Defense Doc. 1500-0-4 Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Herbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session. Excerpt from testimony of Admiral R. F. Ingersoll - Tuesday, February 12, 1946 Mr. GEARHART. When did that occur? Admiral INGERSOLL. Just to show again how memory can trick a person, Admiral Richardson, I read in the paper, had testified that I went to London in 1940 when I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and when Admiral Stark was Chief of Naval Operations. As a matter of fact, I went in December, very late in December of 1937, when I was Director of the War Plans Division and when Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Richardson was perfectly sincere in what he said. Mr. GEARHART. Well, that was pretty early, before events began to develop. Admiral INGERSOLL. There were two purposes. The primary purpose was to investigate and to talk with the British Admiralty officials as to what we could do if the United States and Japan were to find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific. Mr. RICHARDSON. United States and England. Admiral INGERSOIL. United States and England would find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific, to explore all the means, what means could be used, what arrangements it would be necessary to make in regard to command relationships, in regard to communicat ing with each other, of establishing liaison officers and preparing certain codes and ciphers, and so forth. (11404) Hr. GEARHART. Were the assumptions upon which these conversations were based that the United States and Britain would be in war together? Idmiral INGERSOLL. The assumption was that the United States and Great Britain might find themselves both at war with Japan in the Pacific. Mr. GEARHART. And your rurpose in going there was to work out a tentative plan as to how each nation would cooperate with the other in the event that should occur? Admiral INGERSOLL. That is right, to find out what we could do, what forces we could expect. The British had to be a little bit careful about it because they did not know at that time whether they were going to have, in a year or two, a European war on their hands, and they could not state definitely what forces they could allocate to the Pacific at that time. Mr. GEARHART. Did you go there to discuss Japan or Germany? Admiral INGERSOLL. Japan only. Admiral INGERSOLL. As I say, that record of conversations became entirely obsolete when the later agreements in ABC-1 were in effect in 1940 or 1941. (Pages 4272 - 4276, Part 9 - "Pearl Harbor /ttack"