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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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23 September 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Bound File, "Counter proposals Relative to Japanese-American Negotiations".

Date: April-Sept 1941 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry
- DBL DIV
SOURCE

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOYODA, Teijiro; NOMURA, Kichisaburo; KONOYE, Fumimaro.

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Japanese-American Negotiations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Item 2. Telegram No. 230
From: Ambassador NOMURA
To : Foreign Minister KONOYE
Dispatched: 15 April 1941

Report that NOMURA is investigating the following facts in the United States:

1. U.S. is awakening to the influence of the Tripartite pact and is seriously considering Japanese-American War.
2. U.S. is considering the southward advance of Japan as possibly more than a peaceful economic one and is taking counter-measures.
3. U.S. is preparing for a long war, etc.

NOMURA says in conclusion that an understanding must be established between Japan and America in order to turn public attention from war to peace.

Item 16. Telegram
From: Foreign Minister TOYODA
To : Ambassador NOMURA
Dispatched: 24 July 1941

TOYODA asserts that the rumor to the effect that Japan is conducting negotiations with America only to complete preparations for southward expansion, is contrary to facts and that the Cabinet change was undertaken to make the negotiations successful.

Item 17. Telegram
From: Foreign Minister TOYODA
To : Ambassador NOMURA
Dispatched: 24 July 1941

TOYODA states that American actions of freezing Japanese funds and putting an embargo on oil are arousing Japanese public opinion to war.

Item 28. Memorandum from the Foreign Minister, 15 October 1941.

Explained to the Cabinet during its conference the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations. It said that America has interpreted the Japanese occupation of French-Indo-China as a first step in the southward expansion of Japan.

Item 29. Telegram
From: Ambassador NOMURA
To : Foreign Minister TOYODA
Dispatched: 4 October 1941

Explained that American outlook toward the European War is becoming optimistic and requested that Japan re-study the matter of French-Indo-China occupation since it is the only outstanding problem in the negotiations.

Item 30. Telegram
From: Ambassador NOMURA
To : Foreign Minister TOYODA
Dispatched: 4 October 1941

Advised that it will be difficult for Japan to gain self-sufficiency in the co-prosperity sphere, so in the event of a northward expansion, Japan does not know how this problem can be solved. However, in a southward expansion, Japan can occupy a favorable position after several years. He further advised that the decision on peace or war be made slowly after thoughtful considerations.

Item 34. Bureau Chief TERASAKI's plan relative to the Japanese-American Negotiations, 2 September 1941.

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Plan called for either of two steps, viz; (1) meeting of the two chiefs of state and (2) grasping for some point of agreement and then resuming regular negotiations. Plan (2) was preferred because Plan (1) was apt to become an endless argument without any definite decision.

Analyst: FRED F. SUZUKAWA
1st. Lt.

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19/9/47 Shin-Kamachi

From

File of Counter Propositions Relating to
Japan-America Negotiation.

15/4/41.

Telegraph No. 230

From NOMURA, Washington

to KONOE, Foreign Minister

"I notify you what we are there investigating:—

1) U.S. is awakening ^{to} the influences of Tripartite Alliance, and J-A war is beginning to be seriously considered.

2) ^{Thought here} Southward advance of Japan ~~thought~~ ^{here} might ^{become} more than peaceful economic one, which probability being enhanced by J.-Russian Neutral pact. U.S. negotiating with G.B. and N.E.I. about the counter-measures.

3) While it is deemed to be necessary procedure to concentrate American Navy ⁱⁿ Pacific Ocean to cope with the situation of 1) + 2), that makes the situation in the Atlantic rather disadvantageous.

4) U.S. considers it advantageous to keep Japan constrained ^{in regard to} ~~to~~ China, while giving aids ^{purpose of} to the latter, for checking the southern advance of Japan and also for the case of J-A war. This point shall be considered in the realization of what the Foreign Minister told to Steinhardt.

5. U.S. failed to forestall Japan to befriend U.S.S.R. and attract ^{to} democratic side by the J.R. pact.

6. U.S. ^{is} ~~are~~ making economic pressure in co-operating with British dominions, Nations of American continent, and Netherland East India.

7. National resource mobilization, is about to set out, -- U.S. preparing for long-run war.

8. Convoy system is being prepared in the Atlantic to meet the loss of vessels, which means the participation ⁱⁿ War is at hand.

9. The foregoing items (1-8) being considered, it seems important for Japan to take advantage of conditions of J.-A. peace. Two more points should also be considered.

10. In the case of Japan's participation ⁱⁿ War, ^{Japanese Navy,} ~~she~~ must stand alone to take the burden to fight with combined fleet of British and American navy.

11. It is a serious problem for public-minded thinking men to establish some understandings between J. and A. to turn general psychology of War to peace, beginning with a step of Peace on Pacific Ocean, and proceeding to prepare a way to The World peace, ⁱⁿ fostering the cooperation of J. and A.

Item 15)

15 July 1941, Tel. No. 366

From F. Minister Matsuoka
to Ambadr. Nomura.

/ Suggested amendments to American proposals, many of which being rather trifling wording. /

2. - b) re Europe, --- to re-insert
"while the object of Tripartite pact was defensive
in the past as well as it is at present ---
to contribute in checking the extension of war,
---, in the case of unfortunate extension
of war, the Japanese Government shall
decide its attitude solely in consideration of
observance of duty of treaty and the protection
of security of its own people."

3. Re China: -

" - Japanese Government shall announce ---
- the general conditions of Settlement of China
affairs shall not contradict to KONOE announce-
ment, --- the U.S. President shall advise
to Chiang Kai-shek's ^{Government} to negotiate with Japan for
Cease-fire and recovery of peace with Japan."

etc.

Item 16) Date - 24/7/41. From F. Minister TOYODA
to Amb'sdr. NOMURA.
Re F.I.C. stationing

The measures taken by us to Southern F.I.C. does not mean occupations as thought by U.S., but an inevitable measure to maintain security in the Pacific. -- ^{an explanation was given to our side that} The rumor that the J.-A. negotiation is only a stratagem to complete the ^{preparation for} southward expansion ~~preparation~~ is quite contrary to facts - - - - -

The present cabinet change is an outcome of our earnest desire to come to right conclusion of the negotiations. - - - - - This matter shall be proposed to U.S. side at once.

Item 17) 24/7/41 From F. Minister TOYODA
to Amb'sdr. NOMURA.

While the Imp. Government expect that U.S. acts in high statesmanship for maintenance of peace in the Pacific, to which we are wishing to reciprocate, there are numerous news ~~and~~ notifying the freezing of our fund and oil embargo, which react to our public opinion in irritating them to demand retaliatory measures to the Government, risking the thorough breach of economic relation

between Japan and America, or even to worst circumstances.

Please make immediate concession about the matter.

Item 18. 15/7/41. Instruction to Ambas'r Nomura
by Foreign Minister / MATSUOKA /

/ Japanese amended draft dated 15 July is stated side by side with American draft of 21 June. The ^{principal} points of Japanese amendments are as cited above in Item 15). No much alteration besides. /

Item 28. 15/10/41.

Memo re Explanation of progress of J. A. Negotiation, in Cabinet conference. / by Foreign Minister /

"Later progress of J.-A. negotiation-----

The first test draft since Ambasdr. Nomura's arrival was wired from him on 17 April. Our first amended draft was sent on 12 May.

The counter proposal of America came on 21 June, and our second amended draft was send on 15 July.

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We have notified about these progress to Germany and Italy.

Before the above cited our proposal of 15 July was handed over to U.S. The change of Cabinet occurred, and then the stationing of troops to F.I.C. has taken place, which occasion the U.S. side mistook to be the first step of southern advance policy of Japan, and has taken an attitude that the negotiation cannot be continued, and moreover began the practice of freezing of Japanese funds on 26 July, by which we were also obliged to enforce the exchange control law and to exercise the foreign transaction supervision regulation against America.

The "Tutuila" bombing affair at Chungking on 30 July, has seen solution by the announcement of U.S. side that our explanation of 31 July has been appreciated.

In August, ^{the} government, taking it would be a short-cut to resume the negotiation by arranging the direct interview of head men of both sides, made Ambassador Nomura to talk with HULL about the KONOE-Roosevelt meeting (on 8 Aug.). ^{which plan} The U.S. side, while being appreciated at the idea, maintains that U.S. shall be prepared to resume the conference and ^{endeavor for the} head men meeting at the

premise of observance of fundamental principles which U.S. has continued to hold, and that Japan shall stop the expansive activities, ~~asking~~ also that Japan shall express its attitude and enterprises ⁱⁿ more clear and succinct way.

A message of ^{Premier} HONOE was sent to President Roosevelt on 26 August, for which reply ~~came~~ on 3 Sept., but the main points were not differed much from what stated above. --

Later on 6 Sept. and 26 Sept. other message were sent by us, but not on any new proposals.

The U.S. Government, however, appears to be intent ~~on~~ the maintenance of Peace in the Pacific and readjustment of national relation as well as we do. And we are doing our best endeavor for the readjustment of J. A. relation, on fair foundation, even though there might be many difficulties in the way.

Item 29.

4/10/41. Tel. from Amb'sdr. NOMURA
to Minster TOYODA.

/Ambassadors opinions/

While it seems that the J. A negotiation has got to a deadlock, there should not be lacking the chance to break it up, the U. S. memo is leaving room for that.

President's diplomatic policies are gaining overwhelming support of the people; -- industrial mobilization getting on way, --- they are optimistic about European War. -- While greeting Russian stubborn defence; -- fears ^{her} single armistice with Germany, and expect to give further assistance of A. & B., thereby make Russia fight on until next year. -- More German submarines being sunken and maritime risks decidedly decreasing. -- Eastern operation of Germany seems not so successful as propaganda. -- Italy is fighting only at the ~~press~~ sure of Germany.

If German-Russia single armistice shall come out, and Germany's would have more force westward, America must be more concerned in Atlantic, which might tend to soften U. S. attitude in the Pacific, being advantageous to J. A. Negotiation.

Item 29) continued.

Konoe message was instrumental to soften the acute atmosphere and dispel those "fight Japan first" mood in America, and made go further into Atlantic. However, it must be noted that the economic pressure to Japan is never eased but rather enforced that the J. A. war could be won by economic Warfare alone. And that economic policy shall be modified only at cases that a great change take place in the world situation or Japan shall turn its policies. Two of the three standing problems are however beginning to be solved (Hull being of free trade policy-), the remaining one is the troop stationing, while total withdrawal seems impossible in consideration of chaotic condition of China.

A serious case indeed, but as I think this is the key point of the J.-A. Understanding, and beg your further investigations.

Mr. --- (name undecipherable) says that President and HULL are sincerely hope J. A. understanding, and saying that the Troop stationing are the only problem.

Begging pardon for my outspokenness, as the case is thought grave.
yours ---

Item 30.) 4/oct.

Further message from Ambassador NOMURA
to F. Minister TOYODA.

/- After Compliments - - -/

- It is a very difficult problem that Japan shall live on the economy of Co-prosperity sphere - - after prolonged disadvantage of extension of fighting front in China - - to go into Ocean war with combined A. and B. - - a hard task not ^{to be} easily undertaken - -

- the problem of readjustment of American relation, and finding a new turn for national policy, - - might be considered not to get into hurried decision, but heartily requested to be slowly determined after thoughtful calculations. (China

Case, for instance, there might be some ways of direct talk with Chungking, if at the condition that U.S. wishes.)

Item 28"

incomplete fly of 28

Item 34. 2 Sept.

Re J-A negotiation.

(Bureau Chief Terasaki's plan)

I General principle

1.) There are ^{only} two ways of ^{treating the J-A negotiation at present} either one or the other!—

(a) To re-open the negotiation for readjustment of J.-A. relation, and lead to headmen interview according to its developments

(b) To look after ^{for the time being} some point-of agreement apart from the said negotiation, and from ^{the stand point of} wider views, not adhering to "Legal accuracy", and then resume to the regular negotiation.

2.) Comparing these two, (a) is liable to become endless reasonings and cannot be expected to make an urgent conclusions, while (b) shall be relied upon for hastening the headmen meeting, and ^{leading to} simple and succinct, political as well as psychological effects.

- 3) The practical operation of the said principle shall mainly be in Tokyo, while parallel practice shall ^{be} in Washington.

II. Outline

1) Detailed answers were given to the President's suggestion of 24 July, and to the U.S. proposal of 17 Aug., and ^{also} Premier's message was sent, so that we have already said what we ought ^{to} say. We ought, now, to express the following points: - - -

a) No military advance shall be made toward neighboring districts as well as to North without reasonable cause from F.I.C.

b). The attitudes relating to European War of Japan and U.S. shall be regulated by general international notion of self-defence and protection, and in the case of America's participation to European War, the Treaties with third states shall independently be construed by Japan.

c). Japan shall endeavor for the recovery of normal relations with China, and shall be prepared for withdrawal of troops at its realization.

d) ^{Japan} shall cooperate to the procurement and production of articles demanded by U.S. in the South West Pacific Area.

Against these promises, ^{by Japan,} U.S. shall promise the following items:—

a) U.S. shall not go into measures or practices which shall obstruct those endeavors to China by Japan as stated in the c) of the foregoing.

b). U.S. shall co-operate to the procurement and production of articles demanded by Japan in the South-West Pacific Area.

c) Stopping Military installations in the far East and S.W. Pacific Area.

d) Stopping the Freezing Act (which shall be reciprocated by Japan) and do not make artificial prevention of Export of American products demanded by Japan.

e) Withdrawal of measures not to give permission to Japanese vessels passing Panama Canal.

f) To make good offices toward Latin American governments in removing their preventive policies for Japan in commerce as well as utilization of unexplored natural resources.

2) In the case of establishment of the said promises, the political procedures must come next, which shall be in either one of three forms:—

a) Common declaration.

b) Independent declaration of identical contents.

c) Treaty relating to the security in the Pacific Ocean.

/ rather detailed drafts for
these three plans are given /

(State Secrecy)

File of Counter propositions
relating to Japan-America Negotiation.
/ Foreign Ministry /

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1) 17/4/41	Tel #234	Amb. NOMURA WASHINGTON	F. Min. Kono Tokyo	Draft of Agreement
X 15/4/41	230	"	"	a notification
3 17/4/41	233	"	"	
4 24/4/41				Excerpt from Secretary HULL'S speech.
5) 31/5/41		"	"	American proposals
6) 13/5/41	294			English draft with amendment entries annex by Japanese gov't.
7)				
8) 21/6/41				Oral statement
9)				Japanese Opinion
10) 6/sept.				"The Government of Japan Undertakes"
11)				2 page English (?) (fly to 12) "V. Economic activity to"
12) 31/5				English original of (5)
13) 2/1/6				Oral statement
14)				Explanation of American message of 21/6.
X 15) 15/7	Tel #366	MATUOKA	NOMURA	Notification re Am. proposal.
16) 24/7		TOYODA	NOMURA	Re. Statement to F.I.C.
17) 24/7		"	"	another message

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27					Sept. Japanese proposal (Japanese and English) 2 (2 copies)
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