

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No.  
351 dated May 31, 1949, from  
United States Political Adviser  
for Japan, Tokyo, subject:  
"Korean Schools in Japan".

COPY

MEMORANDUM

- I. The education of Koreans will abide by the regulations of the Fundamental Law of Education and the School Education Law.
- II. As per the settlement of the Korean school case, Koreans' schools will apply for authorization as private schools, on condition that they follow education peculiar to the Koreans within the scope of the independence permitted to private schools.

5 May 1948

Minister of Education Tatsuo MORITO

Representative of the Sai Yo Kon  
Counter-measure Committee for the  
Koreans' Education

Witness

Chief of Education Gen Yo Toku  
Section of Central Headquarters  
of the Federation for Koreans in  
Japan

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch  
No. 351 dated May 31, 1949  
from United States Political  
Adviser for Japan, Tokyo,  
subject: "Korean Schools in  
Japan".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Information and Education Section

AG 000.8 (16 Apr 49)CIE

16 April 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Korean Problem in Yamaguchi Prefecture

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED

To determine the proper course of action to be taken in connection with the Korean schools of Yamaguchi Prefecture.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Koreans resident in Japan, with few exceptions, have demanded a special status and on numerous occasions have defied Japanese authority.
2. For the first two years of the Occupation, Koreans operated their own schools, teaching in the Korean language and using textbooks not authorized by Japanese educational authorities. The Koreans refused to apply for licenses for their schools, as such licensing would make them subject to certain Japanese regulations regarding education. The schools clearly were operating illegally. According to numerous reports, the teaching was anti-Japanese and pro-communist in nature.
3. To aggravate the situation, many of the Korean schools were operating in Japanese school buildings which they had simply appropriated. The Koreans defied all attempts on the part of the Japanese to evict them from these buildings in order that the schools could be returned to their proper use.
4. On 19 April 1948, the Japanese Ministry of Education inquired of Civil Information and Education Section as to whether or not the Ministry had authority over and responsibility for Korean schools. Civil Information and Education Section informed the Ministry that Koreans who had refused repatriation by the end of 1946 were subject to all Japanese laws.
5. On the basis of this information, the Japanese authorities attempted to enforce Korean compliance with Japanese educational laws and to remove them from buildings which they were occupying illegally and to the detriment of the Japanese school system.
6. The

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6. The situation came to a head in Osaka and Kobe on 23 April 1948, resulting in disorder, rioting, some bloodshed, and the use of U.S. Army troops to support the Japanese police. The disorders did not spread to the Tokyo area.

7. As a result of the determined action by the Japanese authorities, the League of Koreans Resident in Japan (there was no Korean Mission in Japan at the time) sought a peaceful solution of the problem, resulting in an agreement with the Ministry of Education which appeared satisfactory to both parties.

8. The agreement has been violated consistently by the Koreans, especially in Yamaguchi Prefecture. G-2 reports became so numerous that Civil Information and Education Section, in February 1949, assigned an official to visit Yamaguchi Prefecture and make a detailed investigation.

9. Summary and Conclusions of the report made by the investigating officer are as follows:

a. The majority of the schools are grossly overcrowded, substandard in plant and equipment.

b. Teachers are unqualified in professional training and teaching experience.

c. All teachers and principals are agents of the Yamaguchi chapter of the Korean League and follow its orders concerning the curriculum and textbooks used in the schools. The positions of prefectural chairman of the Korean League and principal of the Korean League Shimonoseki Primary School are always held concurrently by the same person.

d. Some of the teachers are members and/or agents of the Japan Communist Party. Their extra-curricular activities include conducting adult classes in political communism, training "strong arm" and "night soil" squads for battling police officers, leading demonstrations and inciting mobs to civil disobedience and violence, harboring smugglers and agents of the North Korean Government.

e. Some of the teachers have criminal records involving participation in major crimes.

f. The basic curriculum in use in the primary schools includes communism and North Korean propaganda of a jingoistic nature. Subject matter required by Japanese law is taught incidentally, if at all.

g. Basic aims of Korean primary school teaching are as

follows:

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follows:

- (1) To develop attitudes of hate toward the Japanese.
- (2) To develop attitudes which revolt against legally constituted authority and democratic government.
- (3) To develop attitudes among children which will make them class-conscious and receptive to political communism.
- (4) To teach children to be fanatically patriotic to the North Korean government and to pledge sole allegiance to its flag.
- (5) To teach children that the legally constituted Korean government is a puppet government under the strict military control of the Americans.

h. The agreement made by the Minister of Education and the national chairman of the Korean League, dated 3 May 1948, has handicapped the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government in its attempts to deal with Korean school principals and educators as individuals in that the agreement recognizes the League as the spokesman for Korean schools.

i. The North Korean flag is displayed in Korean schools and elsewhere in deliberate defiance of Eighth Army orders, as a symbol of the autonomous state which the Korean League claims for the Korean community in Japan.

10. After this report had been received, the Governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture visited Chief, Civil Information and Education Section, and other SCAP officials (as well as Japanese Government officials) to state that he realized the situation was very bad; that he would like to do something about it but would need two thousand additional National Rural Police; that any action taken with regard to the Korean schools undoubtedly would result in rioting and bloodshed.

11. Conference was held between CIE officials and G-2 officials, including Public Safety, to discuss the report of the investigation (par. 9 above). It was decided to bring the matter (informally) to the attention of Chief, Military Government, Eighth Army.

12. Conference was held between Chief, Civil Information and Education Section, and Brig. Gen. Shepard, Chief, Military Government, Eighth Army. The report of the CIE investigating officer (with

supporting

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supporting inclosures) was made available to General Shepard informally on a loan basis. General Shepard, who already had received similar reports from Military Government officials, stated that he recognized this as an Eighth Army problem and would take immediate steps to investigate the situation further and make recommendations as to action to be taken.

13. The 24th Division accomplished a detailed investigation and recommended immediate action. I Corps concurred in the report but proposed a somewhat modified plan of action.

14. The report of the 24th Division summarizes the problem as follows:

"This, then, is the problem: Should the Korean schools in Yamaguchi Prefecture be closed at once, with probably attendant disorders and political repercussions, or should they be permitted to continue in disregard of law, contribute to the spread of Communism, and eventually create a situation which cannot be solved without widespread violence and probable bloodshed?"

15. Conclusions of the 24th Division report are as follows:

"a. SCAP, Army and Corps Directives, and Japanese National Laws have unquestionably been violated by Koreans in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

"b. Legally sufficient cases for Provost Courts do not exist at this time, nor can they be compiled until such time as security restrictions are lifted and additional substantiating testimony, which is believed to exist, can be secured.

"c. Legally sufficient cases for Japanese Courts do not exist at this time, nor can they be compiled until such time as security restrictions are lifted and additional substantiating testimony, which is believed to exist, can be secured.

"d. Names of members of dissident groups have been compiled and can be furnished Japanese officials with a view to requiring them to prepare legally sufficient cases against such individuals in Japanese Courts.

"e. There are no unlicensed Korean schools in Yamaguchi Prefecture."

16. Recommendations contained in the 24th Division report are as follows:

"a. That,

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"a. That, if approval is forthcoming from higher headquarters, the Governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture be informed that the Occupation Forces desire that the Korean schools, now closed, not be permitted to open until they comply with existing laws and directives; and that the date of execution of these instructions be 12 April 1949.

"b. That the Governor be informed that he will be furnished two thousand (2000) additional National Rural Police to assist him in maintaining law and order in his Prefecture during the period of emergency.

"c. That the Governor be informed that Occupation Authorities are prepared to render armed support in the event that he is unable to maintain law and order; however, Occupation Forces will intervene only after he has exhausted all police forces available to him.

"d. That the Governor be informed he will be required to arrest and deliver to Occupation Forces certain Korean leaders who have violated SCAP orders and directives; these Korean leaders will be tried by Provost Courts.

"e. That the Governor be instructed to take action to cause to be arrested and tried by Japanese Courts those Koreans who have violated the Japanese Fundamental Law of Education or who have committed acts prejudicial to law and order in his Prefecture.

"f. That 24th Infantry Division Headquarters be authorized by Headquarters Eighth Army to try violators of SCAPIN 212 in Provost Courts.

17. I Corps concurs in the recommendations of the 24th Division, except that it believes the Korean schools should not be closed at this time.

18. General Shepard made reports of 24th Division and I Corps available to Chief, Civil Information and Education Section, on informal loan basis. He is of the opinion that Korean schools should be allowed to remain open until Military Government Education officers and Japanese officials can exercise such surveillance as will make possible the accumulation of evidence which is legally sound and which can be used in Japanese and Provost Courts to bring about the convictions of guilty individuals and result in the legal closing of the Korean schools which have been violating the law. General Shepard also invited attention to the statement made by the Governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture with regard to the pending Japan-Korea trade agreement and wondered whether this trade agreement would be jeopardized by action taken against Korean schools.

19. Another conference was held between Chief, Civil Information and Education Section, and officials of G-2. Reports of 24th Division

and I Corps

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and I Corps were discussed and the situation was reviewed from all angles. It was the unanimous decision that action is required in this matter, that certain calculated risks must be taken, and that Chief, Civil Information and Education Section, should present the matter to the Chief of Staff.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

1. That Korean schools in Yamaguchi Prefecture are violating numerous Japanese laws, spreading communism, and inciting to lawlessness. Although legally sufficient cases do not yet exist, in the opinion of the 24th Division, it is apparent that evidence is obtainable which will justify the issuance of an order by the prefectural governor closing all Korean schools in the prefecture and the arrest and trial of individuals responsible for law violations.

2. That when Japanese action is taken to close the Korean schools and to arrest Koreans accused of violations of Japanese laws, there is probability of disorders which will require the employment of use of U. S. Army troops in support of the Japanese police.

3. That action to arrest Koreans and close Korean schools will result in considerable publicity, particularly with regard to employment of U.S. Army troops.

4. That disorders prompted by Koreans and supported by Japanese Communists will, in all probability, spread to other parts of Japan, particularly to Okayama Prefecture and to the Kobe-Osaka area.

5. That if the present situation is permitted to continue, it will progressively deteriorate, resulting in even greater disorders and possible bloodshed when action finally becomes imperative.

6. That Eighth Army should insure that action in this matter is initiated by the Japanese authorities and that action be taken by U.S. authorities (apart from enforcing SCAP directives to the Japanese Government) only when the Japanese have exhausted all means at their disposal.

7. Resulting disorders and publicity must be accepted as a calculated risk.

### IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP, be authorized to inform Chief, Military Government, Eighth Army, verbally, that this headquarters recognizes the need for decisive action in the case of the

Yamaguchi

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Yamaguchi Prefecture Korean schools; that Japanese authorities be encouraged to initiate action immediately in the event that Japanese laws are being violated; that Occupation authorities should take action in the event that directives to the Japanese Government from this headquarters are being violated; that any and all actions taken should be on firm legal ground in order that there may be no embarrassing repercussions to the Command; that information and evidence now held or in future obtained which would assist Japanese authorities in legal action in connection with this matter be made available to them, within the limits of security regulations.

2. That plans for accomplishing necessary action be considered a matter for Eighth Army decision.

D. R. NUGENT  
Lt. Col., USMC,  
Chief, C I E Section

5 Incls

(not forwarded with  
this despatch)

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 351 dated May 31, 1949 from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Korean Schools in Japan".

COPY

19 April 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Korean Problem in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

1. Attached staff study by CIE and its inclosures establish beyond doubt the need for early and decisive action against Koreans who are violating laws. That Koreans in general are contemptuous of Japanese, and to a lesser extent, Occupation directives should require no documentation. This staff study and the appended reports of investigation reveal that the Governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture is powerless to force observance of Japanese school laws, now flagrantly violated, with police means at his disposal. It recommends that Eighth Army encourage prefectural authorities to take action against violators. By implication it recommends that Eighth Army plan to support prefectural authorities to the extent of using troops if necessary. General Coulter and other Occupation authorities feel that strong action should be taken and have recommended plans involving use of U.S. troops should developments so dictate. General Fox, before departure, saw this paper and stated that the time has arrived for GHQ to make a decision regarding the action to be taken in this matter. Yamaguchi is the appropriate place to start. It has the greatest density of Koreans and consequently the most trouble in law enforcement.

2. Following the riots in Kobe and Osaka in April 1948 (and these had their origin in the school question) the Minister of Education and an official of the Federation of Koreans in Japan signed an agreement that Koreans would abide by the Japanese education laws. A further stipulation permitted Korean schools to apply for authorization as private schools on condition "they follow education peculiar to the Koreans within the scope of the independence permitted to private schools". Yamaguchi schools for Koreans are operating under this authorization. A way should be found to abrogate this agreement.

3. At the suggestion of General Fox, a conference was held. Present: Generals Hickey, Willoughby, Maris; Colonels Bratton and Nugent; Mr. Coville, DS. After discussion of the problem it was concluded that:

a. The Yamaguchi Governor will need help of National Rural Police.

b. That

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b. That because the National Rural Police are lacking in the necessary arms, there may quickly develop a need for U.S. troops to restore order.

c. That the CG Eighth Army should be given advance authority for the use of his troops should the Prefectural authorities prove unable to handle the situation.

4. In order to strengthen the hand of the Governor and decrease the probability of a necessity for intervention by U.S. troops, the following preliminary steps are recommended in the order listed:

a. Issuance at once of a SCAPIN prohibiting display of the North Korean Flag or any facsimile thereof. GHQ has never formally issued such an order although informal instructions along those lines have been passed to Eighth Army. Arrests have been made. Understandably Eighth Army would prefer written backing. By separate staff study, G-1 will present a SCAPIN this week providing this backing.

b. Confer with Korean Ambassador and influence him to endorse the Mindan (South Korean Group in Japan) as the civilian organization representing Koreans in Japan.

c. Thereafter influence the Minister of Education to abrogate the agreement of 5 May 1948. This is logical now that Korea has a diplomatic representative who has recognized a group other than the one with which the agreement was signed.

d. A coordinated publicity campaign by press and radio to be arranged by CIE. This campaign will draw attention to the unsatisfactory school situation and feature the numerous cases in which Korean elements have failed to subject themselves to Japanese educational laws.

5. It is further recommended that the CG eighth Army be advised of the foregoing preliminary steps and that he be officially instructed to:

a. Notify the Governor of Yamaguchi at the appropriate time to take action to insure compliance by Koreans with Occupational directives and Japanese educational laws. Also to notify the Governor that he may in his discretion ask the Prime Minister to declare a local limited emergency requiring National Rural Police reinforcement. (At GHQ level the Prime Minister can be persuaded to take appropriate action to order 2,000 NRP to the area).

b. Maintain surveillance over the situation as it develops and to use U.S. troops to restore order when in his judgment the circumstances demand.

c. Try

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c. Try in provost courts Korean violators of SCAPINs and orders issued by Occupation Force agencies.

d. Communicate directly with BCOF in instances where law enforcement operations are carried out in areas under BCOF.

6. If approval is granted to the foregoing recommendations I shall prepare the necessary instructions.

G. V. K.

CONCURRENCES:

D C/S, FEC	_____
G-2	_____
G-3	_____
DS	_____
CIE	_____

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Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 351 dated May 31, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Korean Schools in Japan".

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Check File No. S-350.2 Subject: Tollbooth  
Note  
No.  
2

DS:WJS:CC:hh  
Mr. Coville  
26-7012

From: DS

To: C/S

20 April 1949

1. DS concurs in the attached 19 April 1949 memorandum for C/S as a sufficient basis for the fundamental decision in the matter, although recognizing that numerous details are omitted and will require thorough working out before the action is launched.

2. In an effort to bring the impact of the proposed action in the maximum degree upon communist elements among the Koreans and to strengthen so far as possible the position of the Republic of Korea (and its representatives) with those Korean residents of Japan who are not communist in sympathy or can be disassociated from communist affiliations, DS desires opportunity, in conjunction with CIE, to explore with the Korean Ambassador appropriate means to this end. DS considers it of the utmost importance politically that the Korean Ambassador be persuaded to issue a statement to the Korean people in Japan calling upon them strictly to abide by Japanese law. This statement should be issued several days in advance of any enforcement measures that are envisaged in the proposed plan.

3. It is noted that in the draft memorandum for the Japanese Government with regard to display of the flag of North Korea that regime is referred to by title as if it were a recognized government. It would be preferable to refer to it by some such designation as "the regime at present existing in North Korea." (In this connection, it is understood that G-1 has a staff study on the display of flags ready for submission to the Chief of Staff.)

4. DS expects that, if the action recommended in the memorandum is approved and implemented, Korean reaction will spread to other prefectures also and that the questions raised will be of prime magnitude

in the

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in the relations of SCAP and Japan both to Korea and possibly to the Soviet Union. There is involved in the problem the basic question of Korean compliance with Japanese law, the position of communist activity in Japan, and (probably eventually) the problem of the adequate arming of the Japanese police. Although the potentialities of this problem are explosive, DS concurs in the decision recommended in the memorandum as a first step in a desirable attack upon those three fundamental problems.

Copies to: D C/S, FEC, G-2, G-3, CIE  
Incls. As listed

.....W. J. S.....

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Subject: Korean Problem in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

Note No. 2 From: D C/S, SCAP To: DS Date: 4 May 1949

1. Attention is invited to preceding C/N No. 1 from C/S to D C/S, SCAP, 3 May 1949, and to para 2, C/N No. 2 from DS to C/S, 20 April 1949.

2. Diplomatic Section is requested to contact the Korean Ambassador with a view to determining what steps he is willing to take to prevail upon the Korean people in Yamaguchi Prefecture to abide by Japanese law and eliminate causes for friction with Japanese Government agencies. A report of the result of such conference is requested as soon as practicable.

.....A. P. F.....

Note No. 1 From CofS To: DC/S, SCAP Date: 3 May 1949

1. The transmittal memorandum dated 19 April 1949 of subject study has been reviewed and discussed with both Mr. Sebald of Diplomatic Section and General Fox, both of whom agree to the following:

a. While it is desirable to settle this matter, it is undesirable to risk the resort to unnecessarily harsh police methods or occupation troop support if the desired results can be attained otherwise.

b. Mr. Sebald is of the opinion that the Korean Ambassador should be approached with a view to his initiating efforts to influence Korean leaders in Yamaguchi Prefecture to abide by the Japanese laws and so to conduct Korean school and other activities in Japan as to eliminate the causes for the existing constant friction between the Japanese law enforcement agencies and themselves.

c. That

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c. That in the Nagoya area, according to General Fox's recent visit there with the Military Government team, progress has been made in inducing Koreans to conform to Japanese instructions; and that the same may be attempted in Yamaguchi Prefecture, although the Koreans in the latter area are more militant in attitude.

d. Since the present school period will probably be followed by a summer recess, the Korean Ambassador will have the opportunity both to make public statements to influence Koreans residing in Japan and to pursue those statements by profitable influence on Korean leaders.

e. That if necessary, the action proposed herein -- drastic action -- would then be in order and necessarily have the support of the Korean Government, thereby preventing its sudden sponsoring of Koreans who might insist on resistance to Japanese or Allied pressure.

2. With the foregoing in view, it is desired that this matter be reopened with Diplomatic Section to secure the indicated support of the Korean Ambassador.

.....E. M. A.....

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
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## CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No. 350-2

Subject: Korean Schools in Yamaguchi Prefecture

DS:CKH:RBF:hh  
Mr. Finn  
26-5528

Check From: DS

To: D-C/S SCAP

Date: 28 May 1949

Note

Info: CIE

No.

G-2

3

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in check notes 1 and 2 above, DS has held discussions with the Korean Ambassador in order to apprise him of the situation created by Korean-operated schools in Yamaguchi Prefecture and to explore remedial measures that might be taken. Appended is a copy of a communication dated 16 May 1949 which was handed the Korean Ambassador by way of summary of the situation and as a tentative proposal for action.
2. The Ambassador appeared to be cognizant of the problems raised throughout Japan by Korean schools operated beyond the reach of Japanese law, seemed sympathetic to GHQ's desire that remedial action be taken, and gave assurance that he would look into the matter. Recent information given informally by the Korean Diplomatic Mission indicates that the Ambassador has not as yet arrived at a decision.
3. It is DS' opinion that the Korean Ambassador will endeavor to encourage Koreans in Japan to comply with Japanese law and may be willing to issue a statement of the tenor indicated in the last paragraph of the appended communication. DS believes, however, that the efforts of the Ambassador will be of only limited assistance because Korean leftists, who have precipitated the school issue throughout Japan, oppose the Government which the Ambassador represents and because the Ambassador, as protector of the "under-privileged" Koreans in Japan, can not allow himself to be put in the position of appearing to thwart the interests of Koreans.
4. DS proposes to continue discussions with the Korean Ambassador pursuant to the instructions contained in check notes 1 and 2 above with a view to gaining as effective assistance as possible from him. DS believes that the sympathetic understanding of the Korean Government will also be enlisted in this way. DS will report to D-C/S SCAP the further progress of these discussions.

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5. DS



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

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5. DS



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5. DS considers that the following preliminary action along the lines suggested in check note no. 1 above and in D-C/S' memorandum to C/S, 19 April 1949, affords the best approach to this problem:

a. Advantage of the approaching summer recess during which schools are closed should be taken to prepare action against Korean schools being illegally operated. Available information indicates that the dates for this recess are not yet definite; presumably it will be from about mid-July to mid-September.

b. Japanese Government education authorities -- on both a national and a prefectural level -- should be instructed to issue statements during this recess calling for compliance with Japanese education requirements by Koreans and stating that the law will be strictly enforced beginning with the next term.

c. During the same period local military government education authorities might also issue statements to the effect that there have been violations of Japanese education laws and that all persons in Japan not connected with the Occupation are required to abide by these laws.

d. The assistance of the Korean Mission in approaching individual members of the Korean community or in issuing public statements calling for Korean cooperation should also be sought, as suggested in paragraph 4 above.

e. DS does not believe that the agreement of 5 May 1948 between the Minister of Education and the Korean League need be considered since Koreans have consistently violated this agreement by failing to apply to the Japanese Government for authorization for their schools.

6. DS believes that the above measures will serve the following purposes:

a. Inform Koreans precisely of their obligations in this matter and of the position of the Occupation.

b. Afford adequate time for preparations by the Japanese to enforce Japanese laws against schools and individuals who violate these laws.

c. Provide a solid basis for legal action, should Koreans attempt to reopen their "branch" or other illegal schools. DS notes that doubt is raised in the inclosed staff study by CIE as to the legal sufficiency of evidence presently available for prosecution of presumed offenders in either Provost Courts or Japanese

courts.

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courts. It is believed that, if the Koreans by opening their schools were to violate specific instructions which are in conformity with law, a clear legal basis would be provided for prosecution in Japanese and perhaps Occupation courts.

7. DS believes that, after the preliminary measures described in paragraph 5 above have been taken, action along the lines proposed in the inclosed study will then be in order.

Incl: 1 incl. added: DS communication  
to Korean Mission, 16 May 49.

.....C. K. H.....

COPY

May 16, 1949.

Question of Korean Schools

With regard to the situation in Yamaguchi Prefecture involving the unwillingness of the League of Koreans Residing in Japan to comply with Japanese educational requirements, the following facts are pertinent.

There are twenty-five primary schools in Yamaguchi Prefecture operated under the auspices of the League. Of this number, four are "principal" schools located in Shimonoseki City, Ube City, Onoda City, and Iwakuni City; these four schools were approved by the prefectural government on July 31, 1948. The remaining twenty-one schools are "branch" schools and as such have not been approved or disapproved by the prefectural government. In these twenty-five primary schools there are sixty-three Korean teachers and 2,223 students. After graduation from these schools operated by the League, the students attend Japanese secondary schools.

The Korean schools operated by the League in Yamaguchi Prefecture are overcrowded and substandard in regard to facilities. Headquarters and Japanese officials state that the twenty-one branch schools violate Article 3 of the School Education Law relative to building standards.

The teachers

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The teachers in these twenty-one schools are persons of Korean origin. Fifty-one of these sixty-three teachers have been screened in accordance with Headquarters directives and Japanese regulations to determine their acceptability for educational service. Twelve of the teachers have not been screened. Japanese officials estimate that eighty per cent of these teachers are Communists and state that ten per cent are members of the Japan Communist Party. Several of these teachers have criminal records. It is also known that many Koreans whose residence in the prefecture is temporary and who are therefore not subject to scrutiny by the appropriate officials also teach in these schools. In many instances, the principals of Korean League schools are also chairmen of the local League branch.

Headquarters officials upon investigation found that the curriculum prescribed by law in Japan is not being followed by the Korean League schools and that the curriculum is in many cases not even known to the teachers. There is strong evidence indicating that communist subjects and propaganda favorable to the North Korean regime are being taught in these schools. Textbooks used in these schools are not employed in a supplementary manner, as specified by Japanese law where foreign schools are concerned, but are used as the basic texts in various courses.

The flag of the North Korean regime is displayed in many of these schools, although display of this flag is in violation of Occupation orders.

The Korean League authorities operating these schools refuse to permit Japanese officials to enter and investigate in order to determine the degree of conformity with Japanese law. Japanese police, because of their inadequate equipment and through fear of reprisals, are reluctant to attempt to enforce the law.

The solution of this critical problem centering in Yamaguchi Prefecture would undoubtedly be forwarded if, as one of various possible measures, the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan or other appropriate authorities of the Korean Government should decide to emphasize, in a possible statement expressing the continued concern of the Korean Government and its representatives in the adequate provision of proper education for Koreans within the law, the necessity of the same compliance with Japanese law by Koreans as is required of other nationalities in Japan.

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Office of the U. S. Political Adviser  
Kobe, Japan, June 16, 1949.

894.42/6-1649

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Subject: Forwarding Information Regarding Heishikan,  
former Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Institute.

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The Vice Consul in charge has the honor to forward herewith copies of two Summaries of Information prepared at the request of this office by U. S. Military intelligence authorities in Japan, concerning the Heishikan, an Institute operated by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Summary dated November 18, 1949 was received in response to this office's specific request for information about the wartime activities of one of its applicants for passport; Summary dated February 25, 1949, came in response to a subsequent request for additional information regarding the Institute.

There are a number of discrepancies between the earlier and briefer Summary and that of February 25, recently received, that cannot be attributed entirely to the brevity of the former. Sources questioned by the military authorities have obviously become more expansive with time, and the nature of the school, the purpose of its origin, the curriculum taught, and the ultimate use to which its students were to be put, have changed considerably during the four months' interval. For this reason it is the opinion of this office that it is not improbable that our intelligence agents have been somewhat "taken in" by their sources although further independent investigation on our part in the matter is not possible. Moreover, this office does not go along with the stated conclusion that the "distinctly liberal and non-militaristic atmosphere of Subject appears to preclude any suspicion that it might have been utilized as a training center for future espionage or intelligence purposes."

tion Assigned to DIR/US The citizenship status of a number of the former  
tion Taken 7/6 students of the Heishikan is pending at this office and  
No action necessary in Yokohama. At least six of the students born in the  
United States reacquired Japanese nationality in  
September 1945, following the conclusion of the war.  
It appears that during that unsettled period they feared  
that they would be tried by the Americans for treason or  
that Japanese mobs would commit acts of violence against  
them because of their American nationality. They include  
Sadao YAMADA, Joji KYODO (or KYOTO), Seiichiro KATSURAYAMA,  
Teruo NIMURA, Tetsuka KUBOTA, and Tsutomu YUSA. These  
persons, among others, are now claiming that they re-  
acquired Japanese nationality under duress  
endeavoring to regain their U. S. nationality.

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June 16, 1949  
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It is believed that the information regarding the personalities connected with the founding and operation of the school, as well as that concerning some of the students, will be of interest to the Department's biographical divisions.

Enclosures: *AA*

- ✓ 1. Copy of Summary of Information of November 18, 1948.
- ✓ 2. Copy of Summary of Information of February 25, 1949.

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Copy to USPOLAD, Tokyo  
Copy to Yokohama Branch, USPOLAD

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 94 dated June 16, 1949, from Kobe Branch, USPOLAD, Kobe, Japan, entitled "Forwarding Information Regarding Heishikan, former Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute."

(COPY)

18 November 1948

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: HEISHIKAN Institute

Thorough investigation disclosed that the idea of establishing the Heishikan Institute was conceived by KAWAI Tatsuo of the Foreign Office following his return from the Japanese Consulate in the United States in 1939. The published purpose of the Institute was to educate Nisei of the United States and its territories and Canada in Japanese Culture, History, Economics, and Politics. Upon graduation, the Nisei would work for the Foreign Office to promote 'international friendship'.

The curriculum of the Institute consisted of Japanese Constitutional Law, Foreign Affairs, Economics, Chinese Classics (Kanbun), Japanese Swordsmanship (Kendo), International Law, Japanese History, Journalism, English, Shorthand, and World Geography. Examinations were given to candidates for scholarship to this institute, and transportation and traveling expenses were provided students by Japanese Agencies, i.e., Domei News Agency, South Manchurian Railway, Nippon Times and the Foreign Office. Students were paid an allowance of fifty (50) Yen per month in addition to being given free room and board. On completion of a two year course, the students were obliged to serve the Foreign Office for three years. They were assigned to either an English language newspaper, Listening Post, or the Foreign Office, doing clerical work. Some were assigned to the Research Department, 3rd Section, of the Foreign Office. AKAMATSU Sukeyuki, one time Consul General of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, appeared to be the key man in the Institute. AKAMATSU was described as the advisor, and also gave class instruction. Interviews with former students of HEISHIKAN Institute failed to disclose any ulterior motive on the part of the Institute, although KAWAI Tatsuo was closely identified with SHIRATORI, former Ambassador to Germany, and a close associate of the military clique. It was the claimed consensus of opinion of the students mentioned above that Nisei were recruited for the institute for no other purpose than to increase the linguistic efficiency of the Foreign Office. The 3rd Group of the HEISHIKAN Institute was graduated in March 1945, and numbered eight (8) students; KAWASAKI George, SHINGUCHI Takao, SAIKI Susumu, YAMADA Sadami, KUBOTA Tetsuka, KIMURA Otshiaki, FUKIOKI Tsuruo, and SHIMADA Hajime.

Evaluation: Source - reliable; information - possibly true.

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 94 dated June 16, 1949, from Kobe Branch, USPOLAD, Kobe, Japan, entitled "Forwarding Information Regarding Heishikan, former Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute."

(COPY)

25 February 1949

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: HEISHIKAN INSTITUTE

1. SUBJECT, a language school, was founded in December 1939 by the spadework of Kawai Tatsuo, then Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office, with the cooperation of the late Matsuoka Yosuke, then President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, and the late Iwanaga Yukichi, then President of Domei News Agency.

2. When Kawai returned to Japan in 1939 from a special mission in America and Europe, he noticed the virtual disappearance of the English language from the curriculum of various higher educational institutions in Japan. He recognized a possible paucity of English speaking Japanese if this situation was permitted to continue. In order to check this possibility, Kawai conferred with Matsuoka and Iwanaga, mentioned above, on a plan to establish a school where the English language would be the medium of instruction. It was also proposed that students for the school be recruited from among Nisei in the United States and Canada, in the belief that it would be more practical to educate Nisei in Japanese ways than teach Japanese youths in Western culture and languages, for the long-range project of training the students to acquire a balanced understanding of America and Japan in order that they might strive towards a betterment of relations between the two countries. The nebulous idea was to produce capable international peace envoys--men like Dr. Niitobe Inazo of Japan and Dr. Lin Yu-tang of China.

3. The plan was enthusiastically approved by Matsuoka and Iwanaga and it was agreed upon that funds to carry it out would be provided by the South Manchuria Railway Company, Domei News Agency and the Foreign Office (in the latter case, from the special expense fund which was at the disposal of the Director of the Information Department). No conditions were attached to the funds supplied by any of the three sources. Consequently SUBJECT had no official status with the Japanese Government. It was a separate organ under the direct supervision of the Director of the Information Department of the Foreign Office. It was not a part of or under any government agency, including the Foreign Office or department thereof.

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4. As head of the Information Department, Kawai issued instructions to the various Japanese legations in the United States and Canada to launch a scholarship campaign for Nisei. The candidates were selected on a competitive basis by passing a certain examination. Nisei youth raised and residing in the United States or Canada were eligible for candidacy. The entrants were selected basically in accordance with the possible degree to which they could or would contribute towards better American-Japanese understanding after a broad education in things Japanese. Intelligence and character were, therefore, the basic requirements.

5. SUBJECT had no educational requirements. Members of either sex and any religion were eligible. Consequently, the group that finally assembled in Tokyo was a motley lot. There were college graduates, high school graduates and junior high school graduates. There were males as well as females. There were both Christians and Buddhists.

6. SUBJECT was a very liberal institute; its students enjoyed the widest possible freedom in all respects compared to any other students in Japan. The students were not required to pledge allegiance to the Japanese Government, and those who had no Japanese nationality were not pressed to acquire same.

7. During the two-year course, the students were taught the Japanese language, Japanese history, Japanese politics, Japanese culture, Japanese etiquette, Japanese law, Japanese economics, Chinese classics and calligraphy. They were also given lectures in international law and diplomatic history. The students also took numerous (educational) trips throughout Japan, going as far south as Formosa and as far north as southern Sakhalin.

8. Originally, it was vaguely intended to assign (without compulsion) the graduates from SUBJECT to clerical, interpreter-translator and similar other positions at Japanese legations in the United States and Canada. However, the outbreak of the Pacific War precluded this plan, and consequently they were assigned to the Foreign Office (generally in the capacity of monitors at the listening post), the South Manchuria Railway Company, Domei News Agency, Nippon Times and Japanese diplomatic offices on the Asiatic Continent, for a period of two or three years. After the 2/3 year period was up, they were free to resign and do as they pleased. Recruitment of new students following the outbreak of war was necessarily limited to Nisei who were residing in Japan.

9. SUBJECT

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9. SUBJECT had no connections with the Japanese Army or Navy, either direct or indirect. From the practical point of view, SUBJECT served a very useful purpose in view of the great need of proficient linguists, especially in the English language. Furthermore, so far as can be ascertained, the distinctly liberal and non-militaristic atmosphere of SUBJECT appears to preclude any suspicion that it might have been utilized as a training center for future espionage or intelligence purposes.

10. The following is the list of students who enrolled in SUBJECT, as indicated by the particular group to which they belonged:

a. 1st Group -- Started on 2 December 1939  
and completed on 30 November  
1941

- (1) Doiguchi Yuichi, died during the war.
- (2) Furuya Kaoru, female who departed for the United States in 1941.
- (3) Ishikawa (Bill) Hifumi, whereabouts unknown.
- (4) Kyoto (George) Joji, presently employed at the Readers Digest Distributing Agency, Kanda, Tokyo.
- (5) Masuda Isami, employed at the Foreign Office.
- (6) Nakata Kakuro, Radio Press Company.
- (7) Nishikawa Eiichi, Radio Press Company.
- (8) Ogishima George Ryoichi, President of Radio Press Co., Yuraku-cho, Tokyo.
- (9) Okusako Hideo, reported to have died during the war.
- (10) Omori "Biff," reported to have died during the war.
- (11) Oue George Satoshi, employed at ESS, GHQ, FEC, APO 500.
- (12) Saito Shiro, who died in 1940.
- (13) Somekawa Yojiro, Radio Press Company.
- (14) Tamae Tsutsumida, female, formerly employed at CCD Hqrs, but later discontinued because of ill health.
- (15) Tateishi (fnu), presently employed with Time & Life Magazine.
- (16) Ueno Kazuma, Radio Press Company, Osaka.

b. 2nd Group -- Started in January 1942 and  
completed in latter part of 1943.

(1) Ekimoto

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- (1) Ekimoto Masao, employed at the Radio Press Company.
  - (2) Hirotsuka Masakado, Radio Press Company.
  - (3) Hoshimi Masayoshi, now operating his own business enterprise as Subscription Agent for Life, Time and Newsweek magazines.
  - (4) Ishii Tsuyoshi, who was conscripted into the Japanese Army. Present whereabouts unknown.
  - (5) Iwata Shoichi, now located in the United States, c/o Box 301, Olive View, California.
  - (6) Katsurayama Seiichi, Radio Press Company.
  - (7) Kawatani Kiichiro, employed by an import & export company in Tokyo.
  - (8) Kida Namio, a Java born Nisei who was assigned as interpreter to the Japanese Army during the war. It is believed he is at present in Java.
  - (9) Kuwahara Hideo, now located in the United States, address unknown.
  - (10) Masunaga Seiko, now located in the United States, address unknown.
  - (11) Matsushima Ritsuo, who died during war from illness.
  - (12) Mazawa Shigebi, now located in the United States, address unknown.
  - (13) Nimura Teruo, now located in the United States, address unknown.
  - (14) Ogawa Taro, born in Panama and present whereabouts unknown.
  - (15) Ozaki Shigemasa, employed at C.B.S.
  - (16) Sakamoto Seiichi, was drafted into the Japanese Army, and present whereabouts unknown.
  - (17) Shimogaki Yoshio, now employed by Coca Cola Company.
  - (18) Takamura Toichiro, deceased.
  - (19) Tomita Shuichi, deceased.
  - (20) Uehara Noboru, Radio Press Company.
  - (21) Yusa Tsutomu, employed at 43rd Topographical Engineers, Isetan Building, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.
- c. 3rd Group -- Started in April 1943 and graduated in November 1944.
- (1) Fujioki Tsuruo, who was expelled from SUBJECT because of inefficiency. Present whereabouts unknown.

(2) Kawasaki

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- (2) Kawasaki Tamotsu, employed since September 1945 at the Tokyo-Kanagawa CIC District, Tokyo-to Area.
- (3) Kimura Toshiaki, now located in the United States.
- (4) Kubota Tekka, present whereabouts unknown.
- (5) Saiki Susumu, present whereabouts unknown.
- (6) Shimada Hajime, present whereabouts unknown.
- (7) Shinkuchi Takao, present whereabouts unknown.
- (8) Yamada Sada, present whereabouts unknown.

d. 4th Group -- Started in December 1944.  
Graduation date unknown.

- (1) Chida Yoshio, presently employed at Totsuka Army Exchange Depot.
- (2) Hamayasu Yoshitaka, now in the United States.
- (3) Hide Norio, present whereabouts unknown.
- (4) Kuwahara Masakazu or Seiwa, present whereabouts unknown.
- (5) Matsuda Yutaka, now in the United States.
- (6) Matsumoto Mutsuya, presently employed at GHQ Chapel Center.
- (7) Miyamoto Arata, now in the United States.
- (8) Miyazato Hajime, now in Honolulu, T. H.
- (9) Nii Mikiji, present whereabouts unknown.
- (10) Ohashi Shinichi, present whereabouts unknown.
- (11) Tsutsui Yoneo, present whereabouts unknown.
- (12) Yamazaki Hajime, present whereabouts unknown.
- (13) Yoshida Kiyoshi, employed at Chiba Military Government Team.

e. 5th Group -- Started in April 1945; not completed.

- (1) Rikimaru Akira, present whereabouts unknown.
- (2) Rikimaru Kazu, present whereabouts unknown.
- (3) Rikimaru Kenichi, present whereabouts unknown.
- (4) Rikimaru Satoshi, present whereabouts unknown.
- (5) Tabata Shigeru, a Canadian Nisei, present whereabouts unknown.

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NOTE: The incompleteness of the dates obtained indicating when each group started and graduated is due to the absence of records of SUBJECT. The above name roster was taken from the personal notebook of Akamatsu Sukeyuki, who was supervisor of SUBJECT from January 1940 until the termination of war.

NOTE 2. The HEISHI ( 恢 之 ) of SUBJECT is a Confucian phrase which, freely translated, means "Come, ye promising youths." KAN ( 館 ), of course, means "Institute."

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OVERSEAS PROGRAM STAFF

Japan Branch

Office of the United States  
Political Adviser for Japan

Oral memo to  
No. 488 FR  
9/12/49

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AUG 11 1949

Tokyo, July 26, 1949.

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EDUCATION

Subject: Transmitting Memorandum on "Problems in Japan's Educational Reform".

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum prepared by Foreign Service Officer Richard B. FINN of this Mission entitled "Problems in Japan's Educational Reform", which summarizes the problems being encountered and the progress made by the Japanese Government and the Occupation in their efforts to reform Japan's educational system.

The memorandum describes briefly the major changes that have been made in Japan's educational system and summarizes the principal administrative, financial, and political difficulties that have arisen. The most serious problem is budgetary in that there are not sufficient funds to facilitate establishment of the new system, to build new school buildings, or to assist private schools. Administrative difficulties connected with the transition from the old to the new system, particularly the establishment of the new college system, are considerable, and are providing an opportunity for widespread opposition, some sincere and some politically motivated, to proposals designed to decentralize and liberalize Japan's education.

The Mission desires to commend Mr. Finn for his industry and initiative in preparing a special study on this subject and for the able manner in which he has presented the salient features in the development of the educational program in Japan under the Occupation. His principal sources have been translations from the Japanese press and interviews with officials of the Civil Information and Education Section of General Headquarters and of the Japanese Ministry of Education.

Respectfully yours,

*W. J. Sebald*  
W. J. Sebald

Enclosure: *att*  
Summary of Problems in  
Japan's Educational Reform,  
by FSO Richard B. Finn,  
July 25, 1949.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 488 dated July 26, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Transmitting Memorandum on 'Problems in Japan's Educational Reform'".

PROBLEMS IN JAPAN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM

July 25, 1949.

Reorganization of Japan's educational system is encountering difficult problems of administration and finance as well as considerable opposition to change on the part of students, teachers, and the public. Communists have found in educational activities an excellent opportunity for agitation and spreading confusion.

Reorganization.

That phase of the Occupation's efforts to eliminate militaristic and nationalistic tendencies from Japanese education has been largely accomplished; teachers with undesirable backgrounds have been purged; textbooks have been edited and teaching programs revised in order to eliminate objectionable material.

Administratively, the principal aims of reorganization of Japan's educational system appear to be decentralization of control and broadening of opportunities for education, particularly higher education. To accomplish these aims, a series of laws have been passed and other changes instituted.

Efforts have been made to decentralize the educational system by reducing the function of the Education Ministry of the National Government to a largely advisory capacity as a result of placing administration of elementary and secondary schools in the hands of towns and cities with considerable power of control vested in local boards of education and establishing national universities spread throughout Japan and controlled by local bodies. Certification of teachers and organization of curricula will in large part be functions of local agencies. Parent-Teacher Associations have been established on a local level to advise in regard to educational problems. Steps have also been taken to enable prefectural and local bodies to finance at least part of the new locally administered system.

In order to try to bring education within the reach of larger numbers of students than in the past, elaborate measures have been required. At the lower education level, the controversial 6-3-3 system was installed

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pursuant to the School Education Law enacted in March 1947. The new system requires six years of elementary school, three years of lower secondary education corresponding to junior high schools in the United States and three years of higher secondary education corresponding to United States senior high schools. As a result of the statement of policy for Japanese education contained in the Fundamental Law of Education, the first nine years of this new system are eventually to be free and compulsory. The former system of Japanese lower education consisted of six years free compulsory primary education, five years of middle school, and three years of higher school. The new system, by extending free compulsory education for three years (at present only two of these three years are authorized because of budgetary restrictions), is expected to enable larger numbers of students to go through the lower education level and thus to have an opportunity to proceed to higher education.

The most pronounced reorganization in the educational system has been in the field of higher education. The new system adds a four-year college period to the 6-3-3 levels, thus making an exact parallel with the American system. The old system involved a three-year university course at the conclusion of the 6-5-3 levels. The purpose of the revision appears to be to simplify the previous system, which was a hodge-podge of higher schools, technical schools, liberal arts schools, normal schools, art schools, universities, and women's colleges, by providing a standard type of college generally available to all qualified students. Specialized training may be obtained in the colleges or by postgraduate study. A National School Establishment Law was passed by the fifth national Diet, establishing sixty-nine government-supported national universities, replacing more than two hundred fifty tax-supported normal schools, colleges, and universities. The University Establishment Committee of the Education Ministry has already chartered 68 national universities and 99 other universities which are supported by municipalities, prefectures, or by private means. It is also anticipated that in 1950, junior colleges will be established to supplement the present college system and to provide higher education for those who do not wish the full four-year term. The exclusive character of Japan's prewar university system, in which six imperial universities clearly dominated the field, will be radically altered by eventual establishment

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of over



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of over 200 colleges and universities.

The new college-university system is also to be decentralized. There will be at least one national university in each prefecture. It is contemplated that the control and administration of most of the new universities will be locally managed, although initially at least universities supported by public funds will come under the administrative guidance of the Education Ministry.

The faithfulness with which the reorganization of Japan's educational system has followed the American model can be seen by reference to the proposals made in March 1946 by the American Education Mission to Japan. This mission recommended to General MacArthur that there be six years of primary school and three years each of lower and higher secondary schools before admission to higher education. It also proposed that education be compulsory for nine years in tax-supported, co-educational and tuition-free schools. The report urged that the Education Ministry become an agency to provide technical aid and professional counsel with educational agencies established at prefectural and local levels to exercise actual control. These recommendations, which conform generally to the American education pattern, are all being put into effect. The Education Mission also proposed that Japanese educators undertake a comprehensive program directed at bringing into common use some form of Romanized writing of the Japanese language and at effecting a more democratic form of spoken Japanese.

#### Administrative Problems.

The problem of decentralizing Japanese education has met the same obstacles that Occupation efforts toward decentralization have met in other fields of local autonomy such as local finance and police reform. In the educational field the all-powerful influence of the Education Ministry has been largely destroyed and in its place attempts have been made to establish administration and control on the prefectural, city, and village level. The novelty of the system and the consequent complete inexperience of the Japanese have resulted in problems of considerable difficulty, the solution of which appears to be remote. Local government officials are unfamiliar with the duties they are to discharge and have not as yet developed any skill in educational management. Even though the Japanese

Government,

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Government, under the guidance of the Occupation, has endeavored to institute its program of decentralization on a gradual basis, the initial stages of this program appear to be bogged down in confusion.

In the case of primary and secondary schools, boards of education together with local political entities are now charged with control and administration of the schools. Boards of education were established by law in July 1948 and in November 1948 elections were held throughout Japan in 46 prefectures and in five large cities for selection of members. It is contemplated that boards will be selected in the future in cities and villages. At present, however, boards of education have proved ineffectual in assisting the progress of educational reform. In many instances, board members are either incompetent or thoroughly unfamiliar with educational problems; although strenuous efforts were made at the time of the elections last November to stimulate intelligent public interest, it appears that considerable public education and experience will be required before an effective board of education system can be established in Japan. The result has been that primary and secondary schools are in many cases without guidance or control to help them through the difficult transitional period.

On the higher education level, the situation is critical. Japanese Government plans called for enactment by the recent Diet of a university law which would provide for the equivalent of boards of trustees in the United States to control the operations of new system colleges. This bill became the subject of intense controversy and was not passed, with the result that there is at present no effective system of control for most colleges or universities. (The Japanese word daigaku refers indiscriminately to colleges and universities.) In the case of established colleges and universities, this deficiency has not been critical because of the long familiarity on the part of college and university administrators with the problems they must handle. In the case of new colleges, however, attempts to conform with the requirements laid down by law for colleges and to organize what used to be higher schools and technical schools into effective colleges have proved for the most part futile. Until some satisfactory solution of the problem of university control can be devised, a solution which appears difficult because of intense opposition to current proposals,

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there is little prospect that the new higher education system will be successfully installed in the near future.

Private schools have not been so severely affected by the decentralization program since they are, for the most part, autonomous. Those private schools, however, making the transition from higher schools or technical schools to colleges have encountered some of the difficulties met by the corresponding public schools, primarily those connected with education standards and provisions for control of operations. To meet the standards prescribed by the University Accreditation Committee, private schools as well as public institutions have been forced to expand their activities to include diversified curricula; the resulting financial burden and confusion have been considerable.

The role of the Education Ministry has been a difficult one since, in effect, it has had to plan and execute its own loss of tremendous power. The Education Ministry Establishment Law passed by the recent Diet states that the functions of the Education Ministry are to be largely advisory, its one remaining power of importance being to supervise national universities. The Ministry must, however, watch its actions carefully so as not to appear to be exercising powers of control over educational institutions other than national universities. Several committees consisting of educators and public figures have been chosen to assist the Ministry and to facilitate the nation-wide decentralization program. The Education Reform Council headed by President NAMBARA Shigeru of Tokyo National University has played a prominent part in advising the Ministry because of recent sharp disagreements with the Ministry (and with Headquarters Civil Information & Education Section) over the problem of college control, has lost much of its influence. An Education and Cultural Council, consisting of ten prominent public figures, was selected early this year to recommend general policy for the Japanese educational system; widespread fear that this policy would prove to be a modified version of the former Imperial Rescript has narrowly circumscribed the activities of the Council.

Administrative problems connected with the recruitment and training of teachers have also proved severe. The purge of nationalistic teachers resulted in the

resignation

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resignation or removal of approximately ten per cent of all school and college teachers in Japan. The teaching profession, because of the purge and depressed financial conditions, has become extremely reduced in number. In addition, the personnel readjustment now being conducted by the Japanese Government calls for elimination of about ten per cent of the present elementary school teachers (there are at present about 280,000 elementary school teachers) and about five per cent of the teachers in secondary schools (estimated at about 210,000 teachers). Education Ministry officials state that most of the teachers discharged as a result of the personnel readjustment will be re-hired in other educational institutions, a procedure which will not increase the existing shortage of teachers but which would seem somewhat inconsistent with the readjustment program. An even more serious problem is presented by the scarcity of students willing to enter normal schools: the Education Ministry has planned to train 100,000 teachers for primary and secondary schools but has found that very few students are at present interested in the teaching profession. The fact that normal schools are being absorbed into the new college system and have lost their highly preferred financial status has further contributed to the decline in teaching prospects.

Other administrative difficulties have been met. Parent-Teacher Associations have been established to stimulate interest in education problems and to advise local educational institutions. In many instances, however, these associations have been victimized either by local bosses or by wealthy people eager to advance private interests. As a form of subsidy to the educational system, parents have been requested to contribute to their local Parent-Teacher Associations, which in turn use the funds collected for education purposes. These funds are, in most cases, extremely valuable to the local institutions but their almost compulsory nature has caused some resentment and considerable difficulty in collection.

Another administrative problem is presented by students in institutions transferred from the status of higher schools to that of colleges, as well as those in colleges changed from the three year system to the four year system. Educators have had a hard time in prescribing standards to be complied with by these students, and it appears likely that those

students

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students caught by the transition will, for a period of about six academic years, have a relatively spotty background.

An interesting situation is presented by the efforts of the Education Ministry to test the desirability of teaching romaji in elementary schools. In September of 1948, ninety elementary schools throughout Japan were chosen for the conduct of experimental classes in romaji. After one academic year, these schools were given the option of continuing or of dropping the experiment. Other schools were also given the opportunity of conducting the program with the result that there are now 94 elementary schools teaching romaji. The experiment has not proved very popular and has encountered opposition from Parent-Teacher Associations. The fact that a confused system of romaji, a combination of the Hepburn system and of the prewar official system, is being used has not been conducive to the simplicity or feasibility of romaji as an alternative to kanji and kana. Japanese periodicals have in several instances reached the somewhat inverted conclusion that romaji is far from being accepted in Japan.

#### Financial Difficulties.

Undoubtedly, the most serious problem in Japanese education is financial. The budget approved by the last Diet made provision for only the bare essentials of the educational system, as a result of a decision by Occupation and Japanese authorities that many of the needs of the education system would have to be sacrificed in order to help achieve a balanced budget.

The general account of the 1949-1950 budget provides for about thirty-four billion five hundred million yen for education purposes. The Education Ministry had requested one hundred one billion yen, a figure which the Finance Ministry reduced to thirty-six billion and the Dodge Mission to the sum finally enacted. The figure as approved represents slightly less than five per cent of the budget for the 1949-1950 fiscal year and is proportionately about one and one half per cent less than was approved for the 1948-1949 fiscal year.

The specific provisions made by the general account

budget

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budget for education purposes are as follows:

Elementary school teachers salaries	¥ 13,000,000,000
New middle school system	8,400,000,000
New university system	1,000,000,000
Part-time high school system	500,000,000
Education Ministry	11,200,000,000

Elementary schools and private schools were omitted from the budget and thus will suffer most heavily in the coming year, nor was any special provision made for school construction purposes, although the Education Ministry estimates that about sixty-five thousand new classrooms are required.

In theory, a considerable portion of the financial burden of the new system is to be borne by prefectural and local bodies. Local finances, however, are in even more perilous condition than those of the national government and it is unlikely that the educational system will derive much support from this source for many years.

The results of these straitened financial provisions has been to create widespread uncertainty and fear. In April 1948 the Education Ministry required a three-fold increase in tuition paid by students attending government-supported schools. It had been hoped that government subsidization would serve to reduce the tuition but it now appears that further increases will be necessary.

Nor can the salaries of teachers be increased. The low pay and generally unattractive conditions available for teachers in Japan have resulted in an increasing shortage of persons willing to enter the profession. The inability of the government to alleviate these conditions will probably exaggerate this tendency.

Private schools are particularly hard hit by the lack of government subsidies. It is estimated that about 45 per cent of Japan's colleges and universities are privately supported and that about 26 per cent of Japan's lower education schools are private. Without government support many of these will be forced

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to fold up. Already the tuition paid by students at private schools is several times higher than that required by government schools. In the absence of government subsidies many private schools will be unable to attract students, particularly now that the government-supported school system is able, even though on a very overcrowded basis, to handle virtually all Japan's lower school students.

Another discouraging by-product of these budgetary restrictions is the tendency of local officials to resign from office or to be recalled by their constituencies because they are unable properly to administer their local educational systems. Over one hundred mayors or village heads have resigned because of their inability to cope with local financial conditions, particularly as a result of educational difficulties. Over twenty-five mayors and local assemblymen have been recalled by their constituencies for the same reason. In Wakayama Prefecture alone, 27 officials have resigned and three have been recalled because of their inability or unwillingness to handle local education problems.

Many commentators and critics are now saying that nine years free education is too expensive a luxury for Japan. They point to the 1949-1950 budget and to the general confusion prevailing in elementary educational institutions as evidence of the undesirability of the new system and as proof of the superiority of the old. Without doubt, many of Japan's educational problems, particularly those connected with lower education, could be solved if there were enough money to be used for this purpose. It is clear that Japan's education is suffering just as other aspects of Japanese life are suffering because of severe economic depression.

#### Opposition to Changes in the Educational System.

Many Japanese from all walks of life are today protesting against some of the changes being made in Japan's education. Most of these protests appear to be sincere although it is undeniable that some are politically motivated, particularly in the case of communists.

Underlying this opposition appears to be both

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conservative



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conservative dislike of change and strong pride in the prewar system. Many Japanese say that they are unable to understand why the new 6-3-3-4 system has been installed in place of the previous system; they say that the faults of the old system could have been removed without such a radical reform, particularly in the case of higher education. The fact that the new system is a wholesale transplantation of the American system appears to have caused many well-disposed Japanese some doubt that Japanese traditions and institutions are being subjected to needless Americanization and have led those with anti-Occupation sentiments to talk of "colonization".

The objection that the new college system unduly emphasizes vocational subjects and will be too standardized to permit specialization by qualified colleges and universities is widespread. Many Japanese educators now profess that the aim of prewar education in Japanese universities was the search after truth and that under the new system these colleges and universities will be forced to teach technical and professional subjects without emphasis on abstract theory.

An interesting sidelight on the problem of theoretical versus practical training is offered by the plan of the University Accreditation Committee, established by the National School Establishment Law, to introduce principles of general education into the Japanese system. All college students must now select at least two courses in the three fields of general education - humanities, social science, and natural science. The controversy now prevalent in the United States over the merits of general education has not yet started in Japan, but it would seem that the emphasis placed on general and theoretical knowledge by the general education plan should serve, in part at least, as an antidote for those in Japan who are protesting against the vocational aspect of the new system.

University Bill. The most striking example of opposition to the new system in Japan is presented by the University Bill, which, although it has not been submitted to the Diet and is not yet in final draft form, has provoked a storm of opposition from all groups in Japan.

In July 1948 the government made public a draft  
of the education

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of the education bill which it planned to submit after consultation to the Diet. This bill called for a University Governing Board consisting of 13 members to direct the operations of each national university. The 13 members of the board were to be chosen on the basis of three members from the faculty, three members from the alumni, three members from the local political body (either National Diet members from the local constituency or members of the prefectural assemblies), three members elected from the general public, and the president of the college or university. In addition to this governing board, there would be a Central Advisory Committee to recommend and advise on policy for higher education in Japan. This draft University Bill also called for reduction of the number of teachers in Japanese colleges by providing one teacher for every fifteen students.

Opposition to the University Bill is based mainly on the objection that control of college and university affairs would be in the hands of local laymen rather than in the hands of the university, particularly the faculty, and that, as a result, the university would lose autonomy and would tend to become responsive to the wishes of laymen rather than professional educators. Former imperial universities have been particularly vociferous in objecting, for professional reasons, to the University Bill. Student groups and others have resorted to the more simple argument that universities would become a tool in the hands of local bosses with the result that free education would be destroyed. It is also claimed that the number of teachers in an institution of higher education cannot be arbitrarily limited by the number of students. Opposition to the University Bill, for all of these reasons, has been intense and the government now appears to have reached an impasse in its efforts to propose a solution to the problem of college and university control. Both the Civil Information and Education Section of Headquarters and the Education Ministry are reported to be studying and preparing drafts which will prove acceptable to the Diet and the general public, but in view of the opposition to the University Bill, it would seem likely that the principle of local control will have to be severely modified. There is at present no indication when a draft university bill will be prepared for submission to the Diet.

Student Groups. The only student group of significance

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in Japan today



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in Japan today is the National Federation of Student Groups, which was organized following the tuition raise of June 1948 and claims an organization of about 350,000 members in 400 colleges. There seem to be no other influential student groups either on a higher education level or in lower education, although there are many political and social organizations which claim large numbers of students as members.

Control of the National Federation of Student Groups is leftist, although not predominately communist. The Federation has, however, followed the party line consistently in opposing government proposals in the field of education: it attacked the budget allocations in the 1949-1950 budget; it criticized the government for not publicizing bills submitted to the Diet in regard to education; it claimed that the government suppressed teachers' unions; it attacked the National School Establishment Law and the Teachers License Law.

Its most violent protests have been directed against the University Bill. In May 1949 the Federation called for nation-wide strikes in colleges and universities against this bill with the result that over one hundred schools were struck for periods from several hours to a week; established institutions like Tokyo University and Tokyo Womens College participated wholeheartedly in the strike. When Tokyo University officials suspended twenty students for participation in the strike, the Federation called for a second strike in June with the result that during the first two weeks of the month several departments of Tokyo University were inoperative. The Tokyo University strike finally collapsed as the students lost interest in both the University Bill and the suspension. This pattern of waning interest appears to be common in student strikes: usually a protest meeting is called by the National Students Federation at which a large number of students attend and become violently incensed over some political issue or grievance toward the faculty; a strike is called and for a day or so is eagerly participated in; thereafter all but a few of the hardened core of student agitators lose interest and generally the situation becomes normal within four or five days.

The Education Ministry has attempted on several occasions to control activity by striking students. In October 1948 an instruction was issued by the Ministry stating that government-supported educational institutions must be politically neutral and protect the freedom of education; the instruction prohibited political

activity

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activity in support of a political party on the campus. This order was roundly attacked by the students and the leftist press and no serious efforts were made to put it into effect. Again in June of this year the Education Minister issued a statement indicating his concern over political activity by students, stating that strikes usually were the result of agitation by a small minority of students and frequently resulted from pressure on students exerted by groups having no connection with educational institutions. The Ministry has, however, been almost powerless to do anything about student agitation.

An example of student interference with university administration is offered by the attempts of Waseda University in Tokyo, a private institution, to elect a president. The provision for election of a university president was in itself novel, calling for a vote by 82 electors, all persons connected with the university, to choose the new president. A president was elected in May 1949 but a committee of students opposed the result on the ground that at least five of the electors should have been disqualified because they were considered subject to Japanese Government purge ordinances. The students therefore took steps to prevent the installation of the president with the result that the administration of Waseda is now severely handicapped.

It would appear that Japanese students, particularly in higher education, are confused during this transition period and are therefore susceptible to emotional or political pressure causing them to strike or agitate against virtually all forms of control. One newspaper has commented that students in Japan today react in a way similar to young officers in the Japanese army during the 1930's in that they readily take law and order into their own hands because of intense excitement over some relatively minor issue or imagined oppression.

Political Activity by Teachers. Japanese teachers, both in schools and in colleges, have been taking part in political activities on an unprecedented scale. It is likely that depressed economic conditions, together with a natural desire for change and improvement, have caused most teachers to turn to agitation and political

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means



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means in order to ameliorate their conditions. In addition, it is clear that many teachers have been strongly influenced by communism. Earlier in the Occupation, teachers unions, particularly the enormous Japan Teachers Union, presented considerable difficulty but these unions, as such, appear to have lost much of their influence and now teachers who engage in political activity seem to do so for strictly political reasons.

Political activity by teachers is regulated by the Education Standards Law which states in Article eight that teachers in government schools are prohibited from engaging in political activity including political education in support of or in opposition to particular political parties. The Education Ministry has clarified this prohibition by stating that teachers are not permitted to go to pupils' homes in order to distribute party literature, to teach party songs, or otherwise to propagandize for political parties; the right of teachers to belong to political parties and to engage in normal political activity is not impaired. Article five of the Teachers License Law also states that teachers who organize or participate in political parties or groups advocating the forceful overthrow of government established in accordance with the constitution are disqualified from teaching.

There have been several instances where the government or prefectures have enforced these restrictions and it appears that political activity by teachers is now subject to sufficient control. There has even been one case where a senior high school teacher was disqualified from teaching under the purge ordinance because he supported the Communist Party in his classroom activities. It is impossible to estimate the number of teachers who are communistically inclined or to evaluate their influence in the schools; it would appear that this influence is considerable but not dangerous.

Political Party Opposition. Among political parties, the Communists have taken the lead in opposing changes in the educational system. As might be expected, their opposition appears to be motivated more by the desire to cause confusion than by any disagreement with the merits of the proposed changes. Secretary General TOKUDA Kyuichi of the Communist Party, in his report to the Party made on June 18 and 19, 1949, stated that education and culture in Japan are deteriorating, that the 6-3 educational system and the

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Bill are measures by the traitorous Yoshida Government to enslave the people and are opposed by everyone, and that the Democratic Liberal Party is losing the confidence of the people by such measures. This official statement clearly reflects the attitude of the Communist Party and has been the basis of operations by communist groups throughout Japan. Communists constantly prate about "education for capitalism" and "colonization". Through its Young Communist League and Democratization League the party has been active in recruiting students and in creating opposition to all changes in the field of education.

The Communists have been particularly successful in enlisting the sympathy of students who are not members of the party and who appear on other grounds to oppose communist principles. As a result, when communist groups and the leftist Federation of Student Groups call for demonstrations and strikes against educational proposals, they are able to enlist large numbers of students who are not Communists but who appear genuinely to resent certain Occupation or Japanese Government policies. This ability to sway politically undecided or immature students has been carried over into fields other than education: for example, in the strike conducted in late May 1949, in Tokyo against the Public Safety ordinance approved by the government, over 70 per cent of the demonstrators were students. It appears that the Communist Party has resorted to recruiting of students for demonstration purposes in many instances where government workers are prohibited by law from participating. This tendency is most disturbing, both from the point of view of education and from the point of view of political activity in general.

The Socialist Party has also adopted a position of modified opposition to educational changes. It opposed the order issued on June 25, 1945, by the Education Ministry, restricting political activity by teachers and students on the ground that the prohibition restricted legitimate political activity. If the Ministry's order were examined in the light of practice in American schools, this objection would seem to be legitimate, but from the point of view of disturbed conditions in Japan today, the Ministry may have been justified in going this far. The Socialist Party has also declared opposition to other aspects of the government's educational program but has done little in the way of putting into effect its

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Despatch No. 488,  
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objections.

Conclusion.

The above summary is confined to discussion of the most pressing problems in the field of Japan's education, and therefore has not dealt with the many substantial accomplishments that have been made. It is probable that with the passage of time many of the difficulties discussed above will be mitigated and many of the problems solved. Until Japan's financial position has improved, however, and until more money can be devoted to education, there is little prospect for great improvement. Until that time, the field of education is likely to continue to be a fertile one for opposition to Occupation-inspired changes. For the present, it appears that certain Headquarters policies, although they seem to be in general conformity with Allied policy as prescribed by the Far Eastern Commission, will not be successful, particularly those altering the structure of control of college and university education in Japan, and it is probable that Japan's future educational system will be very much of a compromise between the old as represented by the prewar system in Japan and the new as based on American education.

Richard B. Finn  
Foreign Service Officer

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FORM DS-378  
2-2-48

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Division of Language Services

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*HEP*

TC No. 12046

T-26

TRANSLATOR'S SUMMARY OF COMMUNICATION

Language: French

Date of Communication: September 24, 1949

Addressed to: Mr. Joseph Grew

Name and address of writer: (Mr.) Pierre Laurent  
Ecole Supérieure des Sciences  
Laboratoire de Chimie  
Hanoi  
Indochina

*DC/R*  
*file*

Substance of writer's statement:

The writer, a professor at the Technological Institute of the University of Hanoi, Indochina, approaches Mr. Grew in regard to the proposed Christian University in Tokyo. He is teaching chemistry at the University of Hanoi and wishes to establish some form of intellectual cooperation in the Far East. He has travelled very <sup>widely</sup> and worked at the Universities of Liverpool, Stanford, and in Germany.

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REMARKS:

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DIVISION - (104) H.K.

OCT 12 1949

Ref. to Japan Intex. Christian  
Univ. Foundation New York  
Department of State

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GENERAL INQUIRY UNIT  
FOR EUROPE BRANCH  
DC/R

OCT 11 1949

To IEP for action  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
J.A. Maurer  
*file*

CS/H

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FORM DS-378  
2-2-48DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Division of Language ServicesTC No. 12046

T-26

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REMARKS:



Universite D'HANOI

HANOI, le 24 Septembre 1949

ECOLE SUPERIEURE DES SCIENCES  
LABORATOIRE DE CHIMIE

Tel 211

P. A. LAURENT  
ProfesseurPierre LAURENT,  
Directeur de l'Ecole Superieure des Sciences,NO.-  
49/ESS/PAL/B.-

Monsieur Joseph GREW,

a

(S/C. du DEPARTMENT OF STATE)WASHINGTON, D.C.

Cher Monsieur,

Par le presse j'apprends que vous avez le projet d'organiser une Universite Chretienne a TOKIO.

A titre tout-a-fait prive, et dans le but de trouver une eventuelle forme de cooperation intellectuelle en Extreme-Orient, je viens prendre contact avec vous.

- J'ai commence ma carriere universitaire en France en 1938.

- J'enseigne actuellement la Chimie a l'Universite de HANOI ou j'ai la charge de diriger la Faculte des Sciences.

- J'ai beaucoup voyage et travaille aux Universite de LIVERPOOL, STANDFORD et dans les Universites allemandes.

J'ai la conviction qu'il faille tout faire pour obtenir une cooperation aussi etroitement que possible entre les intellectuels d'Extreme-Orient ou la densite scientifique moderne est trop faible, et c'est ce sentiment qui est a l'origine de cette lettre.

En attendant le plaisir de vous lire, je vous prie de croire, Cher Monsieur, a mes meilleurs sentiments.

/S/ Pierre LAURENT,



DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Action Assigned to *NA*  
INCOMING TELEGRAM  
Action Taken *Noted*

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Date of Action *Oct. 24/49*

OCT 24 1949 Control 8636

Action Office Symbol *NA*

Rec'd October 21, 1949  
9:36 p.m.

Name of Officer *W. H. Bell*

FROM: Seoul  
Direction to DC/R *file*

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1304, *nc* October 21, 5 p.m.

*894.42*  
*xR 394.9564*

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*894.4016*

At weekly conference with foreign correspondents this morning, President Rhee was asked about closing of Korean Schools in Japan by Japanese Government. Rhee remarked this was "serious situation". He intimated SCAP seemed powerless to ease situation. He said he had instructed Korean representative in Japan to "find out what is going on". Rhee said it reported schools in question were supported by Communists, so "we want to find out the truth". Rhee added: "If the Japanese Government or SCAP shows discrimination against Koreans there, we will have to consider it a serious situation. We have endured the anti-Korean attitude long enough."

*xR 895.20*

Rhee also termed Ongjin clash "a very serious situation." He said it largest-scale attack thus far made in that area and it might be beginning of trouble, adding he had it from three different sources, Korean, Chinese and American, that North Korea "is getting ready to come South". He went on to say "large numbers of Chinese Communists already are in North Korea. Soviet authorities are encouraging them take action now. According reports that come to me, it seems that Chinese Communists and Korean Commission in the North are concentrating their forces to come south and take all Korea." Continuing, Rhee said: "We will not let up on our preparedness. Our friends in Washington, realizing the critical situation we are in, should help us materially as much as they can. The trouble is it takes time. It is difficult to decide. Our people are clamoring for weapons. Our police are not too well equipped. Reports indicate that the US has given us large sums of money, but most of it was spent on Military Government. The large quantity of weapons and munitions left here by the US Army was turned over to the Korean Government. It looks big to a small country

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*10-21-49*

DCR NE Unit

*W. H. Bell*

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-2- 1304, October 21, 5 p.m. from Seoul.

but our army is not sufficiently equipped. Everyone wants weapons to protect themselves, their homes and their villages." Rhee then went on emphatically to state: "I would be willing to sell anything we possess to get some weapons. The US is doing much but it is for economic aid...buildings, industry, etc."

Rhee said he did not feel his program for 100,000 standing army and 200,000 national guard was strong enough. "We are not a military nation and anyone knowing our situation could not call us a military nation," he said. "We think our needs are most urgent. We need arms." Rhee then added he did not ask the US to fight for Korea, but he wanted Korea to fight for itself and clean up local situation. Continuing, Rhee said: "We cannot move without starting an international situation. We need weapons. Men and women both want to prepare so when our enemies come in we can resist and you'll see some fighting. Korean people will not yield. They will resist." Indicating he felt it would be easier to defend Yalu River boundary than 38th parallel, Rhee deplored fact that Koreans in North and South could not get together to settle their troubles by themselves without danger of starting world war. He then expressed hope UN could do something to help keep peace. Addressing correspondents, Rhee then said: "Please have faith in us. We will do it if we have aid. We can clean it up in the North. But you say it will mean world war, so we keep quiet."

Repeated SCAP Tokyo 193.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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No. 734

Office of the U. S. Political Adviser  
for Japan

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6 DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS  
Tokyo, October 21, 1949.

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NOV - 8 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION  
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Subject: Closure of Korean Schools.

scm

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

*894.00 / 9-10-49*

Referring to my A-230 of September 10, 1949, reporting the dissolution of three left-wing Korean organizations by order of the Japanese Government, I have the honor to report that the Government issued orders on October 19, 1949, closing all Korean schools operated by the recently outlawed leftist organizations, at the same time notifying other Korean schools not in possession of official permits to reorganize within a period of two weeks in order to place themselves in a position to apply for permission to reopen.

While the Government's sudden action against the schools in question can be taken as a logical consequence of the September dissolution of left-wing Korean organizations, which entailed confiscation of their property, it came as a surprise to the Korean community and to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo. The closure was given the appearance of an independent action by the Japanese Government, although it is generally considered that it would not have been carried out without some indication of approval from General Headquarters. The full text of the English-language Nippon Times (October 20) account of the action forms the first enclosure to this despatch.

1/

The Department will recall that the Koreans rebelled and staged large-scale demonstrations in March and April of last year as a result of a decision to enforce the Japanese laws with respect to the illegally-operated Korean schools in this country. The question again came under study in April of this year, when representatives of various interested Headquarters sections discussed together the question of the deteriorating situation with respect to the Korean schools, particularly in Yamaguchi Prefecture. At that time, it was considered important that some action be taken to bring Korean schools into line with Japanese law and with the Japanese educational system. The subject was discussed with the Korean Ambassador by Mr. Huston on May 16, 1949, at which time the Ambassador was apprised of the seriousness with which Headquarters viewed the circumstances

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Tokyo's 734,  
October 21, 1949.

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and conditions under which the Korean schools were continuing to operate. Although the Ambassador indicated his appreciation of Headquarters' position in the matter and manifested ready willingness to cooperate in regularizing the operation of the Korean schools, the Mission has not known of any subsequent action on his part in the premises. A complete account of the action and correspondence involved in this question at that time is contained in despatch no. 351 of May 31, 1949, together with its several enclosures. *894.42/5-3149*

2/ Although various recommendations put forward by this Mission in its capacity as Diplomatic Section in its check note of May 28, 1949 (en-closure no. 6 to despatch just cited), and subsequently in a CIE (Civil Information and Education) check note dated June 13, 1949, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, no further action in the premises is known to have been directed or approved by General Headquarters.

Thus, while it is natural to assume that at least some officials in Headquarters were aware of the measures contemplated by the Japanese Government to effect the present closure, it would appear that the closure can be considered as having been an independent action on the part of the Japanese Government. General MacARTHUR informed me yesterday evening that he had no knowledge of the action being taken by the Japanese Government until it was announced, and the Chief of Staff told me today that he likewise was taken by surprise.

3/ The Korean Ambassador called on me on October 20, 1949, to ascertain the underlying reasons for the sudden closure of the Korean schools and to express his concern over the fact that he had not been given advance information of the contemplated action. A copy of a memorandum of our conversation is enclosed herewith. Today the Ambassador held a press conference in the course of which he stated that he had not been consulted regarding the closure of the Korean schools and asked the support of the press in his efforts to ensure proper consideration for the rights of the Korean community in connection with the school problem. He also is quoted as having said that he had filed with me a request that the forcibly closed schools be turned over to the Korean Mission and reopened under its direction. Actually, no such proposal was made to me.

G-2 comment as of today regarding the reaction of the Korean community to the school closing is as follows:

"The calm almost subdued manner with which the Koreans accepted the closure of their schools contrasts sharply with the violent reaction to somewhat similar orders issued in March and April of 1948. It is believed that the dissolution of the League of Koreans, coupled with the failure of the Japan Communist Party to support the leftist Koreans, has left the radical Koreans without the leadership and unity of action necessary for coordinated mob riots."

Respectfully yours,

*W. J. Sebald*  
W. J. Sebald

Enclosures (3):

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Tokyo's 734  
October 21, 1949.

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosures(3): *att.*

1. Copy of full text of the English-language Nippon Times (October 20) account of the closure of Korean schools.
2. Copy of check note from CIE to DCS (SCAP) dated 13 June 1949, subject: Korean School Situation.
3. Copy of Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from W. J. Sebald dated 20 October 1949, regarding conversation between the Korean Ambassador and Mr. Sebald on the subject of Closure of Korean Schools.

*gwm*  
350  
CKHuston:cs

Copy to Amembassy, Seoul.

Parchment Mat to Department.

CONFIDENTIAL



Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 734 dated October 21, 1949 from the Office of the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: "Closure of Korean Schools".

CONFIDENTIAL

(COPY)

(Nippon Times, Tokyo, October 20, 1949)

KOREAN SCHOOLS IN JAPAN; PROPERTY SEIZED

Some Told to Reorganize In 2 Weeks and Apply for Permits

The Government yesterday ordered the closure of all Korean schools operated by the recently outlawed leftist League of Koreans in Japan (Choren) and the League of Democratic Korean Youths (Minsei), both of which were banned on September 8.

At the same time, the Government notified all Korean schools, other than those operated by these two organizations and not possessing permits, to reorganize within a period of two weeks and to apply for permission to reopen.

Out of a total number of 274 Korean schools in Japan, including 91 branch schools, with a student population of 40,939 and 1,357 teachers, 57 schools will be closed immediately and 55 schools, operating without permits, will be forced to reorganize, according to Education Ministry figures as of August 1.

Of the 57 Choren schools, 51 are elementary schools (6,475 pupils), one middle (290 pupils), one high school, and four special schools (number of pupils unknown for last two categories).

The 55 schools ordered to reorganize have a student population of 5,900 pupils.

The Education Ministry also issued instructions to prefectural Education Boards to remove the former members of the outlawed Choren and Minsei from executive posts in school administration cooperatives, and organizations sponsoring schools.

#### Assets to Be Frozen

Attorney General Shunkichi Ueda announced yesterday that all the property of the banned Korean educational institutions would be confiscated and the liquid assets frozen.

Educational Minister Sotaro Takase stated that the closing of Korean schools was not intended to rob Korean children of educational opportunities or to discriminate against Koreans in general.

He stated that various local schools had been prepared to accept Korean children and that all necessary supplementary courses had been taken care of for these new entrants.

Students attending these banned schools, incidentally, may enter either Japanese schools or schools operated by the rightist Korean Residents League (Mindan), the majority of which were not ordered closed.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Education



Encl. 1 to  
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The Education Ministry issued a statement claiming that the Choren had violated a fundamental understanding reached with the Ministry following the bloody Korean riots in Kobe last April, to carry out the education of Korean residents in Japan in line with Japanese educational laws.

The statement also charged that biased education, favorable to ideologies sponsored by the outlawed Choren had been taught in these institutions.

According to the INS, Maj. Gen. E. M. Almond, Chief of Staff, "had directed the Japanese Government to make its own decision in ordering the seizure."

The UP reported that Dr. A. K. Loomis, chief of SCAP's Education Division, said "the Occupation Headquarters had neither approved nor disapproved the Government's actions. The matter is entirely under their jurisdiction, and I have not been informed of what is contemplated on the future operation of the Korean schools."

Meanwhile, in contrast to the bloodshed that followed the closing of Korean schools in April last year in the Osaka-Kobe area, the situation throughout Japan was reported comparatively quiet.

Minor disturbances were reported from various parts of Japan. In Yokohama, Koreans erected a barricade around one school preventing the confiscation of the school's property.

In Fukuoka, a dozen Korean adults and 260 children staged a sit-down strike in a classroom of an elementary school, while in Shimonoseki, Koreans demonstrated, broke school fences and besieged the city hall. One pupil was arrested.

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CONFIDENTIAL



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Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 734 dated October 21, 1949 from the Office of the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: "Closure of Korean Schools".

(COPY)

C H E C K S H E E T

Lt. Col. Nugent  
26-5010

Subject: Korean School Situation

From: CIE

To: DCS (SCAP)  
ATTN: General Keyser

Date: 13 June 1949

1. Reference is made to checknote, DS to DCS (SCAP), subject "Korean Schools in Yamaguchi Prefecture." dated 28 May 1949, and to recommendations by Lt. Col. Slocum arising therefrom.
2. Careful consideration has been given to recommendations made in reference checknote. As a result of study and conference regarding the matter, it is considered that the recommendations have merit only if certain additional provisions are included.
3. Reference para. 5., b., reference checknote, it is considered that the Japanese Government certainly will balk at issuing any such statement as is suggested unless there is a clear and unequivocal official statement by this headquarters regarding the legal status of Koreans resident in Japan. Although this headquarters issued two press releases in late 1946 regarding the legal status of Koreans who did not elect to accept repatriation, the Koreans have never accepted this status and, in numerous instances, have demanded a special status as a "liberated people." It is understood that the Head of the Korean Mission in Japan has submitted a paper to this headquarters requesting a new and special status for Koreans. The problem is complicated further by the fact that a Korean Government has been organized in South Korea; it has been recognized by the United States and other powers; it has been admitted to the United Nations; and it maintains in Japan a mission legally accredited to SCAP. Although verbal assurances were given Japanese authorities last year that Koreans resident in Japan were subject to Japanese law, the Japanese hesitate to take further drastic action on the basis of such verbal assurances. In the absence of a clear and unequivocal official statement by this headquarters, it is considered by CIE that any statement by the Japanese government education authorities "calling for compliance with Japanese education requirements by Koreans and stating that the law will be strictly enforced beginning with the next term." would result in immediate demonstrations, riots, and bloodshed. Further, the issuance of any such statement by the Japanese authorities, unless they are prepared to enforce it, would only worsen the existing anomalous situation. If "directed" to issue such a statement, Japanese authorities undoubtedly would request a written order (as in the case of Paper Allocation for Party Organs) in order to throw the responsibility upon SCAP. The position of the Korean Ambassador in the event such a statement were

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issued



Encl. 2 to  
Tokyo's 734  
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issued is difficult to predict. He has expressed great concern about Korean students receiving their education in some of the present Korean schools; he has refused to commit himself with regard to cooperative effort to abolish all Korean schools or take drastic corrective action, much less as to the compulsory transfer of Korean students to Japanese schools.

4. Reference para. 5, c., reference checknote, it is considered extremely doubtful that Military Government officials, in the absence of directive from this headquarters, would wish to issue statements to the effect that "all persons in Japan not connected with the Occupation are required to abide by these (Japanese education) laws." The issuance of such statements would carry the implication that Occupation authorities would support Japanese authorities in insuring that all Japanese laws pertaining to education were obeyed by Koreans. In the present weakened state of the Japanese police, it is reasonable to assume that Occupation support would have to be something other than moral, involving the use of troops. Recommendation to this effect was made previously by CIE but to date has not been approved. It is therefore considered desirable that clarification be provided Military Government before any such statement is issued. By whom are "all persons in Japan not connected with the Occupation required to abide by these laws"? If by SCAP, is SCAP prepared to authorize the use of troops to insure that Japanese laws are obeyed in the event that the Japanese police cannot do so?

5. Reference para. 6, reference checknote, DS believes that the issuance of statements will "inform Koreans precisely of their obligations in this matter and of the position of the Occupation." It is the opinion of CIE that Koreans already know their obligations in this matter and have no intention whatever of abiding by them. It is pertinent to inquire; "What is the position of the Occupation in this matter? Is the Occupation prepared to insure that Japanese law (in this matter) is observed?"

6. The attitude of the Korean Ambassador regarding the whole question of Korean schools deserves further consideration. To date, as noted above, he has refused to take a positive stand on the matter of Korean schools. (Para. 2, reference checknote, bears this out). Apart from the considerations mentioned in para. 3, reference checknote, the Ambassador doubtless realizes that even should he take a strong stand on the school question, even if he ordered compliance on the part of Koreans with Japanese law (and jeopardized his position thereby), the League of Koreans Resident in Japan which operates the schools and which is North Korean in sympathy and communist dominated, would ignore his statements and would defy him, as they have the Japanese authorities, to take action.

7. The status of the North Korean flag must be considered. This flag and other symbols of allegiance to the North Korean regime are displayed openly and defiantly by Korean schools and other organizations affiliated with the League of Koreans Resident in Japan. The Japanese authorities fear to take action in the matter unless ordered to do so by Occupation authorities. There appears to be considerable question in the minds of Eighth Army personnel as to whether or not sufficient authority exists at present under which to take repressive or punitive action. It is the opinion of CIE that this is a question which cannot be ignored.

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8. It must be



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8. It must be recognized that the problem of the Korean schools is but one part of a larger and more basic problem. Behind the schools is the League of Koreans Resident in Japan, an organization recognized by G-2 and other Occupation agencies as subversive to the Occupation and its mission. The League is known to be communist dominated, it is almost 100% loyal to the North Korean regime; it openly defies the South Korean Government; it defies, openly or covertly, the Japanese authorities. The school problem cannot be attacked without immediate repercussions from the League in the form of demonstrations, violence, and probably bloodshed. These demonstrations would be supported by and participated in by Japanese communists and other leftists. That the Japanese authorities, unsupported, cannot cope with such demonstrations and violence has been demonstrated on several occasions. That, under existing conditions, they lack the will to take action which will result inevitably in such violence by organized minorities is understandable.

9. It has been suggested that the school problem might be solved by making Japanese schools sufficiently attractive to lure Korean students away from their present schools. It is possible that a small number of Korean parents might be influenced to transfer their children to Japanese schools. It must be borne in mind, however, that the principal object of the League of Koreans Resident in Japan is to concentrate Korean children in non-Japanese schools in order that their education may be in the Korean language, in Korean subject matter, and that the children may be indoctrinated thoroughly in communist doctrine and loyalty to the North Korean regime. The League will resist with all means at its disposal every effort to effect the transfer of Korean students to Japanese schools. In Yamaguchi Prefecture the Japanese educational authorities have been prepared to accept Korean students for the past eighteen months, affording them exactly the same facilities as those provided for Japanese students. Only a very small number of Koreans have had the courage to transfer their children to Japanese schools. Usually, these are Koreans who belong to the Mindan, a small organization which does not subscribe to the tenets of the League of Koreans Resident in Japan. Japanese authorities report that as of April 1949 they had made available school facilities to care for every Korean student in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

10. DS does not believe that the agreement of 5 May 1949 between the Minister of Education and the League of Koreans Resident in Japan need be considered "since Koreans have consistently violated this agreement." This reasoning is not understood by CIE; the violation of the agreement is exactly the point at issue. Rather than being unnecessary of consideration, it appears that the question of enforcement of the agreement is one which must be faced (but see below).

11. Prior to overt action in the matter of Korean schools it is considered that the following steps must be taken:

a. The status of Koreans residing in Japan must be clarified by a clear and unequivocal statement from this Headquarters.

b. The Korean Ambassador must be influenced by DS to make his position clear in the matter of Korean schools and in the matter of the

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League



Encl. 2 to  
Tokyo's 734,  
October 21, 1949.

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League of Koreans Resident in Japan. Once the Korean Ambassador disowns the League, states definitely that the League is not recognized by the South Korean Government or its Ambassador, and that the activities of the League do not have the approval of the Korean Mission, the Ministry of Education will be in a position to abrogate its present agreement with the League concerning school matters. The Korean Ambassador must state further that any Korean schools organized by Koreans and authorized by the Ministry of Education, enjoy exactly the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities as other private schools in Japan and that any violation of Japanese educational laws by Koreans is not condoned by the Korean Mission nor will the Ambassador intercede in behalf of any Korean school or teacher apprehended by Japanese authorities or Occupation officials for violation of such laws.

c. The attitude of this headquarters with regard to the display of the North Korean flag or other symbol of the North Korean regime must be clarified in order that Occupation authorities and Japanese authorities may take appropriate action.

d. The attitude of this headquarters with regard to the problem of Korean schools must be clarified to the Japanese authorities. The implementation of a., b., and c. above will do much to clarify the headquarters attitude but many other questions remain to be resolved.

e. Eighth Army must be kept fully informed.

12. When the steps outlined in para. 11. above have been accomplished, this section believes that Japanese authorities will be in a position to take action as follows;

a. To abrogate the agreement between the Ministry of Education and the League of Koreans Resident in Japan;

b. To announce that private schools organized by Koreans will be considered for license individually and on the merits of each application by prefectural authorities in exactly the same manner that applications from non-Korean private schools are considered;

c. To announce that Korean schools properly licensed by prefectural authorities will be allowed to operate just as long as they meet the requirements of Japanese laws on education, and that continuing inspections will be made by Japanese educational authorities in order to insure compliance with such laws;

d. To announce that Japanese public schools throughout Japan are prepared to receive students of Korean nationality on exactly the same basis as Japanese students and that facilities are available for as many Korean students as wish to apply;

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e. The Ministry



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October 21, 1949.

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e. The Ministry of Education to announce to prefectural authorities that compliance with Japanese education laws on the part of all schools, both public and private (including Korean schools), is a prerequisite to national subsidies for public education to the prefectures. (This would mean that prefectural authorities who are unwilling to enforce the law with regard to Korean schools would be in danger of losing a very important part of their school revenue and would be an incentive appropriate action by the lax or weak-kneed).

13. When the steps outlined in para. 11. and 12. above have been taken, Occupation authorities, including Military Government, would be in a position to take action as follows:

a. To bring to the attention of prefectural authorities all information on steps taken by Occupation and Japanese authorities, as well as statements made by the Korean Ambassador, and inform them that they are expected to enforce all Japanese regulations regarding Japanese schools; that Military Government will exercise continuing surveillance and will report on violations; that periodic reports from Japanese authorities on Japanese surveillance will be required; and that no laxity in the enforcement of educational regulations will be tolerated;

b. Military Government personnel to maintain continuing surveillance over legally authorized Korean schools in order to insure compliance with Occupation and Japanese directives. Violations noted by Military Government or reported by Japanese educational authorities to be brought to the attention of the prefectural governor with request for immediate corrective action;

c. To issue statements through local information media to the general public and specific statements to Korean organizations concerning the licensing and operation of private schools and indicating that Japanese authorities have been directed to see that all regulations in this regard are strictly enforced;

d. To issue statements through local information media to the general public and specific statements to Korean organizations announcing that the display of the North Korean flag or any symbol denoting allegiance to the North Korean regime is prohibited by SCAP directive and that Japanese authorities have been instructed to insure compliance.

e. To issue statements through local information media to the general public and specific statements to Korean organization to the effect that Japanese public schools are prepared to receive students of Korean nationality on exactly the same basis as Japanese students.

14. Action outlined in para. 13. above would imply that Occupation authorities are ready to support Japanese authorities, if necessary, to insure compliance with Occupation and Japanese directives. It would be necessary for Eighth Army to be prepared to move troops to any part of Japan where emergency situations in this connection might arise.

15. If preliminary steps outlined in para. 11. above can be taken immediately, it is believed that a time schedule can be drawn up for accomplishing other necessary action before the end of the summer school vacation. The advantages of taking action before schools open for the autumn session are obvious.

----- D. R. N. -----

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Enclosure no. 3 to despatch no. 734 dated October 21, 1949, from the Office of the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: "Closure of Korean Schools".

(Copy)

General Headquarters  
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers  
Diplomatic Section

20 October 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

Subject: Closure of Korean Schools

Ambassador CHUNG Han-pum, Chief of the Korean Diplomatic Mission, called upon me this morning to ascertain the underlying reasons for the "sudden" closure of the Korean schools. (DS had no warning that the action was contemplated.) While recognizing that sufficient grounds probably existed for the action taken by the Japanese Government, Ambassador Chung expressed the view that the Korean Mission might have been taken into confidence by Headquarters regarding the timing of the contemplated action. He pointed out that one of the reasons for the presence in Japan of a Korean Mission is to assist the Supreme Commander in solving various problems arising with the Korean community in Japan. He stated that in the instant case the Korean Mission was taken completely by surprise, was unable to inform its Government of the action taken until after the event, and, in any case, was unable to lend its good offices in an endeavor to find an appropriate solution.

Ambassador Chung complained that as a result of the unexpected action by the Japanese Government, he and his Mission have lost considerable "face" vis-à-vis his Government and the Korean community. He said that it is hard to justify the expense of maintaining a Korean Mission in Japan if that Mission is not consulted and taken into the confidence of the authorities concerned when basic problems of this kind arise.

W. J. Sebald

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

NA-MG

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. Allison

DATE: Oct. 24, 1949

FROM : NA - Mr. Green *mg*

SUBJECT: Report on the Education Exchange Survey to Japan

This report leaves very little to be desired in the way of an objective and comprehensive survey of US-Japanese exchange programs. It bears all the hallmarks of having been closely coordinated with Coville, Overton and others in POLAD; and, according to Miss Donovan, has their complete endorsement. As is to be expected under the circumstances, the report may err a little too much in the direction of proposing an enthusiastic program which it may be beyond the means of SCAP and this Government to support.

The report addresses itself to five types of arrangements: (a) for teachers from the US to serve in Japan; (b) for study by Japanese in the US; (c) for Japanese leaders to go to the US for specialized observation; (d) for US students to visit Japan; and (e) for US research workers to do research in Japan.

Obviously the most important aspect of the Survey Mission's task (and the one which originally gave rise to their assignment) was to discuss ways and means for sending suitable, influential foreign teachers and lecturers to Occupied Japan. In this connection the Survey Mission concludes that the Japanese leaders should be the ones to determine what kinds of foreign teachers are desired, avoiding any possibility of the US being accused of "foisting" unwanted American teachers on the Japanese. Contrary to earlier SCAP statements, the Survey Mission found that logistic support is obtainable from the Japanese economy for foreign teachers provided they are not accompanied by their dependents. Quarters would be furnished by Japanese educational institutions while the regular native food rations would be supplemented by purchases from SCAP supply stores with acceptable foreign exchange. The Mission, composed of a wide representation of US education, believes that quite a few outstanding young teachers from the US would be willing to take up assignments in Japan for one or two year periods under these circumstances. They would,

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of course, have to be paid considerably higher salaries than are received by Japanese educators.

The Survey Mission alludes to one as yet untapped source for budgeting the services of US teachers in Japan: namely, the amendment to the Surplus Property Agreement recently signed between the US and Japan which specifies that the US may make use of part of the \$14 million fund derived from the sale of surplus property for "educational programs for the benefit of the citizens of both countries". It appears that there are no great obstacles to the formulation of a Fulbright or similar education exchange program between the two countries. These funds are now available only in yen, so at present would prove more valuable in aiding teachers from the US in Japan than in aiding Japanese students, etc. to come to the US. The Survey Mission has not investigated the potentialities of this source of support for US teachers in Japan but recommends that such a study be inaugurated at once. Here is one field in which I think the State Department should take the immediate initiative.

The Survey Mission assumes that any SCAP directives issued to implement its Report will be phrased as far as possible to apply to the British, French and other national groups that may be ultimately involved in education exchange with Japan.

*Notes - This seems a big advance  
to have anything we can + should do  
to expedite implementation + in  
particular to help the British get  
some of the people in - ?*

*JMG*

FE:NA:MGreen:aw



FORM DS-323  
7-18-46

OUTGOING AIRGRAM 1065

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# Department of State

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NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Washington,

1065

AMEMBASSY,

Seoul.

A-264, Dec. 9, 1949

Department suggests that, if it has not already <sup>899.42/11-249</sup> done so, the Embassy transmit a copy of its Despatch 724, November 12, 1949, to Polad, Tokyo for information.

*Korean reaction  
to the closing of  
Korean schools  
in Japan.*

ACHESON

*Acheson  
(NMM)*

894.42/11-249

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NOV 10 1949

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Office of the United States Political Adviser  
for Japan

REC'D  
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Tokyo, November 2, 1949

ACTION  
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No. 761

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INFO

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OLI

EDUCATION

Subject: Remarks by Mr. Loomis, CIE, GHQ, regarding Educational  
Legislation in Japan.

SCB

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum by Foreign Service Officer Gerald Warner reporting the remarks of Mr. Arthur K. Loomis, Chief of the Education Division of CIE, GHQ, regarding Educational Legislation in Japan.

Mr. Loomis has worked closely with the Japanese Diet since May, 1947, on educational legislation and has found the Diet effective and completely cooperative on educational matters. Mr. Loomis considers Japan to be in the forefront of nations providing compulsory education for children.

Mr. Loomis believes that educational progress in Japan will be furthered by reasonable control of the universities and private schools and by increased attention to the problem of local financing of education. He also reports that considerable attention is being paid to the teaching of principles of democracy in Japanese schools.

894.42/11-249

*9/11/74*

Enclosure: *att.*

✓ Memorandum of Remarks by  
Mr. Loomis.

Parchment Mat to the Department.

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GWarner:vw

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**NO ACTION REQUIRED**  
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**NO ACTION REQUIRED**

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RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.



UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure to Despatch no. 761 dated November 2, 1949, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Remarks by Mr. Loomis, CIE, GHQ, regarding Educational Legislation in Japan".

## MEMORANDUM

Mr. Arthur K. Loomis, Chief of the Education Division of Civil Information and Education Section of General Headquarters, spoke at the monthly luncheon meeting of the America-Japan Society on October 28, 1949, on the subject of Educational Legislation in Japan. Mr. Loomis stated that he has been in Japan since May 1947 and has ever since arrival worked very closely with the Japanese Diet on the subject of education in Japan. Mr. Loomis stated that the subject of education is covered by Articles 26 and 41 of the Constitution and that, by providing free compulsory education for nine years for children between the ages of 6-14 inclusive, Japan is in the forefront of nations which provide such education for their children.

Mr. Loomis stated that he has found the functioning of the Japanese Diet exceedingly effective in regard to matters of education, that all parties including the Communists are of one mind on this subject and have all worked together to achieve effective results in regard to education. Mr. Loomis stated that budget provisions for education are at the forefront of legislators' minds and that while much more needs to be done to provide schools and other facilities for education in Japan, the Diet takes every opportunity to assist educational progress in every possible way. Mr. Loomis stated that the School Education Law of 1946 set up the present educational system and the Board of Education Law of 1948 has been instrumental in carrying out various provisions in regard to education.

Mr. Loomis emphasized that three principal things are needed to develop education further in Japan:

1. Control of the universities. This matter has been under discussion for two years and has caused considerable unrest among university students who fear control measures which might be adopted. There are twenty-five members of a committee from all walks of life working on this important subject and it is expected that a reasonable measure of control will be devised within the near future.
2. Private schools law. Excessive control of private schools is considered to be undesirable but a modicum of control is considered necessary and it is expected that some acceptable measure of control will be worked into a suitable law for this purpose.
3. Local finance plan. This plan envisages an equalization of local governmental expenses including those for education, without an undue increase in taxation and recommendations already made in this connection in the Shoup Report will probably be adopted.

In reply to a question Mr. Loomis stated that considerable attention is being paid in the schools to the teaching of principles of democracy. Mr. Loomis stated that the text book entitled Primer of

DemocracyUNCLASSIFIED



Enclosure to Tokyo's  
Despatch no. 761,  
November 2, 1949.

-2-

Democracy has had wide distribution in the schools of Japan and several of its chapters are of particular value. He especially mentioned the chapter which traces the growth of democratic thought by Japanese in Japan from the beginning of the Meiji period up to the present. He also stated that a number of courses in democracy are offered in many of the schools under social studies and that every effort will be made to continue and increase this teaching.

GWarner:vw



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TO : Department of State

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FROM : KOBE 148 November 4, 1949

*Announcement program*  
*Nov 30/49*  
*2 Enclosures*  
*[Signature]*

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REF : ---

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SUBJECT : OBJECTION OF AMERICAN TAXPAYERS TO PAYMENT OF TUITION FOR THEIR CHILDREN IN ARMY OPERATED SCHOOLS

I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a letter addressed to this office by Mr. N. H. Briggs, the Manager of Osaka office of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company, detailing his objections to the payment of tuition fees for the schooling of his children in the United States Army operated Kobe American School. It is the understanding of this office that free schooling in the Army operated schools in Japan is limited to the children of American members of the occupation. The children of Americans not connected with the occupation and other Allied nationals are admitted to Army conducted schools on a pro rata cost basis, provided there is room in the school.

J  
JF

While this is the only formal protest to the assessment of tuition fees on American taxpayers in Japan who are not connected with the occupation which I have received, I know through informal conversations that Mr. Briggs' letter expresses the view of practically every American businessman resident in this area.

I would appreciate receiving from the Department for communication to Mr. Briggs an indication of the Department's views in this matter.

*[Signature]*  
Douglas Jenkins, Jr.  
American Consul

894.42/11-449

Enclosures: *att*

1. From Mr. N. H. Briggs, October 25, 1949.
2. To Kobe American School from Mr. Briggs, October 25, 1949.

Copy to Tokyo

Douglas Jenkins, Jr./mh 11/1/49

DEC 23 1949  
FILED

*[Signature]*

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

MB



UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure no. 1 to Kobe's No. 148,  
November 4, 1949, Subject:  
Objection of American Taxpayers  
to Payment of Tuition for Their  
Children in Army Operated Schools.

( C O P Y )

OSAKA, JAPAN.  
Central P. O. Box 379.  
25 October 1949.

Mr. Douglas Jenkins,  
American Consul,  
Kobe, Japan.

Dear Mr. Jenkins:

I have just received a request from the Board of Education to pay the tuition for my three daughters who are in school on the basis of \$330. each per year. I am complying with this request and although I well knew that I would eventually have to pay this amount, I was not going to do anything about it until I had been officially requested to make payment. Now that this request has been received and I have made the payment, I would like to present my ideas on the subject.

I am an American tax payer, paying the current income tax on a regular basis. As a tax payer, I am already standing my share of the occupation costs of Japan. The occupation costs cover all basic human needs of the occupation personnel, such as housing, food, and clothing. The occupation personnel either receive allowances or pay back to the government part or all of such expenses. Housing needs and other items of a personal nature, I can take care of myself and naturally I would not expect to receive any Government accommodations, or Government assistance in fulfilling such needs. Educations, however, is far different, namely, that this is a common need and generally taken care of as a community function. It would be very impracticable and in fact impossible for me to set up my own private school for the exclusive use of my family. It is generally recognized that education should be provided as a public institution and paid for out of taxes. On the basis of being a United States income tax payer, and hence contributing to the occupation costs, I think it reasonable that I should receive free tuition. The occupation personnel do not pay tuition, and why a civilian who is a tax payer should pay a premium for a service that is free to others does not seem logical.



UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of Enclosure no. 1 to  
Kobe's No. 148, November 4, 1949

I understand exactly the Board of Education's position in this matter, namely, that they are complying with a SCAP directive and SCAP in turn operates under instructions from Washington. The educational program was set up in Washington and therefore, at least immediately, there is nothing to do but to comply with this directive, or to take my children out of school and the latter I do not choose to do. This letter is not written in any form of criticism, but simply to give substantiation for my position taken as an American citizen and an American tax payer. As far as the school itself goes, I have heard nothing but praise, the physical facilities are good, it is ably directed, and the teaching staff fully competent. I realize that there are enough difficulties in the world already, and it is not my purpose to make more, but I do think I should be entitled to the equivalent value of what other tax payers receive without paying a premium for such facilities that are offered free on a community basis and paid for by general taxation. I have also presented my views direct to the Board of Education and I attach a copy of my letter which is substantially the same as what I have outlined above.

As you are the representative of American civilian interests in Kobe I wanted to bring this subject officially to your notice. If you concur with what I have said, and think that my basis of argument is sound, I would like to offer the suggestion that this be developed with the State Department. Should they agree in substance they might see their way clear to take it up with the War Department or other Government agencies who would be in a position to direct or influence the present policy of the Board of Education in Japan.

Very truly yours,

/s/ N. H. Briggs

N. H. Briggs.

NHB:fp  
1 Inclosure



UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure no. 2 to Kobe's No. 148,  
November 4, 1949, Subject:  
Objection of American Taxpayers  
to Payment of Tuition for Their  
Children in Army Operated Schools.

( C O P Y )

OSAKA, JAPAN.  
Central P. O. Box 379.  
25 October 1949.

United States Eighth Army,  
Board of Education,  
Kobe American School,  
APO 371.

Gentlemen:

In accordance with your request I attach my check for \$99.00 which is the monthly tuition fee for my three daughters, and covers payment for Norma May, Carol Irene, and Muriel Katherine Briggs. I will send a check for this same amount on the first day of each month.

In making this payment I think it only fair that I be permitted to explain my view-point on it. I am an American tax payer, paying the current income tax on a regular basis. As a tax payer, I am already standing my share of the occupation costs of Japan. The occupation costs cover all basic human needs of the occupation personnel, such as housing, food, and clothing. The occupation personnel either receive allowances or pay back to the government part or all of such expenses. Housing needs and other items of a personal nature, I can take care of myself and naturally I would not expect to receive any government accommodations, or government assistance in fulfilling such needs. Education, however, is far different, namely, that this is a common need and generally taken care of as a community function. It would be very impracticable and in fact impossible for me to set up my own private school for the exclusive use of my family. It is generally recognized that education should be provided as a public institution and paid for out of taxes. On the basis of being a United States income tax payer, and hence contributing to the occupation costs, I think it reasonable that I should receive free tuition. The occupation personnel do not pay tuition, and why a civilian who is a tax payer should pay a premium for a service that is free to others does not seem logical.

I understand exactly your position in this matter, namely, that you are complying with a SCAP directive and SCAP



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Page 2 of Enclosure no. 2 to  
Kobe's No. 148, November 4, 1949

in turn operates under instructions from Washington. The educational program was set up in Washington and therefore, at least immediately, there is nothing to do but to comply with this directive, or to take my children out of school and the latter I do not choose to do. This letter is not written in any form of criticism, but simply to give substantiation for my position taken as an American citizen and an American tax payer. As far as the school itself goes, I have heard nothing but praise, the physical facilities are good, it is ably directed, and the teaching staff fully competent. I realize that there are enough difficulties in the world already, and it is not my purpose to make more, but I do think I should be entitled to the equivalent value of what other tax payers receive without paying a premium for such facilities that are offered free on a community basis and paid for by general taxation.

Very truly yours,

1 Inclosure

N. H. Briggs.



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7-18-46

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Department of State

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Washington

87

KOBE BRANCH,  
USPOLAD,  
KOBE, JAPAN  
A-56, Dec. 1, 1949

894.42/11-449

Reference your despatch No. 148, November 4, 1949, regarding objections of American taxpayers to payment of tuition for their children in Army operated schools.

The United States Army Schools in Japan as well as in Germany are financed from appropriations embodied in Public Law No. 327 passed by Congress. This law restricts the use of these appropriations to the education of Federal employee's children. When the estimates for these appropriations were drawn up they were based only on figures giving the numbers of Federal employees' children and did not include children of persons employed by private industry.

894.42/11-449

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

13

Despatch 724

American Embassy

REC'D  
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Seoul, Korea, November 12, 1949

ACTION  
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DMASubject: Korean reaction to the Closing of Korean Schools  
in Japan

scm

The Ambassador has the honor to refer to Despatch 734, October 21, 1949, of the Office of the Political Advisor, SCAP, to enclose a translation of an editorial appearing in the T'aeyang Shinmoon, a newspaper close to the Prime Minister, entitled "Oppression of Korean Residents in Japan," and a passage from this Embassy's summaries of the proceedings of the Korean National Assembly recording the Assembly's disposition of the problem on October 29th, and to offer further comment on reaction in Korea to the closing of Korean schools in Japan.

On the whole, Korean reaction to the action of the Japanese Government in closing Korean schools was rather restrained. The enclosed editorial appearing in the T'aeyang Shinmoon on October 22nd (Enclosure 1) was the only editorial of importance on the subject, although a number of other briefer records of and comments on the incident did appear in other newspapers. Interest in the incident has not been evidenced since the first of November. The tone of the T'aeyang is well shown in its statement, "What we wish to point out is not the Japanese method of closing the schools but their neglect in not undertaking appropriate negotiations." The editorial also berated the Japanese for "employing again their past tactics . . . by which they have tormented our nation for 40 years," and asked of the Government "adequate measures . . . to show our national dignity and capacity." This sentiment is fairly typical of the reaction of the Korean press generally.

News of the closure arrived just previous to the President's press conference on October 21st. His reaction appeared to be similar to Korean reaction generally. He remarked that the situation was serious, intimated that SCAP was powerless to ease it, and that he had instructed his representative in Tokyo "to find out what is going on." "Since it has been reported that the schools in question were supported by Communists, we want to find out the truth. . . . If the Japanese Government or SCAP shows discrimination against Koreans, we will have to consider it a serious situation. We have endured the anti-Korean attitude long enough." He then suggested that there be some nationality law in Japan to care for such a situation. On November 4th, the question arose again in a press conference. At this time the President said: "Yesterday we received a report from Ambassador Chung, informing us that the

Japanese

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RESTRICTEDAmerican Embassy  
Seoul, Despatch 724

- 2 -

November 12, 1949

Japanese Government has allowed the reopening of all Korean schools except some 50-odd troublesome ones. According to the report, the Japanese Government can close any unreasonable schools though it can not dissolve the Communist party, an open political party. Concerning this, the National Assembly wanted to send an 'adjusting group' composed of Assemblymen. This plan is beyond the scope of the National Assembly. If the National Assembly also works as the executive branch, the existence of the Government will prove no longer necessary."

The attitude of the members of the Committee on Education in the National Assembly is expressed in the enclosed record of discussion in the National Assembly (Enclosure 2). It was also expressed in expanded form by Dr. LEE Yung Choon, Chairman of the Committee on Education, and Mr. KWUN T'ae Hi, a former school teacher and introducer of the resolution (which was not adopted) to send a mission of Assemblymen to Japan to investigate the closing of the schools, in a conversation with an officer of this Embassy. At that time, the attention of Mr. Kwun and Dr. Lee was brought to the conditions existing in Korean schools in Japan, especially in Yamaguchi Province as described in Tokyo's Despatch 734.

Both men appeared fairly well apprised of these conditions and did not attempt to excuse them. They said that they were happy to see Communist activity among Koreans in Japan discouraged and realized that Korean schools must operate in conformity with Japanese laws. They were critical of the abruptness with which the closing of schools was taken and also expressed belief that many good and law-abiding schools had suffered with the bad. They appeared to realize that means would probably be found to reopen such schools in the near future. The aspect of the question which most interested them lay in the possibilities for arriving at some understanding with Japan whereby Korean schools could import textbooks in Korean from Korea and receive permission to teach a curriculum somewhat different from the Japanese-prescribed one. They were especially interested in the parallel with other foreign schools in Japan both before the war and now and asked the Embassy officer on what basis American schools in Japan were able to teach in English and adopt their own curriculum. Little specific information on this could be given in answer, but it was pointed out that cases of special agreements on schools with foreign Governments had been made and that it might be both feasible and advisable for such an agreement to be concluded with Japan at some time in the future. Both men expressed regret that the Assembly had decided not to send Assemblymen to Japan to investigate the situation. While admitting the appropriateness of conducting inquiries through the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo, they doubted whether this Mission had sufficient personnel or facilities to do an adequate job of investigation.

It is doubtful whether this issue will recur in very acute form in Korea so long as any reasonable disposition of the problem

is made

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American Embassy,  
Seoul, Despatch 724

- 3 -

November 12, 1949

is made in Japan. The President, the National Assembly and the press appear to realize that there are some cogent reasons with which Korea fundamentally agrees for taking the action taken. They are, however, extremely anxious to see that Korean citizens are treated on an equal basis with the citizens of other foreign nations and not as inferiors of the Japanese. Koreans can be expected to be very sensitive to any future indications of discriminatory treatment of their nationals.

Enclosures *att*

1. Translation, editorial, T'aeyang, Oct. 22.
2. Excerpt from Assembly Summary, Oct. 29 session.

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Enclosure 1 to Despatch 724, November 12, 1949, American Embassy, Seoul.

Translation of editorial from Taeyang Shinmoon, October 22, 1949:

OPPRESSION OF KOREAN RESIDENTS BY JAPAN

Of late the Japanese government ordered the closure of 273 Korean schools in Japan, thus compelling 38,829 Korean school children to wander in the streets like beggars. We cannot but say that such an act is brutal, inhuman and against democracy and peace, only in virtue of which all mankind can co-exist. In the vile attempt to persecute our brethren the Japs employed again their past tactics such as closure of schools, threat, drubbing, massacre, etc., by which they had tormented our nation for 40 years.

Whether we like or dislike the Japs, we and they are facing each other geographically. When the Japs were imbued with the ideas of democracy and peace after their defeat, we expected their revival as a re-born nation. They have, nevertheless, persecuted our brethren on political, cultural and economic lines with increasing ferocity by taking advantage of the United States' warm and generous policies toward them. In the long run, they have come to torment even children as mentioned above. They have deprived our brethren of their right of existence. The closure of schools cannot but be taken as an act of robbing the fathers of their children or hitting the latter in the face of the former. The Japanese government found no one but our brethren in venting its spite as the vanquished nation. Needless to repeat, the method was too barbaric.

We must however grasp the realities calmly and take the best measure. What we wish to point out is not the Japanese method of closing schools but their neglect in not undertaking appropriate negotiations. They cannot defend their action as the foreclosure or confiscation of properties as conducted by bailiffs or agrurers.

Even the Japanese should know that it was unavoidable that our brethren are in their country. We cannot but ask if they are right in treating their neighboring nation in such a way. Before calling the Japs into account, however, we are rather inclined to ask SCAP how it considers Korea.

Our government authorities are required to take adequate measures for the issue, so as to show our national dignity and capacity. That we did not know the trend of the Japs until the foregoing incident occurred calls forth our sense of responsibility as well as our regret. If the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan is incapable of solving the issue, the government should send a higher official there in order to make an over-all, fundamental and durable solution for the brethren in Japan.

What we must remind ourselves of is that the state is based on the people. There is no greater sorrow than that of the homeless people.

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Enclosure 2 to Despatch 724, November 12, 1949, American Embassy, Seoul.

Translation of discussion on Korean schools in Japan, held at 27th meeting, Fifth Special Session of the Korean National Assembly, October 29, 1949:

KWUN T'se Hi, member of the Committee on Education and Social Affairs, introduced in behalf of the Committee an urgent resolution that the Assembly send a mission of Assemblymen to Japan to investigate the case of the closing of Korean schools in Japan.

LEE Yang Choon, chairman of the Committee on Education and Social Affairs: "As you may have read in the newspapers, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Justice of the Japanese Government ordered 364 Korean schools in Japan to be closed as of October 19, and as a result, approximately 38,000 Korean children have been forced out of schools. According to a newspaper article appearing in one Japanese newspaper, the Japanese Government announced that any schools under the sponsorship of the Federation of Koreans in Japan shall be closed and that any Korean private school opening in the future must take necessary steps in accordance with the Japanese Law on Education. I also understand that General MacArthur has proclaimed, in November, 1945, that Korean nationals are subject to Japanese laws and that some time in May of this year an agreement was reached between the Japanese Government and the Federation of Koreans in Japan that Korean private schools shall comply in their education with the Japanese law on education.

"However, the Committee on Education and Social Affairs interpreted that aliens including Koreans residing in Japan are subject to Japanese laws but this theory does not apply to the education of other aliens in Japan. Why, before the war there were dozens of foreign schools in Japan but I knew that these foreigners' schools could teach their children in their own tongue and they were allowed to import their textbooks from their mother countries.

"I personally agree with the Japanese Government in closing Korean schools where they openly teach Communism and display the flag of the People's Republic, but that does not necessarily excuse our Government in overlooking the matter since it affects most unfortunately the education of tens of thousands of our children."

KWUN T'se Hi (Il-min): "I want to supplement what Chairman Lee has said about the case. There are approximately one million Koreans residing in Japan, of whom 100,000 children and students go to primary schools and universities. The Korean people have not been treated as nationals of an independent and sovereign state. Although the Japanese held, as Chairman Lee pointed out, that they had reached an agreement between the Korean representatives and themselves to have Korean private schools comply in their education with the Japanese law on education, the representative of the Federation of Koreans in Japan does not officially represent the Republic of Korea, although members of the Federation are predominant among the Korean nationals in Japan. The Japanese

Government

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Enclosure 2 to Despatch 724, November 12, 1949, American Embassy, Seoul.

- 2 -

Government ordered the closing of all Korean private schools in Japan suddenly, without even informing the official Korean diplomatic mission in Japan. The Japanese Government should have notified the Korean diplomatic mission promptly. The Korean mission in Japan has not made, as far as I know, any effort to solve the problem. The Minister of Education inquired through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to SCAP about the case, but SCAP dodged the issue and passed the buck to the Japanese Government. The Ministry of Education should have done something about this case. After all, the Ministry of Education is supposed to take care of these children's education. I am furious over so lukewarm an attitude by the Ministry of Education toward such an important problem."

YOON Ch'i Yung, Vice-Chairman: "I fully appreciate what Mr. Keun has proposed; his enthusiasm toward the good education of our children in Japan is admirable. But I do not agree with Mr. Keun in sending a mission of Assemblymen officially to a country which is under the control of an allied power and has no sovereignty.

"According to international law one country cannot establish schools in another country. In the event that one country mistreats children of another country in its schools the latter can protest to the former country against such discrimination or mistreatment; but this is not the case. So long as the Japanese Government treats Korean children on the same basis as they do their children, the Korean Government should not and cannot interfere with their internal affairs, no matter how many of our children there are. This would be a violation of international law. If the Assembly resolves to send a mission to Japan to investigate the case, it will reveal the ignorance of our National Assembly to the world."

KIM Choon Yun, influential member of the Democratic Nationalist Party, supported Yoon's statement.

LEE Yung Choon: "I do not agree with Mr. Yoon. Article 2 of MacArthur's memorandum recognized the freedom of education of Koreans in Japan. I do not mean that the Assembly should try to lodge a legal protest against the Japanese Government but I want to see to it that Korean children in Japan are properly and efficiently educated. The Korean Government certainly cannot remain silent."

CHO Heun Yung, DNP, opposed the motion and CHO Yung Kyoo, LDP, made a motion that the Assembly propose to the Government that it have the Korean diplomatic mission in Japan investigate and take appropriate measures for this case. This motion carried by a vote of 83 to 7 out of 124.

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894.42/11-1243

MIS



NOV 22 1949

In reply refer to  
IEP

My dear Mr. Diffendorfer:

There is enclosed a letter from Mr. Pierre Laurent, a professor at the Technological Institute of the University of Hanoi, Indochina, who writes to Mr. Joseph Grew in regard to the proposed Christian University in Tokyo. Mr. Laurent wishes to establish some form of intellectual cooperation in the Far East. It would be appreciated if you would reply to Mr. Laurent's letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Don B. Cook  
Chief  
Voluntary Programs Branch  
Division of Exchange of Persons

X.R. 890.42

894.42/11-2249

Enclosure:

From Mr. Laurent  
dated September 24, 1949.

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Mr. Ralph E. Diffendorfer,  
President, Japan International  
Christian University Foundation,  
214 East Twenty-first Street,  
New York 10, New York.

NOV 27 1949 OSH

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11/17/49



Universite D'HANOI  
ÉCOLE SUPERIEURE DES SCIENCES  
LABORATOIRE DE CHIMIE

Tel 211

P. A. LAURENT  
Professeur

C O P Y

HANOI, le 24 Septembre 1949

NOV 23 1949  
DC/R

Pierre LAURENT,  
Directeur de l'Ecole Superieure des Sciences,

NO.-  
49/ESS/PAL/B.-

Monsieur Joseph GREW,

a

(S/C. du DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Cher Monsieur,

Par le presse j'apprends que vous avez le projet d'organiser une Université Chretienne à TOKIO.

A titre tout-à-fait privé, et dans le but de trouver une éventuelle forme de coopération intellectuelle en Extrême-Orient, je viens prendre contact avec vous.

- J'ai commencé ma carrière universitaire en France en 1938.
- J'enseigne actuellement la Chimie à l'Université de HANOI où j'ai la charge de diriger la Faculté des Sciences.
- J'ai beaucoup voyagé et travaille aux Universités de LIVERPOOL, STANDFORD et dans les Universités allemandes.

J'ai la conviction qu'il faille tout faire pour obtenir une coopération aussi étroitement que possible entre les intellectuels d'Extrême-Orient où la densité scientifique moderne est trop faible, et c'est ce sentiment qui est à l'origine de cette lettre.

En attendant le plaisir de vous lire, je vous prie de croire, Cher Monsieur, à mes meilleurs sentiments.

/S/ Pierre LAURENT,

C O P Y



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*JWA*

*Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

- Mr. Johnson

DATE: November 23, 1949

NA - Mr. Green *mg*

Document must be returned to the RWR Central Files

~~THW~~

~~ACT~~

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RE: Campaign Against Communist Teachers in Japan

The attached report on the above subject was prepared at NA's request. If you are too pressed for time to read the whole report, I suggest reading its summary which conveys the general purport. You will note that our research people are quite disturbed about the trend against Japanese academic liberty which the dismissal of Communist-sympathizers from the teaching profession is likely to abet.

*894.0013*

As remedial measures, we have already sent SCAP a telegram requesting full information for meeting probable FEC criticisms on this matter. SCAP's reply was unsatisfactory, but he did react to our cable as being implied Washington criticism of what is going on in the academic world in Japan. Such was our intent.

This report, which will be sent through regular channels to the Army Department, may have further salutary effects.

Since President Nambara of the Tokyo Imperial University will be arriving shortly in Washington in connection with the National Conference on Occupied Areas, I suggest that we make an appointment for him to call on Mr. Allison and/or you. In the course of this courtesy call, the subject of Japanese teacher dismissals might be raised. As you know, Nambara has expressed some pretty strong views against the dismissals.

*Henry [unclear]*

894.42/11-2349

*Agree, but think we must try to strike a balance between ideal of maximum academic freedom and unquestionably serious communist infiltration of schools. It is a question of methods rather than ends. Do not think any further action on our part at this time necessary but we should continue to watch.*

CSM<sup>W</sup>

*894.42/11-2349*

FE:NA:MGreen:clh

State Dept.  
Northeast Asian  
Affairs Office  
From Green

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NA - Marshal Green  
via Miss Colbert  
2 ccs

Copy No. 1

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THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNIST TEACHERS IN JAPAN

OIR Report No. 5087  
November 14, 1949

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F.W. 894.42 / 11-2349

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OF U.S. OR DEPARTMENTAL POLICY OR AS A  
RECOMMENDATION OF ANY GIVEN POLICY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of Research for Far East  
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

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CONFIDENTIALSUMMARY

In mid-September 1949 Japanese educational authorities embarked upon a campaign to rid the school system of Communists -- a campaign that has to date affected some 400 teachers and reportedly will result in several thousands of dismissals by the end of the current school year. All Japanese teachers are limited in the political activities in which they may engage by legislation designed primarily to prevent the use of the schools for political indoctrination but more recently extended by Education Ministry interpretation to cover certain off-campus activities. Ninety percent of Japan's teachers, moreover, are or will be affected by the wide restrictions that have already been imposed on the political activities of members of the national public service and that are expected to be paralleled in the local public service in the near future.

Despite this extensive statutory structure designed to limit the political activities of school teachers, the legal basis for the current drive to eliminate Communists from school faculties is far from clear and, indeed, there is every indication that Japanese officials themselves are not confident that the current campaign has a well-founded legal basis. Moreover, there is as yet no evidence to indicate that measures have been taken to defend teachers against unfounded accusations or arbitrary procedures. Of more pressing and broader concern than the problem of dismissal of Communist teachers, however, are the problems raised in the academic field by restrictions on the political activities of public servants. Under the

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terms of regulations already in effect, the single issue of Communism becomes rather minor and a much more important question is raised: whether the members of that vastly preponderating segment of the academic community that falls into either the national or the local public service are, whatever their political persuasion, to enjoy the right to express their political views by speech or writing or even to discuss in any forthright fashion problems of government or political policy. The answer to this question will be vital in determining whether the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty that increasingly directed pre-surrender Japanese scholarship into safe and sterile channels is to be revived in the post-surrender period. Such a revival would be facilitated by the strength of the tradition of submission and the preponderantly public nature of the Japanese school system.



CONFIDENTIALTHE CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNIST TEACHERS IN JAPAN

In mid-September 1949 Japanese educational authorities embarked upon a campaign to rid the school system of Communists -- a campaign that has to date affected some 400 teachers. Although precedent for this action had been established when the government discharged Communist employees as part of the program for reducing the size of the public service, the more recent application of similar principles to the school system raises important questions with regard to academic freedom and the independence of scholarly research. Because almost all Japanese schools are publicly controlled and because, despite decentralization, determination of general educational policy is likely to remain in the hands of the national government for some time to come, the importance to Japanese education of the policies worked out by the government to resolve the conflict between civil liberties and the preservation of the school system from political encroachment is particularly great.

I. LEGAL BASES FOR CONTROL OF NATIONAL AND PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

A nation-wide survey of Japanese educational institutions in 1946-47 revealed that there were 600,000 school teachers -- full and part time for more than 18,000,000 students. Of these teachers, all but 48,000, employed by private schools, were in the employ of national schools or public schools maintained by prefectures, municipalities, towns, and townships. More than 17,100,000 students, or 94 percent of the national total, were enrolled in these publicly supported schools.

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As the result of the decentralization of educational administration enforced under the occupation, responsibility for enforcing education legislation and regulations concerning political activities of educational personnel rests with various organs and officials. The locus of authority depends on the type and level of schools. The Education Ministry functions primarily in an "advisory" capacity. However, a permanent system for education administration has not been completed. Pending establishment of university administration organs,<sup>1</sup> personnel of national universities fall under the administration of university councils, presidents, or faculty boards, depending on the posts of the personnel concerned; public universities are under the management of the heads of the local entities maintaining the schools; and private universities, for certain purposes, are under the general jurisdiction of the Education Minister. Schools of higher secondary and lower levels are divided into three categories for administrative purposes: those schools attached to universities<sup>2</sup> (national, public, or private) fall under the jurisdiction of the university presidents

- 
1. For this purpose, a revised version of the controversial University Bill (which is intended to cover national and public universities) and a Private Schools Bill are to be presented to the Diet during the current or next session.
  2. Schools of elementary and secondary levels are often maintained as part of universities for experimental and training purposes (e.g., in connection with education courses) or, as often in the case of private institutions, for the purpose of providing a "through education" at a single school.

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concerned; public schools are temporarily<sup>1</sup> administered by the prefectural education committees, which, on the basis of the 1946-47 survey, had jurisdiction over 470,000 teachers in charge of more than 16.5 million pupils; and private schools are regulated by the prefectural governors concerned. The only national schools of higher secondary or lower levels that come under the direct jurisdiction of the Education Minister are special institutions not attached to universities, such as schools for the deaf and dumb.

Because of the dual nature of their status as teachers and as government officials, Japanese teachers of national and public schools -- from kindergartens through universities -- are governed by two sets of laws and regulations insofar as their political activity is concerned. First, all teachers, including those of private schools, and all education officials are required to uphold the fundamental principles and objectives of education as defined in the Education Standards Law. Second, teachers in national and public schools are subject to the application of rules affecting all regular national and local civil servants.

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1. Although the prefectural education committees have permanent jurisdiction over prefectural schools and will continue to set standards and regulations for their respective areas (within the framework of national standards stipulated by law, of course), direct administrative powers over schools maintained by the municipalities, towns, and townships eventually will be shifted to the education committees of the local entities concerned. For budgetary reasons, however, establishment of education committees below the prefectural level has been postponed until 1952 or 1953.

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The Education Standards Law (Kyoiku Kijun Ho), enacted in March 1947, sets forth the basic objectives of education in Japan and prohibits all schools (national, public, and private) offering formal education<sup>1</sup> from engaging in partisan political education or activities.<sup>2</sup> Since the passage of the law, the scope of this prohibition has been gradually enlarged by Education Ministry interpretations. It was evident from the outset that the ban affected the conduct of teachers and other educational personnel. It was originally interpreted by the Education Ministry as requiring that classroom instruction and educational activities on school grounds have no political aim and that teachers refrain from exerting or attempting to exert political influences upon students during school hours or on the campus. In October 1948, as a result of disturbances created by students opposing tuition increases, the Education Ministry ruled that student strikes and other organized student political activities in school were also banned under the law.

In June 1949 the Education Ministry further broadened its interpretation of the political activities ban clause in the Education Standards Law to include certain off-campus activities by teachers that

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1. The term "formal education" excludes schools operated by such organizations as political parties, trade unions, etc.
  2. Article VIII of the Education Standards Law reads:  
"The political knowledge necessary for intelligent citizenship shall be valued in education."  
"The schools prescribed by law shall refrain from political education or other political activities for or against any specific political party."

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might tend to influence students. Radical tendencies among teachers in off-campus activities had increased, and, during the weeks preceding the January 1949 general election, teachers in many sections of the country reportedly had actively campaigned and solicited votes for the Communist Party. The Education Ministry, therefore, announced that visits by teachers to students' homes for the purpose of propagating political doctrines and attempts to influence students along political lines in off-campus educational activities would be contrary to the spirit of the Education Standards Law. Under this interpretation of the law, it was far from clear whether teachers could not engage in any political activity whatsoever or whether they were barred only from acts that had as their principal intent or effect the exercise of political influence over students.

Under another statute, the Educational Personnel Certification Law (Kyoiku Shokuin Menkyo Ho) of May 1949, which sets forth licensing requirements for teachers henceforth to be appointed in all schools through the secondary grades,<sup>1</sup> certain individuals are to be denied teaching certificates. Those who will not be eligible for certificates include persons "who organize or join political and other associations which advocate the overthrow of the government by force." It is not clear at this time precisely what categories of individuals are to be barred from the teaching profession under this

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1. Standards for university professors are not set through legislation, but will be determined on the merits of individual cases in accordance with general policies to be adopted by university administrative organs.

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provision, although its application to Communists and fellow travelers is certainly conceivable.

The June 1949 ruling of the Education Ministry left in some doubt the degree to which school teachers could engage in political activities that were not directly aimed at influencing or directing student political attitudes or acts. In September, however, this issue was clarified in a National Personnel Authority regulation designed to implement the general prohibition contained in the National Public Service Law against political activities by civil servants. Under legislation of January 1949,<sup>1</sup> national school teachers had been brought within the national public service and all other teachers in publicly supported schools had been defined as members of the local public service, legislation governing which, generally parallel to the National Public Service Law, is expected to be enacted in the current Diet session.

The September ruling of the National Personnel Authority has two general aspects: first, it defines political aims; second, it sets forth the activities connected with the furtherance of such aims that are prohibited to members of the public service. Political aims are defined in the regulation as including support of or opposition to candidates for public office, support of or opposition to any particular political party or group, support of or opposition to the cabinet, support of or opposition to any particular program by

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1. Special Law Concerning Educational Public Personnel (Kyoiku Komuin Tokurei).

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political action, interference with the carrying out of policies adopted by national or local government agencies, and organization or interference with the organization of petitions in the exercise of the right of initiative, referendum, and recall in the local government field. Political activities in furtherance of these aims that are barred to public servants include utilizing private or public influence or the power of one's signature or office; making monetary contributions; collecting contributions, dues, or fees; participating in the planning or establishment of a political party or group; holding office in a political party or group; participating in any way in the publishing activities of a particular party or political group; engaging in canvassing activities in connection with an election, referendum, or recall; organizing, leading, or sponsoring participation in parades or demonstrations; manufacturing or distributing political insignia; and -- of particular relevance to educational personnel -- addressing any number of persons at any place with regard to one's political opinions or publishing material, signed or unsigned, with a political aim.

National personnel, however, are not to be prohibited or restricted from engaging in any acts that it is "incumbent" upon the personnel to perform in the course of carrying out official duties.

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II. DISMISSALS OF COMMUNIST TEACHERS

Despite this extensive statutory structure designed to limit the political activities of school teachers, the legal basis for the current drive to eliminate Communists from school faculties is far from clear and, indeed, there is every indication that Japanese officials themselves have been unable to decide on what legal grounds they are acting. Nevertheless, as of the beginning of October, this drive, initiated in mid-September, had resulted in the dismissal of 20-30 professors of national universities and 300-400 teachers of elementary and secondary public schools, including officials of some teachers' unions. At least as many more public school teachers were expected to be "purged" by the end of the month. Some reports estimate that thousands of teachers may be affected by the end of the current school year. There are no indications, however, that teachers of private schools will be affected at this time.

In some cases, apparently, teachers believed to be Communists have been asked to resign -- in the universities by the president, in the local public schools by the prefectural education committee -- and those who have refused to do so have been summarily discharged. In some prefectures at least, Communist teachers in public elementary and secondary schools are being dismissed ostensibly within the general framework of the personnel retrenchment program carried out throughout the Japanese Government during the summer of 1949 in line with the Economic Stabilization Program. Elsewhere the retrenchment program was used to discharge Communists as part of a general

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reduction of government personnel. There is some reason to believe, however, that in the school system retrenchment has been solely a pretext for discharging Communists, since surveys made in April 1949 indicated that normal turn-over and limitations on new employment would keep the personnel situation in the schools under control and, as a result, no plans for the mass discharges that occurred in other agencies were formulated.

With regard to professors at national universities, ASAI Kiyoshi, President of the National Personnel Authority, has stated that it would be difficult to base the current dismissals on the Authority's recent political activities regulation alone, since evidence of specific violations must be established and the regulation is not retroactive in force. Education Minister TAKASE Sotaro has declared that membership in a political party does not constitute sufficient ground for dismissal of professors. He reiterated the Education Ministry's stand that all teachers must conform to the Education Standards Law, but denied that the Ministry had suggested that any concrete measures be taken against certain professors for purely ideological reasons, despite its constant concern in the past over the "destructive, terroristic acts" of some teachers.

The role of the occupation in the Communist teachers' purge has been as obscure as the legal basis of the purge. American correspondents in Japan have in many cases claimed that the occupation has brought pressure to bear on the Japanese to carry out

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the program. The Japanese press, however, has not reported any occupation activities in this direction, and occupation officials -- with the exception of Dr. W. C. Eells, SCAP adviser on higher education, and W. P. MacCoy, Acting Chief of the Civil Service Division of SCAP -- have been silent on the subject, at least publicly. In a speech at Niigata University, Dr. Eells stated that Communist professors were no longer capable of exercising their free will because of the iron-clad tenets of the party and, therefore, were not capable of conforming to the Education Standards Law. Asserting that Communism is a dangerous and destructive doctrine because it advocates the overthrow of established government by force, he questioned whether Communist professors should be permitted to remain in their profession in the name of academic freedom. He declared that "The university not only has the right, it has the duty, in order to preserve true academic freedom, to refuse to allow members of the Communist Party on its faculty." MacCoy, expressing his full support of the National Personnel Authority regulation, commented that "the forcing of education into restricted and specific channels (in line with political beliefs) ... is not education, but propaganda in its worst sense." He pointed out that discharge of legitimate teaching responsibilities was protected by the provision in the regulation reading: "No provision of this rule will be deemed to prohibit or restrict any action which is naturally incumbent upon an employee to perform in the prosecution of his proper duties." He praised

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the National Personnel Authority's recognition of the importance of politically neutral education as "heartening in the extreme" and added: "... the Japanese Government does not ever again intend to force the mind of its youth into an iron-bound political mold, but intends to make them free citizens in a free democracy able to make their own judgments."

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III. REACTIONS TO THE PROGRAM

Although American correspondents have reported the existence of a good deal of uneasiness with regard to the implications of the current wave of dismissals, there have to date been relatively few public expressions of opinion among the Japanese concerning the dismissal of Communist teachers. Such comments as have been made, however, have generally been critical in tone, and there are indications that many have hesitated to comment on the issue lest they be branded as Communists or Communist sympathizers. President NAMBARA Shigeru of Tokyo University, who reflects the common sensitivity of the universities regarding their autonomy and the preservation of their new academic freedom, has opposed firing of professors for ideological reasons. He maintains that the study and publication of ideological principles dealing with political and social problems should be permitted in universities in order that the freedom of academic research be safeguarded. In the past he has often expressed the view that ideological convictions of individuals should be recognized and divorced from the overt political acts that might result from such convictions. The All-Japan University Professors' Federated-Council, headed by Nambara, on September 22 issued a statement opposing the current wave of dismissals of professors on the ground that freedom of academic research, as universally accepted, implied recognition of the liberty of university professors to undertake and publish research studies of any kind. The statement added that university professors, if given such freedom, must

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