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THE BIBLE AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE.

BY

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THE BIBLE AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE.

The opponents of Woman Suffrage draw an argument against it from the Bible. Many of them regard the position of the Bible as clearly and directly antagonistic to it and as alone decisive of the question. Many of the friends of the cause are embarrassed by the claim.

I believe that it admits of demonstration, that the passages of Scripture relied upon by the opponents of Woman Suffrage, conceding all that they claim as to their meaning, and as to the permanency and universality of their application, have nothing to do with the question, and must be ruled out of the discussion for irrelevancy.

I make the attempt to show this not merely in the interest of Woman Suffrage, but of the Bible as well. The enemy of all good could not do a greater service to the cause of evil than by leading Christian men blindly to interpose the Bible as a barrier against every great social reform, so that when the reform triumphs, it shall seem to the unreflecting mass of men to be, not merely the defeat of the opposers of the reform, but the overthrow of the Bible also. This book is too precious, and a recognition of its authority too important to the world, for its friends and the friends of truth to expose it so unnecessarily to discredit. The Bible can be put to a better use, it cannot be put to a worse, than to be thrown into the street to help form a barricade against every attempt to overthrow old dynasties of wrong.

I have said that my argument would proceed upon a concession of all that is claimed on the other side, as to the interpretation, and permanency and universality of application, of the passages relied on. It will of course be understood that this is

conceded merely for the purposes of the argument. This concession must cover all that is claimed by those who go farthest in their adverse interpretation and application of these passages.

The scriptural declarations relied upon, consist in the curse pronounced on woman at the time of the fall, "Thy husband shall rule over thee," and in several passages in the New Testament, in which Paul repeatedly, and Peter once, enjoins on wives obedience to their husbands, and in which the former, in addressing the Ephesians and Collossians, enjoins on women to keep silence in the churches, and if they would learn anything ask their husbands; and in addressing the Corinthians enjoins on them not to pray or prophecy with the head uncovered; giving as the reason that it is a shame to a woman to have her head shorn and a shame to a man to wear long hair, that the man is the head of the woman, that the man was not created for the woman but the woman for the man, and that the woman was of the man and not the man of the woman.

The ordinary mode of disposing of these passages by those who would lift woman from the burden of them, is by saying—that the subjection, if imposed as a curse, would not seem to be an ordinance of nature, and that Christ came to remove the curse under which both men and women lay; that the injunctions of Paul as to keeping silence in the churches were evidently meant only for the particular churches addressed, inasmuch as he directs the women of one church to keep silence, and those of another not to pray or prophecy (preach) without having the head covered, two utterly inconsistent directions; that the rule that he lays down, that if a woman would learn anything she must ask her husband, is utterly repudiated by all Christian society, and women are freely admitted to institutions of learning; that the proposition that the man is the head of the woman as Christ is of the man and God of Christ, can have no political meaning whatever, if it really has any practical meaning, and especially that no superiority can be inferred by those who contend that Christ is the co-equal of God; that in stating that man was made first, and woman afterwards, he is only stating the understood historical fact, his inference that woman was made for man having no force as an argument, because she might have been made, as claimed on her side, as his equal companion; and that Paul's statement that woman was of the man, and not man of the woman, shows that he was

dealing only with the historical fact of her origin, the real fact in every case since having been directly opposite; and that the declaration of God at the creation, and the recorded history of that creation, are far better authority than Paul's obscure reasoning about them—the Almighty having said, in the day of creation, "Let us make man in our image, and let THEM have dominion," to which the inspired historian adds: "So God created man in his own image, male and female created he them," and again, "Male and female created he them, and blessed them and called their name Adam;"—all which the advocates of woman's equality say, shows that the equality of the sexes was the design of nature, and that Paul, in laying down certain rules of propriety for the churches of his day, was merely enforcing his directions by referring to certain current notions of the Jews, availing ^{himself} ~~themselves~~ of their hold on the popular mind, but not intending to endorse them as really sound in themselves, and especially not intending to give them a new sanction and a perpetual authority.

The question as thus stated is wholly one of interpretation and construction. But I propose in this argument to avoid all questions of interpretation, and take these passages as meaning precisely what the opponents of Woman Suffrage claim them to mean. It is, I think, a fair statement of that meaning in its utmost severity, that they declare, 1st, The subjection of the wife to the husband, and 2d, The duty of all women in religious matters of a public nature, not to make themselves prominent in any noticeable way; or, to take Paul's own language, to keep silence in the churches. And I am to be understood as conceding not merely this meaning of the passages relied on, but their continued force as practical directions, and their application to human affairs in all countries and through all time.

Now the question comes up, "What has all this to do with Woman Suffrage?" Very clearly the fact that she may not preach, and may not pray unless covered, has nothing to do with it. But what has her subject condition, her servient condition as we may term it, to do with it? The same Paul, in the same Epistle in which he enjoins submission upon wives, says also to servants, "Servants be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling." And Peter, in the same chapter in which he enjoins obedience upon wives, says also, "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle but also to the

froward." Can the subjection imposed upon the wife exceed that here imposed upon servants? And if the imposition of this subjection upon women was meant to be permanent and universal, that imposed upon servants in the same connection could not have been of temporary and limited application. And yet who ever thinks of claiming that a servant cannot vote? No proposition could be presented to the American people that would seem more absurd.

There is no better way to bring out distinctly the proposition that must be established by those who use the Bible against woman suffrage than that of presenting their argument in the form of a syllogism. This, it is true, is but a restatement of what I have already stated, but it brings the proposition into special distinctness, and such special distinctness of statement is necessary to those, and their name is legion, whose habits of thinking are careless and inaccurate.

I will take first and by itself, as most important, the argument from the subject condition of the wife. This argument in syllogistic form is as follows :

Major premise—Persons in a subject condition ought not to vote.

Minor premise—Married women are in a subject condition.

Conclusion—Therefore married women ought not to vote.

Here it is to be seen, 1st. That the major premise, the truth of which is necessary to the conclusion, is utterly unsound, inasmuch as servants are allowed to vote without objection ; 2d. That the minor premise, the truth of which is necessary to the conclusion, is admitted only for the purposes of the argument, and is open to controversy when independently asserted ; and 3d. That the conclusion is of little or no value, inasmuch as it leaves the case of unmarried women entirely untouched. As therefore a conclusion must in some manner be secured which will cover the case of all women, married and unmarried, we must enlarge our major premise, and as we do so we will add, to make the proposition complete, the preaching and praying disability. It will then stand thus :

Major premise—All that class of persons, of whom a part are in a subject condition, and all of whom are forbidden to preach, ought not to vote.

Minor premise—All women are of that class.

Conclusion—Therefore all women ought not to vote.

Here the conclusion is satisfactory, as it covers the whole

ground. And this conclusion cannot possibly be arrived at except by employing the premises proposed, and the absolute truth of both these premises is essential to the conclusion.

Now the minor premise, let it be observed, is admitted only for the purpose of the argument, and would have to be established in dealing with any person not so admitting it. But the major premise is as absurd a proposition as can well be conceived. Just think for a moment of presenting it to the intelligence of this age of common schools and common sense, as a self-sustaining proposition, that "the entire class of whom a part are in a subject condition (including, of course, all servants,) and who are forbidden to preach, ought, by reason of those facts alone, never to be allowed to vote." If any one will undertake to sustain this proposition before the people of this country, he must expect to encounter merely ridicule. And yet those who contend that the Bible is opposed to woman suffrage must sustain that proposition or abandon their ground.

But the opponent of woman suffrage may here say, and consistently, "I do not care to contend on Bible grounds against the mere act of *voting*, if the participation of women in political affairs could stop there. There may be a justice and propriety in allowing her, as a member of the body politic, and often a tax-payer, to vote for the men who shall rule the state and especially who shall lay and expend the taxes. But voting implies more. It implies *eligibility to office*, and political office often involves *political ascendancy*, and it is this aspiration after and possession of ascendancy, which the passages of Scripture relied on forbid."

Well, my candid opponent, I cheerfully take up the question precisely as you have presented it to me. But first let us see where we stand. Let us clear up the ground around us, so that we may see just how far we have advanced.

May I understand you then as conceding that, so far as any objection to mere voting is concerned, you no longer interpose the Bible against it? That is, that so far as any Biblical objection is concerned, you would take no exception to a law that should allow women to vote, but should forbid their holding office? You must either answer my argument or concede this. I understand you to concede it.

And now a word as to what we are to understand by office-holding. There are a great many offices that involve no political ascendancy, and which could be held by women to the great

benefit of the public service and with a reasonable profit to themselves. Shall I understand that you interpose no Scriptural objection to her holding these offices? If your objection to her office-holding generally is on the ground that she might thus be placed in a position of political ascendancy, which ascendancy alone is the thing forbidden, you of course would leave all other offices open to her. And it is to be observed that probably nineteen offices out of twenty involve no political ascendancy. Indeed the proportion must be much greater. May I understand then that a law would satisfy you that should give women the right to vote and to be eligible to all offices not involving political ascendancy? You must concede this if I have represented you fairly in putting your objection now wholly on the ground of the ascendancy involved in office-holding. And I have intended to represent you with all the fairness in my power; and besides, I know it to be the only ground that you can take.

But there is one point more to be settled in advance of the further argument. The subjection prescribed by Scripture is only of the wife to the husband. There is therefore no Scriptural objection to unmarried women holding offices that involve ascendancy. Shall I consider you as conceding this? I know that you cannot escape the concession in the position in which you stand.

The Biblical objection is therefore now limited to the holding by married women of offices involving political ascendancy. The objection as thus narrowed and made precise, I proceed to answer.

For convenience sake I will drop the matter of woman's disability as to preaching and praying, as it has little application to the subject, and an answer to the objection founded on her subject condition will cover the whole ground. The point now made by our objector rests of course on this Scriptural subject condition of married women. Now for the purposes of this argument I will assume that subject condition to be as extreme as any one has ever claimed; as extreme, I will say, as the English common law of two hundred years ago made it. Under that law and under the claims of some interpreters of the Bible, the man is the absolute legislator and ruler of his wife and household. He may not compel her to commit a crime, but he may compel her to serve his convenience or pleasure. If he wishes to sell his home and remove to another, and she is opposed to it, the house is to be sold. If she wishes her son sent

to college and he to the shop, the boy must go to the shop. If she wishes for flowers in the garden and he wishes for none, there must be none—always provided she cannot persuade him to comply with her wishes. No matter how unreasonable and unkind he may be in asserting his will, his will when asserted is law. Now all this power on the one hand and subjection on the other I admit for the purposes of this argument to be the ordinance of God. And I put the case thus strongly, not for the purpose of making the impression that all whom I am combating would go so far in theory, or that any of my opponents would approve anything that should approach to tyranny in practice, but that the case that I am to meet and overthrow may be the strongest that can possibly be put. For the more complete the Scriptural subjection of wives to the power of their husbands, the more that subject condition would seem to stand in the way of their holding offices that involve political ascendancy, and which may give them ascendancy over their husbands.

Now does it not occur to you, my candid opponent, that you have narrowed down the question till what is left on your side is hardly worth contending about? Married women will generally choose to stay at home. They have cares there that both require their constant attention and that hold their affections. And besides, if eligible to office, a woman could not get it without a majority of the votes of the district, and the voters would not be likely to vote for a woman who could not leave her home. And further, if she happens to have abundant leisure and the requisite ability, her husband very likely would assent to her taking office, and as the restriction upon her is simply for his benefit he can at any time waive it. The cases therefore of married women who aspire to office against the assent of their husbands, and who get the office, will be too few to be talked about; especially too few to make any reason for excluding all women, not only from all offices of ascendancy, but from all offices whatever, and from the right of voting too.

But I will meet this Biblical objection in every form in which it can be put. We will suppose that the subject condition, limited upon any interpretation of Scripture to married women only, extends to *all women*, and that all the offices of the State and nation are offices of *political ascendancy*. The rule to which the woman is subject must be still the rule of a husband; but we will consider all women as destined to be married, and

so as potentially under subjection. For the purposes of this argument I concede all this.

Now what is this dominion of the husband to which the wife is subject? It is too clear for argument that it is dominion *only as to family matters*. It is, we will call it, an absolute power, but only *within its jurisdiction*. It is the same exactly in this respect as the power of the father over the child, or of the master over the servant. The will of the father and of the master is law, *within their jurisdiction*. I may tell my servant to drive me east when he wants to go west, and my will is law. I may tell my servant to mow to-day and hoe to-morrow, and my will is law. But I may not command him to name his boy John when he wants to name him Peter. I may not command him to go to a Protestant church when he wants to go to a Catholic. Why? Because these last matters lie wholly out of my jurisdiction. I may tell my minor son to go to the post-office when he wants to go to play, and to spend his evenings at home when he wants to be in the street. But if, as is sometimes wisely done, the discipline of the school he attends is left to the scholars, and he happens to be on a jury to try some alleged offender, I may not command him to find the boy guilty, nor to find him not guilty. Why? Because that is his own matter and wholly beyond my jurisdiction. My wife may desire to be a Superintendent of a Sabbath School. Upon the theory of subjection which I have conceded I may have the right to say that she shall not do it; that I want her at home on Sundays to read or sing to me. But if I assent to her taking the place, I have no power to control her as to the lessons she appoints, or as to her discipline of the school. Why? Because it is wholly outside of any subjection that she is under to me. I may be a professor of Greek in a college, and my wife, with my consent, a professor of chemistry. I should have no right to direct her as to her mode of instruction. Why? Because it is wholly outside of my jurisdiction. My wife may own property in her own right, over which and the income of which I have no control. Fathers often leave property to their married daughters in that way. I should have no right to command her to make over the income to me; none to command her to sell the property and give me the proceeds. Indeed, laying all benefit to myself out of the case, I should have no right, simply because I thought it best for her, to require her to sell her property and invest it in some other manner.

My wife may be an executor or trustee, but I would have no right to control her action as such. She may lawfully be elected a member of a school district committee. This thing is beginning to be done, and will be more extensively done, to the great benefit of our schools. I cannot control her action as a member of that committee. I cannot command her to employ this teacher or reject that. Why is all this? Because in all these cases the matter lies wholly outside of the limits of her subjection to me as my wife.

So a woman in her political relations is wholly outside of the limits of her subject state. When admitted to these relations she will stand in them as an individual, responsible to God for her vote and for her political action in every respect, but in no manner responsible to her husband or subject to him. This is no repudiation of the doctrine of subjection. There was always a field of individual right that lay beyond the husband's jurisdiction, and the existence of such individual rights must either be perfectly consistent with the ruling power of the husband within his jurisdiction, or else that ruling power cannot be held to exist.

Do you still adhere, my candid opponent, to your Scriptural objection? Then I have one practical question to ask you? Does the Bible, in your opinion, condemn the reign of Queen Victoria? If you say it does not, you yield the whole argument; if you say it does, you run against the entire Christian sentiment of the world. Notice, that the question is not one of monarchy, (*that* you may condemn,) but of a Queen as against a King. Would the Bible approve the one and disapprove the other? Notice also, that it is the clearest possible case of political ascendancy, and that Victoria is not merely a woman, but has been till recently a wife.

It will not do to say, as Rev. Dr. Bushnell does, (in another connection, however, and pertinently to the matter he has in hand,) that the women who have reigned have been merely nominal rulers, while men have really administered the government. History I feel sure establishes the fact incontrovertibly against him. But if the fact be as he claims, it has no pertinence here, for it is the mere *holding* of an office of power, not the vigorous *administration* of the office, that constitutes the offense against the Bible.

But you may say, after all, that the political equality of women with men, though not expressly forbidden by Scripture, is

yet directly against the spirit of its teachings, and that Paul, if called upon to speak directly upon it, would have expressed his disapprobation of it. If you make this point, you are in good company, for it has been made by so able a man as Rev. Dr. Bushnell in his book against woman suffrage. He says, (page 81,) "The assertion of their political equality with men would have shocked any Apostle." Now suppose one of Paul's churches had proclaimed the political equality of all *men*—of the humblest with the most exalted, of the subject with the king, would he not have been astonished? Suppose a convention of men had adopted our declaration of independence, and declared that all men had equal natural rights, would not Paul have been astonished? Suppose the next day another convention had declared that women too had the same rights, how much would his astonishment have been increased? Would it at all? Well, this additional astonishment of the second day above that of the first, would be the precise measurement of his astonishment that has any pertinency to the matter in hand. But when we have obtained the exact measurement of Paul's astonishment, what is it worth? If he could have had a vision of the nineteenth century he would have found a thousand things to astonish him; not material things merely, which are of no consequence to this point, but current and established moral ideas, and moral ideas which are the legitimate fruit of his own teachings. He would have been astonished, shocked, if you please, to see woman putting herself forward into such a place of power in literature. He would have been astonished at her position as a power in society, at the recognition she has obtained for herself in science and art. Paul was not inspired to advise this century in practical matters. He was inspired to advise his own age as to such matters, and to lay down great principles of universal application. But he himself had no conception of all the workings of those principles in their application in later ages to human affairs. The wisdom of the average man of to-day as to what is practically best to-day, is better than the inspired wisdom of Paul brought down bodily from his age, and applied literally as so much practical advice for to-day. Paul, if he was living to-day, would, I have no doubt whatever, be among the foremost in advocating woman suffrage. The great principles of liberty and individual responsibility which Christ laid down, could lead to no other result.

Still, it is not so certain that Paul would have been shocked at this claim of equality for women. How does Dr. Bushnell know that he would? He had heard of the Queen of Sheba, and there is no reason to think he was shocked at every mention of her name. And the magnificent Cleopatra had then just finished her reign, and he had heard of other women on thrones. He was very free to speak his mind, and wrote many epistles. If the tenure of political power by these women shocked him, it is a little strange that he has not somewhere put his emotions on record.

It may be said that, conceding the propriety in itself of a woman's holding office, yet upon the theory of subjection which I admit, the husband would have the right to forbid her taking the office, or to require her to resign it, and that thus a great practical difficulty would arise, the liability to which is enough to show the inexpediency and perhaps absurdity of opening the political field to women; and I may be asked if I concede the right of the husband thus to interpose his will in the matter? I reply, that upon the theory of subjection which for the purposes of the argument I have admitted, I feel bound to admit that the husband would have a right to forbid his wife's accepting office. Where, however, she has accepted office with his consent, he would clearly have no right to require her to resign it. Every analogy of the law is against such a right. A consent thus given and acted upon can never be recalled, especially where, as here, the rights of the public and of third parties are concerned. A husband may refuse to allow his wife to be a dress-maker, but if he assents to it, and she contracts as such to make certain dresses for a lady by a given time, he cannot stop her short in her work, and by the interposition of his mere will make her abandon it. Society would never tolerate such a law. The right which I here concede of the husband to forbid her to assume office, ought to satisfy every one who objects to her holding office on the ground of Scriptural subjection, since the husband, to whom alone her subjection relates, has a right to waive his privilege, and thus there would be in fact no office-holding by women that would in fact conflict with the claims of her subject condition.

But as the difficulty here suggested, even to those who do not hold the subjection theory, may seem a serious one, I depart for a moment from the concession of my argument to state what I believe to be the only sound rule on the subject. I re-

gard husband and wife as perfectly equal in their relation to one another, and they ought to be made perfectly equal by the law. Under this law of perfect equality all their interests are more completely one than where the existence of the wife is substantially merged in that of the husband. In the application of this rule I should hold the agreement of both essential to the undertaking by either of any important matter seriously affecting the family welfare. Thus the wife ought not to take office unless upon a full consideration of the matter together they both think it best. And the husband ought not to accept an office which may seriously interfere with the family support, or perhaps take him a long time from home, unless upon full consideration by them both they shall both be satisfied that it is best. I would carry this rule so far as to make it the duty of the husband to consult his wife as to any important business investment, the failure of which may seriously affect the family welfare. Her happiness in the marriage relation is just as important a thing to be secured as his, and she will consider as faithfully and as wisely as he every matter bearing upon the family welfare. He has no more right to wreck the family welfare by his folly, than she to wreck it by hers. A consultation upon all important matters will result in the wisest thing being done. The caution of the one will always be a check on the rashness of the other, and a discussion by two minds is always valuable. Where, upon the agreement of both, a course is taken which proves disastrous, there will be no room for mutual reproach, and the calamity will be borne bravely and cheerfully. There will be many cases where this rule cannot be applied literally. Each must often decide upon a course of conduct in the absence of the other, but a knowledge of each other's general ideas will help each to judge more wisely, while the duty to consider the wishes of the other will make each more cautious. There will of course, too, be exceptions to the rule, as where a drunken husband leaves his family to suffer; there she will have a clear right to resort to any honest employment that will enable her to feed herself and her children. I do not propose that all this be enacted by human law. It cannot be. But it will become a potent law when established as the Christian rule of the family.

The family relation is the last one that will suffer from the establishment of woman suffrage. It will only be heightened and its happiness enriched by it.

It is foreign to my argument to attempt to meet any objection to woman suffrage except that founded upon the Bible; but I cannot forbear, even at some expense of unity in my argument, to notice a kindred objection to the tenure of offices of authority by women, made by Rev. Dr. Bushnell. In his book on woman suffrage he draws a strong contrast between men and women in respect to the force-power which characterizes the one sex, and is strikingly wanting in the other, and from it infers that women were made to be subordinate and men to rule. Now when two classes of people or two races are thus brought into contrast, the one as superior in every attribute of power, the other as inferior in these respects, the object (and the comparison has no real pertinence except as it bears on that object) is generally to show that the superior class or race is made to rule the other. Thus it was a favorite argument with those who defended slavery, that the white race had very positive qualities of superiority, and the black race very positive qualities of inferiority, the inference being that the white race was born to rule the black, and the black to serve the white; the power of the one finding its object in the weakness of the other. Now Dr. Bushnell does not intend that the inference be drawn from the case as he puts it, that men are to rule over women. But it is only as aimed at such a result that his facts have any real pertinency. Taking the result which he seeks, namely, that men as a sex, and as distinguished from women as a sex, have the natural power of domination, and we find it to be a domination not over women, but over men as well. Indeed nine-tenths of all the governmental force ever used in the world has been to keep down men and not women. The case then is, that the sex which he says contains this element of dominion, contains also in vastly larger measure the element of *subjection*, for where there is one man who is a natural ruler of men there are ten thousand who seem only made to be subject. The division then should not be by a perpendicular line dividing the sexes, but by a horizontal line separating the few whom God has made for great natural leaders from the immense mass below them whom he has made only to be led. The matter therefore is not one of sex, but one of individuals. And if it be a matter of individuals wholly, then we may reasonably expect that nature will provide occasional master-spirits among women as it has done among men. But we are not left to speculation alone on the subject. History furnishes ex-

amples of magnificent administrative power among women. It is no answer to say that there have been very few natural governors among women as compared with men. There are very obvious reasons why such instances should be rare. Aside from the fact that in the rude ages of the world power naturally fell into the hands of those who had the most physical strength and courage, there is this further fact, which is entitled to great consideration. In all ages the field of political ambition and power has been open to men, and has been their natural field, and those men who have exhibited the greatest power of leadership are those who rose from humble ranks under the inspiration of this ambition and opportunity. Women, on the other hand, shut out from all such opportunity, have occupied only such thrones as have come to them by inheritance, or by some preëxisting law, and it is only as power has chanced to fall in this way into the hands of those who proved themselves natural rulers, that history has furnished any examples of true sovereignty among women. They are, therefore, to be compared only with the kings who have obtained their thrones by inheritance, and not by their own strength; while it is to be considered that the laws of many countries wholly exclude women from the succession, and thus place their sex at great disadvantage even in this already disadvantageous comparison. It is to be considered too that women have long been denied the education that has been given to men, while they have not been able, like men, by converse with large subjects, to find a practical substitute for it.

Whatever might be said with regard to the unfitness of women for authority in past ages, cannot reasonably be said now. The world has heretofore been governed by force. Although force cannot now be dispensed with, yet it is no essential personal quality of a king or other ruler. Government is now far more by reason, and where reason does not suffice and the use of physical force is necessary, that physical force is embodied in an army or in a police, which the ruler never heads in person, but puts into motion by his mere command; and that command can be issued by a queen as well as by a king.

It will of course be seen that in setting aside the Bible objection to woman suffrage, the writer leaves every other objection untouched. The questions still remain, whether women have the same moral right to enfranchisement that men in the same relative position have, and whether it is for the benefit of society that they should be enfranchised. These are great questions, which the writer will be glad to discuss at some other time. He has aimed in this article merely to show that these questions are to be discussed purely on their merits, and with no embarrassment from any supposed Scriptural intimations on the subject.

So far from Scriptural authority being against the enfranchisement of women, the whole tenor of Christ's teachings, which we must all accept as the highest authority, and which to the writer are the teachings of a Divine Master, present a great law of liberty and personal responsibility, which can find its full application only in the perfect equality of man and woman in the home and in the state. When it receives this application society will have taken the greatest step ever taken since Christ came toward a perfect Christian civilization, and the reign of Christ, which his followers have worked for and waited for so long, will be nearer at hand. It is the perfect conviction that this movement is one of true progress towards that promised and blessed reign, that gives the writer his deepest interest in it, and makes him certain of its success.

HARTFORD, CONN., Nov. 24, 1869.