugged outline of the lightning scathed oak, which overhangs its waters.

* [A few days since meeting, in a bookseller’s shop, with a work entitled “Glimpses of the Past,” I was agreeably surprised to find the name of Charlotte Elizabeth on the title page, and opening the volume at random, my eye alighted on the following passage, “When my rambles bring me suddenly within view of some time-worn edifice—from which no part of England is altogether free—the sensations excited are indescribably strong. A chord is touched, that seems to awake an echo from every little cell of slumbering memory; and I am carried back to times and scenes, thoughts and feelings, wherein it is hard to say whether the painful or the pleasurable emotion predominates.” The following sentence occurs in the *first* page, “We walk as along a vista, where the onward prospect is wrapped in impenetrable darkness: but what we have already trod lies open, under a broad beam, inviting retrospection: and, to me at least, *every ensuing stage of the progress imparts an aspect of more mellowed loveliness to that which lies in the distance.*” T. S. PRIDEAUX, MARCH, 1840.]

the human mind, which disposes man to "dwell on the past," the fact, that there are several songs and ballads, as "The Light of other days," "Auld Lang Syne," &c., addressed almost exclusively to such a feeling, must not be lost sight of. I am disposed to attach considerable importance to it.

T. S. PRIDEAUX.

NOVEMBER 18, 1838.

AN EXTRACT FROM AN UNPUBLISHED ESSAY ON THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE EXTERNAL SENSES.

SINGLE CONSCIOUSNESS.—Many philosophers have occupied themselves in investigating this phenomenon, and various theories have been offered in its explanation. Some think that single consciousness is a power acquired by the sense of touch; but the capacity of every sense, for performing its function, depends upon the perfection of its individual organisation; and, in animals, whose eyes are perfect at birth, vision is also perfect, and requires no previous rectification, from the sense of touch, to see objects single. Moreover if single consciousness depended upon knowledge acquired by the sense of touch, why, in some positions, do we see an object double, with which we are previously acquainted, and which we know to be single; whilst in other positions, an object, seen for the first time, and of which we have no previous knowledge, is seen single. Sometimes also, in fungoid affections, of the orbit, objects are seen double, notwithstanding all previous experience to the contrary, plainly showing that, single consciousness, does not depend upon any acquired knowledge of the sense of touch.

Mr. Combe explains single consciousness, by observing, that "the perceptions of the mind, being always directed to the objects which make the impressions, and not to the instruments, by means of which they are experienced; the mental affection partakes of the unity of the object exciting it, and not of the duplicity of the organs, through which the impression is transmitted." The mental affections however, depend solely upon the

nature of the impressions transmitted from objects by the organs, and not at all upon the nature of the objects themselves, and the question to be decided is, "what is the cause of double organs transmitting only a single impression." Did we possess, previously to examining an object with our senses, an intuitive knowledge of its unity, this explanation might deserve to be taken into consideration, but as no such knowledge exists, it is evidently inadmissible. It presupposes in fact, the knowledge resulting from an effect, as an explanation of the cause, of the nature of the effect produced.

Dr. Gall explained single consciousness, by supposing that only one organ of a sense is active at the same time. "He distinguishes two states of activity in organs of the senses, calling one active, the other passive. The functions are passive, if performed independently of the will; the eye for instance, necessarily perceives the light which falls upon it, and the ear, the vibrations propagated to it. Now we perceive *passively* with both organs, says he; we see with both eyes, hear with both ears, but the active state is confined to one organ, and commonly to the strongest. We see with both eyes at the same time, but we look with one only; we hear with both ears, but we listen only with one: we feel with both hands, we touch with but one, &c."

Strictly speaking, however, the external senses are always passive, and merely transmit the impressions they receive; the difference between what Dr. Gall terms their active and passive state, is, that in the former, the mind is attending to their impressions, and in the latter, no. When defined with precision, then, Dr. Gall's explanation of single consciousness amounts to this, that the mind only attends to the impression of one of the organs of a sense at the same time. Admitting, for the sake of argument, this proposition to be correct, as an explanation of single consciousness, it is far from satisfactory, since it does not at all account for the single consciousness of passive impressions. Besides, it has already* been shown, that single consciousness is by no means invariably concomitant with attention, and also

* This alludes to a previous portion of the essay, which is omitted from not being intelligible, without the diagram which accompanies it.

that it is partly dependent upon physical causes, since, if we look at an object, we see nearer and more distinct objects double, but with this remarkable difference, that the right hand image, of the object beyond the point for which the eyes are adjusted, is seen with the right eye, and the left, with the left, whilst the right hand image of the nearer object, is seen with the left eye, and the left with the right.

Dr. Spurzheim does not consider Dr. Gall's explanation of single consciousness satisfactory, yet joins with him in believing that the mind only attends to the impressions of a single organ of a sense at the same time, an opinion he supports in conjunction with Dr. Gall, by the following experiment :—

“ In placing a pencil, or any other thin body, between us and a light, keeping both eyes open, and throwing the axis of vision, the stick, and the light, into a right line, did we look with both eyes, the pencil should occupy the diagonal, and its shadow fall on the nose. But this always falls on one eye, on that which the person who makes the experiment ordinarily uses, in looking with attention. If the pencil be kept in the same position, and the eye not employed in looking be shut, the relative direction of the objects will seem to remain the same ; but if he shut the eye with which he looked, it will be altered, and the pencil will appear removed far from its former place.”

In this experiment, Drs. Gall and Spurzheim seem to overlook the fact, that each eye has its separate axis of vision, which is a right line from it to the object inspected, and since the rays of light pass only in right lines, whether we look with one eye, or with both, it is equally impossible, that the shadow of any body, placed on the axis of either eye, can fall on the nose. When the eyes are directed to the light, the light is seen single, and the pencil double ; and whichever eye is closed, the change which takes place in the apparent relative position, of the three images, is the same. If the right eye be closed, the image of the pencil, seen by the right eye vanishes ; and the light, and the image of the pencil seen by the left eye, remain stationary ; and if the left eye be closed, the image of the pencil seen by the left eye vanishes, and the light, and the image of the pencil, seen by the right eye, remain

stationary. In the experiment before us, did we look with only one eye, upon the pencil being placed in the axis of the eye employed in looking, the light ought to appear entirely obscured behind it; and if, on the contrary, the pencil be placed in the axis of the eye not employed in looking, the light ought to appear with undiminished brightness, whereas neither of these conditions ever takes place, for whichever axis the pencil is placed in, the result is precisely the same, we are sensible of the interposition of a body, between us and the light, and sensible at the same time of being able to see the light behind it; indeed if a book be substituted for the light, we can read the print, behind both images of the pencil with equal facility, which is, I think, a strong proof that we look with both eyes.

“Let any one” continues Dr. Spurzheim, “look at a point but a little way distant, both eyes will seem directed towards it; let him then shut his eyes alternately. If he close the one with which he did not look, the other remains motionless; but if he shut that with which he looked, the other turns immediately a little inwards, in order to fix the point.

I have tried this experiment many times, but not with the same result. If the eye which is shut, be not closed very gently, the other is apt to give a slight convulsive start, but if the eye be closed very carefully, or a bit of card placed between it and the point looked at, the other remains stationary.

Dr. Spurzheim observes moreover, that “the eyes of many animals, are placed laterally, and cannot both be directed at once to the same object,” and concludes by remarking that, “the gestures of man and animals prove, that they look with one eye, and listen with one ear, for they direct one eye or one ear, towards the object to be seen or heard.”

Although in many animals, the eyes are undoubtedly placed in such a position as to preclude their both being at once directed to the same object, yet, I think, this fact by no means proves, that those animals whose eyes are differently situated, and who constantly turn both to the same object, look only with one eye. In man, and almost all large animals, the motions of the eyes are uniform, and they are both invariably directed towards the same

point, a fact which is I think almost conclusive in proving, that they are both simultaneously employed in looking. Since then, man directs both eyes to the object to be seen, his gestures must be admitted to be in favour of his looking with both.

With regard to hearing, it must be observed, that there is an essential difference between this sense and sight. To effect distinct vision, it is absolutely necessary that the eye should be directed to the object inspected; hence, could it be shown, that only one eye was turned towards this point, such a fact would be at once decisive, and prove that we only looked with one eye; but since, in order to hear distinctly, there is no necessity for the ear to be directed towards the object from which the sound is emitted, it cannot be inferred, that because both ears are not turned in the same direction, that we listen only with one. I admit, that faint sounds could be heard rather more plainly if both ears were turned towards the direction in which the impressions reached us; and if man possessed this power, and never made use of it, then, there would be some ground for supposing that he listened with only one ear, but since, he is not able to turn both ears in the same direction, no such inference can be drawn.

In opposition to the doctrine, that the mind only attends to the impressions of a single organ of a sense at the same time, and in support of the opinion that we look with both eyes, and listen with both ears, &c., it may be observed, that since we are scarcely conscious of passive impressions; were only one organ of a sense employed at the same time, we ought to be able to see as well with one eye, and hear as well with one ear, as with both, whereas, most undoubtedly, we can see much better with both eyes, and hear, beyond all comparison, better with both ears than with one, a fact which appears to me an unanswerable argument in favour of the opinion that both organs of the senses are simultaneously employed.

April, 1837.

T. S. PRIDEAUX.

