EUGENICS, CIVICS
AND ETHICS
A LECTURE BY
SIR CHARLES WALSTON

CAMBRIDGE 1920
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A Lecture delivered to the Summer School of Eugenics, Civics and Ethics on August 8th, 1919, in the Arts School, Cambridge

BY

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I have one or two personal remarks to make. I may be obliged to refer to and quote some of my own writings. I beg you to understand that it is not from egotism or vanity. We very often find that we can save time, and be more accurate, when we read what we have written than in an extemporaneous speech; moreover the fact of having published our views in earlier times and from a different angle and point of view is more or less confirmatory of the truth of our present opinions. I wish to make another half-personal remark, leading to what I intend to say this evening. It concerns something the Chairman has just said in short and very telling words—namely, as to the advantage of such a synthesis as I propose to give to you. When my lecture was announced to you yesterday at the
end of the very interesting lecture of Mr Farquharson, at which I was present, I saw a gesture from one of your class which was something of this nature. You may perhaps guess what it meant. I sympathise with it. It meant: "Good God, what a generalisation! We might as well have a lecture on this life, the after-life, immortality of the soul, practical truth and religion, all in one. What a field for tremendous generalisations it will give, and what nonsense the lecturer will probably talk!" I think the member of the class who made that gesture-protest was justified; because generalisation, wide and sweeping, is very easy, very amateurish and, as a rule, very misleading and unscientific. But we must remember what our Chairman has just indicated: that true science, the most thorough science, has two aspects always—the analytic and the synthetic. The analytic deals with the single data, the single facts; the synthetic joins those single facts together and discovers the correlation of all facts, of all disciplines, leading to that final unity of goal which is called Truth.
That is what I have to deal with tonight—the synthetic side. And I say, that we shall be just as scientific if we centralise our vision, carefully making our induction of facts on a wider macroscopic scale, as when we do this microscopically. A traveller, if he wishes to advance securely, ought to look carefully before him step by step. But if he has an aim—a further aim—he must see the goal and make for that: he will know that he is not walking round and round, but going in the right direction. That is the true aim of science.

I will not waste time with definitions of eugenics, civics and ethics. We all know the province, aims and methods of these studies—or think we do. Eugenics, I must remind you, however, is not identical with genetics: this at once establishes the essential relation to civics and ethics, which is the subject of my lecture this evening.

I have loved horses all my life; and, from loving them as an amateur, I studied them zoologically, biologically, and morphologically. The study of the hoof of
the horse, for instance—its fingers or toes, show there are undoubted traces of them having been separate once—interested me as an amateur (meaning a 'lover,' but not a dabbler). Those two things are not identical. From that study I came to try breeding. As you know, there are various classes of horses: there are cart-horses, carriage-horses, race-horses, hacks, hunters, etc. I specialised on the hunter. The difference in classification between these several classes of horses depends on the nature or purpose which in domestic life they fulfil—I need not dwell upon it. You will recognise that the cart-horse must be different in structure and breed from the race-horse or the hunter. Now, I found that the hunter must be fairly high, that his back must be strong and short, because he has got to jump and carry weight at the same time. He must have well-developed hips—some good hunters even have ugly, so-called “ragged,” hips; he must have a good sloping shoulder, because he must lift his forelegs and raise them rapidly, and when he falls he must rise easily and quickly and, in general,
propel forward in a gallop. So also his hind-quarters must be high and strong, not sloping and weak; and his hocks must be especially strong to ensure his jumping power and speed in galloping. All these qualities—the definite purpose of their use to individual man—must direct the selection of the breeder of hunters. But it occurred to me at an early date to ask: "Why do not breeders consider what may be called the ethical or moral conditions?" I say the hunter must have a certain temperament—a good heart—courage—and, not only that, but a good temper, because, if he has got only heart and courage, he will rush his fences, will be too hot; you will not be able to steady him and, in jumping, he will land you in the ditch. I therefore endeavoured to introduce this question of temper—of, what I might be allowed to call, moral character—into the selection for breeding purposes—a point almost entirely ignored by practical breeders. It is true that extreme and manifest forms of vicious temper may affect the choice of a sire by breeders of race-horses, in fact most
horses. A "savage" or uncertain-tempered horse will not be so readily chosen by the breeder of race-horses, for his temper may make him unmanageable and thus lose a race. But I doubt whether the consideration of such moral properties in breeding goes any further than this. I think this illustration will suffice to show you that I wished to introduce into breeding the principle of selection and not merely "natural" nor merely selection on anatomical or physiological grounds; but selection based upon the human purpose and aim—which I might call moral selection.

Now, domestic animals are not in an untamed state of nature. What this simple fact implies I wish to commend to you to think out for yourselves. The moment the step is made from the natural state to the domestic animal, a curious paradox results. Science deals, and ought to deal, with pure causality, not with the end, not with the purpose, not with Teleology. This is eminently so in all natural and physical sciences. It is so in Genetics. But when we come to Eugenics, even
when we make the step to domestic animals, and still more so when we ascend to man, we must be teleological. What was pure causality, necessity, may become in our eyes more or less accidental—chance (which we wish to eliminate)—and our desire and purpose is to establish our design as a necessary law, as the logical sequence of cause and effect in which some moral purpose or design is the ultimate cause.

My friend, Sir Edwin Ray Lankester, has carried on an interesting controversy in palaeontology on the question of eoliths. The controversy turns on the question, whether certain small stones in which a peculiar regularity is clearly noticeable, corresponding to the stone or flint implements with which the Neolithic period, and also the later Palaeolithic periods, have familiarised us—whether these stones, dating back to the earliest Palaeolithic period, were deliberately made or selected by man for such purposes of use, or whether their purposeful regularity is due to merely natural causes—whether they are accidents or, what
we might almost call, "freaks of nature." In a shorter form the question is: Are they artifacts to which man has given this form, or is the form due to natural causes? You will understand that if they are artifacts the *cause* in the existence of that form is the human purpose or end; but if they were produced by nature their striking and useful form is exceptional and may be called by us an accident. Now, I must repeat to you that the moment the study of Genetics takes the form of Eugenics in man, the moral purpose, in differentiation from the natural factors of evolution, becomes an essential cause in the production or modification of the individual and the type.

The evolution out of which established forms of nature arose was studied with the greatest benefit to science and to us by Charles Darwin: he is the great founder. Whatever modifications may have been introduced by Weissman, Mendel, De Fries and others, the general principles of evolution, I believe—as I am told by my betters in these matters—the fundamental principles, will remain.
But with Darwin these principles were not absolutely and directly applied to moral properties and characters in man and to social life. On the contrary, in my reading of the works of Darwin I remember passages in which, more than once, he points to the "immorality" of nature. But moral writers have applied—or rather misapplied—Darwin's principles to ethics, and even to politics and civics. One of the greatest sinners in this respect—a genius—was Nietzsche. I may here quote what I published in my book *Aristodemocracy—From the Great War back to Moses, Christ and Plato* (John Murray, 1917), pp. 190—193:

But the main question as regards the practical ethics of Nietzsche is how the superman is to be produced; not he who is to obey and follow, but he who is to command and lead. It is here that, to my mind, the whole theory of Nietzsche's superman fails, I venture to surmise, because of a complete misapprehension of the Darwinian theory of evolution, and its misplaced and crude application to ethics. The Darwinian theory of evolution, which, I repeat, was emphatically not meant to be teleological, but strictly causal, simply accounted for the survival of the fittest in nature's great struggle for existence, chiefly through adaptation of the organism to its environment. Darwin himself repeatedly points out the unethical, if not
immoral, cruelty of nature in this process. Bacon took quite a different point of view when he upheld the great aim of man placed in nature as the establishment of the Regnum Hominis, the reasoned victory of man over the unreasoned course of nature. But Darwin deals with no such prospect of man’s activity, and is simply concerned with the natural progress arising out of such an adaptive principle which leads to the survival of the fittest. From man’s point of view, however, if he wishes consciously to apply the principle of the adaptation to the environment, there is no chance of advancement or progress unless the environment itself, as, if I might say so, almost a planetary body, advances. For man may adapt himself to physical conditions that are “lower” instead of “higher.” As a matter of fact a good deal of the political and social ethics of our own days is nothing more nor less than this ethical opportunism, of adaptation of man’s life to the surrounding conditions of nature, the final goal of which is merely physical subsistence or at most increase of comfort. In one aspect of his powerful writings Nietzsche fulminates against this ideal of comfort. We are thus in a vicious circle if we apply the Darwinian principle of evolution direct to ethical principles. Our only hope would be in a fatalistic renunciation as regards all ethical progress, in which we hope that the environing nature itself may “improve”; so that by adapting himself to his environment man himself may improve and ultimately rise to greater heights of human existence. For Nietzsche’s superman, however, this environment does not only consist in the physical conditions in which the human animal finds himself living and by which he is surrounded; but in the physical conditions of man’s own body and his own instincts, his inner force of living.
These are to guide him. He is to follow these as his true friends and to deny them no claims which they may press upon his conscious will. They must really become the "environment" to the central personality of the individual, which we may call soul, spirit, or whatever else we like. But here again we are placed in the vicious circle, though a circle one step higher than, or perhaps only nearer to, the central core of individual man. For we can hardly see how mere physical health by itself or the following of our individual instincts and passions can ensure progress and lead us to the true superman, unless we can assume that these instincts and passions themselves and in themselves "improve" and go to the making of the superman.  

On the contrary, not only the unbiassed study of anthropology, ethnology, archaeology, and history, but also our daily experience of life, teach us that the pursuit of our instincts and passions, unrestricted and unhampered by any further consideration or guiding principle, leads, not only to the misery, if not the destruction, of other individual life; but in no way produces the type which approaches the conception of even the meanest imagination of what a superman ought to be. Nietzsche apparently has forgotten or ignored (excellent Greek scholar though he was) the simple statement of Aristotle that man is a ἀθάνατος. Were each man completely isolated and destined to live the life of an absolute anchorite, with-

1 I may at once anticipate here, what will be dealt with in the course of this inquiry, and say, that only when idealism is called in to supplement evolutionism, when Plato and Aristotle—or rather Plato and Darwin—are reconciled and united, can the theory of evolution be applied to ethics.
out any relationship to other men, it might perhaps be maintained that his chief task would then be to adapt himself to his environment, which includes his body and his instincts. But even then—as I shall have occasion to show—there is a point of view from which this would be grossly immoral, if not grossly untrue to human nature as such.

I have tried in this work to show what the superman theory may do. The result in practical life is the establishment of the type of the "blond beast"—and we know what the "blond beast" has led to and how with the German nation it has produced ideals and aims, unsocial and immoral, which, thank God!, did not win the day. We won this war because we were right, and the whole world knew it. Ultimately we must have won, however long it might have taken. Another misapplication of the still very hypothetical results of Ethnological studies—of which it might be well for Mendelians and Eugenists to take note—is furnished by a recent book by Mr Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race. I must here again quote what I have already published (Patriotism—National and International, Longmans, Green & Co., 1917, pp. 98—
and must give my estimate of Mr Grant's book, which, I regret to say, takes the form of direct and unmitigated attack (a practice in which I have hardly ever indulged in my literary career), because I am fully convinced of the demoralising effect on the scientific spirit of such generalisation, as well as of the directly mischievous influence of its application to practical politics and social life:

The principles of racial subdivision for Europe to-day are the Nordic, Mediterranean and Alpine. Militant activity now chiefly centres round the proposition that the Nordic is the superior race and should as a race not only survive, but dominate all others.

From the interesting, and comparatively innocent, essay of Count Gobineau, with many minor lucubrations, we come to the grotesquely pretentious, superficial and tragically mischievous work of Mr Houston Chamberlain, the fatal influence of which I have indicated elsewhere (see Aristodemocracy, p. 53). Its influence on the inception of the present war, as regards the development of the present political mentality of Germany, can hardly be exaggerated. A correspondent and friend, commenting on this opinion of mine, has humorously suggested that, should (as we trust) the war end in the utter overthrow of German militarism, the defeated Germans will maintain that the real responsibility of this world-tragedy is to be ascribed to the fact that they were
misled by the writings of an Englishman whom they will, in their legal phraseology, describe as the *Intellektueller Urheber*. Our own days have witnessed the production of a work by an American would-be ethnographer and historian, supported in an introduction by a well-established and distinguished zoologist and biologist, which is the most amateurish as well as pretentious piece of scientific over-generalisation, incomplete induction and dogmatic application of scientific principles to practical politics and life, which I have met with in the whole range of my own reading. Starting with the proposition that somatic (bodily or physical) characteristics and distinctions in the human race correspond with unvarying interaction to intellectual and moral characteristics—even to fitness for political organisation, general activities and occupations in civilised life, intellectual achievements and social amenities—he endeavours to show that the Nordic race, compared to all others, possesses all the qualities that make for civilisation and moral and intellectual development to the highest degree. He maintains that the wars of the past and the present war have tended to disintegrate this race and to lead to its submersion by the lower races, and his expressed hope and emphatic injunction is that, by the action of modern society and of the individual, it should be preserved and its dominance assured. The definition of the Nordic race by means of somatic attributes is limited to the combination of the dolicho-cephalic shape of the head (though he denies the definite distinctive racial claim to this craniological attribute), the possession of light eyes, fair or red hair (including pro-


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fusion of hair on head and body), straight nose and a tall muscular body. On such grounds of ethnological distinction he proceeds to write the "political and social history of Europe," nay, of the world, in a few pages. This war has confirmed us in deploiring the work of many historians of note, whose patient research into the documents of the past and whose critical sincerity and acumen have been vitiated by their personal and political bias and by "patriotic passion," all made still more disastrously effective in filtering through the history school-books, where young "patriots" are brought up to hate and to despise their actual or potential national enemies. But if history is to be written in the spirit of Mr Grant's ethnological generalisation, and if the American people are to be trained to keep separate and pure the tall, light or red-haired, long-headed, blue-eyed and straight-nosed inhabitants from contamination with the rest, instead of concentrating the efforts of their citizens on the maintenance of the spirit of their constitution and the realisation of the highest ideals of mankind (this object by itself absorbing all the energies left them after having earned an honest livelihood), it will be a sad day for the people of the United States and for the development of the American nation and its position in civilised humanity.

Now, Galton held that moral, as well as physical, qualities may be transmitted—but surely only through their physical concomitants. We know of the resemblance of children to parents. But it is most important for eugenists to remember
that resemblance can never mean identity and that the human body, and still more the human character and mind, are composed of an infinite number of attributes and an infinite number of combinations in these attributes which go to the production of individuality and personality, and that we can never hope for the reproduction of identical units or types and only for broader resemblances. But we are justified in asking, "If children inherit similar or almost identical noses, why not similar brains, nerve-centres and cells, ganglia—the whole man?" For a great many years I have been interested in the different types of walks; I have made many careful notes, not hastily arrived at. Walks indicate character to a marvellous degree. You will find that the walk of the energetic man differs from that of the slothful, the ambitious and vain from that of the unambitious and humble. It is a most interesting study. Well, if that be so even in the case of a walk, why not with character and temperament? As I mentioned before, a good hunter must have the right tempera-
ment, a good "heart," which he inherits from his progenitors. The same applies to human beings. We may inherit our temperament which makes us energetic, passionate, courageous, emotional, full-blooded and warm-blooded and emotional or anæmic and fish-blooded, lethargical or cowardly. But whether the fortunate individual who inherits such a warm-blooded temperament, energy and courage—what Plato called τὸ θυμοειδὲς—will turn this priceless emotive capital into those social qualities which will make him a great general, a martyred leader of thought and religion, a bold reformer and philanthropist, or a fearless burglar, pirate or anarchist, depends upon his earliest training and surroundings from infancy upwards, which by the forces of environment, by education, and by the constant repercussion of habituation, subconscious as well as conscious, give social direction to this inherited temperament.

Eugenics is quite safe and can hardly ever go wrong in combating pathological conditions, diseased bodies, which are transmitted to the human being and off-
spring and lower the vitality of a race. Beyond this negative aspect it can improve collectively and individually the physical condition, all those physical properties which tend to secure a healthy body and a healthy mind to the race. But let us take heed that by the exclusive pursuit of these aims we do not arrive at the ideal of the "blond beast." You may have done what genetics advises, but the "eu" part of eugenics remains, and this is the most important part in the end. What is your best man? What is the type? For an answer to this question the Eugenist must turn to the student of Civics and the student of Ethics.

In this summer school of ours we are studying in Civics the development of social man. We are dealing with the corporate individual, the evolution of associations, corporate forms, the State, shop-work, philanthropic and other organisations. We must study the past, the sociological and historical aspects of society, causes which underlie its evolution; the broadest influence of physical
surroundings — social geography — the origin of natural traditions, of work and purpose. We must further study the nature and origins of the institutions and associations which man has evolved and the relation of the individual to these institutions. Above all, among these social associations, we must study the political organisations, the State and its government, imperial, national and local.

But I wish here to insist upon the fact that all these civic studies and civic aims depend finally upon what individual man is and what he ought to be. Civics ultimately depends upon Ethics, however useful it may be for the researcher as well as the teacher to separate, for the time being, these two branches of theoretical and practical work. But for the thorough study of Civics, as well as of international politics, we ultimately depend upon our knowledge and appreciation of the character of individual man, on his ethical nature and the ethical standards of his individual life. I may again be allowed to illustrate my meaning by giving here what I have recently written in a forthcoming
book on "The League of Nations" and quote a passage which follows the consideration of directly and technically political and international conditions favourable to the establishment of such a league:

In fine I must admit, and it may be rightly urged, that all principles of social and political betterment to secure the peace of the world and the progress of civilisation which we can devise on political or on economic grounds, will not secure our great purpose unless we can change and mend the heart of man. Only then can peace be assured. We must first remove the all-pervading force of envy and jealousy, leading to hatred, and ending in strife. I have stated elsewhere that few people can forego the emotional luxury of hatred, of a pet aversion. The passion of envy among individuals and nations cannot be totally eradicated; nor can the comparatively milder vice or weakness—kindred to envy and hatred—of vanity. I have endeavoured to show how potent a factor was this national vanity in leading Germany into the war. Anyone daring to hope that he can totally eliminate these nefarious forces from the heart of individual man and the soul of nations would indeed be rash. But what we can do is, as far as possible, to remove the conditions favouring their growth and strengthen the forces arrayed against them. And we may hope,

1 This book (The English-Speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations—Cambridge University Press) has since appeared and has reached a second edition.

2 Aristodemocracy, etc., p. 67; Jewish Question, etc. (2nd ed.), p. 12; Patriotism, etc., pp. 43 seq.

3 Aristodemocracy, etc., p. 103; Patriotism, etc., pp. 36–41.
by insisting upon those universal and potent qualities of human nature which war against these evil instincts in man and beast—or rather in the beast in man—and by establishing and strengthening the conditions which make for the dominance of humanity and justice, to control and overcome, even extirpate, the powers of evil.

If this is so with politics, it is essentially so with civics. Civics must have before it a consciousness of what the individual man is in his relation to society, as composed of individual men, not primarily institutional men. These institutions are not ends in themselves.

I had the privilege of attending several of Mr Farquharson’s interesting and instructive lectures on “The Foundations of Civics.” In these he endeavoured to deduce the general principles of Civics from a study of the origin and development of human associations in the actual life of modern times and in the traces of their earlier development from all the conditions prevailing in the past, physical as well as social. Now, this is very useful scientific work, which he has pursued with much intelligence and discrimination. All the same I feel bound to warn him
and his sociological colleagues against the dangers of over-generalisation from incomplete and sometimes doubtful data which form the groundwork of their induction. There can be no doubt of the potential influence of physical and—in the widest sense—geographic conditions, as well as public and social conditions, in producing both the economical, political, and social associations of our modern civilised life. So also the broadly social and economical relationship of the "political animal" man—so called by Aristotle—are effective moving factors in the production of the established "associations" in our complex modern life. But I think it only right that I should convey a warning to him and his colleagues in the study of Civics, and of the still wider department of study called Sociology, against over-generalisation and, especially, against the one-sided exaggeration of the formative influence of such factors. I will illustrate my meaning by taking for criticism two definite examples from his lecture which I attended two days ago:
In his illustration of the supreme importance of the physical effect of a definite site upon the establishment of an individual industry for a district or town, he maintained that Oxford and Cambridge had become higher educational centres—which they actually were and are—chiefly, if not exclusively, because of their physical or geographical position. Now, I must express my grave doubts, if not directly deny, the correctness of this conclusion. So far from believing that both Oxford and Cambridge are naturally the proper places for a university, as regards locality and climate, I can hardly conceive of any places less suited to this purpose. The relaxing climate of Cambridge is only surpassed by that of Oxford as a place unfitted to develop the physical conditions favourable to the life of a student. Those, who, like myself, have spent many years of residence here will agree with me that they have been severely handicapped in their work by these physical conditions. Many of us have found that we can only keep up the physical vitality and energy
for productive intellectual work by frequent recreation and changes of abode during our holidays. And not even their geographical position in the past, as regards the main arteries of communication in the ancient high-roads, are necessarily contributive to their suitability as centres of education and learning, inasmuch as it might be maintained that centres of higher learning are more properly placed in the quiet seclusion removed from the arteries of traffic. But it is equally true that for certain studies, like medicine and those immediately drawing their material from actual and practical life, the great centres, the metropolises, are most suitable and tend, as a matter of fact, in modern times to attract such studies to the capitals in every country and district. If, as regards my own experience of universities in various parts of the world, I had to choose an especially favoured site for those studies not directly concerned with the applied sciences of practical life, I would choose Cornell University in America on the gently rising and salubrious hill, its
bracing climate, and its beautiful landscape view on all sides. No, I maintain that Oxford and Cambridge owe their development as higher centres of learning to historical and not to physical, or even ethnological, causes.

I must also say that, when he singled out Berlin as the centre for musical art, I am inclined to think that that city has never occupied such a prominent place. From Bach and Beethoven, Mozart and Haydn, Schubert and Schumann, Wagner and Brahms onwards, Berlin has never been a musical centre—in fact I do not believe that any great German musician has ever been a Prussian. The leading Prussians themselves would probably deny to Mendelssohn the ethnical title of Prussian. Of course the capitals of every state, with their great wealth and as centres of amusement, can often attract the most prominent representatives in all work of the mind to such local centres. In so far as this has been the case it has not been to the advantage of truly German Kultur, nor has this been the case in other countries as well.
So also I am at issue with Mr Farquharson (including some of his sociological colleagues) when he, to my mind, exaggerated the importance of the simply utilitarian factor in the establishment of centres for the textile industries and, especially, when he swept aside, as unworthy of consideration in this respect, the mere question of "superfluous" adornment in female attire—as not of importance in the true "civic" development of the textile industry. However important the question of the immediate production of the basal materials in the making of yarns and cloths, their strength and durability, may doubtless be, as a matter of fact the "more frivolous" element of fashion, of taste (which may be very bad), of adornment and luxury, is one of the ruling and dominant factors in that modern industry. It is the weaving and dyeing of both cotton and woollen goods, their attractiveness to the purchaser in the patterns given to them, which may be the decisive factor in their economic value. Fashion and design may perhaps be the very soul of industry in a large number of modern goods, not
to mention art-production and artistic craft. I venture to maintain—in spite of the great intrinsic and constraining value of durability of material—that two-thirds of the objects sold in our shops, and the consequent purchases there made, are meant directly to appeal, and do appeal, to the "luxury" side of life. Moreover, in highly civilised societies it is right that this should be so. I could perhaps convince you—though it would take more than one lecture—of the highly serious and moral aspect of this condition of things. But remember that we cannot return—nor could it be maintained that it is desirable that we should return—to the conditions of prehistoric life, when the conscious existence and efforts of prehistoric man were almost exclusively centred on producing the necessary food in its crudest and almost raw condition, and, having sated his hunger and provided himself with bearskins to protect himself against cold, he could crawl into his cave or wattle-hut and sleep in security. I repeat, that two-thirds of our actual industries
are in great part directed towards the satisfaction of what might be called the aesthetic side of life; and this side and these desires are to be satisfied, not only in order in themselves to respond to the aesthetic instinct and spirit, but also to the moral and social aspect arising out of them. The poorest wife of the most unskilled labourer chooses the stuffs she needs, even the food required, from motives transcending the more immediate necessity of physical existence; still more so when she purchases any article of furniture for her home, even of the humblest and most necessary class. The chair, table, teapot and plate which commends itself to her "taste" and decides her selection in purchase is that which has the best shape and most attractive decoration. She does not only do this because of the immediate satisfaction of her taste (a highly commendable moral reason) but because of the satisfaction of a most important motive in social ethics which is at the very foundation of social intercourse and progress. This motive is to secure the approval
and esteem, if not the admiration, of her neighbours and fellow-beings. Remember, that within certain cogent limitations, upon which I need not dwell now, it is right for women, and even for men, to wish to make themselves look "pretty" and to attract the approval of those with whom they come in contact. And even if there were no such fellow-beings to be thus affected—even if we lived on a desert island—it would be right for us to make ourselves and our surroundings as beautiful and attractive as we know how to do this. Self-respect and the esteem of our neighbours are as fundamental as they are high motives in social life.

I am now coming to the main point of this lecture when I maintain that for Civics, as well as Eugenics, Ethics forms the fundamental foundation. The students of both these studies must turn to the widely moral consideration of individual man and solve the essential problems concerning his character, life and aims before they solve, and in order that they should solve, the chief problems of
their own study. However important man's relation to the widest, as well as narrowest, social "associations" may be, and however essential it undoubtedly is that every citizen in a modern democracy ought, from the elementary school upwards, to be made intelligently familiar with the institutions and practices of his own country and locality, with the national constitution and with local government, there remains thorough knowledge of the relationship of man to himself and to his neighbours as a moral and social individual, regarding his fellow-beings as individuals and his intercourse with them as that of individuals to one another, and not merely in their relationship to "associations," before he can study with truth and profit these wider relationships.

We can no more make "associations" an end in themselves than the State of Hegel or Treitschke could be made such with due regard to truth and the welfare of humanity; though both are based upon, and are destined for, the right development of individual men and women and of their lives.
But the question remains: What is the perfect man as well as his perfect life to be? We are bound to solve this question and to make the goal of ethics, as well as of civics and eugenics, clear in this fundamental principle underlying all sociology. Yet, we at once find that the conception of this ethical goal or ideal varies in the different periods of history. They are subject to evolution, though "conscious evolution"; and this "conscious" evolution—as we have seen before—is not purely "causal" but "teleological." For it is concerned with beings possessed of wills, intelligence, morality and imagination. Each period must therefore, above all, clearly establish its own ethical standards, which must in their turn again be progressive. Civics must rely on, and turn back to, ethics for an answer to the question: "What is the perfect man and what is his perfect life?" Eugenics, after having duly considered the most important conditions of producing a healthy race and stamping out the continuance of disease and degeneration must always remember that
in social life the physical end depends upon the moral and that its ultimate aim is not to produce the "blond beast."

I thus come finally to the chief object which I have set before myself in delivering this lecture: it is to insist upon the most pressing need of our time, namely, to organise and develop the study of ethics on an equal footing with all other great inductive studies, governed by the same spirit, and by adopting the same methods of research and teaching. I even think that it would be advantageous to substitute for the denomination of such study the term "Ethology" instead of Ethics. As I have endeavoured to show elsewhere¹, the study of ethics, as hitherto pursued by the philosopher, has chiefly, if not exclusively, been concerned with the establishment and discussion of the fundamental principles of all ethics on a more or less deductive or, at most, psychological groundwork. In the future I hope that those best qualified to carry out this work will be concerned with the study of actual man as a social

¹ See Aristodemocracy, etc., pp. 256 seq.
being and with the actual social life of the past and present as well as the future. Please remember that the philosopher Kant, after he had concluded his *Critique of Pure Reason*, turned to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, which latter contained his ethics.

As with most studies, we shall be concerned with two main aspects of the subject, namely, (i) that of the pure researcher, and (ii) that of the practical teacher. The groundwork and justification for the development of such a new department of truly scientific work, to be carried on as systematically and conscientiously as the biologist deals with his problems, is the simple, though comprehensive and all-important, fact, that ethical theory and practice—the standards of right and wrong—have varied in the different periods of man's history and that, even in the present, they are essentially modified by dominant traditions, systematic or unsystematic education, of individuals and classes, localities and occupations in actual life and for all communities as well as for mankind as a whole—
especially in the development of modern democratic society. It is of paramount importance—in fact it is essential to the rightness of social life—that the ultimate ideals be clearly formulated for each period with the logical promise of progress in the future.

I am sure that with this audience I hardly need insist upon the fact that our ethical conceptions have varied and have undergone a process of change in the recognisable history of the past. Consider merely what has been the change in our conception of “honour,” not only in the remote past, but even a few generations ago, when the grandfathers of some of us would have considered it their duty to set right the wrong done to their “honour” by going out to Chalk Farm on the chance of shooting their opponent or being shot themselves. I must, by the way, tell you that, in more than one “highly civilised” community on the Continent, I have met the most perfect representatives of cultured society who have seriously asked me: “How can you gentlemen of England and
America get on without the duel?” I must also remind you of the fact that, while there has been in the past a marked change in the conception of “business honesty and honour” as the communities rose from a state of petty barter to the larger business transactions in which dependence upon the mere written or spoken word of the parties was essential to any business procedure. Even in our own days and in our own country, you will be bound to admit, that the conceptions of business honesty and fairness differ with definite occupations and that the recognised traditions of dealing in horses and in “antiques,” in which the value of articles is in no way fixed while in others it is publicly established and known, the traditions do not follow the same standards.

So too you will all recognise that in the relation between men and women our moral practices, or at least our precepts and ideals, have vastly altered and are even now in an acute state of flux and, let us hope, of sane and beneficent development. The not very re-
mote legislation resulting in the Married Women's Settlement Act has, in some respects, done more actual good than a long series of political bills over which so much time has been, and is being, wasted, in parliamentary activity. I cannot refrain from expressing my own hope, that many of the problems regulating sex-morality, as well as their direct bearing upon physical eugenics, the solution of which appeared to many philanthropic and public-spirited men as remote, if not hopeless, are now promising in their outlook, because, while we have hitherto faced them exclusively as men, the direct co-operation of women will now lead to their ultimate, if not rapid, solution. All this change in the whole purview of social life is produced by this glorious period of ours in which—whatever grave and depressing mistakes may be made by the women in this early stage of their emancipation—woman has come into her rights.

In another and equally important sphere of modern life we are also giving birth—with all the consequent and distressing labours of such birth—to the establish-
ment of a new ethcial relationship between the employers and employed. At last it is being recognised that these ethical factors are essential to the sane and rational development of economical life and prosperity.

In fact the great change which marks the development of Political Economy in our time, compared with the period when the Manchester School reigned supreme, is the recognition of the ethical factor as equivalent to others which have hitherto been considered the only truly active co-efficients in economical phenomena or the only ones to be considered by the economist. If this admission of ethics marks the great and characteristic change in Modern Economics, we may hope that in the future a further step will be taken and Aesthetics (in the widest acceptation of that term) will be equally admitted as an important factor in sane Political Economy.

1 I may even venture, at the risk of appearing to enunciate a great, if not an absurd, paradox, to say that the day may come when truth will be reduced to an aesthetic principle.
Allow me, finally, to relate a homely incident of my own experience which may be pertinently illustrative of the point I wish to impress. Some years ago, when I resided at Athens as the Director of the American Archaeological School and kept house there, I received notice from some friends travelling in Egypt that they were arriving by steamer at the Piraeus shortly and begging me to help them to find suitable quarters. I at once despatched my old and trusted Greek butler, Costi, with orders that he should proceed to the Piraeus and, if needs be, stay till the next day until the Egyptian boat arrived and bring the party to my house as my guests. He was obliged to stay the night at the Piraeus and finally arrived with my friends. When, after the first greetings, they found themselves comfortably established in my house, they thanked me warmly for my reception and insisted that they should repay the expenses I had incurred through my servant. I agreed to this, on condition that, while they should pay for all expenditure by old "Costi" the moment he arrived at
the ship's side in the rowing-boat—including porterage, carriages, etc.—his expenses before that moment only concerned me. I accordingly ordered the servant to make out two separate bills for them and for me. This he did and duly presented them to us. As a mere matter of curiosity I asked them to show me their bill, when, to my astonishment and horror, I found that every item was charged to them double and treble the price I usually paid. I then ordered him up to my study alone and indignantly charged him with dishonesty, calling him a rogue and swindler. He stood pale and petrified at this insult. "Have I not always dealt honestly by you, Sir?" he said with voice trembling with emotion. "Have I not fought with all the tradesmen to save you every penny I could for all these years? And now you insult me like this!" I answered: "I did trust you all this time and was grateful to you for your fidelity to me; but I can no longer trust you, since you have treated these people, my guests, as you have done." "But," he replied with his characteristic gesture, bowing for-
wards with his hands to his chest and then removing them downwards in a sweep, "those are strangers, Sir." To make a long story short, I found it impossible to convince him that there was no difference as regards honesty between me and them—in fact to recognise any abstract or general duty to honesty. He was too old and set in his mentality to alter his whole view of life and morals, and I could only persuade him not to repeat such an offence by winning him over to another point of view: that everybody who stayed in my house as my guest in so far belonged to my family. This he could understand and promised me to act accordingly.

This anecdote illustrates an important principle of ethology, the study of evolutionary ethics. With old Costi and with people in that phase of ethical development the sole avenue towards general and abstract principles of conduct is the emotions, especially the affections. Fidelity and loyalty are the supreme and all-dominating virtues. Many a party-politician stands on the same level of civic morality.
The highest and the essential quality appealing to a politician of the old Tammany Hall order was summarised in the phrase: "He stands by his friends." And many a "patriot" has reached no higher stage in ethical development. It has been a common-place to say that woman, taken as a whole, is not so capable of being appealed to by more general and more abstract principles as is man, and that her outlook on public affairs "will always be guided by personal affection, admiration and similar considerations." Even in the most intellectual and purely dispassionate occupation, such as the pursuit of science, it has been remarked that distinguished votaries among women are inclined to favour a more passionate and partisan attitude, or will readily make themselves the militant champions of one outstanding figure who represents a definite direction in scientific work, while men will not be thus swayed by personal issues. Even if this generalisation were justified our answer would be: that her intellectual education, as bearing upon her ethical outlook and practice has hitherto been defective, and that, with
the complete reform of her education long since initiated, this fault may be mitigated, if not completely reformed.

However, I cannot refrain from qualifying the implied censure of the personal emotional attitude of mind which has been attributed to women. The Défauts de ses qualités here implied have, as qualities, certain educational and social advantages which must not be overlooked. The development of the affections which may produce a personally emotional attitude, at times out of place, is of supreme value in the development of social and moral human beings. I may take this occasion to suggest that, with whatever justice it may be claimed that certain conditions of parental life—especially with the poorer people and with the rich and worldly who have no time to spare for the care and education of their children—are less likely to produce good educational results than where children are handed over to institutions and the care of qualified nurses and teachers, who follow their noble pursuit because they feel fitness for such a vocation—that, in spite of this, the fact remains that we cannot forego the
supremely important element of natural affection inherent in motherhood and in all intimate family relationships. The ideals which led to the organisation of the Spartan State-education of children may possibly produce a certain form of "superman," but not the social beings who correspond to our ideals of life, private and public. Moreover, it is important to remember that the direct cultivation of the emotions which develop the imagination—directly leading to art and religion in the widest sense of these terms—also gives imaginative and emotional form to the human will, to the human soul. The normal human being cannot do without these spiritual forces. If I am right in the definition I have ventured to give of religion ("that man is religious only in the degree in which ultimate ideals are real to him"), then the directness and potency with which such ideals pass through the imagination into our emotions and produce an ethos, a sub-conscious habit of mind, becomes one of the greatest assets of the human character and one of the most important aims of education. Among such ideals, of course, the more
general and abstract ethical laws are undoubtedly included.

I have recently published a monograph on *Truth—an Essay in Moral Reconstruction*, in which I have endeavoured to show the marked change and advance in the conception of that essential requisite of ethical life from the earlier periods to our own day, the inadequacy of our standards in the present and the crying need for reform for the future. For there can be no doubt that our conception of Truth, as revealed in the lives of all classes of modern communities, has not kept pace with that of other qualities of our moral life. I have endeavoured to impress the necessity of a correct formulation of these standards and, above all, of effectually teaching such high principles of conduct in our elementary and secondary schools where the need of truthfulness is in no way adequately impressed and where often the only practical method of developing the sense of truth and justice upon the less-educated people of our communities is through the national idea of fair-play in our national sports.

The great task before us now is to
formulate clearly our present ethical standards in every aspect of our life. In the first instance, there will be the task of the special students, the philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, social historians, the careful and conscientious observers of the facts of ethical life in the past and in the present, to establish our ethical standards by means of methods which will be as careful and systematic as are those of the students of nature in all the inductive sciences of modern times. There will undoubtedly be many arguments and much controversy among the authorities dealing with such questions as regards the past and the present. Yet such difference of opinion is the life of all enquiry and science. But the ultimate result will be the establishment of a residuum of facts and inductive truths which will lead to the codification of ethical tenets and standards in every period and country, and with especial urgency in our own times. A further and most important result of such enquiry will be the realisation of the changes in the conception of the perfect man in the various periods of human history and, above all, in our own
days. Such special enquiry by qualified specialists will lead to active and helpful discussion of the ethical aspect of phases in our actual life which are thus in a state of flux and growth—such, for instance, as the problem of commercial and industrial morality—which will give vitality to enquiry and have direct bearing upon the formation of public opinion.

But the establishment of our ethical code will not only be limited to the examination and establishment of those broader moral duties\(^1\) to which the terms "morals" and "morality" have been more exclusively applied; but they will also be concerned with the "social life of the surface," which, so far from being superficial, penetrates deeply into the moral and social life of every period and of every community.

Thus in establishing, through the principle of "conscious evolution," what we can best call the ideal of the gentleman, the perfect human being, for each period, we shall be bound to go beyond the deeper legal and moral requisites to those qualities which directly bear on the

\(^1\) Truth, pp. 4 seq.; Aristodemocracy, etc., pp. 200 seq.
social intercourse between individuals in civilised communities, as they also have a potent, if not so direct, a bearing upon self-respect in the individual. The gentleman will not only be law-abiding and public-spirited, but he will also be a well-educated man. He will, without being a dabbler in all subjects, develop in himself intellectual sympathy and interest in every department of human thought. The "distinguished dowager" who, at a dinner-party began her conversation with the historian Lecky, by asking him what he did or cared for, and, when he informed her that he was a historian and asked her whether she was interested in history, replied: "No. I always say 'Let by-gones be by-gones'"—this dowager was not representative of the type of a "lady," the complement of our gentleman. Whatever her qualifications to social eminence may have been in other respects, she was distinctly wanting in the development of one essential attainment of a representative man or woman in our civilised communities, namely, that they should keep abreast with the higher intellectual, moral and artistic achieve-
ments of their country and their age. Let me repeat: this does not mean superficiality, dabbling with knowledge, sciolism; it does not produce insincere pretentiousness to knowledge we do not thoroughly possess; it does not create the prig and the humbug—it produces true intellectual sympathy with true modesty. As was said by Terence, *Homo sum; humili nihil a me alienum puto* (Human I am; I consider nothing human foreign to me), so the true gentleman will say, *intelligibile nihil a me alienum puto*. “No great intellectual achievement, no great work of art, no beneficent movement in the world of individual or civic morality is foreign to me—I dare not be indifferent to the spiritual life about me or out of sympathy with it.” We can never claim omniscience; on the contrary, the more intense this intellectual sympathy of ours, the more are we alive to our own limitations compared with the vastness of true science and art, the more sincere our humility and our reverence. Let me give you but one instance: I had the privilege of being present at the lecture of Professor Punnett on the subject of Mendelism,
as well as at the lectures of some representatives of biometric research for which my friend Professor Pearson has done so much. Well, we must have been struck by the wonderful evidence which the small feathers in the wing of a fowl furnished for sound Mendelian generalisation, as also the complicated facts resulting from higher statistical and mathematical methods of the researcher. Not one of us, I am sure, would think or act as if he were an esoteric researcher in these domains of higher science or really knew much about its problems. But this we did learn and this we know now, namely, the great problems before them, and the methods applied to solve them; we have cleared up what were vague and confused notions about the problem of heredity; we have really clarified and economised thought for ourselves, and we are satisfied to be unpretentious and modest. We should never say that any important department of study or art is foreign to us and that "we do not care about it."

To be a gentleman is not a question of class, it is a question of morals, character, culture, conduct and manners. A gentle-
man will have good manners; and good manners, allow me to insist, have their groundwork, their rationale, in deeply social principles. The gentleman will take due care (and of course I include the female counterpart, the much abused term "lady") of his personal appearance, not only from a purely hygienic point of view. I remember many years ago hearing George Eliot dwell upon the importance of "putting on their Sunday-best" on the manners and morals of the labouring classes. This, she maintained, went far to prevent them from acting and speaking coarsely. I hold that the habit of "dressing for dinner" (which includes washing and changing one's working-dress in every class of life) is one of the greatest national assets in the life of the British people. May it never die out.

I have advisedly chosen these rather light and superficial instances to insist upon the comprehensiveness of the study of ethics, including as it does the whole life of social intercourse.

Now, the study of Ethology in the past, the establishment of our code of
conduct in the present and our social ideals for the future will be the task of the special ethologist. His work will at least present us with a body of definite standards which will be beyond controversy, to which every class and every sect of religion will necessarily subscribe. The next and all-important task will be that in our schools, as in our homes, the young will be definitely instructed in this code, whichever competent teacher, including of course the priests of all denominations, will be able and qualified to do. Let no one say that the mere teaching of what is right of itself makes man act rightly. On the other hand, no one will dare to maintain that our children are to be brought up without having been in some way familiarised with the universally admitted standards of right and wrong of our own times, adequately and clearly expressive of such modern moral needs. Moreover, the proper methods of teaching will be by vivid illustration from the actual life which appeals to them and by methods which go beyond the intellect, touch the emotions and the imagination, and familiarise them with these tenets to such a
degree that they produce an ethos, a mental habit, in them from their earliest years upwards. The simple injunction or correction which in our early days many of us have received when our teacher reproved us by saying: "A gentleman does not do that kind of thing" has produced a lasting effect on our lives and we owe him a debt of gratitude. What I insist upon with conviction and with all the emphasis which I can give, is the need of clear formulation of our current ethical code, the establishment of our ideal of the perfect man and woman and the teaching of such practical ethics in all our schools and homes. Eugenics, as well as Civics, are bound to take cognisance of these ethical needs and the co-operation of all these three departments of study and practice must produce an organic whole which will conduce to the welfare of man, as such a synthesis corresponds to make of all three departments of social science a true and effective contribution to human knowledge. In any case, Eugenics as well as Civics must take cognisance of Ethology.
BOOKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR


"Few of the many books which the war has called forth merit more careful consideration. . . . His long and varied experience, his scholarship, his residence in foreign countries, including Germany, give great weight to his judgments on men and affairs. We know no recently published book which will do more to stimulate this social sense."—The Times, June 1, 1916.

"As a positive expression of what we must continue to call the Hellenic Spirit, this brilliantly reasoned sequel to The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World’s Peace will unquestionably rank as one of the most truly hopeful works which the war has produced. The practical quality of Sir C. Waldston’s idealism, etc."—New York Times, August 26, 1917.

"The distinguished author traces the causes of the war, formulates the need of a fresh conception of morals, states the duty of the citizen in the present crisis, and outlines a scheme for an International Council, backed by force, for the maintenance of peace. . . . It is a reason for thankfulness that the fruit of a mind so judicial, so well equipped, should be issued in a cheap yet complete form."—Glasgow Herald, July 24, 1917.


"Sir Charles Waldstein in his book, Patriotism, etc., delivers such a rebuke to Chauvinism as one would expect from a man of his cosmopolitan outlook and broadly cultivated sympathies. An American by birth and education, Sir Charles Waldstein has long been eminent as an archaeologist and teacher of art at the English Cambridge. As long ago as 1898 he advocated an American coalition, believing that England and the United States were the ‘two civilised powers’ best fitted by existing circumstances ‘to draw nearer to each other.’"—Springfield Republican, Jan. 10, 1918.

Patriotism and What Germany is Fighting For.

"Anything Sir C. W. writes on the disturbing problems of the hour deserves attentive scrutiny because of his wide and diversified knowledge of social and international politics. His pen has kept pace with events. Two recent works: What Germany is Fighting For and Patriotism, etc., following closely his notable Aristodemocracy, have emerged in book form above the large volume of his contributions to periodicals. The fact that one of these appears in paper covers at a price of sixty cents does not diminish its importance."—Carroll X. Michener in The Bellman, Minneapolis, Feb., 1918.
What Germany is Fighting For. Longmans, Green & Co.

"These papers show with absolute clearness the reasons for which Germany provoked, and is still engaged in carrying on, the world's war, as well as the undoubted responsibility, not only of the German Government, but of the majority of the German people for the War."—The Daily Telegraph, July 20, 1917.

"His book constitutes an important war document."—Punch.


"Prefaced with an open letter rebuking Mr Roosevelt for his disbelief in a League of Nations as a panacea; this spirited pamphlet examines the objections raised to Mr Wilson's proposals, and urges that one need not be a Bolshevik or a Pacifist to approve of them."—Spectator, Nov. 9, 1918.


"This is a book pitched in a noble key. A book to put into the hands of the 6th-form schoolboy, and of the politician that now is, of the Statesman yet to be. Seriousness is not the key-note of our age; we have the cinema habit, the paragraph passion. Thought is a bore and rarely encouraged. Well-balanced judgment is our wash-pot, over accuracy do we cast our shoe. But if anyone will give half an hour from his newspaper to the study of the opening of this book, we shall be surprised if that half-hour is not extended until the end, to the moral and material benefit of the reader. . . . All who desire to cultivate in themselves and in their children a sense of the importance of truth, which is clear thinking, a readiness to face the issues of life—uncoloured by emotion, sentiment, or prepossession—should read a book like this, a manual of ethics in the highest sense."—Saturday Review, Sept. 27, 1919.

"Truth is even more powerful a plea for a fresh revaluation of morals than is the preceding volume (Aristodemocracy), and in its brilliant reasoning and cogency of message, to say nothing of its urbanity and delicacy of style, is an important contribution to the literature of modern ethics."—San Francisco Chronicle, July 20, 1919.

"Que je regrette de ne pouvoir traduire ici les cinq chapitres qu'il a consacrés dans un de ses ouvrages à l'examen critique du journal et du journalisme! Comme il expose lucidement le tort fait à la culture, à la vérité, à la bonne foi par les mœurs journalistiques d'aujourd'hui! Comme il excelle à faire valoir l'information véritable, qui est d'acquisition lente et de ton mesuré! Comme il stigmatise la hâte, l'unilatéralité, le sensationalisme des quotidiens à grand tirage! Il conclut son étude..."
par un désir véhément d’assister à une ‘reconstruction’ du journalisme,
à la fois du dehors par l’État et du dedans par les professionnels!”—
René Johannet, Les Lettres, April 1, 1920.

“As a practical idealist, whose Aristodemocracy was one of the wisest
books begotten of the war, he seeks to point out to the politician, the
millionaire, the journalist, the ecclesiastic, how best they may fulfil their
function in the State. . . . His essay will repay careful study, and should
exercise a helpful influence in the reconstruction of public life and
conduct.”—The Scotsman, May 1, 1919.

“Are we a truthful people? Is there a declension in this virtue? What
are the new temptations to mendacity? What professions and callings
are chiefly affected by it? Sir Charles Walston discusses these questions
with a sense of their gravity and with a keen eye for the presence of the
weaknesses which he deplores.”—The Times, June 12, 1919.

“Sir Charles Walston’s Truth: An Essay in Moral Reconstruction,
is a book of absorbing interest. . . . It is distinctly a thought-provoking
work and deserves wide circulation.”—The Hindustan Review, March,
1920.

The English-Speaking Brotherhood and the League

“In these troublous times it is hard to predict what a day may bring
forth. An analysis of the situation to-day may be of little good to-morrow.
Thousands of books that appear wise and learned when issued are thrown
into the discard almost as soon as they leave the press. This will probably
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holds to definitions on nationality and internationality which are markedly
sound and rational. He discusses the expansion of Western ideals and
the world’s peace with intelligence, and argues with vigor for a Super-
national Court, backed by power. He recognises the difficulties in the
way of his scheme, but presses on with true British persistency.”—Boston
Evening Transcript, April 1, 1920.

“Sir Charles Walston, if he thought it worth while, might claim to
rank among the prophets, for though some of the essays which compose
this volume date from as far back as the Spanish-American War, they
reflect by anticipation views which are leading ideas in the world of
international affairs at the present moment. These views are underlined
in the essays of post-war date. . . . As one who has a first-hand
knowledge of the problems and interests of both hemispheres, Sir
Charles Walston writes from wide experience, and also with pregnancy
of thought.”—The Scotsman, Oct. 6, 1919.

“Sir Charles Walston has rendered a public service by his The English-
Speaking Brotherhood. He reprints the suggestive address he delivered
in 1898. The volume also contains more recent pieces, including a powerful defence of the League of Nations. Perhaps the most fundamental principles of these essays is that the peace of the world can be secured only through ‘the closer understanding and co-operation between the great English-speaking democracies.’” — The Daily Graphic, Oct. 10, 1919.

“This volume is an effort to meet the demand for a republication of the author’s The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World’s Peace, now out of print, which anticipated the foundation of a League of Nations and also looked to this consummation primarily through the intervention of the United States in the world’s affairs, and especially through the closer understanding and co-operation between the two English-speaking democracies.” — The Glasgow Herald.

“Sir C. Walston can be congratulated on having published a book that is bound to stimulate discussion, and thereby to render a service to the cause we have at heart.” — E.S.K. in The Covenant, Oct., 1919.

OTHER WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL

The Political Confession of a Practical Idealist.— A Pamphlet. (John Murray, 1911.)

The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World’s Peace.— 1899.

The Balance of Emotion and Intellect.— 1878.

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