

1981

I M T F E

The United States, ~~and~~ <sup>et al</sup> others

- VS -

ARAKI Sadao, ~~and~~ <sup>et al</sup> others

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent : NEMOTO Hiroshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.



NEMOTO Hiroshi's Affidavit

Ques: Please state the Witness's age and address.

Ans: Age - 57.

Address - no. 1047, KUNOGAYA,  
TSURUKAWA-MURA, MINAMITAMA-GUN,  
TOKYO-TO

Ques: Please state a brief history of the Witness.

Ans: I ~~was~~ graduated <sup>from</sup> the military academy <sup>(in 1911)</sup>  
and <sup>from</sup> the military <sup>General</sup> Staff College <sup>respectively</sup>  
~~by~~ <sup>in 1922.</sup> in the 44th year of MEIJI (1911)

~~and the 11th year of TAISHO (1922)~~

After serving as a member of the General Staff  
~~Afterwards~~ I served in the General  
Headquarters, a member of  
Staff Office, The War Affairs Section, of  
the War Ministry and <sup>a member of</sup> the Information



Department, of the War Ministry, ~~and~~ <sup>was</sup>  
~~then~~ I became the ~~head~~ Regimental Commander at

ASAHIKAWA. During the China Incident,

I was a staff officer under General  
TERAUCHI, Commander of the North

China <sup>Area</sup> District Army. Following this,

I held various posts, such as Chief of

~~the~~ Staff of the South China Expeditionary

Army, Commander of a Division ~~stationed~~

~~in Manchuria~~ and a District Army

stationed in MANCHURIA, and at the ~~end~~ <sup>end</sup> of the

war I was Commander of the North

China Army.



Ques. While the witness was <sup>the</sup> Chief of  
~~the~~ Staff of the South China Expeditionary  
Army, was SATO Kenryo <sup>the assistant</sup> ~~the~~ Chief of  
~~the~~ Staff of the said Army?

Ans. Yes. SATO Kenryo was at that  
time <sup>an Army Air</sup> Flight Colonel and <sup>was</sup> serving as  
<sup>the Assistant</sup> ~~the~~ Chief of ~~the~~ Staff of the South China  
Expeditionary Army.

Ques. Please describe the duties of SATO  
as <sup>Assistant</sup> ~~Vice~~ Chief of ~~the~~ Staff.

Ans. SATO was <sup>mainly</sup> in charge of the so-  
called rear <sup>area services, i.e. maintaining</sup> ~~arrangements, regarding~~  
~~Army~~ equipment, supply of ~~was~~



~~materials~~ and <sup>supply of</sup> clothing and food, etc. <sup>(for the Army),</sup> and

which <sup>the Chief of the Staff,</sup> ~~thus~~ enabled me to devote myself <sup>solely</sup> to

operational duties without other worries.  
the military operations, ~~feeling~~ no  
anxiety <sup>for things</sup> from behind.

Ques. ~~Was~~ <sup>the Assistant</sup> ~~Chief of the Staff,~~ <sup>Chief of the Staff,</sup>  
have the right to give orders to his  
~~authorized~~ <sup>subordinate</sup> staff officers?

Ans. The main duties of SATO <sup>The business which</sup>  
~~was in SATO's charge~~ <sup>can be explained</sup> in other words as  
follows:-  
with a view to <sup>maintaining the full fighting strength</sup> ~~the replenishment of~~ the Army,  
SATO's job was to keep in close contact with the other  
~~fighting power,~~ SATO, ~~closely~~  
sections in the Army headquarters so that necessary  
~~connected with various departments~~  
matters can be jointly agreed upon and that the sections  
~~within the Army Command, was making~~  
can function smoothly.



~~arrangements regarding necessary~~  
~~items and endeavouring to carry on~~  
~~things smoothly, and~~ <sup>since SATO was</sup> ~~was thus~~  
~~rendering~~ assistance to me, <sup>the</sup> Chief of ~~the~~ Staff,  
in this manner, <sup>he had no power</sup>  
Accordingly ~~SATO was not authorized~~  
to <sup>give orders or supervise</sup> ~~dictate or superintend~~ <sup>the</sup> other  
staff officers within the Army Headquarters  
Command.

Ques. Was it <sup>while you were in the position</sup> ~~during your tenure~~

of Chief of ~~the~~ Staff of the South China

Expeditionary Army that the Japanese  
forces advanced into north French

Indo-China ? ?

Ans. yes.



Ques Please explain in detail the circumstances which led to a clash between the Japanese and <sup>the</sup> French <sup>Indo-China</sup> ~~armies~~ at the time of the former's advance into north French Indo-China.

Ans. The advance of the Japanese forces into north French Indo-China was ~~a problem~~ which was agreed upon in August <sup>1940</sup> the 15th year of SHOWA, (~~1940~~) between ~~both~~ <sup>the</sup> governments of TOKYO and VICHY (the Vichy government was then ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> lawful government of France). As for the execution of ~~the~~ <sup>this advance!</sup> ~~said~~ ~~problem~~, it was to be ~~carried out~~ ~~done~~



Major General NISHIHARA Issaku, ~~the representative~~ <sup>representing</sup> of the Japanese Army and the Governor-general of French Indo-China were to meet <sup>at HANOI</sup> ~~at HANOI~~ <sup>make</sup> ~~decide upon~~ a detailed agreement, according to which the advance was to be carried out, ~~which was to be decided on at HANOI~~

~~between Major General NISHIHARA~~

~~Issaku, representing the Japanese Army and the Governor-general of French Indo-China.~~ ~~For the part of~~

The South China Expeditionary Army, as it was ordered by the <sup>Imperial</sup> General Headquarters to organize ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> French Indo-China expeditionary army ~~it was~~ <sup>and was in the</sup> process of making ~~its~~ <sup>its</sup> table of organization and preparations ~~engaged in the organization of the~~ for the dispatch.

~~said army and preparations for its~~ <sup>the negotiations for</sup> However, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> itemized agreement ~~under negotiations~~ <sup>by Major General NISHIHARA</sup> was nowhere near reaching a conclusion.

~~There were, however, no prospects of easily materializing the said~~



~~under negotiation~~  
~~detailed agreement~~ ~~by~~  
Major General NISHIMURA, to be

~~concluded~~

At that time, from the ~~General~~ <sup>Imperial</sup>  
Headquarters Major General TOMINAGA  
Kyoji, Chief of <sup>Operations Section of the Army Dept,</sup> ~~the Army Strategic~~  
of the <sup>Imperial</sup> ~~General~~ Headquarters, was  
dispatched, bringing with him a plan  
for an independent advance, ~~allowing~~

~~in case of~~  
any resistance ~~being offered~~ <sup>on the part of</sup>  
by the French <sup>Indo-China</sup> Army,  
while making the independent advance,



the use of arms was permitted to  
~~permission was given for use of~~  
~~armed force to~~ remove the  
obstruction) ~~to~~ and the South China  
Expeditionary Army, under the  
guidance of Major General TOMINAGA,  
mapped out <sup>afresh</sup> a plan for an independent  
advance.

The plan for the said  
The outline of independent  
Advance is as follows:—

A. From the French Indo-China - Chinese frontier, that is,  
from a broad front extending  
about 80 km <sup>from</sup> north ~~and~~ <sup>to</sup> south,  
with CHENNANKAN as its center,  
the 5th Division shall advance  
~~forming itself into~~ <sup>in</sup> several columns.

B. The French Indo-China Expeditionary



Army (about <sup>the strength of</sup> one ~~Army~~ mixed brigade)  
~~in strength~~) shall be transported by  
sea route and, with a view to acting in  
concert with A. ~~laux~~ <sup>troops</sup>, it shall land on the  
coast near HAI PHONG and proceed to  
HANOI.

C. ~~By~~ <sup>By</sup> transporting one mixed brigade by  
sea route and ~~making it~~ <sup>landing it</sup> land on the right  
bank area of the Rouge River, ~~interception~~  
~~when necessary, the communications shall be cut off~~  
~~of the communications~~ between ~~the~~ south and  
north French Indo-China. ~~was to~~  
~~be accomplished, if necessitated,~~

As it was a purely <sup>operational</sup> ~~strategic~~ movement,  
~~various~~ <sup>various detachments</sup> of the Army units  
were ~~put~~ <sup>placed</sup> under the direction of the



Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army and the ~~responsibility for the~~ protection of the sea-route transportation and <sup>of</sup> the landing ~~units~~ <sup>detachments</sup> was to be taken care of by the Commander-in-Chief of the South China Expeditionary Fleet.

In other words, there were two ~~alternatives~~ <sup>alternative</sup> plans: ~~either~~ in case of One was, if the <sup>negotiations for the itemized</sup> ~~agreement~~ <sup>agreement</sup> "can be successfully concluded, ~~smoothly materialized, to land~~ <sup>been</sup> The French ~~in accordance therewith,~~

Indo-China Expeditionary Army ~~only~~ alone would ~~be~~ landed at <sup>HAIPHONG</sup> ~~HANOI~~ harbour and make ~~it~~ a peaceful advance; the other plan was, if the negotiations fail, ~~advance peacefully~~ <sup>in case</sup> there were the above-mentioned independent advance ~~which would be~~ no prospects for the detailed agreement ~~and~~ <sup>to carry out</sup> ~~like~~ an operational movement ~~would be made~~ being reached ~~in~~ an independent advance



which was a strategic movement,  
~~and~~ in accordance with  
~~the previously mentioned plan.~~

However, <sup>the</sup> negotiations for "the itemized agreement"  
~~The detailed agreement, negotiated for~~

by Major General NISHIHARA, was  
making a very slow progress <sup>toward</sup> ~~its~~

~~conclusion~~, and After various complicated  
complications,

~~circumstances~~, Major General NISHIHARA  
made a final proposal  
~~proposed a final counter-measure~~

to the French Indo-China Governor-

General, ~~making~~ <sup>setting</sup> noon, Sept 22 as the  
deadline for ~~an~~ answer. The Governor-General was  
~~time limit~~ for a "yes" or "no" reply. It was

notified <sup>also</sup> that a free action would be taken,  
if no reply was forthcoming by that time.  
~~in case of no reply being given.~~



With the completion of the <sup>above plan for an</sup> ~~and~~ independent advance ~~plan~~, the 22nd Army (command-  
ed by Lieut. General KUNO) <sup>(was in the following positions)</sup> ~~and~~ The

5th Division (A) <sup>(A) ~~plan~~</sup> prepared for ~~separate~~ <sup>in columns</sup> advance, by deploying <sup>near</sup> ~~themselves~~ along the frontier on the north-south line through

CHENNANKAN ; <sup>sea-borne</sup> the French Indo-

China Expeditionary Army <sup>(B) ~~force~~</sup> <sup>(~~stored~~ ships)</sup> assembled ~~by ships~~ and stood by ~~was~~ gathered in preparedness off the

coast of YAMHSIEN, KUANHSI province;

~~and~~ the mixed brigade (C) <sup>(C) ~~force~~</sup> <sup>(~~aboard~~ ships)</sup> assembled and stood by ~~was~~ gathered in readiness of HAI KOW,

HAINAN island, <sup>and</sup> The ~~Its~~ Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army



~~Leaving~~ <sup>with</sup> a required number of staff officers  
with him, proceeded to the ~~Operations~~ <sup>Command post</sup>

~~Center~~ at HAIKOW, HAINAN  
island.

As there was no reply from The French  
Indo-China Governor General ~~until~~ <sup>by</sup> noon.

Sept. 22, the negotiation for the ~~the~~ <sup>itemized</sup>  
agreement" was ~~thought to have broken off.~~ <sup>regarded as unsuccessful.</sup>

Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial

~~As the independent~~ <sup>decided</sup> ~~advance was to be begun~~  
Headquarters order that the action for an independent advance  
at 12 A.M. Sept 23 by the general Headquarters  
he started at 2400 Sept 22, the Commander of the South China  
order, the Commander of the South  
Expeditionary Army ordered the units, A. B. C. etc, to commence  
China Expeditionary Army ordered these  
advancing detachments.

~~Designated in the previous~~  
their movements at 2400 Sept 22.

~~begin their advance at 12 A.M. Sept. 23~~

Thus ~~these detachments~~ <sup>the units</sup> began their respective

movements, especially the 5th Division



through the narrow mountain paths, <sup>in widely deployed formations</sup> proceeded <sup>to</sup> the frontier line, ~~deploying itself~~  
~~along the broad front.~~

At this time we ~~abruptly~~ <sup>unexpectedly</sup> received a dispatch from Major General NISHIHARA <sup>7</sup> telling of the acceptance <sup>that</sup> by the French Indo-China Governor-general of the <sup>agreement proposed by</sup> Japanese <sup>came to agree to the Japanese proposals.</sup>

I do not remember the <sup>time</sup> ~~time~~ <sup>exactly</sup>, but it was in the evening. ~~(On the receipt of~~  
As soon as the ~~dispatch~~ <sup>dispatch</sup> was received, ~~the said telegram,~~ the Commander of the South

China Expeditionary Army immediately gave <sup>by wireless</sup> orders <sup>at his own discretion</sup> ~~by wireless to~~ the <sup>units</sup> ~~various~~ ~~detachments~~ to suspend their ~~independent~~ advances and reported thereof to the <sup>Imperial</sup> ~~General~~ Headquarters in detail. From the <sup>Imperial</sup> ~~General~~ Headquarters also we received an order for suspension of the ~~independent~~ advance.



This ~~said~~ suspension-order was ~~conferred~~ <sup>definitely</sup>  
by conveyed to the C ~~unit~~ <sup>unit</sup> ~~detachments~~, which  
remained stationary of HAIKOW. ~~but~~ The  
B-~~class~~ <sup>unit</sup> ~~detachments~~; (namely, the French Indo-China  
advance unit, had already left. ~~Advancing forces~~ <sup>having set sail from off the coast of YAMHSIEN</sup>  
were making for HAIPHONG,  
and Commander KUNO of ~~the unit~~ <sup>unit</sup> ~~detachments~~, having  
received the telegram from HAIKOW, immediately  
sent a telegram to the 5th Division Commander  
of the A-~~class~~ <sup>unit</sup> ~~detachments~~ for suspending the advance.

However, as it was already night <sup>time</sup> and  
after the Division Commander ~~was already~~ <sup>had started</sup> on his  
~~way to~~ <sup>men at</sup> ~~advancing~~ toward the frontier, the wireless  
communications post of the ~~said~~ <sup>5th</sup> Division  
~~had to face~~ <sup>found it</sup> ~~the difficulty of bringing~~ <sup>difficult</sup> ~~to go with the code telegram~~  
~~in the dash~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~the Division Commander~~



~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> faced with the difficulty of tracing the Division  
Commander through the darkness to forward the code  
Telegram. However, overcoming such difficulty, the order

~~forcing through the bad roads in a dark~~  
from ~~the~~ Commander KUNO was delivered to the Division  
~~night.~~ But ~~surmounting all difficulties~~  
Commander.

~~they succeeded in conveying the order from~~  
~~however, was delivered~~  
Commander KUNO, to the Division

~~Commander in spite of such~~

But much time was ~~however~~ wasted

due to this difficulty and it was 20

minutes before <sup>2400 hrs.</sup> ~~12 A.M.~~ Sept 23, the scheduled

time for the <sup>front unit</sup> ~~live detachments~~ to pass the

frontier, that the Division Commander

received this order.

Although the Division Commander

immediately <sup>gave</sup> ~~ordered~~ orders to the ~~various~~ columns

to suspend their advance, it was



0040 hrs  
at ~~12:40 AM~~ Sept 23 that ~~the Comades~~ ~~his suspension~~  
the commander of the unit  
~~order reached the chiefs of the detachments,~~  
constituting the central columns,  
in the CHENNANKAN area <sup>received the order,</sup> and the ~~rest~~

columns were already fighting the  
French Indo-China forces of TONDAN.

Thus, due to the darkness and the fighting, it was  
~~thus it was reported that nothing could~~  
~~reported that nothing could be done~~  
~~be done due to the dark night and~~  
there was nothing that <sup>could</sup> be done.

~~fighting~~

Such was already the case with the central  
columns, and much worse was it  
with the right ~~columns~~ and <sup>the</sup> left ~~columns~~  
columns which were 20 or 30 ~~km~~ <sup>km</sup> further

away. Although these columns <sup>at finally</sup> received

the suspension order ~~as late as after dawn,~~ after dawn, it was said that  
the fighting situation was already so



in the stage that it was impossible to stop.  
~~advanced that there was no suspension~~  
~~for it, the report told~~

While not moving,

Orders can be conveyed comparatively  
quickly among ~~detachments~~ <sup>units</sup> ~~by~~ <sup>wire and</sup> wireless,  
~~and~~ telegrams or telephone, while they

~~remain stationary.~~ But once they  
are on the move, it ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> not an easy matter to maintain  
~~contact by the Japanese Army telephone or telegraph.~~  
~~contact could not~~  
~~contact by the Japanese Army telephone or telegraph.~~  
~~could be maintained by the telegraph or~~

~~telephone of the Japanese army at that~~

~~time.~~ It must be understood that in

such mountainous districts no means of  
conveyance quicker than mounted orderlies  
~~were~~ <sup>were</sup> available during the 2 or 3 hours  
before the ~~detachments~~ <sup>units</sup> reached ~~at~~ their  
next destinations.



On Sept. 22,

The Commander of the South China Expeditionary

Army could not dispatch <sup>airplanes</sup> ~~an air unit~~

~~on Sep. 22~~ as it was <sup>already</sup> after sunset, but

at dawn, Sep 23, <sup>he</sup> immediately dispatched

a reconnaissance unit to the CHENNAN KAN

area, <sup>ordering it</sup> if ~~it found~~ any ~~detachments~~ <sup>units were found</sup>

beyond the frontier, to immediately drop message

tubes and <sup>to withdraw</sup> tell them <sup>to turn back</sup> within the frontier

line.

Subsequently, he learned through,

~~Afterwards, it was known by the~~

reports from the Commander of the Air Division

and Commander KUNO that, due to the

delay in the <sup>delivery</sup> ~~conveyance~~ of the suspension-order,

the advancing <sup>units were in a confused state of</sup> ~~detachments had been thrown~~ <sup>fighting</sup>

~~into a confused fight.~~ Therefore,



he had the air unit drop over the battle scene,

leaflets ~~ordering~~ <sup>requesting</sup> to suspend fighting, ~~and~~

~~made to be scattered from the sky over the~~

~~battle scene by an air unit, but~~ <sup>even</sup> this

~~failed to bring~~  
~~could not put an end to the fighting.~~

Finally  
At last a staff officer was dispatched

by airplane in order to convey the suspension

order directly to the 5th Division Commander,

<sup>clouds were hanging over</sup>  
but the mountain districts near the battle

scene ~~were covered with clouds~~, so that

neither the Division ~~Command~~ <sup>Headquarters</sup> nor a landing

place could be found. Thus the

staff officer returned <sup>without result</sup> without success and there was

nothing that ~~can~~ <sup>could</sup> be done except

~~no other alternative than~~ to leave the situation

take its own course.

Although the Japanese forces suspended



their independent) advance, the ~~1st~~ <sup>first-</sup> line ~~detachments~~ <sup>units</sup> which, ~~due to the delay in the conveyance of~~ <sup>did not receive the order to suspend</sup> ~~the order,~~ <sup>their action</sup> ~~had not received the suspension order,~~ <sup>due to the</sup> ~~simultaneously began trespassing the~~ <sup>delay in the delivery thereof, began to cross the boundary</sup> ~~frontier,~~ <sup>all at once when the scheduled time arrived.</sup> ~~at the advent of the scheduled time,~~

~~And at the same time when the frontier~~  
As soon as these units crossed the frontier,  
~~was passed by the Japanese,~~ the French Indo-  
China forces opened fire and thus gave  
occasion for an all-round fighting.

Faced with this <sup>situation,</sup> ~~to counteract this~~ the Commander of the  
South China Expeditionary Army, Commander  
KUNO and the 5th Division Commander each  
endeavoured to suspend <sup>the fighting.</sup> Maj. Gen-  
eral NISHIHARA also, ~~by~~ <sup>dispatched</sup> Colonel  
KOIKE to the fighting line <sup>in his attempt to work</sup> ~~made efforts to~~  
together with French Indo-China in bringing the fighting to  
~~put an end to the fighting.~~ <sup>But it took</sup>  
an end.



a considerable length of time to ~~do so~~ <sup>end the</sup>  
~~hostilities~~ disorganized fighting in the vast mountainous  
~~as the fighting was already thrown into~~  
terrain.  
~~confusion, extending over a vast area~~  
~~among the mountains~~

~~The causes which ~~had led to such~~~~  
This) undesirable hostilities <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ attributable to the fact  
had not been given within the <sup>given</sup> allotted time  
and <sup>that</sup> ~~the~~ French Indo-China's <sup>front-line units</sup> ~~1st line detach-~~  
~~ments~~ had opened fire on the Japanese,  
contrary to the intention of the Governor-  
General, and there had been no  
deliberate action on the part of the Japanese  
forces to provoke the hostilities.

The Commander of the South China  
Expeditionary Army at the time of the said  
advance, was Lieut.-General ANDO Rikichi,



and I (NEMOTO) was the Army's Chief of ~~the~~  
Staff. ~~and~~ SATO Kenryo was <sup>the Assistant</sup> ~~the~~ Chief of  
~~the~~ Staff, <sup>and</sup> assisted me under my  
direction.

We ~~altogether~~ <sup>were</sup> being quartered at  
HAIKOW, HAINAN island <sup>and took charge of the</sup> ~~were responsible~~  
overall command, but the front-line being several hundred  
~~for the general direction, but being separated~~  
~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> ~~the~~ ~~front~~ ~~line~~ ~~by~~ ~~several~~ ~~hundred~~  
~~difficult.~~  
~~K.M. experienced extreme difficulty in the~~  
~~direction of the forces.~~

Ques. Please explain the bombing of the  
streets of HAIPHONG.

Ans. The French Indo-China Expeditionary  
Army ~~after~~ <sup>arrived</sup> outside HAIPHONG Harbour.



and were ~~about~~ <sup>ready</sup> to land peacefully from  
~~within~~ the harbour in accordance with "the  
~~stipulated~~ <sup>itemized</sup> agreement" <sup>the</sup> on advance, but the local  
French Indo-China authorities ~~on the~~  
~~spot~~ <sup>refused to accept</sup> would not consent to this, so that

the Commander of the French Indo-China  
Expeditionary Army <sup>sent to the Commander of the South China</sup>  
<sup>Expeditionary Army</sup> ~~communicated~~ his  
opinion ~~saying that he wanted~~ to carry out  
a forced landing from outside the harbour.

↳ The Commander of the South China Expeditionary  
Army, ~~however,~~ <sup>instead of giving his consent to such landing,</sup> ~~did not permit this,~~ telling  
made the French Indo-China Army wait  
~~the said Commander to wait~~ for the results  
of the negotiations <sup>conducted,</sup> by Major General  
NISHIHARA. ~~At the very time however, when~~  
~~after~~ ~~the negotiations ended in success~~ <sup>on the</sup>  
When finally the negotiations ended successfully and <sup>on the</sup> the day



before the)

Landing was to be carried out the following  
a report was received ~~to~~ to the effect that the landing  
~~day~~ we received ~~a~~  
day was postponed.

~~notification regarding postponement of~~

~~the landing day~~ And again on the

day before the postponed date of landing, another notice  
~~previous to the day~~ ~~arrived~~ (for  
of posts to put off the landing was received.

~~the postponed landing~~, we ~~were~~ notified

~~of further postponement of the landing~~

day. The French Indo-China Expedition-

ary Army was thus kept waiting for as

long as several days aboard ships

temporarily riding at anchor outside

HAI PHONG harbour, and, ~~consequently~~ due to

the ~~heat~~ hot climate, the war-horses,  
~~the army was thrown into such a plight~~

~~that, due to the heat of the climate was~~

~~horses~~ fell dead on board the ships and



~~so many cases of Thirst-disease broke out~~  
~~there were countless <sup>cases</sup> ~~numbers~~ of heat-exhaustion~~  
among soldiers

Commander of the  
~~From~~ The French Indo-China

Expeditionary Army ~~gave his~~ ~~Commander~~ ~~opinion~~  
to his commander that "if the Army is made to wait  
~~was communicated saying as follows:~~  
aboard the cramped ships any further in this condition,  
" ~~If before waiting on board the narrow-~~  
the entire ~~troops~~ ~~may get~~ become ill due to the heat.  
~~spaced ships at their temporary anchorage,~~  
the whole number of the soldiers may fall  
sick on account of the climatic heat.

If ~~we~~ ~~landed~~ <sup>now, the Army</sup> on the <sup>coast</sup> outside HAIPHONG  
harbour, ~~we~~ shall be able to do so with  
no possibility of causing hostilities.

Therefore permission is requested ~~for~~  
~~to~~ to carry out <sup>this</sup> landing." The

Commander of the South China Expedition-  
ary Army, ~~gave his consent to the Commander with~~  
~~relying on~~ the said



~~the condition that~~  
Commander's conviction <sup>that</sup> ~~the~~ ~~no~~  
gave his consent to the proposed landing, with the condition  
~~hostilities would be caused, permitted~~  
that the Commander of the French Indo-China Expeditionary  
~~landing on the outside of the harbour,~~  
Army cause no hostilities.

And <sup>the air unit</sup> ~~the SHANGHAI~~ air corps was  
ordered to patrol the sky over the  
landing ~~place~~ <sup>area</sup> from dawn on the  
day of landing, <sup>in order to prevent</sup> ~~for~~ ~~prevention~~

of ~~land~~ <sup>any</sup> hostilities from breaking out.

Because of the continuous flying time, one company  
~~the air unit, in consideration of~~  
of light bombers was assigned to this task, ~~and~~ <sup>It is said</sup>  
~~the duration of continuous flight, was~~  
that although ~~composed of one company of light bombers,~~

Bombs were loaded on the planes in pre-  
caution against a possible contingency, ~~but~~

the unit was dispatched under a strict  
order not to engage in combat.

~~prohibition from launching hostile actions,~~

~~it was told.~~ <sup>It is further said</sup> ~~and we also heard that~~







hit a severe ~~meeting~~ with an adverse air current of  
typical of the locality and jumped.  
a local character, ~~was given a big~~

~~shake, and the crew-members of one of~~  
One of the planes in,  
the formation mistook it <sup>and thought the wings</sup> ~~for a deliberate~~  
~~flapping of the wings by the Commander's~~ <sup>of the commander's plane flapped,</sup>  
~~flapping of the wings by the Commander's~~  
~~plane~~ <sup>then,</sup> and released the bomb-dropping  
lever.

The French Indo-China Army, ~~thought that it did, as planned,~~  
~~was expected,~~ safely finished the landing  
without giving rise to <sup>any</sup> hostilities. The  
Commander of the South China Expeditionary  
Army also was about to ~~be~~ <sup>feel</sup> relieved of the  
~~constant~~ strenuous tension that he ~~experienced~~ <sup>felt</sup> continuously for days.  
~~mental strain of several consecutive days~~  
Thus, they were shocked when they suddenly received  
~~and night,~~ when suddenly there arrived



a dispatch from the ~~General~~ <sup>Imperial</sup> Head-  
quarters, ~~to ordering~~, "Report in detail on  
the bombing of HAI PHONG," taken by

When the above circumstances were made clear after  
~~surprise, we immediately ordered the~~  
having the Commander of the Air Division investigate the  
~~Commander of the Air Division to~~  
matter, the Army Commander made a report to the  
~~investigate the matter, but on learning~~  
Imperial Headquarters and punished the men and whoever  
~~the previously described circumstances,~~  
were responsible for them.

~~The Commander of the Army reported to~~  
~~the General Headquarters and at the same~~  
~~time~~  
~~punished those who were guilty of the fault~~

~~responsible for it. But scarcely had,~~ the

Commander's report been received,

when a notification of the

the Army Commander was

to

the War Minister



It was a matter of deep regret that  
the news of a mistake made by one ~~the~~ <sup>(of the plane)</sup> crew-member had

been exaggeratingly ~~reported~~ <sup>spread</sup> and that even  
the highest ranking Japanese leaders temporarily  
~~the Japanese top leaders~~

misunderstood the South China Expedition-  
ary Army, although it was ~~only~~ <sup>only</sup> for a while.

However, <sup>as</sup> the ~~real~~ <sup>true</sup> circumstances were  
soon unveiled and ~~it was made~~ <sup>the fact that the mistake</sup>  
was caused by an optical illusion on the part of ~~a~~ low-  
~~clear that the fault was caused through the~~  
ranking men was made clear,  
~~illusion of more subordinates,~~ <sup>As the</sup>

~~result of this,~~ the Japanese side apologized

to the French Indo-China <sup>authorities</sup> ~~side~~ and

compensated for the damages, and thus

the trouble was settled.



On this 10 day of July, 1947

at \_\_\_\_\_

DEPONENT NEMOTO Hiroshi (seal)

I, KAZUMA Isaburo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At NEMOTO's residence, 1047

NOGAYA, TSURUKAWAMURA  
MINAMITAMAGUN, TOKYO

Witness: (signed) KAZUMA Isaburo (seal)



OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding  
nothing.

NEMOTO Hiroshi (seal)



Ref Doc # 1981

SAT

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書

供述書者

根本博

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シ  
タル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

2043



宣 誓 書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ默祕セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザ  
ルコトヲ誓フ

(捺  
印名)

根本博





昭和二十二年(一九四七年)七月十日於

供述者

根本博

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證

明シマス

同日

於東京都南多摩郡鶴山村能ヶ谷一〇四七根本方

立會人 數馬伊三郎



少實、根本博、供電、徒書、何、各、時、一、密、封、二、重、録、

出、類、一、主、官、事、務、之、更、一、保、言、一、申、一、ス、一、一、軍、過、關、一、

問 証人、年齢、住所、経歴、テ、詳、述、ス、テ、詳、述、ス、テ、詳、述、ス、テ、詳、述、ス、

答 年、五十七年

住所、東京都南區摩耶、村能、新、谷、五、四、七、三、番、地、一、番、

問 證人、略歴、テ、詳、述、ス、テ、詳、述、ス、テ、詳、述、ス、テ、詳、述、ス、

答 一、明治四十四年（一九一一年）陸軍士官學校ヲ、大正十一年

（一九二二）陸軍大學ヲ、シテ卒業シ、其ノ後、參謀本部

員、陸軍省軍事課員、陸軍省報導部員ヲ、經テ、旭、列

強、隊、長、ナリ、支那、事、變、中、ハ、北、支、方、面、軍、司、令、官、寺、内

問 大將、幕僚、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、

師、団、長、軍、司、令、官、ヲ、經、テ、終、戦、當、時、ハ、北、支、那、軍、司、令



圖

必要ノ事項ヲ協定シ業務ノ函滑ヲ図リ、參謀長タル  
私ヲ輔佐シ専居セシメ駐藤ニ主觀給部内他ノ參謀ヲ  
指揮揮監督ノ權限ハヤリマセザレシタ。南支派軍ハ富  
貴方ニ南支派遣軍參謀長在職中日本軍ガ北部佛印  
洋進駐セシタ點合カノヲ持刺スル為メ海陸軍別用スルコトヲ

問

答

問

答

問

抄レテ本營カテ自主駐印軍トテ別取軍一隊  
北部佛印進駐ノ際日本軍トノ間ニ衝突ノ起リタル経緯  
ヲ詳細説明シテ下サ。國自衛隊ハ谷島ニ在リ、且父三ニテ  
日本軍隊ノ北部佛印進駐ハ昭和十五年（一九四〇年）八月  
東京ヲ以テ西政府間ニ協定（ウイニ）政府ハ當時佛國  
ハ正當政府ナラズ、且電ラレタ問題ナラズ、佛國之ガ在實  
行ハ日本軍ノ代表者タル西原一策少將ヲ佛印總督ト



此目自進進駐計画大概要共ニ第ニ十二軍(夕張中隊)

A 森佛即駐中國ノ国境即鎮南関ヲ中央トスル南北約八十

吉米至廣田面ヨリ第五師團ヲ教縱隊トシテ進込セ

テ其ノ中隊ヲ二隊トシテノカ諸ノ回答ヲ五月二十二日

B 駐佛印派遣軍(實力)混成約一旅團ヲ海軍ヨリ輸送シ

テAノ策應又此為海防附近ノ海岸ニ上陸シテ河内ニ

前進セシム

C 混成一旅團ヲ海上ヨリ輸送シテルウシ河右岸地区

ニ上陸セシメテ必要ノ際ニ南北佛印間ノ交通ヲ遮断スル

テ此ヲ軍ヲ純然タル作戦行動デアリマスオカ陸軍諸部隊

南支派遣軍司令官ガ指揮ニ担ル海上輸送及上陸

部隊ノ掩護ハ南支派遣艦隊司令長官カ之ニ担ルコトニ



指揮之軍(A、第五師團ハ鎮南開南北線ニ於テ國境ニ接シ  
展開シテ分進ノ準備ヲ懲ヘB、佛印派遣軍ハ乘船シテ  
廣西省欽縣沖ニ集合待機シ、C、混成旅團ハ乘船シテ  
海南島海口沖ニ集合待機シ、南支派遣軍司令官ハ所要  
之幕僚ヲ從ヒテ海南島海口ニ戰鬪司令部所ニ前進シテ  
之ヲ指揮スルニ自主進駐ノ中ニハ各部隊ニ無難  
九月二十日正午ニ至ルニ佛印總督ヨリ何等ノ回答ナク  
細目交渉ニ決裂ト見ラレ南支派遣軍司令官ハ大本營  
命令ノ規定ニ依リテ自主的進駐ノ行動開始時間ヲ二日  
日午前零時ト確定シタリA、B、C各進駐部隊ニ  
對シテ二十三日午前零時ヲ期シ進駐開始ヲ命ジマシタ  
斯クハ如クニテ各部隊ハ各々行動ヲ開始シ特ニ第五師

4



團ハ山間ニ細道ヲ廣正  
面ニ分散シテ國境線ニ推進

此ノ時英軍トシテ西原少將ヨリ佛印總督ハ日本側ニ

協定案ヲ受諾シシトシテ至急電報ガ發シテ

間ハ正確ニ記憶シテ居リマセンガタ刻デアリ

此ノ電報ヲ受領スルト共ニ南支派遣之軍同令官ハ直ニ

ニ独断ヲ以テ自主進駐ヲ中止スル様各部隊ニ無線

電信ヲテ命令シテ此ノ始末ヲ大本營ニ報告シ

大守營カラモ亦自主進駐ヲ中止スル様ノ指令ガ

電報ヲ受領シテ各部隊ニ傳ハリ

右ノ中止命令ハ部隊ニハ確實ニ傳ハリ

此ノ時居リマシヤカニB部隊即チ佛印進駐軍ハ欽縣



神戶出帆シテ海防ニ向テ航行シテ久能司令官所海口ヨリテ  
電報ヲ受領シタノテ直ニニA部隊ノ第五師團長ニ進  
駐中止ノ電報ヲ發信シタノテ西ノ部ヲ以テガ此ノ時既ニ夜  
間トナリ師團長既國境ニ向ツテ前進ヲ起シテ後テ  
中ノ夜ニカテ師團長無線通信所テハ受信シテ暗  
號電報ヲ携フテ暗夜ノ悪路ヲ師團長ニ追及シテケ  
部ハカテ海關ニテ困難ニ遭遇シタノテ其ノ難ヲ排シ  
テ久能司令官ノ命令ヲ師團長ニ傳達シテ久能司令官  
所ニ面シテ時利身ニ面シテ二十三日前夜四十分  
然レテ此ノ困難ニ為ルニ非常ニ長時間ヲ費ヤシ師  
團長カ此ノ命令ヲ受領シテ第一線部隊ヲ國境  
ヲ越スルヲ定時刻即チ二十三日午前零時ノ二十分前



テアリマス。式報隊相二十三日下午零時、二十分前  
師團長は直命を各縦隊に前進中止ヲ命令す。自テア  
リマスガ此以前進停止命令カ中央縦隊又西鎮南關  
方面ノ部隊長ニ届イタノガ二十三日午前零時四十分テ  
アリマス。縦隊ハ既ニ「トング」及佛郎集ト交戦中ナ  
暗夜ト戦鬪トノ為メ如何トモ為シ難キ實情アリ  
ト報告アリマス。部隊ハ無事ニ進マシマス。  
中央縦隊既ニ悉リマシテニ、三十吉米ツツ遠隔ニ右縦隊  
ヤ左縦隊等ハ夜明ト後ニ漸ヤツ中止命令ヲ受ケタ  
アリマスガ時既ニ戦況ハ中止不可能ニ陥ツテ居タ  
トアリマス。又、無線ト有線ト電信ト電話ト比較  
軍隊ハ駐止シテ居ル間ハ無線、有線、電信、電話ト比較



的迅速ニ命令ヲ傳ハリマスガ一旦行動ヲ開始スルヤ當時ノ  
日本軍ノ電信電話テハナカク連絡ヲ出来ナシ次ノ駐兵  
點ニ各部隊カ到着スル迄ノ二三時間ハ斯ノ如キ山地帯  
テハ乘馬傳令以上ノ快速ナル傳達機關カ無イコト預  
知解セネバナラズ  
南支派遣軍司令官ハ二十一日中ハ日没ヲ為ル飛行機ヲ  
出スコトが出来マシタガ二十三日ノ天明ヲ待ツテ直ニ開  
偵察機ヲ隊ヲ鎮南關方面ニ派遣シテ萬一越境部隊  
等カアレバ直ニ通信筒ヲ投下シテ國境線内ニ後退スル  
様傳達スルノ處置ヲ採ラシメ次テ飛行師團長及入能司  
令官カテノ報告ニヨリ中止命令ノ傳達遲延シテ遂ニ  
進駐部隊ハ混戦状態ニ陥ツタコトヲ知リ飛行隊ヲ

進駐部隊ハ混戦状態ニ陥ツタコトヲ知リ飛行隊ヲ



テ戰場ノ上空カラ戰鬪中止ノヒラケテ散布カセマシメガ猶  
ホ戰鬪終息スルニ至ラズ遂ニ戰鬪中止方ヲ直接第  
五師長ニ傳達スヘク參謀ヲ飛行機ニヨリ派遣シタルモ  
戰場附近ノ山地ニハ雲アリテ師團司令部モ着陸地ヲ  
モ覓見スル能ハスシテ空シタテ歸還シ事態ハ成リ行キ  
ニ任セルヨリ他ニ手段無カツ知ラズアサマス高ニ越ル時新  
日本軍ハ自主進駐ヲ中止シタルデアルガ命令傳達時間  
ヲ必要トシタテ為メ中止命令ヲ受領シ得ナカツ所第  
線部隊ハ豫定時刻ノ到来ト共ニ一齊ニ越境ヲ開始  
シ越境開始ト共ニ佛印軍ハ發砲ニ依リテ全面的戰鬪  
ヲ展開シタルニ對シテ南支派遣軍司令官久能軍團司  
令官及第五師團長ハ夫々戰鬪ヲ停止スルヲ要スルヲ努  
力スルニ命ジテ對シテハ一旦停戦ヲ開始スルヲ當部ハ



カシタ、西原少將も亦小地大佐ヲ戦線ニ派遣シテ佛印側ト協同  
シテ戦闘ヲ停止セシムルニ努メテガ山地内ガ廣地帯ニ  
亘ツテ混戦状態ニ陥ツテ戦闘ヲ停止セルニハ相當ノ時間  
ヲ必要トシタ。夫デアサマ各部隊ノ交戦ノ結果ヲ待テマ  
スカル好マシカラザル戦闘ヲ惹起スルノ原因ハ指定時間  
内ニ回答ヲ為サザルコトト佛印側第一線部隊カ總督ノ  
意志ニ反シ日本軍ニ向テ発砲シタルコト等ニアリマシ  
日本軍ガ故意ニ作為シタハテハアリマセン。トシタ  
邊駐當時ノ南支派遣軍司令官ハ安藤利吉中將デヤ  
私(根本)ガ其參謀長デ佐藤賢了大佐ハ參謀副長  
テ私ノ指導下ニ於テ私ヲ補佐シテ居リマシタ  
高知海南島ヲ海軍位置シテ全般ノ指揮ヲ担ヒテ







シテ來マシタノデ佛印派遣軍ハ海防港外ニ假泊シテ待ツ  
コト數日ニ及ビ暑熱ノ為メ軍馬ハ船内ニテ斃死シ兵  
員ハ暑氣ノ為メニ嘔病患者續出ノ有様トナリ  
佛印派遣軍指揮官カラ  
此マ、假泊地ノ窮屈ナ船内テ待機サセラレタ  
ト云ハ暑氣ノ為メニ全員病氣ニナツテ終フテア  
今海防港外ノ海岸ニ上陸スルナラバ必ズ戰鬪ヲ惹  
起スル様ナコトナク上陸可能ナルカラ上陸ヲ許可  
セラレ度イト云フ意見上申ガアリマシタノテ南支  
派遣軍司令官ハ戰鬪ヲ惹起セストハ指揮官ニ  
人確信ヲ條件トシテ港外ヘノ上陸ヲ許可致シマ  
シタ。當日天賦ト共ニ上陸ノ前ハ許可致シマ  
シタ。海防港ニ此ノ彈藥、意欲ヲ新カスル様ナ







斯クテ哨戒隊ハ上陸地上空ヲ哨戒中先頭ノ隊長機ガ  
局地的ナ悪氣流ニ遭遇シテ動搖シタ為メ之ヲ見  
タ編隊中ノ一機ガ隊長機カ翼ヲ振ツタト誤認  
シテ遂ニ投下槓杆ヲ引イメノデアリマス

佛印派遣軍ハ豫期ノ通り戦闘ヲ惹起セズニ無  
事上陸ヲ終リ南支派遣軍司令官天連日連夜  
心算ヨリ解放セラレントスル瞬間大本營ヨリ  
電アリ海防爆撃ノ事情ヲ詳細報告セヨト  
ニ警テ直チニ飛行師團長ニ命シテ調査セシメ  
前記ノ事情判明シタルニヨリ軍司令官ハ之ヲ大  
本營ニ報告スルト共ニ其過失者並ニ責任者ヲ處  
罰シタノデアリマス又右軍司令官ノ報告小始







INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : -- NEMOTO, Hiroshi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country  
I hereby depose as follows.

Ques: Please state the Witness' age and address.

Ans: Age-57.

Address - No. 1047, Nogaya, Tsurukawa-mura,  
Minamitama-gun, Tokyo-to.

Ques: Please state a brief history of the Witness.

Ans: I graduated from the Military Academy in 1911 and  
from the Military General Staff College in 1922.  
After serving as a member of the General Staff  
Headquarters, a member of the War Affairs Section,  
War Ministry and a member of the Information  
Department, War Ministry, I became the Regimental



Commander at ASAHIKAWA. During the China Incident, I was a staff officer under General TERAUCHI, Commander of the North China Area <sup>Army</sup>. Following this, I held various posts such as Chief of Staff of the South China Expeditionary Army, commander of a division and a district army stationed in MANCHURIA, and at the end of the war I was Commander of the North China Army.

Ques: While the Witness was the Chief of Staff of the South China Expeditionary Army, was SATO, Kenryo the assistant Chief of Staff of the said Army?

Ans: Yes, SATO Kenryo was at that time an Army Air Colonel and was the Assistant Chief of Staff of the South China Expeditionary Army.

Ques: Please describe the duties of SATO as Assistant Chief of Staff.

Ans: SATO was mainly in charge of the so-called rear area services; i.e., maintaining equipment, supply and clothing and food, etc. for the Army, which enabled me, the Chief of Staff, to devote myself solely to the operational duties without other worries.

Ques: <sup>Did</sup> the Assistant Chief of Staff have the right to give orders to his subordinate staff officers?



Ans: The main duties of SATO can be explained in other words as follows:-- With a view to maintaining the full fighting strength of the Army, SATO's job was to keep in close contact with the other sections in the Army headquarters so that necessary matters can be jointly agreed upon and that the sections can function smoothly. Since SATO was rendering assistance to me, the Chief of Staff, in this manner, he had no power to give orders to or supervise <sup>the</sup> other staff officers within the Army headquarters.

Ques: Was it while you were in the position of Chief of Staff of the South China Expeditionary Army that the Japanese forces advanced into North French Indo-China?

Ans: Yes.

Ques: Please explain in detail the circumstances which led to a clash between the Japanese and the French Indo-China armies at the time of the former's advance into North French Indo-China.

Ans: The advance of the Japanese forces into North French Indo-China was agreed upon in August 1940, the 15th year of SHOWA, between the governments of TOKYO and VICHY (the Vichy Government was then the lawful government of France). As far the execution of



this advance, Major General NISHIHARA Issaku, representing the Japanese Army, and the Governor-general of French Indo-China were to meet at HANOI and make an itemized agreement, according to which the advance was to be carried out. The South China Expeditionary Army. was ordered by the Imperial General Headquarters to organize a French Indo-China expeditionary army and was in the process of making its table of organization and preparations for the dispatch.

However, the negotiations for "the itemized agreement" by Major General NISHIHARA was nowhere near reaching a conclusion.

At that time, from the Imperial Headquarters Major General TOMINAGA Kyoji, Chief of Operations Section of the Army Dept. <sup>of</sup> the Imperial Headquarters, was dispatched, bringing with him a plan for an independent advance (in case of any resistance on the part of the French Indo-China Army, while making the independent advance, the use of arms was permitted to remove the obstruction) and the South China Expeditionary Army, under the guidance of Major General TOMINAGA, mapped out a fresh plan for an independent advance.



The outline of the plan for the said independent advance is as follows: --

A. From the French Indo-China - Chinese frontier, that is, from a broad front extending about 80 km. from north to south with CHENNANKAN as its center, the 5th Division shall advance in several columns.

B. The French Indo-China Expeditionary Army (about the strength of one mixed brigade) shall be transported by sea and, with a view to acting in concert with A, it shall land on the coast near HAIPHONG and proceed to HANOI.

C. By transporting one mixed brigade by sea and landing it on the right bank area of the Rong River, when necessary, the communications shall be cut off between south and north French Indo-China. As it was a purely operational movement, the army units were placed under the direction of the Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army and the protection of the sea transportation and of the landing units was to be taken care of by the Commander-in-Chief of the South China Expeditionary Fleet.

In other words, there were two alternative plans: One was, if the negotiations for "the itemized agreement" can be successfully concluded in accordance therewith, the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army



alone would land at HAIPHONG harbour and make a peaceful advance; the other plan was, if the negotiations fail, the abovementioned independent advance an operational movement would be made. However, the negotiations for "the itemized agreement" by Major General NISHIHARA was making a very slow progress. After various complications, Major General NISHINAGA made a final proposal to the French Indo-China Governor-General setting noon of Sept. 22 as the deadline for an answer. The Governor-General was notified that a free action would be taken if no reply was forthcoming by that time. With the completion of the above plan for an independent advance, the 22nd Army (commanded by Lieut. General KUNO) was in the following position: The 5th Division (A) prepared for advance in columns by deploying near the frontier on the North-south line through CHENNANZUN; the sea-borne French Indo-China Expeditionary Army (B) assembled and stood by off the coast of YAMHSUN, KUANHSI provinces; the mixed brigade (C) aboard ships assembled and stood by off HAIKOW, HAINAN island. The Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army, with a required number of staff officers proceeded to the command post of HAIKOW, HAINAN island.



As there was no reply from the French Indo-China Governor General by noon, Sept. 22, the negotiation for "the itemized agreement" was regarded as unsuccessful. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial Headquarters order that the action for an independent advance be started at 2400 Sept. 22, the Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army ordered the units, A.B.C. etc, to commence their movements at 2400 Sept. 22. Thus the <sup>units</sup>  $\wedge$  began this respective movements, especially the 5th Division proceeded through the narrow mountain paths in widely deployed formations to the frontier line. At this time we unexpectedly received a despatch from Major General NISHIHARA that the French Indo-China Governor-General came to agree to the Japanese proposals. I do not remember the exact time but it was in the evening. As soon as dispatch was received, the Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army immediately gave orders by wireless at his own discretion to the units <sup>to</sup> suspend their advances and reported thereof to the Imperial Headquarters in detail. From the Imperial Headquarters also we received an order for suspension of the independent advance. This suspension-order was definitely



conveyed to the <sup>C</sup> unit which remained stationary off  
HAIKOW. The <sup>B</sup> unit; namely, the French Indo-China  
advance unit, had already left from off the coast  
of YAMHSIEN for HAIPHONG, and Commander KUNO having  
received the telegram from HAIKOW immediately sent  
a telegram to the 5th Division Commander of the A-  
unit to suspend the advance.

However, as it was already night time and the Division  
Commander was on his way to the frontier, the wireless  
communication post of the 5th Division was forced  
with the difficulty of tracing the Division Commander  
through the darkness to forward the code telegram.  
However, overcoming such difficulty, the order from  
commander KUNO was delivered to the Division Commander.  
But much time was wasted due to this difficulty and  
it was 20 minutes before 2400 hrs, Sept. 22 the  
sheduled time for the front unit to pass the frontier,  
that the Division Commander received this order.  
Although the Division Commander immediately gave  
orders to the columns to suspend their advance, it  
was at 0040 hrs. Sept 23 that the commander of the  
unit constituting the central columns in the  
CHENNANKAN area received the order, and the columns  
were already fighting the French Indo-China forces of  
TONDAN



Thus, due to the darkness and the fighting, it was reported that there was nothing that could be done. Such was already the case with the central columns, and much worse was it with the right columns and the left columns which were 20 or 30 km. further away. Although these columns finally received the suspension-order after dawn, it was said that the fighting situation was already in the stage that it was impossible to stop.

While not moving, orders can be conveyed comparatively quickly among units <sup>by</sup> wire and wireless, telegrams or telephone. But once they are on the move, it is not an easy matter to maintain contact by the Japanese Army telephone or telegraph. It must be understood that in such mountainous districts no means of conveyance quicker than mounted orderlies were available during the 2 or 3 hours before the units reached their next destination.

On Sept. 22 the Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army could not dispatch airplanes as it was already after sunset, but at dawn, Sep. 23, he immediately dispatched a reconnaissance unit to the CHENNANKAN area, ordering it if any units were found beyond the frontier, to immediately drop message tubes and tell



them withdraw within the frontier line. Subsequently, he learned through reports from the Commander of the Air Division and Commander KUNO that due to the delay in the delivery of the suspension-order the advancing units were in a confused state of fighting. Therefore, he had the air unit drop over the battle scene leaflets to suspend fighting, but even this failed to bring an end to the fighting. Finally a staff officer was dispatched by airplane in order to convey the suspension-order directly to the 5th Division Commander, but clouds were hanging over the mountain districts near the battle scene, so that neither the Division Headquarters nor a landing place could be found. Thus the staff officer returned without success and there was nothing that could be done except to leave the situation take its own course. Although the Japanese forces suspended their independent advance, the first-line units which did not receive the order to suspend their action due to the delay in the delivery thereof began to cross the boundary all at once when the scheduled time arrived. As soon as these units crossed the frontier, the French Indo-China forces opened fire and thus gave occasion for an all-round fighting. Faced with this



situation, the Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army, Commander KUNO, and the 5th Division Commander endeavoured to suspend the fighting. Maj. General NISHIHARA also dispatched Colonel KOIKE to the fighting line in his attempt to work together with French Indo-China in bringing the fighting to an end. But it took a considerable length of time to end the disorganized fighting in the vast mountainous terrain.

This undesirable hostility was attributable to the fact that the reply had not been given within the given time and that French Indo-China's front-line units had opened fire on the Japanese, contrary to the intention of the governor-general. There had been no deliberate action on the part of the Japanese forces to provoke the hostility.

The Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army at the time of the said advance was Lieut.-General ANJO Rikichi, and I (NEMOTO) was the Army's Chief of Staff. SATO Kenryo was the Assistant Chief of Staff and assist<sup>ed</sup> me under my direction.

We were at HAIKOW, HAINAN Islands and took charge of the overall command, but the front-line being several hundred km. away, the task of giving command was unduly difficult.



Ques: Please explain the bombing of the streets of HAIPHONG.

Ans: The French Indo-China Expeditionary <sup>Army</sup> arrived outside HAIPHONG harbour and were ready to land peacefully from the harbour in accordance with "the itemized agreement" on the advance, but the local French Indo-China authorities refused to accept this, so that the Commander of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army sent to the Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army his opinion to carry out a forced landing from outside the harbour. The Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army, instead <sup>of</sup> giving his consent to such landing made the French Indo-China Army wait for the results of the negotiations conducted by Major General NISHIHARA. When finally the negotiations ended successfully and on the day before the landing was to be carried out a report was received to the effect that the landing day was postponed. And again on the day before the postponed date of landing, another notice to put off landing was received. The French Indo-China Expeditionary Army was thus kept waiting for as long as several days aboard ships temporarily riding at anchor outside HAIPHONG harbour, and due to the hot climate, the war-horses



fell dead on board the ships and there were countless cases of heat-exhaustion among soldiers. The Commander of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army gave his opinion to his commander that "if the Army is made to wait aboard the cramped ships any further in this condition, the entire force may become ill due to the heat. If landed on the coast outside HAIPHONG harbour now, the Army shall be able to do so with no possibility of causing hostilities. Therefore permission is requested to carry out this landing." The Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army gave his consent to the proposed landing with the condition that the Commander of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army cause no hostilities.

And the air unit was ordered to patrol the sky over the landing area from dawn on the day of landing in order to prevent any hostilities from breaking out.

Because of the continuous flying time one company of light bombers was assigned to this task. It is said that although bombs were loaded on the planes in precaution against a possible contingency, the unit was dispatched under a strict order not to



engage in combat. In taking off, the commander of the company gave the following order: "Regardless of the loaded bombs, none is to be dropped because we are not going on a bombing mission, if it ever becomes necessary to drop bombs, the wings of the commander's plane will be flapped. Until then no bomb will be dropped." (Japanese bombers not being equipped with radio apparatus in those days, the method of giving command was as inadequate as that). While the unit was patrolling the sky over the landing area the leading Commander's plane hit a severe air current typical of the locality and jumped. One of the planes in the formation mistook it and thought the wings of the commander's plane flapped, then, released the bomb-dropping lever. The French Indo-China Army thought that it did, as planned, safely finished the landing without giving rise to any hostilities. The Commander of the South China Expeditionary Army also was about to feel the strenuous tension that he felt continuously for days. Thus, they were shocked when they suddenly received a dispatch from the Imperial Headquarters to "report in detail on the bombing of HAIPHONG." When the above circumstances



were made clear after having the Commander of the Air Division investigate the matter, the Army Commander made a report to the Imperial Headquarters and punished the men and whoever were responsible for them. But scarcely had the Army Commander's report been dispatched, a notification of the dismissal of the Army Commander was received from the War Minister.

It was a matter of deep regret that the news of a mistake made by one crew-member of the plane and been exaggeratedly spread and that even the highest ranking Japanese leaders temporarily misunderstood the South China Expeditionary Army. However, as the true circumstances were soon unveiled and the fact that the mistake was caused by an optical illusion on the part of low-ranking men was made clear, the Japanese side apologized to the French Indo-China authorities and compensated for the damages, and thus the trouble was settled.

On this 10 day of July, 1947

At \_\_\_\_\_

DEPONENT /s/ NEMOTO, Hiroshi (seal)



DEF. DOC. #1981

I, KAZUMA, Isaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At NEMOTO's residence, 1047

Nogaya, Tsurukawa-mura,

Minamitama-gun, Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NEMOTO, Hiroshi (seal)