




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
on 11 March, 2020



A

SKETCH OF THE WAR,

TIPPOO SULTAUN.



A
SKETCH OF THE WAR,

WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN:

OR,

A DETAIL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF
HOSTILITIES AT THE LINES OF TRAVANCORE IN DECEMBER, 1789,
UNTIL THE PEACE CONCLUDED BEFORE SERINGAPATAM,

IN FEBRUARY, 1792.

IN TWO VOLUMES.



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BY

RODERICK MACKENZIE,

LIEUTENANT 52d. REG.

31878

Sic vos — non vobis.

VOLUME SECOND.



CALCUTTA:
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.

1794.

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ERRATA.

- Page 69, for " eight Bombay battalions," *read* eighth Bombay battalion.
— 89, for " northeast," *read* southwest.
— 157, for " Tookagee," *read* Ragogee.
— 159, for " fittn," *read* fitting.

GLOSSARY.

GLOSSARY.

AHMEDI, of, or belonging to Ahmed, or Mahomed.

Badjerab, a small grain of Hindoostan.

Badshah, king.

Baugb, a garden.

Bazar, a market place.

Binjarab, people who live by transporting the produce of one country to another, over land.

Buckshee, a pay-master.

Cawn, or *Khan*, when applied to man, is a title of rank:—vide Richardson's Dictionary.

Choulum, a small grain of Mysore.

Dawlet, riches.

Doll, or *Dall*, split vetches.

Droog, a fortified hill.

Durbar, the hall of audience; a court; levee room.

Eadgab, the place set apart for solemnising the festivals of Easter, the Passover, and of the sacrifices at Mecca.

Gee, a sort of butter made from the milk of buffaloes.

Gram, a kind of pea, or vetch.

Juary, a grain of Hindoostan.

Laul, red.

Maand, a certain weight; it is of forty seers in Bengal, but of 12 at Madras, and varies at different places.

Moody, shop-keeper; grain-merchant; grain-market

Nachine, a small grain of Mysore.

Paddy, unhusked rice.

Pagoda, Hindoo temple; place of worship; also a gold coin, in value about eight shillings sterling.

Seer, usually the 40th part of a maund.

Shebir, or properly, *Sheb'r*, a city.

Sirkar, government; principal manager; from *sir*, head, and *kar*, business.

Sirraf, money-changer; banker.

Tattoos, an inferior species of horses.

Tom Tom, an Indian drum.

Tope, a clump of wood; a grove.

A

S K E T C H

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE FIRST.

THE operations carried on against Tippoo Sultaun have been detailed in a former volume, until the arrival of the British forces in the neighbourhood of Vellout, a village at which the campaign under Major General Medows came to a close (1), and distant from Fort St. George about eighteen miles. Here, after detaching the advance, with the exception of Stevenson's regiment, to the Eastward of Poona-mallee, in order to keep our communication with the Presidency open, the troops rested from the 27th January 1791, until the 5th of the ensuing month. During this short interval, the several depart-

(1) This period is considered a conclusion to the first campaign; not that the army quitted the field, or entered into quarters, as in other countries; nor on account of any inclemency of weather or alteration in the seasons; but because the whole, after a total change in the plan of attack, took a new departure from the Carnatic, with fresh equipments and under a different commander.

A SKETCH OF THE WAR

ments were occupied in completing their equipments for a service, which, from the evident disinclination of the enemy to give battle, promised honour to the British troops more from perseverance and a patient endurance of hardship, than from any advantages that could be obtained in the field.

THROUGHOUT the Carnatic military preparations forwarded by all descriptions of people might be seen in every direction. Fourteen hundred Bengal volunteer sepoy, soon after their arrival on the coast, received instructions to proceed to camp, and to escort a reinforcement for the park, consisting of eleven eighteen pounders, six iron twelves, eight mortars, with an ample proportion of ammunition and a variety of other stores, all under the direction of Colonel Patrick Duff of the Bengal artillery; recruits and recovered men belonging to the army, were directed to join their respective corps from Madras, Poonamalee, and other adjacent stations without loss of time; the sick, all the brass twelve pounders, with whatsoever was judged unnecessary among the immense quantity of baggage and stores already collected, were ordered into Fort St. George; the servants of that government, as well as of its several dependencies, whether civil or military, vied with each other in forwarding the public service; nor was the Nabob of the Carnatic altogether deficient in demonstration of zeal, although circumscribed by deranged finances. Upwards of three hundred troopers, tolerably accoutred, (of which number one hundred and twenty eight were mounted) detached from his own guards, discovered inclinations warm

in the British interest. Three elephants with twenty camels enhanced the value of this supply. The Nabob's troopers, however, backward in discipline, were still less serviceable from the mean quality and wretched condition of their horses.

AFTER being formed into battalions headed by Captains Hyndman and Welsh, the Bengal volunteers were supplied with two six pounders to each corps, and ordered to strengthen the brigades which their countrymen already composed; some alterations that tended to the improvement of bazars for the native infantry, were recommended to the commandants of battalions on the coast establishment (1); the twelve pounders sent to Fort St. George were replaced by an equal number of six pounders from that garrison; commanding officers of regiments were directed to complete their arms, accoutrements, stores and camp equipage, to the extent for which they had means of conveyance; pay and allowances for the troops were issued to the first of the ensuing month, at the exchange of three hundred and sixty-five rupees for every hundred pagodas; and, the followers were repeatedly cautioned to furnish themselves with a supply of provisions, sufficient for a consumption of at least twenty days (2).

(1) *G. O. 31st Jan. 1791.* My Lord Cornwallis is desirous that all the Native corps shall have Bazars attached to them upon the same principle as is regulated for the Bengal native corps, as soon as their commanding officers shall report themselves prepared to carry the arrangement into execution. His Lordship is convinced that the conveniency to corps from a regulation of this kind, and the advantage that will be derived from it to the service at large, will occasion immediate exertion in the officers at the head of the coast native corps. They are directed to report to the adjutant general as soon as they have completed their arrangements for regimental bazars. — Lieutenant Bulby being the superintendent with the Bengal bazars with the army, will be ready to give them every information they may require on this subject.

(2) *G. O. 1st February, 1791.* Parole, The Prince of Wales.—For the day tomorrow Lieutenant Colonel Dupont—next for duty Major Skelly.—Followers are cautioned to provide themselves with twenty days rice from the 3^d of this month. Field officers of engineers and artillery being sufficiently employed in their own branch of the service, are not to take the daily duty of the line. Lieutenant Colonel Giels will superintend and direct the artillery and ordnance of the right wing, Major Moorehouse of the left, Major Woodburn of the heavy park, and Major Montague of the advance. Lieutenant F. Caper is permitted to serve as volunteer with the Cavalry. Empty money tumbrils to be sent to Madras. Piquets and guards not to change their front to pay military honours. All piquets and guards are to be informed that Lord Cornwallis dispenses with their turning out when he passes, and that centres are not to rest to his Lordship.

WHILST the army was thus strengthened by men, money, bullocks, and stores from different directions, but principally from Bengal, Major General Medows continued at Madras, discharging duties of a judicial nature, annexed to his appointment as Governor, that could not be carried on by any delegation of power; reinforced from the stations to the northward, Fort St. George, with all the troops remaining in the Carnatic, were given in charge to Major General Musgrave, during the absence of Earl Cornwallis and General Medows; and, as the Sultaun still continued his ravages on the Southern districts of the Carnatic, he certainly aimed at enticing his opponents into their former system of pursuit (1). Conscious, from the preparations going forward, that he could not at this period procure an advantageous peace, he wished to divert Earl Cornwallis from his designs on Mysore; and as delay must have been fatal to the cause of Britain, nearly in the same proportion with failure or defeat, he wished to protract the war, well knowing, that in this event, his purposes would be answered, not less from the difficulty of subsisting the multitude against whom he had to contend, than from the ease with which the experience of former times taught him to imagine he could loosen the bands that united the native branches of the confederacy. Disappointment, however, appears to have attended all his expectations from the instant that the Governor General personally undertook the charge of the war.

AT whatever period Earl Cornwallis determined to abandon the invasion of Mysore from the Coimbatore district, for a length of time

(1) A summons from the Sultaun, accompanied by the appearance of the whole Mysorean force, about this period, threw the inhabitants of Cuddalore into the utmost consternation; some escaped along bye paths to the southward, some concealed themselves in their godowns, whilst the greater part, quitting their habitations, made the best of their way in boats to Madras. However on the very first intelligence of Earl Cornwallis's movement towards Mysore, the Sultaun decamped without waiting an answer to this summons.

after his arrival at Madras, an idea of his joining the army at Trichinopoly, and of entering the enemy's country by the Guzzlehatty pass, was designedly circulated. His Lordship, however little he fluctuated in reality, strengthened this idea both by conversation and arrangements. Although occasional circumstances of necessity discovered the real design in some degree, still, the intention of moving the troops from Trichinopoly to the vicinity of Fort St. George, was not known by any part of the army, until the orders for marching were about to be issued. It is now evident that the British General at an early period "determined, instead of prosecuting the plan of a "southern invasion, to penetrate by the passes that lead from the "centre of the Carnatic, and to commence operations with the sieges "of Ouffore, and Bangalore, unless Tippoo should resolve to hazard "an action, and its event should render it expedient to take other "measures" (2). But on this alternative, which risked absolute ruin, whilst it promised little hopes of success, the Suldaun did not think proper to venture.

THE advance having joined the army by break of day on the 5th February, the whole was immediately put in motion (3) in a westerly direction, and proceeding by easy marches, passed Parumbaucum and Pollilore, situations rendered famous in history by misfortunes, and marked as classical ground from the defeat of Colonel Baillie, and the destruction of his army; and for an action between Hyder and Sir

(2) Earl Cornwallis to the right honorable W. W. Grenville, 28th December, 1790.

(3) General Medows will act as general at the head of the line, and he will assist Lord Cornwallis in forming plans of operations, in arranging the marches, and in conducting the general detail of the army.—G. O. 5th February, 1791.

Eyre Coote, in which if the latter was not put to the route, he certainly could boast of no material advantage. Shulangur, the scene of another action between these warriors, being also left to the right, the whole arrived at Vellore (1) after a march of six days, impeded but little either by the train or stores, and not at all by the enemy. A small party of horse, however, that watched the motions of the army, contrived to carry off several bullocks, a few bandies, and some sepoy's that straggled from the line.

ORDERS of march, however minutely described, seldom convey much serviceable information, or afford satisfaction to the generality of readers. Varying daily with the nature of the country, and adapting positions to the probable situation of the enemy, and other casual circumstances, when the vast multitude of followers and immense quantity of baggage is taken into consideration, there was less confusion and loss than could reasonably have been expected (2). But as outlines seldom tire, it may be observed, that the rules practised by the army during the former part of the war were put in force on this occasion. The cavalry, with the exception of one regiment ordered for the rear guard, strengthened by a regiment of the Company's Europeans, and two battalions of sepoy's, with their proportion of guns, moved in advance; flanked on the left by the relieving piquets

							<i>Miles Per.</i>		
(1) 1791. Feb.	5th.	Caukilore,	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	6th.	Parambaucum,	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
	7th.	Pollilore,	—	—	—	—	—	12	4
	9th.	Alumpauk,	—	—	—	—	—	13	—
	10th.	Lallpett,	—	—	—	—	—	14	—
	11th.	Near Vellore,	—	—	—	—	—	10	—

(2) Besides elephants, camels, buffaloes, and other beasts of burden employed by individuals, the contractors for the public departments alone started from Vellout, with at least a supply of forty thousand bullocks; cattle for slaughter, with large speculations by individuals of various complexions, contributed also to render this an unwieldy mass, incapable of order.

the park followed (3) ; the infantry marching in general by columns of half companies, with their several quarter guards, and inlying piquets on the same flank, next succeeded ; the baggage, covered by the Pullicat hills from the north, moved on the right of the whole in perfect security, the enemy being to the southward ; and two battalions of sepoys, that composed the piquets of both wings, supported by the regiment of cavalry already mentioned, brought up the rear.

No occurrence that will be deemed of an extraordinary nature by such as are accustomed to the wiles of dushes, and Eastern hirelings, took place during the march ; but, those who never had intercourse with this race of men, and whose ears have been dinned with the sympathetic epithets of “innocent natives”, “injured people”, will be astonished to hear that many hundreds of the camp followers accumulated fortunes within twenty miles of Fort St. George, by the most shameful and barefaced plunder that ever took place in any civilized country, to the disgrace of the Madras police, which wanted energy to stop this flagrant, licentious, and dangerous abuse (4). To such a height did these dextrous thieves carry their ravages, that many officers who had pro-

(3) The advance piquets coming on duty will march in future on the flank of the heavy park, instead of drawing a battalion from the line for that duty. They are to be formed in front of wings at assembly beating, and to move up as soon as formed to the flank of the park, where the field officer of the day will receive them, and give the further necessary orders. The captains will march with their piquets, but the field officer of the day is to move with the advance, as soon as the line is marked out ; the piquets will form in the front of wings respectively, and there wait the orders of the field officer of the day. — Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse is posted to the heavy park, and Major Woodburn to the left wing. G O, 6th Feb. 1791.

(4) I understand, that the want of a police at Madras has been an object of presentment at every session, for upwards of twenty years, and that a plan suggested by Mr. Popham, the Company's solicitor, had been brought forward during Sir Archibald Campbell's administration, but, unfortunately for the projector, and the community, General Campbell resigned the government before this plan was thoroughly established. The consequence is, that imposition still prevails, much to the inconvenience of all persons in moderate situations of life, and to the serious prejudice of Mr. Popham, whose extensive bazars are still unoccupied, though built in a neat substantial manner, and centrally situated. I cannot do justice to this gentleman's exertions in a short note, and therefore refer my readers to an address he has lately published, to the proprietors of India stock, detailing his services, and abounding with so much local information as must essentially assist those who may have the arrangement of any future system of reform in the Madras police.

vided themselves with supplies for a campaign of six months, were to be seen without a single article of comfort or nourishment, on their arrival at Caukilore, the first ground of encampment. On this occasion no rank, no station, not even the commander-in-chief, was permitted to proceed without loss.

DURING a short halt in the Vellore district, the sick of the army were ordered into the fort, and several other arrangements took place. A reinforcement of two twenty-four with one eighteen pounder, as also a quantity of grain, was drawn out of that garrison; to the carriage of five days provision for the Europeans, and of ten for the native troops, both consented without a murmur (1). The 21st Coast battalion, left by General Medows in Arnee, joined the army here; and a battalion of Coast seapoys, the 23d, ordered towards Amboor, with which much baggage strayed, confirmed the Sultana in an opinion which he for some time cherished, that it was the intention of our General to ascend the ghauts, either by the Paduagdirgum pass, or through the Barahmahl valley. It was in this persuasion that he hastened through the entrance at Changama, to oppose our ascent; but the distance between that and Muglee rendered all attempts at opposition abortive.

FROM Vellore, the army, turning of a sudden to the right, struck immediately into the Pollums, and for several days continued marching amongst rocks, jungles, and eminences which were formerly reckoned impenetrable for cannon, and where horse can never act. After

(1) *G. O. 12th Feb. 1791.*— Lord Cornwallis is highly pleased with the willingness which the troops shewed to carry an extra quantity of provisions, to promote the grand object of the war. His Lordship's approbation of this additional proof of their zeal is to be communicated to the troops in the strongest terms.

forming into two distinct divisions (2), one under the immediate command of Earl Cornwallis, lightly equipped, advanced at break of day on the 14th, leaving the other to follow at leisure, with the train, under the guidance of Major General Medows. During the whole of this day's march there was no diversity of scene; one rugged jungle terminated the view wherefoever the eye was directed; no vestige of cultivation could be traced; still nothing that bore resemblance to those tremendous ghauts described in such lively colours by Major Rennel, Doctor Thomson, and others, was to be seen.

ON the 15th the whole again proceeded, moving with wonderful expedition, considering the weight of the train, and vast quantity of stores that was conducted through thick jungles, intersected by many deep ravines and sloughs. The appearance of the country varied but little from that on the day before; but so confined were the roads, that the first division, after sending the reserve some distance in front, was necessitated to encamp on two pieces of ground separate from each other; the second remained some miles in the rear.

ON the following day both divisions passed Chittore, a fort alternately in possession of the contending powers during the former war. In shape this fort is nearly square, and constructed with so little judgment as to be commanded by many of the adjacent heights. It was at this period in a state perfectly ruinous, and although most of the inha-

(2) *G. O. 13th Feb. 1791.*— The army marches in two divisions tomorrow: Lord Cornwallis will take the immediate command of the first, which is to be composed of the advance, the first regiment of native cavalry excepted, and the first and third brigades. The second division will be commanded by Major General Medows, and is to consist of the left wing, the 4th brigade, and the regiment of cavalry, with the heavy park, and all the stores and provisions of the army, except such proportion as will be directed to move with the first division. — Information has been signified twice this day, by beat of tom tom, that the followers are to provide themselves with grain, so as to march from the present ground supplied for twenty days, and as much more as they can carry: this order is to be strictly attended to.

bitants had abandoned their homes, such was the plentiful state of the country, and the confidence of those who continued their occupations, that grain, poultry, and gram were to be purchased at a cheaper rate than offered afterwards throughout the war. Gram sold at forty seer for a rupee during our march through the Pollums; rice at from twenty five to thirty.

STILL continuing to advance, on the 17th the first division obtained fight of the pafs, which presented nothing to be dreaded in ascent. Although the face of the ghauts is wholly covered by jungles, the perpendicular height in this quarter does not exceed nine hundred feet, and that neither steep nor stony. The nature of the ground, too, was so well humoured in constructing the road, that with the assistance of an elephant and a few men to each gun and carriage, the whole was got up in a very inconsiderable space of time. Indeed in ruggedness, in steepness, or in height, the Mugley pafs bears no comparison at all to that of Tapoor. Major Gowdie, with the infantry of the reserve, being the first division that ascended, took post on the 17th at the top of the hills, whilst the army encamped in a well cultivated valley at bottom (1). On the 19th the Commander in Chief, with his division ascended also, and by the 21st the whole army was encamped in Mysore (2), without firing one shot since their departure from Vellout.

(1) *G. O. 17th Feb. 1791.*—Parole, Liverpool.—For the day tomorrow Major Skelly; next for duty Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell. The army halts tomorrow. Major Montague, with the guns of the 9th brigade, and with the 27th battalion of native infantry, to join this brigade at the head of the pafs tomorrow morning: they will strike tents at reveille beating, and march off as soon as possible.

(2) March of the army in two Divisions, as already noticed:

Route of the first division:

		Miles, Furlongs.	
February	14	Chittapelly,	12 - 4
	15	S. E. Chittore,	8 - 4
	16	Maffamoodrum,	7 -
	17	Muglee,	14 - 4
	19	Palkmanair,	8 -

FROM

FROM the village of Palmanair, the first ground occupied by our army after their ascent, the hills to the Northward and Westward form a grand and picturesque view. This place with other villages for several miles further in advance, is under the supremacy of the Nabob of Arcot, the land being rated in the collectorship of Vellore. Although the districts at the top of the ghauts are rocky and mountainous, they have in many instances very liberal gifts from nature. The whole face of the country, except where it is overgrown with thickets and jungles, is intersected with natural or artificial streams, and consequently is friendly to the growth of corn. Great quantities of water, too, are constantly collected in tanks around the bottoms of the hills, so that large tracts of land in high cultivation, are easily inundated at every season of the year. These districts are peopled by Poligars of various descriptions, who, notwithstanding their fealty to the Sovereign of the Carnatic, range in tribes under separate leaders. Their manners are truly feudal. Rejecting soft and effeminate amusements, their warlike dispositions are legible in their countenances. They pay obedience to no law but the will of their immediate ruler. Their distance from the superior Lord, prevents attendance at his durbar, and consequently transfers their allegiance to the Poligar Chief, who, living in the midst of them, is ever ready to adjust internal animosities, or, to avenge foreign insults. At the display of his banner danger has taught them the necessity of pre-

Route of the Second division.

14	Marapetty,	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	-	-	4
15	Tadapadoo,	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	-	-	4
16	Chittore,	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	-	-	4
18	Inkatagheria,	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	-	-	—
19	Muglee,	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	-	-	—
20	Palmanair,	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	-	-	—

paration

paration for defence; the found of the conque proclaims the approach of that danger throughout the district; and a circular citadel of considerable height that rises in the centre of each village, and to which they invariably flock, is strongly characteristick of their habits and fears. Here they hoard up grain to provide against famine and scarcity; here they deposit their valuable effects when they proceed against a distant foe; here they assemble for mutual defence when attacked by superior force; and, as their country is naturally fertile and strong, these rude fortifications would never have been built but for the apprehension of danger and the frequency of commotion.

It would appear; that the terrace of Myfore declines towards the extremity of the peninsula, as well as towards the eastern boundary. The rivers in general, rising near the summits of the Malabar ghauts, or on the tops of the loftiest mountains, in their course wind to the southward: and as they all empty themselves into the sea on the Coromandel Coast, it is evident that the western range is considerably higher than the other. The plains, too, on the Carnatic side, decline as you approach to the southward in a proportion still greater than the table land; consequently, the more southern the passes, the more the perpendicular height from the bottom to the terrace. It is on this principle, also, that the extraordinary fertility of the districts to the southward, of the Coleroon, and the great capability of improvement, can be accounted for with most probability of correctness.

THE secrecy that covered the designs of Earl Cornwallis contributed in a high degree to the brilliancy of the success that attended his arms. So sudden the movement from Vellout, and so unexpected the route from Vellore, that when the distance between

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the entrance by Changama and the Mugley pafs is taken into confideration, all poffibility of the Sulthaun's collecting a force fufficient to oppofe our afcent was done away. Indeed, fuch was the ardour throughout every department, that no difficulty could obftruct our progrefs, efpecially with fo decided a fuperiority of difcipline. Such exertions muft ever furmount all difadvantages, and reap the fruit of patient perfeverance in the end.

WHILST at Palmanair, provifions for the troops and followers were to be purchafed in the utmoft abundance, and at a rate nearly as reasonable as in the Pollums. Here feveral hundred brinjaries, driving bullocks, affes, and buffaloes, laden with rice and other grain, that joined our army, could find no purchafers; they were, however, induced to follow the camp, by affurance of protection, and a ready fale whenever the followers expended their ftore, and before any confumption from the public ftock fhould be admitted. Their confidence met the merited attention. It was here alfo, that the elephants from Bengal made their appearance, eforted by Lieutenant Macdonald and a fmall party of troops from that eftablifhment. Sixty four of thofe noble animals, all, excepting five, in high order, facilitated the enfuing marches. Beyond all descriptions of cattle, the elephants are ufeful in the movements of Indian armies. Sagacious, powerful, and hardy, they travel for a greater length of time, and carry a greater weight than any other animal; befides that they feed on grain of any kind, or on whatfoever nourifhes horfes or bullocks; branches and leaves of trees ferve them for provender: in fhort, whilft their fervices are more beneficial, their wants are more eafily fatisfied than thofe of any other beafts of burthen. Thus fupplied, independent

dent of what was carried by the brinjarries, the whole army was ready to start, with provisions sufficient for a consumption of at least forty-five days.

AMONGST the Polygar chiefs that paid their respects and offered services to Earl Cornwallis whilst in this neighbourhood, Chiel Naig and the chief of Punganore were the most conspicuous. Mounted, and armed with pikes and spears, each leader was attended by a grotesque group of adherents firmly attached to his interest, but without order or discipline. The want of union amongst these tribes, subjects each individual branch to every adventurous warrior that chuses to visit their district with artillery. Their villages, although abundantly protected by hedges and mud walls against the depredations of horse, are utterly unprovided against cannon; consequently, they seldom remain in a state of vassalage to one prince for any length of time; indeed they frequently acknowledge no superior at all. The particulars of one amongst them, will, with some allowance for occasional variations, lead towards forming a sufficient acquaintance with the whole.

ABOUT forty years ago the chief of Punganore paid fealty to the rajah of Cuddapah. Some time afterwards this rajah yielding to Nizam Ally Khan, transferred to his Highness the homage he had just acquired. The subadar of Decan in his turn had to surrender the superiority of Punganore, and many other valuable districts, to the Maratta states; and it is not above six years since that turbulent people were compelled to abandon the whole of their usurpations near the ghauts, before the all-grasping power of Tippoo Sultaun. The activity and valour of Chiel Naig, the other Polygar chief, not-

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withstanding a far greater vicissitude of fortune, renders him even at this period rather an ally than a vassal to the East India Company.

AT the top of the ghauts some alterations were directed, both in the arrangement of the march, and encampment. The cavalry, after sending a regiment to cover the baggage, proceeded to the flank on which the army was prepared to form, and preserving a distance of about two thousand feet, advanced parallel to the head of the column. In the event of an attack, this corps formed the reserve, and on all occasions, from the present period, encamped in the rear of the centre (1). All the iron twelve-pounders were at the same time ordered from the park, and attached to European regiments.

AFTER mustering the bullocks, and distributing the elephants, except a few that were allotted for the park and head quarters, amongst the several European corps (2), the army marched towards Bangalore on the twenty fourth, at day-break, in three columns. The infantry moved in the centre, with the artillery on their right, and cavalry on their left, flank. The villages, which were numerous, and defended as already repeatedly described, were totally abandoned by their inhabitants; great quantities of grain and forage, collected in granaries, or heaped up in stacks, strongly indicated high

(1) *G. O. February 22, 1791.*—The army will continue to encamp in the order that is customary, with the exception of the cavalry and brigade of infantry which is placed under Lieutenant Colonel Floyd. This corps is to encamp in the rear of the centre of the line, and will in future be called the reserve. The order of march will be only materially altered in respect of the corps commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, who after sending regiments to flank the baggage & form the rear guard, as usual, and two troops as an advanced guard at the head of the column, will march with the two three pounders from a quarter to half a mile's distance from, and keeping his front nearly opposite to the head of, the line, on the flank on which the army is prepared to form. Patrols and flanking parties will be detached, according to the nature of the country.

(2) *G. O. February 22, 1791.*—The elephants and their keepers, being placed under the general controul and superintendance of Lieutenant Sandys, the commanding officers of corps are directed to make their representations to him, when any occur, respecting the state of the elephants

cultivation, mild management, and consequent happiness ; and extensive tanks in every direction afforded an abundant supply of water.

CONTINUING our march next day, the licentious behaviour of our followers was the cause of more vexation to Earl Cornwallis, and of concern to every lover of discipline, than any occurrence of a similar nature that offered throughout the war. Many of the principal inhabitants in this district approached the Commander in Chief to take coule at the very instant their villages blazed to ashes. Parties of horse were dispatched in every direction, to seize the perpetrators of such wanton mischief ; but the abuse, once begun, raged without the possibility of a check, even for the day. The vast tract over which the followers extended, rendered it impossible for them to know the motives that actuated the first culprits ; nor were the horse able to communicate the detestation which these ravages occasioned, to a proportion of one in the hundred ; so that many considered the destruction meritorious. Thus, a strict General, at the head of an army disciplined equal to any on earth, was necessitated to witness an evil, which, although it galled him to the soul (1), he could not for a time correct. Of all curses imposed by a wise Providence on the human race, this certainly is amongst the worst.

PUNISHMENT, the only magistrate that can awe an Hindoo, prevented a repetition of this disgrace ; for, nine of the principal leaders, being clearly convicted, they were executed on the following day, in the most conspicuous situation of as many bazars. After a tedious

(1) *G. O. 26th February, 1791.*—Lord Cornwallis has too high an opinion of the zeal, honour, and public spirit of the officers of the army, to doubt for a moment that every individual amongst them felt the same concern and indignation that he did himself at the shocking and disgraceful outrages that were committed on the last march. His Lordship now calls, in the most serious manner, for the active assistance of every officer in the army, and particularly those commanding flanking parties, advance and rear guards, to put a stop to this scene of horror ; which, if it should be suffered to continue, must defeat all our hopes of success and blast the British name with infamy.

march through a country, rugged and difficult to pass, from sloughs and other impediments, the whole encamped on the 25th, within a short distance of Molwoggle. This hill is from three to four hundred feet in height, steep in ascent, difficult of access, and strengthened with a stone wall towards the summit, but without bastions or guns. It was at the foot of Molwoggle, that Captain Brooke, of St. Helena, practised a stratagem in a former war, which would do credit to the first military genius of any age.

ABOUT twenty-five years ago, Colonel Wood, then detached with a division of General Smith's army, had nearly fallen a sacrifice to the abilities and superior force of Hyder Ally Cawn, when the Captain was attracted by the fire to the scene of action, but with a very inconsiderable force. Situated as Colonel Wood then was, any assistance which this weak party could afford, would evidently prove of no material advantage. Conscious of this, Captain Brooke rightly judged, that the only chance of rendering effectual service was by impressing the enemy with an idea of General Smith's near approach. He therefore beat the grenadier's march in a situation where the smallness of his force was not liable to be discovered; and, the stratagem succeeding, Hyder drew off his troops, in the apprehension that the main force of his enemy was at hand.

THE march of the 27th was along a road perfectly good, through a country in a high state of cultivation, and abounding with inhabitants. It had also plenty of forage and water, with some hills, which although of no considerable height, afforded a number of entertaining prospects. During this day's march, the inhabitants contiguous to the road, in general, had the resolution to continue in their villages;

nor did they suffer the smallest degree of molestation. Here the enemy's horse made their first appearance since the departure of our army from Vellore, in number probably about one hundred, but they kept at a very respectful distance.

It was now evident that the Sultaun had relied on the result of his threats to destroy the Carnatic for the security of his Mysorean possessions, and that he waited the effect of his plans for a length of time too considerable to admit of any serious opposition to the invasion, even at this period. However, all that was in his power, although it might not essentially avail him, he attempted. To harass the British army as they advanced, to destroy as much as possible their baggage, to lay waste the whole face of the country, and to burn and carry off all grain and forage, was his first object. To deprive his antagonist of any communication with the Pollums and Polygars of every description was naturally his next endeavour. Nor was it possible entirely to prevent the execution of these intentions. The vast disparity in numbers obliged the cavalry of our army to move in compact bodies, although under the necessity of keeping a constant eye on the baggage and stores, whilst those of the enemy, from the weight of their columns, were enabled to detach parties that scampered in every direction, and consequently, in a considerable degree effected their designs.

STILL proceeding on a good road, over a well cultivated country, the next ground of encampment was close to an opening through the Colar Hills(1). This lofty range, together with an extensive

						Miles	Fur.
(1)	Feb. 24	Goondagal,	—	—	—	14	—
	25	Molwoggle,	—	—	—	14	4
	27	Nefampelly,	—	—	—	10	4
	28	Colar,	—	—	—	10	—

district, takes its name from a town which is fortified after the ancient manner of the East. Colar, standing at the bottom of the hills, towards their centre, on the south-east face, is of considerable extent, and enclosed by a high mud wall with several bastions. The main street is wide and regular, the houses in general have flat roofs, with pipes to throw off water; and chimnies, however rare in Asia, decorate the principal dwellings of this town. From the number of walls, windings, and other obstacles that stand in the way, the citadel, although not tenable against cannon, would not be easily forced by other means. Here, a few Polygars who awaited our arrival, surrendered to the third battalion of Bengal sepoy: but the killedar, with the garrison, fled previously towards Bangalore. About two hundred blankets, manufactured in the neighbourhood, together with a quantity of gram and some provisions, were captured in this citadel.

AT a short distance to the westward of Colar a small but neat mausoleum covers the remains of Nadim Sahib, the father of Hyder, as also those of his mother. Here likewise lies interred his elder brother Ismael Sahib. Superstition had decorated the several tombs with baskets of flowers, with feathers, and with trinkets of various kinds. It is known too, that the Myforean hero, having finished his earthly career in the neighbourhood of Vellore, about the middle of December 1782, his corpse was embalmed and conveyed into Mysore nearly by the route on which Earl Cornwallis had now advanced, and that it remained in this building for several months, in order, most probably, to allow time for finishing an elegant mausoleum then preparing for its reception on the island of Seringapatam.

CLOSE to this tomb, a garden, surrounded by a high stone wall, planted with vines of different descriptions, with rows of cypress, with clumps of orange, lime, guava, and other trees, and abounding with roses and shrubberies of various kinds, marked the religious veneration in which the shrine of Tippoo Sultaun's ancestors had been held. Nor did this repository, or its ornaments, sustain the least injury on the present occasion, as centries posted by direction of the Commander in chief, guarded whatsoever appeared sacred to those relicks. Tanks too, dug at a considerable expence, together with a large jeel, or natural sheet of water, contributed to render this situation at once convenient, romantick and agreeable.

THE mild and lenient treatment of the natives, who, continuing their respective occupations, remained at their homes, together with the severe punishments already inflicted on such of the followers as discovered an inclination to pillage, appeared to have taken the best effect on the inhabitants of the districts between Colar and Ooscotta. On this march villages were to be seen crowded with people ready to supply every want of the troops, but with gates doubly barred against all that were not in arms. Narsipore, an insignificant fortification near to the first ground of encampment, alone offered insult. A patrolle of horse under Major Young could not prevail on these refractory villagers to open their gates; but on the appearance of two sepoy companies with a gun, the whole of the inhabitants fled with precipitation. From thence to Ooscotta the road was equally good as for several preceding days. It had been cut by the inhabitants with

with

with much labour through an uneven brush-wood and thick jungle. Taking advantage of the confined situation, which prevented our cavalry from covering our flanks on this march, the looties contrived to carry off two elephants, some camels, and a number of bullocks.

JUST as the army encamped in the neighbourhood of Ooscotta, the 13th Bengal battalion, with its guns, were ordered to take possession of the fort and pettah. On approaching the gate, the garrison refused admittance. A gun, loaded with blank cartridge, and used as a petard, had no effect: but the first discharge of shot shattered the bars, sprung the bolts, and wounding some people within, the rest surrendered at discretion. This fort is in figure nearly square: its walls are chiefly of mud, with a berme and deep dry ditch. To the north and from the west it is protected by an extensive jeel; and, in front of the gate, a work of excellent masonry, built in the European manner, is of considerable strength. The south face however, is completely commanded from a rising ground, even to the very bottom of the rampart. Ooscotta, in circumference, measures about twelve hundred yards. A quantity of forage, some grain and cattle being secured, this fort, like Colar, was put in possession of some friendly Polygars:

ABANDONED by its inhabitants, the pettah was given over to be plundered by our followers during a halt on the ensuing day. They were however prohibited from injuring a plantation of coffee trees, apple trees and vines, that was evidently in its infancy: indeed, the high state of cultivation of the country around promised and afforded a considerable supply of grain. The culture of silk, too, appears to have been an article of much attention in this vicinity, as several

worms, in their various forms, from the egg to the insect enveloped in thread, were found in different factories; and, as the Sultaun had begun to face the wall of the fort with stone at a great expence, he certainly intended it for a place of some importance.

FROM this period the nearness of the contending powers to each other enabled the Mysoreans to rocket the British camp at night; and to appear in force through the day. A thick fog that cleared away as the sun strengthened early on the 4th, discovered a body of horse, in front, so near as to induce Earl Cornwallis to order a brigade of infantry to support our cavalry, who were then a short distance in advance, and to cover the train as it passed a deep slough. This enemy, however, did not think proper to risk an engagement. Content with watching an opportunity to attack the baggage, they separated into several divisions, and failed in almost every attempt. A troop of Young's regiment, detached against one of these parties, returned with six horses, having cut down their riders. Another body mounted, and still more considerable, appearing in the afternoon, the left wing was ordered under arms, whilst the Commander in Chief, escorted by several squadrons, advanced to reconnoitre. His Lordship soon discovering that this enemy, although in force, had no inclination to fight, returned to camp.

AMONGST the many masterly strokes in the military career of Earl Cornwallis, his manœuvres on the 5th of March will ever hold a conspicuous place. The whole force of the enemy, now but a few miles distant on the left flank, was ready to seize on any advantage

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rage that offered, either from oversight, or from the natural obstacles and impediments of the country. Aware of these circumstances, at break of day the left wing, which then led, strengthened by the fourth brigade from the right, was ordered to form on an advantageous ground fronting the direction in which the enemy had been seen the day before. The first and third brigades, proceeding on their march in columns of half companies, for a short distance, were ready to support this line if necessary; whilst the piquets, the ninth brigade, and the cavalry, awaited orders to advance with the baggage. By this piece of generalship, the train and stores continued in perfect security for the day; every division of the army underwent the usual fatigues of an ordinary march, and a front was opposed to the enemy which he durst not venture to attack, but with a distant cannonade. After halting in this position for upwards of one hour, it was evident that the Sultaun had no inclination to give battle.

THICK fogs concealed the Mysoreans for some time after gun fire; but clearing up as the day advanced, their whole force was discovered in motion towards Bangalore. Orders for marching were immediately issued in the British camp, and the two powers moved for some time parallel to each other, separated by a piece of low swampy ground. The line already described, after fronting the enemy for some time, under the immediate direction of the Commander in Chief, followed slowly in the rear, and to the left of the baggage. Perceiving our disposition, the Sultaun inclined to his right, as near as the nature of
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the ground would admit, and pushing forward his cavalry, in order to strike at our baggage in front, he opened a heavy cannonade about ten o'clock, across the swamp. The distance, however, was so considerable, that not one shot was fired in return. Our loss throughout the day amounted only to one man killed and four wounded.

THE first and third brigades proceeded with the baggage, and unlimbering the twelve-pounders whenever the horse made their appearance, they held them in compleat check, and defeated all their designs. Here a most daring attempt on the life of Earl Cornwallis was frustrated by the vigilance of his guards. Three desperadoes, riding at full gallop, mixed with a body of our troops on a rising ground, from whence his Lordship, with General Medows, and several staff officers, viewed the movements of the enemy. Two of them forfeited their lives to their temerity; the third was spared through the mercy of the General. Ferocious and unenlightened as the Sultaun has been represented throughout this work, to charge him with a design so diabolical as the deliberate intention of murdering his antagonist, would be dangerous to the cause of truth. The most reasonable conclusion is, that he was totally ignorant of that dark, savage, and truly villainous attempt, and, that it arose, either from an ill judged intention to establish superiority in courage amongst the individuals; or, from an instantaneous effect of stupefaction occasioned by the free use of bang. Towards sun-set the troops encamped within random shot of Bangalore (1) after witnessing villages blazing to ashes in every direction, by order of the Mysorean ruler.

		Miles	Fnr.
(1) March 1	Beyloor, — — — — —	8	4
2	Oofcotta, — — — — —	13	4
4	Kistnaporam, — — — — —	8	6
5	Bangalore, — — — — —	8	4

ON the morning of the 6th the army changed ground, and embracing the pettah, occupied a position on its north-west face, in which it continued with but little variation during the siege. Towards three o'clock in the afternoon all the cavalry, supported by Gowdie's brigade, were ordered out under Colonel Floyd, in order to cover the chief engineer, and other staff officers, whilst they reconnoitred Bangalore from an eminence on its north-east face (2); about mid-way between this eminence and camp, there was a broad and deep swamp, which the artillery and infantry had instructions from our leader not to cross. As the cavalry advanced, the enemy's horse displaying two standards, assembled on the reconnoitering ground, seemingly with an intention to dispute the right of possession. Colonel Floyd approached it also with his six regiments, in separate columns, preserving intervals to form in line; yet the Mysoreans, although far inferior in numbers, did not give way until their opponents approached them to within fifty yards.

JUST as this height was gained, another body of horse, about seven hundred in number, appeared on a rising ground in front, displaying several standards. Swarms of bullocks, with bandies and some guns, were also seen in that direction. Preserving the same order, the cavalry advanced as before, and the enemy again gave way. At this period the baggage of the Sultaun's army, protected

(2) I arrived before Bangalore in the afternoon, on the 5th of March, and on the 6th the engineers were employed in reconnoitering the place, both in the morning and evening; on the latter excursion Lieutenant Col. Floyd, who escorted them, with the whole cavalry, discovered the rear of Tippoo's line of march, apparently in great confusion, and unfortunately suffered himself to be tempted by the flattering prospect of striking an important blow, to deviate from the orders he had received from me to attack the enemy. His success at first was great, but the length and ardour of the pursuit threw his squadron into great confusion. In this state they were charged by Tippoo's cavalry; and being out of the reach of all support, they were obliged to retire with great precipitation, and the loss of above two hundred men and near three hundred horses. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd received a very severe wound in the face, from which, however, I have the pleasure to add, that he is now perfectly recovered.—*Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 21st April, 1791.*

only by an inconsiderable rear guard, assisted by small parties of irregular horse, on the flanks, was in fight. The temptation to action was scarcely to be resisted. Stevenson's regiment was directed to push forward on the right, whilst the other corps proceeded as before. All these movements were at two thirds speed; so that the principal part of the enemy's baggage, with a number of guns, were passed immediately, without much opposition. Panick-struck at an enterprize so hardy, daring, and unexpected, the Mysoreans fled in every direction. Horse and foot relinquished their charge for a time. The nature of the ground, however, now impeding the pursuers, afforded the runaways time for reflection. Volleys of shot from a pagoda crowded with people stopped Stevenson in the middle of his victorious career, notwithstanding his endeavours to possess it sword in hand. Rocky heights and deep ravines that stretched along and intersected the country in every direction, impeded the other corps; and although the enemy were at first unprepared to oppose so desperate an attempt, yet perceiving that the assailants were totally unsupported by infantry, they faced about, and bethought them of resistance. Collecting their forces, therefore, on the several heights, they commenced such a discharge of musquetry and rockets as rendered it apparently judicious in our cavalry to put about. In an instant the retreat was general. Colonel Floyd, by this time shot in the head, had fallen from his horse as suddenly as if struck with a twenty-four pound ball. He was consequently left on the field for a while. Corporal Murray, with Buchan, a dragoon, observed the situation of their colonel, and in defiance of danger dismounted, examined the
wound,

wound, and finding it was not mortal, the former hastened to report, whilst the latter remained to protect his leader on the spot.

As the retreat was at full speed, although but a short time had elapsed, the cavalry had galloped not less than a mile when Murray overtook his regiment. Captain Child, then in command of the Dragoons, instantly directed that a troop under the writer of this narrative, should return to bring off the Colonel. This service was effected. The enemy pressed hard in pursuit. Their fire was heavy and destructive; but the nature of the country, divided every where by deep ruts and interfections of water courses, heightened our embarrassment more than the shot and swords of our opponents. Jaded and worn down with excessive fatigue, the horses were incapable of clearing ditches which but an hour before they passed with spirit; and as the Mysoreans mixed with our rear, the seasonable assistance derived from a determined countenance in the infantry, together with a well-directed fire from our cannon, could alone secure the retreat. In short, had not Majors Gowdie and Montagu advanced, although in disobedience of orders, the greatest part of the cavalry would most assuredly have been disabled from further service for what remained of the campaign.

IN whatever light this hazardous enterprize may be viewed by the generality of readers, if a narrator of facts has any right to advance opinions founded on probable contingencies, it is affirmed, that in the event of having been contented with moderate acquisition, appearances promised abundance of success. Not only the principal
part

part of the Sultaun's baggage, but many of his guns, carts, elephants, and camels, were completely in our possession, without a possibility of escape, had the capture of these been our sole object. It is affirmed also, that had not Colonel Floyd been wounded, the cavalry would in all human probability have gone round the fort with a loss not more considerable than they suffered through the confusion of a retreat. However dangerous in a soldier to act contrary to orders, if allowable in any instance, the temptation on this occasion will ever be deemed the most difficult of resistance; nor was the din of staff officers not only recommending but spurring to action, the least pressing of these temptations, especially as their opinions were known to have considerable influence amongst the officers of the army. But few indeed are the instances in which blame has not been attached to misfortune. Where things turn out unhappily, mankind in general pretend to discover errors, although the self-same measures, under opposite circumstances, would be stamped with the highest applause; without pausing to enquire into the springs of action, they ever ascribe misfortunes to want of foresight and arrangement, which most probably, had their rise in accident, the neglect of others, or some improbable contingency. Induced by the present failure to survey with a retrospective and more minute eye the conduct of this leader at Sattimungulum, on which occasion credit had been given him for an union of judgement with intrepidity; reasoners affirmed, that the result warranted that conclusion in neither instance (3).

(3) For a return of the killed and wounded, on this occasion, and on every day throughout the siege of Bangalore, see the first volume, Appendix, No 21.

AN intention of storming the pettah on the night of the 5th, with the piquets, had been abandoned, under the idea of its being reinforced during the day, a circumstance in which various intelligences concurred; however, to do away any impression occasioned by the late disastrous rencontre, and to secure a large supply of forage and materials for the siege, the intention was again renewed, but with another body of troops. His Majesty's 36th regiment, and the 26th Bengal battalion of sepoys, with their field pieces, supported by two eighteen and two twelve pounders, were ordered for this service, early in the morning of the 7th, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell. Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse took charge of the heavy guns. The point of attack was a gateway of considerable strength on the north face, to which a winding passage led, that was smooth and even, but narrowed so much by a thick jungle on either hand, that the troops, unable to extend their front, had scarcely room to advance by columns of half companies. The first barrier was soon carried. After a few discharges of an eighteen pounder the troops rushed to the bayonet. They secured this post, and pushed forward; but whilst the field pieces played on the inner gate, without effect, as it was barricaded with stones, a brisk fire from a mud bastion, from turrets, and from roofs of houses, made considerable slaughter amongst the Europeans. It was here that the gallant Moorhouse fell (†), just as the heavy guns made their appearance. His manly exertions,

(†) *Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 2^d April, 1791.*— I cannot, however, help expressing on this occasion, my sincere regret for the death of that brave and valuable officer, Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse, who was killed at the assault of the Pettah, on the 7th of March.

President and Council of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, 14th April, 1791.— We sincerely lament the loss sustained on that occasion, by the death of Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse, whose military character was so much distinguished, and whose long, active, and zealous services to the Company deserved the highest applause: In order to testify our sense of such conspicuous merits, we came to the following resolution;

exertions, conspicuous from the beginning, were now followed up without intermission, by the intrepid Medows. Enlivened by such examples, the soldiery strained every nerve. A delay in bringing up the heavy cannon, together with some other untoward circumstances, instead of tending to abandon the enterprize, increased their eagerness to proceed; and their officers, alike inured to danger and accustomed to victory, were foremost whether to scale the ramparts or to pass through openings or apertures. Slender in frame, but raised up by some sturdy grenadiers, a hole made by some eighteen pound shot admitted Lieutenant Ayre through the gate, under the immediate eye of his General, who with the strongest marks of approbation encouraged the troops to "support the little gentleman" (1). Ladders were now applied, and the ramparts were covered with assailants in an instant. All obstacles surmounted, the enemy gave way; but the nearness of the pettah to the garrison afforded them shelter in the quarter under its immediate protection. During this attack the fort kept up an incessant fire of cannon; and several of their shot reached our encampment, although at a distance of nearly two miles.

SUCH was the obstinacy of this defence, that Earl Cornwallis directed the 76th regiment, with the third Bengal battalion, and the first battalion of volunteers, to join in the assault; but the confined nature of the passage would not admit of their assistance. However,

lution; viz. "Government having received advice of the death of Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse, who was killed in storming the pettah of Bangalore, on the 7th instant, resolve, as a testimony of respect to the memory of an officer who served the Company many years with distinguished zeal, spirit, and ability, that his remains be, with the permission of the ministers and church wardens, publicly interred in the church at Fort St. George, at the Company's expence, and a marble table fixed over his grave, with a suitable inscription, in commemoration of his merits; Resolved likewise, that a letter be written to Earl Cornwallis, to inform him of this intention, and to request his Lordship will be pleased to direct, that the body of the late Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse be removed to the Presidency so soon as the situation of affairs will permit."— We are assured that your honourable Court will be pleased to find, that proper respect has been paid to the memory of one of the best officers that ever served the Company; and we are confident this present testimony will be gratefully received by the whole army.

(1) These were his own words.

in the space of two hours they enabled Colonel Cockerell to establish posts over two thirds of the pettah, and to capture a vast quantity of forage, which contributed so much to our ultimate success, that the Commandant is said to have forfeited his life for disobedience of the Sultaun's orders, positively commanding, that the whole should be burnt. Confidence in the strength of the place, and not a treacherous disposition, led to this catastrophe.

THE pettah of Bangalore is of a circular form, and measures full three miles in circumference. All around, except where it is defended by the fort, it has a deep dry ditch, the inner side of which is in general faced with stone. Besides an open communication towards the garrison, there are four entrances to this place, all defended by strong gates and bastions with embrasures for guns. Of these one is on the east face; two are to the northward, and one at the north-west quarter. A thick and almost impenetrable jungle of trees, bamboos, thorny bushes, and prickly shrubs, extends along the ditch, within which a lofty mud wall, with several turrets, ranges. To strengthen the inner works, this jungle, which is upwards of one hundred yards in depth, is secured by redoubts or fletches at each of the outer entrances. Many years ago these defences, on repeated occasions, baffled the whole Maratta force; nor does it appear hazardous to affirm, that they are still abundantly strong against any native power in the east. An idea of their sufficiency, even against our army, prevented the destruction of all grain and forage, which, without doubt, considerably facilitated the fall of Bangalore.

HERE there are many streets laid out with much regularity, and of great width; few towns in Hindostan can boast of better houses, or of richer inhabitants, if credit can be given to appearances; and although

though the people had removed the principal part of their wealth on the advance of the British army, still, bales of cloth, with immense quantities of cotton and grain, were strewed in every direction; indeed the booty dug up by individuals, out of concealments and deserted houses, strongly indicated ease, comfort, and happiness in former times.

GRIEVED at his misfortunes, the Sultaun instantly meditated a plan for retaking the pettah. Early in the afternoon, he, as a feint, drew out his army to the north-east of the fort, and advanced towards the British camp with all the appearance of an intention to give battle, whilst his real design was to strengthen his troops, not yet dislodged by Colonel Cockerell, with six thousand chosen men. Earl Cornwallis, suspecting the true motives from appearances, immediately directed the 76th regiment, which had been recalled to camp in course of the day, to return to Colonel Cockerell. His Lordship struck his encampment, and wheeling to the right, he formed his line with its front to the enemy, and watched their approach. A low marshy ground now separated the two armies, across which the Sultaun contented himself in this quarter for the day, with a distant cannonade. Widely different was the struggle to deprive us of our late acquisitions.

As if confident of success, the Myforean-reinforcement advanced on the 36th and 76th regiments, but they were received at the point of the bayonet. With the sepoy's also, they came to a close engagement. The struggle was obstinate and bloody. As if fired at being driven from their homes by strangers, they yielded to superior discipline with much unwillingness. Mortified that their foes should triumph around their altars and zenanas, they fought with uncommon

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mon resolution; and at length, although defeated and pursued with considerable slaughter, they retreated reluctantly, and disputed every wall, range of houses, or other building, that afforded the least prospect of shelter. The loss fell heavy on the 76th regiment. But although this was their first trial in arms, they behaved with a firmness that would stamp credit on the most veteran troops (1). The Mysoreans, after losing from three to four hundred men, no longer able to contend with such successful opponents, abandoned their intentions, and returned to their encampment.

FROM this period to the 12th, nothing of importance occurred. Working parties were employed in cutting down bamboos, in collecting materials for batteries, and in erecting redoubts and fletches in front of the encampment, on a construction more to prevent alarms, than for the security of the troops (2). A ten gun battery, intended to take off the defences, but not to breach, now opened, but without any material advantage for some days. A two gun-

(1) *G. O. March 26, 1790.*— Lord Cornwallis having this morning received from the 36th regiment, the colours that were so gallantly taken by that corps, at the time that it contributed to render abortive an attempt which was made by a large body of the enemy, to retake the pettah on the 7th instant; he gladly embraces this opportunity of declaring, that the behaviour of the officers and soldiers of that regiment, during the whole of that day, must ever reflect great honour upon their courage and discipline, and justly entitles them to his highest approbation. He likewise desires, that his best thanks may be presented to the 26th Bengal battalion, for the zeal and spirit which was manifested by that corps in the assault of the pettah; and to the 76th regiment, the 3d Bengal battalion, and the 1st battalion of Bengal volunteers, for the firmness and gallantry which they displayed in repulsing the attack which the enemy afterwards made upon it; and His Lordship requests that Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell will accept of his warmest acknowledgments for the vigour and judgment with which he so successfully conducted the assault of the pettah, and for the military ability with which he occupied the different posts; and maintained possession of them during the day, against the very extraordinary powerful efforts of the enemy to dislodge them.— Ensign Manoury, of the 52d regiment, is to do duty as an assistant engineer in Bangalore until further orders. Lord Cornwallis orders the following sums to be paid to the serjeant and twelve of the advanced party, on the assault of the 2d instant; the serjeant, twenty pagodas; corporals five pagodas; and privates, three pagodas each; if any of the men who were killed in the assault have left families, they are to receive double.

(2) *G. O. March 8, 1791.*— Lord Cornwallis is so sensible of the zeal and spirit of the officers and soldiers of the army, that he is convinced they will bear with cheerfulness, the fatigues which the present important crisis renders indispensably necessary. He must, however, recommend it to them to keep it constantly in their minds, that the utmost exertion upon all working parties is not less requisite for ensuring success, than gallantry under arms; and he with great truth declares, that he shall feel the most sincere gratification when he finds it in his power to give them every relaxation that good soldiers can desire, after the service of hardship and labour that they have undergone with a degree of animation and steadiness which reflects so much honour upon them.

battery for enfilading, with another for firing en ricochet, were in readiness about the same time. A considerable distance in front, but somewhat to the westward of these, another battery for nine guns, constructed by Captain Kyd of the Bengal engineers, was begun; and soon afterwards a mortar battery was laid out in that part of the pettah ditch which was nearest to the fort. This opened on the 15th with excellent effect, and an incessant fire from the other on the following day promised a practicable breach, at an early period, in the first curtain to the eastward of the Delhi gate. From the opening of the batteries until now the contingencies were neither important nor numerous.

A sally attempted on an advanced post, in which was stationed a company of the 76th regiment, with two of the 28th battalion of Bengal sepoys, was repulsed with loss. The enemy's horse occasionally made their appearance in parties through the day, and rockets were thrown into our camp at night; forage, notwithstanding the supply found in the pettah, could not be procured at any price; the bullocks of the public departments died daily in hundreds, whilst the cattle for slaughter were reduced to mere carrion; our gallant handful of cavalry, unequal to oppose the myriads by which they were surrounded, were necessitated to forage within pistol shot of their pickets; and besides other necessities at this period of the siege, two of our guns, a twenty-four and an eighteen pounder, were completely disabled.

EITHER the movements of the enemy, or secret intelligence, or perhaps both, induced Earl Cornwallis, on the 16th, to direct some alterations in the order of encampment. The cavalry changed ground with the second brigade, and the fifth and sixth brigades with part of the fourth, occupying a new position, fronted outwards in the direction formerly observed by the reserve. By this alteration the horse were thrown into a hollow that covered them from the enemy's view. A sudden and brisk cannonade on the morning of the 17th discovered the propriety of the late arrangements. This fire was principally directed towards the ground lately occupied by the cavalry; consequently, the loss fell principally on the corps encamped in that position.

As large bodies of horse, encircling our encampment like a rainbow, hovered on the eminences all around, it is reasonable to conjecture, that the Sultaun intended to strike at the baggage and stores, in the event of any confusion; but on the return of Earl Cornwallis from the pettah, where his Lordship had been to examine the effect of his batteries, Colonel Stuart, with the principal part of the first and third brigades, was ordered to advance against the right flank of the enemy. On this movement the Sultaun judged it prudent to retire; and the fort, at the same instant, ceased a discharge of cannon, which, as if by concert, it opened with the fire in the field. The only return to the cannonade from the northward was from one eighteen and one twelve pounder, served with excellent aim by Captain Carlisle of
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the Madras establishment. A four-gun battery, intended to destroy the defences at the gateway, was constructed on this night.

So just was the aim of our artillery, that on the 18th, notwithstanding the strength of the wall, the breach was considered practicable by several qualified to judge from the experience of many years service. However, during the night, another parallel, upon which the enemy opened an incessant and heavy fire of musquetry, was laid out and completed within two hundred yards of the fort, and its proportion of guns were placed in the battery lately erected. A discharge of rockets was kept up on our encampment without intermission.

EARLY on the 19th the four-gun battery opened; this, together with those already mentioned, kept up a constant cannonade on the breach and neighbouring towers, that of the enemy being much slackened; they, however, fired sharply with musquets from the covert way and outworks. Against these a battery for two six-pounders was constructed, that completed for four, was enlarged so as to admit six guns; and on the left of the advanced parallel a mortar battery was finished before day-light. From camp the 36th regiment, and a battalion of sepoy, were sent out under Major Skelly, to surprize a body of the enemy reported at a short distance. Twelve only were found from the intelligence, all of whom were put to death, with the exception of one man, who escaped by flight.

THE fire of the 20th widened the breach, and rendered it much more easy of access, by the destruction of its defences, which notwithstanding the cannonade, were still numerous and respectable. At
dusk

dusk a strong working party of the 72d regiment was ordered to open a sap from the advanced six-gun battery to the crest of the glacis. This work, so very close to the enemy, could not be carried on unperceived, even from the ramparts; but as large bodies of the besieged were out stockading the breach, a galling fire was received just as the party began to work, and as it did not cease until under complete cover, the casualties of this night were very numerous.

EARLY on the 21st, the Sultaun, with his whole force, was in motion; part of his troops advanced, with an intention of opening a battery in order to enfilade the pettah, from high grounds on the east side of the fort, close to the cypress garden; others dragged several heavy guns to the bank of a tank in which a number of well marked embrasures had been cut, whilst his main force was drawn up on the neighbouring heights, to protect these operations. A thick fog concealed the Mysoreans from the British general till towards eight in the morning; but as soon as it cleared away, the drums beat to arms, the encampment was instantly struck, and the right wing moving towards the enemy by columns, intimidated them for the present from their designs.

As a storm was now reckoned practicable by all, the fire of this day was levelled chiefly against the defences about the point of attack, and the guns and towers which looked in that direction. A small bastion, close to the Delhi gate, together with one of a much larger size, which bore on the breach, and flanked the shattered curtain to the eastward, were battered to pieces. Anxious under these cir-
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cumstances, the Sultaun in the evening again drew out his troops, and as in the morning conducted several heavy guns to the bank already described, evidently with intention to cannonade the pettah. The critical stage at which affairs had now arrived, required that bold and energetic determination which totally abstracted from scale and compass reasoning, is only to be found with great minds.

As night approached, preparations were made for the storm, with the direction of which Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell was entrusted. A serjeant and twelve, supported by Lieutenants Duncan and Evans, with thirty chosen men, composed the forlorn hope. The grenadiers of the 36th, 52d, 71st, 72d, 74th, 76th, and fourth Madras regiment, with the light infantry of the corps just mentioned, in all fourteen companies, followed as in this detail. Close to these the 36th, 72nd, and 76th advanced according to seniority of regiments, and in the rear of the Europeans two Bengal battalions, the 7th and 26th, were posted in the last parallel, with instructions to scour to the right and left so soon as the storm should commence. Pioneers carrying scaling ladders were judiciously interspersed with the troops; the appearance of General Medows amidst the ranks, added vigour to discipline and valour; and, although Colonel Maxwell issued his instructions to the whole, the flankers were considered under the immediate direction of Major Skelly.

WHILST the troops destined for the assault, advanced to their several stations, with awful stillness, the garrison both in the fort and outworks, as if wearied with incessant exertion, were equally lull; a bright moon, at times obscured by a passing cloud, shone
against

against the battered precipices over which the assailants had to pass; from the heavens there came not a breath of wind; nothing disturbed thought; and, this gallant corps, after bestowing in reflection a soldierly and affectionate tribute on their fair friends, bade adieu to all worldly concerns, and rivetted their minds to death or victory.

At the hour of eleven a signal for advancing passed along the ranks in perfect silence. A causeway upwards of one hundred yards in length which would not admit of eight men abreast, was the only road that led from the trenches to the point of attack. To render the breach inaccessible, the besieged had cut a wide and deep trench across this causeway, leaving a wall about two feet thick entire on the right hand. As there was no draw-bridge it was by this wall that the garrison communicated with the covert way, and were enabled to sally; but, although so narrow as to be passed by Indian files only, it served also to convey our troops over the ditch, which was nowhere fordable in this quarter. To the left the fausse-bray, about twenty feet in height, and but little damaged, as it was covered by the glacis, was escaladed in an instant; but the principal part of the troops, in defiance of all obstructions, advanced straight forward, and surmounted every obstacle. At some places they clambered over mounds, walls, bulwarks, and hindrances of various kinds, that had been shattered by the cannonade. At others, where the fortifications were more entire, they ascended or descended by the help of ladders. As the assailants approached the bastion and curtain that had been breached, the resistance, which till then had fallen far short of expectation, began to increase. Awakened from a fatal security into which the garrison had been lulled, by the multiplicity of dif-

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difficulties that the besiegers had to encounter, as well as by the strength of the place and the number of its defenders, they now bethought of precautions, which, if seasonably applied, would in all probability, have rendered success doubtful. The alarm once given circulated like wild-fire. Multitudes crowded tumultuously to the point of attack. In an instant, blue lights and fire balls thrown in every direction rendered all objects around the fort clear as at noon day; a blaze of musquetry, which added strength to this magnificent illumination, furnished it also with abundance of victims; a general discharge of rockets contributed to the awful grandeur of an exhibition in itself truly tremendous; and one universal roar of cannon all over the fort and pettah at once struck the spectator with consternation and horror.

WHILST the forlorn hope mounted the breach, the leading companies kept a constant fire on the parapet; as these ascended, other divisions scoured the ramparts to the right and left. The assailants, although broken in advance, pushed on with irresistible pressure. Instances of individuals at single combat were to be seen in different directions; courage was equal on both sides, but superiority in discipline and bodily strength secured to the British troops a firm footing on the ramparts. In short, before one hour had elapsed, the grenadiers march beating all over the works announced to their friends without, complete possession of the place. Of the garrison, however, there were many who fought with a degree of valour that bordered on desperation; but the want of timely concert amongst them rendered all attempts at opposition abortive.

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ALTHOUGH the struggle was of short duration at the breach, it was repeatedly renewed as the columns proceeded to take possession of the works. At several of the bastions, the defenders, encouraged by supplies of fresh troops, in vain endeavoured to retrieve their loss; and the assailants, having previously divided their force, rushed forward to the right and left, until they met at the opposite entrance, which is called the Mysore gate.

WHILST the grenadiers advanced along the ramparts on the right, the light infantry pressed forwards to the left; the 36th regiment descended into the body of the fort; the 72d and 76th regiments, supporting the several divisions, secured all above the breach; and the two sepoy battalions, scouring the glacis and covert way, bayoneted whomsoever offered opposition in the outworks. Taking advantage of the circulation of terror by contagion, Lieutenant John Plumer, of the 13th battalion of Bengal sepoys, sallied with two companies of that corps from the pettah; and, driving off their guards, he took possession of some guns which the enemy intended to open on our batteries, from the bank of a tank already described. In this storm, General Medows, observing a number of sepoys, chiefly of the 7th battalion, amongst the Europeans at the top of the breach, he immediately directed that they should return to their stations in the outworks.

As women and children crowded along with the affrighted garrison through the gate the carnage there was truly shocking. The height of the surrounding walls, the length of the arches, and the noise of the musquetry, which had not as yet subsided, notwith-

standing the humanity of British troops, for a time prevented all distinction of age or sex. About two thousand chosen troops that hastened to strengthen the garrison, pressed to get in at the Mysore gate; but, from the rapidity of the assailants, this reinforcement, which was too late in arrival, contributed only to increase the confusion and slaughter. On the whole, upwards of fourteen hundred lives were lost in this momentous event; an event, which firmly fixed the war in the heart of the enemy's dominions, as it put Britain in possession of probably the strongest and most important fortrefs in Mysore.

ALTHOUGH to particularize any individual in military operations, where the merits of all are most willingly acknowledged, must ever prove a task highly invidious, yet the conduct of Colonel Giels during this siege, but more especially on the 21st of March, 1791, cannot be passed over in silence. A heavy fire kept up throughout the day was by his direction increased and wholly pointed at the breach for a full hour previous to the attack; and as the assailants advanced, the cannonade which intimidated the enemy from remaining in that quarter, was continued with blank cartridges, thus furnishing the forlorn hope an opportunity of approaching the walls unobserved. The expectation of a storm on the preceding night contributed also to the lethargick state of the garrison. A reinforcement of seven hundred chosen horse-men, dismounted, gave additional strength to Bangalore late in the evening of the 20th. These, with the rest of the defendants, continued a constant discharge of musquetry until daylight, but the fatigue which they had undergone rendered them unable to watch on the ensuing night, and accounts in some measure

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for their being so little prepared when the attack actually took place (1).

BANGALORE, the capital of a province bearing that name, in shape approaches an egg, although by the model it appears to have been originally designed for an exact oval. It is somewhat more than a mile in circumference. The rampart, which is lofty, strong, and of good masonry, has a parapet five feet in height, and of the same thickness. Besides twenty-six circular bastions, mounting three guns apiece, and at the distance of sixty-seven yards from one another, it has five cavaliers, which whilst they overlook the whole work, are calculated for that number of guns each. Exclusive of these, there are other bastions of a smaller size over either gateway. All round the bottom of the rampart a regular and substantial fausse-bray is erected. The ditch is wide and deep, but at the season of the year in which the siege was undertaken, it contained but very

(1) *G. O. March* 22, 1791. Lord Cornwallis feels the most sensible gratification in congratulating the officers and soldiers of the army on the honourable issue of the fatigues and dangers which they underwent during the late arduous siege.— Their alacrity and firmness in the execution of their various duties has perhaps never been exceeded, and he shall not only think it incumbent upon him to represent their meritorious conduct in the strongest colours, but he shall ever remember it with the sincerest sentiments of esteem and admiration. The judicious arrangements which were made by Colonel Duff in the artillery department, his exertions, and those of the other officers and soldiers of that corps in general in the service of the batteries, are entitled to his Lordship's perfect approbation, to which he desires to add, that he thinks himself much obliged to Lieutenant Colonel Giels for the able manner in which he directed the fire during the day of the 21st.— Lord Cornwallis is so well acquainted with the ardour that pervades the whole army, that he would have been happy if it had been practicable to have allowed every corps to have participated in the glory of the enterprize last night. but it must be obvious to all, that in forming a disposition for the assault, a certain portion of the troops could only be employed. The conduct of all the regiments which happened in their tour to be on duty that evening, did credit in every respect to their spirit and discipline, but His Lordship desires to offer the tribute of his particular and warmest praises to the European grenadiers and light infantry of the army, and to the 36th regiment, who led the attack, and on that occasion furnished a conspicuous proof that disciplined valour in soldiers, when directed by a zeal and capacity in officers, is irresistible. The activity and good conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, in the command of the pettah, for several days previous to the assault of the fort, was in every respect highly commendable, but His Lordship desires that he will accept his particular thanks for the judicious arrangements which he made for the assault, which was committed to his disposal, and for the gallantry which he displayed in the execution of them.— He likewise returns his warmest acknowledgements to Major Skelly, who undertook the command of the corps who commenced the attack of the breach, and who by animating them by his own example, contributed essentially to our important success.— Lieutenant Colonel Stuart may be assured that Lord Cornwallis will ever retain a grateful remembrance of the valuable and steady support which that officer affords him, by his military experience and constant exertion to promote the public service; and although his Lordship is unwilling to offend General Medows's delicacy by attempting to express his full sense of the able and friendly assistance which he uniformly experiences from him, he cannot avoid declaring, that it has made an impression upon his mind that can never be effaced.

little water. On the south-west face there were rocks in it, which must have considerably facilitated an attack, had a breach been made in the opposite curtain; but this appears not to have escaped observation, as the glacis in that quarter covers the works much better than in any other. Here there is also a ravelin, which is without any fault; but the opposite berme extends so far beyond the work as to admit of a lodgment should an enemy get over the ditch; another ravelin strengthens the east face. There are also lunets at proper distances from each other all around the crest of the glacis. In front of the Mysore gate there is a work of considerable strength, with a large tank on its south face. The Delhi gate, with some little distance on each side, embraced in a kind of crescent by the pettah, is defended by seven strong walls; and causeways, which as there are no drawbridges to the fort, terminate the ditch at either entrance, are the only passages that lead into the body of the work. Besides all these obstacles, the glacis, except that part directly opposite the pettah, was bounded by a close and thick prickly hedge. The impossibility of procuring forage to maintain even the cattle for slaughter, heightened the distress of the besiegers (1). But above all other disadvantages, that of a powerful army still in readiness for motion, keeping our infantry buckled up in their accoutrements, and the cavalry at the heads of their horses, was the cause of much inconvenience to the troops, as it gave rise to frequent alarms, con-

(1) *G. O. March 6, 1791.* As it is well known, that the cattle in this country are at particular seasons subsisted principally by tufts of grass, the Commander in Chief recommends it to all individuals to make the utmost exertion to feed their cattle in that manner. He likewise expects that the agents of the bullock contractor will take similar measures for supplying the public cattle; and as the Commander in Chief is sensible, that in the present situation of the army, it may not be practicable to make that provision without some additional expence, he directs that an account of whatever may be incurred in this manner, shall be kept with the utmost precision, and certified upon honour; upon which the Commander in Chief will be ready to allow a reasonable proportion of it to be defrayed by the public.

stantly

stantly destroying their rest, and consequently occasioning disease, and heightening the bad effect of every sickness and disorder (2).

WHEREVER gallantry is recorded, Bahauder Khan, Killedar of Bangalore, will ho'd a conspicuous place amongst the heroes of our times. True to his trust, he resigned it with life, after receiving almost as many wounds as were inflicted on Cæsar in the capitol. In death his manly countenance wore a mild yet commanding aspect. His appearance, respectable from an old age of temperate living, was rendered venerable by a beard of considerable length, every hair of which vied with silver in whiteness; and his corpse, fair as any European, covered with wounds, all received from before, and close to the point of attack, clearly declared that this resolute Mogul, besides a firm attachment to his Prince, possessed the genuine spirit of a soldier. His remains were offered to the Sultaun for interment, but refused with many acknowledgments of the attention: they were therefore decently interred according to the Mahomedan rites. It is said that the Sultaun, in answer to Lord Cornwallis's soldier-like offer, replied, that the Khan could be buried nowhere with greater propriety than in the neighbourhood of the place at the defence of which he had fallen. Musselmans of the first rank in our army attended his funeral with every mark of respect and attention. At the loss of this faithful servant, and the severity of the blow he had received, the Sultaun wept; but his reasonable grief was succeeded by unreasonable and unmanly vengeance, which he wreaked on his unfortunate prisoners.

(2) *G. O. March 12, 1791.* Lord Cornwallis knows that the troops are desirous on the present occasion to be vigilant and alert. His Lordship observes, with the utmost satisfaction, that they are cheerfully ready for the execution of any duty, and directs that corps shall be accoutred, and the cavalry saddled, from eight every night until sunrise, as the surest means of defeating every purpose of the enemy, to relieve the place.

OUR of about one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon captured at Bangalore, eighty-five of which were fit for immediate use, several were cast under the auspices of Hyder; some were Spanish, some French, and a few bore the English stamp. For this train there was ammunition sufficient for at least a twelve month's siege found in four magazines; of these, two which are under ground, are substantially built with the best materials, and may be considered bomb proof. In the pettah there was an extensive gunpowder manufactory. Store-houses, founderies, with public buildings of various descriptions, appeared in considerable forwardness at Bangalore, and a machine copied from a French Encyclopædia, produced different samples of carabines, but very unequal in the bore.

HERE, a palace begun by Hyder, and at this time completely finished, is, if we except some public buildings at Agra and Delhi, the most airy and elegant of any in the East. In form it is an oblong square, with a terrace of eighty-four paces by thirty-two to the principal face. About the centre of the palace, this terrace for a space of eight paces projects beyond the building on either side. Here the artist has exerted his utmost skill with success. The roof, supported by two rows of wooden pillars, that communicate with each other by a scolloped arch, is painted with exquisite taste; the pillars, which have eight equal sides, are about twenty feet in height; the field throughout is nearly of a purple colour; and the whole is decorated with a variety of flowers neatly executed in gold leaf. Besides these ornaments, several galleries and projections magnificent in themselves, but too difficult of description, give an air of grandeur

to this palace that is seldom to be met with in any country. In one of these, to which four flights of stairs lead, there is a place with a canopy over it, for the Sultaun to sit on when giving audience. This rich throne is lacquered within all around; it is ornamented with gildings of various colours; and the magnificence of its appearance is heightened by a beautiful fountain in front. The sides of the palace that run east and west are half the depth of those in the opposite directions; the workmanship is nearly the same throughout the whole, but the painting occasionally varies. Rich carpets covered the floors, superb hangings decorated the walls, and ivory inlaid in figures of various shapes might be seen in every quarter. On the frame of a door, in a wretched hovel adjoining this palace, the names of Gowdie and many other British officers were carved. Here these gentlemen had been closely confined in massy irons, cruelly insulted, and otherwise illtreated during the former war.

THE only entrance into this palace is on the east face; neat and commodious zenanas run all around the other sides; but if we except what has been already described, the buildings within this fort are despicable in the extreme. One universal confusion throughout the store, ammunition, and provision departments, clearly discovered that the establishment for Bangalore, however well supplied; was, from a deficiency of arrangement, still in an infant state. In front of the palace, a large space, enclosed with a high wall, served for a grand parade. In this wall there are four gates; one leads to the palace, another to the arsenal and foundery, and another towards each of the entrances to the fort.

To determine the precise period at which Bangalore became a military

ilitary station, would be greatly hazardous; but to affirm that it was a respectable fortress upwards of forty years ago, and that it has been strengthened piecemeal since, is safe from various concurrent circumstances. In the year 1655 it was reduced by Adil Shaw King of Beejapoor; but before the close of that century, it was surrendered to the arms of Aurungzebe. From that conqueror it was obtained in purchase by the then Rajah of Mysore. In 1730 it was besieged by a large body of Marattas, without success; but from another attack which was made about fifteen years afterwards, under Gopaul Row, its safety was purchased with a large bribe (1). Towards the Mysore gate part of the original works has undergone no alteration; all around, however, except in that quarter, it has been improved by several additions, which has so thickened the wall, that a breach through it can never be effected with artillery. The east face is the most regular, as to the width of the berme, or the height and breadth of the parapet; but, although of considerable strength, neither is so complete on the opposite side.

To the principal actors in this assault fell the lead in the province of humanity. Attention to the wounded captives succeeded the fury of the storm. Both the fort and pettah, with a garrison consisting of one European regiment, four native corps, a small party of artillery, and a considerable number of lascars and pioneers, were given in charge to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell; but when it became necessary

(1) For such of these remarks as are not consistent with my own knowledge I am indebted to the researches of the ingenious Mr. Colebrook; and as I know that his information is drawn from a source highly respectable, I entertain no doubt of its correctness. On this subject the reader is further referred to the explanation of that Gentleman's View, in Mysore.

to examine the heavy guns, to repair the damaged carriages, to provide platforms, and to make every preparation for the siege of Seringapatam, this charge was transferred to Colonel Patrick Duff.

ON the fall of Bangalore the enemy decamped, and proceeded to the westward with the utmost precipitation. Struck with extreme panick at so sudden a reverse of fortune; had circumstances admitted of pursuit, the principal part of the Sultaun's guns and stores must, in all probability, have been taken; but, when it is considered, that the British forces had nearly exhausted their stock of grain; that their ammunition for the heavy guns had been almost expended; that cattle of every description, from a want of forage, died in hundreds at their pickets; and that all communication with supplies was cut off, unless forced by a movement of the whole army, the success of our achievements, which could not have taken place at a more favourable period, exceeded the most sanguine hopes, and pointed to the propriety of not endangering the loss of what we had already in possession.

THE climate of Bangalore is extremely temperate and salubrious. Situated, nearly, in the center of the peninsula, and abounding with reservoirs of water, the lands benefit by the monsoons of either coast, without being deluged by the weight of their fall; the soil is fruitful, and produces the necessaries of life in great plenty; cabbages, lettuce, and other European culinary wares, planted by British officers, thrive in the gardens all around without any extraordinary attention; and cypress, plantain, guava, with trees and shrubberies of various descriptions, rising in clumps in all directions, afforded abundance of shade.

A
S K E T C H

OF THE WAR WITH
TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

THE reduction of Bangalore, whilst it afforded the British force a firm establishment, and fixed the war on a solid foundation, in the heart of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, was at the same time attended with the very best consequences to the several operations of our allies. The capture of so important a fortress, disheartening the Mysoreans wheresoever besieged, operated to the advantage of the confederates in all directions. Darwar, Capool, with several inferior forts that had till now persisted in a resolute defence, as if struck with the superior prowess and tactical skill of their antagonists, for the first time bethought of surrender (1); Polligars of all descrip-

(1) The strong fortresses of Darwar and Capool, had long been invested by the Marattas and the Nizam, and with so little prospect of success, that it had been more than once under the consideration of the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, whether they should not convert those sieges into blockades, to set their armies at liberty for more active operations; but the news of the fall of Bangalore, which seemed to have been unexpected by the garrisons of those places, so effectually intimidated them, that although in no shape reduced to extremity, or even distress, they agreed to surrender.—Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 7th September, 1792.

tions transferring their allegiance to the superior power, in order to testify attachment at an early period, flocked with provisions to the British camp; and the enemy, conscious of inferiority from the beginning, still continued to evince a determined resolution not to try his fortune in battle, unless accident furnished him with some unforeseen advantage. Yet, notwithstanding these and many other favorable circumstances, grounds that rendered the adjustment of disputes highly adviseable were not wanting.

AMONGST these, the state of politics in Europe, strongly pressed to bring the war with Tippoo Sultaun to a speedy conclusion. Every information, about this period, confirmed an opinion, that a rupture with Spain, in which France must have necessarily been included, could not be avoided without much loss of national reputation. In this event, situated as the British forces then were, our settlements in the east would be exposed, not only to the chance of invasion from the French islands in the Indian seas, but, Pondicherry, a strong fortress, garrisoned with a considerable body of regular troops, must, from its situation, have threatened the worst of consequences. To accommodate differences with the Mysorean Prince without loss of time, was therefore an object of the utmost importance; but as none of his overtures had been addressed to the confederates jointly, although told all along that such only would gain attention, whether to bring about an advantageous peace, or to effect a total subversion of empire, a movement towards his capital became absolutely necessary.

WHILST

WHILST the loss of Bangalore was fresh in his memory, the detestation which his haughty and imperious demeanour had occasioned amongst the neighbouring powers, must have pressed hard upon the Sultaun's mind. He could not be ignorant, that a combination in which all ranks and classes united, must have arisen from a conviction that his conduct had been considered in a light singularly enormous. He clearly perceived, that the Native Princes, the British Governor General, the managers for other European powers, their adherents, dependants and subjects of every description, were under the influence of one impression; that, in order to humble his pride, ties of interest, connection, and religion, gave away amongst individuals in various instances; nay, that all for a time fled comfort. He saw the examples of the several chiefs, spread like wildfire to the extremities of their dominions; in short, he had the most ample proof of the hatred towards him being universal amongst the neighbouring nations, and, so firmly rooted, that the several leaders however guided by prudence, found it difficult to restrain their subjects.

UNDER these embarrassments it was natural to suppose, that a movement towards his capital would induce the Sultaun, to avert the threatening storm by proportionate concessions, especially, as he must have known, that this capital was unequal to a defence against a force which had already captured a fortress of much greater strength, and, after being rendered still more formidable by the co-operation of powerful armies and reinforcements, now in readiness to join. But, the haughty Mysorean, bearing up against all these disadvantages,

was

was not as yet sufficiently humbled to become a supplicant or suitor.

AFTER burying the dead and providing hospitals for the sick and wounded, Bangalore, with a garrison consisting of his Majesty's 76th regiment, the 14th Bengal battalion, the 2d battalion of Volunteers, the 21st Coast battalion, with the exception of one Company, then under command of Lieutenant Munro, and two Companies of Bengal artillery, was, as already mentioned, given in charge to Colonel Patrick Duff, whilst the principal force continued its operations in the field. Amongst other advantages, the operations at Bangalore had encouraged a considerable body of horse detached from the army of his Highness Nizam Ally Cawn, to advance towards the British troops. At once to favor a junction with this reinforcement, and to benefit by a considerable supply of men, money, and provisions then in readiness at Amboor, the army set out in a direction first to the northward, but soon afterwards changing towards the east.

THE very first movement on this service, afforded a fresh proof of the Sultaun's inferiority in the field. As our army proceeded towards the intended ground of encampment, on the 28th March, a battalion of sepoys sent in advance, in order to secure forage, discovered the enemy at a very short distance. Conceiving this to be our advance-guard he immediately took the alarm, and, as usual on our approach, his nagger beat the signal for departure. In an instant his whole force was in motion. His rear was pursued and cannonaded by our troops in front; but, the reduced state of our cattle, the celerity

celerity with which he moved, and his dexterity in covering a retreat with large bodies of horse, which our cavalry were not adequate to oppose, protected his infantry and secured his guns, excepting one brass nine pounder, of which the carriage had given way. Here a quantity of ammunition, with a small but valuable supply of bullocks for slaughter, was also captured. That neither Commander had been acquainted with the movement of his antagonist on this occasion, until nearly in sight of each other, was evident throughout the march, which, from the very great fatigue, was the cause of a halt on the ensuing day. At this period, it was most probably the intention of Tippoo Sultaun, to throw his army in a situation, which by intimidating the detachment of Nizam Ally, would induce its leader to fall back.

CONTINUING our route to the northward, Deonelly, famous from having given birth to Hyder Ally Cawn in the year 1728, was our next ground of encampment. On the strength and decoration of this small fort, the Sultaun appeared to spare neither pains nor expence; European workmen thickened the walls all around with hewn stone, and materials of the very best kind; bastions and cavaliers defended each angle; a magazine constructed with judgement was finished in a superior stile; and a gateway, of which the foundation only had been laid, promised to render the place respectable. As a very large Pettah, surrounded by a mud wall, had been built at a short distance, it is probable, that in order to procure an esplanade, the destruction of the old one was intended. Still, as

Deonelly is commanded by several adjacent grounds, it will never be able to hold out against a regular force. Here a reasonable supply of forage induced the general to halt for a day.

CHINABALABORAM was on the 1st of April (1) found in a state of repair, nearly similar to Deonelly; but being nowhere commanded, the situation is preferable in a military point of view. It is surrounded with a good faussebraye, a deep ditch, a covertway, and a glacis; which as it is raised much higher than those hitherto seen in Mysore, the wall is under better cover from breaching. Four angular bastions and cavaliers were entirely finished, but the rest of the works were very incomplete. This fort was put in possession of some friendly Polligars; the enemy, however, having suddenly turned about, retook it by escalade, and put the whole of the party to the sword.

PROCEEDING from thence to the eastward by easy marches, after repeated contradictory accounts of their movements, a junction with the Nizam's detachment was effected on the 13th at Cottapilly (2). This reinforcement, which consisted of about fifteen thousand fighting men, all on horseback, set order and discipline at defiance. It was commanded by Tedgewunt Sing, a Hindoo, nowise dignified in appearance; without respectability amongst his countrymen; without experience in warfare; and, of principles at the best doubtful.

					Miles.	Furlongs.
(1)	1791, March 28th,	Teronchy,	—	—	15	0
	30th,	Deonelly,	—	—	10	0
	April 1st,	Chinabalaboram,	—	—	14	0
(2)	April 5th,	Sillgottah,	—	—	9	4
	6th,	Chintomeny,	—	—	14	0
	11th,	Trambipetty,	—	—	10	2
	12th,	Cottapilly,	—	—	11	4

Armed

Armed with swords, spears, pikes, matchlocks, bows and arrows, with implements of destruction from every nation, their very appearance forbade the expectation of benefit or regularity. Each was prepared to fight, according as his fancy or judgement dictated. One clad the right arm up to the elbow in steel; another with both exposed had for defence a massy breast-plate; some trusted their safety to shields and bucklers; others were covered over with complete coats of mail; some wore regular helmets of solid metal; many had casques with trappings, to secure the neck and shoulders: besides these, there were several who without aught for defence, were armed with loaded rockets. Each moved as if himself had been sole commander. In short, scampering in every direction, they appeared like mountebanks tilting their weapons in the air, as at a joust or tournament, and not like a regular force, seeking redress of wrongs. From a people of this description, and under such a leader, but little could in reason, be expected. Yet, there were a few, who, on the principle which sometimes gives the day to an unskilful gladiator, forbode advantage even from their irregularities. But, as in every instance they proved inferior to the enemy, their assistance fell miserably short of the most moderate hopes. Of this motley groupe, about two thousand were attached to the reserve, and put under the immediate direction of Brigade Major Dallas, to whom, without any advantage whatsoever, they proved the source of much trouble and vexation. Lieutenant Stewart, of the Bengal establishment, assistant to Sir John Kennaway, accompanied this detachment of Nizam Ally.

AFTER

AFTER a saluté of seventeen guns, and a compliment from the line under arms to the Nizam's general, the whole proceeded to Venkitaghery, and were there (1) joined by Lieutenant Colonel Oldham, having under his command about four hundred and fifty Bengal cavalry, seven hundred European infantry, and nearly four thousand sepoy. With this reinforcement there was a large supply of provisions, which had been principally collected by Captain Alexander Read; an officer, whose indefatigable exertions have been pointedly acknowledged by his superiors on repeated occasions. But from the villainy of the native drivers, or some other cause, to ascertain which, a court of enquiry assembled, upwards of thirteen hundred bullocks, laden with grain, were captured by looties whilst on their way to join. Colonel Martin, of Bengal, a gentleman advanced in years, high in respectability and fortune, served as volunteer with Earl Cornwallis from this period; Lieutenant Colonel Ross, of the Madras engineers, Messrs. Hoare and Kingscot, with some others of less note, here also joined the army.

STRENGTHENED with men, money and provisions, the British force directed its route towards Bangalore, on the 22d of the month. This movement was productive of little worthy to be recorded. Small detachments from the enemy's horse, hovered on our skirts, whether encamped or in motion; but they did no mischief besides cutting down a few native camp-colourmen. On all occasions they

						Miles.	Furlongs.
(1) April	14th,	Hoodally,	—	—	—	11	4
	15th,	Moodianoor,	—	—	—	11	4
	17th,	Agani,	—	—	—	14	0
	18th,	Venkitaghery,	—	—	—	8	0

studiously

studiously displayed their contempt of our Hyderabad allies. Throughout this country, villages depopulated, gardens unprotected by fences, houses burnt down to the ground, whole fields of unripe corn torn away by the roots, trees not only robbed of their fruit, but stripped of their very branches, nay, the whole creation piteously bemoaning the desolations of war, engraved the ruinous scene on the contemplative mind, and stamped the remembrance of its horrid effects in the most lasting characters. But not to dwell on this dreary prospect, after a march of seven days from Venkitaghery, and an absence of just one month from our late valuable acquisitions, the whole arrived on the 28th, in the neighbourhood of Bangalore (2).

AT this stage of the war, however, in order to give a just idea of the calamitous state to which the affairs of Tippoo Sultaun had been reduced, and of the shocks that threatened to burst his empire asunder, it will be necessary to cast a retrospective eye towards the operations carried on by the other branches of the confederacy, before the description of any movement against Seringapatam is attempted. In the prosecution of this design, the arrangement which appears best adapted for elucidation, is, to trace the military operations, just as they were carried on by the several powers in alliance, according

							Miles.	Furlongs.
(2) April	22d,	Mindapilly,	-	-	-	-	10	6
	23d,	Aytenpilly,	-	-	-	-	12	4
	24th,	Vakulairoo,	-	-	-	-	12	6
	26th,	Maloor,	-	-	-	-	12	0
	27th,	Dorootooroo,	-	-	-	-	10	4
	28th,	Agaram,	-	-	-	-	10	4

to the natural position of their respective dominions. Quitting therefore the exertions of Earl Cornwallis, agreeably to the plan proposed, the part which His Highness Nizam Ally Cawn took in the war, comes next under consideration.

FAR from a certainty of exactitude, with respect to the number of fighting men, that assembled on the plains of Hyderabad, towards the latter end of May 1790, even conjecture must be deemed dangerous. The desire of revenging the many insults offered to their Prince, and of recovering their ancient possessions, was so strong amongst the subjects of Nizam Ally, as that the whole face of the country was covered with men in arms, with elephants, camels, horses and military equipments of every description. This unwieldy mass, moving in a southerly direction, after crossing the Kistna, reached Rachore, and pitched their encampment in that neighbourhood, for a term of at least six weeks. From thence proceeding still towards the south, possession was taken of Vanoo, with various other barrier stations, which offered little or no resistance.

AFTER laying waste the whole country, and being strengthened according to agreement (1), by two battalions of Madras sepoy, under Major Montgomery of that establishment, with about sixty

(1) Establishment of a battalion of native infantry, according to the stipulation between the Right Honorable the Governor General, and His Highness the Nizam :

1 Captain,
 4 Lieutenants,
 4 Ensigns,
 1 Adjutant,
 1 Assistant Surgeon,
 8 Serjeants,
 8 Subadars,
 8 Jemmadars,
 32 Havildars,
 32 Naigues,
 8 Drummers,
 2 Fifiers,
 1 Black Doctor,
 8 Puckallies,
 800 Sepoys,
 40 Recruits,
 1 Head Concooly,
 1 Assistant ditto,

European artillery-men, under Captain Tutt, the grand army of Nizam Ally fat down before Capool, on the 28th of October, 1790. This high rock, although scarcely accessible from nature, is surrounded at the summit with a strong wall, within which, several barracks and magazines are constructed. A lofty cavalier, which stands in the centre of this enclosure, overlooks the other works, and commands all around; in every other part where the steepness will admit of it, batteries and other defences are erected; and the lower walls, which are built with hard blue stone and chunam, have bastions and out works, with a deep ditch. The Pettah was soon taken possession of, and in less than six days, the siege was turned into a blockade. One battery of six twenty-four-pounders, opened on the north face of the fort, and immediately after, another which had four guns of the same calibre, played on the opposite side. Several skirmishing parties, and sallies, too tedious to detail, were constantly opposed with success by Monsieur Remon, an enterprising Frenchman, in the employ of the Subah; the cannonade although it had not effected a complete breach, appeared to have made considerable impression upon the wall; but such had been the unserviceable state of the guns, that in one week, all were completely disabled, by their own fire alone. The probability of this dangerous event, although pointed out at an early period (2), had not been attended:

(2) As the instructions given to the officer at the head of the detachment sent to Nizam Ally, would occupy more room than the nature of this volume could conveniently spare, it is conceived the following extract may prove satisfactory to the reader:—"Major General Medows, is highly pleased with the readiness expressed on your part, at the meeting with Meer Abdul Cossim, to comply in every respect, to the utmost of your power, with the wishes of His Highness the Nizam; and recommends strongly your continuing this line of conduct."

tended to by Məhomed Jung, an unexperienced Muffelman, who then held the supreme command. From various concurrent testimonies, this man's obstinacy, which could only be equalled by his ignorance, prevented all possibility of convincing him that his opinions were erroneous. Under these circumstances, it became necessary to draw a supply of cannon from Rachore and Pangul, at the latter of which stations, His Highness had determined to await the return of his army.

From the difficulties attendant on a fresh equipment, it was the middle of January before the new guns were ready to open; but as the battery on which they were chiefly planted, was erected within three hundred yards of the fort on the western face, a breach of twenty-seven feet in width, was effected; still a steep rock of considerable height rendered all access to the wall in this quarter extremely difficult. The cannonade was incessant, until a flag hung out in the beginning of April, discovered a disposition to surrender (1). On the 18th, the place was given up by treaty, and about a week afterwards, the example was followed by Bahauder Bunder, a strong rock, at the distance of about three miles. In these forts

near

“ He is highly sensible that many difficulties may occur, in the course of the service in which you are employed, in co-operating with the general, appointed by the Nizam, to conduct the expedition. On this subject, the Commander in Chief trusts much to your judgement and discretion; and that as the command of the expeditions, will unavoidably be placed in the Nizam's officer, you will pay the necessary attention to the execution of every plan of operation he may finally determine upon. Captain Kennaway intimates, that the Nizam's officer will be directed to consult you, on whatever is proposed to be undertaken; and the General directs me to express his earnest hope, that you will in every respect, as far as possible, conduct the public service, in the best, and most conciliating manner; so as not only to prevent complaint, but to ensure success.” Adjutant General, to Major Montgomerie, the 2d of July, 1790.

(1) The fall of Capool was as already noticed, one of the salutary consequences which resulted from the capture of Bangalore, and not from the operations of the troops, by whom it was invested. The discretionary powers given to Lieutenant Colonel Cockerel, whilst the Bengal detachment was on its way to the southward, must lead the reader to believe, that considerable expectations had been founded on the exertions of our Hyderabad allies at the beginning; however, as no requisition for troops, beyond the two battalions already mentioned, appears

near three thousand fighting men surrendered to the army of His Highness, and upwards of fifty pieces of cannon, with a considerable quantity of provisions fell to the captors.

LEAVING Rachore to the left, this force moved on the 1st of May, 1791, towards Cuddapah. When they had advanced as far as Canool, after a halt of one week in that neighbourhood, news which confirmed the surrender of Gunjecotta to Haffez Jee, an officer of merit and enterprize, was brought in from different directions. The main force now proceeded towards their late acquisitions, and forming a junction with the successful division at Gunjecotta towards the end of June, the whole halted for the space of one month. Proceeding again to the southward, and leaving Cuddapah, which had now been given up, on the left, after a march of six weeks, Gururumconda was besieged on the 15th of September.

HERE, as on a former occasion at Capool, the guns soon became unserviceable. However, this deficiency was remedied by a supply of two eighteen-pounders, under Lieutenant Ruffel, of the Madras

appears to have been made from that court, it is reasonable to suppose, that Nizam Ally had determined at an early period not to attempt any hazardous enterprize, but contenting himself with retaking those districts which had been lately wrested out of his possession by Tippoo Suldaun and his father, to await the result of our operations, as observed at the close of the first volume. A letter from the Adjutant General to Colonel Cockerel, runs thus: "In answer to the part of your letter, that states the discretionary power granted by Earl Cornwallis to join the forces of his Highness the Nizam, in case they had crossed the Kistna into the northern countries of the Mysore chief, under the possibility that his Highness had placed a reliance on being supported with a part or the whole of the detachment under your command, I am directed to signify as follows from the Commander in Chief: That as Earl Cornwallis authorized you to halt the detachment eventually, and communicate with Colonel Kelly, commanding the troops in the centre division, and with Captain Kennaway, the public Minister at the Nizam's court, and to act conformable to the orders and communications you might receive in consequence, that therefore your conduct ought to be guided by such communications and orders, to the extent prescribed by his Lordship. But I am directed to signify at the same time, that Major General Medows is of opinion, it will meet with the approbation of Earl Cornwallis, considering the advanced situation to the southward of your detachment, before this letter can reach you, if you do not join the Nizam without positive orders from his Lordship, from the Commander in Chief on the Coast, or from the Council of Fort St. George. I am also directed to signify from Major General Medows, his decided opinion, that your detachment ought not to be divided in the event of your receiving orders to join the Nizam."

establishment, which had been employed in the reduction of Nundydroog; these, together with two twenty-six pounders, and large quantities of ammunition sent by order of Earl Cornwallis from Bangalore, arriving in charge of Lieutenant Macgregor of Bengal, with a detachment of sepoys, gave additional vigor to the operations against Gurrumconda.

TOWARDS the beginning of November, the batteries opened afresh; and on the 6th of that month, a practicable breach was effected. About nine o'clock at night, the besiegers advanced to the storm; twelve Europeans under Mr. Nixon, a conductor of stores, composed the forlorn hope; these, supported by all the artillery, grenadiers, and six companies of sepoys under the direction of Captain Andrew Read, got possession of the lower fort, but not without much resistance and loss of blood. Two Killedars, with about three hundred of the defendants are said to have fallen in the breach. Of the Madras troops upwards of thirty were killed and wounded; amongst the latter, Lieutenant Hall of that establishment was numbered. At this place a number of sepoys of the Company's service, together with several hircarras in the employ of Earl Cornwallis, and Sir John Kennaway, were released; all of them had been detained in heavy irons.

ALTHOUGH the besiegers had thus become masters of the works around the bottom of the hill, the upper fort still continued in possession of the enemy. Strong by nature, this fort was now strengthened.

strengthened by all who saved their lives in the storm of the lower wall; it was accessible only by one confined passage, which had been defended by nine gates of the best construction; and was not, therefore, to be taken without much loss of time. The prosecution of the siege was consequently given in charge to Haffez Jee, with about five thousand fighting men, of which number nine hundred were mounted; but the principal force, which had now been joined by about twenty-five thousand fighting men, under the Prince Secunder Jaw, attended by Meer Allum, and Sir John Kennaway, moved towards the Padnagdirgum pass, in order to strengthen a convoy then on its way to the grand army, with Lieutenant Colonel Floyd.

As this force proceeded, information received on the 22d left no room to doubt, that Gurrumconda had been retaken about the 20th of the month. Led by Hyder Sahib, one of the Sultaun's illegitimate sons, about ten thousand fighting men, chiefly on horseback, advanced to attack Haffez Jee. In order to save some Vakeels that imprudently resided without the works, and to do away the disadvantage of fighting between two fires, this resolute warrior determined to advance on the enemy, at the head of his horse. Of his first onset nothing could withstand the shock; but overcome by superiority of numbers, he fell under a multitude of blows, and with him the greatest part of his detachment were cut to pieces. Under the young Prince of Canool, supported by Rajah Joute Sing, the combat, however unequal, was for a time fiercely maintained; but,
overpowered

overpowered by a multitude, after the Rajah had been severely wounded, the Prince yielded to his untoward fate and reluctantly gave way. He, however, managed his retreat with such dexterity, that he protected his wounded friend, and got possession of Muddawier, a small fort which he maintained until he found an opportunity of joining Secunder Jaw, on the 24th of the month. Such a preference of a chance of protection from within to the fortunes of the field, communicated a fatal panick to the whole of the defendants. The enemy pressing in close pursuit, entered the works along with the fugitives; the garrison of the upper fort sallied at the same instant; and, as the attack thickened from all sides, the route was general and compleat. At the head of the infantry, whilst attempting to encourage them, the Rajah Paparow, and his brother were amongst the first that fell; in short, but few escaped this bloody massacre, and these owe their existence to dexterity in feigning the appearance of death. Here a considerable quantity of treasure, with a large supply of provision and stores fell to the captors.

CONTENTED for the present with this instance of fortune's favour, Hyder Sahib returned towards his father, and having taken the family of Cummer ul Deen out of the upper fort, he left a reinforcement of men and provisions in Gurrumconda. But this strong hold was doomed to be the scene of further contention. On Christmas day, about the hour of ten, the Madras detachment still under Captain Read, supported by Secunder Jaw, again attacked the Mysorean garrison and soon became masters of the lower fort, without the loss

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of one man; indeed, it is said, there were none wounded. The enemy, however, suffered a little, although their retreat into the upper fort was very precipitate: they were pursued with much intrepidity to the very gates. During the attack, and for several days after, there was a constant discharge of cannon from the top of the hill; and several of those that fought under the unfortunate Haffez Jee, quitting their lurking places amidst the jungles, presented spectacles miserable to behold, all of them being deprived of some limb or other.

THE army of Nizam Ally Cawn advancing to the southward, left the lower fort of Gurrumconda, with a force much superior to that which had been lately cut off, in charge of Affed Ally, and took a final departure about the middle of January 1792. As the British forces were at that time employed in the reduction of several Droogs that rise amongst the jungles, between Bangalore and Seringapatam, it was recommended to the Prince by Earl Cornwallis, to advance but slowly with his army, as it would be impossible for so large a force to approach within several miles of the ground upon which the British troops were obliged to encamp; therefore, after halting for some days in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, the Hyderabad forces proceeded by easy marches, and formed a junction with the grand army towards the latter end of the month.

A DEGREE of caution that may be said to have bordered on fear, marked all efforts made by a considerable force from the Marratta states, which was employed in the districts between the Kistna and

Tumbudra rivers, throughout the first stage of the Mysorean war. The leader of this armament, conscious of inferiority, and conceiving that the British nation might, from want of success or some other cause, be forced into a separate accommodation, dreaded offending the Sultaan beyond the probability of reconciliation. However numerous, the eastern Marratta division, trusting for protection more to the powers in alliance than to their own strength, they contented themselves with taking possession of Gudgenagur, and some other barrier stations, at the time their Hyderabad allies laid siege to Capool, Gunjettota, Cuddapa and Gurrumconda; but they resolved not to attempt any hazardous enterprize, unless supported by another branch of the confederacy; indeed it is well known that by themselves they effected nothing worthy of notice. The operations of the Marrattas who assembled under Purseram Bhow, were widely different; but as the insults to which this Prince had been subjected, roused him to powerful exertions, not less than the personal injuries he had sustained, it will be necessary to detail his exploits at greater length.

EARLY in the month of September 1790, after being joined by two battalions of Bombay sepoy, under Captain Little, agreeable to stipulation, about twenty thousand fighting men, headed by the Bhow in person, proceeded to besiege Darwar. As this force advanced, several inferior stations surrendered, without opposition; but a strong party that was posted in advance, in order to cover the fort, was not dislodged without considerable loss. In this action, which took place on the 21st October, four sepoy grenadier companies, and
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the eighth Bombay battalions, under Captain Macdonald, commenced the attack with great steadiness; and being well supported by the Marrattas, continued to advance on the enemy until they gave way. The fugitives quitted the field with much precipitation, and leaving their guns to the conquerors, they fled to Darwar for shelter. In this action the loss, which amounted in all to about one hundred and twenty killed and wounded, fell nearly equal on the Bombay and Marratta troops. Of the enemy upwards of two hundred were slain. Lieutenants Maxwell and Wynne, of Captain Little's detachment, were amongst the wounded.

DARWAR, garrisoned by seven thousand fighting men, was now closely invested, but without suffering any material injury for a considerable length of time. Against this strong hold, it was on the 13th of December that the first project of importance was attempted. Under Appa Sahib, son to Purferam Bhow, the Bombay battalions, assisted by a numerous Marratta force, assaulted the Pettah. They carried the lower works by escalade, and drove the enemy into the upper ones; but the division under Captain Little excepted, the whole, unable to depart from their wonted habits, betook to plunder.

THE garrison of the upper fort, taking advantage of this circumstance, sallied from different directions and drove the Marrattas in all quarters. The discipline of a few saved the whole from destruction. Emboldened by success, the Mysoreans dealt slaughter on every hand, and the utmost efforts of the Bombay troops was required to cover

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the retreat. His small body, however, contrived to carry off three of the Sultaun's guns. Captain Little was himself wounded; Lieutenant Forster, with about thirty sepoy, shared a similar fate. Amongst our slain, which amounted to about half that number, there was no man of rank; but the confusion in which the Mairattas attempted to escape, subjected them to a loss far more considerable, although it could never be exactly ascertained.

AFTER the besieging army had been strengthened by one regiment of Europeans, a battalion of sepoy, and a detachment of artillery and lascars from Bombay, under Lieutenant Colonel Frederick, Darwar was surrendered by capitulation, on the 4th April, 1791 (1). Reports generally believed say, that the articles of this capitulation were shamefully violated by the Bhow's troops. The terms of surrender were highly honourable to the Killedar, Budder ul Zemeen Cawn. With security for private property, he had the promise of a passport for his garrison, their fire arms, and public treasure to Simoga, a fort which the Sultaun held on the northern bank of the Tumbudra; but before they had advanced any distance, besides being forcibly stripped of their whole property, several lives are said to have been taken; and the venerable Killedar, although he escaped with life, suffered a number of severe wounds.

(1) "Last night official accounts arrived of the surrender of Darwar to Purferam Bhow, on the 4th instant. From what is reported of the capitulation, the conditions on the part of the Marattas are shameful. The enemy's garrison were allowed to pass out with all their fire-arms, ammunition, and several field pieces. All the public treasure, as well as private property, were to remain in the enemy's hands; and the whole to be conducted safe to Simoga, one of Tippoo's forts at some distance to the southward of the Tumbudra." Extract of a letter from an officer of Major Montgomery's detachment to a friend in Bengal, dated 7th April, 1791.

THE short period which elapsed between the fall of Darwar, and the junction of Purseram Bhow with Earl Cornwallis, was employed by the former in providing magazines, and securing a safe communication with his own country, by occupying a chain of posts that stretched in a direct line from the vicinity of Seringapatam to Darwar. But the failure of an expedition which soon afterwards took place against the enemy's capital, rendered it necessary to abandon this chain, as it led so far to the westward, for another, which stretching by Sera and Roydroog, could be maintained with much less chance of danger. However, as these circumstances will be more fully detailed in due time, the reader is conducted to an attempt at the fulfillment of a promise that was made in the first volume.

THE confidence which the appearance of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley's detachment in Travancore, so early as April 1790, afforded to the Ram Rajah and his subjects, was closely followed up by the most vigorous exertions of the British forces on both sides of the peninsula. The unbridled ambition of the Sultaun, by a premature attempt to commit an act of injustice in flagrant breach of the treaty of Mangalore, having given just cause for war during the period of a vigorous government, called forth the only power whose influence in India could forge shackles anywise capable of restraining that ambition.

HIS restless temper had no sooner consented to the treaty just mentioned, than he meditated an extension of conquest from his northern neighbours, which he soon carried into execution; consequently squabbles

and bickerings, in which he was generally successful, ensued between him and these powers for a period of nearly two years. The time that intervened between these troubles and the late war, he employed in preparation for the accomplishment of those latent schemes of conquest which have since been attempted against the King of Travancore, and which he well knew must ultimately have embroiled him with the allies of that prince. Whilst the Suldaun by the erection of fortresses out of number, daily acquired internal strength, he invigorated his whole system by principles of sound government, and by an economical management of resources to which those of any neighbouring power, if state exigencies are considered, bore no comparison. However bigotted to the tenets of the Koran, the vast number of Hindoo temples recently decorated throughout his dominions authorizes an assertion, that his enthusiasm gave way to his ambition, and that his zeal to propagate the Mussulman faith, did not occasion so many instances of barbarity, as his rage for conquest, and an innate cruel and revengeful disposition. Although parsimonious in a high degree, numbers of his confidential Hindoo servants, who during the war fell into our hands, acknowledged him a lenient and indulgent master; nor have we to boast of many instances where his people were induced by our flattering prospects of success, to throw off his yoke and shelter themselves under the benign influence of Christian rulers. On the contrary, with the exception of a very few districts, the inhabitants of Myfore have invariably laid waste their country. They destroyed their habitations, and flying in
every

every direction, they drove their cattle into the most hidden recesses, burning their grain, although famine must have been the inevitable consequence.

CHECKING the frauds of intermediate agents by severe and exemplary punishments, the Sultaun protected his ryuts, who were chiefly of the Hindoo religion, from the enormities of black collectors; and wherever it became necessary to hold out an ostensible reason for the inhuman cruelties which he frequently committed, the cloak of religion was always spread to sanctify the transaction. Although so parsimonious, that it was attended with the utmost difficulty to prevail upon him to discharge, with any degree of punctuality, the arrears due to his troops, yet their attachment to his cause, was such all along that they paid the most implicit obedience to his mandates in the worst of times.

IN all favorable situations, particularly contiguous to Bangalore; he was employed in erecting new forts with broad and deep ditches, with excellent covert ways and glacis, and flanked with strong bastions. As these were built of the best materials, under the direction of European workmen, they must have been intended as places of safety for the surrounding inhabitants, whilst the standing army should be occupied in the conquest of distant countries. Fortunately, however, he commenced his career at a period in itself too early, and rendered still more disadvantageous to his pursuits from the internal distractions that agitated the House of Bourbon. Besides, he could not possibly have expected, that any negotiation of our Governor General, could have united

united powers so discordant, as the several chiefs of the peninsula, for the overthrow of his House.

SENSIBLE of the part which Great Britain would take in the cause of her ally, and fearful of the consequences, it is said that in the last council of war which the Sultaun called before his attack of the Travancore lines, more than the majority of his confidential servants opposed the measure; but none so pointedly as his favorite Buckshee, a Hindoo, to whom he facetiously observed, that his was not the profession of arms; that although he sought his opinion, he was not obliged to abide by it; and, cautioning him to provide ample resources, he declared his intention to march with the light of the ensuing day. His progress in the prosecution of that design has been already detailed, and the recovering of about forty guns out of the Paniani river, by Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, clearly discovers the precipitate manner in which he for a time abandoned his trophies and prospects of conquest.

THE advance of Major General Medows into the Coimbatore district in April 1790, rendering it necessary for the Sultaun to withdraw from his intended invasion to the protection of his own dominions, the Bombay detachment remained in Travancore without being sent on any material exploit, until ordered in the ensuing September to relieve the Madras battalions which had been left in charge of Palligautcherry. Soon after this service was effected, trusting the security of our southern acquisitions to Major Cuppage, with two sepoy battalions, and a considerable body of troops from the Rajah of Travancore,

core, Colonel Hartley returned to the Malabar Coast. As he approached Callicut on the 10th December, information was brought into camp, that about fourteen thousand of the enemy were strongly posted in a jungle at the distance of about ten miles, and that they were under the command of Mohub Cawn with Hooffen Ally Cawn, then phufdar of those districts. At the head of His Majesty's 75th regiment, the 7th Bombay battalion, and one of native grenadiers, Colonel Hartley set out in quest of this enemy, who trusting to superiority of numbers, and the natural strength of their position, did not decline the engagement. However, after a warm conflict they were driven to a village, where they made a most obstinate defence; but compelled at length to give up this new post, they fled with precipitation to Trincalore fort.

HERE the grenadier sepoy's entering with the fugitives, Hooffen Ally Cawn was taken prisoner, but Mohub Cawn having put himself at the head of some horse, escaped by flight. A victory so complete, could not be in reason expected over such superiority of numbers, without loss of blood; yet our sufferings bore no proportion to the advantages gained, or to the length of the action. In Colonel Hartley's detachment, there was no man of rank slain; Captains Lawman and Blachford, with Lieutenants Powel and Stewart, were amongst the wounded. This brilliant victory, was followed by the immediate evacuation of Furrucabad, a new fort in the vicinity of Callicut.

ABOUT the time that Lieutenant Colonel Frederick advanced to the assistance of Purseram Bhow, Major General Abercromby, with His Majesty's 77th regiment, the 12th battalion of sepoys, and some artillery and lascars, proceeded to the Malabar Coast; on the arrival of this force at Tellicherry, early in December 1790, one and all of the native princes who had paid implicit obedience to the will of Tippoo Sultaun, ever since his accession to the Mysorean throne, made a ready and sincere declaration of allegiance to the British government. The reduction of Cannanore by that General, on the 16th of the month, which was soon succeeded by the surrender of Biliapatam, without loss of blood, left no part of the rich and fertile districts that stretch from the Decla to Travancore, under the sovereignty of the usurper's son. The approach of Colonel Hartley's detachment on the last day of the year, enabled the Governor of Bombay to prosecute the plan of operations, which he had at an early period concerted with Earl Cornwallis; and in order to forward a junction of our force at the enemy's capital, by the nearest route, nothing which industry, judgement, and zeal could effect, had been neglected throughout the several departments of our western army.

THE difficulties of equipment for weighty military operations from the Malabar Coast, are widely different from those that offer in Bengal and the Carnatic. The Nairs who in general spread along the western shores, do not submit to labour like the inhabitants of other countries, far less is that degree of condescension to be expected from

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the rich and ufurious Moplahs. The confined nature of Bombay forbids the expectation of an adequate proportion of camp-followers from that quarter, confequently our principal dependance refted on what fupplies could be procured from the Maratta ftates; but as that people have an unconquerable averfion to expeditions by fea, however well inclined to the public caufe, the infular fituation of our weftern prefidency, offered a formidable barrier to their exertions.

NOTWITHSTANDING thefe difadvantages, an army which confifted of His Majefty's 73d, 75th and 77th regiments, one Bombay regiment of Europeans, the 2d, 7th, 10th and 12th battalions of Bombay fepoys, the 14th battalion of Coaft fepoys, and two flank battalions, with a proportion of artillery lascars and pioneers, proceeded to the eaftward on the 22d February, 1791. From the moment that Earl Cornwallis affumed the fupreme command of the troops in the field, one uniform plan of approaching the enemy's capital by the neareft convenient route was laid down, and invariably adhered to by both armies. Whatever advantages might have been derived from diverfions or attempts to cut off the enemy's fupplies, fatal experience had taught us the danger of dividing troops, and of throwing them at a diftance from the main fcene of action. The Sultaan had now become too formidable to be fought in detail, and any good which could poffibly have arifen from traversing diftant countries, in order to cripple his refources, could in no fort balance the chance of injury to which detachments muft have been expofed, from the rapidity

dity of his evolutions, in consequence of so decided a superiority in cattle.

THE best and shortest road from the Malabar Coast to Seringapatam, is that which leads through the Coorga country. There is a safe conveyance by water from our several sea-ports, by the Keeway river as far as Iliacore. From thence to the top of the principal Ghaut, including the rise, is twenty-one miles, but from the ruggedness of the country, and closeness of the jungles, it is a journey which cannot well be performed with artillery in less than three days. To Periapatam from this summit, the distance is not short of thirty-six miles, the country is difficult to penetrate, and consequently cannot be passed over in a shorter period of time, than the other division of the pass. From Periapatam to Seringapatam, the distance is nearly the same as to the Ghaut, but the road is better beyond all comparison.

AFTER their communication with the Coast had been secured, with infinite labour the battering guns, field pieces and stores, were got up an immense range of mountains, which rising almost perpendicular, separates the ancient dominions of Myfore from the possessions of the Rajahs, who time immemorial have inhabited the Malabar Coast. By fixing tackles to large trees, that grow all over the face of this range, a service which otherwise appeared impracticable was considerably facilitated; but besides other difficulties which they had to encounter, the making a road for heavy guns through a forest of sixty miles, where the whole way is closely interwoven with thick jungles

jungles, or over soft paddy fields, is a strong proof of the indefatigable exertions of the army at large.

BESIDES the difficulties attendant on ascending at Poodicherum, and descending at Sedasier, this stupendous barrier, for a distance of about thirty miles, appears from nature to bid defiance to invasion. All the rivers that water the Malabar coast, and some of those that enrich the southern districts of the Carnatick, take their rise on these mountains, which although in general covered with almost impenetrable jungles, are here and there divided by vallies of extraordinary fertility. A tribe of the Hindoo religion called Coorgs, a people in their manners and appearance singular as the country itself, inhabits these wilds from the confines of Bedanore nearly to the southern extremity of the table land.

HABITUATED from an early period in life to hunt the deer, the hog, and the fox, as well as to guard against the assault of the elephant, the tyger and the bear, the principal boast of the Coorgs is in the dexterous management of their arms, yet they are by no means negligent with respect to the cultivation of their lands. From the height of the mountains that rise on all hands, the vallies are constantly watered by the breaking of clouds around their summits, so that the country, however wild in appearance, is a granary which peace and industry must render inexhaustible. Nor were the advantages, which might have been derived from these circumstances in the event of besieging Seringapatam as at first intended, suffered to pass in neglect. The western force continued for a time to collect a

stock of provisions in the Coorga country, which, if it became requisite, might easily be brought forward from thence, after a junction of the two armies; an employment than which none more useful could possibly attract their attention.

ALTHOUGH the equipments of our western force for the first campaign, were not so complete as those at the heads of departments could have wished, the exertions that effected so much, rather than any deficiency, raises admiration. The hardships attendant on want of conveyance, had already been severely felt at Bangalore; but whether a British army can at all traverse the plains of Hindostan, with stores and provisions adequate to momentuous military undertakings, without some dependance on assistance from local contingencies, is a matter which admits of much doubt; nor is it hazardous to affirm, that the wisdom and address of Earl Cornwallis, in conciliating the Brinjaries, and in securing their services by protection and liberal payments, contributed to our ultimate success, not less than the exertions of the several subordinate presidencies, his own superior policy and happy arrangement, or the extreme valour and rigid discipline of his troops. Without the aid of these industrious carriers, even the united force which Bengal, Madras, and Bombay had sent abroad, although it amounted in all to about forty battalions of infantry, and six regiments of horse, together with the myriads of our Poona and Hyderabad allies, would scarcely have enabled us to advance to Seringapatam, so as to sit down for the reduction of the place with any certainty of success.

UNTAMED as the elephants and tygers that inhabit the western barrier of the Mysorean dominions, the Coorgs spurning a foreign yoke, maintained perpetual hostilities with the House of Hyder, ever since his first attempt at their subjection. Repeatedly have they been reduced to fly their country, but never have been brought to acknowledge a master, who aimed not only at the conversion of their principles, but at the extirpation of their race. Their present Prince, whilst a captive at Seringapatam, after being compelled to endure the painful rituals of the crescent, found means to make his escape; but the disgrace to which he had been necessitated to submit, rivetted his mind to just revenge.

SENSIBLE of the advantages which his assistance must have afforded, the Sultaun at an early period of this war, for the first time sought an alliance with the Chief of the Coorgs; and, in order to establish a friendship between them on a solid basis, he is said to have offered one of his daughters in marriage. Mercara, the capital of those wilds, had been for a length of time in the possession of the Mysorean Prince. It was closely invested by the Rajah at the time the British army passed through his dominions; but in the true spirit of chivalry, he with much profession of gratitude, refused assistance. On a prior occasion, in return for services rendered this Prince, during his captivity, by an officer who had been sent with a detachment to relieve Mercara, he not only suffered the whole party to escape, although completely in the power, but he permitted them to throw their succours into the place. However, to do away any unfavorable impression

impression to which a conduct of this nature might give rise, he explained his motives to the perfect satisfaction of General Abercromby. He stated, that this return for former kindneſſes could avail the Sul-taun nothing, for that it would contribute to leſſen his magazines of provision, without retarding the fall of Mercara many weeks; and in the metaphorical ſtile of his country, proteſted that he had but one heart, and that it was locked up in a ſtrong box, of which the key had been ſent to the King of England.

THE policy of Hyder in the eſta bliſhment of his houſe, was uniform throughout. Fomenting the quarrels of his neighbours, he conſtantly overthrew the ſtronger of the contending parties, by taking the weaker under his protection; and, whiſt ſo decided a ſuperiority enſured the deſtruction of the former, the latter became an eaſy prey to his ambition. It was thus that he ſeized, and for a time held, not only the country of the Coorgs, but Bedanore and all the diſtricts of the Nairs, even to the confines of Travancore. The barbarities that took place in quelling the ſubſequent inſurrections, particularly thoſe inflicted on the Coorgs, however ſhocking to humanity, only ſerved to heighten the diſcontents of that people and to whet their revenge: nor is the period diſtant, at which, after collecting the whole force of their nation, they fell ſuddenly and ſilently on a brigade of the Sul-taun's troops, then eſcorting a rich convoy from the Malabar Coaſt towards Seringapatam. The remains of this corps, unburied as our army paſſed the place, lay ſcattered all over the ſcene of action, and fully confirmed the truth of this relation.

OPPRESSED and weakened by repeated struggles to recover their rights, the whole force of the Coorgs at the commencement of this war amounted only to about five thousand fighting men. Desolated from repeated invasions, their neglected fields, sometimes, scarcely yielded a sufficiency for the maintenance of their cultivators; yet so sincere was the Rajah in his endeavours, and so punctual in the performance of his engagements, that considerable advantages were derived from his assistance; the first instance whereof, appeared in an early and valuable supply of bullocks. This piece of service was closely followed by the most spirited exertions to forward the transport of our equipments across his country. Unaffected in his manners, he cultivated the acquaintance of our officers, and as his heart was a stranger to guile, he was readily admitted to their society without distrust.

THE detention of the Coorga Rajah at Seringapatam, although it excited his indignation and justified his vengeance, was still attended with consequences that ultimately turned out highly advantageous to his interest. Compelled to abandon the prejudices of his education and religion at an early period, his mind was prepared to receive instruction from every channel of information, to which he could find access. Active, by nature, and desirous of intelligence the regularity of our shipping, attracted his particular attention on repeated visits; but it was on horse-back only, that he acknowledged the superior advantages, and consequently appeared in our dress. The attachment of the Coorgs to his person was heightened by his sufferings, and their

readiness to obey his commands, proved of the most essential benefit in passing through his dominions.

As the western army descended into the plains of Mysore at Sedasfer on the 15th of May, they distinctly heard a canonade in the direction of the enemy's capital: they encamped on the following day at a short distance from Periapatam, an extensive country fort, which had been dismantled and abandoned by its garrison; several bastions had been blown up, but an iron twelve-pounder, with its carriage and yokes complete, stood at the gate-way. Here, after throwing the 12th battalion into the place, in order to secure the general hospital and public stores, the encampment was changed to a strong ground on the southwest face, where they continued for some days, in perfect readiness for contributing to a speedy termination of the war. To a well regulated camp, and happy arrangement in the detail of duty, every thing necessary to good order and protection was added.

THE troops were divided into three brigades. The advance composed of the two flank battalions, with his Majesty's 73d and 75th regiments, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hartley. The 77th regiment, the 2d, 10th and 14th battalions of native infantry, under Colonel Balfour, formed the 1st brigade; and the Bombay regiment, with the 7th and 12th battalions of sepoy, were called the second. The whole encamped in one line on rising grounds, where the two brigades on the right were covered in front by a low swampy valley of considerable width, which was strengthened with jungles, and the other extending towards the fort, was completely protected

ted on the left by the 12th battalion. Beyond the swampy valley in front, there was an open dry height on which the piquets of the army were posted.

SECURED from insult by the strength of their position, and ready to act their part in whatever measures should be judged most advisable for bringing the war to a close, our western force awaited orders in this encampment. But as all their operations had a close reference to those of the other division, and as no just idea of their movements after this period can be conveyed, without previous acquaintance with the operations carried on by Earl Cornwallis, it will be necessary for the reader to return to the grand army, which has been left at Bangalore, from whence it was to proceed towards the enemy's capital.

A

S K E T C H

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

ALTHOUGH the havock amongst our cattle, from a scarcity of forage or sustenance of any kind during the operations at Bangalore, had been in some degree remedied by the supplies which Lieutenant Colonel Oldham had brought from the Carnatic, yet, the bullock department was in a state miserably inadequate to the transport of necessaries sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam. This deficiency rendering it requisite for Earl Cornwallis to call forth the exertions of individuals(1), public spirit, zeal in the cause of their coun-

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try,

(1) *G. O. April 25, 1791.* The Commander in Chief has experienced so perfect a readiness in the officers and soldiers of this army to undergo very great fatigues with the greatest cheerfulness, that he cannot for a moment doubt of a corresponding inclination to submit to any temporary inconvenience which may conduce to the success of the important object the army is now proceeding to attempt. The number of public cattle and carriage bullocks in particular, having from various causes diminished to a very alarming degree within these two last months, and there being very little reason to hope that the contractors can replace the deficiency with so much expedition as the present emergency requires, it is directed, that the commanding officers of the reserve, and of the right and left wing do separately assemble the commanding officers of brigades and regiments under their command, as soon as convenient, and from an inspection of the present state of corps, do allot for each regiment, in conjunction with the commanding officers of brigades, as small a proportion of camp equipage as possible. The commanding officers of artillery will make a similar arrangement in that corps; and the Commander in Chief is convinced that the commanding officers above-mentioned, the gentlemen at head quarters,

try, and personal attachment to the General, was displayed to a very conspicuous height. Even amongst our Nizamite allies, the example shewn by the British troops had so good an effect, that for a trifling reward their principal people afforded considerable assistance; but without any advantage whatsoever, and, with all the cheerfulness of men acting for the advancement of their own private fortunes, the very subalterns of the British army might be seen with from twenty to sixty cannon balls daily piled up at their tents (1), at a time when they laboured under every disadvantage that dearth of cattle, desertion of servants, and severe duty, could create.

BUT although many disheartening circumstances opposed the design, others that counterbalanced them pressed the General to attempt an attack on the enemy's capital at an early period (2). The propriety of bringing an expensive war to a speedy conclusion, various rumours of a rupture with the House of Bourbon, an expectation

quarters, and all other officers, and persons on the staff, will be disposed to give the utmost assistance, by reducing as much as the business of their station will allow, their own camp equipage on this occasion. Whatever camp equipage can by this means be dispensed with, is to be sent to Bangalore, whenever the army takes up its position near it; and the public cattle which can be spared in consequence, are to be sent, with their proportion of drivers, to the commissary of stores, as soon after as possible; but as this measure may still be insufficient to equip the army so amply as the Commander in Chief would wish, he hesitates not, on such emergency, to call forth the spontaneous exertions of all the officers of the army: trusting, that they will be prevailed upon to deposit, also, every article of superfluous private baggage they can possibly spare, in the garrison of Bangalore; and to apply whatever means of carriage they have in their power to command, to the service of the public, either by transferring, for the few days they can be required, their carts or cattle, to the commissary of stores, with the drivers of them; or, if more agreeable, by taking up from the park, such a number of loads as they can find conveyance for, retaining the charge and direction of their own cattle and servants, and using their most careful endeavours to return again to the park what they take charge of when the army arrives before Seringapatam. It is hoped the officers of the Bengal establishment, who have cattle for the carriage of their camp equipage or private property, will apply, in like manner, such proportion of them as may be in their power, to the service of the public.

(1) *G. O. 231b April, 1791.* Lord Cornwallis takes this public method of expressing the high sense he entertains of the zeal of the officers of this army, and of the troops in general, in their exertions to supply, to the utmost of their ability, the deficiency of carriage for public stores and provisions. His Lordship can only express to the officers his sense of their public spirit, at this time, by offering them his warmest thanks; and as he has likewise understood the Commanding officers of corps have an intention to prevail on many of their followers to carry shot to Seringapatam, he authorises them to offer a premium to every follower upon whose care they can place any dependance, in charge of shot intrusted to them, of one rupee and a half for every twenty-four pound shot, and one rupee for every eighteen that they return to the park on the arrival of the army at Seringapatam.

of deriving essential assistance from our allies, a certainty of the north east monsoon's near approach, and the probability of finding with General Abercrombie a supply of grain sufficient for the siege, superceded every other consideration, and with the candid and liberal will for ever justify the measure.

AFTER the utmost stretch of exertion, Earl Cornwallis found it impossible to move from Bangalore with provisions sufficient to last for more than twenty days, and that only for his fighting men; his Lordship, in order to facilitate the transport of food, issued as much grain as the soldiery could carry, without a charge on that account; and as liquors could not be procured at any price, officers were indulged with permission to draw from the public stores an allowance equal to what has always been granted to the privates (3). Through uncommon activity the train had been put in a state of complete repair, and drawn out on the esplanade, during the absence of the army; but, besides the number of cattle requisite to move our stores, ammunition, fifty-two field pieces already in camp, together with a few howitzers, bullocks sufficient for the draft of fifteen battering guns, could only be procured.

(2) *Earl Cornwallis to the Right Honourable W. W. Grenville, dated 21st of April, 1791.*— Our success at Bangalore has tended to establish, in the general opinion of the natives, the superiority of the British arms; and it has, in particular, made an impression on the minds of our allies, which I am persuaded will contribute to induce them to use vigorous exertions in prosecuting the war to an honourable conclusion. At present we can only look for the speedy accomplishment of that desirable object, by proceeding to attack the enemy's capital, which I clearly foresee will, from the near approach of the season of the periodical rains, and the danger of a scarcity of provisions and forage, for the large bodies of troops that are to be employed, be attended with so many difficulties, that upon any other occasion I should have thought it advisable to have deferred the attempt to the end of the ensuing monsoon. Having, however, been informed of the critical situation of political affairs in Europe, and being sensible that the finances of the Company require the adoption of those measures that are most likely to bring the contest to an early decision, I have thought it my duty to hazard the undertaking; and having received the strongest assurances of exertions from the chiefs of the Nizam's cavalry that are now with me; and the Marattas having also promised an hearty co-operation against the common enemy, I am encouraged to entertain sanguine hopes, that all obstacles will give way to our efforts, and that the enterprize will succeed.

(3) *G. O. May 1st, 1791.* As it may be convenient for many officers to draw a certain proportion of arack from the commissary of stores, when their own stock happens to be expended, the Commander in Chief authorises the commissary to comply with their indents, on their being countersigned by commanding officers of corps. The indents are only to be made in case of necessity; and when the necessity arises, they are to be given daily, and to the same amount as is drawn for the soldiers at the time. The payment to be made on receipt, at the established price, agreeable to the regulations.

THUS

THUS equipped, after being joined by the 76th regiment, the 14th Bengal battalion, and the second battalion of volunteers from Bangalore, the army, consisting of one regiment of European cavalry, five regiments of native cavalry, three battalions of artillery, seven regiments of European infantry, ten battalions of Coast sepoy, with seven battalions of sepoy from Bengal, and fourteen thousand irregular horse, marched on the 4th of May in a westerly direction, over a country which from the ruggedness of its surface, occasioned the loss of several carts and much baggage. In order to obstruct our advance, the direct road by Chinapatam, and Ramgherry, had been strengthened with redoubts and batteries, at this time occupied by the Suldaun's principal force. A movement to the northward, by Magree, and Bumanelli, besides thwarting the intention of an early junction with General Abercombie, as it would lead wide of the fords-supposed passable, below Seringapatam, was exceptionable from being threatened by Savandroog, Outradoog, Hooleadroog, and several other hill forts; it became therefore necessary to advance by Cankenelli, and Suldaunpet, a route which inclining to the southward, led through a valley so jungly and uneven, as to render it impossible to convey any adequate idea of the difficulties which the army had to encounter.

FOLLOWING the policy of his father, when attacked by a similar confederacy in 1767, Tippoo Suldaun now contrived to reduce to ashes, not only the villages in this direction, but every vestige of straw and forage above ground. From the roughness of the roads, heavy rains, and the low state to which they had been already reduced, the cattle exhausted in their yokes, fell down in hundreds; and

and notwithstanding the extent over which our army of necessity ranged, not one inhabitant could be found, to act as a guide, or to discover where the grain had been concealed; but it is difficult to determine, whether this must be attributed to inviolable attachment to their Prince, or to the activity of a party sent to drive away the villagers by his command. It is certain, however, that our pusillanimous allies, either under the influence of fear, or actuated by some detestable Asiatic chicanery, resisted all entreaties, and could not be prevailed on to face this enemy, although in a tenfold proportion as to numbers (1).

PRESSING onward, after passing Gopauldroog, one of the Sultaun's principal cities, for exercising his invention to inflict cruelties, with some other hill forts of less note, and leaving Cancanelly (2), and Sultaunpet (3) in the rear, the army quitted the jungles, and took possession of Mallavelly (4), a stone fort in which a considerable

(1) *Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, September 7th, 1791.*—It soon appeared, that only a small number of the enemy's irregular horde had been appointed to attend to that road; but by an extraordinary activity on their part, and a most unaccountable supineness and want of exertion on the part of the Nizam's cavalry, which neither my requisitions nor orders could overcome, we suffered some loss, both in baggage and followers, on the march; not only the villages were laid in ashes, but all the inhabitants of the country, on the whole of the road to Seringapatam, were also, with the most unrelenting barbarity, carried off, and more completely removed beyond our reach than could have been supposed to be practicable. Those severe measures of the enemy, and the inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a distance, frequently occasioned a scarcity in camp, both of forage for the cattle, and provision for the followers; and in a country of which no account or minute description has hitherto been published, or till now obtained by any European, I experienced the greatest inconvenience, in many shapes, by the removal of the inhabitants.

(2) Cancanelly, a small mud fort of no strength, is situated in a beautiful and fertile valley, which is narrowed by jungles and hills on each side, and watered by a constant and clear stream. In this fort there was a machine for boring muskets, with several anvils, forges, and other articles necessary for a foundry. As the army approached Cancanelly, the enemy's horde rocketed our rear guard; but our allies, instead of attacking, pushed to the front on all hands, and could not be prevailed upon to face about, until beyond the reach of danger.

(3) Sultaunpet is an extensive village situated in a fertile plain. The road to this place was by no means bad, yet the public cattle were so completely disabled, that notwithstanding great quantities of stores had been left behind, and several carts destroyed, the rear guard was not at its ground of encampment till nine at night. In passing a narrow defile the enemy was so daring as to render it necessary to unlimber some of the guns, and to fire several rounds of grape.

		Miles	Fur.
(4) May	3d.—Bafentiporam,	—	—
	4th.—Cagliagerry,	—	6
	5th.—Soominapelly,	—	—
	6th.—Cancanelly,	—	10
	7th.—Sultaunpet,	—	8
	10th.—Mallevelly,	—	15
			9

supply

supply of grain was found; yet, the quantity lost on the march rendered it necessary, at this period, to reduce the issue of rice (1) for the troops to one half the usual allowance. Here delightful plains all around, whilst they furnished a pleasant contrast to the closely interwoven thickets through which we had lately passed, afforded at the same time abundance of pasture for our half-famished cattle (2). This favourable change, together with a heavy fall of rain, occasioned a halt for one day, during which the Cauveri was examined at different fords, but found every where impassable.

As there was no place of strength near the capital to the northward, in which the heavy guns and stores could be lodged in security for a few days, with a moderate garrison, Earl Cornwallis was in hopes he might be able to ford the river, with the whole of his army, below Seringapatam, and to effect a junction with General Abercrombie before he should find it necessary to approach near to the ul-

(1) *G. O. May 10th, 1791.* — Lord Cornwallis having been informed, that large quantities of grain, of various kinds, which it is not in the enemy's power to destroy, can by a moderate degree of industry be discovered, or dug up, either in the villages, or in the fields adjoining to them, over the whole face of the country in which the army is now arrived, and being desirous to adopt a measure which will equally tend to facilitate the success of our future operations and to promote the private interest of the soldiers; he has on the one hand directed, that in future one half seer of rice, or in lieu of it one seer of paddy, shall be issued as the daily allowance to each European and native soldier; and on the other hand he has given orders, that no charge whatsoever shall be made to the natives, for the rice or paddy so delivered, and that an equivalent in money shall be paid to the Europeans, for the quantity of grain to which they are entitled by the regulations. Considerable magazines of grain will in general be applied to increase the public stock of provisions; but, except in such cases, for which particular orders will be given, Lord Cornwallis expressly prohibits either corps or individuals from posting guards, or giving the smallest interruption, either to the soldiers or followers, in carrying off the grain that they can find either by searching or digging in any places where they may think proper to use their industry, under the protection of the pickets or detachments of this army. This order is not to interfere with the general instructions which the quartermaster-general has received, to preserve the forage of all new encampments, as far as it may be possible for the public departments. It is to be considered, by the field officer of the day, as an object of his attention, to protect as many villages in the day time as he conveniently can, without exposing his posts to any material hazard. The provost-marshal is not to go on with the advanced guard, nor to confine any persons, on pretence of their going into villages, or searching houses, until further orders.

(2) *G. O. May 8th, 1791.* — Lord Cornwallis is highly pleased with the exertions of the troops in assisting the store-carts yesterday and the day before, and directs that working money shall be drawn for the companies sent for that duty on those days; as also working money for those days, for such detail of the rear guard as shall be certified by the commanding officer of the rear guard, to have exerted themselves to assist the carts.

timate object of the movement : to favour this intention, in the event of being able to cross, the fort of Mysore, from its situation, promised a convenient and secure place of arms, whilst a body of troops, lightly equipped, might approach the other division. However, from observation, and other intelligence, it soon appeared, that the bed of the Cauveri, for some distance below the capital, was so deep, rocky, and uneven, as to render the conveyance of heavy guns over it utterly impracticable; even the ford of Arickery (3), at which place the army arrived on the 13th, although reckoned by far the best, was after the most particular examination, reported impassable. But as the account which Lord Cornwallis has given of the transactions at this period, is so full, as to require neither elucidation nor comment, it is here subjoined, without any attempt at alteration. The language of his Lordship runs thus; “ After minutely re-examin-
 “ ing every person in the army, who was acquainted with the river, my
 “ expectations of being able to form an early junction with General
 “ Abercrombie rested solely on assurances, that the ford near the village
 “ of Catiambaddy, about eight or nine miles above Seringapatam, over
 “ which it was positively asserted that Hyder Alli had frequently pas-
 “ sed twelve pounders, and some heavier guns, would be found prac-
 “ ticable. In the mean time, however, I conceived, that Tippoo had
 “ furnished an opening which would enable me to force him to risk
 “ an action, and I resolved not to let slip so favourable an opportunity

(3) May 12th, — Candoorconda,	— — — — —	Miles.	For.
13th, — Arickery,	— — — — —	13	6
		10	—

“ to endeavour to obtain the reputation to our arms, which must necessarily result from a victory in the fight of his capital; and, in the event of my being able to cut off the greatest part of his army, to be prepared to follow up the advantage to the greatest extent that might be possible.

“ UPON my arrival on the ground which was marked for the encampment at Arickery, I saw a considerable body of the enemy at the distance of about six miles in our front, who were drawn up with their right to the river, and their left to a mountain of a very rugged and inaccessible appearance; but I considered them in no other light, at that time, than a large detachment, sent to observe our motions, without any design to wait for our approach.

“ My intention to pass the river at that place, if the ford could be rendered practicable, and the hopes that were at first held out, of the success of our working parties, occasioned my halting on the 14th, in the camp at Arickery; and I then obtained certain intelligence, that although only a small part of the enemy's forces could be seen from the ground in our possession, yet that Tippoo, with his whole army, had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his right covered by the Cauveri, and his left extended along the front of a high mountain, with a deep swampy ravine, the passage of which was defended by batteries running along the whole of his front, and that being encouraged by the advantages of this position, as well as those of the intermediate ground, which, by the river on one side, and a steep ridge of hills on the other, was narrowed

“rowed to a space nowhere between the two encampments exceed-
 “ing a mile and a half, and within cannon shot of his line not above
 “one mile in breadth, he had determined at a hazard of the event of
 “a battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer approach to his ca-
 “pital.

“IN consequence of this information, and from my having ascer-
 “tained, from the few people in camp, who had any knowledge of the
 “adjoining country, as well as from the observations of intelligent
 “persons who were employed for the purpose, that it was practicable
 “though difficult, to cross the ridge on our right, from the great
 “road on which we were encamped to a road which leads from Ce-
 “nepatam to Seringapatam, I resolved upon that knowledge, to at-
 “tempt, by a night march, to turn the enemy's left flank; and by
 “gaining his rear before day-light, to cut off the retreat of the main
 “body of his army to the island and fort of Seringapatam.

“ORDERS were accordingly given, with the utmost secrecy, to
 “the principal officers who were to be employed, that the 19th
 “dragoons, the three strongest of the native regiments of cavalry,
 “His Majesty's six regiments, and twelve battalions of native infan-
 “try, with field pieces only, should be in readiness to march at ele-
 “ven o'clock at night, leaving their piquets and camp guards be-
 “hind, and their tents standing; and Colonel Duff with those de-
 “tachments, and the remainder of the army, (except the Nizam's
 “horse, who were directed to follow me at day-light) was left in
 “charge of the encampment, provisions, stores, and heavy artillery.

“ WE had suffered greatly during the preceding week, by rains
 “ uncommonly frequent and heavy so early in the season; but un-
 “ luckily, on that particular night, we had for several hours the most
 “ violent thunder, lightning, and rain that I have seen in this part of
 “ India.

“ THE ground of our encampment having been intersected by
 “ some ruined villages and inclosures, and several deep ravines, much
 “ valuable time was lost before it was possible to form the troops in
 “ the order of march which was directed; and, owing to the heavy
 “ rain and excessive darkness of the night, I was obliged to halt so
 “ frequently after I had begun to move forward, either on account
 “ of many of the regiments losing at different times the line of march,
 “ or of the weakness of the gun bullocks, which were so jaded and
 “ exhausted by the severity of the storm, that I had only advanced a
 “ few miles when the day began to dawn.

“ ALL hopes were then at an end of being able to execute my
 “ original plan; but having accomplished the part of the march that
 “ had been described to me as the most difficult, and having the ut-
 “ most confidence in the valour and discipline of the King’s and Com-
 “ pany’s troops, I determined to persevere in endeavouring to force
 “ Tippoo to hazard an action on ground which I hoped would be less
 “ advantageous to him than that which he had chosen; with the ex-
 “ pectation that a complete victory might not only relieve many of
 “ our temporary distresses, but tend to bring the war to a very speed-
 “ dy conclusion.

“ THE

“ THE army, therefore, continued its march, and the movement
 “ had been so entirely unexpected by the enemy, that we had begun
 “ to descend the heights on the Eastward of the deep ravine that I
 “ have mentioned, and at the distance of four or five miles from the
 “ left of their camp, before they took the alarm.

“ AFTER some movements, the object of which could not for a
 “ short time be clearly ascertained, it appeared that Tippoo, not-
 “ withstanding that we were advancing by a route for which he was
 “ not prepared, did not decline to risk the event of a battle in a
 “ new position. He detached immediately from his main body a large
 “ corps of infantry and cavalry, with eight guns, to occupy the sum-
 “ mit of a rising ground about two miles from the extremity of his
 “ left, which terminates to the northward in an abrupt precipice in the
 “ middle of a plain; and though the ascent is broken by large rocks,
 “ some intermediate lesser heights rise gradually for about a mile and
 “ a half or two miles, from a valley that was in our front, and
 “ which continued to the Cauveri, and divided the ridge of hills
 “ that we had crossed during the night from another steep ridge,
 “ consisting principally of two large mountains (on a projecting point
 “ of the southernmost of which stands the Carigat pagoda) running
 “ nearly at right angles to the former, at the distance of about a mile
 “ and a half, and extending very near to the Cauveri, opposite the
 “ island of Seringapatam.

“ WHILST the corps was on its march, to possess itself of the sum-
 “ mit that I have mentioned, Tippoo was employed in changing the
 “ front of his army to the left, covering his left flank with the steep
 “ hill, which had been in his rear, and his right flank with the ravine
 “ which ran along his former front.

“ THE disposition on our side for action could only be made on
 “ the ascent of the heights, to the summit of which the enemy’s

“ detach-

“ detachment, was then moving, and from which it was absolutely
 “ necessary to dislodge it before I could attack their main body.

“ Our march was therefore continued in that direction across
 “ the valley, through which ran a continuation of the ravine, which
 “ covered the enemy’s right; but, owing to the depth of that ravine,
 “ the weak state of the gun bullocks, and the near approach of a large
 “ body of the enemy’s horse, that, though repulsed in several at-
 “ tempts, appeared to be prepared to take advantage of the least disor-
 “ der in any of our battalions, it was upwards of two hours after the
 “ passage of the head of the column, before the whole infantry could
 “ cross to the same side of the ravine with the enemy, and conse-
 “ quently before the disposition for action could be completed; and
 “ during that time we suffered some loss from the guns on the height,
 “ opposite to the head of the column, but were severely galled by a
 “ well-directed though distant fire from the artillery of the enemy’s
 “ main body, which had formed nearly parallel to the direction of our
 “ march.

“ UNDER these difficulties, and under the disadvantage of the
 “ want of all satisfactory local information beyond what could be
 “ seen, of the intended field of battle, and of the adjoining country,
 “ nine battalions were formed opposite to the enemy’s main body,
 “ in a first line, under the command of Major General Medows and
 “ Lieutenant Colonel Stuart; four battalions in a second line, un-
 “ der Lieutenant Colonel Harris; and five under Lieutenant Colo-
 “ nel Maxwell were destined for the attack of the enemy’s corps on
 “ the summit of the hill upon our right: This attack had been un-
 “ avoidably postponed until the other parts of the disposition could

“ be made, and by that means Tippoo should be effectually awed,
 “ and prevented from making any attempt on the flank or rear of
 “ those troops, whilst they were moving forward to drive his detach-
 “ ment from their post. Our own cavalry, and the Nizam’s horse,
 “ were left out of the reach of the cannonade on the descent of the
 “ rising ground on the opposite side of the ravine, in readiness to
 “ take advantage of any confusion they might observe in the enemy’s
 “ army; and orders were given to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell;
 “ after succeeding in his attack, to leave only a sufficient force to
 “ retain possession of the summit of the hill, and to advance imme-
 “ diately with the remainder of his corps, and endeavour to possess
 “ himself of the mountains which covered the left flank of the main
 “ army of the enemy.

“ A ROCKY height afforded considerable protection to the troops
 “ from the enfilade from the hill on our right, during the time that
 “ was necessarily employed in making the disposition, and forming
 “ the lines; which being accomplished, I began the action, by or-
 “ dering Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell’s corps to attack the hill on our
 “ right, and upon observing that he had without much loss or diffi-
 “ culty, completely succeeded, I moved forward with the main body
 “ of the army, and the action soon became general along the
 “ whole front.

“ THE enemy’s cavalry that had harrassed us, and frequently at-
 “ tempted to break in upon the infantry, whilst the column was
 “ passing the ravine, made no stand after we were prepared to advance.
 “ Part of it retreating to the westward of the ridge on which the Ca-
 “ rigat pagoda stands, with the infantry that had been driven from

“ the

“ the hill by Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, and the remainder falling
“ into the rear of the main army. Their infantry on this occasion
“ shewed a much better countenance than usual, which perhaps
“ may be principally attributed to Tippoo’s own presence and exer-
“ tions amongst them ; but, in a short time, they began to waver,
“ and soon after, upon the cavalry moving towards their right, and
“ three battalions of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell’s corps advancing
“ rapidly to gain the heights on their left, they entirely gave way.

“ AT this moment our own cavalry made a gallant charge ; but,
“ after dispersing and almost destroying a small body of infantry that
“ made a very determined resistance, were soon obliged to fall back,
“ from a more considerable body of infantry, that had rallied and made
“ a stand on a space of broken rocky ground, extremely disadvantage-
“ ous for cavalry ; and at the moment of their retreat, and whilst
“ the whole of our first line was impeded by it, the Nizam’s horse
“ who had followed Colonel Floyd across the ravine, with very
“ good intentions, but very injudiciously, threw themselves in an un-
“ wieldy mass, into the front of our left wing, on a piece of ground
“ so rugged and rocky, as well as so near to the enemy’s batteries
“ on the island of Seringapatam, that they could not act with effica-
“ cy in front, and continued to prevent our line of infantry from
“ advancing ; by which means an invaluable though short space of
“ time was lost, which enabled the enemy to avail themselves of the
“ vicinity of the batteries upon the island, and, by retreating to their
“ protection in the utmost confusion, to save their army from
“ entire destruction.

“ FATIGUED

“ FATIGUED and exhausted as the troops were by the badness
 “ of the night, the tediousness of the march, and by their long and
 “ extraordinary exertions during an excessive hot day; and covered
 “ as the beaten enemy were by the works on the island, and by the
 “ guns of the fort, nothing more could then be attempted: and the
 “ army accordingly, after the arrival of the tents from Arickery, en-
 “ camped just beyond the reach of the cannon on the island, and
 “ nearly on the ground upon which the action had terminated.

“ THREE of the enemy’s guns were taken, on the hill that was
 “ attacked by the corps under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
 “ Maxwell, and one gun, with a great number of standards and co-
 “ lours, were taken from their main body. Their loss in men was
 “ very considerable, but the number could not be ascertained (1). ”

THAT the enemy should have made a better stand in this action than on any former occasion, cannot be wondered at when the extraordinary advantages of their position are considered. Superior in numbers, and individually valorous, they could not have been driven from hills, rocks, and ravines, such as they occupied, but by the uniform exertions of troops linked together in strict discipline, and holding the most implicit confidence as well in their leader as in one another. Although a total defeat within the range of cannon mounted on the outworks of his capital must have made a deep impression, not only on the Sultaun, but on the minds of all the troops whom he

(1) *G. O. May 16, 1791.* — Lord Cornwallis congratulates the army on the signal victory which was obtained yesterday over an enemy who for the first time since the commencement of this war, came to a resolution to try his fortune in a general action. The movements of the enemy, and the dispositions which became necessary on our side, in consequence of them, afforded opportunities to all the officers and soldiers of the army to manifest at different periods alacrity and firmness either in immediate action, or in sustaining the heavy cannonade to which they were for some time exposed, that did honour to their courage and discipline. On an occasion where the behaviour of all has so eminently been distinguished, His Lordship offers the tribute of his private thanks to the whole army in general, and requests that both officers and soldiers may be assured, that he is truly sensible of what he owes to their uncommon spirit and zeal for the public service since he had the honour to command the army. For a Return of killed and wounded, see the 1st Vol.—Appendix, No: 21, Art: B.

head-

headed, yet, notwithstanding the victory was so complete, the penetration and judgment by which it was acquired, pointed to the propriety of resting satisfied with the advantages already obtained; and of abandoning all flattering hopes from an attack on Seringapatam, until the attempt became less liable to failure. From the sufferings of a well-fought day, after a night so uncommonly severe, it became advisable to desist from action or pursuit until refreshed from fatigue, and strengthened by the additional force then at Periapatam; and in order to secure in quietness the ground on which the battle had been fought, Major Frazer with his own regiment was directed to carry a post which the enemy still occupied, on the summit of the highest hill. This service was effected, and the camp equipage having arrived in the night, the troops rested until the 18th of the month. During our encampment on this memorable ground, the pioneers were employed in burying the slain, whilst the wounded were treated with every possible attention.

FROM the field of battle two marches brought the army to Caniambaddy: but, notwithstanding the pressure for time, the miserable state of the cattle rendered a halt for one intervening day absolutely indispensable. The whole country, where rocks and stones had not been removed, was from an incessant deluge of rain so soft, that the wheels of the carriages sunk down to the axles; consequently large detachments of fighting men were necessitated to pull at the traces; but although they performed services to which bullocks in their best state must have been very unequal, some of the heavy guns, disunited, from the nature of the country, still remained at a considerable distance in the rear. Advancing slowly, from these circumstances, the troops in front alarmed an extensive encampment, which

which had been pitched close to the ford at Caniambaddy, on each side of the river. To take advantage of this discovery, the advance, strengthened by a brigade of sepoy's under Colonel Cockerell, immediately pushed forward; the expedition, however, with which the Mysoreans decamped, although it occasioned considerable loss in crossing the river, left nothing to their enemies besides a few bullocks loaded with grain. Towards nine at night, after the most severe fatigue, the rear guard reached the intended ground of encampment (1). It was not until now that we felt in full force the bad effect of the unavoidable delay which the reduction of Bangalore, and our subsequent junction with the Nizamites, had of necessity occasioned. In truth, at this period, but little was known relative to the changes of the weather in that country.

HERE, amongst other causes, the lateness of our arrival, the severity of the monsoon, the deficiency of provisions, and the very extraordinary inactivity of our allies, discovered the futility of attempting the siege of Seringapatam; until a more favourable season, fresh equipments, and an addition of strength, should afford better prospects of success. "It was not, however," says Lord Cornwallis, "till after
 " I had received the reports from the different departments on the
 " following morning, of the general wretched condition of the pub-
 " lick cattle of the army, that I saw the impossibility of moving the
 " heavy guns and stores from the spot where they then were;
 " and that it became necessary for me to decide on relinquishing
 " entirely the prosecution of the plan for the campaign, in which

					Miles,	Fur.
(1) May 15.	North East of Seringapatam,	—	—	—	6	—
18.	Five miles North of Seringapatam,	—	—	—	9	—
20.	Caniambaddy,	—	—	—	11	—

Y

“ General

“ General Abercromby had been instructed to co-operate. I then
 “ lost no time in communicating my determination to General
 “ Abercromby, who had advanced as far as Periapatam; and direct-
 “ ed him, after descending the ghauts, with the troops under his com-
 “ mand, to put them into cantonments on the coast of Malabar du-
 “ ring the rains, and until the proper season should return, for re-
 “ commencing our operations.”

THUS necessitated to abandon the enterprize, orders were issued on the 22d of the month, to burst three twenty-four and eight eighteen-pounders, to bury and destroy all military stores for which conveyance could not be procured, and to distribute the whole of the public grain amongst the troops. Two brigades sent across the river on the 24th, in order to intimidate a large body of the enemy then on its march to the westward, from any attempt against the Bombay army, having been re-called, Earl Cornwallis moved from Caniambaddy on the 26th, in the direction of Bangalore; but as the designs of General Abercromby, from their immediate connection with the plans of Earl Cornwallis, had undergone a total alteration at this period, it will be necessary to detail the effect which a change of measures at head quarters had on the operations at Periapatam, before any description of our return to the eastward is attempted.

WHILST the western army remained above the ghauts, a total want of horse, the cautious conduct of the Sultaun, and the naked situation of the country, however discretionary his powers, left no opening for General Abercromby, either to distress the enemy, or to add to his own fame. The body of Mysorean cavalry which had been seen on the 23d, from Caniambaddy, nowise affected by the move-

ment

ment of Colonel Stuart across the river, approached on the evening of that day to the skirts of the encampment at Periapatam. As this was the first appearance of the Mysoreans before the Bombay troops, the cattle of that army grazed until then without molestation; and as the native drivers, who are never on their guard until they have experienced danger, suffered considerable numbers of them to wander at a distance, notwithstanding the most positive injunctions to the contrary, some were unavoidably captured.

THE encampment of the enemy having been seen at no great distance, towards evening, in order to prevent further loss, it was determined to attack this force at break of the ensuing day; but the arrival of a messenger from Earl Cornwallis about sun-set left the General no longer at liberty to pursue any active measures, except such as in his opinion appeared necessary for conducting his troops to the coast. At an immediate consultation of the principal officers, it was judged adviseable not to advance on the enemy, but to fall back about the hour of eleven. Instructions to that effect were consequently communicated to the heads of departments without a moment's loss of time. The tents were ordered to be struck; the baggage master, directed to assemble his people about nine o'clock, on the main road which led to the ghaut, was commanded to proceed with all possible dispatch; and the surgeon-general, in particular, after being furnished with cattle to supply the deficiency of doolies, had, with the earliest notice of the intended movement, strict cautions regarding a timely removal of the sick.

ALTHOUGH

ALTHOUGH the monsoon does not in general set in with full force at this season of the year, still, towards the middle of May, heavy rains occasionally fall all over the Malabar coast. Hitherto the weather, in this quarter, had been clear and open; unfortunately, however, on this night it rained excessively; it was dark and dismal; and to add to the natural torpor of the followers on such occasions, all of them, conceiving that the movement was intended to effect a junction with Earl Cornwallis on the ensuing day, considered the rear as the situation of most safety. The heads of departments excepted, there were scarce any amongst our troops who did not expect to advance; consequently few indeed were solicitous about baggage. The servants of all were negligent. From these circumstances, from the inclemency of the weather, the badness of the night, and the reluctance with which the publick followers came together, difficulties and delays arose that could not have been guarded against, as they were totally unexpected. In short, it was day-break before the 12th battalion of *sepoys*, which was stationed in the rear, took up its ground on the road.

THE stores, with the principal part of the baggage, had by this time gone on towards the pass, but that of some officers moving in a contrary direction, from causes already assigned, was taken by the enemy; a number of tents were so heavy, from the rain, that they shared a similar fate; however, from the dislike of retreat, and various losses, as several of this army suffered some disappointment or other, murmurs prevailed; but in truth, the loss which chiefly deserved to be lamented, was the capture of Ensign Mackie of the 77th, with about sixteen men, who, through some unaccountable neglect in the hospital department, were left to a merciless enemy. Towards eight o'clock
bodies

bodies of horse which made their appearance in the rear, were kept in check by a company of the 12th battalion; yet as they contrived to wound two or three followers, whole groups of that dastardly people threw down their loads and took to their heels. The day clearing up, the troops, after a march of eleven miles, encamped at the muddy tank in the Coorga country.

THE movement from this tank to Ahmoonah, about ten miles, was performed without much difficulty; but the dragging of the heavy guns on the 26th, for thirteen miles, the distance from thence to the top of the pass, was attended with the utmost labour. Here as the troops descended on the 28th, the gullies which in advancing had been filled up with earth, from the incessant pour of rain became so miry, as to render the conveyance of heavy guns utterly impracticable. That, and the ruts made by water-courses in a road originally steep, narrow, and difficult of passage, pointed to the propriety of not wasting the troops in attempting to drag heavy guns; especially as these troops must have been exposed to the most inclement weather, and unavoidably without any shelter. Four heavy pieces of ordnance were consequently buried on the top of the pass. Indeed, even the transport of the field pieces took the hard work of six long days. However, after the most extreme fatigue, which besides much injury to the troops, had almost destroyed all the cattle, the field train and stores arriving at Iliacore, they were sent from thence to the coast by water: and the several corps having finished their fatigues for a time, about the 10th of June, they were cantoned in Biliapatam, Cananore, Durrampatam, and Tellicherry. But to return to Earl Cornwallis.

At the close of the first march from Caniambaddy, his Lordship was agreeably surprized with the arrival of about forty thousand Marratta horse, accompanied by two battalions of Bombay sepoy, under Capt. Little, of that establishment. There was also a crowd of irregular infantry. This immense reinforcement, headed by Hurry Punt and Purferam Bhow, besides upwards of twenty pieces of cannon, with an adequate proportion of ammunition, had with them provisions and supplies of every description in abundance; but, taking advantage of our necessities, in a two-fold degree, they produced the articles most wanted, with a very sparing hand, screwing up their prices to a most exorbitant height, whilst they lowered the value of our coin a rupee in every pagoda; indeed, silver was the only coin which would pass current amongst them for near its value; and, as our troops had been for a length of time paid in gold, the exorbitant prices at which they sold grain, and their diminishing the value of our specie, almost precluded the possibility of our becoming purchasers, so as to relieve the distresses of our followers.

The destruction of our guns became now matter of concern to all. Instigated by revenge, the chiefs discovered an uncommon degree of eagerness to prosecute the war; but they felt conscious it was to the tardiness of their own movement to co-operate in the reduction of the capital, they could alone attribute the respite which must of necessity be allowed to the Sultaun; however, that the time which ought to be employed in repairing misfortune might not be wasted in unprofitable regret, Earl Cornwallis, accompanied by Major General Medows, held a conference with the Maratta leaders,

on the 29th; in tents pitched between the two encampments for that purpose; here, according to his Lordship, “ as it was of great consequence, to cultivate a good understanding with them, I said very little on the just grounds which I had to complain of the lateness of their arrival, and contented myself, at the first meeting, with obtaining a knowledge of the nature of their instructions, and of their future intentions.

“ THEY made the most explicit declarations, that they were ordered by the Peishwa, and it was equally their own inclination, to act entirely in concert with me; and in the course of two or three conferences, it was not only settled, that all the confederate forces should keep the field in the Mysore country, during the rains, but they also acquiesced in a general arrangement that I proposed, for the disposition of the armies, the principal objects of which were to give me an easy and safe communication with the Carnatic, to enable me to draw from thence the supplies of artillery and stores, that would be necessary for prosecuting the operations of the ensuing campaign, to subsist the allied armies, as much as might be possible, at the expence of the enemy, and to endeavour to deprive him of the revenues and resources of all the northern parts of his dominions.

“ HAVING stated to the Maratta chiefs the danger of attempting to maintain the communication with their own country, by the route to the westward of Chittledroog, by which Purseram Bhow had marched from Darwar, they agreed to relinquish it, and to be satisfied with that by Sera and Roydroog, which I recommended as preferable, on condition that I would delay my march to the east-

“ ward

“ward until the detachments which Purseram Bhow had left upon
 “his route could join the army, or be sent back across the Tumbudra, to which, upon their assurances that we should be able to purchase from the grain dealers attached to them, a sufficient quantity
 “of grain to subsist our troops and followers for some time to come,
 “I consented.

“In order, therefore, to effect these purposes, we halted frequently,
 “and having soon after the junction of the Marattas, sent back to the
 “Nizam, all those of his troops that had, either from the loss or the
 “weakness of their horses, become unfit for service, the confederate
 “force moved together gradually, though slowly, towards Bangalore, and upon our arrival within about twenty miles of that place,
 “it was thought advisable to acquiesce in Purseram Bhow's wishes,
 “to move, with the army under his own immediate command, towards Sera, to secure that communication, and to possess himself
 “of the adjoining country, according to the plan that had been arranged; Hurry Punt, with his division, and the Nizam's cavalry,
 “remaining with our army.” (1).

SENSIBLE that the suspension of his ruin depended on sowing dissension amongst the confederates, and on keeping them at the utmost possible distance from each other, the Sultaun, by means of his irregular horse, and faithful villagers, contrived that out of about forty messengers dispatched at different periods by the Marattas, whilst on their way to join, not one should reach the British camp. Far from neglecting the essential point of communication with Earl Cornwallis, hircarras in succession were from time to time dispatched, by Hurry Punt, as well to camp, as to Bangalore; and had any of these made

(1) This and the two foregoing extracts will be found in a letter from Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, dated the 7th September, 1797.

their appearance, we should have avoided all the public and private evils which ensued (1). Surrounded by enemies, and disheartened from recent defeat, it required management in a superior degree to convince the Sultaun's people that their respite from the impending destruction was not nearly at an end; and although a salute fired at Seringapatam on the 26th was said to announce some advantage gained by Sayed Sahib, over the rear of the Bombay army, the real intention must have been, to buoy up the spirits of his people from sinking under circumstances of accumulated distress.

HOWEVER incredible, that two large armies should march near three hundred miles towards a third engaged in the same cause, without any mutual communication or intimation of each other's approach, yet to this very fortuitous circumstance the Sultaun owed possession of his capital; for, had a junction of the Marattas with the British armies been effected before the destruction of our battering guns, his whole force must have been shut up in the island of Seringapatam, to the total destruction of his cavalry, and utmost distress of his people at large. As an additional prop to the remains of his tottering empire, a flag of truce, accompanied with a present of fruit and vegetables, conveyed proposals for accommodation from the Myforean ruler to Earl Cornwallis, on the 27th; but the present was returned untouched, and in the same manly spirit of perseverance, it was still declared, that no negotiation could be entered upon unless the proposals came addressed to the con-

(1). It is said, that one of these messengers delivered his dispatches at Bangalore, for which the Punt produced Colonel Oldham's receipt, and that it was forwarded from thence to Earl Cornwallis early in May, but intercepted on its way by the enemy. Had several successive copies of this dispatch been transmitted, as the army was at such an inconsiderable distance, it is reasonable to suppose that some one must have arrived safe. But, whether the Commandant of Bangalore had permission to open his Lordship's public letters, or otherwise, it is not for me to determine. As the success or failure of the most momentous military operations frequently depend on slender links like these, 'tis pity that officers in command of stations, do not, from a consciousness of right intention, consider themselves more at discretion,

federacy, and until a general release of all the British subjects in the Mysorean dominions was granted. However, trusting that he could breed discord in the league, he could not be prevailed upon publicly to acknowledge its existence, and still persisting that no British prisoners were detain'd in Mysore, he flatly objected to a truce that had been recurred to as a preliminary which of necessity must have preceded accommodation.

ALTHOUGH fantastical figures, like those that have been described in the detachment of Nizam Ally were not to be seen in such numbers amongst the Marattas, yet their appearance, upon the whole, resembled that of a banditti, anxious to share the spoils of Seringapatam, rather than of a regular force, determin'd to humble an overbearing foe. In consequence of the junction, however, our affairs wore a very different complexion; naturally enterprizing, our new allies ridiculed the Subah's troops for inactivity; their foraging parties ranging to a considerable distance, brought in large supplies of cattle; the necessity of a precipitate return to Bangalore was done away; famine was no longer to be dreaded; but the Nizam's troops, whose attendance, independent of political considerations, we had every reason to deprecate, still gave us room to regret their presence, as they rushed into the Maratta camp, and bought up all the grain and provisions they could find. It was on the ground where this junction took place, that Hyder drew out his army, in 1772, when upwards of fifty thousand Marattas, under Madharou, advanced to attack his capital; but the Mysorean was defeated with such slaughter, that upwards of twenty thousand of his men were left on the field of battle; however, so abundant were his resources, even at this early period, that he, in a few months,

months, appeared again in the field, with a powerful army. On the ground where this battle was fought a neat tomb was erected to the memory of Seif Sahib, an officer of rank, who there was mortally wounded, by the thrust of a spear, in the loins; the remains of his son Budder ul dien Cawn, who was slain at Sattimungulum, were deposited close to those of his father, under the Milgottah pagoda (1). Whilst the army remained in these districts, a quantity of grain captured in Nagmungulum was given over by Purferam Bhow to the thirteenth and twenty-eight battallions of bengal sepoys, who had been detached for that purpose.

MOVING leisurely, as well to favour the advance of several convoys that the Marattas expected, from the Sera district, as to weary the enemy into a compliance with reasonable terms by helping to exhaust his supplies, the army on the 18th crossed the Madoor river, a beautiful stream then about knee deep, and encamped in sight of Hooliahdroog (2). This fort, situated on the summit of a high circular rock, is nearly surrounded by an extensive pettah. Colonel Ross, the chief engineer, attended by the 6th brigade, was directed to summon Hooliahdroog. It was of great strength, but the appearance of so powerful an army within three miles induced the killedar to surrender, on a

(1) This pagoda stands on the top of a hill, bearing the same name, which is the principal in a range of considerable height that trends with a curve from north to south. In a populous village, close to the base of Milgottah, there was a large quantity of grain, with a vast number of cattle, until the arrival of the Marattas: However, from want of intelligence, we did not benefit by that circumstance. At a short distance from thence the lake of Mooty Tallaw is formed by an embankment between the hills; but as a minute description of this romantic spot is given by Mr. Colebrooke, the reader is referred to the explanation of that gentleman's view in Mysore.

			Miles,	Fur.
(2).	May, 26.	Six miles north west of Seringapatam,	7	—
	27.	Five miles north of Seringapatam,	3	4
	29.	Toudanoor,	4	—
	June, 4.	Mooty Tallaw,	2	—
	6.	Milgotta,	3	4
	7.	Near Rajahmungulum,	9	—
	9.	Yekaty,	6	4
	14.	Boomanelly,	6	4
	18.	Near Hooliahdroog,	10	4

promise

promise of security for private property and personal protection to the multitude that it sheltered. The terms of capitulation were rigidly adhered to; but our allies following their wonted habits, attempted to plunder the crowds of inhabitants, as they returned to their villages. Sepoy detachments, however, sent to protect them, were true to their trust; and it was not until several lives were lost that the plunderers could be prevailed upon to desist.

DURING former periods of public disturbance in Mysoor, the inhabitants took refuge in districts at a distance from the invaders, on the tops of high hills, or in the midst of thick jungles; but the complete establishment of new masters in every direction, now reduced such as refused allegiance to the necessity of seeking protection around the fortifications, consequently, the villagers swarming under cover of the guns clung to the several droogs, and in particular to this rock, like bees around a hive. Here they were induced to consider themselves in security, as the only access to the principal work, is, in general, by single steps cut obliquely in the face of the solid rock, at one part of which the ascent is by a ladder about twenty feet in length, and through a natural arch, which a few resolute men might defend against the assault of whole armies. This hill, which measures upwards of a hundred yards in height, is about one mile in circumference around the base (1).

(1) If guns of a large calibre were placed on the western extremity of a range of hills which stand to the eastward of this rock, the shot would in my opinion, reach the works; but as its base is on every side, except where it is accessible by the ladder, narrower than toward the top, it might resist an enemy who neglected that advantage, for a length of time. The Petrah, at first sight, has the appearance of being built on ground, raised for that purpose, considerably above the level of the country: its walls were not of sufficient strength to resist cannon-shot; and, as the Killedar had only three Malabar guns on the rock, to protect the whole, he was induced the more readily to accept of terms; whatever credit he might acquire by a resolute defence, he knew that the place was in itself of no political importance. Petrahs in general, and this one in particular, appear, constructed more for the convenience of providing garrisons with bazar's, and for procuring a maintenance for the Killedar, and other public officers, than for strengthening or defending the principal fortifications.

AMONGST a number of captives that were bound in chains of various constructions, at Hooliadroog, several who had their ancles fastened asunder by a heavy iron bar of about eighteen inches in length, had from habit acquired a straddling amble, which, when liberated, they could not for a length of time alter or amend; some from having been closely pinioned could move neither arm; others had acquired a stoop, from which they were unable to stand erect; in short, as most of them had been confined in this wretched state for a period of about ten years, there were few indeed who had not lost the power of some limb or other. Here, after securing several thousand head of cattle, with large quantities of grain, the guns and tanks were destroyed; and the works were blown up, and otherwise dismantled.

MOVING from thence by easy marches, on a road which wined round a variety of eminences, covered with jungle, or led through vallies intersected by numerous streams, the army, after summoning Outradroog (2), and reconnoitring Savandroog (3), without any prospect of success, encamped on the 11th of July, at a short distance to the westward of Bangalore (4). During this movement, the Sul-

(2) Lieutenant Macleod, of the intelligence department, was sent with a flag of truce to summon Outradroog: the fort, at first, firing on the party, it was evident that the garrison was not of a disposition to surrender; but the killedar afterwards sent an answer which was couched in terms highly proper. He declared by a messenger, that he could not for a moment think of a surrender; that as a confidential servant, entrusted with a strong hold, he could not after eating the salt of Tippoo Sultan, for upwards of twenty years, deliver it up, until his master would shew the example at Seringapatam: that as the children of an indulgent parent, the people were determined to hazard their all in his support; even their lives, or what was still more near and dear. His simple, but determined answer, left them in unquieted possession of the place for a while.

(3) On the 29th of the month, under cover of the 7th and 13th Bengal sepoy battalions, the chief engineer reconnoitred Savandroog, on the north face, and from the westward. The next day, his Majesty's 52d regiment, accompanied by the 13th, 14th and 26th battalions of Bengal sepoys, with the 9th co. st. battalion, marched in order to protect the engineers, whilst they examined the hill from the southward; after several minute views of this immense rock, the troops returned to camp. No attack was made on Savandroog, as it was considered by many totally impracticable. All agreed that the army, in its present crippled state, could reap no benefit from the attempt, that would compensate for the loss which in all probability would ensue; and from the waste of time which must have been employed in its reduction.

			Miles,	Fur.
(4) June	22d,	Hoololoocondah,	—	—
	25th,	Coonigul	11	4
	26th,	Outradroog	8	4
	28th,	Soomaisengoody,	5	4
	29th,	Magree,	6	—
July	2d,	Goodinganelly,	2	4
	4th,	Sandicoopen,	10	—
	8th,	Kittanhelly,	7	4
	11th,	West of Bangalore,	6	4
			6	—

taun attempted nothing against the main force of the confederates. In order to secure forage, as well as to avoid a country confined by much brush-wood, our allies made a circuit of several miles, through open districts to the northward. Three battalions of sepoy were ordered from the left wing with Captain Archibald Brown, to strengthen a convoy under Captain Alexander Read, which escorted towards Bangalore a body of brinjaries, then threatened by a party of Mysorean cavalry in the neighbourhood of Venkitaghery; and, as it had been judged advisable, during the monsoon, and the time necessarily employed in fresh equipment, to straiten the enemy within the least possible bounds, the army of Purseram Bhow retired towards Sera, and the other districts which had been wrested from the Sultaun, in that direction. Amongst the horses of our Nizamite auxiliaries, but few were at this period in a state capable of keeping the field; the greater part of them were consequently permitted to return home; whilst the squadrons under Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, equally in want of being recruited, were directed to proceed to the Carnatic. Much to the credit of Lieutenants Turner and Grant, who commanded the body guards of Earl Cornwallis and General Medows, it must be acknowledged, that their troops were in a very different state; they therefore continued with the army, without any respite from fatigue.

AGREEABLE to the plan which had been concerted amongst the leaders of the allied forces, it was now judged adviseable to open a communication with the Carnatic, by whichever road was reckoned the most easy of access. The able exertions of Sir Charles Oakley had so seconded the designs of the Governor General, all along, that no-
thing

thing remained but to determine on the most judicious route for conveying the fresh equipment to Bangalore. The direction of the Mugly pass, although advantageous on many accounts, led so far to the northward, that it must have either disunited the armies for its protection, or allowed a greater range to the enemy than was necessary. The Padneigdirgum pass had long been considered practicable, amongst the senior officers on the Coast, provided a sufficient establishment of troops secured the districts in the vicinity of Venkitaghery; but it was known to be excessive steep, and difficult of draft for heavy guns. The footpaths by Cuddapanatam, Cungoody, Neelghery, Malicandroog, and Alumbaddy, were considered totally impracticable for the conveyance of a battering train. In short, after a minute examination of the whole range, from the entrance at Mugly, to the Cauvery river (1), the passage which leads by Oodiadirgum and Palicode was considered by far the most easy of access. In addition to other recommendations, possession of this pass, whilst it confined the enemy within the least possible bounds, must have threatened any detachments which he might think proper to employ against our acquisitions to the southward.

THROWING the sick, and one half the tumbrils of the field pieces into Bangalore, the army marched with four battering guns from

(1) Whilst the army halted at Moodagampelly, about the beginning of August, the 13th Bengal and 27th Coast battalions, were detached on this service, under the command of Capt. Norman Macleod. It was intended also, that a strong party of the Nizam's horse should have accompanied the sepoy; but as usual, very few could be found, with inclinations to proceed. This detachment advancing to the southward, passed Denaincottah, an extensive village, protected by a mud fort and inhabited solely by weavers, on the 4th of the month. As the troops made their appearance at this place, the villagers, abandoning their cloths, cotton, and other valuables, fled in every direction. On the 6th the battalions descended by a narrow pass into a small valley enclosed in jungles. Here they took possession of a pagoda fortified on the top of a hill. It was called by the natives Mollygerrydirgum. It had a pettah crowded with people, and a great number of cattle which were driven away for the use of the army. As the guns could not be carried any further, from the badness of the roads, the 27th battalion returned with them to camp. A detachment from the thirteenth proceeded to the bank of the Cauveri, and fully ascertained that there was not any road to the southward of the Palicode pass, by which troops with guns could enter the Barrahmah. A party of Polygars attempted to oppose the sepoy in their progress, but they were driven back after a slight skirmish. In all this track there appeared but one pathway which was accessible even for foot passengers. Satisfied on these points, the battalion returned to camp.

thence,

thence, and on the 15th encamped near the village of Satrum, having previously detached Major Gowdie, with his brigade, to summon Ouffore. This fort is a parallelogram of considerable strength: its defences had been far advanced in their repair. Instead of bastions on the ramparts, it had several circular towers. A deep ditch, about eighty feet in breadth, with which it was surrounded, might be filled at any time from a large tank which had a sluice on the east face, close to the gate; but like most of the lesser forts which are spread over the plains, it was commanded from a neighbouring height. Ouffore was abandoned on the approach of Major Gowdie. The garrison blew up one of the angles; fortunately, however, they failed in their attempt on the magazine, through some interruption in the train. After depositing the guns, this post, with the second battalion of volunteers, and Captain Glas's company of artillery, was given in charge to Captain Thomas Welsh, of the Bengal establishment. As a wide road, with an avenue of trees, stretched from the fort to Bangalore, and towards Kistnagherry, it was certainly intended as a place of great importance.

THE horrors of a piteous tale told by the inhabitants of Ouffore, in their own simple but pathetic strain, cannot be heightened in relation. Piqued at the bold measures of Earl Cornwallis, and in order to prevent detection in false assertions, the British forces had advanced but a short way into Mysore when the Suldaun issued a mandate for the assassination of three Europeans who had been prisoners in this fort for several years. The fact is too well authenticated to admit a doubt. A manuscript written in the English language by one of the sufferers was found in the arsenal. It detailed carpenter's work which this unfortunate man had been necessitated to perform. His name was Hamilton. He had been an officer in the British navy, but despairing of freedom, he contracted an intimacy
with

with a companion of the other sex, from which a family sprung, that naturally impelled him to every honest endeavour for their maintenance.

WHEN the bloody mandate was about to be put in execution, the people surrounding the house of their killedar, with prayers and lamentations intreated to spare the whole, but for the life of Hamilton they were clamorous. Besides the ties of a family and connexions, he had become perfect in their language: he improved the mechanics in their several occupations; his advice was the guide in all common transactions; he was umpire in matters of dispute; in short, as he dignified a superior understanding by a life perfectly harmless, he was universally known by the distinction of father. Hamilton was for a time given to their intreaties; but the other two were beheaded with the sabre. His reprieve was of short duration. On the fall of Bangalore his doom was irrevocably fixed; and, a special messenger, habituated to the scene, was forbid the presence until he saw performed the murderous office. Their behaviour in death was distinctly told by witnesses nowise interested in colouring the narrative. It was manly and firm. After passing some minutes in fervent prayer, they bent forward, resting their hands upon their knees. The heads of the two former were severed from their bodies at the first blow; but with Hamilton it required repetition. Their graves were pointed out to several British officers. Their remains confirmed this relation; and, a lock of hair from each head, which is now in the writer's possession, will, when deposited in a British repository, contribute to stamp the appellation of tyrant on Tippoo Sultaun amidst thousands as yet unborn.

THE army, proceeding from Ouffore, towards the Palicode pass, took possession of Anchittydirgum on the evening of the 18th. On the 20th Neelghery (1) and Ruttonghery submitted without resistance, but the garrison of Ryacottah refusing to surrender, Major Gowdie, with his own brigade, after carrying the lower fort in a spirited assault, got possession of the upper one by capitulation. Ryacottah is defended by three distinct fortifications, each of which admits of a separate defence. The principal work, towards the summit of the rock, is nearly of a circular form; that in the centre, constructed on the face of the hill, is accessible only by one narrow passage, which is excessive steep and rugged; and the pettah, or lower fort, besides the advantages of its own works, is protected by the guns of the other two. Confident, from the strength of the place, and the numbers by which it was defended, the killedar not only refused to surrender, but fired on the flag that conducted the first summons. Early on the morning of the 20th, a detachment consisting of about three hundred and fifty men, with a brigade of guns, advanced under Captain Oliver, to attack the pettah. The gate was soon blown open; but the garrison, strengthened by the neighbouring inhabitants, fired briskly from the top and center works. Major Gowdie now led the attack in person; animated by his example, the troops entered, and took possession of the second fort; still the enemy occupied the upper work, nor could they be prevailed upon to

(1) As the havildar who was sent with a flag to summon Neelghery, approached the fort, he was fired upon and killed by the enemy. The place surrendered in the course of the day, and the man by whom the havildar had been slain being demanded, he was immediately given up; but as it appeared that he was totally unacquainted with the nature of a flag of truce, he escaped punishment. Fearful of their master's displeasure, almost all the Mysorean forts fired less or more shot before their submission. The quantity was in general regulated by their degree of strength; but few of them directed their guns so as to do much execution. On a former occasion one of their garrisons proposed not to deliver up the post until a certain number of guns had been discharged.—See the first volume, page 63.

capitulate, until a reinforcement was seen, conducting some additional heavy guns to the besiegers.

KENCHILLYDROOG, Tyandroog, Chinroydirgum, and Oodiadirgum, with several inferior hill forts, offered little or no opposition, at a change of masters. Considerable quantities of grain, stores, and cattle, were found in and about those castles, all of which were occupied by the seventh Coast battalion, under Captain Chase, or dismantled of their defences. On this service we had to lament the fall of Lieutenant Crie, of the Madras engineers; a few sepoy's were also slain; but the number wounded was considerable.

S K E T C H

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE FOURTH.

ALTHOUGH the Mysoreans were thus hemmed in on all sides, they occasionally found means to burst through the surrounding multitude. Their horse, deprived of the range necessary to feed in, were enfeebled from want of forage beyond the sufferings of the most severe service, yet their exertions were wonderful; whatsoever of the country's produce was spared in pity by the disciplined troops, was consumed through the ravages of unfeeling followers. Of that vast empire which at the commencement of hostilities, acknowledged the superiority of Tippoo Sultaun, Beduore was the only province which had not now been laid waste by either of the powers in alliance; and in order to draw supplies from thence, as well as to check the depredations of Purseram Bhow on the districts around Chittledroog, the Sultaun moved to the northward, with his principal force, whilst a strong detachment endeavoured to recover the provinces which had been wrested out of his possession at the beginning of the war.

As the army under General Medows fell down along the northern bank of the Cauveri, towards the close of the first campaign, a large reinforcement of sepoy's crossed that river, in order to secure our acquisitions to the southward. Charged with the defence of these districts, Major Cuppage, after examining the post at Coimbatore, directed that the heavy guns, ammunition, and stores, should be removed to Paligautcherry. Coimbatore was not considered tenable against disciplined troops with artillery: it was intended solely, as a check on irregulars and horse who might threaten to molest Mr. Vincentia Corbet, whilst employed in collecting the revenues (1). The fourteenth battalion of Coast sepoy's having been therefore withdrawn, it was ordered to escort the convoy from thence to its place of destination; and a body of Travancorean troops being placed in the pettah, Lieutenant Chambers, of the Madras establishment, with his own corps of topasses, was left in charge of the whole.

GREAT quantities of damaged powder, with a number of guns which had been considered unserviceable, were found in Coimbatore. Of these guns three stood a proof. Mr. Chambers, therefore, contrived to mount them on carriages that he patched together from wheels and fragments which lay scattered about the fort. Two three pounders, with one four pounder, were thus put in a state of com-

(1) I am directed by Major Cuppage to communicate to you the following instructions as a guidance for your conduct in the command of the troops and post at Coimbatore, to which the Commander in Chief has been pleased to nominate you. Coimbatore is to be considered as a post of protection against cavalry, or other force of the enemy that may appear before it, without having the means of attacking it, with any probability of success; in opposition to the resistance which may be made with effect by the troops under your orders. Major Cuppage does not conceive it in the power of the enemy's whole force to possess themselves of Coimbatore, without bringing heavy cannon against it, which he desires may be understood as the interpretation of the words mean. The Travancore battalion and topass corps to remain under your command; the Major recommends your placing the Travancore battalion in the pettah, and the topasses in the post. Mr. Corbet is desired to place immediately in Coimbatore rice and provisions for 100 men, sufficient for four months; you are to give every assistance he may require in the protection of it, and report to Major Cuppage, from time to time, the quantity provided; as far as is consistent with the nature of your post. You are to comply with the requisitions made to you by the collector, Mr. Corbet, for military aid in his collections. You are without delay to report every material occurrence to Major Cuppage; particularly any intelligence you may receive, in regard to the movements of an enemy, towards your quarter.—Major of Brigade Bannerman to Lieutenant Chambers. 2d February 1791.

plete repair; on an application to Major Cuppage a supply of five hundred shot was furnished from Paligautcherry; to these two hundred stone ones were added by some of the topasses who had been employed about guns whilst in the service of Mahomed Ally; and as Mr. Chambers conceived that extraordinary exertions might possibly keep out an enemy for some days, the whole garrison set to work at a barbet battery, which had been begun by a regular engineer on the pettah face.

TOWARDS the first of May, 1791, the troops intended for the defence of Coimbatore, were reduced by detachments (2) and otherwise, to one hundred and twenty topasses, with two hundred of the Ram Rajah's sepoy. From these, small parties were repeatedly sent out, to scour the country; but, opposed by Cawder Ally Cawn, an active dewan who had been appointed by the Sultaun to the Sattimungulum district, and without the countenance of an European leader, they were as often driven back. On the 10th of the month, Captain La Combe, an enterprising Frenchman in the employ of the Rajah, made offer of his services at Coimbatore. Under this zealous officer, about one hundred men were pushed on in advance; they attacked and beat back the dewan, and continuing in the field, they kept his people at a distance for the rest of the month. However, before the first week in June had elapsed, reports of the descent of an

(2) I am directed by Major Cuppage to acquaint you, that one Commandant, three Subadars, two Jemidars, eight Havildars, six Naigues, three Drummers, three Fifers, and two hundred sepoy of the Travancore battalion, now doing duty at Coimbatore, will in a day or two be ordered to proceed to this place, where they are to remain. Should the detachments from your post render it inconvenient for you to send the above detail, you will lose no time in calling in a sufficient number, to enable you to send the number intended for this garrison when ordered.—I am further directed to signify to you, that one Serjeant, one Corporal, and twenty-five topasses, will be ordered to proceed to this place at the same time with the Travancoreans; they are also to do duty at this place; you are to select from the topasses such men as have been brought up to the gun exercise, as they are intended for that service.—The 14th battalion will march in a few days to join General Abercromby, when the detail for this place coming from Coimbatore will be directed to proceed. *Major of Brigade Bannerman to Lieutenant Chambers. 13th February 1791.*

army by the Guzzlehatty pass, induced Mr. Chambers to recall Captain La Combe with his party (3).

EARLY on the 13th of this month fifty horsemen reconnoitered Coimbatore, and the pettah all around. Immediately after, a lascar who had been made prisoner, but found means to escape, came in and gave correct information of the enemy's strength. It consisted of two cushoons, each about one thousand men, with eight pieces of cannon, the heaviest of which was an eighteen pounder; there was one fourteen, one twelve, and five four pounders, a number of the inhabitants with ginjal pieces, one thousand horse, two elephants, four camels loaded with rockets, and a multitude of polygars, all under the command of Meer Buckshee Shadavadelly Cawn.

ABOUT 10 o'clock in the morning of the 16th, a party of infantry, supported by upwards of two hundred horse, charged the guard at the pettah, and put them to the rout. The exertions of Captain La Combe, however, restored order, but it required no small degree of persuasion to prevail on this people to enter the fort. Several amongst them, preferring a chance of escape to Paligautcherry, betook to the hills; the rest were prevented following with the utmost difficulty; indeed a total want of subordination and discipline has, on almost every occasion, subjected the Travancorean troops to defeat from an inferior force, unless when headed by European officers. After pitching his encampment to the northwest of the pettah on this day, the Mysorean leader summoned the fort verbally; he demanded immediate

(3) From the representations of Timulrow, the late Amuldar, I have reason to think he would fall a sacrifice, should you be unfortunate enough to be obliged to surrender to a superior force. I have from motives of humanity allowed him to proceed with his effects to Paligautcherry; I request you will order a trusty guard to accompany him, who are to prevent the possibility of his escape, by their vigilance.—*Vincentia Corbet to Lieutenant Chambers. 12th June 1791.*

possession of the place, on pain of death, without exception of women or children. His threats were disregarded, and a determined refusal was sent for answer.

A DISCHARGE of musquetry opened from both sides on the 17th, and as it continued for the whole of the ensuing day, Mr. Chambers found it necessary to withdraw some swivels which fired en barbette. Whilst his people stood to these swivels, several were wounded by ginjal pieces, from the tops of houses in the pettah; another summons on the 19th had a refusal similar to the first; but as the next day cleared up, a battery which had been nearly finished in the course of the night, was observed within four hundred yards of the walls. A party was immediately ordered to be in readiness to storm this work; but before it advanced, a third summons made its appearance, with offer of terms highly favourable. The refusal of this, although conveyed in a milder strain, was equally determined as on either of the former occasions. Hostilities instantly re-commenced. After firing several shots at the battery, the party sallied, but galled on their approach by musquetry from the tops of houses, they were obliged to return without accomplishing their intention.

A DESERTER completely equipped, who formerly served the Company, but had been taken with Colonel Braithwaite, now came in, and informed the garrison that the batteries would open upon them in the course of the evening. Accordingly, about dusk, a French twelve pounder and two long sixes began and fired incessantly until near eleven o'clock; they commenced again at four next morning, and continued until six in the evening. Upwards of two hundred shots entered the works; several of these struck the magazine: it became,

therefore, necessary to fill up the intervals of the inclosures. In addition to this labour, the troops found much employment during the night, in repairing what damage had been done to the cavaliers and bastions.

EARLY on the 22d another battery for three guns was in readiness. Here, eight scaling ladders, capable of allowing four men to mount abreast, were distinctly seen. A smart cannonade continued from the first battery all the forenoon, with much more effect than hitherto; several rockets were thrown into the fort; yet as all the straw roofs and other combustible erections had been pulled down, little damage ensued. When the following day broke, the new battery opened, but ceased to fire towards nine o'clock, as one of their guns had by that time been dismounted; the other battery, however, continued throughout the day. The garrison employed the night in repairing the damage done to the works, and the besiegers continued to impede them with showers of rockets.

A THIRD battery of two embrasures was nearly completed by daylight on the 24th, within two hundred yards of the bastion on the north-west angle. The whole fire of the garrison was pointed in this direction; but as there were no guns of a calibre sufficient to receive shot of a greater weight than four pounds, and as the powder was in quality miserably bad, the damage was trifling through the day. The continuance of our fire, however, prevented their strengthening the battery in the dark. A discharge of cannon, musquetry, and rockets, was kept up all the next day and night without intermission. At this period

period of the siege several casks full of combustibles were planted on the ramparts, in order to annoy the enemy, in the event of their attempting an escalade.

As a fourth battery within one hundred and fifty yards of the half moon threatened the besieged on the 26th, three mines were opened in that direction. Here the enemy did not press on in advance. They contented themselves, on this and the two ensuing days, in opening approaches to their batteries, and making them communicate with each other. The fire of the besiegers slackened a little; but the garrison, conceiving that this indicated an intention to lull them into security, continued indefatigable in their exertions. The mines were loaded, the gates were blocked up with earth and stones, and as shot run short, although there was abundance of powder, the hammermen were set to making iron flugs, to supply the deficiency of balls.

UNDER an increase of fire, from cannon, ginjals, and small arms, the Mysoreans advanced their works on the 29th and 30th, whilst the garrison redoubling their industry, opposed them with showers of grenades from the guns. By means of swivels mounted on arrack carts the fire increased from within also; and the besieged, grubbing the weeds from the ditch, bound them into fascines for repairing the breaches. On the 31st a resolute party of the enemy that advanced in order to capture some bullocks whilst they watered at the tank, occasioned an alarm in the garrison; but as it brought on a smart fire, the enemy suffered a repulse, accompanied with the loss of a few daring men. By the beginning of August the batteries of the besiegers were all completed. Besides other mischief, they dismounted a gun which stood in one of the cavaliers; and as their fire had been
destruct-

destructive as well as constant, the casualties within increased fast. The garrison now mounted a Malabar gun, from which they managed to throw several grenades. On the 3d, however, this new source of defence burst, and wounded several men; on the 4th and 5th the besiegers advanced their approaches to within fifty yards of the ditch; their fire increased in fury; and as the garrison had information of large reinforcements to the enemy, from the district of Sattimungulum and Denaguncottah, a general attack was hourly expected.

THE cannonade from the north-west was so heavy on the 6th, that large pieces of the parapet and revetment of the curtain came down. An active serjeant of topasses, with several of the people, were wounded on this day. The besiegers suffered in their turn. The nearness of their batteries enabled the garrison to take such certain aim, that every shot entered their embrasures, and obliged them to draw their guns under cover of the merlons, to re-load. The necessities of the besieged thickened; their ammunition was nearly exhausted; their wounded were numerous, and without medical assistance; almost all the table and other linen within the works were cut up for cartridges; and, to add to the wretchedness of the prospect, the Travancoreans grew clamorous for surrender.

THE besiegers slackened in working at night, about this period; but their guns opened at break of day on the 7th, and battered incessantly, until twelve o'clock. In two hours afterwards they recommenced, and continued to play without intermission until sun-set, when about twenty yards of the parapet gave way. A fourth summons

mons now made its appearance. The Cawn condescended to reason with his antagonist, on the impropriety of holding out any longer, against such superiority of force. He argued, that regard for the families which he knew were in the place ought to induce Lieutenant Chambers to capitulate; but if the garrison still persisted, he protested that no living creature should find mercy. To this it was answered, that the ladders had been distinctly seen, and that the besieged were determined to stand the assault. A letter received on this day, from Major Cuppage, promising relief, confirmed the resolute, encouraged the timid, and strengthened the confidence of the steady.

THE cannonade opened with the light on the 8th, and continued throughout that and the two ensuing days, until sunset. The besiegers now working incessantly in the dark, advanced their approaches to within twenty yards of the ditch. Emboldened from a want of flints amongst their antagonists, the bad quality of their powder, and a consumption of bullets which the smiths were unequal to supply, they threatened to storm without delay. The garrison, however, having repaired some swivels, planted them on posts sunk into the ground, so as to enfilade the breach, and used every means that could favour a resolute resistance. Besides the casks loaded with combustibles, as already mentioned, they covered the ramparts with large stones and missile weapons of various kinds. In short, nothing was neglected, to render the defence desperate.

A GENERAL assault, which took place about four o'clock on the morning of the 11th, was announced by an universal roar of cannon, musquetry and rockets from the trenches and all around. The garrison

son, flying to their stations in an instant, returned the fire with much briskness. Regardless of danger, the ditch was immediately crowded with the enemy; they planted their ladders with composure, and mounted the parapet on the east and south faces at five distinct points. La Combe was in charge of this quarter, with his sepoy. He was nearly overpowered by numbers; but strengthened by a party of topassies from Lieutenant Chambers, he redoubled his exertions. His activity and valour encouraged the defendants to wonderful feats; and the people, following his example, closed with the assailants all around. At this critical juncture a subadar set off one of the combustible casks. This new instrument of destruction terrified the Mysoreans on all hands; they put about; the defendants, following their advantage, threw showers of stones on the enemy; one and all of them retired from the ramparts; they abandoned their ladders, and took shelter in the ditch, and under a wall on the crest of the glacis. To the northward, and from the westward, however, they still advanced with much spirit. Driving in the troops that defended the half moon, they carefully avoided the mines. Numbers of them pressed to the gate; but their principal force in this quarter, planting their ladders against the curtain, close to the south-west bastion, several got to the top. Here they were manfully opposed by Mr. Chambers, with his topassies. As that officer, fighting amidst crowds, strained every nerve, his people gave ample support. Fortunately, too, the curtain was flanked with some swivels, that played with good effect; and, as fireballs and rockets exposed the movements of the assailants to full view, they were compelled to retire with considerable slaughter.

THE day now clearing up, the discomfiture of the enemy was soon completed. Towards six o'clock they abandoned the attempt all around. With the utmost speed they ran from the works in every direction; still, all of them assisted in carrying off their wounded and slain. Notwithstanding these efforts, such was the carnage, that upwards of two hundred bodies were found on the glacis and in the ditch. The loss sustained by the garrison bore no proportion to that of the assailants; only six men were slain, and the wounded scarcely doubled that number. Twenty-five ladders, with a number of swords, and pieces of armour of different descriptions, lay strewed about the works; but the defeat was rendered more complete by the fortunate appearance of Major Cuppage, who, on being apprized of the enemy's designs, moved to raise the siege. His approach was the signal for the garrison to fall. The instant the Mysoreans beat to arms, La Combe, with eighty topasses and sepoy, entered their trenches. Although under a heavy fire of musquetry and rockets, he took possession of their batteries, put their guards to the rout, and as one eighteen and one twelve pounder had been already limbered, they were dragged into the fort. The overthrow of the besiegers was rendered still more perfect.

News of the enemy's descent into Coimbatore having been conveyed to the Travancorean minister, who then resided at Calicut, he immediately detached Captain De Crock with a battalion of the Ram Rajah's troops, to Paligautcherry. On the same occasion the spirited exertions of Mr. Macleod, the then collector of Madura, brought forward about three hundred and fifty polygars and revenue troops.

troops. Quitting the enjoyment of domestick happiness, in its best shape, this patriot, in defiance of hardships, headed the fighting men of his district in person. So soon as information of these aids had been received, Major Cuppage detached Captain B. Vigors, with a battalion of Coast sepoy, to Chatram, in order to favour a communication with the besieged; and in a few days afterwards, the people under Macleod and De Crock formed a junction with the Madras troops.

THIS force, which in all amounted to about one thousand fighting men, advanced with four iron four pounders, and two brass sixes, towards Coimbatore. Approaching the enemy just as they had suffered the repulse from Lieutenant Chambers, Major Cuppage continued to heighten their distresses. The two flank companies of the 16th battalion, supporting the party already described under La Combe, drove the enemy from all their posts in the pettah. As usual, however, their horse drew up on a rising ground, evidently with a view to cover the retreat of their infantry; but a few shot from the six pounders, made them also fall back. The rapidity with which the Cawn moved off, the extreme fatigue which the bullocks had undergone, the approach of night, and the necessity of attending to the garrison, rendered pursuit ineffectual.

It was ten o'clock next morning before the necessary arrangements for pursuit took place at Coimbatore. About that hour Captain La Combe having joined Major Cuppage, with as many men as the garrison could spare, the whole advanced after the enemy, and by a rapid movement, obtained Vellady, a distance of twenty-one miles, without a halt; and as several wounded men, and some camp equipage,

were

were taken in the course of this march, it is highly probable, that if circumstances had admitted an immediate pursuit, the whole corps must have been dispersed. The victors proceeded to the banks of the Bevani; but as the river was nowhere fordable, and as the enemy had already secured the boats on the opposite side, they began to take heart; and, after crossing the river, they took post at Demiacottah.

THE principal object of the detachment being thus effected, the Major pitched his tents on the southern bank. The Myforeans, screened from view by thick woods, brought two four-pounders to play on the encampment, before their approach was observed. The party consequently changed ground: they fell back from the Bevani, proceeded by easy marches to Coimbatore, and having put that post in as good a state of defence as circumstances would admit, the corps dispersed to their several stations. Mr. Macleod returned with his polygars to his occupations at Madura. De Crock remained with Major Cuppage at Paligautcherry; whilst La Combe continued to assist Lieutenant Chalmers at Coimbatore.

PRESSED as the Sultaun had been on all hands, at this stage of the war, he could not brook the failure of an expedition, to the success of which he looked forward with the utmost confidence. Without loss of time, he detached a much larger body of troops, under Cumer ul dien Cawn, towards Coimbatore. The approach of this force, about the latter end of September, left but a short interval for Mr. Chalmers to refresh his garrison, and to repair the breaches which had been made during the former siege. Different reinforcements had, however, increased his strength to seven hundred fighting men; he had also the two pieces of cannon which were captured from the

enemy at their late failure; and as he was now supported by upwards of forty regular sepoys, under Lieutenant Nash, of the Madras establishment, he was if possible more determined than ever on resistance.

THE Cawn, having under his command six regular cushoons, each about one thousand strong; upwards of five hundred stable horse, in low condition; twelve six pounders; two eighteen pounders; four mortars; twenty camels loaded with rockets, and a number of irregular troops, sat down to the north west of Coimbatore, on the 6th of October, and took possession of the pettah without opposition. They changed ground to the southward on the following day, and on the 8th, they attempted to drive in a small party which occupied the bank of a tank close to the post. Lieutenant Nash, with his own sepoys, a party of topasses, and a company of Travancoreans with a gun, were sent out in order to prevent their getting possession of this bank. A smart action, in which the enemy were repeatedly repulsed, took place; but as several reinforcements increased their number to upwards of eight hundred strong, it was thought prudent to withdraw the whole of the garrison within the works.

ON the 12th a battery of two embrasures, which opened from the bank, nearly opposite to the center bastion on the south face, was silenced by the fire of a fourteen pounder from that bastion, and from an eighteen pounder on the cavalier. Two eighteen pounders, which opened from fresh embrasures cut in the same bank, to the eastward of the others, on the 14th, were disabled by guns which the garrison brought to bear on that quarter. A third battery of three embrasures opened on the 15th, a little to the right of the first, and soon afterwards two guns from a fourth played on the south east
angle

angle bastion. The fire of these batteries brought down the wall very fast; but as some embrasures on the east face bore in their direction, two guns which opened from thence attracted the fire from the point where it had most effect, and enabled the garrison to counteract the enemy's designs, by erecting a substantial battery for the heavy guns, on the south curtain.

FROM this period until the 23d, the besiegers continued to advance by sap, under a constant discharge, either of cannon, rockets, or musquetry; whilst the defendants, from the bad quality of their powder, were unable to prevent their working. To oppose six pieces of cannon with which they covered the approaches, none but the shot from the two largest guns in the garrison, could reach their batteries; and as twelve pound balls were the largest in the place, the aim of these guns, from the disproportion of the shot to their calibres, could not be taken with any degree of certainty. About the middle of the month a letter from Major Cuppage, promising relief, found its way into the garrison. Although much harrassed with constant work and duty, this communication threw the whole of the defendants into the highest spirits; the gates, which had been blocked up with large stones from the beginning, were now cleared away, and every preparation was made for co-operating with the troops expected in the field.

A SECOND letter, received on the 23d, informed the garrison, that two battalions of Madras sepoys, one from Bombay, and two of Travancorean troops, with six field pieces, advanced under Major Cuppage, in order to compel the enemy to raise the siege. On the arrival of this force, at Madaghery, Cummer ul dien Cawn, leaving part of his
troops

troops in the trenches, approached Major Cuppage, with intention to determine in battle whether he should be left to prosecute his original plan without molestation, or be forced to abandon the design. So soon as the Mysoreans were discovered in motion, the detachment struck its encampment and prepared to fight. In order to alarm Major Cuppage for his post at Paligautchery, and still more for a large convoy of bullocks which was then on its way to General Abercromby, the Cawn made a movement to the right of the detachment, which threatened to have possession of the pass for its object. By this manœuvre, it was left for Major Cuppage to chuse whether he should abandon the idea of relieving Coimbatore, or risk the equipment of our western army; and as the latter object was considered by far the most important, it was immediately determined to fall back; a measure upon which opinions have been various.

ON the first movement of Major Cuppage, the polygars and rocket men of the enemy began the attack on his right flank, whilst the stable horse advanced to charge his rear in solid columns. The flank companies were entrusted with this station. Their valour and discipline were put to a severe test. When hard pressed, the battalions flew to their assistance. In repeated attempts the horse found they could make no impression; and as the Cawn saw that all his endeavours could not occasion the smallest confusion, he determined to abandon the pursuit, and to prosecute his operations at the siege. The loss on this occasion was considerable on both sides. Of the detachment three officers and about fifty sepoy were wounded. Amongst the slain, which amounted to about half that number, there was no man of rank. What the enemy suffered has never been exactly ascertained; but, from the number that were seen to fall, their loss must have been very considerable, especially in horses.

THE first communication which the garrison had with Major Cuppage after this action, left no further room for Mr. Chalmers to expect any relief. The enemy returned to the siege, and carried on their approaches with redoubled exertions. All the ammunition in the fort, which had been originally bad, was now nearly expended; a wide breach was rendered easy of assault from the nearness of the trenches; Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, with the store serjeant and several privates, increased the wounded on one and the same day; and as the people in general had their families in the place, all of them intreated their commandant to propose a capitulation. Mr. Chalmers consented, and terms similar to those which had been granted at the surrender of Daraporam and Permacoil being readily agreed to, the Cawn was put in possession of Coimbatore on the 3d of November.

UNDER a pretence that it was necessary for the Sultaun to ratify the treaty, the prisoners, instead of being sent to Paligautchery, according to agreement, were, after a confinement of thirteen days, forced away to Seringapatam. Before he would consent to move, Mr. Chalmers ventured to remonstrate; he refused to march in any other direction than that which was specified by the terms of agreement; and as he had been already deceived, in order to have an explanation of this strange conduct, he requested an audience of the Cawn in person.

WHILST on his way to that officer, he was surrounded by fresh guards, and closely confined by himself in a small hovel: from thence after a farther detention of two days, he was compelled to march towards Seringapatam. On his arrival at this capital, he was confined

for

two months in a bullock stable, which resisted neither wind nor water, and on the wretched allowance of one measure of rice, with ten cash per day, to maintain himself and family. An infant son soon fell a victim to this barbarous treatment. Lieutenant Nash, with the rest of the garrison, underwent indignities and cruelties nearly similar to those which Mr. Chalmers was compelled to endure; nor is there the least room to doubt, that all of them owe their lives to the discomfiture which the Sultaun suffered at his capital in the following February, and to the spirited remonstrances of Earl Cornwallis respecting their treatment. These facts, however unimportant, in the grand scale of this war, are related with more than common minuteness, in order to shew what the exertions of individuals may effect in the worst of situations.

At the time that Lieutenant Colonel Floyd proceeded to recruit the cavalry in the Carnatic, Captain Oram, with his own battalion, moved in advance towards Vinkitaghery. A few days afterwards the seventh Bengal and twenty-third Coast battalions marched in the same direction, under the command of Captain Rattray, with all the carriage cattle that could be spared from the army. The two last mentioned corps returning with about five thousand bullock loads of grain, passed towards Oussore on the 10th of August; and on the 13th Captain Williamson, with the 28th Bengal battalion, and two volunteer companies that protected one hundred and fourteen elephants from their first setting out at Lucknow and Cawnpore, escorted those animals, which had been loaded with treasure at Madras, into camp. Upwards of six thousand bullocks carrying rice and other provision, above one hundred carts, with swarms of coolies, accompanied Captain Williamson's detachment. This immense

menſe ſupply advanced through the Barahmahl valley, and entering the Myſore country by the paſs at Pallicode, approached the army unmoleſted, under cover of the forts which had been lately acquired in that direction.

ON the 16th of the month Captain Williamſon's detachment reconducted all the elephants and ſpare cattle towards Ambore, along a route, which winding amongſt hills and jungles, leads by Ryacottah to Kiſtnaghery. This paſſage into the Barahmahl, although it had been widened by our pioneers, was found much more difficult of acceſs than that by Pallicode. Thence it was never afterwards attempted with cattle, throughout the war. Captain Oram, with his own and part of the fifteenth battalion, was poſted at this period, in the neighbourhood of Kiſtnaghery, to watch the movements of that gariſon. Theſe two diviſions formed a junction; they proceeded to Ambore, and after being joined by the firſt battalion of Coaſt ſepoys, the whole eſcorted a ſecond convoy, conſiſting of ſome camp equipage, proviſion, and ſtores, to Bangalore, about the middle of September. This diviſion was accompanied by the heavy guns from Ouffore, under the particular direction of Captain Glaſs of the Bengal artillery.

A VAKEEL ſent by the Sultau to treat for peace arrived at one of the outpoſts about the middle of Auguſt. This negociator was ſo particular about the mode of his reception, as to create ſuſpicions reſpecting the intention of his miſſion, and the ſincerity of his maſter's propoſals; particularly as his credentials were addreſſed to Earl Cornwallis only. His name was Appajee Row: he was of the Hindoo religion, and by birth a Maratta, but ſo little reſpected by his

countrymen, that it became necessary to protect his person with a guard. The twenty-sixth Bengal battalion was sent on this duty. Suspected of intrigues, he was dismissed without a hearing on the 23d, when the battalion returned to its station in the line.

THE communication with Bangalore, having, in consequence of our movements (1), been considered open, several gentlemen visited their friends in that garrison. On one of these occasions Mr. Hume, surgeon of the 36th regiment, was unfortunately captured by looties on the 24th, as he was returning from thence to camp; nor has any certain account of his fate been as yet obtained. Another unlucky circumstance happened about this time. A body of horse, about one thousand in number, and headed by a descendant of the former proprietor of Nundydroog, having separated from the confederates, in order to keep the ancient possessions of his family in quietness, a detachment under Cummer ul dien Cawn surprized their encampment, and put most of them to death, in the neighbourhood of Chinapalaboram. The few that escaped fled for shelter to the walls of Bangalore; yet, notwithstanding their irregular mode of warfare, this was the only serious blow which they sustained whilst acting in concert with the rest of the allies. The Marattas, although not so rude as the people of Nizam Ally, had several quarrels with our troops. In one of these a sepoy of the seventh Bengal battalion was put to death; at another time a private of the thirty-sixth had his hand cut off by the blow of a sword: but the culprits were constantly delivered up for punishment to the leaders in whose divisions they served.

									Miles	Fur
(1)	July	22	Neelgherry,	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
		29	Shettapelly,	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
		31	Moodoogampelly,	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
	Aug.	7	Colkacondapelly,	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
		12	Near Ouffore,	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
		11	Agatapelly,	—	—	—	—	—	6	4
		23	Beyoor,	—	—	—	—	—	10	—

As the equipments for a second attempt on the Sultaun's capital were now in great forwardness, it was judged adviseable by Earl Cornwallis to lay open our communication with the districts of Nizam Ally. Besides the interruption which our supplies from the dominions of that prince might suffer whilst Nundydroog and a whole chain of hill forts continued in the hands of the enemy, no material advantage could be derived from the northern brinjaries, or from the herds of polygars by whom these romantic wilds are inhabited. Gowdie's brigade, strengthened by a detachment of artillery, with four iron twelve pounders and two mortars under Major Montagu, marched on this service on the 13th of September. On the 15th they were joined by the fourth and part of the third and fifteenth battalions of Coast sepoy under Captain Alexander Read. This last reinforcement had been for a length of time most advantageously employed in the collection of grain.

RAYMANGHUR, a hill fort of considerable strength, was summoned on the 17th, but the killedar refused to surrender. Batteries erected with uncommon rapidity were then in considerable forwardness: their effect was therefore tried towards evening. A well directed fire soon made impression upon the wall; and as some shells thrown into the place with much judgment contributed to heighten their consternation, the garrison submitted at discretion (2). Am-

(2) *Major Gowdie to Major Close*,—Last night and this day we have been employed in constructing the batteries.—Lieutenant Mackenzie of the engineers, by my advice, took advantage of the bank of a deep ravine to bring the twelve pounder to an elevation to bear on the work, distance eight hundred yards. Major Montagu, with indefatigable exertion and labour, got four six pounders and the two mortars on the top of a rock that completely flanked the works I proposed to attack. At one o'clock two men from the killedar waited on me, proposing terms that I could not comply with on account of time; I sent them back at three, to acquaint the killedar that if he did not accept of terms in course of that afternoon, I should open such batteries on him as I had constructed. No message arriving from the fort within the limited time, I accordingly fired with great effect. After a few rounds I discovered people descending from the rock, and immediately gave orders to cease firing. Captain Read at this time requesting to advance with a company, to meet the party coming down, I agreed, and as soon as it was possible for him to gain the summit, I had the pleasure to be informed he had full possession of Rahmanghur. It is not possible for me at this late hour to ascertain what is upon the hill. Captain Read, with his detachment, marches to-morrow morning, to summon Ambagydroog and Chillumcottah; the latter known by the name of Moorigam Ally.

bagydirgum and Chillumcottah, two neighbouring hill forts, opened their gates to a party detached under Captain Alexander Read, on the first summons (1). After the two divisions had again formed a junction, the whole detachment proceeded without loss of time to Nundydroog; and on the 22d, towards noon, the grenadiers carried the pettah, and a considerable portion of the hill by assault (2). Reports, however, of the approach of Cummer ul dien Cawn to support the northern hill forts, induced Major Gowdie to move off from Nundydroog, and to take post at Chinapalaboram on the 24th. Four days afterwards the detachment again sat down before the hill, with every preparation for the siege, and on the 29th Captain Norman Macleod of the Bengal establishment, with his own and the tenth Coast battalion, escorted to Major Gowdie two additional battering guns, four mortars, with a quantity of grain and stores.

(1) *Major Gowdie to Major Clofe, 21st September, 1791.* You will be pleased to acquaint his Lordship, that I made a march of nine miles to this place. After coming to my ground, I received a letter from Captain Andrew Read, of Gurrumcondah, expressing his apprehensions of the approach of Cummer ul dien Cawn. From this information, and other reasons, I have determined to alter my plan, and proceed no further westward. From very good authority, I understand they have in Nundydroog between two and three thousand fighting men. To attack it, thus circumstanced, would be madness; independent of this, Major Montagu is of opinion, that the twelve-pounders cannot breach the walls. Captain Read and his detachment has again joined me. The two hill forts of Ambagydroog and Chillumcottah surrendered to him yesterday without opposition. He informs me, that my present station will cover five thousand brinjaries proceeding to the grand army. The killedar of Rahmangur is a venerable old man; he requested permission to proceed to the Cuddapah country, which I have granted him. He was so wretchedly poor, that I was obliged to give him two bullocks, one to ride on, the other to carry his little baggage; and I furnished him with fifty rupees, to pay his expences on the road.

Answer in Cypher.—Major Clofe to Major Gowdie.

I am directed by Lord Cornwallis to inform you, that Captain Macleod, with his battalion, and a Coast battalion, will march tomorrow morning from Bangalore, to join you, with the ordnance and stores Major Montagu has applied for. Under his escort two hundred bullock loads of rice, and a supply of arrack and salt, will also proceed. This detachment, goes from hence with rice for their own consumption to the 10th of October inclusive.—23d September, 1791.

(2) *Major Gowdie to Major Clofe, 22d September, 1791.*—You will acquaint his Lordship, that I marched with the flank companies of the detachment, at ten last night, for the pettah of Nundydroog, and completely surprized it at day break this morning. Zeal for the service, in this instance carried me farther than I intended. Captain Read and Lieutenant Mackenzie, of the engineers, with astonishing resolution mounted the hill, and made a lodgement within one hundred and fifty yards of the first gate; but the place is of such wonderful strength, there being three walls, one above the other; that I have given up the idea of keeping possession of the post, and shall withdraw the troops immediately after dark; with a full conviction, that this part, the north face of the hill, is not to be taken: I have had a very heavy cannonade and musquetry on me the whole day. On leaving the pettah an hour since, my loss was only one European and three sepoy wounded. I shall halt tomorrow, and the next day move round to the south side of the fort, to reconnoitre it. My people behaved with great humanity; having many of the inhabitants in their power, whom they spared. A few lives, however, were lost.

THUS

Thus strengthened, the works went on with much spirit; abundance of materials for pickets, fascines and gabions, were easily procured from jungles all around; and a battery constructed for six guns, in the face of the hill, by Lieutenant Mackenzie, of the Madras engineers, was completed on the 2d of October. With unparalleled labour and exertion the guns were got up this steep hill in the course of the two ensuing nights (3). By means of tackles fixed to posts sunk into the ground, and to ropes fixed around rocks and trees, this fatiguing service was carried on in the dark, under the direction of Major Montagu; but situated as the battery lay, it is highly probable that no degree of exertion in the troops, or of skill in the director, could have overcome the difficulties that intervened, but for the assistance of elephants, the wonderful sagacity of which animal is highly conspicuous in his performance of the most severe task in perfect silence, when noise would expose him to danger. A mortar battery which had been laid out on the pettah side, to the westward of Nundydroog, was in readiness about the same time with the other. The latter opened on the 4th without effect, from the height of the hill, and the former on the following day was found unequal to breach the wall, as the stones, which were all of an oblong form, and had been laid lengthwise, from their hardness not only resisted the shot, but frequently broke them to pieces.

THE progress of our operations at Nundydroog having been daily reported to Earl Cornwallis, it was left to his Lordship either to abandon the design, or to advance up the face of the hill by regular ap-

(3) *Major Cowdie to Major Clofe, 3d October.*—With astonishing labour and exertion Major Montagu did in the course of last night get the two twenty-pounders only into the battery, and I believe no man has more resources within himself. I have not a doubt but I shall be able to open the battery tomorrow, as soon as the clouds disperse from the hills, which generally happens about ten o'clock. I propose opening the mortar and gun batteries at the same time. By Major Montagu's advice I have thought it necessary to order the eighteen pounders on, likewise the elephant, as mine had work enough last night. It is my intention to erect a two gun battery at a gateway leading to the pettah, directly under the mortars, to play on the gateway of the fort, and to take the large bastion in flank.

proaches.

proaches. The latter alternative was immediately adopted. Orders were sent to prosecute the siege with the utmost vigour; Captain Kyd, of the Bengal engineers, was directed to join Major Gowdie's detachment; and a trench which had been dug for the foundation of another wall, forming a safe cover to the besiegers, it was occupied in the first instance. This advanced post lay parallel to the enemy's outer wall, at the distance of about one hundred yards. Here Captain Read and Lieutenant Minden were both wounded.

WITH the most unremitting perseverance in excessive labour, a battery for eight guns was completed much higher up in the hill than the first, on the 11th; but from the steepness of the road by which the guns must have been conveyed into it, each required two elephants and four drag ropes crowded with men to bring them forward. After summoning the fort (1), it opened on the ensuing day with excellent effect, and soon silenced all the guns which bore in its direction, excepting one that fired in flank from the south east angle, and did much damage (2). Against this annoyance a traverse was thrown up at

(1) *Sultaun Cawn Sheriff Bahauder, killedar of Nundydroog.*—Major Gowdie now addresses him, to let him know, that he has orders from the Right Honourable Earl Cornwallis to take Nundydroog. If Sultaun Cawn Sheriff is determined to hold out, Major Gowdie recommends to him, for the sake of humanity, that he will send down from the fort all women, children, bramins, and ryuts, that they may be escorted to any place of safety he may point out. After this intimation the killedar may depend on it, that if he obliges Major Gowdie to open his batteries of guns and mortars, that no flag will be attended to. Major Gowdie thinks it necessary to acquaint Sultaun Cawn Sheriff of the fall of Chittledroog to Purseram Bhow; also of the Marattas having possession of Perybalaporam, and of their having spread themselves over the country. Added to this, the grand army is within ten miles; so that all succour is entirely cut off from Nundydroog. Major Gowdie hears that Sultaun Cawn Sheriff is a good soldier: he therefore must be a good man, and one who would save the blood of his fellow creatures. He therefore recommends to him to take one day's consideration of the consequence that must ensue, should he oblige him to storm the fort with the forces he has the honour to command. If the killedar is disposed to treat on honourable terms, Major Gowdie will negotiate matters, by Sultaun Cawn sending proper people down before the batteries are opened. The bearer of this, Huffain Cawn Jemadar, is the confidential man of Major Gowdie; he therefore expects that he will be treated with respect, in such a manner as Major Gowdie would treat a man from Sultaun Cawn. An answer is expected to this letter, such as one soldier would send to another.

Major Gowdie to Major Close.—I sent a jemadar and flag to summon the fort. The killedar refused having any thing to say to him, and fired both cannon and musquetry at him.

(2) *Major Gowdie to Major Close, 13th October, 1791.* Since writing you yesterday, I have had eight or ten people killed and wounded, but as I have not had a return of them, I cannot be particular. The firing 40-day has made a considerable hole in the wall, which is of much greater strength than I could have formed
any

night, and a work was constructed for two six pounders still farther in advance. A twelve pounder being also conveyed into this battery, with infinite labour, the angle gave way to a few shots well aimed by Major Montagu; and the gun which had all along done so much mischief, came tumbling down the rock. As the besiegers fell short of ammunition about this period, the fire from the batteries slackened; but a supply having arrived on the 16th, from Bangalore, it recommenced with much briskness.

THE flank companies of His Majesty's thirty-sixth, and seventy-first regiments, formed a junction with the besiegers on the 17th; and immediately advanced to occupy the last parallel. In order to intimidate the besieged, Earl Cornwallis moved with his whole army within a few miles of Nundydroog (3) on the following day; and after closely reconnoitering the breach, his Lordship gave directions for an assault with the first light of the moon. About dusk, Major General Medows, with Majors Gowdie and Montagu, joined the troops in the advanced parallel. The storm was attended with all the suc-

any idea of. The people in the fort are stockading both sides of the breach. Fascines and earth was laid behind the wall last night, which we are now bringing down. Captain Kyd writes to Colonel Rois. He will give a farther description of the breach; for my part, I think it will take two days more to effect a practicable one. As the wounded men are now very numerous, and many of them bad cases, the surgeons are desirous of removing them to an hospital, and have requested of me to write to his Lordship for twenty or thirty coolies to be sent from the grand army.

							Miles	Fur.
(3) August	28	Malloorpelly,	—	—	—	—	10	—
	30	Agaram,	—	—	—	—	7	—
Sept.	10	Beyoor,	—	—	—	—	4	—
	19	Basantaporam,	—	—	—	—	6	—
	26	Gebbahly,	—	—	—	—	10	4
	27	Elevanca,	—	—	—	—	7	4
	29	Singanipelly,	—	—	—	—	3	4
O ^r .	18	Aroonapelly,	—	—	—	—	11	—

cess that could be expected from the most judicious disposition (1). Two guns, fired at the rise of the moon towards midnight, gave the signal to advance. Under Captain Robertson, of the 71st regiment, the grenadiers, accompanied by Major General Medows, pushed on for the first breach which had been laid open, whilst the light infantry under Captain Hart, of the thirty-sixth regiment, accompanied by Major Gowdie, assailed the other in the outworks; parties from the fourth Madras regiment, under Captains Gibbons and Cameron, with all the pioneers carrying tools and scaling ladders, accompanied these divisions: Major Montagu sent an officer with some artillery men and a mortar, which he intended to make use of as a petard, to blow

Regulations for the assault of Nundydroog, agreed on between Major Gowdie, commanding the detachment, and Captain Robertson, of his Majesty's seventy-first regiment, who commanded the storming party, 17th October.

(1) The fort to be assaulted by two different attacks; the first to be led by a serjeant, corporal, and twelve grenadiers, supported by a Lieutenant and twenty men, who are to be followed by the grenadiers under Captain Burn, who are to make a lodgment in the breach in the curtain; the subaltern who leads this attack, will the moment he carries the breach take possession of the cavalier in the rear of the breach, from whence he will keep up a heavy fire on the round bastions to the right and left, so as to cover the men advancing out of the parallel. The second attack, the light infantry under Captain Hart, with the same forlorn and storming party as the grenadiers, are to move out in the same order, and to attack the breach in the enemy's advanced work to the left, in which they will make a lodgment, and there wait for orders. Both these attacks are to carry six ladders each, two with the serjeant, two with the subaltern, and two with each captain; the men for this duty to be warned before we march off, and posted at the head of the respective attacks; the greatest silence to be observed, and the men to be warned against cheating, or making any noise whatever.

Instructions for Captain Macleod.

When the sepoy grenadiers are paraded near the grenadiers post, which will be by two o'clock this evening, you are to move up as close as possible after the European working party, so as to get as near the parallel as you can, keeping your men under the best possible cover. The instant the storming party moves out of the parallel, you are to march into it, sending two companies to support the light infantry, who are to attack the left breach; you will likewise support the grenadiers, who are to attack the right breach, to the best of your judgment, as circumstances may occur.

Instructions for Captain Gibbings.

You are to move from your lines with the battalion companies of your corps so as to be at the first station on the gun road beyond the engineers post before two o'clock this evening; you are to form your men on the right of the sepoy grenadiers, who are to parade at the above place. When the whole are formed, you will be pleased to move off in such a manner as to prevent your men from being exposed as little as possible; you will then wait on Captain Robertson in the parallel, and know from him the number of your men he will require for carrying the scaling ladders for the attack; the remainder of your own men to be employed as Lieutenant Makenzie, senior engineer, may direct.

Instructions for Lieutenant Mackenzie.

The attack is to be put off till the rising of the moon. Captain Gibbings and Lieutenant Dowse, with the men under them, have instructions to obey your orders. I have no intention of making any lodgment but in the breach in front of the cavalier, and on the cavalier; if it should afterwards be found practicable to get possession of the bastions to the right and to the left of the breach, their gorges must be pulled up. An additional working party of one hundred sepoy is ordered to join you for any service you may chuse to employ them on. It will be necessary that you should be in the parallel early. General Medows and I will be there before dark. My reason for wishing you to be there early, is to see the materials ready to put into the people's hands.

Instructions

blow open the gate of the inner wall; and the whole was supported by all the grenadier sepoys of the detachment under Captain Macleod. As if they expected an assault, the enemy were more than usually alert; their fire from ginjals and small arms inflicted some severe wounds, and a blue light discovering the assailants to the garrison just as they left the parallel, a heavy discharge of musquetry and rockets opened; stones of immense weight, too, rolling down from the works at the summit of the hill, with astonishing velocity, were still more formidable to our troops than all the other defences.

Instructions for Lieutenant Dowse, commanding the Pioneers.

You will have your men ready to move up to the parallel by two o'clock this evening, and you will be pleased to comply with every requisition from Lieutenant Mackenzie, senior engineer.

General Orders, by Earl Cornwallis.

Lord Cornwallis having been witness of the extraordinary obstacles, both of nature and art, which were opposed to the detachment of the army that attacked Nundydroog, he cannot too highly applaud the firmness and exertions which were manifested by all ranks, in carrying on the operations of the siege, or the valour and discipline which was displayed by the flank companies of his Majesty's thirty sixth and seventy-first regiments; those of the Madras fourth European battalion; the thirteenth Bengal battalion of native infantry; and of the third, fourth, tenth, fifteenth, and twenty seventh battalions of Madras native infantry, that were employed in the assault of last night, and which, by overcoming all difficulties, effected the reduction of that important fort.

His Lordship is highly sensible of the zealous and meritorious conduct of Major Gowdie in the command of that detachment, both at the attacks of Raymanghur, and in carrying on the arduous operation of the siege of Nundydroog, for which the Major will be pleased to accept his best acknowledgments. The whole of the officers and soldiers who composed that detachment appear likewise to be justly entitled to the strongest expressions of his approbation; and he particularly desires that his warmest thanks may be presented to Major Montagu, for his successful efforts in bringing the artillery into the batteries, and for the ability with which it was afterwards served.

To Captain Robertson, of the seventy first regiment, who commanded the European flank companies that led the assault, and to Captain Macleod, who supported the Europeans with the flank companies of the native regiment, for the gallantry and judgement with which they discharged the duties of their respective situations. To Captain Read, for his almost unexampled perseverance in carrying on an approach, and establishing a parallel near to the enemy's work on the ascent of the hill, which was calculated to facilitate the success of the assault.

To Captain Kyd, his Lordship's aid-de-camp, for the zealous and able professional assistance which he gave as engineer; and to Lieutenant Mackenzie the senior engineer upon duty, for the skill and indefatigable industry which he uniformly exerted, both at Raymanghur, and during the whole of this siege. Although the services of pioneers are less brilliant than those of the troops, they are of peculiar value in all such operations, and his Lordship thinks himself called upon, in justice to Lieutenant Dowse, and all the non-commissioned officers and men of the pioneer corps; as well as to Ensign Stokoe of the engineers, who assisted with so much ability in directing their labours, to declare that their behaviour on this occasion has deserved his highest commendation.

Lord Cornwallis cannot sufficiently express the sense of his obligation to General Medows; but he requests that he will be assured, that he considers the handsome manner in which the General undertook the temporary command of a detachment so inadequate to his rank, and the conduct of the assault, both as a mark of personal friendship to himself, and as an additional proof of his earnest desire to promote the honour and interest of his country.

THE enemy made but a feeble resistance. Notwithstanding the many disadvantages which our soldiery had to surmount, they soon got possession of the breaches; after one discharge of musquetry they pressed forward, and closely pursuing the runaways, they prevented their barricading the inner gate, and entered the upper works without the loss of one man. The fears of the defenders led them to seek safety in various alternatives. From the nearness of our encampment on the preceding day, numbers became clamorous for surrender; the active and young in a mutinous mood descending the rock by means of ladders made of ropes, escaped through the jungles; and several abandoning their posts, fled for shelter to the principal pagoda, where they were soon followed by the killedar and buckshee. On gaining possession of the place, mercy and mildness rendered the situation of the prisoners as comfortable as circumstances could possibly admit; but the dejected killedar could not be diverted from the lowness of spirits into which he had been thrown by the fall of his post. He was a Mussulman of high trust, about forty years of age. Naturally of a pensive and melancholy turn, he could not be persuaded from musing on the sudden loss of a fortress which had been considered impregnable, and which, whilst in a very imperfect state, and with a feeble garrison, withstood all the efforts of Hyder for three successive years, and yielded at last to famine only. The buckshee, of the same religion, but somewhat farther advanced in life, was one of those who a few years ago was employed on an embassy to Constantinople.

THE victors observing by day light the difficulties which they overcame in the night, were struck with astonishment at their wonderful success and good fortune. Independent of the works, from the natural advantages of the hill, a few resolute men might have made this acquisition worthy of the high confidence which the Sultaun reposed in its strength. Neither pains nor expence had been spared in rendering the rock impregnable. It is inaccessible all around, except by one steep and rugged passage, which is fortified with two strong walls and a number of towers. The labour in raising these high walls and outworks with hewn stones of much hardness, in such a situation, must have been excessive, tedious, and expensive; and as the foundation of a third wall had been laid out, it is reasonable to suppose, that Nundydroog was fixed on as the pillar to which the Sultaun's chain for supporting his ambitious projects against the north, must have been fastened.

To the southward and westward of this strong hold, the country is fertile, well cultivated, and full of villages. Although the inhabitants had abandoned their houses, as they had not hitherto suffered any material disturbance, considerable concealments of grain were discovered by the followers in these directions; and as nothing could surpass the confidence of the enemy in the strength of the place, contrary to their wonted custom, not only the towns, but even large quantities of forage, escaped the ravages of fire. Cormalghur, or Calarumcunda, another hill fort at the distance of three miles from Nundydroog, surrendered on the first summons. Taking advantage

of these circumstances, our allies remained in this plentiful neighbourhood for a while. Major Gowdie, after leaving Captain Read, with his own detachment, in charge of Nundydroog, forwarded three heavy guns, under an escort of a sepoy company, for the use of the Nizam's army, then besieging Gurrumcondah, and proceeded with the rest of the troops in the direction of Bangalore.

ON a retrospective view of the several important services performed by the division under Major Gowdie, during a period of little more than three months that it acted by itself, they cannot be deemed unworthy of a very considerable share of the applause so justly bestowed on detachments from the army. The surrender of Ouffore, the storming the pettah, and center fort of Ryacottah, the fall of that strong hold, the capture of Raymanghur, the yielding of Ambagydirgum and Chillumcottah at discretion, the reduction of Nundydroog, and the consequent submission of Cormal Ghur, in conjunction with the other posts, completing a chain of strong fortifications across the country, gave entire protection to the brinjaries and northern polygars in their movements to the southward as far as Bangalore; and exclusive of other services, whilst with the main force, must ever entitle that body of troops to a most respectable mention from all candid writers. The fall of Nundydroog opened our communication with the possessions of Nizam Ally, without much risk of interruption; and disheartening the garrison, it strengthened the confidence of the troops that besieged Gurrumcondah.

WHILST

WHILST the grand army was thus occupied in covering the operations against the hill forts which stretched from Bangalore towards the dominions of Nizam Ally, a detachment that separated from the force under Cummer ul dien Cawn, as he descended into Coimbatore at Guzlehatty, crossed the Cauvery at the foot of the mountains. This division, headed by Bunker Sahib, son to Budder ul Zemeen Cawn, the late killedar of Darwar, advancing to the northward with address and rapidity, entered the Barahmahl valley by the Tapoor pass, and occasioning considerable alarm amongst our parties in these districts, after throwing a killedar of great trust, and an additional force into Kistnaghery, they threatened the convoys which approached Amboor from Fort St. George. On receiving intelligence of Bunker Sahib's approach, in order to protect a supply of cattle which grazed in the vicinity of Vaniambaddy, Captain Oram found it necessary to withdraw his battalion from Tripatore, a post at which he had been stationed, with a view to keep open our communication with the Pallicode pass.

THIS enemy, which the fears of the inhabitants had greatly exaggerated, together with some plunderers who appeared in the districts to the southward of Ouffore, induced Earl Cornwallis to detach Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, with His Majesty's seventy-fourth regiment, the seventh Bengal and first Coast battalion, towards the Barahmahl vally. Tripatore, with all the principal villages in this quarter, had been already plundered. Irritated by the ill treatment which his father experienced from another branch of the confederacy, the Mysorean leader commanded, that cattle of whatsoever

descip-

description should be driven away in the direction of Seringapatam; and that the whole produce of the soil should be swept off towards Penagra, a mud fort which stands near the south end of the Barahmahl valley, and at no considerable distance from the entrance at Tappoor.

THITHER Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell directed his course. The place was demanded by a regular summons, but the garrison, not contented with a refusal, aggravated their obstinacy by firing on the flag. As the fort was of no strength, the insult met with a just and instantaneous punishment. It was immediately attacked all around, and carried by escalade, without the loss of one man; indeed there were but very few wounded; the enemy suffered considerably before a stop could be put to the carnage. Enraged at their violation of the rules practised amongst civilized nations, the assailants made free use of the bayonet; nor was it possible to stop the effusion of blood, until nearly two hundred lives had been expended. The place was dismantled of its defences, and the detachment proceeded towards Kistnaghery.

HERE they met with a very different reception. On the 7th of November, towards eleven at night, two distinct divisions, composed of Europeans and sepoy, advanced by separate routes to attack Kistnaghery. One was commanded by Captain Wallace, of the seventy-fourth regiment; the other by Captain Rattray of the seventh Bengal battalion. Those two parties stormed the pettah, and were successful at the same period of time. The enemy fled to the upper works, and the assailants, conceiving that they might enter with the fugitives,

pro-

proceeded up the rock with the utmost expedition. Although thus closely pursued, the defenders contrived to shut up their gates. Alarmed by the noise of the attack below, all of them flew to the ramparts. Every attempt at escalade was frustrated by an immense quantity of stones, which incessantly pouring down the rock, swept away the ladders and those by whom they were carried. As one party was driven off, another returned to the walls; straining every nerve, they repeatedly renewed their efforts; but as a bright moon discovered every movement, the activity of the defenders made considerable slaughter, and pointed to the propriety of withdrawing the troops. Thus abandoning the enterprize, the retreat was effected with composure, and after destroying the pettah, the whole returned to their encampment before day-light. The loss was considerable on both sides, but the assailants had to lament the fall of some valuable officers (1). This repulse, together with the success at Coimbatore, afforded the Sultaun a temporary gleam of comfort; but it was soon overcast by the shocks that he was compelled to endure in other quarters. After driving the invaders out of the Barahmahal and neighbouring districts, Colonel Maxwell returned with his detachment to the grand army (2).

(1) *Return of killed and wounded in the attempt on Kistnaghery.* Seventy-fourth, killed, Lieutenants Forbes and Lamont; wounded, Captain Wallace, Lieutenants Mackenzie and Ayton,—Bengal Establishment, wounded, Lieutenant Bird, seventh battalion:—Coast Establishment, wounded Captain Agnew, aid de camp to Colonel Maxwell.

(2) Lord Cornwallis returns his best thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, for the zealous and able manner in which he has executed his general instructions, to dislodge and drive out the detachments that the enemy had sent into the Barahmahal, and the district of Ousfore. The good conduct and gallantry which was manifested at the assaults of Pinagra, reflects great credit upon Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, and the corps under his command; but his Lordship considers the spirited and judicious attempt which, after surprizing and carrying the pettah and lower fort, was made upon the upper fort of Kistnaghery, as highly honourable to all the officers and soldiers who were employed on that occasion, and justly deserving his warmest applause.

DURING this period, Earl Cornwallis occupied a position in the neighbourhood of Ouscotta (3), which was judiciously calculated for covering at once the stores with the heavy guns that approached the army from the Carnatic, and the immense quantities of grain which the brinjaries brought towards Bangalore from the northward. In a situation so central, his Lordship could also succour his detachments in the Barahmahl, should the movements of the enemy have rendered that measure necessary; and as the intention of conveying the train by the Pallicode pass had not been laid aside, a safe communication with Colonel Maxwell was of still greater importance. But as Captain Andrew Read, Captain Richard Scot, and Lieutenant Colonel Giels, agreed that the Padnaigdirgum pass could with some little difficulty be rendered practicable for heavy guns, that road was adopted in preference to the former, which besides being liable to interruption from the enemy, and in itself circuitous, had now the additional disadvantage of having the valley leading to it flooded by the rains.

ON the 21st of September a company from the twenty-sixth Bengal battalion, under Lieutenant Bradford, escorted Captain Howley with from two to three hundred lascars, towards Amboor, in order to forward the transport of the heavy guns; about a fortnight afterwards Captain Scot, with the remainder of that battalion, conducting the prisoners of war, and the remains of the late Lieutenant Colo-

		Miles	Fur.
(1) October 20	Boodikery,	14	2
	21 Nalloorpelly,	14	6
	23 Ooffeur,	3	4

nel Moorhouse to the same place, had instructions to return with the first convoy. Through the zeal of the Honourable Charles Stuart, and other members of the Supreme Government in Bengal, seconded by the able exertions of the Madras presidency, immense supplies had by this time been collected at Amboor.

BESIDES large sums of money, great quantities of military stores, with about eight hundred drafts and recruits for the King's and Company's service, all arrived from Europe on the ships of that season, were in readiness to join; recovered men for the native corps of the Bengal and Madras establishments, amounting nearly to the same number, here awaited orders; and about three hundred volunteers from the Bombay Government advanced thus far on their way to the army. These divisions, when added to his own battalion, augmented the convoy under Captain Scot to about two thousand five hundred fighting men. There was also a detachment of two troops from the native cavalry, under the command of the Honourable Lieutenant St. Leger.

As the stores were of more easy conveyance than the heavy guns, under this escort about twelve thousand loaded bullocks were sent on in advance. Just as they passed Colar, a body of five thousand horse, sent by Tookajee Bounsla, Rajah of Berar, to join the army, having been mistaken for the enemy, occasioned an alarm in the neighbouring districts, which was conveyed to Captain Scot by messengers, who from their fears accumulated the prospects of danger to the highest pitch. From this intelligence many judged it adviseable to
make

make a forced march at night ; but as the safety of the supplies was of more importance to the ultimate object of the war than that of the corps itself, the commanding officer judiciously determined not to endanger the former by a movement in the dark, for the risk to which the latter would be liable. He continued to advance by regular marches ; and, as it was soon ascertained that the intelligence was erroneous, the result justified the propriety of his conduct. After lodging the stores in Bangalore, Captain Scot received orders to join the division employed under Major Gowdie ; and the horse of Tookajee Bounla formed a junction with the Maratta army in three days afterwards.

THE train followed this important convoy without loss of time, in two separate divisions. The first under charge of Captain Howley, assisted by Captain Glas with his own company of artillery, was escorted by the fourteenth battalion of Bengal sepoy, commanded by Captain Archdeacon, and arrived at Bangalore on the 22d of November ; the other under Lieutenant Colonel Giels, accompanied by Major Stevenson, whose regiment of cavalry had now been completely recruited, reached that depot on the last day of the same month. But as the principal division of the cavalry, together with a considerable part of the equipment, remained still in the Carnatic, Earl Cornwallis determined to attempt the reduction of Savandroog and the other hill forts that threatened his operations against Seringapatam, during the period which must have elapsed in drawing forward

ward his last convoy. Whilst these strong holds continued in possession of the enemy, no dependance could be placed on the engagements of our brinjaries, who in the event of their fall, were willing to contract for the transport of ample supplies.

ALTHOUGH the judicious position of our main force (4) prevented these convoys from suffering any material interruption, the enemy still hovering on the skirts of our encampment, contrived occasionally to do some mischief. Just as the first division of the train approached Bangalore, some of their horse found means to carry off twelve elephants from a party that were sent to forage from the left of the line; but as they were closely pursued by a division of Marattas, three were re-taken. A few days afterwards about two hundred and fifty of that people, who had ventured too far in the direction of Magree, were cut off to a man, by a party of the enemy's horse. But those trifling advantages were scarcely felt, when compared with the success that attended our operations in other directions. Independent of his sufferings from the confederates in Mysoore, our squadron, at this period, contributed much to cripple the enemy by their exertions on the Malabar coast.

A SMALL island which stands within one mile of land, in the latitude of Onore, had been fortified by the Sultaun with much care. Intended principally as a magazine of naval stores, every article necessary for constructing or fitting out of ships, were lodged in this

								Miles	Fur.
(4) November,	7	Basantiperam,	—	—	—	—	—	11	4
	22	Near Kingery,	—	—	—	—	—	5	4
	23	Kingery,	—	—	—	—	—	2	—

fortress in great abundance. His Majesty's ship the *Minerva*, accompanied by the *Thames* and *Vestal* frigates, commanded by Captains Sutton, Truebridge, and Osborn, sailed on an expedition against this strong hold, and anchoring close to the works, the killedar was summoned to surrender on the 11th of October. The garrison refused to submit. Besides having many advantages from nature and art, it was strengthened by about forty pieces of cannon; but the dextrous management of some marines who landed to attack the place, together with the appearance of our ships, intimidating the enemy, they consented to lay down their arms. A circumstance which took place about six weeks after this period, threatened for some time to involve Great Britain in a war with France. As the *Resolu*, a frigate of thirty-six guns, convoyed two French merchantmen towards the port of Mangalore, Commodore Cornwallis ordered Captain Sir Richard Strachan, with the *Phoenix* and *Perseverance* frigates, to examine the trading ships. Whilst the boats were employed in this service, the commander of the *Resolu*, sheering along side, fired one round of all her guns into the *Phoenix* without any previous communication. This sudden attack was repelled with promptitude. Sir Richard raked the Frenchman fore and aft, and continuing his advantage, the *Resolu*, after fighting for about one hour, struck, but not until the *Perseverance* had joined in the engagement. Upwards of fifty men were killed and wounded on each side; Amongst the latter, the captain of the French frigate was for a time disabled; but the wounds of Lieutenant Finlay, of our marines, proved mortal. The frigate was delivered over to the commandant of Mahé, and the trading
ships

ships containing no warlike stores, they were permitted to proceed on their voyage without molestation. However, as several vessels had sailed from French ports with supplies for the Sultaun, it was highly necessary to check the interference of that country in the first instance; nor does it appear that any attempt to land succours took place after this period. It is said that the French commodore, Monsieur St. Felix, although inclined to resent the indignity which in his idea had been offered to his nation, could not prevail on his people to run the risk of involving their country in a war with England.

As the reduction of Savandroog had been considered an object of the first importance, the third and thirteenth Bengal, with the sixth Coast battalion, accompanied by a troop of cavalry, escorted the chief engineer on the 30th of November, whilst he again endeavoured to form an acquaintance with this inhospitable fortress. The place, after being closely reconnoitred, was deemed practicable on the north face, and the best judges having reported to that purpose, his Lordship determined on the attack without loss of time. This immense rock, which rises upwards of half a mile in perpendicular height, out of a country every where broken by deep ravines into rugged precipices, is embraced by walls and fortifications all around. Towards the top it is separated by a frightful chasm into two huge masses, each of which is strengthened by distinct works. Thick belts of bamboo and thorny bushes encircle its base, which measures full eight miles in circumference; and, as if intended by nature to strengthen the whole, one impenetrable jungle, extending from thence in every direction, forms a barrier nowhere short of five miles in depth.

THE party sent to escort the chief engineer, encamping at Thoonakery, within six miles of Savandroog, they were joined by the twenty-sixth Bengal battalion on the 4th of December. At this time Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell took charge of the detachment. The army, after a junction of the divisions which had been detached under Colonel Maxwell, Major Gowdie, and others, advanced to within four miles of Thoonakery (1). Escorted by a battalion of sepoy, Earl Cornwallis reconnoitred the country, and in particular the districts to the northward and westward. His Lordship directed that Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell, with the third and thirteenth battalions, should take post at Sandycoop, a small mud fort on the north road, at the distance of about six miles. The twenty-eighth Bengal, with the ninth and twenty-first Coast battalions under Captain Welsh, in order to cover the other flank, were sent in the opposite direction, as far as the centre road; and the only route, besides these, by which the enemy could pass the wilds which separate Seringapatam from Bangalore being that to the southward, it was left to be watched by Captain Alexander Read with his own detachment. The immediate prosecution of the siege was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, who had under his command His Majesty's fifty second and seventy-second regiments, the fourteenth and twenty-sixth Bengal, and the sixth Coast battalion. In addition to this force, Major Montagu, conducted four twelves and the same number of eighteen pounders, all of iron, together with two howitzers, and a proportion of artillery men.

(1) December 7. Kanelly, — — — — — Miles
 12. Thoonakery, — — — — — 5
 6

PREVIOUS to any attack on Savandroog, it became necessary to cut a road through the thickets, so as to admit of transporting the guns to the foot of the hill. From the close texture of the jungle, and the broken surface of the country, this service appeared at first almost insurmountable; but the same skill and perseverance that overcame the difficulties at Nundydroog, removed every obstacle in this quarter. The piquets of the detachment clambering up the mountain, occupied an immense precipice attached to Savandroog on the 10th of the month; and in course of the night, a few companies of Europeans, with the twenty-sixth battalion of sepoys, formed a lodgement within two hundred and fifty yards of the first wall, in a situation which was fixed on for the upper batteries. The enemy, in not defending this position, clearly discovered that they trusted for safety to the natural strength of the place, and not to their own exertions.

FROM the extreme fatigue of making roads, and erecting works in the face of the hill, notwithstanding that the garrison offered little or no opposition, it took the hard labour of seven days before any of the heavy guns were in readiness to open. However, about noon on the 17th, one battery of three eighteen pounders commenced, at the distance of eight hundred yards from the wall, at an elevation of twenty-three degrees; another, erected nearer by one hundred yards, played about the same time from three twelves and two eighteen pounders; but as these guns required a greater degree of elevation than the others, and as the wall was built of large hard stones, fastened to the rock by strong iron bolts, the effect of
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the cannonade from the twelve-pounders did not at the beginning answer expectation. From two two-gun batteries which had now been constructed within two hundred and fifty yards of the wall, the fire soon promised a practicable breach; and as the twelve-pounders were replaced with eighteens from the army, a constant discharge on the upper wall opened an entrance there also. Lieutenant Macpherson, of the seventy-sixth regiment, who on this and similar services at former periods, commanded the European pioneers, advanced to the outer breach in broad day-light, and measured the height of the wall. Major Montagu, conceiving from his report, that it had not been made sufficiently practicable, kept up an incessant and well directed fire from all the batteries, and with such success, that before dark the first wall was shattered to the very foundation. The fire of the 20th widened the breaches, and commanded the whole of the rock in this direction. The flank companies of the seventy-first and seventy-sixth regiments were directed to join Colonel Stuart's detachment; and as all the defences, except such as nature offered, had given way to the skill of our artillery and engineers, every preparation was made for the assault. On the suggestion of Colonel Nesbit, who as second in command had all along discovered the utmost activity, the Commander in Chief gave orders to storm. From a confidence in his abilities, and a thorough acquaintance with his spirit and zeal, his Lordship entrusted that officer with the direction of this momentous undertaking.

CLOSE and noxious fogs regularly descend on Savandroog at night; and as their departure towards the summit of the rock, with the rise of the sun, daily exposed the breaches to the besiegers, whilst the at-

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mosphere growing still more dense around the enemy darkened their view, that period of the 21st was fixed for the assault. But as the instructions issued by Colonel Nesbit at his tent on the evening before the storm, in presence of all the officers who were to command attacks, or lead divisions, must convey the most correct idea of this enterprize, they are here submitted in the Colonel's own words.

“ It is intended to assault Savandroog tomorrow morning; the attacks will be composed as follows; — The light company of the seventy-sixth, with the grenadier companies of the fifty-second and seventy-sixth, under Captain Gage, will take as early as possible to the left, by the path leading in that direction through a small gateway in an upper wall, or by any other path or way by which they can ascend the hill. Arriving there, Captain Gage will form and remain to cover the ascent of the main body. This division will be accompanied by ten European pioneers, with four scaling ladders and a proportion of tools, to follow in the rear of the leading company.

“ THE light company of the fifty-second, ascending the first wall as fast as possible, and as much to the right, will proceed along the inside of the wall, to a small gateway, or beyond it if practicable, to amuse the enemy in that quarter, and to secure the right flank of the attack. If Captain Monson should see occasion to push forward, he will be instantly supported. This division will be accompanied by twenty pioneers, with their tools.

“ THE light companies of the seventy-first and seventy-second regiments, under Captain Robertson, will move as much to the right of the breach as shall be possible, and make along the wall a short distance, to some huts, pass them, and ascend the hill by a path

“ a path which will be found in the recess of the rock ; a guide,
 “ however, will attend, to shew this path. Captain Robertson will
 “ use the utmost expedition in getting to the top of the hill, where
 “ he will join Captain Gage, and remain with him to cover the
 “ ascent of the main body. Ten European pioneers, with four scal-
 “ ing ladders, and a proportion of tools, will accompany this at-
 “ tack in the rear of the seventy-first company.

“ THE main body, under the direction of Major Fraser, assisted by
 “ Captain Hunter, and led by the Honourable Captain Lindsay, will
 “ consist of the seventy-first and seventy-second grenadiers, four bat-
 “ talion companies from the two regiments in camp, and four com-
 “ panies of native grenadiers, to move under cover of the parties to the
 “ right and left up the rock, opposite the European post, deliberately
 “ and slowly, and keeping as collected and compact as possible, and
 “ are to have no other object in view than that of gaining the hill.

“ THE men are not to fire, or otherwise to interrupt their progress.
 “ This attack to be supported by the sixth battalion Coast infantry,
 “ under Captain Macpherson, who will ascend the hill, and then
 “ form, according to situation and circumstances ; being ready at
 “ every instant, whether in his progress, or on his arrival, to assist or
 “ support where occasion may require. This attack to be accom-
 “ panied by twenty European pioneers, ten in the rear of the seventy
 “ first grenadiers, with four scaling ladders ; ten more, with four lad-
 “ ders, in the rear of the first battalion company ; and thirty native
 “ pioneers, with an officer, to attend the sepoy grenadiers ; and a pro-
 “ portion to be attached to the sixth battalion.

“ EACH

“ EACH attack and division of it, to commence at the same instant of time. The officers will be informed to-morrow morning of the signal agreed on. An attack is to be made on the N. E. pettah, and a considerable corps will be sent to shew themselves on the other side of the hill.”

As the fogs around Savandroog, had been still more close than usual on the morning of the 21st, our batteries fired but little till towards ten o'clock; about that hour, however, the day began to clear up, and the enemy having been seen descending, in order to defend the breach, all the heavy guns opened upon them with grape, a well directed and deadly fire. Our troops at that instant advancing in the order described, the defendants were struck with a panick, from which the rapidity and fierceness of the assault left them no room to recover. Such were their fears that, with little or no resistance, except what offered from the natural steepness and ruggedness of the rock, the divisions under Captains Gage and Monson, entered the two walls promiscuously; unmolested by the fugitives, they took possession of their cannon, and penetrated to the summits of both rocks, without the loss of one man; indeed, on the whole of this memorable enterprize two only were wounded (1). Of the enemy about two

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hundred

(1) “ Lord Cornwallis thinks himself fortunate, almost beyond example, in having acquired, by assault, a fortress of so much strength and reputation, and of such inestimable value to the public interests, as Savandroog, without having to regret the loss of a single soldier on the occasion. He can only attribute the pusillanimity of the enemy, yesterday, to their astonishment, at seeing the good order, and determined countenance, with which the troops who were employed in the assault entered the breaches, and ascended precipices that have hitherto been considered, in the country, as inaccessible. But although the resistance was so contemptible, he is not the less sensible, that the behaviour of the grenadiers and light infantry of the 52d, 71st, 72d, and 76th regiments, who led the assault, and who must have made such decisive impression upon the minds of the enemy, reflected the most distinguished honour upon their discipline and valour. The vigour and alacrity which was shewn by the officers and men of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart's detachment, in supporting the labour and fatigues of the

“ siege

hundred were slain, and numbers in endeavouring to escape the bayonet, lost their lives from the height of the precipices over which they attempted to descend. The fall of Savandroog in so short a time, and with loss so very inconsiderable, impressed the allies with a most favourable opinion of our prowess and skill; especially as the whole Maratta force, had on a former occasion, besieged the same fortress without success for a period of at least three years. Yet notwithstanding what they had seen, so high were their opinions of the Sultaun's strength and resources, that several amongst them still doubted of success against his capital.

RAMGHUR and Sheriaghery, struck with the sudden fall of Savandroog, and intimidated further by a spirited assault on the former, under Captain Welsh, they both yielded to his detachment, which had advanced for their reduction. Although of considerable strength, as the intrepidity of the assailants had made them masters of the pettah and centre fort of Ramghur, the killedar was induced to surrender on a promise of good treatment, and the example was soon followed by the other. Quantities of provisions and stores were captured in these hill forts, all of which having been secured the detachment returned to camp.

THE division of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart again advancing in order to reduce Outradroog, Earl Cornwallis moved with the rest

“ siege, entitle them to the highest commendation; and his Lordship desires that Lieutenant Colonel Stuart will accept of his warmest acknowledgements, for the zeal and judgement which he manifested, both in directing the efforts of the troops under his command during the siege, and in making arrangements for the assault. His Lordship also returns his best thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Ross, Chief Engineer, for the judicious choice which he made in selecting proper situations for the batteries, and for the great attention which he paid to the other duties of his station; and to Lieut. Colonel N. Birt, for the able and officer-like manner in which he conducted the troops to the assault; and the greatest praise is due to Major Montagu, for his laborious and successful exertion to overcome the infinite difficulties that occurred in placing the guns in the batteries, and for his professional skill in directing their fire.”

of

of his army to the pagodas, at Magree. At this time, as on a former occasion, the killedar of Outradroog, treated a summons sent by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart with contempt, and threatened to fire on the flag, if it did not retire. About 10 o'clock, a detachment consisting of the 26th battalion of Bengal sepoy's; four battalion companies from the 52d and 72d regiments, with two field pieces and a proportion of artillery-men and pioneers, advanced to storm the pettah, under Captain Richard Scott; whilst Major Stephenson's cavalry, with a company from the 52d regiment, made a circuit to the northward of the hill, in order to cut off the garrison in the event of their attempting a retreat.

At the hour of eleven, and within one mile of the pettah, the attack was planned with much judgement. In the event of meeting with but feeble resistance, Captain Scott fortunately determined to follow up any advantage which the fears of the garrison or other fortuitous circumstance might throw in his way. However, as the killedar requested a cessation of hostilities for two hours, it was granted on his promising that he would bring the garrison to submit. Treachery was soon suspected; the people on withdrawing their property from the pettah, were seen to range along the fortifications, pointing their guns and making every preparation for resistance; and as the place, independant of its natural advantages, was defended by seven strong walls at the only point where it was accessible, delay became highly dangerous.

TOWARDS

TOWARDS one o'clock, some shots being fired from the garrison, with excellent aim at the head of our column, the suspicions of treachery were confirmed beyond a possibility of doubt; Lieut. Shipton, of the Bengal Artillery, in return, opened his guns on the lower works with the best effect; Capt. Scott gave the order to storm at the same time, and as the troops advanced from the left, the 72d companies under Lieut. Macinnes, escalated the pettah in an instant. The companies of the 52d headed by Captain Zouch entered somewhat to the right, and the sepoy's mounted the walls directly in front. The whole again assembling, formed a junction on the opposite side of the pettah. Four walls constructed on the face of the hill, were successively carried by the help of ladders. The gates of the second and third walls, were burst open by main strength; but those of the first and fourth, could only be opened from within. A source of defence hitherto unpracticed in the war, was for the first time attempted between the upper of these walls. A number of wild bullocks let loose by the runaways, in order to cover their retreat, played their part with wonderful adroitness, and overturned upwards of thirty men. Several Europeans and sepoy's, tossed in the air to a considerable height, received severe contusions; but the steady discipline of the troops, overcame every impediment. After surmounting these obstacles, lofty precipices and strong walls, still stood in the way; the passage which had till now been single branched from here to the right and left; the latter road, defended by too lofty walls, led by single steps, cut in solid rock, over the brow of a frightful precipice; the other

other, passing through a natural arch of this rock, like that already described at Hooliahdroog, could not have been forced if guarded by a few resolute men, as it was not of width sufficient to admit troops by files. Through this latter passage, however, the assailants continued to advance; the road through the arch, was but feebly defended, and the troops entered the upper works without having one man slain; two only were wounded by musket shot, but several were for a time disabled by the bullocks, and amongst them Captain Zouch, was much bruised from a severe heave. The killidar was taken prisoner; about forty men were put to the bayonet; but as ladders had been previously planted at two different points in order to secure a retreat, the principal part of the garrison made their escape into the jungles (i).

ON the works of Outradroog which were in good repair, we found about twenty pieces of cannon. The entrances at the several gateways were flanked by turrets and bastions. In the upper fort there were some magazines constructed in chasms of the rock; there were also, several hoards of grain, a number of chains and handcuffs, with a quantity of sheet-copper. In one immense chasm there was an inexhaustible reservoir of excellent water. From these, and

(i) " Lord Cornwallis has received, with the highest satisfaction, a report from Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, that the strong and important rock of Outradroog was carried yesterday forenoon, by assault, by a detachment consisting of two companies of the 52d, and two companies of the 72d regiments, and the 26th Bengal battalion, without the loss of a man on our side. The judgement with which Lieutenant Colonel Stuart made the general disposition for the assault, reflects the highest credit on him as an officer; and his Lordship desires that Captain Scott, of the Bengal infantry, who commanded the assault, will accept his warmest acknowledgements, for the spirit and good conduct which he manifested in availing himself of the confusion of the enemy, according to the instructions given him by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart. His Lordship likewise desires that his thanks may be communicated, in general, to the other officers and soldiers who composed the detachment, for their gallantry and steadiness on that occasion; and that it may be particularly signified to Lieutenant Macinnes, of the 72d regiment, who led the European company, and to Lieuts. Macpherson and Dowle, who conducted the European and native pioneers that were employed in carrying the scaling ladders to break open the gates, that from Lieutenant Colonel Stuart's report, he considers their behaviour highly meritorious."—G. O. 25th December, 1793.

other favourable circumstances Earl Cornwallis was induced to occupy Outradroog as an hospital, whilst the operations against Seringapatam were going forward. Besides other advantages, possession of this stronghold together with Savandroog gave ample protection to the Binjanics, who advanced towards the army; and as none of the other hill-forts which rise between Seringapatam and Bangalore were of any material importance, as they are situated at such a distance to the southward of this road, the army rested in the vicinity of Outradroog, without attempting any further exploits for a time.

A
S K E T C H

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

WHILST Earl Cornwallis was thus employed in the reduction of the several fortresses, that anywise threatened to impede the operations carrying on against Seringapatam, the cavalry corps under Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, strengthened by drafts and recruits were augmented in men nearly to their original force. Rest from fatigue, abundance of forage, and the unremitting attention of their officers, enabled Stephenson's regiment to take the field before the setting in of the monsoon in the Carnatic; the disinterested zeal of their leader, having, with uncommon liberality, kept pace with our distresses, in the worst of times, the recovery of this corps was soon effected; consequently accompanying Lieutenant Colonel Giel, with the heavy guns, they formed a junction with the grand army, whilst encamped in the vicinity of Savaudroog.

BUT

BUT the horses of the other corps, although their recovery was in considerable forwardness, were by no means equal to undergo the fatigues of another campaign; it was therefore determined that all his Majesty's dragoons should be mounted from the best horses of the native regiments, and that such, besides these, as were in a serviceable condition, should be made over to Major Orr, in order to enable his regiment also to take the field. Yet, after the utmost stretch of exertion in re-equipment, the whole cavalry of Earl Cornwallis, including the two body guards under Lieutenants Turner and Grant, did not at any ensuing period exceed twelve hundred swords.

ALTHOUGH the monsoon of this season was very uncommonly severe, parties of horse detached from the division of Bunker Sahib, carried their ravages into the heart of the Carnatic, and rendered it necessary to cover each convoy that approached Amboor with a body of troops. Towards the beginning of January, one of these divisions penetrating nearly to the gates of Fort St. George, burnt several of the adjacent villages, robbed and disabled the inhabitants, and carried off great quantities of plunder. Fortunately, however, none of the European families that dwelt without protection on Choultry Plain, fell into their hands. Alarmed by some ryuts who fled on the wings of fear, one and all of the Europeans retired to the fort, or took shelter under cover of a small detachment of artillery, which was stationed at the Mount; but the plunderers having succeeded, probably beyond all expectation, drove away their booty, and

and disappeared with a suddenness nearly similar to the rapidity of their advance. A sum equal to the injury which the Carnatic revenues sustained by these and similarly despicable bodies of irregular horse would maintain a corps of respectable cavalry, capable of defending that country, against such an enemy, to the end of time. Yet the zealous exertions of Captain Alexander Read, in collecting supplies at Amboor, were so completely followed up by Captain Cuppage his successor, that the whole of our equipments were in motion through the Padnaigdirgum pass towards the middle of December, and before the 20th of that month they advanced to the encampment of Captain Oram, who, with his own battalion, strengthened by a small reinforcement, awaited their arrival in the vicinity of Venkitaghery.

After being joined by Major Scot, and a detachment of Royal Artillery which arrived on the ships of this season, under his command, together with a reinforcement of about three hundred men from *St. Helena*, Lieut. Colonel Floyd, covering the convoy in rear, ascended the Padnaigdirgum pass on the 23d of December. The road had been improved with much care and skill; but although the rains had subsided the Palar river was of considerable depth. Various streams that in a manner separate the hills unite near the bottom of this pass, from whence that river meanders as far as the eye can reach, through a beautiful valley towards Amboor, where it is joined by another stream from the Barahmahal. These rich valleys watered abundantly from mountains that of a sudden rise with majestic grandeur were in thorough cultivation, and contrasted with the jungly surface of the rugged ranges by which

they are nearly enclosed appeared to wonderful advantage. Indeed the country throughout, in consequence of the rain, had undergone a change of appearance greatly for the better.

On the junction of Colonel Floyd with Captain Oram every precaution was taken for the security of the convoy, which included loaded bullocks only amounted to about fifteen thousand. The movement of Hyder Sahib against Gurrumconda, as already detailed in the 2d Chapter, occasioning considerable alarm, the utmost care was bestowed on keeping the cattle compact, and Captain Alexander Read with his own battalion and two squadrons from Stevenson's Regiment under Lieutenant St. Leger having strengthened the convoy on the 29th of the month, the whole encamped to the westward of Bangalore on the 7th of January.

So soon as the grain had been lodged in this depot, the cavalry followed by twenty pieces of battering cannon, with some mortars and howitzers, under the direction of Colonel Duff, proceeded to the Westward, and joined the Grand Army by the 12th of the month. These, with the addition of eight heavy guns, which had been already advanced as far as Outradroog, completed the train intended for the siege of Seringapatam. Bodies of sepoy's encamped in battalions or detachments, whose piquets communicated with each other, stretching along the road from Bangalore to the encampment, formed one continued chain, every link of which contributing to the security of the rest, the whole bespoke the workmanship of an able master. As regularity and order pervaded every department, for a distance of thirty miles, notwithstanding the nearness to the enemy's capital,

capital, protection was complete; and followers of all descriptions might be seen moving to and fro with no more concern than in times of perfect peace. But these threatenings were rendered still less bearable by a severe blow which the Sultaun suffered from another quarter.

THE forces of Purferam Bhow, supported, as heretofore, by Captain Little's detachment, on quitting the Grand Army, proceeded in a north-west direction across the Sera district. After reconnoitering Chittledroog, and endeavouring to bribe the killedar without success, it was judged advisable, from the strength of the place, not to attempt an attack. Against the hill fort of Kincoopy, the Bhow had better success. He besieged and carried the place, but his enterprising spirit now led him to undertake achievements of a nature by far more serious.

THE rich district of Bedanore had hitherto remained in perfect peace. Notwithstanding the hazard to which the measures concerted with Lord Cornwallis would be exposed by such a movement, thither the Bhow determined to proceed. Regardless of his promise to form a junction with General Abercromby about this period, he could not withstand the temptation of aggrandising himself amongst the neighbouring Princes, by a conquest of such high importance; but as Hoolyonore, Bankipore, Simoga, Cumpfy, Anaapore, with several other strong holds, guarded the best passage towards Bedanore, their reduction became necessary, as well to ensure success, as to secure a communication with the rest of the Confederates,

when

when advanced to the siege of Seringapatam. Simoga, the principal of these stations, stands on the Northwest bank of the river Budra; however, as it was judged adviseable to occupy one of the adjacent inferior posts in the first instance, Hoolyonore, a fort constructed near the confluence of that river and the Tum, was besieged by Captain Little about the middle of December. The wall was soon breached, and the place was carried by a night assault, on the 19th of that month.

THE garrison of Bankipore terrified by the early fall of Hoolyonore, surrendered at discretion in three days afterwards, but the troops in Simoga encouraged by the presence of an army nearly three thousand strong under the Nabob Refa Sahib, was not of a disposition to submit. In order, that the operations against this stronghold might be carried on without disturbance, the Bhow determined to attack the covering army in the first instance. Refa Sahib had already taken post amongst the jungles, to the southwest of Simoga, in a situation where his right was covered by the Budra, his left by impenetrable jungles, and his front by a deep ravine.

Towards noon on the 29th of December, Capt. Little with about one thousand Bombay sepoy, supported by Appa Sahib, with nearly the same number of infantry, and about three thousand horse, advanced on the enemy. The contest was severe and bloody. For a time victory stood on the balance. Partial charges of daring parties from both sides were repeatedly opposed by obstacles which the enemy had thrown in the way, or by the steady discipline of our sepoy. Captain Little was to be seen encouraging

encouraging his people wheresoever the battle raged the most severe. In short, after a well fought action of two full hours, the enemy gave way to a close fire, which was directed against their left wing, and as the impression was followed up, the route soon became general.

THE victors collecting as they advanced, continued the pursuit for fifteen miles; they captured ten guns, upwards of three hundred horses, with double that number of bullocks, and large quantities of stores; but his country had on this occasion to regret the loss of a valuable officer in the fall of Lieut. Ross, who acted as Brigade Major to the Bombay troops. Here, as at Darwar where he was also wounded, this officer's exertions were highly conspicuous. The killed and wounded of Captain Little's detachment amounted to sixty in number, amongst the latter, Lieutenants Bethune, Doolan, and Moore, were for a time disabled.

THE overthrow of Reza Sahib was soon followed by the capture of Simoga. Captain Little had effected a breach in this fort on the 2d of January; and, on his promise of security to private property, the garrison submitted. The barefaced breach of capitulation at Darwar, having destroyed all confidence in Maratta faith, the Killedar of Simoga exacted this promise from the English leader. Cumpfy and Ananpore surrendering on the approach of Purferam Bhow, his forces threatened Bedanore towards the latter end of January; but the Suldaun, determined not to permit the subjection of this favorite district without a struggle, detached Cummer-ul-dien Cawn with a chosen body of troops in that direction; and, although no engagement took place

the measure answered his intention, as the Bhow desisting from the design returned towards Seringapatam.

Whatsoever advantages might have been derived from these successes the general interest of the confederate powers was very materially endangered by such uncommon deviation from the concerted plan. Except in the districts intrusted to the Bhow, the storm which for a time hung over the Mysorean dominions collecting from every direction, again threatened to burst on the Sultaun's capital at an early period. In addition to the multitudes that advanced from the Eastward, our army on the Malabar Coast, quitting their cantonments, had already reassembled in the neighbourhood of Cananore. Rest from fatigue, new equipments, fresh supplies of stores and necessaries of every kind, added to the exertions of their leader in procuring conveyance, enabled these corps to take the field about the beginning of December.

THE army of General Abercromby, consisting of his Majesty's 73d, 75th, and 77th Regiments; the first European Regiment of Bombay; the 2d, 4th, 6th, 10th and 12th Bombay battalions, one battalion of grenadiers, and the 14th battalion of Coast sepoy were divided into three brigades and a reserve. The train consisted of ten eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, twenty field pieces, and two mortars, attended by upwards of seven hundred men; and two battalions of sepoy, with a body of irregular horse from the Rajah of Travancore, augmented this force, in all, to nearly ten thousand strong. A supply of draft

draft and carriage cattle, procured by General Abercromby partly from Bombay, and partly from the Maratta country through the exertions of Sir Charles Ware Mallet, together with eight thousand bullocks, sent from the Madras Government, by the way of Palligautcherry; besides furnishing the proportion required for the train and stores, enabled them to march with forty days provisions for the whole.

THE access from Cananore to Seringapatam had been considerably facilitated by the operations of our former invasion, yet the weight of the rains had so broke up the roads, as to render their repair a task of much labour and fatigue. However, perseverance overcame every difficulty, and the whole equipment obtained the top of the pass by the 18th of January. Here a friendly intercourse with the Coorga Rajah immediately recommenced; with his assistance granaries and depots were loaded in the direction of the enemy's capital; the guns which had been buried as already mentioned were now dug from their concealments; the entrance of the pass was fortified with well constructed batteries; and as the train with the confederates was considered sufficient for the reduction of Seringapatam, all the Bombay heavy guns, with a detachment of about four hundred men were left with Colonel Peche on the top of the Poodicherrim Ghaut, whilst the rest of the troops proceeded to Sedaier, where they had instructions to await orders from the Commander in Chief.

MEANWHILE the armies of Earl Cornwallis, Secunder Jaw, and Hury Punt formed one extensive encampment, separated by

by the jungles, which spread over the districts in the vicinity of Outradroog into three immense divisions (1). After a meeting of the Leaders on the 25th of January, 1792, and previous to their movement against the enemy's capital, the British troops were drawn out in review before the Chiefs of the Poona and Hyderabad forces on the last day of the month.

EARLY on the ensuing morning, the British army, leaving Hooliah-droog close upon the right, quitted the jungles, and after crossing the Madoor, encamped near Tagelly: the other branches of the Confederacy, advancing as it suited their convenience, remained on the opposite bank of the river. Hooliadroog, on being summoned by Colonel Maxwell, previous to this march, again surrendered to our arms without having done any injury. What resistance it offered was, as on a former occasion, intended solely to obtain a promise of security in their effects to the people that it protected. The post had undergone a complete repair, and being left in charge of a small party of sepoy's under Lieutenant Macleod; it formed the first link in a chain which Earl Cornwallis determined to establish, from his hospital at Outradroog to Seringapatam.

The mud fort of Tagelly, garrisoned with two companies from the 26th and 28th battalions of Bengal sepoy's, and given

(1) Whilst the allies lay encamped amongst the Droogs several papers calculated to promote desertion were dropt within the Sentries of our piquets at night. All of them were left about the same time, written in the same hand, and with the same inaccuracies. A literal copy is subjoined—"The King is very sorry to understand that some reports have been made in your camp, that when any European comes to the Badchaws camp at Seringapatam that he puts them to death, but there is no such thing, when they arrive here the king gives them a present of 30 or 40 Rupees per man and gives them every encouragement. For we have nothing to do here, only eat, drink, and sleep, nobody to say any thing to us or molest us. If the one half of you only know'd how we live at Seringapatam, you would not stay long in the English camp; the least pay we receive here, is thirty Rupees, from that to forty, fifty, from this to ninety rupees per month and upwards, to any good man that comes to serve the Badchaw, you may come with the greatest safety there is nothing here to fear."

in charge to Lieutenant A. Charron, formed the second link of communication from Outtradroog. Besides protection to the Brinjaries, this chain became necessary to cover the approach of a party who were then on their way from Bangalore, with entrenching tools (1).

As the army proceeded, Caricode, another mud-fort, at the next ground of encampment, was put in a state of good repair, and guarded by two companies from the 9th battalion of Coast sepoy; it was entrusted to Lieutenant Bradshaw (2). The confederates still continued to advance, and Captain Croaker, with the remainder of the 9th battalion, having been posted at Hooraloo, he had instructions to strengthen the other stations according to the best of his judgment,

(1) *Adjutant General, to Lieutenant Charron, 1st February, 1792.*

“Captain Mandeville, of the Coast Artillery, having left Bangalore, on the 31st of last month, with twenty-nine bullocks loaded with entrenching tools, and the escort of a Jemidar’s guard from Captain Williamson’s battalion, it is expected he will arrive at Hooladroog, on the morning of the 2d of this month, from whence he may probably have his escort strengthened by one of the companies stationed there, under Lieutenant Macleod; Lord Cornwallis has in consequence directed a detachment of two companies of sepoy, one of which is ordered from the 3d brigade, and one from the 4th, to be left in the fort, named Tagely, close to the line, until Captain Mandeville’s arrival there. The company from the 3d brigade, being commanded by Ensign Jackson, you, as the senior officer, will consequently take the command of the detachment left in Tagely;—and as Lieutenant Morris, Commissary of Stores, is instructed to give over to your charge this evening a sufficient number of bullocks, to relieve those employed in carrying the entrenching tools from Bangalore; Lord Cornwallis directs, that you will take them under the charge of your own company, on their being sent by Lieutenant Morris, and that you will move to the fort in the morning with your detachment, and the bullocks, and there wait the arrival of Captain Mandeville, under whose orders you are to march to join the army; intimation to the above effect having been signified to that Officer. Captain Mandeville, is also directed to join the army on the next ground on the 3d of this month, if possible, and is instructed to send back as soon as he joins you, the escort and cattle from Bangalore, with whatever addition of the escort he may receive from Hooladroog; (the cattle being private property,) and as there are about eight hundred Brinjaries coming up with him, who may not choose to march so quickly as he will have the opportunity of doing, by means of the fresh detachment and fresh cattle left with you, he is authorized to leave a few sepoy from your detachment to protect these Brinjaries if they shall desire it. I have been directed to signify the last paragraph that you may consider the orders therein stated, to have been sent to Captain Mandeville, as your guide in the event of any accident happening to him; and, of the escort, with the bullocks, entrenching tools, and the Brinjaries joining you without him. I have only further to add his Lordship’s orders, that you are to lose no time in reporting to Head Quarters, in case Captain Mandeville, contrary to expectation, shall not join you by two o’clock P. M. on the 3d of this month, that the necessary orders may be forwarded to you in consequence. The Company from the 3d brigade, is ordered to join you after general beating to-morrow.”

(2) As the army approached Caricode through some mistake of the guide, the park did not arrive at its ground until four in the evening, although the troops were in their tents about one. So deep were the sloughs that each battering gun required all the exertions of one hundred men, with two elephants to get forward, and in many places, quantities of draft and carriage stores stuck fast, and could not be brought on at all. As this night have been avoided, the General discovered a degree of dissatisfaction which produced such attention as to prevent a repetition of the complaint. A party of lootics miserably mounted, found means, during the march to mingle with the Nizam’s horse. They passed for Marattas; converted freely on various subjects, and, on a preconcerted signal, at the first halt when such of the confederates as were mounted had alighted, each looty sprung on a valuable horse, made free use of the spur, and leaving the unsuspecting throng in amazement, they instantly flew off at full gallop.

and to keep a watchful eye over the security of the whole chain. Repeated attempts at plunder by looties, were as often defeated by the vigilance of the several parties in these stations, and their activity was rewarded by particular marks of the Commander in Chief's approbation (1).

FROM the time of our quitting the jungles at Hooliadroong, the enemy's horse made their appearance daily in small parties, but they now assembled in such force, that it became necessary to strengthen the advance with the leading brigade. Towards 9 o'clock, the troops in front opened a view, grand beyond all description. In one direction, the enemy's capital, describing a quadrangle of great extent, with two sides stretching across the island of Seringapatam, appeared, from the bustle of swarms within, as if in motion. The best affections of multitudes who continued true to their trust from the beginning, by keeping all alive about their works, still discovered that the Suldaun's mode of carrying on the war gave satisfaction, and that however moderate his prospects, his conduct was in high favour.

IN addition to double walls and ditches, this capital was strengthened on more than two-thirds its circumference by the river Cauvery, which separating into two branches at the western extremity, washed the skirts of the glacis on either side. In the centre of the

(1) I have laid before Lord Cornwallis your letters dated at noon and 2 P. M. this day, and his Lordship directs me to express his approbation of the active and zealous part you have taken for the public service. I am further directed to signify to you, that you are to remain at your present post until Captain Mandeville's arrival, agreeable to your former orders, and that as two companies of the 9th Coast battalion, under Lieutenant Bradshaw are to be left here (the fort of Caricode) when the army marches in the morning, a party from them will be detached if bullocks can be procured to bring up the shot, &c. which you have collected.—Adjutant General, to Lieutenant Charron, 3d February, 1792.

island, at the distance of about a thousand yards from the fort there stood a pettah constructed with much regularity, and surrounded by a lofty mud-wall; and, towards the eastern extremity where the branches of the river re-unite, a rich garden, decorated with lanes of cypress intersecting each other at right angles, added splendour to a superb palace, which was further adorned by several adjacent buildings, constructed on a scale of great magnificence.

ON the northern bank of the river, an encampment, secured by a chain of six well constructed redoubts was defended on the right, by works thrown up on the Carigat hills. On the island, batteries, strengthened with bastions and fletches ranging along the river, formed a second line of protection wondrous in strength; and a bound hedge, with a deep nulla, run all along in front of the whole. Besides these defences, soft paddy-fields and deep ravines gave additional security to the position in which the Sultaun determined to defend his capital. His judgment, in this instance, had also the advantage of being supported on that principle of blind adherence, which Mahomedans in general pay to the discernment of their predecessors. It was on this ground that Hyder, not only disunited a similar confederacy in 1767, but turned their arms against each other, and advancing from his works, over-run the Carnatic, until his threatenings procured a peace creditable to himself alone. The event of our last campaign, tended also to justify the measure.

WHEN the eye turned in another direction, a moving world seemed to threaten whatsoever presumed to obstruct its career. Every attempt

attempt to convey just ideas of the several bodies that composed this huge mass, must fall miserably short of the original. Regular columns of infantry ready to act on the appearance of an enemy, extended along the front and left flank, wheresoever danger was to be apprehended. The train and heavy carriages of whatsoever description moved on better ground to the right of the infantry, in general, at the distance of about one-hundred yards. Stores, sutling, and private carriages of various kinds, advanced on a third road to the right of the other two; and elephants, camels, buffaloes, bullocks, tatoes, asses, with myriads of followers, that defy description, kept pace with these lines on the baggage flank. In the rear, and to the right large bodies of horse from the army of Nizam Ally, connected with powerful divisions from Hurry Punt. These in their turn cooperating with the cavalry of Colonel Floyd, extended to the infantry in front; in short one immense chain of cavalry and infantry, embracing the whole mass afforded compleat protection to the several component parts. From this moving world, swarms of irregular horse branched out in every direction as far as the eye could reach.

At one part of the surrounded space, whole groups of Brinjaries might be seen driving herds of cattle loaded with grain, whilst their female companions groaned under the additional burden of infants clinging to their sides. At another a speculative dabash with some hundred bullocks, carrying viands the best adapted to European palates, poured plentiful abuse on whomsoever had the misfortune to approach his drove. Here coolies out of number cros and jolt each other

other to the great detriment of their employers. There, on an alarm of horse, occasioned by their associates in villany, in order to defraud their masters, whole loads are thrown off and plundered.

In one place bodies of horse press inwards from the skirts on such as shew an inclination to scatter; in another the crack of the baggage-master's whip forbids followers of all denominations to approach the publick stores. Yonder a sough threatens to stop carriages of every description, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the willing team, until the sagacious elephant lends the aid of his powerful shoulder to the wheels, or raises the funken load with his proboscis. Now bullocks tired of their burthens and determined to carry them no longer, bound, twist and sling, until by breaking the cords, they are extricated from their loads. * Others with similar intentions lie flat on the ground; torture of various kinds is applied without effect; their tails are wound up, and almost bitten off with teeth white as alabaster; but no degree of pain will move them, until cords tightly twisted round their muzzles effectually stop their breath, and compel obedience. Yet with all this bustle, such was the earnestness of every department to get on, that the whole kept pace with the heavy guns, and performed a march of ten or twelve miles on each day without injury or insult from the enemy (1).

As the confederates advanced over the plains, it was reasonable to suppose that the Sultaun would not suffer such an immense armament

(1) Except on the last march, during the advance of the confederates from the jungles at Hoolladroog until their arrival before Seringapatam, the baggage moved on the left flank, skirted by the cavalry. The line marched from the left, and Colonel Baird, as he commanded the leading brigade, was daily in charge of the advance. But on the 5th, the day we got sight of the capital, the line marched by the right, in consequence of which change, Colonel Cockerel was from the same cause, entrusted with the advance. The baggage was thrown on the right flank, and the cavalry moved to the right of the whole.

to approach his capital, without some desperate effort for its relief. He could not be ignorant, that to protect such an enormous quantity of stores required abilities of a very different kind, yet nothing inferior to those by which they had been collected. He well knew that neither the army under General Abercromby, nor that of Puisseam Bhow, had as yet formed a junction with Earl Cornwallis; and he was certain that Seringapatam with its environs, contained upwards of fifty thousand fighting men, independant of looties; consequently, that thirty thousand regular infantry and five thousand disciplined horse might have opposed the allies, in whatever situation he judged most advisable, without endangering the garrison. The system that the Saltaun adopted on this occasion, differed widely from general expectation. Solely bent on fortifying a camp under the guns of his capital, he made no attempt whatever towards stopping the progress of the allies, from the day they left the jungles near Hooliadroog, until they sat down before Seringapatam; indeed the whole of his conduct indicated indifference of their approach. Secure in the strength of his fortifications, and confident from the number and valour of his troops, he dared the joint efforts of his enemies, and furnished a conspicuous instance in confirmation of the well received opinion, that no post whatever is tenable before a well appointed and well disciplined force, under the direction of a judicious commander.

ABOUT noon, the whole army took a sweep to the right, around the base of a hill not six miles distant from the island, and completely

in

in sight of Seringapatam. The enemy's horse now appeared somewhat more formidable than for several preceding days; however, they still continued to discover an aversion to action on equal terms. The cavalry in advance, led by Major Orr, repeatedly attempted to engage, but those of the Sultaun as often gave way, contenting themselves with a discharge of rockets from the many ravines by which the country is intersected. The army after a fatiguing march, encamped in a strong position judiciously chosen at the foot of the Cappillair hills (1), distant from the island about eight miles.

FROM the last movement of the British General, from the space and nature of the ground that lay between his camp and the island, and from the long marches that he had lately performed, the Mysorean Prince was induced to believe, that nothing serious would be attempted until a junction with General Abercromby had been effected. Nor was the Sultaun singular in this opinion; the latter part of the last march from its direction, certainly indicated nothing of an immediate attack. But when a manœuvring army is at hand, when an active enemy is within one short march, little dependance ought to be placed on appearances.

BOTH armies remained quiet on the 6th, during which day the enemy's works to the northward and eastward of the fort, were com-

							Miles.	Furlongs.
(1)	Dec.	15.	Coodul,	—	—	—	6	0
		24.	Maggree,	—	—	—	11	4
	Jan.	5.	Aagalawte,	—	—	—	6	2
		26.	Dowaboodikery,	—	—	—	6	6
		27.	Hooliandroog,	—	—	—	3	4
	Feb.	1.	Tagilly,	—	—	—	8	4
		2.	Caricode,	—	—	—	9	0
		4.	Hooralloo,	—	—	—	8	2
		5.	French Rocks,	—	—	—	10	4

pletely

pletely reconnoitered, and their situation and strength were thoroughly comprehended by the Commander in Chief. In proof of this assertion, nothing can be stronger, than the following instructions, which were delivered to commandants of wings, about dusk, just as his Lordship had received the reports of the officers whom he sent to examine the Sultaun's position.

“ ORDERS to be communicated by officers commanding wings,
 “ to officers commanding brigades and corps only, with the neces-
 “ sary information to the field officers on picquet.

“ THE army marches in three divisions at seven this evening, to
 “ attack the enemy's camp and lines; picquets to join; field pieces,
 “ quarter and rear guards, and camp-guards, to stand fast.

“ Right Division, Major General Medows.

“ 36th }
 “ 76th } Regiments, - - Lieutenant Colonel Nesbit.

“ 3d Brigade, - - - - Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell.

“ 22d Native Battalion, - Captain Oram.

“ Lieutenant Lennon's Pioneers.

“ A detail of officers from the engineer corps, and a proportion
 “ of scaling ladders.

“ Centre, - Lord Cornwallis.
 Lieutenant Colonel Stuart.

“ 52d }
 “ 71st } Regiments, - Lieutenant Colonel Knox.
 “ 74th }

4th. brigade,	—	—	—	Major Ruffel,
2d	—	}	Native Battalions,	— Major Langley,
21st	—			

Lieutenant Dowse's Pioneers,

A detail of officers from the Engineer corps, and a proportion of scaling ladders.

Left division,	}	Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell,
72d regiment,		Lieutenant Colonel Baird,
5th brigade,		

Ensign Stokoe's Pioneers,

A detail of officers from the engineer corps, and a proportion of scaling ladders.

Order of march for the right division.

One battalion company from the 36th re-	}	Lieutenant Colonel Nesbitt.
giment,		
Pioneers,		
Four European flank companies, with scaling		
ladders,		
36th regiment,		
Two Bengal battalions,		

A SKETCH OF THE WAR

General Medows,
 Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell,
 Engineers.
 76th regiment,
 Two Bengal battalions,
 22d native Coast battalion.

Order of march for the centre.

One battalion company from the 52d regiment,
 Pioneers,
 Six European flank companies, with scaling
 ladders,
 52d regiment,
 One Bengal battalion,

Lieutenant Colonel
 Knox,

Lord Cornwallis,
 Lieutenant Colonel Stuart,
 Engineers,
 71st regiment,
 Two Bengal battalions,
 74th regiment,

2d

21st

Coast battalions, Major Langley,

Order

Order of march for the left,

One flank company of the 72d
regiment,

One ditto, with scaling ladders,

Pioners,

One battalion from the fifth brigade,

} Lieutenant Colonel
Baird.

Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell,

72d regiment.

Two battalions of the fifth brigade.

“ IF the right attack is made to the westward of Somarpett,
“ the troops of that attack, should, after entering the enemy’s lines,
“ turn to the left. But, if the attack is made to the eastward of
“ Somarpett, the troops should turn to the right, to dislodge the ene-
“ my from all the posts on the left of their position.

“ THE troops of the centre attack, after entering the enemy’s
“ lines, should turn to the left; the front divisions, however, of both
“ the right and center attacks, should, after entering, advance nearly
“ to the extent of the depth of the enemy’s camp before they turn
“ to either side, in order to make room for those that follow; and
“ such parts of both divisions, as well as of the left division, as the
“ commanding officers shall not think it necessary to keep in a com-
“ pact body, will endeavour to mix with the fugitives, and pass
“ over into the island with them.

“ THE reserve, leaving quarter and rear guards, will form in front
“ of the lines at nine this night; and Colonel Duff will receive the

Commander

“ Commander in Chief’s orders concerning the heavy park, the encampment, and the reserve.

“ YOUNG soldiers to be put on the quarter and rear guards at gun firing, and the piquets to join when the troops march off.

“ A careful officer from each corps to be left in charge of the camp and regimental baggage.

“ COLONEL Duff to send immediately three divisions of gun ladders, of fifty men in each, to the chief engineer, to carry the scaling ladders; and the chief engineer is to send them to the divisions, respectively along with the officers of this corps.

“ THE officers of engineers and pioneers to be responsible that the ladders, after having been made use of by the soldiers, are not left carelessly in the enemy’s works.

“ SURGEONS and doolies to attend the troops, and arrack and biscuit to be held in readiness for the Europeans.

“ The divisions to form as follows, after dark.

“ The right in front of the left of the right wing,

“ The centre in front of the right of the left wing.

“ The left in front of the left of the left wing.”

PREVIOUS to assembling these divisions, Colonel Duff received instructions from Earl Cornwallis in person, concerning the safety of the encampment, and made his arrangements accordingly. On the advance of the columns the reserve was drawn up in front of the encampment; and remained there for the night. The artillery was commanded to range by their guns, and the quarter and rear guards to stand to their arms until day-light. The Colonel was further instructed to send with the columns a detachment of artillery, consisting of two captains, six subalterns,

subalterns, one hundred European artillery, with three hundred and fifty lascars, under orders of Major Montagu. The division of Earl Cornwallis was accompanied by Major Montagu, Captain Ross, two subalterns, fifty European artillery men, and one hundred and fifty lascars. The division of General Medows by Captain Howell, two subalterns, fifty European artillery men, and one hundred and fifty lascars; and the division of Colonel Maxwell by two subalterns, thirty artillery men, and fifty lascars; the allies, ready to mount, waited for day in silent anxiety, and the whole felt conscious that the fate of the war hinged on the success of this enterprize.

TOWARDS eight o'clock the three columns were in motion, agreeable to these orders. The rise of a full moon assisted to direct their course, and nought to disturb the stillness of a serene night preceded the impending convulsion. The troops, unencumbered by cannon, trusted solely to the ladder and bayonet. Well did they act their part. But as the nature of the service frequently separated officers from their corps, and as much of the success of the night was due to the personal exertions of some gallant individuals thus situated, it is intended to be as circumstantial as possible in the description of this momentous and conclusive attack; an attack, which amongst other salutary consequences, justly claims the preservation of many lives, as it ultimately proved decisive of the war.

As the ground could not have escaped the recollection of the corps, and in particular of the seventy-second regiment, from their acquaintance with it on the 15th of May, 1791, Colonel Maxwell's column required no guides to direct its progress. Favoured also by an approach

proach shorter in distance, and easier of access than either of the other divisions, a spirited attack which was made on the Carigat hill opened the engagement towards eleven o'clock, and warned the Sul-taun of his danger. Besides the steepness of the ascent, these works, in themselves, were of great strength. A well-constructed redoubt was protected by a double row of breast works; but the firmness of the assailants overcoming every obstacle, they drove the enemy from the post, and after securing possession, followed them towards the island. The column, in descending from the Carigat pagoda, suffered severe loss, as it was entirely exposed, not only to the right of the enemy's line, but to a body of troops posted under cover of a mound which supported a canal on the face of the hill, yet proceeding un-checked by these obstacles, Colonel Maxwell crossed the Lockany river, and entering the right of the Sul-taun's encampment, formed a junction with the division of Earl Cornwallis.

Just as the attack of the Carigat hill commenced, a trusty squadron of horse, with a number of rocket boys, that the enemy had posted in advance, discovered the centre division moving towards the island with awful silence. They rightly judged, that to oppose the approach of the column was certain death without any possible advantage to the Sul-taun; that to alarm his camp was the principal if not the only service he could now reasonably expect, or at least that they could render; consequently, they let fly a plentiful discharge of rockets amongst the assailants. They fell back with regularity and composure: nor did they attempt to enter their lines until the danger was completely proclaimed in every quarter.

STILL

STILL preserving the same solemn silence, the column twice crossed the Lockany, a river that covered great part of the enemy's right wing in front. Whilst wading the second time, it was severely galled by heavy discharges of musquetry poured from a hedge, behind which the Saltaun's first line had been posted. So close and frequent were the flashes, that the atmosphere was for a while in one continual blaze. Perseverance, however, soon procured the opposite bank. The front division approached the hedge, gave one volley, and with a tremendous shout the whole column rushed to the bayonet. The ardour of the troops rendered the daring exertions of the pioneers of no avail. Some pressed through; some crept under; whilst others bounded over. All mingled with the enemy. In vain did the Mysoreans defend; in vain seek protection from flight. Eternity stood open in every direction. Each individual closed on his antagonist, put opposition at defiance, and plunging amidst unheard-of dangers, performed feats, of which no possible description can convey ideas tolerably just, or at all adequate to the occasion. Under these circumstances, the several corps could no longer act by the direction of any one individual leader. The Commander-in-chief, therefore, made choice of a position from which he could observe to advantage the effect of the storm, and directed that Captain Vigors should remain there with his battalion.

SEVEN companies that originally headed the column, passed the north branch of the Cauvery, at a ford close to the foot of the glacis. Various other divisions crossed somewhat lower down. Whilst in the river, the several corps were surrounded by, and interspersed a-
amongst

amongst, immense bodies of the enemy. The stream was rapid, it was frequently waist deep, and almost every where the bottom was both slippery and uneven. In this situation the superior bodily strength of the assailants availed them more than their acknowledged discipline and valour. A blow from the butt of the musquet, or soldier's fist, was equally fatal to the Mysorean fugitive, as the thrust of the bayonet, or deadly bullet : Whenever he came down he was hurled away by the current, without a possibility of recovery ; and if any probable conjecture can be formed from the appearance of the bed of the river on the ensuing days, more lives were lost by water than by all other means put together.

NOTWITHSTANDING the confusion of a night attack, and the various unavoidable obstacles to action in concert, instinct, discipline, or some other providential cause, inclined five of these companies not to separate ; nor can a doubt be entertained of their having been the first British troops that ever held a firm footing on the island of Seringapatam. On reaching the bank, a soldier-like sense of danger induced the officers to halt and form their men ; seniority gave the command to the Honourable Captain Monson ; and, with the utmost regularity, this body advanced briskly across the island, until it reached the opposite branch of the river. Its rout was along the principal street of the enemy's bazar, which lay on the edge of the glacis, near to the eastern face of the fort, and immediately in front of the pettah. Through a wide passage, which opened into the chelah gate from this street, swarms of the flying enemy crowded to take shelter in the covert way, and under the ramparts ; and as the assailants, in passing along, gave a discharge obliquely by divisions
amongst

amongst this mass, the slaughter must have been dreadful. The ramparts, the covert way, the glacis, the bazar, and the pettah, were crowded with men in arms; yet, as if petrified with fear, the only serious opposition made to this handful of troops, was, by a small redoubt at the end of the street, from the gorge of which two guns played on the assailants under cover of musquetry. The free use of the bayonet not only cleared the street, but obtained possession of the redoubt also.

THE enemy now discovered that the British held posts all over the island; consequently, they abandoned it in crowds; the only ford to which they had access was over the south branch of the river, and was commanded by the guns of this redoubt; they were necessitated, therefore, either to escape through showers of grape; to swim; or to crave quarter from a victorious and injured enemy. The corps, now much fatigued, rested for several hours. Repeated cheers, the grenadier's march, with various other means, had been resorted to in course of the morning, in order to discover any part of the British army, but without effect. It was therefore, at a consultation of the captains, judged necessary to abandon the redoubt; and having spiked the guns, this gallant corps retired towards the pettah, which was then occupied by a body of troops under the Colonels Stuart, Maxwell, Knox, and Baird.

It was the original intention of Earl Cornwallis, that the seven leading companies of this column, with the fifty-second regiment and fourteenth battalion of sepoy, should have formed a division under the immediate direction of the Honourable Colonel Knox, during this enterprize; but on approaching the island a heavy body of the enemy

pressed through the division, and separated the Colonel, together with the seventy-first and seventy-fourth light infantry, from the other five companies. Captain Ruffel, too, with about seventy men, chiefly of the fifty-second regiment, had been borne away in a similar manner. These fortunately united; still they scarcely amounted to two hundred men. The Colonel, however, true to the design of his General, determined to occupy some post on the island, and having a French prisoner for a guide, he inclined to the left; passed the Dowlat Baug, and entering the pettah from its eastern face, was foremost in the attack of that important post. Here he experienced much opposition. Repeated charges in different streets only served to discover that the enemy was not to be dislodged with a force so inconsiderable. Heavy squadrons of the Sultaun's cavalry, charging at full gallop, were no sooner beat back by showers of bullets, than solid columns of infantry presented a firm front. As these gave way before the British bayonet, the cavalry renewed the fight. Against such superiority of numbers, alternately supporting each other, the Colonel thought proper not to persist; and as a destructive discharge of cannon and musquetry, from the lines on the island, was directed against the corps that were then crossing the river, he judiciously directed Capains Ruffel, Robertson, and Wood, with three parties, to attack these batteries from their rear, whilst himself took post at the nearest gate. The success that attended the ready execution of this order contributed in a high degree to the security of the troops that were then wading; as

at

at this place the river was scarcely fordable, even had there been daylight and no opposition.

THE fire from the batteries ceased at once. An attack from the rear was so unexpected by those in charge of the lines, that all of them sought for safety in flight. Some escaped to Seringapatam; others, desirous of abandoning the island, pushed for the ford over the southern branch of the river, whilst several, ignorant of our having a post in the pettah, were captured by the party under Colonel Knox. From this latter class it was learnt, that a number of Europeans were confined in an adjacent hovel. A party for their release was immediately detached; and twenty-seven men, chiefly reduced by ill treatment to a state the most miserable and debasing in nature, were thus liberated from heavy irons. After dislodging the enemy, the parties returned to the gate of the pettah, from whence they had been detached, and continued with Colonel Knox for the remainder of the night.

ABOUT three hundred yards to the eastward of the fort, and immediately between the glacis and the pettah, the fifty-second regiment, under Captain Hunter, together with three companies of the fourteenth battalion of Bengal sepoys under Lieutenant White, and some pioneers, entered the island, taking possession of the Dowlat Baug, a spacious palace, in the centre of a beautiful garden, around which was a high though slender brick wall. The palace made stout resistance; indeed every inch of ground that this body passed over was warmly disputed. The garden was perfectly exposed to one whole face of the garrison; and as the enemy was ob
served

ferred in motion, with elephants to push down the wall, and with guns on the opposite bank, the palace, after several hours possession, was fortunately abandoned. This corps now retired from the island, towards Sibbald's redoubt: what ammunition it had not expended was rendered unserviceable from the depth of the river; and there was scarce time to replenish, before it was called to assist against a large body of the enemy that advanced towards a plain on which the Earl had assembled some troops.

THE force that His Lordship had collected bore no proportion to the number by which he was attacked. It consisted of seven companies of the seventy-fourth regiment, under Captain Dougald Campbell, with the second and twenty-first Coast battalions under Captains Vigors and Montgomery. This handful of men withstood the furious and desperate onset of many thousands for some time. Three companies of Madras sepoys that had been detached under Lieutenants Kenny and Roberts, to within fifty yards of the enemy, fired by platoons, with a regularity and steadiness that would stamp credit on the best troops in Europe; and on being most seasonably reinforced by Captain Hunter's division, the whole body came to the bayonet, and after repeated charges proved successful.

THE Mysoreans, however, on this occasion discovered no want either of discipline or valour. The reinforcement which fell suddenly on their right flank instantly received a heavy and well-directed fire from a corps that changed front for that purpose. Nor did this body attempt to give way until they felt the points of the bayonets from different directions. The success that attended the assault of the
island;

island ; the approach of day ; and the risk of continuing an action under the guns of the fort, contributed to induce Earl Cornwallis to desist from pursuit, and to retire towards the pagoda hill.

WHILST the troops in front of the centre column were thus engaged, the seventy-first regiment, after penetrating the bound hedge, was drawn up by Major Dalrymple across the enemy's line of encampment, with a regularity that would not discredit the parade of Dublin. Notwithstanding the disadvantages of a night attack, all of this steady corps stood firm by one another until day-light ; and, supported by the seventh and twenty-eighth Bengal battalions, scoured the plains towards the right of the Sultaun's position. Here heavy columns of Mysorean horse, separated by the weight of our fire into squadrons, were soon driven to the retreating infantry. Whilst pressing onwards, a redoubt that protected the right of the enemy's position was attacked by two companies, whose progress it obstructed, without breaking the order of the regiment ; and as the garrison, abandoning their trust, joined the runaways, this post became an easy acquisition ; one of these, strengthened with two companies from the twenty-eighth Bengal battalion, commanded by Lieutenants Morgan and Weguelin, and a detachment of artillery, were left in charge of the place under Captain Sibbald ; and the corps, proceeding as before, continued to disperse the enemy's right wing until they formed a junction with the division of Colonel Maxwell, who, after crossing the Lockany, now pressed towards Earl Cornwallis.

HERE

HERE, as they were hemmed in between the centre and left columns, the defendants had no chance for escape, unless by attempting to gain the island. They all, therefore, crowded tumultuously towards the river, which was nowhere fordable in this direction, for a space of two miles; yet, in order to avoid the bayonet, thousands plunging into the water, endeavoured to get across. The intrepidity of the assailants led them to underrate the obstacles which lay in the way, and to encounter whatsoever danger the desperate situation of the runaways drove them to attempt. At one part of the river horses fully caparisoned dragged riders, who held fast by their manes, across the stream; at another, men in complete armour, plunging into the water, trusted for safety to their dexterity in swimming. In many places the unusual closeness of the rocks at their surface enabled some to escape by bounding from one to another; but the depth and rapidity of the currents in the chasms below, constantly hurled to eternity such as chanced to slip a foot. Frequently the width of a crevice compelled the runaway to encounter his pursuer, as the preferable alternative; sometimes a horse or bullock jammed between the rocks, afforded him a footing, that promised a probability of escape. To these disadvantages in crossing, a heavy fire from the lines added a deadly hindrance.

WHILST thus situated a call that loudly forbade all attempts to get across, was repeatedly heard from the rear: but in front, the voice of Colonel Baird, pressing to persist, gained the attention of the soldiery all round. Himself foremost to shew the example, men were not wanting to follow; and having, with the assistance of Major Petric,

Lieutenant

Lieutenant Sutherland and others, secured a footing on the island, several of the column got over by degrees. At a ford which was discovered about one mile to the left, the main body crossed under Colonels Stuart, and Maxwell; and, as the lines on the island had been by this time cleared of the enemy by Colonel Knox, the several divisions advanced to the pettah without further molestation, where they continued for the remainder of the night.

WHILST these things were going on, under the immediate eye of Earl Cornwallis, our right hand column advancing silently with a firm pace, directed its course somewhat to the westward of Somarpett, and engaged in a warm attack on the Edga redoubt, a strong work which protected the left of the enemy's position. Twelve pieces of cannon, loaded to the muzzles with grape, pointed from this redoubt; a deep nulla winded in front and on either flank; a thick hedge all around strengthened the other defences; there was also a double ditch, a strong parapet; and on this occasion, within and around, upwards of fifteen hundred fighting men stood ready for resistance.

FROM the frequency of its bendings it became necessary to wade the nulla repeatedly before the enemy's encampment could be approached in this direction; still the defendants made no resistance at crossing: the bound hedge was also penetrated without opposition; but immediately afterwards a heavy discharge of cannon and musquetry opened on the head of the column. This was not a time to hesitate. Warned of their danger by the noise of the other engagements, the enemy fired with much briskness. The five com-

panies

panies in front, however, led by Colonel Nesbitt, and supported by the thirty-sixth regiment, made a sudden wheel to the right, and commenced the attack with desperate resolution.

A CONSIDERABLE corps of Europeans, under Monsieur Vigie, drawn up to strengthen the redoubt on the left, were driven off by a party from the thirty-sixth, whilst the remainder of that regiment closely followed the flank companies, who now pushed for the body of the work. From the depth of the ditches, and some delay occasioned by the slaughter amongst those who brought on the ladders, the leading companies were for a while unable to ascend the work: but the seventy-sixth grenadiers fortunately discovered an entrance which promised some hopes of success. Towards the fort a traverse incapable of admitting two men abreast, led across the ditches to a narrow winding passage, at the far end of which a gate well barred secured the only access into the redoubt. To strengthen this passage a triangular work had been erected on the right, and another on the left, with much judgement. Both were attached to the work. Both were crowded with troops. The traverse, the passage, and the gate, were completely exposed to the fire of these triangles. A piece of ordnance in each, with one that stood in the body of the work, were ready to pour grape on the assailants; and the whole garrison, by facing inwards, could point their fire at the gate and gorge as rays converge towards a focus. Besides these advantages, Lally's corps of Europeans, which had been drawn up on the left of the assailants, as already mentioned, added greatly to the strength of the post, and to the confidence of its garrison. Another division opposed Captain Oram, who

who had been previously directed to advance with his battalion along the great road in front, with intention to attract the enemy's notice from the principal object of attack. In short, every appearance of the redoubt, every disposition of the troops around, bespoke bloody and determined resistance. Before a furious charge made by the division sent from the 36th regiment, Vigie gave way, and was pursued, whilst the redoubt, with some distance around, appeared one complete sheet of fire.

MAJOR DIROM, Deputy Adjutant General, had been directed by Major General Medows to attend the storm and report the issue. The Major, Captains Wight, Gage and Markham, Brigade Major Nightingall, Lieutenants Barton and James Robertson, Ensign Maccoll, with a number of subaltern officers well supported, passing the ditches by the traverses already described, entered the winding passage, and struggled to break down the gate. The first discharge of grape from the cannon, with a heavy fire of musketry from every direction, in an instant levelled six officers, and a proportion of men along the passage. The natural effect of so severe a shock, was somewhat of a pressure backwards, but no one thought of retreat. The three Captains already mentioned, fortunately escaped this volley. All at the same instant seeing the importance of the triangles, they soon became masters of them on either side; and a brisk fire from these stations prevented the enemy from securing advantages, which the effect of so favourable an impression might otherwise have rendered permanent.

SUCH of the officers as had not been disabled by the first volley, renewed the struggle at the gate with an addition of force, before the garrison had time to reload their guns. There was no resisting this second attack. Some of the bars shattered by the grape, giving way to the struggle, and before the pressure of the onset, an opening was soon widened at the gate; and as ladders had by this time been planted from the ditch, the assailants ascending the ramparts, entered the redoubt from every direction. As there was no way to retreat, a terrible carnage ensued. Each of the defendants determined to sell his life at the highest possible price. In short, within a circle whose diameter did not exceed twenty yards, besides the fall of an important post, Tippoo Suldaun had to mourn the loss of about four hundred chosen men, amongst whom was Sahid Hummed, an officer of high renown, and commandant of his left wing. Nor had we to boast a victory without regret; the site of this horrid scene, was strewed with the prime of our soldiery, and officers of the greatest promise, attacked by numbers, resigned life just as they overpowered their immediate antagonists. But there followed what was still more grievous to the Commander in Chief; the column, as if sickened of blood at the first outset, continued inactive for the rest of the night. In place of attacking another redoubt, which began to oppose their progress, soon after they were put in motion towards Earl Cornwallis, an unhappy council of war, in order to avoid delay, after some little deliberation, determined to make a circuit to the left. The encampment of this wing consequently remained without further

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ther molestation during the action. The column repassed the bound-hedge, again forded the nulla at different bends, and proceeding towards the Carigat Pagoda, got bewildered amongst paddy-fields for the latter part of the night. Before day, however, the whole division with the exception of the garrison, left under Captain Austin, in the Edga redoubt, was drawn up, at the foot of the hill (1).

NOTWITHSTANDING the unhappy result of the council in General Medows's division, the advantages of the enterprize were numerous and important. What part of the enemy's right wing escaped the bayonet, was totally dispersed, and although his left had been but partially beaten, they could not possibly maintain their ground by day whilst we held possession of the Edga redoubt. The position of the troops in the island, although occupied in the dark, was such as the best of Generals could have wished for the night. Under Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, about two thousand men were stationed within the Pettah, on the center of the island, whilst the divisions of Captains Hunter and Monson held posts a considerable way in advance on either flank. The approach of day however pointed to the propriety of several alterations.

ABOUT sun-rise the 76th regiment, and 3d battalion of Bengal sepoy's augmented the troops on the island, in all to about the strength

(1) In the early stages of this action, the Commander in Chief was accompanied by Colonel Martin, by Lieutenant Colonels Patrick Ross, Alexander Ross, Malcolm, and Richardson; by Majors Skelly, Haldane, and Smart; by Captains Madan, Kyd, and Apily; and by Mr. Kingfoot, Doctor Laird, Mr. Cherry, and Lieutenant Turner, with his Lordship's body guard. Major General Medows was accompanied by Colonel Harris; by Majors Hart, Dirom, and Close; by Captains Macauley and Bordes, and by Lieutenant Grant with his body guard. Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell was accompanied by Captain Agnew, and by Lieutenants Wallace and Capper; Captain Beaton, of the Madras establishment, was posted with the right column; Captain Allen and Lieutenant Macleod led that of Earl Cornwallis, but the column of Colonel Maxwell required no guide.

of eight complete corps. Thus reinforced, Colonel Stuart was enabled to occupy the Pettah from whence he withdrew in course of the night. The enemy attempted to regain the island soon after day-break, but desisting as their opponents increased in strength, the whole retired towards Seringapatam. Another struggle which had the recovery of Tippoo Sultaun's redoubt, for its object, although maintained with greater perseverance, was rendered ineffectual from the desperate valor of the troops, to whom it was intrusted. Three different attacks on this post were as often repulsed.

UNDER cover of some rocks from whence two field pieces fired within pistol shot of the work, and encouraged by a heavy cannonade from the garrison, a large body of infantry attempted to storm about the hour of ten, but they were beat off with considerable loss. The second attack was by a resolute party of dismounted horse, who towards one o'clock threatened to enter sword in hand; these, however, were also beat back. Still the Sultaun did not relinquish the design. Without a doubt of success, he commanded the whole of his Europeans under Monsieur Vigie, to recover the work; yet this attempt was attended with no better effect, than either of the former ones; but as it proved to Tippoo Sultaun, that the garrison to a man, was determined to resign the post, with life only, he desisted. The slaughter within and around, was truly shocking; the wounded deprived of all access to water, and medical assistance, piteously implored help; but the multitude of the enemy that were still scattered about the encampment

ment prevented the possibility of affording them any relief until late in the evening (1).

HAVING carried away what remained of their camp-equipage, the Mysoreans now set about abandoning the north side of the river entirely. Every redoubt was evacuated. Besides possession of his encampment and two thirds of the island, eighty pieces of cannon, with immense quantities of arms, standards and trophies of various descriptions, graced the victory; and, but for the ill-judged determination of our council to the right, the courage of the conquerors was so completely inflamed, and the spirits of the enemy so miserably spent, that all his standing force must have been dispersed if not totally annihilated (2).

ALTHOUGH our troops in other quarters remained in quietness whilst the attack on Sibbald's redoubt lasted, the Sultaun immediately afterwards endeavoured to retrieve part of his loss, by an attempt to recover the island. Upwards of three thousand

(1) Perhaps the wonderful degree of resolution discovered in the defence of this redoubt, was due, not more to the acknowledged gallantry of its first garrison, than to the exertions of several officers, who from wounds or other causes had, during the night, taken shelter within the place; among these we find Major Skelly, Captains Hunter, Maitland, and Montgomery; Lieutenants Irvin and Madden. Another fortuitous circumstance which tended also to the safety of Sibbald's redoubt, was that Quarter Master Serjeant Howard, of the 28th Bengal battalion, while in quest of that corps, in the dark, fell in with Lieutenant White, who after taking a supply of ammunition, for the three companies which he headed, directed the Serjeant, with the remainder, towards that redoubt.

(2) However inclined to render justice to the memory of many gallant individuals, whose exertions contributed in a very conspicuous degree to the success of this enterprize; however desirous to enlarge on the numerous instances of zeal, courage, ability, and perseverance that shone forth with brightest lustre, throughout the engagement, the ablest writer, after the most minute research and careful attention, will find his labours fall far short of his wishes to delineate the respective merits of the several actors. It is to a want of competency to the task, and not to neglect or dearth of information on the subject, that every failure of this nature in the present instance must be attributed. At a particular stage of this action, it was, perhaps, to the able manœuvres of Captain Dugald Campbell that his country is indebted for the preservation not only of Earl Cornwallis, but of his whole suite. The tactical skill of Lieutenant Buchan, with the intrepidity of Sibbald, Skelly, Hunter and other officers, gave a degree of confidence to the troops that composed the garrison of Sibbald's redoubt, which saved the whole from destruction. At the Edga redoubt, perhaps the strength and intrepidity of Ensign Maccoll was not of less importance in ensuring success, than the collected conduct of Colonel Nesbitt, or the determined valour of Captains Wight and Gage. In short, to particularize every individual who distinguished himself on this occasion, can only be done by giving a list of the whole that were engaged.

men sweeping from river to river, advanced through the Pettah, and drove the followers who plundered there, in crowds upon the lines of Colonel Stuart. The first battalion of Madras sepoy's was pushed on in advance, and being soon followed by the 7th regiment, a smart action took place. The enemy yielded to the superior discipline of their antagonists, and reluctantly retiring towards the fort, they left Colonel Stuart in quiet possession of the Pettah. The troops in the redoubts taken from the enemy, had been by this time relieved; the encampment of the army had moved somewhat nearer to the fort; and, after strengthening our position in the island with four additional field pieces, Major Gowdie's brigade was commanded to lie on their arms for the night, at the foot of the Carigat hills, in order to throw succour to any direction at which the Sultaun might point an attack in the dark. But contrary to expectation, all remained in quietness till day-light (1).

It was not until now that the enemy fully acknowledged his defeat; repeated struggles in different directions, hitherto discovered that the Sultaun entertained some hopes of recovering part of what he had lately lost; but now that he everywhere gave up the battle, it was evident that want of success in all directions had thrown a damp on the spirits of his people, which neither affection for their prince,

(1) "The conduct and valor of the officers and soldiers of this army, have often merited Lord Cornwallis's encomiums; but the zeal and gallantry which were so successfully displayed last night, in the attack of the enemy's whole army, in a position that had cost him so much time and labor to fortify, can never be sufficiently praised; and his satisfaction on an occasion, which promises to be attended with the most substantial advantages, has been greatly heightened by learning from the commanding officers, that this meritorious behaviour was universal, through all ranks to a degree that has rarely been equalled. Lord Cornwallis therefore requests that the army in general will accept of his most cordial thanks, for the noble and gallant manner in which they executed the plan of the attack. It covers themselves with honor, and will ever command his warmest sentiments of admiration." G. O. 7th Feb. 1792.

love of their country, enthusiasm in religion, nor a tenacious adherence to the transmissions of ancestors, could remove (1).

THE Pettah of Shehar Ganjam, is perhaps the most regular in India; it is surrounded by a mud-wall, which although of no greater thickness than those generally raised for the protection of gardens, is upwards of twelve feet in height. Within this enclosure ten wide streets intersect each other, at right angles; between these, several lesser ones are directed by the fancy of the builder. The principal entrances are at either end of the centre streets which lead to Seringapatam, and towards the Laulbaug; but there is a smaller gateway at the next streets, to the right and left of the former, in the same direction. All the houses are built nearly on one principle, those in the main street are on a larger scale, and more commodious than the rest; but the whole are white-washed and covered with tiles. A regular row of trees, shaded the people from the sun along the principal streets on either side. At the northwest outlet on each hand, a range of barracks stretched from the Pettah towards Seringapatam; here the Chela battalions were quartered, in times of peace. These buildings from without appeared perfectly regular, but on the inside they were parted into a number of small divisions, as the whim of each individual occupant suggested. Besides the advantages of being

(1) In this action, Earl Cornwallis, whilst exposed to the utmost danger, received a slight hurt on the right hand; besides the Commander in Chief, the following names were amongst the sufferers:—Wounded, Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, Major Frazer.—Killed, Captains Archdeacon, Mackenzie, Sibbald.—Wounded, Captains Hunter, Rois, Browne, Maicland, Markham, Zouch.—Killed, Lieutenants Stewart, Bain, Hutchison, Jones, Robertson, Buchan.—Wounded, Lieutenants Macpherfon, Robertson, Brownrigg, Irvin, Madden, Rowan, Hemming, Martin, Philpot, Ward, Robert Campbell, Shawe, John Campbell, Farquhar, Niccoll.—Killed, Ensign Smith.—Wounded, Ensign Hamilton, and Surgeon's Mate Paley.—Europeans killed, wounded and missing, including officers, 303.—Natives ditto, 232.

disciplined under his own immediate eye, the position of these troops in the centre of his dominions, prevented their escape from slavery; they served also as a constant watch on the inhabitants of Shehar Ganjam, of whom, as they had been forcibly conveyed away by Hyder, during his several incursions in the Carnatic, some jealousy had still been entertained. All of them were manufacturers of cotton, and being consequently an acquisition of the first importance to this political prince, although he kept a strict watch over their movements, he endeavoured by mild treatment to reconcile them to a change of country. Between the Pettah and Seringapatam, to the right, and in the centre of a garden, there stood a palace, called the Dowlat Baug, which was intercepted from the view by clumps of cypress. Within this building, an historical representation of Colonel Ballie's defeat, decorated the walls; the explosion of the tumbrils, as the leading cause of that disaster, was the most conspicuous part of the painting; and a small tomb which adjoined, was said to contain the remains of that gallant but unfortunate officer. From the walls of the Pettah to the river on either side, and indeed over the greater part of the island, the destruction of innumerable huts appeared so fresh as to confirm the belief, that a large city had been laid in ruins since the commencement of the war, or perhaps from the time our armies entered Mysore. This scene of devastation, extended in an easterly direction, close to a thick bamboo hedge that surrounded the Laul Baug, a beautiful garden, which covered the east end of the island.

A MAGNIFICENT palace constructed on a similar principle, and nearly of the same dimensions, with that already described at Bangalore, stood towards the center of this garden. It was built principally of wood, with ornaments, which were lacquered and varnished as the former; but although the whole was finished, in appearance, from without, the decorations had not been completed. From the palace, through a beautiful avenue of cypress trees, the tomb of Hyder, a neat square building, with a dome rising from its center, closed the view. At the entrance into this mausoleum, there was a neat piazza, with its roof supported by pillars of granite, which from the exquisiteness of the polish, and nicety in staining, were invariably mistaken for black marble. This spacious area, formed by four double arcades furnished a pleasant retreat for priests and pilgrims of every description. From the square building at each of the corners around the dome, there rose minarets of the best workmanship; numerous apartments for the religious of the Mahomedan order, encircled the sacred ground; and, an extensive terrace on which the building stood, was here and there vaulted and set apart for such of Hyder's relatives as had been killed in battle since the tomb had been erected. Avenues of cypress intersecting each other in every direction, besides furnishing abundance of shade, divided the garden into plots of different shapes, which were planted throughout with fruit trees and shrubberies of various descriptions.

THE Laul Baug appeared a princely nursery for the produce of Mysore; trees bearing apples, oranges, guavas, grapes, plantains, co-

coanuts, beetlenuts; as also sandal-wood, sugar-cane, with cotton and indigo plants, rose from out the several inclosures; and paddy, raggy, choulum, chewaree, machine, coultie, with various other species of pease, grains and pulses, might be seen in different directions. Plants of mulberry too, from the extraordinary attention with which they were treated, discovered that the Sultaun had set his mind on the manufacture of silk. At the eastern extremity of the garden, there is a neat bungalow, that commands a view of the river for a considerable distance, after the re-union of the two branches. From this building a deep nulla that watered the garden, formed a breast-work along the south bank of the island, which was further strengthened with several redoubts; but the principal defence on this side lay in the difficulty of crossing the water; for, bad as the bottom was on the opposite branch, it was still better than on this, where it could scarcely be forded at any time from the ruggedness of the rocks.

THE best and indeed the only ford into the island, except those on either side close to the walls of Seringapatam, was that under the Carigat hills, which was strongly defended with trenches and batteries. In short, if the natural advantages of his position, and the strength of the several defences, are taken into consideration, it will not be wondered at, that the Sultaun should have thought himself secure from sudden attack. In no other manner than that adopted, could the attempt be made without the certainty of great loss, with considerable risk of failure; and although of singular boldness, the unanimous opinion of all unprejudiced spectators, proclaimed the wisdom

of

of the measure, as to judgement in planing, as well as firmness in the leader with respect to coolness in execution.

ALTHOUGH a considerable part of the Sultaun's right wing had been dispersed during the action, large bodies on his left who had been but little molested, continuing to remove their camp-equipage and guns, pitched their encampment on the south side of the fort. In every other direction Seringapatam was now so closely invested, that the Sultaun on the 8th, blew up whatever outworks were detached at any distance. His loss in twenty hours was computed at as many thousand fighting men, of which number about one-fourth were slain, several were made prisoners, but by far the greater part returned to their homes. Immense quantities of arms and standards of various descriptions, with upwards of eighty pieces of cannon, graced the victory (1).

THE critical stage at which his affairs had now arrived, began to produce a temporary appearance of humility in Tippoo Sultaun, that had hitherto been a stranger to his overbearing mind; but his necessities had not yet humbled him sufficiently to give over all hopes of converting the concessions which his situation rendered necessary, to purposes of pride and ambition. Fearful that his enemies should press him sore, whilst his troops were scattered and dispersed from their late defeat, he strove by protractive arts to gain time. Another

(1) The loss of Tippoo Sultaun in forts, guns and troops, during this war, will scarcely gain credit amongst those who have not had an opportunity of witnessing the strength of his country. Upwards of seventy forts are said to have surrendered to the allies; eight hundred pieces of cannon taken from the enemy, gave additional strength to the districts that had been conquered; and the destruction or dispersion of above fifty-thousand fighting men, is a crush to his power from which he will find it difficult to recover for many years.

motive for delay, was the desire of being reinforced by a division of his army, which then watched the movements of Purseram Bhow, under the command of Cummer ul Dien Cawn, one of his best officers. The first step which the Suldaun judged necessary towards this important object of protraction, was the release of Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, who, as already related, had been detained in Seringapatam contrary to capitulation, ever since the surrender of Coimbatore. After an audience of two hours, accompanied with some mean representations and entreaties for their interposition to procure a peace, he requested Lieutenant Chalmers to deliver two letters to Earl Cornwallis, and to return with an answer. This conversation was accompanied with a promise of restoring all their baggage, horses, and whatever they possessed at the surrender of Coimbatore, or an equivalent in money; it was the effect of a correspondence, which passed between the Suldaun and Earl Cornwallis on the preceding month (1). A list of the whole loss was sent with the

(1) *From Tipoo Suldaun. Received January 13, 1792.*—"At this time, with a view to strengthen the friendship, and remove the disagreements between the Ahmudy Sirkar, the Company, his Highness the Nawaub Afoph Jaw, and the Peishwa; and to cultivate the ties of intimacy between these four Sirkars, a confidential and experienced man belonging to this Sirkar will be deputed to your Lordship, in order that by negotiation personally with every one, the displeasure of the mind may be done away, and a reconciliation with each other (which is for the good and quiet of mankind) may take place. If this meets with your Lordship's approbation, be pleased to notify it, that the abovementioned person may be sent to a place appointed, and the ancient friendship may be renewed."—Dated 12th Jemmadie ul Owel, 1206, Hejira,—or 7th January, 1792.

Answer to Tipoo Suldaun.—Written the 16th January, 1792, after recapitulating the letter received the 13th of January.—"It is well known, that after having made every conciliatory proposition in my power to prevent this war, I was forced by the dictates of honor and good faith, to have recourse to arms, to save one of the Company's allies from destruction; and I have ever been desirous to make peace as soon as proper compensation can be received, for the injuries and losses that have been sustained by the Company, and by those allies with whom it is connected in the strictest bonds of confederacy.—But with what confidence can a negotiation be carried on with a man, who not only violates treaties of peace, but also disregards the faith of capitulations, during war. The garrison at Coimbatore ought by the capitulation, to have been set at liberty, upon certain conditions, immediately after its surrender; and I have a just right to demand, that the agreement should still be executed on the spot where it was made; but being unwilling, at this critical time, to occasion any delay that can be avoided in opening a negotiation, I shall not insist on a literal performance of the original stipulations, on account of the length of time that the execution would require.—Let therefore the garrison of Coimbatore be sent to this army, to be set at liberty according to the conditions of the capitulation, that were settled between Lieutenant Chalmers, and Cummer ul Dien Cawn, and I shall then be ready in concert with the allies, to fix upon a place where Vakceels from you may conveniently meet proper persons that will be deputed, on the part of the three confederate powers, for the purpose of endeavouring to arrange the terms on which a general peace can be re-established."

answer

answer, yet this promise has never been fulfilled. Rejoiced with the prospect of liberty at any price, these gentlemen were liberal of their promises in return; however, the melancholy account which they gave of their treatment during captivity, pleaded nothing with our Commander-in-chief in favour of their plighted suit.

ON the 9th the army changed ground, and took a final position for the siege. So close to the object of attack was this encampment, that it became necessary to leave the magazine at a little distance in the rear, as some of the enemy's heavy guns threw random shots through and over our tents. The troops in every direction were now regularly relieved, and working parties of great strength were ordered to prepare fascines, gabions, and pickets, with materials which were furnished in abundance from the pettah and Laul Baug. The whole corps of engineers encamped in the middle of this garden. Assisted by a division of lascars, and of European and native pioneers, upwards of two thousand men daily reduced the several plots of planting, with the rows of cypress by which they were enclosed, to mere waste. The palace, with the buildings around the tomb, formed convenient hospitals; and the Sultaun, by felling the trees at the Dawlet Baug, was alike busied in forwarding means of resistance.

WHILST these preparations were going forward, a large body of the enemy's horse made a daring attack upon our magazine soon after day-break on the 11th. They were observed on the preceding day in motion to the Eastward, on the south side of the river, but their designs had not been suspected. After fording the Cauvery in the neighbourhood of Arrakery, this enemy made a circuit around the north-east extremity of the Pagoda hill; and as a similarity in appear-

ance prevented them being distinguished from the horse of our allies, had their judgment kept pace with their spirit, it is dangerous to hazard a conjecture on the degree of mischief which might have followed; indeed, as the head quarter line encamped in this direction, many imagined, and with much appearance of truth, that this was a second blow aimed at the life of our Commander-in-chief. His Lordship was consequently persuaded to admit a Captain's guard of Europeans over his tent during the night, for the remainder of the war.

TOWARDS evening a working and covering party of great strength was sent out from the several corps, across the south branch of the river, to erect a redoubt on a rising ground which commanded the whole of our posts on the south side of the island. This work, with three companies from Colonel Stuart's division, was put in charge of Lieutenant Macinnes, who continued in that command until the peace. Swarms of brinjaries that arrived in camp during this and the preceding day, were encouraged in their advance by a small detachment which, under Captain Mandeville, escorted a supply of entrenching tools, from Bangalore. The enemy kept up a constant but ineffectual discharge of cannon throughout the day, from the period of our first attack on his encampment until the evening of the 13th, when it ceased for a time. The cause of this temporary lull was the advance of two vakeels, who approached tents pitched for their reception in the vicinity of the mosque, or Edga, redoubt; but at their return about ten o'clock next morning, the fort fired as before. Another cannonade was now heard in a westerly direction.

THE army of General Abercromby advancing towards Earl Cornwallis, agreeable to the plan concerted, crossed the Cauvery on the 11th, about twenty-five miles above Caniambaddy. On the 13th and 14th, large bodies of the enemy's horse attempted to cut off their baggage, and to retard a junction which they felt themselves unable to prevent; but as the whole of our cavalry, with the exception of one regiment, supported by the twenty-ninth battalion of Coast infantry, and about four thousand of the allied horse, proceeded in that direction under Colonel Floyd on the 12th, an union of the two armies was effected without any material loss. On this occasion, however, the tardiness of our allies, and their inattention to command, furnished the enemy another opportunity of displaying their superiority in the field; and, but for the protection of Colonel Floyd, their escape to either army must have been at evident hazard. After leaving at Poodicherrim and Sedafer a force sufficient for the protection of both passes, General Abercromby on the 15th conducted to Earl Cornwallis upwards of six thousand fighting men, of which number about one third were Europeans. For regularity of conduct and uniformity in discipline this corps was not to be surpassed in any country.

ALTHOUGH the vakeels of Tippoo Sultaun continued to confer daily with those of the allied army, whether the eye turned towards attack or defence, there was no slackness of preparation on either side. The fort had been closely reconnoitered all around, except on its south face, where the Sultaun's troops still continued to encamp. Towards the island the defences were of wondrous strength. Double walls and ditches of excellent masonry, were covered in front by works constructed with the best materials, and on the most approv-

ed principle of the present time. Drawbridges secured the communication over the ditches at every entrance, and heavy guns out of number pointed in all directions from bastions, cavaliers and out-works. The defences to the northward, notwithstanding that they were covered by the river, were on a comparative view considered of less strength than those towards the island. The walls in this direction were not of the same thickness as in the other: the ditches excavated from the solid rock, at an enormous expence, were inferior in width and depth: but the natural advantages of the ground were still more favourable to an attack on the north face than all other considerations. From a gradual rise in the country, not only the buildings within, but the walls of the fort, were exposed to the very foundation; and several French deserters, who had lately abandoned the Sultaun, agreed in opinion, with respect to the weakness of Seringapatam in this direction.

AFTER the General had set his mind on the point of attack, he directed such subordinate arrangements as in his opinion became necessary to ensure success. The island and Sibbald's redoubt were left in charge of Colonel Stuart. The piquets and out-posts were, as usual, intrusted to Colonel Maxwell. The rest of the works that originally secured the enemy's encampment were confided to Captain Brown, of the Madras establishment; and under the immediate eye of the Commander-in-chief, Major General Medows was directed to superintend the whole (1). All matters preparatory to breaking ground

G. O. 18th February, 1792.—“ The following arrangement ordered for conducting the duties of the line, and the operations of the troops, during the siege.”

“ An engineer's park to be established immediately near the bound hedge, in the rear of Captain Brown's redoubt; as the rendezvous of the corps of engineers, for the stores, &c. of that department, and for the corps of European and Native pioneers, who being placed under the orders of the chief engineer, for the period of the siege, are to be considered as a distinct detail, for working service, and regulated accordingly.

being thus adjusted, on the 17th a brigade was ordered to carry fascines, gabions, and pickets from the island. Towards evening the party was relieved by three corps, who carried these materials to Brown's redoubt, a work which, erected about one mile in front, and to the northward of Seringapatam, covered the centre of the Sultaun's fortified encampment. From thence it had been determined to carry on the approaches. Six complete corps, therefore, conveyed materials thither on the 18th; but as the design was considerably facilitated by a successful diversion from the island, it will be necessary to detail that measure before any description of the opening of our trenches is attempted.

“ The entrenching tools, lodged with the Commissary, to be removed to the engineer's park, in charge of a conductor of stores, who is to remain there, and, under the direction of the chief engineer, regulate the delivery of the tools to working parties; and see that, when no longer wanted, they are carefully returned into store. Lists of artificers in European corps, but particularly carpenters, to be sent forthwith to the Deputy Adjutant General. The field officer for the island discontinued. The picquets (out posts) from the line, to report to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, as usual. The following corps posted on the island, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, until further orders. The 52d and 72d regiments, the 13th and 14th Bengal, and 5th and 21st Coast battalions. These corps to be accommodated with a few tents from camp; but his Lordship recommends, that the number only, indispensibly necessary to cover the troops, may be taken from the lines. The remainder of the troops on the island to return to camp in the course of to-morrow morning. A detail, including a field officer, to be relieved daily, will be ordered as a guard for the trenches, to be turned from camp, or the troops under Major General Abercromby. The field officer for this duty, to have authority over the advanced redoubts; which, Sibbald's excepted, are to be occupied, until further orders, by the first native battalion. The working parties for the trenches will be ordered in like manner; and, so long as numerous details are required for working service, a field officer will be appointed to command them. He is to regulate, in communication with the engineers on duty, the details required to work; and frequently visit the different parties at work; but is not to interfere in the command of the guard for the trenches; which is to be under the orders of the field officer included in that detail. Lieutenant Colonel Knox, to meet the chief engineer at four o'clock, at the engineer's park; and make himself acquainted with the situation of the out-posts; and receive from him the Commander in Chief's directions, regarding the manner in which the troops are to be employed, and disposed of, for the protection of the working parties during the night. Working parties to march at three this afternoon, to carry fascines, ropes and pickets, from the depot of materials, near the ford, to the engineers' park, the seventh Bengal, and second Coast battalions: after one trip, this party to return to camp. Working party for the trenches this evening, to be furnished by the troops under Major General Abercromby; and to march so as to arrive at the engineers' park by sun-set. Lord Cornwallis is convinced, that the same military ardour, which has been so often manifested by the officers and soldiers of this army, during the course of the present war, will call forth the most animated exertions of all ranks, upon an occasion which may eventually bring the contest to a speedy and honourable conclusion; and, he therefore, only thinks it necessary to desire, that both officers and soldiers will recollect, that gallantry under arms, forms but one part of the duty of a soldier, during a siege; and, that the ultimate success cannot be secured, without the most vigorous and unmitigated exertions of industry and labour. His Lordship will enter into all the details of the arrangements for carrying on the siege; and he feels a peculiar satisfaction, in possessing the advantage of General Meadows's zeal and activity, for assisting to superintend them. He requests that the General will be pleased to visit the works as often as he may judge it expedient; and that he will give such orders on the spot, as may from time to time appear to him to be calculated for preserving our own troops; and for rendering our fire more effectual against the enemy; communicating the nature of such orders to his Lordship, as soon as may be convenient for him; and in every respect, his Lordship relies, with the utmost confidence, upon the General, both for suggesting what may be useful for improving any of the arrangements, and for executing with energy, whatever may be directed, for promoting the success of the present enterprise.

WHILST

WHILST the materials were conveyed to the depot at Brown's re-doubt, some works constructed for the security of our posts on the island creating great jealousy amongst the besieged, their whole attention was attracted to this quarter: but an attack which was made on their camp in the night withdrew their anxiety from other objects to that alone. Under Major Dalrymple, His Majesty's seventy-first regiment, and the thirteenth battalion of Bengal sepoys, crossed the south branch of the Cauvery on the 19th, about nine at night, and in two hours afterwards approached the enemy's encampment unperceived. The main body remaining on their skirts, four companies of the seventy-first, under Captain Robertson, were pushed on in front. At the beginning numbers were bayoneted whilst fast asleep, by the party in advance; but as the principal object was to create an alarm in the fort, several regular volleys were discharged. No resistance was offered by the Mysoreans. Ignorant of the force by which they were attacked from this new direction, they thought of nothing but flight: and without having one man hurt, the party returned to the island, after having completely effected their design. So strongly was the enemy's attention riveted to what was going on to the southward, that not one shot was fired on a division who worked incessantly throughout the night, within eight hundred yards of the fort on the opposite side. But as soon as day discovered our operations in the dark, a furious cannonade opened, and continued for a length of time without intermission.

THESE were not the only advantages gained over Tippoo Sultaun on the night we broke ground. It had been for some time determined that the army of General Abercromby should occupy a position

to the southward of Seringapatam, and it was the original intention of Earl Cornwallis to have beat up the enemy's encampment with the advance of that army; but the ruggedness of a ford at which this corps at first attempted to get over, rendered it necessary either to abandon the design, or to put it in execution from the island. However, as a better ford had been found out about two miles higher up; under Major Dow, the Bombay grenadier battalion, with the light companies of the seventy-third and seventy-fifth regiments, crossed in the dark; and as they got over without being discovered by the enemy, they experienced no opposition, except such as offered from the rapidity of the stream and ruggedness of the bottom. The Major, on gaining the opposite bank, immediately took post on an adjacent height, so as to cover the rest of the troops whilst crossing. A considerable body of horse at first threatened interruption; but contenting themselves with watching our motions, they permitted the whole to gain the southern bank, and to take up their ground without opposition.

TOWARDS two o'clock a large body of cavalry, supported by a line of infantry and some guns, advanced seemingly with intention to give battle, to a redoubt which was in some measure covered by the guns of the fort. Their first endeavour was to recover a village of which our troops had taken possession; they at the same time opened a cannonade upon the heights; and, as the Sultaun appeared at the head of his horse in person, it was evident that he watched an opportunity to take advantage of any confusion which might occur. Although he continued in the field until dark, not chusing to run that hazard

on the approach of night, he drew back towards the fort; and the party left in the redoubt following his example, after a feeble resistance, the place was occupied by a detachment of our troops. Thus our position to the southward of Seringapatam was gained without any material loss; and the absence of Purferam Bhow alone prevented the place from being completely invested. For some days from this period bodies of horse escorted large quantities of baggage, carried chiefly upon elephants and camels, from Seringapatam to Myfore; and, as the wreck of his numerous army could find no place of safety to encamp in around the walls of the former, what part of his forces could not be employed in its defence, was directed to occupy the latter.

ON the 19th and two following days an incessant cannonade was kept up on our trenches; but, from the strength of our cover, the casualties were not so numerous as might have been expected; our lines on the island became daily more respectable; and as the duties of the trenches were uncommonly severe, six corps only were left to protect the posts that were under the direction of Colonel Stuart (1). The time now approached for commencing our operations from the southward. The redoubt which a few days before had been deemed worthy of so much contention, was abandoned by our troops soon after it was taken, from its having been so much exposed to the guns of Seringapatam; neither was it occupied by the enemy; but from its situation at equal distances between the encampment and the

(1) His Majesty's 52d and 72d regiments; the 13th and 14th Bengal battalions, the 6th and 21st Coast battalions.

garrison, it was judged adviseable, towards facilitating an attack from the southward, to re-possess this station in the first instance, as also to occupy a neighbouring tope.

UNDER Captain Mackenzie of the seventy-fifth regiment, a detachment was pushed on in advance for this purpose, on the 21st, towards duik; but on the following morning, as soon as the measure was discovered by the enemy, a large force sallied out of the fort, and rushed with the utmost impetuosity to attack that part of our division which was posted in the tope, whilst Captain Mackenzie advanced for their support with the whole of his detachment. The enemy, although greatly superior in number, gave way before the British bayonet; but the Sultaun, as if disgraced by their conduct, at that instant opened a discharge of grape promiscuously upon the whole. Towards noon an immense multitude again advanced to attack the tope, which had now been strengthened by four additional companies under Captain Cameron.

WHILST the ammunition of our division lasted, notwithstanding the great disproportion of numbers, the struggle was maintained with much obstinacy; but no longer in a condition for defence, they retired towards the shelter of a nulla in the rear. Encouraged by the appearance of retreat, the Mysoreans advanced with rapidity and resolution; however, from the superiority of our discipline, they had nought to boast of in the long run; for, our detachment facing about, drove them in their turn, and pursuing with the bayonet, continued the chase until close to the bank of the river. The length of the ac-

tion, and the vicissitudes of the day, had now attracted the attention of both armies. Alternate retreats raised anxieties in every breast. General Abercromby's force, although in readiness to advance, were prevented by the expectation of an attack from the division under Cumer ul dien Cawn. Our troops on the island prepared to assist from that quarter; and the Sultaun, as if determined to gain the day, at length advanced in person to the support of the action.

As the division under Captains Mackenzie and Cameron fell back a second time, they were met by the twelfth battalion of sepoy's under Captain Oakes, who detached by General Abercromby to their assistance, also conducted a supply of ammunition. On the junction of this reinforcement, the whole immediately advanced, and again took post at the top. The Mysoreans also, by this time reinforced, renewed the fight with unabated ardour. Fortunately, however, another supply of troops strengthened our division. The second battalion of sepoy's, with the remaining companies of the Bombay European regiment now advancing, the engagement continued until evening, and the prize of victory was so well contended for, that when the Sultaun withdrew, besides officers (1), we had upwards of one hundred men killed and wounded. During the several actions on this day both parties signalized themselves by achievements the most brilliant, but our troops had the disadvantage of fighting against disproportionate numbers, and under the fire of a cavalier on which several pieces of cannon were mounted. About dusk all was quietness; and although the

(1) It does not appear that any officer died from wounds received in this action, although several were for a time disabled; among whom we find Lieutenants Douglas, Lloyd, Mears, and Hunt; and Ensign Kennedy.

struggle is said to have cost the Sultaun about six hundred fighting men, he found means to convey the whole towards the fort.

WHILST General Abercromby was thus employed, in establishing his position to the southward, our operations at the trenches went on with much spirit. Two parallels of great security had been completed, at a distance of six and eight hundred yards from the fort. One battery for twenty, with a smaller one for twelve guns, had been laid out in advance of these parallels; another for twelve guns was carried on in front of the Bombay army, under the direction of Major Sartorius; and a communication between the two attacks was rendered safe and easy by means of a post which had been occupied on an island to the westward of the fort, within the distance of one mile. To counteract these preparations, the Sultaun endeavoured to strengthen his works against the main attack by thickening his walls, and deepening the bed of the river.

So soon as he discovered our views, after diverting the nulla which ran in front of our encampment into the northern branch of the Cauvery, many thousands of his people were daily at work, in order to dam up the water at a ford just below the fort; but as this part of the river was exposed to a gun in Sibbald's redoubt, Captain Monson, the officer in trust of that post, obtained permission to use his endeavours towards retarding the embankment. The fire from this piece of ordnance, although it was the only one that opened against Seringapatam during the war, served as a warning of what the Sultaun had to expect in the event of an obstinate defence; for it not only
disperked

dispersed the people who were at work; but the very first shot penetrated the principal pagoda, which stood in the centre of Seringapatam. Several guns opened in return; however, as they were unable to silence the redoubt, the coolies, who are naturally inclined to loiter, could never afterwards be prevailed on to work with spirit. The critical stage at which his affairs had now arrived, evidently discovered to Tippoo Sultaun, that his suspension from total ruin could not be of long duration.

HEMME*D* up on all sides by enemies flushed with victory, it was left him only to choose between a desperate defence against the storm, and a submissive compliance with the dictates of his opponents. Within doors, also, he was by no means secure from danger. However faithful in their allegiance, it was natural to conceive that the multitudes of peaceful people who had flocked to the capital could not relish a struggle of so little expectance, whilst their families and property remained at hazard on the issue. His favourite officer, with a large division of his best troops, continued still at a distance; nor was there aught of hope to cheer up the drooping spirits of his disconsolate garrison, or to dissuade them from surrendering his person as the best forfeit of his intemperate attack on Travancore.

IN addition to the numbers that nearly encircled his capital, the division of Purseram Bhow, which was hourly expected, by completing the line of circumvallation, would entirely cut off all chance of supplies; whilst the growth, as well of Mysore, as of the surrounding kingdoms, remained for the confederates without molestation. Brinjaries out of number conveyed grain imported from Bengal to
Madras,

Madras, with every species of produce from the districts to the northward. Nizam Ally and the Marattas, thoroughly bent on the overthrow of their ancient scourge, neglected nothing that could tend to whet every instrument of vengeance; the indefatigable exertions of General Abercromby, aided by the active and zealous prince of the Coorgs, from the nearness of their country, had established immense magazines close at hand to the westward; and whatsoever could be brought forward, as well from the districts conquered by Major General Medows, as from the other countries in a southerly direction, was now advanced to Talamally, a fort situated near the top of the Guzzlehatty pass, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, headed by Major Cuppage (1).

THESE

(1) From the fall of Coimbatore, on the 3d of November, no movement of importance took place in the neighbouring districts until the last day of the ensuing month, when Major Cuppage took the field with the fifth and sixteenth Coast battalions. It is conceived, that besides the intention of reducing Errood, Sattinungalum, and Deniaguncottah, as also of giving security to our collections, Earl Cornwallis was induced to call forward this detachment, in order to collect the immense supplies which might have been procured from these and the adjacent districts, provided that Seringapatam had stood a tedious siege. Be this as it will, it is certain that the garrisons of Trichinopoly, Dindigul, Carore, Palamcottah, and Madura, had instructions, to comply with the requisitions of Major Cuppage, with respect to any supply of troops he might require. In consequence of which towards the beginning of January, Trichinopoly furnished under Captain Alexander Cuppage, about two hundred and twenty Europeans, with the two flank companies of the twenty-fifth Coast battalion: Carore gave five companies of the twentieth Coast battalion, with Lieutenant More; Palamcottah the two flank companies of the nineteenth, with Lieutenant Seale; in all when assembled, about fifteen hundred fighting men: to this was added sixty European artillery men, under Lieutenant Madde: on the 12th of January the whole marched for Sinaore, from whence they proceeded next day to Pungaur; a messenger was now sent to Deniaguncottah, with a summons to surrender. The killedar refused to comply; on which all the Europeans, together with all the flank companies, were detached in that direction. The Major himself accompanied this division, but the immediate command was given to Captain Alexander Cuppage. One six pounder was brought on, in order to blow open the gate, in case of resistance. On approaching the fort, several shot were fired on the detachment without effect; a second summons was sent; and on the killedar's conviction of the superiority with which he had to contend, he immediately surrendered the fort, and opened his gates. A company of sepoy's under Ensign Marriot garrisoned the fort, and continued in possession of it until the peace. A considerable quantity of grain and ammunition was found here, with a few iron guns, in tolerable good repair. Two days were passed in securing these acquisitions, after which the detachment proceeded to Sattinungalum. This post, like the former, fired some guns; but, from the direction of the shot, it was evident that they were not intended to do mischief. The piquets under Captain Torrins crossed the river and approached the fort. The garrison immediately took flight, but the inhabitants to a man remained in the pettah, as if certain of a kind reception. This post was likewise garrisoned with a company of sepoy's under Ensign Grant, who soon fell a sacrifice to the badness of the climate. The Major now, in expectation of orders for more serious operations, remained in Coimbatore, moving occasionally, in order to benefit by the forage and grain, as the country could best afford, till the beginning of March, when he received his instructions to proceed through the Guzzlehatty pass. During the
time

THESE miserable prospects, rendered still less supportable by the distraction of his forces in every direction, at length reduced Tippoo Sultaun to the necessity of compliance with the terms which had all along been sought after by the confederates. General orders on the 24th, announcing that preliminary articles of peace had been signed, our troops forbid to work, were directed to desist from hostilities; but although there was no return, the fort and outworks, instead of reciprocal cessation, continued to fire with more inveteracy than before. Perhaps this extraordinary demeanour had a view towards impressing the natives with an idea of his obtaining peace more from the dread of his guns than from his humility in consequence of the wretched state to which his affairs had been reduced. Whatever were his motives, he ceased not to fire until noon, notwithstanding that repeated messages for the purpose had been sent by the confederates.

time that elapsed between the taking of Sattimungulum and the ascent of the pass, Captain Vigors had been detached, with his own battalion, together with the fifth, in order to surprize the camp of Cawder Ally Cawn, who lay in the point, between the rivers Bewanee and Cauvery, at their confluence. After a forced march of about thirty two miles; which, with the common march of the day, made in all forty-four miles, the battalions commenced an attack on the enemy, who fled in all directions with considerable loss. Cawder Ally with difficulty escaped; but his palanquin, his chelumchee, with the rest of his baggage, and the whole of his camp equipage, was taken; considerable sums of money were thrown into the river; and in short, nothing was saved by the enemy except a few horses that were seized on at the first panick. On the fifth of March the detachment had got to the bottom of the pass at Guzzlehatty. Captain Torrens was directed to ascend with a party of sepoy's.— A redoubt near the top of the pass that had been well manned, refused to surrender. Captain Torrens, conscious of the weakness of his party, returned with intelligence, upon which Captain A. Cuppage was immediately directed to reinforce this party with the whole of the Europeans, who preceded and commenced an attack. The fort stood firm till a ball had lodged in the body of their leader, which caused the whole to give way, and possession was taken of the post, where the party remained till morning. The day had scarce broke when every exertion was required and given, in order to get up the guns and stores; the sepoy's worked like common coolies, and by the power of ropes around the trees, the whole was got up before night. In this the Sultaun had shewn the example. Many of the trees were cut half through by ropes, he having conveyed his eighteen pounders, through the same pass, when he attacked Colonel Floyd the year before. The whole now proceeded, and next day took possession of Tal-lamallee, where they had not been twenty hours before orders came to retire below the ghants. In passing through the Deniaguncottah district, a malignant fever cost us many valuable lives; amongst these Lieutenants Grant, Brown, and Baikur, were suddenly carried off. Ensign Lewis, and Lieutenant Madder, of the artillery, shared a similar fate. In short, so hostile was this fever, that amongst the whole of the Europeans, not one officer was fit for duty.

So soon as the cessation from hostilities was acknowledged by both parties, the colours of Seringapatam were displayed, although they had until then been laid aside, probably under the impression of some superstitious idea. Sir John Kennaway, accompanied by the vakeels of Nizam Ally and the Marattas, had daily conferences with those of Tipoo Sultaun; but all to no purpose for a length of time. Notwithstanding that the Bombay army had, in compliance with his intreaties, been ordered back to Caniambaddy, and that all descriptions of people had been prohibited crossing to the south side of the river, still the works of Seringapatam were strengthened daily in the direction of our approaches, and the same treacherous disposition which had hitherto marked his career in life was evident in every part of his conduct throughout the negotiation.

HOWEVER, on the 26th, about noon, the hostages at length made their appearance, and advanced towards the British camp with a retinue worthy the children of any prince. Abdul Calick, the elder, was about ten years of age; Moosa ul Dien, the younger, scarcely attained eight. That part of the line which lay in their way complimented the royal strangers under arms; and as they approached head quarters, a salute of nineteen guns from our park was answered by an equal number from the fort. Earl Cornwallis met the hostages beyond the cords of his tent with unaffected courtesy; and after some conversation, having presented a gold watch to each, His Lordship conducted his new charge to their elephants, and returned the visit at their own tents on the following day. Here, as to state with respect to the accommodation of these princely youths, although there

there was a degree of neatness that far exceeded the awkward unmeaning pomp of our allies; still a modest sense of misfortune was easily discernible; and the princes themselves, in the whole of their demeanour, shewed a degree of gracefulness which clearly discovered that their education had been treated with very particular attention. Each of them presented Earl Cornwallis with a sword, and accepted in return, the elder a fusée, the younger a pair of pistols. Farther offers were declined by His Lordship, who, after the usual compliments, now returned to his encampment. Besides their own guards, the hostages were farther protected by the twenty-eighth battalion of Bengal sepoy's under Captain Welsh; Captain Doveton constantly attended in their suite as interpreter; and Sir John Kennaway pitched his tents in their neighbourhood so as to render daily visits at their Durbar the less inconvenient. Another motive for this movement, was the nearness of their position to the tents in which the vakeels held their meetings, in order to adjust the definitive treaty of peace. But the Sultaun still continued to protract negotiation by numberless artifices. At one time his vakeels over-rated the districts which were to be ceded as the principal conditions of peace; at another the pagodas which were tendered in payment, were estimated by his shroffs at double their value. On some days the revenues of his dominions towards the centre of Myfore were diminished to half their amount; on others, the supremacy of the Coorga country furnished grounds for contention. Day after day produced some new quibble; in short, the Sultaun's conduct had such an equivocal appearance, that, on the 10th of March, working parties were again ordered out, both on the island and from our encampment.

AFTER much prevarication and loss of time the Vakeels went into the fort on the 11th, and returned on the following day with such unsatisfactory answers, as occasioned all the guns which had been withdrawn, to be replaced on the lines and in the redoubts; indeed every other preparation was now going forward, on both sides, for recommencing hostilities; but in truth the Sultaun ceased not to improve his means of defence from the beginning. Although he had advanced above one million sterling, and delivered two of his children as hostages for the performance of his engagements, still, should hostilities have recommenced, his prospects would have borne a much better appearance than when the cessation took place. Whilst such of his troops as had been dispersed at the storm of his lines, collected from all directions under an idea of a speedy termination to the war, the division of Cumer ul Dien Cawn, found means to throw themselves into Seringapatam. But the principal advantage which he derived from protraction, consisted in the sufferings of his enemies, especially in Europeans. Prevented removing their encampment, from a situation totally destitute of vegetables, or verdure of any kind, he was sensible that the putrid air arising from the late scenes of destruction, must have occasioned much sickness amongst constitutions naturally at variance with the climate; he well knew that our materials for the siege, being chiefly branches of cypress, could not be brought into use after the trees had been felled for nearly a month, and rendered still the more unpliant from being exposed to such extreme heat; and he was certain that in the event of being able to

hold out but a few months, the myriads by whom he was surrounded, although they might possibly be provided against famine, must inevitably have yielded to the approaching monsoon. It was these impressions that actuated his conduct, from the first stage of negotiation; but although Earl Cornwallis could not have expected such a high degree of duplicity, still his means of attack, and arrangements for supply far exceeded expectation.

MATTERS were thus situated on the 14th, when the Princes with their usual escort strengthened by the 19th light dragoons, were directed to proceed towards Bangalore; but the Mysoreans permitted to remain in their train were disarmed and treated as prisoners of war. The troops under General Abercromby had instructions to occupy their former position before the fort; and upwards of twenty thousand horse, headed by Purseram Bhow, with Captain Little's brigade of sepoys, having at length formed a junction, they were commanded to close the line of circumvallation from General Abercromby, to the division stationed on the island.

STRUCK with these preparations, and anxious for the fate of their master, the Vakeels again withdrew to the fort. From their representations the Sultaun at length listened to reason, and seriously began to relent. The Vakeels returning towards evening with an answer full of submission, the march of our western forces towards the capital was countermanded; Captain Welsh was directed to reconduct the hostages to their former ground; our parties ceased to work; and throughout the confederate lines every department once more assumed

a peaceful aspect. Notwithstanding that he acceded to the conditions of peace as settled by the Vakeels, before Earl Cornwallis consented to the second armistice, still the Sultaun kept our anxieties alive by delaying his signature under various frivolous pretences. Trusting solely to assurances from the Vakeels, day after day passed in painful expectation until the afternoon of the 18th, when they made their appearance with a ratification of the definitive treaty(1). On the following day, Abdul Calig, the elder Prince, closed the last scene of this momentous negotiation, by delivering a separate copy to the representatives of each confederate power in presence of the whole, receiving on the 20th, a counterpart of the treaty, from the allies, under a salute as on the day before.

THIS glorious conclusion of the war was celebrated from the center to the utmost extremities of the British empire, with the most brilliant rejoicings; few indeed affected to disapprove of the treaty, and these were actuated by a desire of seeing the house of Hyder totally extirpated, without attending to the danger of throwing an addition of power into the hands of our northern allies. With men of judgement and experience, the peace was evidently calculated to ensure permanent as well as immediate advantages to the several European settlements in the east, for, whilst the loss of half his dominions would be fatal to his plan of conquest, the tranquillity of India would in all human probability, be out of danger from the restless disposition of Tippoo Sultaun for many years. His resources crip-

(1) See the first Volume, Appendix No. 32.

pled, his treasures exhausted, his troops dispersed, his artillery reduced to wreck, the most stern policy could not have demanded further reparation for the insult offered to the British nation, in the attack of her ancient and faithful ally, the inoffensive Prince of Travancore.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

APPENDIX.

NUMBER I.

Meteorological Remarks in Mysore, during the Years 1791-2.

AS the army ascended at the Mugly pass in February, 1791, a change of climate much for the better was sensibly felt. During that month and March, the weather was very hot at noon, but temperate both in the evenings and mornings; with a serene sky. It continued with little variation, only that the heat was greater at noon, until towards the end of April. Frequent showers of rain fell generally in the evening, from that time until the 10th of May, when the fall was so heavy in the night, that the army, unable to march, halted of necessity the next day.

A MATERIAL change took place at this period: during the day the wind blew, in general, fresh from the southwest, driving light clouds before it, and at night, or in the evening, there usually fell some rain. On the night of the

14th, there was an incessant heavy pour for five hours; on the evening of the 15th, there was also a heavy shower. The days were cloudy and cold, with frequent showers; and, a fresh southwest wind blew during the remainder of this month. The weather continued much the same throughout the month of June; frequent showers fell, but there was no constant rain. In July the wind blew still fresher, with the same cloudy sky, and showers of rain were frequent as in June. But the following diary will, probably, prove more satisfactory to the reader, than general remarks,

Meteorological Diary, in Mysore, from July 19th, 1791, to the 18th of February, 1792.

FARENHEIT'S THERMOMETER.

1791.	Meridian Heat.		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed	Shaded.		
July 19.	96	82	66	Dark and cloudy; blowing fresh from the S.W.
20,	96	82	66	Blowing fresh; sunny day; rain in the evening.
21,	92	82	66	Cloudy, windy day; rain in the evening.
22,	92	80	66	The same as yesterday.
23,	92	80	66	The same.
24,	94	82	66	A cloudy, windy day.
25,	90	78	66	A clear, windy day; rain in the evening.
26,	97	84	66	A cloudy, windy day; rain in the evening.
27,	94	82	66	A clear, windy day; rain in the evening.
28,	92	80	66	The same as yesterday.
29,	92	80	66	A cloudy day.
30,	90	78	66	A cloudy day, with light showers.
31,	90	78	66	A cloudy, windy day; rain in the evening.

APPENDIX.

1791.	Meridian Heat.		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed.	Shaded.		
Aug: 1,	84	78	66	Cloudy, windy day; rain in the forenoon.
2,	84	78	66	The same.
3,	84	78	66	Cloudy, windy day.
4,	94	78	66	The same.
5,	94	78	66	The same.
6,	96	84	70	The same.
7,	96	82	70	The same.
8,	96	82	70	The same.
9,	99	84	70	The same.
10,	96	82	68	High wind; day cloudy.
11,	96	82	68	The same.
12,	96	82	68	The same.
13,	96	80	68	Wind much abated.
14,	96	80	68	Little wind; rain in the evening.
15,	96	80	70	Little wind, clear day.
16,	96	80	70	The same.
17,	96	87	70	The same.
18,	98	88	70	No wind; clear day.
19,	96	84	70	Cloudy day; little wind; lightning at night.
20,	96	84	68	Clear, windy day.
21,	94	84	68	Wind increased; a light shower in the evening.
22,	96	82	68	Clear day; less wind; a shower in the evening.
23,	96	84	68	Clear day; little wind.
24,	94	82	66	Cloudy day; little wind; much appearance of rain.
25,	94	82	66	Clear day; windy; much rain at night.
26,	95	82	64	Clear day; windy; cloudy in the evening.
27,	84	73	64	Forenoon clear; cloudy in the evening.

APPENDIX.

1791.	Meridian Heat.		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed	Shaded		
Aug. 28,	84	73	64	Little wind; frequent showers.
29,	83	72	62	Cloudy morning; clear and windy at noon.
30,	92	76	63	The same; heavy dew at night.
31,	94	78	64	Clear, windy day; wind fresh at night.
Sept. 1,	92	78	64	Clear, windy day.
2,	90	76	62	Clear, windy day; heavy showers in the evening.
3,	92	78	64	Clear, windy day.
4,	92	78	64	The same.
5,	93	79	64	The same.
6,	93	79	64	The same.
7,	94	80	65	Clear day; little wind.
8,	96	88	65	The same.
9,	98	92	70	The same; rain in the evening.
10,	96	92	70	Cloudy; a shower in the morning; no wind.
11,	98	94	68	Clear day; thunder and rain in the evening.
12,	96	92	66	Cloudy morning; clear noon; with little wind.
13,	98	86	66	Clear, calm morning; rain at noon and night.
14,	98	86	66	Cloudy; rain at noon; little wind.
15,	102	88	66	Clear morning; calm noon; rain in the evening.
16,	100	86	66	Cloudy morning with rain; thunder in the evening.
17,	102	88	66	Cloudy morning; rain in the evening.
18,	102	88	66	Clear day; heavy dew at night, and lightning.
19,	102	88	66	Clear day; thunder and lightning in the evening.
20,	100	86	65	Calm morning and noon; rain in the evening.
21,	98	84	66	Cloudy morning; clear noon; dew at night.
22,	100	86	64	Clear, calm day; dew at night.
23,	104	86	64	Clear morning and noon; rain in the evening.

APPENDIX.

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1791.	Meridian Heat.		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed.	Shaded.		
Sept. 24,	104	86	64	Cloudy morning; clear noon; rain in the evening.
25,	100	80	64	The same, with thunder, lightning and rain.
26,	100	80	64	The same; but no thunder or lightning.
27,	102	80	64	The same.
28,	104	84	66	Clear morning; calm noon; rain in the evening.
29,	104	84	66	The same.
30,	104	84	66	Foggy morning; clear, calm noon.
Oct. 1,	104	84	68	Clear, calm morning and noon; windy night.
2,	106	84	68	The same, both day and night.
3,	102	84	68	Clear, calm day.
4,	102	84	68	Foggy morning; clear noon; dewy night.
5,	102	84	68	The same; but a windy night.
6,	102	84	68	Foggy morning, with dew; calm, clear noon.
7,	102	84	68	Calm, clear morning and noon; wind easterly,
8,	102	84	68	The same.
9,	102	84	68	The same.
10,	102	84	68	The same.
11,	100	80	66	Calm, clear morning and noon; dew at night.
12,	100	84	66	The same.
13,	100	84	66	The same; but without dew.
14,	100	84	64	Cloudy morning; clear noon; rain in evening.
15,	100	84	64	The same.
16,	102	86	65	Cloudy morning; calm, clear noon.
17,	104	88	66	Cloudy morning; clear noon.
18,	104	88	66	The same.
19,	104	88	66	The same.

1791.	Meridian Heat.		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed	Shaded		
Oct. 20,	98	85	64	Cloudy morning; clear and windy noon.
21,	96	86	64	The same.
22,	78	76	68	Cloudy, windy day.
23,	98	80	66	Cloudy, windy morning; rain in the evening.
24,	80	72	68	Cloudy morning; rain; cloudy noon.
25,	76	76	64	Cloudy, rainy morning and evening.
26,	78	76	66	Cloudy day, with rain.
27,	79	74	66	Cloudy day, with heavy rain in the evening.
28,	94	76	66	Cloudy, foggy morning; clear noon.
29,	90	78	68	Calm, foggy morning; clear noon.
30,	84	76	68	The same; but more windy.
31,	84	76	68	Calm, foggy morning, with a heavy dew.
Nov. 1,	76	76	66	Dark, cloudy day; rain in the evening and night.
2,	74	74	64	The same; more windy from the north.
3,	96	76	64	Rainy morning; clear noon; rain in the evening.
4,	94	80	62	Cloudy morning; clear noon; rain in the evening.
5,	96	80	64	Cloudy morning; clear noon; no rain.
6,	96	80	64	The same.
7,	94	80	64	The same.
8,	88	80	66	Clear, dewy morning; wind from the N. E.
9,	94	80	66	The same.
10,	92	78	64	Cloudy, windy morning; noon clear.
11,	88	78	64	Cloudy, windy morning and noon.
12,	68	68	63	Dark, cloudy day; wind fresh; much rain.
13,	66	66	63	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent showers.
14,	66	66	63	Dark, cloudy day, with some rain.
15,	66	66	64	Dark, cloudy day, with light showers.

APPENDIX.

1791.	Meridian Heat.		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed.	Shaded.		
Nov. 16,	66	66	64	Dark, cloudy day, with little wind.
17,	78	78	64	Cloudy, windy day; a little sun at noon.
18,	70	70	66	The same.
19,	92	78	66	Cloudy, dark morning; sun strong at noon.
20,	92	78	66	The same.
21,	92	78	66	The same, with lightning in the evening.
22,	92	78	66	The same; but without lightning.
23,	92	78	63	The same.
24,	110	80	64	Foggy, dewy morning; clear sunny day; calm.
25,	100	80	65	A calm, dewy morning; clear day.
26,	92	80	62	Cloudy morning; sun strong at noon; calm night.
27,	92	80	62	A foggy, dewy morning; clear day; little wind.
28,	88	80	62	A cloudy morning, with a little wind.
29,	88	80	63	Cloudy morning; clear, windy day.
30,	90	82	63	Cloudy morning; heavy dew at night.
Dec. 1,	92	82	63	Foggy morning; clear day.
2,	88	80	62	Cloudy morning; rain in the evening.
3,	82	78	63	Dark, cloudy morning and day.
4,	88	78	62	Cloudy morning; sun at noon; rain in the evening.
5,	68	68	62	Cloudy, dark day, with constant showers.
6,	68	68	62	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent showers.
7,	78	68	63	Cloudy morning; sun at noon.
8,	88	76	63	Cloudy morning; little wind; sun at noon.
9,	88	76	63	Calm, cloudy morning; clear fore and afternoon.
10,	98	78	63	Calm, dewy morning; clear day, with sun.
11,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; sun strong all day.

APPENDIX.

1791.	Meridian Heat		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed	Shaded.		
Dec. 12,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; sun strong in the forenoon.
13,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; sun in the forenoon.
14,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; sun strong all day.
15,	98	80	60	Calm morning; clear day, with a strong sun.
16,	98	82	60	The same.
17,	98	82	58	The same.
18,	70	70	60	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent showers.
19,	70	70	60	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent showers.
20,	80	80	60	Dark, cloudy morning; sun at noon.
21,	80	80	60	The same; only the showers less frequent.
22,	80	80	60	Cloudy morning; sun in the fore and afternoon.
23,	84	80	60	Dewy morning; clear day, with sun.
24,	84	76	60	Calm, dewy morning; clear day, with sun.
25,	86	76	60	As yesterday.
26,	86	76	60	The same.
27,	86	76	60	Dewy, foggy morning; clear, windy day.
28,	86	76	60	Calm, dewy morning; clear day, with sun.
29,	86	76	58	The same.
30,	86	76	58	The same; wind regular from N. E.
31,	86	76	58	Calm, dewy morning; clear day; little wind.
1792.				
Jan. 1,	86	76	58	Calm, dewy morning; clear day; a gentle breeze.
2,	86	76	58	The same.
3,	86	76	58	The same.
4,	84	76	58	The same.
5,	80	70	58	Dark, cloudy morning; cloudy, windy day.
6,	80	70	58	The same.

APPENDIX.

1792.	Meridian Heat.		At Night.	WEATHER.
	Exposed	Shaded		
Jan. 7,	80	70	58	Dark, cloudy day, with some rain.
8,	86	76	56	Calm, dewy morning; clear day.
9,	90	78	58	The same.
10,	80	78	58	The same; a little cloudy.
11,	86	76	58	Calm, cloudy morning; clear day; windy night
12,	90	76	58	Calm, clear day; night windy from nine o'clock
13,	90	80	58	The same.
14,	100	80	58	Calm, clear day.
15,	100	80	58	The same.
16,	90	80	56	Calm, foggy morning; clear day.
17,	90	80	56	Calm morning, with a little dew; clear day.
18,	90	80	56	The same as yesterday.
19,	88	80	56	Calm morning, with a little dew; clear day.
20,	88	80	56	The same.
21,	88	80	56	The same.
22,	90	80	56	Calm morning, with a little dew.
23,	90	80	56	The same.
24,	92	82	56	Calm morning; little dew; clear, calm day.
25,	95	83	55	The same.
26,	97	82	58	The same.
27,	90	80	58	The same.
28,	70	70	58	Calm, cloudy morning; cloudy, windy day.
29,	88	80	58	Calm, cloudy morning; clear and windy at noon
30,	97	82	69	Calm, clear day.
31,	100	90	69	The same.
Feb. 1,	100	90	70	Calm, clear, hot day; morning and evening cold.
2,	100	90	70	The same.

1792.	Meridian Heat		At Night	WEATHER.
	Exposed	Shaded.		
Feb. 3,	100	90	70	Calm, clear, hot day; morning and evening cold.
4,	100	90	70	The same.
5,	100	90	70	The same.
6,	100	90	70	The same.
7,	100	90	70	The same.
8,	100	90	70	The same.
9,	102	90	70	The same.
10,	102	90	70	The same.
11,	102	90	70	The same.
12,	104	90	70	The same.
13,	104	90	70	The same.
14,	104	90	70	The same.
15,	104	90	70	The same.
16,	108	90	70	The same.
17,	104	90	70	The same.
18,	104	90	70	The same.

Meteorological Remarks in continuation.

DURING the months of December and January, no climate could be more delightful than that of Mysore. The country every where was covered with rich verdure, but the luxuriance of the foliage began to fade towards the beginning of February. From the 18th to the 24th of that month, the sky continued cloudy, and occasional showers of rain fell. For the three following days the sky was the same, but the showers were much heavier. At this period the weather became settled as before; for some time, however, the rains were succeeded by heavy dews at night.

THE wind, blowing in general from the northeast during the first fortnight of March, increased in strength till the 15th, when for a week, it blew uncommonly fresh from ten in the morning, till past three in the evening, with frequent whirlwinds which raised much dust. The heat also became very great. On the 23d, the wind abated much, and the appearance of the sky indicated rain; but after much lightning changed as before. The weather continued excessively hot for the remainder of this month, and the first part of April, but became cooler as that month advanced. On the night of the 10th, there was much thunder and lightning. In the evenings and mornings it blew a fine fresh breeze, but about noon it became perfectly calm.

ON the evening of the 15th, it blew a heavy squall from the southeast, accompanied with a slight shower of rain. It continued to blow fresh during the night; and on the morning of the 16th, there was another heavy squall with thunder, lightning and rain. For two days afterwards the wind was strong, with thunder, lightning and rain in the evening. The sky was cloudy for the rest of this month, and although it sometimes varied, the wind blew fresh, in general, from the southwest. It rained on the 19th and 20th. It was moderately cool throughout April excepting the first week, and for an hour or two about noon, when it became calm with a great increase of heat.

DURING what part of May we remained in Mysore, the weather continued much the same as in April. The winds were variable, with a cloudy sky and occasional showers; but these showers were less severe as we advanced to the eastward, and the wind appeared to settle in the southwest. Although oppressed with heat in the Carnatic, at the time of our ascent at the Muglee, and on our return by Padnaigdirgum, during the time of our remaining in Mysore, we never suffered much inconvenience from the climate, except at Seringapatam in the months of February and March 1792. These months in 1791, we passed near Bangalore, where the season was perfectly moderate.

In point of temperature there appears a great difference between the air of Seringapatam and that of Bangalore. The former is situated in a much lower country than the latter, and consequently we experienced there a greater and more disagreeable heat. Of the fourteen months we continued in Myfore three only passed without rain, viz. March 1791, with January and March 1792. The influence of the south-west monsoon from the Malabar coast, and that of the north-east monsoon from the Coromandel Coast, seems to extend all over Myfore, with this difference, that each is of more considerable strength according to the vicinity of the country to either coast; that is, the south-west monsoon is felt more at Seringapatam, and in the provinces to the southward and westward of it than at Bangalore, and in the districts to the northward and eastward, where again the north-east monsoon from the Coromandel Coast falls heavier. Some description of the effect of these rains on the cultivation of Tippoo Sultaun's possessions has been already attempted.

APPENDIX.

NUMBER II.

Equipment Tables for Armies, or Detachments, in India.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

IN calculating provisions for an army, to act in a country where
1st.—forage is not procurable, either owing to its having been destroyed by the enemy, the barrenness of the soil, or the want of cavalry to cover foragers, it is evident that food not only for the men, and for the cattle employed in carrying the provision and stores, for the men, must be included; but also that food, and the means of transporting it, must be provided for the cattle employed in carrying the food of the first loaded cattle; and so on till the lowest number is reduced to one bullock carrying something more than its own food. Considering this to be undeniable, the Tables Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have been constructed; the 1st, supposing a bullock to carry two maunds; the 2d, supposing the burthen to be two and a half maunds, and the 3d, supposing it to be three maunds.

2d.—**B**UT as these Tables exhibit only the number of bullocks necessary, on such a particular occasion, to carry the provisions of the men and of the
cattle

cattle that carry the men's provisions, the calculations must be extended to other stores. For this purpose, the Table No. 4, calculated on a supposition, that a bullock can march with two maunds of provisions or stores, exhibits the number of cattle that would be necessary to carry thirty day's provisions for 1,000 men, as well as for the several other services therein detailed; and by multiplying these, the number necessary for any specified force, or quantity of stores, may be found: The detail from which the Table is constructed, is annexed to it.

3*d*.—THE Tables Nos. 5 and 6, are calculated exactly for the same number of men and articles, as detailed in No. 4, with this difference, that in No. 5, the bullocks are supposed to carry each two and a half maunds, and in No. 6, three maunds. Grain, of any sort, procurable, is the most compact food for carriage, and the easiest collected, in great quantities, for cattle; but whatever the food may be, it must, on some expeditions, under the circumstances above described, be carried along with the troops, unless there is a certainty of finding sufficient provisions in the course of the marches of the army, or unless such expedition be undertaken under imminent hazard of failure. Each bullock is allowed two feers per diem, not as full food, but as equal to the preservation of their lives, when they cannot procure dry, or even green, forage, to make up their full food.

4*th*.—IN order to lead the mind towards the totality of the supplies necessary, the Table No. 7, has been constructed, on the principle of Nos. 1, and 4. It supposes an army to consist of 80,000 men, furnished with thirty day's provisions for men and cattle, appointed with a certain field train, and served by bullocks able to carry two maunds; and the detail of the data on which the Table is formed is annexed to it.

5*th*.—THE Table No. 8, for the like army, is calculated on the principle of the Tables Nos. 2 and 5, for bullocks carrying burdens of two and a half maund. According to this Table, the supposed army would require 87,823 bullocks, and 202,890 maunds of provision; whereas according to the Table No. 7, the same army, appointed in the same manner, would require

1,79,344 bullocks, and 3,40,266 maunds of provision, for one month for the men and cattle, exclusive of all the cattle constantly employed to replenish, the grand depot, from various quarters.

6th.—THE Table No. 9, constructed on the principle of Nos. 3 and 6, for bullocks carrying three maunds each, will shew that the services detailed in Nos. 7 and 8, may be performed by 65,422 bullocks; which manifestly proves the great advantage of strong, over slender cattle, for the service of an army; but as it would be difficult to collect such a number of bullocks, and more difficult to provide food for them, in a collected body, the paper No. 10 has been prepared, in order to demonstrate the practicability of performing the service with a smaller number of bullocks, by endeavouring to shew the nature of a plan, or arrangement, which might be used to effect this; and if the army consists of fewer men; if any of its appointments be less than the quantity adopted; if the strength of the bullocks be greater; if the trips to the different stations can be made in shorter periods, or if the provisions of the cattle need not be carried with them, still fewer bullocks will be sufficient; and the principles of the calculations may, with facility, be adapted to any given number of men and cattle, with defined appurtenances of stores and provisions, to be transported to fixed distances, by cattle or men, carrying specified burdens.

7th.—IT will be found from these Tables, that in expeditions on which provender for the cattle must be carried, two useless followers would occasion three useless two maund bullocks, and a waste of four and a half maunds of grain for the bullocks, with one and a half maund for the two useless men, in all six maunds, equal to the carriage of eight useful men's provisions for a month; and that four useless followers would occasion three useless two and a half maund bullocks, and a waste of seven maunds of grain, or carriage for more than nine men's provisions for a month, exclusive of the provisions of the bullock drivers in both cases, and the carriage for them; and this establishes the importance of not suffering useless attendants to accompany an army.

8th.—But as it may not, on ordinary occasions, be necessary to include in the calculations for the equipment of an army, or detachment, the carriage of provender for the cattle, the Tables Nos. 11, 12 and 13, have been constructed on that principle, for detachments served by bullocks carrying two, two and a half, and three maunds each, and the Tables Nos. 14, 15 and 16, exhibit the number of cattle that would be required, on the same principle, for large bodies of troops, appointed as therein described; and these Tables afford data that will facilitate the various calculations that may be necessary, according to different circumstances, in equipping troops for service, especially if a Table of the weight of an article of every denomination of stores was printed; and it is understood that such a Table has been actually prepared by Lieutenant Golding, the Commissary of Stores, under direction of the Bengal Military Board.

Table No. I.

EIGHTY THOUSAND Men will require for one Month's Provision, at the Rate of 1 Seer each Man per Day, 60,000 Maunds of Grain; each Bullock will carry 2 Maunds, requiring 30,000 Bullocks; and their Food, at the Rate of 2 Seers per Day, will, in one Month, amount to 45,000 Maunds.

BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
30,000 Bullocks, will carry the	60,000
Their food as above is	45,000
22,500 Bullocks, will carry that,	
Their food is	33,750
16,875 Bullocks, will carry that,	
Their food is	25,312
<u>69,375</u>	Carried over, <u>1,64,062.</u>
	Brought

APPENDIX.

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BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
69,375	Brought forward,	1,64,062
12,656	Bullocks, to carry 25,312 maunds.	
	Their food is	18,984
9,492	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	14,238
7,119	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	10,678
5,339	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	8,009
4,004	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	6,006
3,003	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	4,505
2,252	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	3,378
1,689	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	2,534
1,267	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	1,900
950	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	1,425
712	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	1,069
534	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	801
400	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is	601
300	Bullocks, to carry that,	
1,19,092	Carried over,	2,38,190
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APPENDIX.

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
1,19,092	Brought forward,	2,38,190
	Food for 300 Bullocks is	451
225 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	338
169 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	253
126 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	190
95 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	142
71 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	107
53 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	80
40 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	60
30 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	45
22 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	33
16 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	25
12 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	19
9 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	14
7 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	10
<hr/> 1,19,967	Carried over,	<hr/> 2,39,957
		Brought

APPENDIX.

19

BULLOCKS.

1,19,967

Brought forward

MAUNDS.

2,39,957

5 Bullocks, to carry 10 maund,	Their food is	8
4 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	6
3 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	4
2 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	3
1 Bullock, to carry that,	Its food is	2
1 Bullock, to carry that,	Its food is	2

It has been ascertained by an accurate Calculation, that the Fractional Parts in this Table, amount to a Number equal

to 17 whole Bullocks, and to 18.

1,20,000 Bullocks, will carry	-	2,40,000.
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There are not any spare Bullocks included in the preceding Table.

Table

Table No. 2.

EIGHTY THOUSAND Men's Provisions for a Month, at the Rate of one Seer each Man per Day, is equal to 60,000 Maunds. Each Bullock will carry 2 and 1-half Maunds, requiring 24,000 Bullocks; and their Food, at the Rate of 2 Seers each per Day, will amount in a Month to 36,000 Maunds.

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
24,000 Bullocks, will be required, for the Carriage of	-	60,000
	Their food is	36,000
14,400 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	21,600
8,640 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	12,960
5,184 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	7,776
3,110 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	4,665
1,866 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	2,799
1,120 Bullocks, will carry that,		
	Their food is	1,680
672 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	1,008
403 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	604½
242 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	363
145 Bullocks, to carry that,		
<hr/> 59,782	Carried over,	<hr/> 1,49,455½
		Brought

APPENDIX.

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BULLOCKS, 59,782	Brought forward	MAUNDS. 1,49,455½
	Food for 145 Bullocks, is	217½
87 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	130½
52 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	78
31 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	46½
19 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	28½
12 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	18
7 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	10½
4 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	6
3 Bullocks, to carry that,	Their food is	4½
2 Bullock's food is		3
1 Bullock's food is		1½
60,000 Bullocks, will carry, at 2½ maunds,		150,000

Spare Bullocks not included.

N. B.—The fractional parts of the Bullocks, have not been attended to in this Table.

APPENDIX.

Table No. 3.

EIGHTY-THOUSAND Men, will require for one Month's Provisions, at the Rate of one Seer each Man per Day, 60,000 Maunds of Grain. Each Bullock will carry three Maunds, requiring 20,000 Bullocks, and their Food, at the rate of two Seers each per Day, will amount, in one Month, to 30,000 Maunds.

BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
20,000 Bullocks will be required for the carriage of	60,000
Their food is,	30,000
10,000 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	15,000
5,000 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	7,500
2,500 Bullocks to carry that	
Their food is	3,750
1,250 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	1,875
625 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	937
313 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	469
156 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	234
78 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	117
39 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	59
17 Bullocks to carry that,	
Their food is	25
<u>39,978</u>	<u>1,19,966</u>
	Brought

APPENDIX.

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
39,978	Brought forward,	1,19,966
8	Bullocks to carry 25 Maunds, Their food is	12
4	Bullocks to carry that, Their food is	6
2	Bullocks to carry that, Their food is	3
1	Bullock to carry that, Its food is	1½
<hr/>		
39,993	Bullocks will carry	<hr/> 1,19,988½ <hr/>

N. B. The Fractional Parts have not been attended to in this Table.

Table No. 4.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry two Maunds.

Food for each man, 1 feer per day, }
Ditto of each bullock, 2 feers per bay, } for 30 days.

SPECIFICATION OF THE SERVICE.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice, for 10,000 men, and as in all other cases, the } food of the necessary bullocks, - - - }	1,500	3,000
ORDNANCE.		
One brass six-pounder, - - -	140	210
One iron twelve-pounder, - - -	312	468
One iron eighteen-pounder, - - -	468	802
One iron twenty-four-pounder, - - -	620	930
CAVALRY.		
One thousand horse, - - -	6,000	12,000
		Elephants

APPENDIX.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Elephants, 10,	150	300
SHOT LOOSE.		
200 Shot for eighteen-pounders,	100	150
200 Shot for twenty-four-pounders,	136	204
CARTRIDGES, MUSQUET BALL.		
150 Rounds for one thousand men,	500	750
50 Ditto for one thousand cavalry and artillery,	168	252
SPIRITS.		
Drams for one thousand men,	240	360
CAMP EQUIPAGE.		
For one battalion native infantry,	64	96
For one company of Europeans.	16	24
Every maund of public stores or private baggage,	2	3

Though grain only is mentioned, this weight is supposed to include salt, spiceries, and the other necessary articles of provisions, as well as some allowance for waste.

Spare Bullocks only included for the Train.

Detail from which the preceding Table has been constructed.

Rice for 1,000 men, for 30 days, at 1 seer per day.

1,000 Men,	Maunds,	750
1,500 Bullocks to carry that and their own food, which is,	do.	2,250
<hr/> 1,500 Bullocks,	Maunds of Grain,	<hr/> 3,000 <hr/>

ORDNANCE.

From information received, the draught cattle of the Madras establishment, employed in this department, are in the proportion of ten to six upon the Bengal establishment:— For example, a tumbril, which is the same size upon both establishments, is here drawn by six bullocks, whereas, upon the Madras establishment, ten bullocks are required.

COMPARISON.

COMPARISON.

Bengal Bullocks, Madras Bullocks.

One brass six-pounder, with its two tumbrils and spare		
cattle, - - - - -	21	35
One iron twelve-pounder, with its four tumbrils and		
spare cattle, - - - - -	47	78
One iron eighteen-pounder, with its six tumbrils and		
spare cattle, - - - - -	70	117
One iron twenty-four-pounder, with its eight tumbrils		
and spare cattle, - - - - -	93	155
	231	385
	231	385

ONE BRASS SIX POUNDER.

35 Bullocks as above,—their food is, - - -	52½
105 Bullocks to carry the food of the 35, and their own food, -	157½
<hr/> 140 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 210

ONE IRON TWELVE POUNDER.

78 Bullocks as above,—their food is, - - -	117
234 Bullocks to carry the food of the 78, and their own food, -	351
<hr/> 312 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 468

ONE IRON EIGHTEEN POUNDER.

117 Bullocks as above,—their food is, - - -	175½
351 Bullocks to carry the food of 117, and their own food, =	526½
<hr/> 468 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 702

ONE IRON TWENTY-FOUR POUNDER.

155 Bullocks as above, — their food is, - - -	232½
465 Bullocks to carry the food of 155, and their own food, -	697½
<hr/> 620 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 930

CAVALRY.

Allow each horse only four feers per day, is 3 maunds in 30 days.

1,000 Horse,	- - - - -	3,000
6,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- - - - -	9,000
<u>6,000 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>12,000</u>

ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant 10 feers per day, is $7\frac{1}{2}$ maunds in 30 days.

10 Elephants,	- - - - -	75
150 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- - - - -	225
<u>150 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>300</u>

LOOSE SHOT FOR EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-FOUR POUNDS.

One bullock will carry eight shot for eighteen-pounders, or 144 pounds,

Ditto, ————— six shot for twenty-four-pounders, or 144 pounds.

At this rate,

25 Bullocks carry 200 shot for 18-pounders,—their food is,	- - - - -	37 $\frac{1}{2}$
75 Bullocks to carry the food of the 25, and their own food,	- - - - -	112 $\frac{1}{2}$
<u>100 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>150</u>
50 Bullocks carry 300 shot for 24-pounders,—their food is	- - - - -	75
150 Bullocks to carry the food of the 50, and their own food,	- - - - -	225
<u>200 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>300</u>

MUSQUET-BALL CARTRIDGES.

N. B. One bundle containing ten musquet-ball cartridges, with the paper, wrapper, and string, in which they are put up, will weigh one pound and twelve drams.

Each bullock to carry 1,200 rounds, or the ammunition of eight men, which is more than 120 pounds, exclusive of the barrels.

APPENDIX.

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FOR 1,000 MEN,

125 Bullocks,—their food is,	-		187½
375 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-		562½
500 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	750

Fifty rounds for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery.

42 Bullocks,— their food is,	-		63
126 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-		189
168 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	252

SPIRITS.

The ordinary allowance is one gallon per day for forty men; at this rate, which is very small in the field, the drams of 100 men will weigh, including the casks, about thirty pounds.—1,000 men, for thirty days, is 9000 pound weight, equal to 110 maunds, or the load of sixty bullocks, which allows for eight extra drams per man, per month.

60 Bullocks as above,— their food is,	-		90
180 Bullocks to carry the food of the 60, and their own food, is	-		270
240 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	360

CAMP-EQUIPAGE, NATIVE INFANTRY.

Allowing three officers to go in a tent; twelve officers require four tents, to be carried on four bullocks: and for a tent per company for the natives, quarter and rear guards, twelve tents, carried by twelve bullocks.

16 Bullocks, as above, for a battalion, without allowing for bells of arms,—their food is,	-		24
48 Bullocks to carry the food of the 16, and their own food	-		72
64 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	96

One

One tent, Madras pattern, for a company of sepoy's, including the poles, dry weight, two maunds, nine seers.

CAMP-EQUIPAGE FOR A COMPANY OF EUROPEANS.

Supposing twenty men to a tent, including those on duty, and only sixty men, is three private tents, and only one tent for the officers.

4	Bullocks,—their food is,	-	-	-	-	6
12	Bullocks to carry the food of the four, and their own food,	-	-	-	-	18
<hr/>						
16	Bullocks.			Maunds of grain,		24
<hr/>						

Spare bullocks only included for the train.

General Rule resulting from the preceding Table.

For every maund of public stores, or private baggage, two bullocks, and three maunds of grain for their food are required.

Table No. 5.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry Two Maunds and One Half.

Food of each Man, One Seer per Day, }
 Ditto of each Bullock, Two Seers per Day, } For 30 Days.

SPECIFICATION.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 1,000 men, and, as in all other cases, the food of the necessary bullocks,	750	1875
Ordnance. One brass six-pounder,	52	78½
One iron twelve-pounder,	117	176½
One iron eighteen-pounder,	175	262½
One iron twenty-four-pounder,	232	348½
		Cavalry.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Cavalry. One-thousand horse,	3,000	7,500
Elephants. Ten,	112	281 $\frac{1}{4}$
Loose Shot. Two-hundred shot for eighteen-pounders,	50	75
Two-hundred shot for twenty-four-pounders,	62	93 $\frac{1}{2}$
Spirits. Drams for 1,000 men,	170	255
Musquet-ball } 150 Rounds for 1,000 men,	250	375
Cartridges. } 50 Ditto for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery,	85	129
Camp-equipage. For one battalion native infantry,	40	60
————— For one company of Europeans,	10	15
Every maund of public stores or private baggage,	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$

The mode of preparing the detail on which this Table is constructed, will be seen by looking at the detail annexed to No. 4.

The general Rule resulting from this Table is, that for every maund of public stores or private baggage, one bullock and 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ maunds of grain, are necessary.

Table No. 6.

SHewing the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required, as per the annexed Detail, for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry three Maunds.

SPECIFICATION.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 1,000 men, and as in all other cases, the food		
of the necessary Bullocks,	500	1,500
Ordnance. One brass six-pounder,	42	62
One iron twelve-pounder,	94	141
One iron eighteen-pounder,	140	210
One iron twenty-four-pounder,	186	279
		Cavalry

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS:
Cavalry. One thousand horse,	2,000	6,000
Elephants ten,	50	150
Loose shot 200, for eighteen-pounders,	34	51
300, for twenty-four-pounders,	68	122
Musquet-ball } 150 rounds, for 1,000 men,	128	192
Cartridges. } 50 Ditto, for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery,	44	66
Camp Equipage. One battalion native infantry,	24	36
For one company of Europeans,	6	9
Spirits. Drams for 1,000 men,	72	108
Every maund and one-half of public stores, or private baggage,	1	1½

Spare Bullocks only included for the train.

DETAIL.

Rice for 1,000 men for 30 days, at one seer per day,		
1,000 men will require in 30 days,	-	750
500 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	750
<u>500 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>1,500</u>

ORDNANCE.

One brass six-pounder,		
21 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	31½
21 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	31½
<u>42 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>63</u>
One iron twelve-pounder,		
47 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	70½
47 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	70½
<u>94 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>141</u>
		One

One iron eighteen-pounder,

70 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	105
70 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	105

<u>140</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>210</u>
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One iron twenty-four-pounder,

93 Bullocks will be required, — their food is,	-	-	139½
93 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	139½

<u>186</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>279</u>
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CAVALRY.

Allow each Horse only four seers per day, is three maunds in 30 days.

1,000 Horse, will consume,	-	-	3,000
2,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	3,000

<u>2,000</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>6,000</u>
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ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant ten seers per day, is 7 ½ maunds in 30 days.

Ten elephants will consume,	-	-	75
50 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	75

<u>50</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>150</u>
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LOOSE SHOT.

16 Bullocks carry 200 shot for eighteen-pounders,—their food is,	-	-	24
16 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	24

<u>32</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>48</u>
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30 Bullocks carry 300 shot for twenty-four-pounders,		
	Their food is	45
30 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,		45
<u>60</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>90</u>

MUSQUET-BALL CARTRIDGES.

Each bullock to carry equal to three maunds: vide Detail of No. 4.

For 1,000 men,

64 Bullocks,—their food is,		96
64 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,		96
<u>128</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>192</u>

Fifty rounds for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery.

22 Bullocks,—their food is,		33
22 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,		33
<u>44</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>66</u>

SPIRITS.

The drams of 1,000 men for thirty days, is equal to 9000 pounds weight, or the load of thirty-six bullocks, which allows for eight extra drams per month, per man.

44 Bullocks as above,—their food is,		66
44 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,		66
<u>88</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>132</u>

CAMP-EQUIPAGE, NATIVE INFANTRY.

12 Bullocks to carry the tents of a battalion,—their food is		18
12 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,		18
<u>24</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>36</u>

For

For one company of Europeans,

4 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	-	6
4 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, which is,	-	-	-	6
8 Bullocks.			-	12

For every maund and a half of public stores, or private baggage, one bullock and one maund and a half of grain, are required.

Table No. 7.

CALCULATION, agreeably to the Tables No. 1 and 4, of the Bullocks and Grain required to move an Army of the undermentioned Strength, carrying Thirty Day's Provisions, and each Bullock carrying Two Maunds.

SPECIFICATION.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including lascars, &c.	-	1,20,000 2,40,000
Ordnance, brass six-pounders, - 44	-	6,160 9,240
Iron twelve-pounders, - 12	-	3,744 5,616
— eighteen-pounders, - 10	-	4,680 7,020
— twenty-four-pounders, - 6	-	3,720 5,580
Cavalry, 3,000 horse,	-	18,000 36,000
Elephants, 200	-	4,500 9,000
Loose shot, 8,000	-	4,000 6,000
4,000	-	2,800 4,200
Musquet ball-cartridges for 15,000 men,	-	7,500 11,250
50 Rounds for 5,000 cavalry and artillery,	-	832 1,248
Spirits, drams for 5,000 Europeans,	-	1,200 1,800
Carried over,	-	1,77,136 3,36,954

E

Brought

		BULLOCKS. MAUNDS.
	Brought forward,	1,77,136 3,36,954
Camp-equipage for native fighting men, equal to twenty-		
two battalions, - - -	1,408	2,112
----- For Europeans equal to fifty companies,	800	1,200
	Total, -	<u>1,79,344 3,40,266</u>

As it is supposed that all private baggage is carried by the followers, and that all public stores, and the baggage of head quarters, are carried by the 200 elephants, nothing is stated on these accounts.

Spare bullocks only included for the train.

Shells are not included; but a Table of the weight of shells of different sizes is annexed.

The number of battering shot is too small for a long siege, and this is intentionally done, to shew, that the calculation of the cattle is not exaggerated. The number of men and guns, as well as the quantity of stores, assumed in this calculation, is merely arbitrary; but the principle of the calculation will apply to any given number of men, or quantity of stores.

A Table of the Weight of Bomb Shells, and the Quantity of Powder each contains.

Nature.	Higbest.	Medium.	Lowest.	Powder each Shell contains.	
				lbs.	oz.
Inches diameter.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	oz.
13	200		190	9	
10	88	84	80	3	
8	42	40	38	2	4
5 $\frac{1}{4}$	15 $\frac{1}{4}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14		14
4 $\frac{2}{5}$	8	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	7		7
Grenade.	2	1 14	1 5		4

Detail.

Detail of No. 7.

Rice, or other food, for 80,000 men, at one fcer per day, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including lascars, &c.

80,000 Men,	-	-	-	60,000
1,20,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	-	1,80,000
<u>1,20,000 Bullocks carry,</u>				<u>2,40,000</u>
			Mounds of grain,	<u>2,40,000</u>

ORDNANCE.

Bergal proportion of Bullocks, of 6 to 10. *Madras proportion of Bullocks, of 10 to 6.*

One brass six-pounder, with carriage and limber, requires,	-	-	-	6		
Its two tumbrils, six to each,	-	-	-	12		
Its spare cattle, one in six,	-	-	-	3		
				<u>21</u>		35
One iron twelve-pounder, with carriage and limber, allowing $\frac{1}{3}$ more cattle for iron than for brass ordnance, requires,	-	-	-	16		
Its four tumbrils, six each,	-	-	-	24		
Its spare cattle, one in six,	-	-	-	7		
				<u>47</u>		78
One iron eighteen-pounder, with carriage and limber, requires,	-	-	-	24		
Its six tumbrils, six each,	-	-	-	36		
Its spare cattle, one in six,	-	-	-	10		
				<u>70</u>		117
One iron twenty-four pounder, with carriage and limber, requires,	-	-	-	32		
Its eight tumbrils, six each,	-	-	-	48		
Its spare cattle, one in six,	-	-	-	13		
				<u>93</u>		55

44 Brafts fix-pounders, with tumbrils, &c. at the Madras proportion will require,

1,540	Bullocks,—their food is,	-	-	-	2,310
4,620	Bullocks to carry the food of the 1,540 and their own food,	-			6,930
<u>6,160</u>	Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,		<u>9,240</u>

TWELVE IRON TWELVE-POUNDERS.

936	Bullocks as above,—their food is,	-	-	-	1,404
2,808	Bullocks to carry the food of the 936, and their own food,				4,212
<u>3,744</u>	Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,		<u>5,616</u>

TEN IRON EIGHTEEN-POUNDERS.

1,170	Bullocks as above,—their food is,	-	-	-	1,755
3,510	Bullocks to carry the food of 1,170, and their own food,				5,265
<u>4,680</u>	Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,		<u>7,020</u>

SIX IRON TWENTY-FOUR-POUNDERS.

930	Bullocks as above,—their food is,	-	-	-	1,395
2,790	Bullocks to carry the food of 930, and their own food,	-			4,185
<u>3,720</u>	Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,		<u>5,580</u>

CAVALRY.

Allow each horfe only four feers per day, is 3 maunds in 30 days.

3,000	Horfe,	-	-	-	9,000
	18,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-			27,000
<u>18,000</u>	Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,		<u>36,000</u>

ELEPHANTS.

ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant 10 seers per day, is $7\frac{1}{2}$ maunds in 30 days.

200 Elephants,	-		1,500
3,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-		4,500
3,000 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	6,000

LOOSE SHOT FOR EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-FOUR POUNDS.

8,000 for eighteen-pounders.

Allow one bullock to eight shot, or 25 to 200;—at that rate,

1,000 Bullocks carry 8,000 shot,—their food is,	-		1,500
3,000 Bullocks to carry the food of the 1,000, and their own food,	-		4,500
4,000 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	6,000

4,200 for twenty-four-pounders, allow six shot to load each bullock; then,			
700 Bullocks will carry 4,200 shot,—and their food is,	-		1,050
2,100 Bullocks to carry the food of the 700, and their own food,	-		3,150
2,800 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	4,200

MUSQUET-BALL CARTRIDGES.

Each bullock to carry 1,200 rounds, or the ammunition of eight men, which is more than 120 pounds, exclusive of the barrels.

For 150,000 men, at 150 rounds each,

1,875 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-		2,812 $\frac{1}{2}$
5,625 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-		8,437 $\frac{1}{2}$
7,500 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	11,250

For 5,000 cavalry and artillery, at fifty rounds each.

208 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-		312
624 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-		936
832 Bullocks.	-	Maunds of grain,	1,248

SPIRITS.

The ordinary allowance is one gallon per day for forty men; at this rate, which is very small in the field, the drams of 100 men will weigh, including the casks, about thirty pounds,—this for 1,000 men, for thirty days, is 9000 pound weight, equal to 110 maunds, or the load of sixty bullocks, which allows for eight extra drams per man, per month.

For 5000 men,		
300 Bullocks will be required,— their food is,	-	450
900 Bullocks to carry the food of 300, and their own is	-	1350
<u>1,200 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>1,800</u>

CAMP-EQUIPAGE, NATIVE INFANTRY, MADRAS PATTERN.

Allowing three officers to go in a tent; twelve officers require four tents, to be carried on four bullocks: and for a tent per company for the natives; quarter and rear guards, twelve tents, carried by twelve bullocks.

For 22 battalions, at 16 bullocks is,		
352 Bullocks,— their food is,	-	528
1,056 Bullocks to carry the food of the 352, and their own food	-	1,584
<u>1,408 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>2,112</u>

For one company of Europeans, supposing twenty men to a tent, including those on duty, and only sixty men, is 3 private tents, and only 1 tent for the officers—4 tents carried by 4 bullocks.

For 50 companies, at the above rate;		
200 Bullocks will be required, their food is,	-	300
600 Bullocks to carry the food of the 200, and their own	-	900
<u>800 Bullocks.</u>	Maunds of grain,	<u>1200</u>

GENERAL RULE.

For every maund of public stores, or private baggage, two bullocks and three maunds of grain for their food, are necessary per month.

Table.

Table No. 8.

CALCULATION agreeably to the Tables Nos. 2 and 5, of the Bullocks and Grain required to move an Army of the undermentioned Strength, carrying 30 Day's Provisions, and each Bullock carrying two Maunds and a half.

SPECIFICATION.

		BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including lascars, &c.	-	60,000	150,000
Ordnance. Brefs six-pounders,	44	2,310	3,465
Iron twelve-pounders,	12	1,410	2,115
Eighteen-pounders,	10	1,750	2,625
Twenty-four-pounders,	6	1,395	2,092½
Cavalry. Three-thousand horse,		9,000	22,500
Elephants. Two-hundred,		2,250	5,625
Loose Shot. Eight-thousand for eighteen-pounders,		2,000	3,000
Four thousand two hundred, for twenty-four-pounders,		1,313	1,875
Musquet-ball Cartridges, for 15,000 men,		3,750	5,625
50 Rounds for five-thousand Cavalry and Artillery,		415	622½
Spirits. Drams for 5,000 men,		805	1,275
Camp-equipage. For native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions,		880	1,320
For Europeans, equal to 50 companies,		500	750
		<u>Total, 87,823</u>	<u>202,890</u>

As it is supposed that all private baggage is carried by the followers, and that all public stores, and the baggage of head quarters are carried by the 200 elephants, nothing is stated on these accounts.

Shells

Shells are not included: vide Remark and Table, relative to them and to the shot for battering guns, &c. annexed to No. 7, as applicable, verbatim, in this place.

Table No. 9.

CALCULATION, agreeably to the Tables Nos. 3 and 6, of the Bullocks and Grain, required to attend an Army of the undermentioned Strength, carrying 30 Day's Provisions, and each Bullock carrying 3 Maunds.

SPECIFICATION.

			BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 80,000 men,	-	-	40,000	1,20,000
Ordnance. Brafts six-pounders,	-	44	1,848	2,772
Iron twelve-pounders,	-	12	1,128	1,692
Iron eighteen-pounders,	-	10	1,400	2,100
Iron twenty-four-pounders,	-	6	1,116	1,674
Cavalry. Three thousand horse,	-	-	6,000	18,000
Elephants. Two hundred,	-	-	1,000	3,000
Loose shot 8000, for eighteen-pounders,	-	-	1,334	2,001
4200, for twenty-four-pounders,	-	-	840	1,260
Musquet-ball } For 15,000 men,	-	-	1,920	2,880
Cartridges. } 50 rounds, for 5000 Cavalry and Artillery,	-	-	220	330
Spirits. Drams for 5000 men,	-	-	440	660
Camp Equipage, for native fighting men, equal to 22				
battalions,	-	-	528	792
For Europeans, equal to 50 companies,	-	-	400	600
Total,			58,174	1,57,761

DETAIL

DETAIL OF NO. 9.

Rice, or other food, for 80,000 men, at one seer per day, viz.		
20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 camp-followers, is,	-	60,000
40,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	60,000
<u>40,000</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	<u>1,20,000</u>

ORDNANCE.

Forty-four brafs six-pounders, with tumbrils, &c.

924 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	1,386
924 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	1,386
<u>1,848</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,		<u>2,772</u>

Twelve iron twelve-pounders,

364 Bullocks will be required,— their food is,	-	-	846
564 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	846
<u>1,128</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,		<u>1,692</u>

Ten iron eighteen-pounders.

700 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	1,050
700 Bullocks to carry that,—and their own food,	-	-	1,050
<u>1,400</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,		<u>2,100</u>

Six iron twenty-four pounders,

558 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	837
558 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	837
<u>1,116</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,		<u>1,674</u>

CAVALRY.

Allow each horse four seers per day, is three maunds in thirty days.

3,000 Horses at that rate, will require,	-	-	9,000
6,000 Bullocks to carry that,—and their own food,	-	-	9,000
<u>6,000</u> Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,		<u>18,000</u>

APPENDIX.

ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant ten fcers per day, is $7\frac{1}{2}$ maunds in thirty days.

200 Elephants at that rate, will require,	-	-	1,500
1,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food is,	-	-	1,500
<u>1,000</u> Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,	<u>3,000</u>

LOOSE SHOT FOR EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-FOUR POUNDERS.

1,000 For eighteen pounders.

Allow one bullock to twelve shot, or 25, to 200, At that rate,

667 Bullocks will carry 8,000 shot,—their food is,	-	-	1,000 $\frac{1}{2}$
667 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	1,000 $\frac{1}{2}$
<u>1,334</u> Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,	<u>2,001</u>

4,200 For twenty-four pounders.

Allow ten shot to load each Bullock, then,

420 Bullocks will carry 4,200,—their food is,	-	-	630
420 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	630
<u>840</u> Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,	<u>1,260</u>

MUSQUET BALL-CARTRIDGES, FOR 1,5000 MEN.

Each Bullock to carry equal to three maunds.

960 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	1,440
960 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	1,440
<u>1,920</u> Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,	<u>2,880</u>

For 5000 Cavalry and Artillery, at 50 rounds each.

110 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	165
110 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	165
<u>220</u> Bullocks.		Maunds of grain,	<u>330</u>

SPIRITS.

APPENDIX

SPIRITS.

For 5000 Men.

220 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	-	330
220 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	-	330
440 Bullocks.			Maunds of grain,	660

CAMP EQUIPAGE.

For 22 Battalions of Native Infantry, at 24 Bullocks to each.

264 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	-	396
264 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	-	396
528 Bullocks.			Maunds of grain,	792

For 50 companies of Europeans,

200 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	-	-	-	300
200 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	-	-	-	300
400 Bullocks.			Maunds of grain,	600

GENERAL RULE.

For each $1\frac{1}{2}$ maunds of public stores, or private baggage, one bullock, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ maunds of grain, are necessary per month.

APPENDIX.

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,		32,575	45,902	43,348		
They will move on the 23d, with equal quantities of provisions, as on the preceding trip, and after having consumed,						
They will lay down on the 27th day,		7,375				
They will return on the 32d day, after having consumed in returning,			22,576	21,574		
		14,750				
Twenty-thousand camp-followers, will perform the same number of marches as above, under the same escorts, and each will carry 35 seers, viz. 10 day's provisions for themselves, and 25 seers surplus grain,—they will consume in 32 days,	16,000					
And they will lay down a surplus of,			37,500			
These Bullocks are supposed to have been escorted by 5,000 artillery and infantry, from the 1st to the 2d Station, which is to be occupied; a body of allied cavalry, is also supposed to have attended, but to have found their own provisions, the followers carrying their own provisions, all the marches.						
The 5,000 fighting men would carry 5 day's provisions for themselves, from the 1st, to serve on their march to the 2d, Station, at 1 seer each is,	625					
	16,625	47,325	105,978	65,022		
Carried over,						

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Pro- visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Pro- visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Pro- visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
	16,625	47,325	105,978	65,022		
<p>Brought forward, The provisions of so many of these men, as shall be left established at the 2d Station must, from that time, be taken from the store laid in there. Say three thousand fighting men, with 1000 camp-followers, and 500 bullocks, which may be supposed to be sufficient whilst at that fixed station. The other 2000 fighting men, and most of the allied cavalry, return to the 1st point with the cattle. These 2000 men will carry 5 day's provisions for themselves, from the surplus laid down at the 2d point, which is deducted below. The escorts who attend the subsequent convoys of provisions, from the 1st to the 2d Stations, are supposed to carry with them from the 1st point their own provisions for each trip. The 2000 fighting men, exclusive of allied cavalry, composing the escorts, will have consumed in performing the 2d and 3d trips, from the 1st to the 2d point, 12 day's provisions equal to, The 1000 camp-followers carried 5 day's provisions, from the 1st point, making,</p>	600					
	17,350	47,325	105,978	65,022		
Carried over,						

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Pro- visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Pro- visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Pro- visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
	17,350	47,325	105978	65,022		
	3,950		3,950			
		800		800		
	21,300	48,125	102028	64,222		
			102028	64,222		

Brought forward,
 The 500 bullocks carried 5 day's food from the 1st point.
 From the depot at the 2d point, make the following deductions,
 viz.
 Provisions for the above escort of 2000 men, returning from the
 2d to the 1st Station, for 3 trips, or 15 days,—Maunds, 750
 Provisions of 3000 fighting men, who maintain the post esta-
 blished, at the 2d Station, for 32 days, they having carried
 5 day's provisions, as above from the 1st point, *i. e.* till
 the period, at which it is supposed the army will arrive at
 the middle Station, or the 37th day, from the movement
 of the 1st convoy with grain, - - - - - 2,400
 Provisions of 1000 followers, supposed to be attached to the
 above number of fighting men, exclusive of those who
 carried grain, for 32 days, - - - - - 800
 Deduct from the food for cattle, at the 2d Station, food for 32
 days, for 500 bullocks, supposed to be attached to the 3000
 fighting men, - - - - -
 The quantity of provisions for men and cattle, at the middle Sta-
 tion, on the arrival of the army, - - - - -
 Carried over,

Brought

APPENDIX.

CONSUMPTION.			II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.		Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
21,300	48,125		102028	64,222		
		2,125				
		7,375				
		1,500				
		250				
		5,072½				
		2,302½				
		30,800	102028	64,222		
		57,250				

Brought forward,
 The army consisting of 76,000 men, viz. 17,000 fighting men, and 59,000 camp-followers, together with 3000 horses, 200 elephants, 20,289 grain bullocks, 500 being stationed as above, and 9,211 ordnance bullocks, arrive at the middle Station, after 5 day's march, or on the 37th day from the movement of the 1st convoy.

The fighting men will have consumed in these 5 days, provisions carried by themselves, from the 1st Station, being at 1 feet, each, per day,
 The camp-followers will have consumed 5 day's provisions, out of the 20, also carried by themselves, from the 1st point amounting to,
 The 3000 horses will have consumed 5 day's provisions, carried by themselves from the 1st point, at 4 feet each, is,
 The 200 elephants will have consumed 5 day's provisions, out of the 10, carried by themselves, from the 1st point, which at 10 feet each per day is,
 The 20,289 grain bullocks will have consumed 5 day's food out of the 16, carried from the 1st point,
 And the 9,211 ordnance bullocks, will have consumed 5 day's food out of the 10, brought by them from the 1st point, being,

Carried over,

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
	30,800	57,250	102,028	64,222		
			9,500			
					9,125	
					92,528	55,097
						22,125
	40,300	66,375	92,528	55,097		

Brought forward,
 From the above quantity of provisions, at the middle station, for men and cattle, deduct, and insert in the column, of consumption 5 day's provisions for the fighting men, camp-followers, Horses, Elephants, and grain, and ordnance Bullocks, in order to serve them for 5 day's march, to the 3d station, as under viz.
 Five day's provisions for 17,000 fighting men, 2,125
 Do. for 59,000 Camp-followers, 7,375

Five day's food for 3,000 Horses, 1,500
 Five do. for 200 Elephants, 250
 Five do. for 20,289 Grain Bullocks, 5072 ¹/₄
 Five do. for 9211 Ordnance Bullocks, 2,302 ³/₄

Provisions for men and cattle, at the middle station, after the above deductions, and the movement of the army to the 3d. Station. On the 10th day, from the first point, or the 42d day, after the movement of the 1st convoy, to the 2d point, the army, composed as above, arrives at the 3d station, or object of attack, and the Camp-followers lay down, 15 out of the 20 day's provisions, carried by themselves, from the 1st point, - - - -
 The 20,289 Grain Bullocks, having replaced from the store at the 2d point as before noticed, the 5 days provisions, Carried over,

Brought

APPENDIX.

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Pro-visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Pro-visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Pro-visions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	40,300	74,176	92,528	55,097	41,522	108,604
above, for 2,000 fighting men, and 20,000 camp followers, who return to the 2d point, with the bullocks,	3,850				3,850	
Remains 27 day's provisions for 15,000 fighting men, and 39,000 camp followers, at the 3d Station, or object of attack equal to,					37,672	
The 22,289 bullocks above mentioned, march from the middle Station, carrying 44,578 maunds of provisions, to the 3d, viz. 5 day's for themselves, being 5572½ with a surplus of 28,028½ for men, and a surplus of 10,977 maunds for cattle, the whole of which falls to be deducted from the store at the 2d Station, excepting the 5 day's provisions for the cattle, which must be entered in the column of consumption,		5,572½	28,028½	16,549½	28,028½	10,977
The 2,000 fighting men, and 20,000 camp followers, who accompany the above bullocks from the 2d to the 3d Station, will have consumed 5 day's provisions, which therefore falls to be deducted from the store, at the 2d Station, and entered in the column of consumption.	2,750		64499½	38547½		
				2,750		
Carried over,	46,900	79,748½	161,749½	38,547½	65,700½	218,372

Brought

APPENDIX.

	CONSUMPTION.			II. STATION.			III. STATION.		
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.		Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.		Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	
Brought forward,	46,900	79748½		61749½	38547½		65700½	21837½	
And the camp followers having carried 35 feers each, including the 5 day's provisions for themselves, above mentioned, will lay down at the 3d Station a surplus of 30 feers each, which falls to be deducted from the store, at the 2d Station, and added to that at the 3d,									
Provisions for the 3,000 fighting men, 1,000 camp followers, and 500 bullocks, left to protect the store at the middle Station, after the departure of the army from thence, until the escort which went from the army for supplies, to the 2d point, shall have returned to the army at the 3d Station, viz. for 17 days, must be deducted from the store at the 2d Station, and entered in the column of consumption,	1,700		425	15,000		1,700	15,000		425
Provisions for men and cattle, left at the 2d point, after deducting the quantities consumed, and supplied to the army, as above detailed,				45049½	38122½				
From the above quantity of provisions for men and cattle, at the 3d Station, deduct provisions for 54,000 men, including fighting men, and camp-followers,									
Carried over,	48,600	80173½		45049½	38122½		80700½	21837½	

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.			II. STATION.			III. STATION.		
	Men's Provisions.	Cattle's Food.	Maulds.	Men's Provisions.	Cattle's Food.	Maulds.	Men's Provisions.	Cattle's Food.	Maulds.
Brought forward,	48,600	80173½	45049½	38122½	80700½	21837½			
followers, 3,000 horses, 200 elephants, and 7,211 bullocks, for 12 days, being the space of time from the arrival of the army, at the 3d Station, or object of attack, until the return of the escort with the grain, from the middle Station; which quantities fall to be deducted from the store at the 3d point, and to be inserted in the column of consumption,	16,200	8,526½			16,200	8,526½			
There will remain with the army, after the arrival of the 1st convoy, from the middle Station, a quantity equal to 33 day's provisions for 76,000 men, and 18 day's food for 3,000 horses, 200 elephants, and 9,211 bullocks; the rest of the cattle being supposed to have been sent back immediately after their arrival,	64,800	88,700	45049½	38122½	64500½	13,311			
					64500½	13,311			
					64500½	13,311			

THE post and the detachment at the 2d point, must be so strong as to put the depot there, out of the danger of being captured, or destroyed, by the enemy. The principles of this sketch, for forming a depot, will apply equally to progressive supplies, from the rear, or flanks, or in any direction; and to any number of bullocks of specified strength, with given quantity of supplies, to be carried from given distances; the intention being only to shew, what may be gradually performed, by a certain number of men and cattle, in cases where it is not practicable to carry, at once, with a great army, to a considerable distance, every thing necessary for undertaking a siege, and for enabling the troops to persevere against an obstinate defence, until they shall have conquered the place.

SPARE cattle are not included in this detail, nor any allowance made for the contingencies of capture, of any part of the convoys; but the surplus left at the second station, will admit of a greater allowance, than the probable loss by contingencies.

THE calculations of the preceding detail, have been proved; but the proof Table is not inserted, because it is deemed unnecessary in this place.

PADDY, or unhusked rice, may be reckoned at full weight, for cattle; but, in being prepared for the food of men, it would lose quarter of its weight.

THESE Tables were formed in the interval between the first and second campaigns, against Tippoo, under Lord Cornwallis. The wise and politic measure, of having gained over and conciliated to the British service the Brinjaries, whose successive supplies, resembling, in some degree, the operations described in filling a depot, gave decisive advantage to our army, in the articles of supply; and the following memorandum taken, before Seringapatam, by the proper officers, will corroborate the usefulness of Tables of this nature. Indeed the whole will afford a lesson of great value, to those to whom it may belong to declare, or to conduct, war, by conveying to their minds, more competent ideas than they might, perhaps, otherwise have, of the

the immensity of the requisite supplies; nor must they reflect on those for their own troops only, but, on the grand aggregate, for all the belligerent armies; which must be furnished from countries of known extent and capabilities.

Memorandum above alluded to.

GRAIN fold and delivered at the Moodie, before Seringapatam, between the 5th of February, and 24th March, 1792.

Rice,	-	-	-	-	-	Seers	37,00,000
Jowary and Padjurah,	-	-	-	-	-		7,20,000
Cooltie, or horse gram,	-	-	-	-	-		4,20,000
Dell,	-	-	-	-	-		80,000
Sugar,	-	-	-	-	-		40,000
						Seers	<u>49,60,000</u>

Equal to 76,307 bullocks load.

Cee and Oil,	-	-	-	-	-	Seers	70,000
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THE above was exclusive of private sales, by the Brinjaries to individuals, and of the great variety of bazar articles, such as spices, mausaulahs, salt, cloths, &c. &c. which constitute a part of the Brinjara traffick. It has no connection with the supplies brought to the Maratta and Nizam's camps, by the Brinjaries attached to them. The fighting men of the English army, were also provided for by a separate and public store, which accompanied the grand army from Bangalore, and General Abercromby from the other side.

THE above was also exclusive of draft and carriage cattle, employed for the train; the transport of immense quantities of shot, shells, ammunition, pioneer's tools, camp equipage, and other public stores and private baggage.

FROM twelve to fourteen thousand bullocks are said to have died before Bangalore, for want of food.—They could not be sent to forage, because there was not a sufficient strength of cavalry to protect them; whereas at Seringapatam, the cattle foraged at a distance under protection of the allied cavalry.

Table No. 11.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermentioned Services. Each Bullock carrying two Maunds, Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day, for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

	Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice, For 1,000 men, - - -	375	750
Ordnance, One brass six pounder, with its two tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - - -	35	
One iron twelve pounder, with its four tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - - -	78	
One iron eighteen pounder, with its six tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - - -	117	
One iron twenty-four pounder, with its eight tum- brils and spare cattle, - - - - -	155	
Cavalry, One thousand horse, - - - - -	1,500	3,000
Elephants, Ten, - - - - -	38	75
Shot loose, 200 for eighteen pounders, - - - - -	25	
200 for twenty-four pounders, - - - - -	33	
Cartridges, } 150 rounds each, for 1,000 men,	125	
Musquet balls, } 50 ditto for 1,000 cavalry or artillery,	42	
Spirits, Drams for 1,000 men, - - - - -	60	
Camp Equipage, For one battalion native infantry, - - - - -	16	
For one company of Europeans, - - - - -	4	
Every two maunds of public stores, or private baggage, - - - - -	1	

Rice is mentioned in these Tables, as the food for the men; but they will apply equally well to the same weight of any other sort of provisions.

Table

Table No. 12.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry two Maunds, and one half.—Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day, for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

	Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice, For 1,000 men,	300	750
Ordnance, One brass six pounder, with its two tumbrils, and spare cattle,	21	
One iron twelve pounder, with its four tumbrils, and spare cattle,	47	
One iron eighteen pounder, with its six tumbrils, and spare cattle,	70	
One iron twenty-four pounder, with its eight tumbrils and spare cattle,	93	
Cavalry, One thousand horse,	1,200	3,000
Elephants, Ten,	30	75
Loose Shot, 200 for eighteen pounders,	20	
200 for twenty-four pounders,	25	
Spirits, Drams for 1,000 men,	60	
Musquet-ball Cartridges, } 150 rounds each; for 1,000 men,	100	
50 ditto for 1,000 cavalry or artillery,	34	
Camp Equipage, For one battalion native infantry,	16	
For one company of Europeans,	4	
Every maund of public stores, or private baggage,	1	

Table No. 13.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the under-mentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry three Maunds. Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

	Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice, for 1,000 men,	250	750
Ordnance, One brass six pounder, with its 2 tumbrils, and spare cattle,	21	
One iron twelve pounder, with its 4 tumbrils, and spare cattle,	47	
One iron eighteen pounder, with its 6 tumbrils, and spare cattle,	70	
One iron twenty-four pounder, with its 8 tum- brils, and spare cattle,	93	
Cavalry, One thousand horse,	1,000	3,000
Elephants, Ten,	25	75
Loose Shot, 200 for eighteen pounders,	17	
200 for twenty-four pounders,	20	
Musquet-ball Cartridges, 150 rounds for 1,000 men,	64	
50 ditto for 1,000 cavalry and artillery,	22	
Camp Equipage, for 1 battalion of native infantry,	12	
for 1 company of Europeans,	4	
Spirits, Drams, for 1,000 men,	44	
Every 3 maunds of public stores, or private baggage,	1	

Table

Table No. 14.

*SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the un-
dermentioned Services. Each Bullock carrying two Maunds. Food of each
Man, 1 Seer per Day for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.*

SPECIFICATION.

		Number of Maunds of bullocks.	grain.
Rice, For 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including lascars, &c.		30,000	60,000
Ordnance, Brafs six pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - 44		1540	
Iron twelve pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - 12		936	
Eighteen pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - 10		1170	
Twenty four pounders, with tum- brils and spare cattle, - 6		930	
Cavalry, Three thousand horse, - -		4,500	9,000
Elephants, Two hundred, - - -		750	1,500
Loose Shot, 8,000 for eighteen pounders,		1,000	
4,200 for twenty-four pounders, - -		700	
Musquet-ball Cartridges, for 15,000 men, - - -		1,875	
50 rounds for 5,000 cavalry and artillery,		208	
Spirits, Drams, for 5,000 Europeans, - - -		300	
Camp Equipage, for native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions, - - - -		352	
For Europeans equal to 50 companies, - -		200	
Total,		<u>44,461</u>	<u>70,500</u>

Table No. 15.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to every two Maunds and one half. Food of each Man 1 Seer per Day, for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

		Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice,	For 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including lascars, &c.	24,000	60,000
Ordnance,	Brafs six pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - 44	924	
	Iron twelve pounders, with tum- brils, and spare cattle, - - - 12	564	
	Eighteen pounders, with tum- brils and spare cattle, - - - 10	700	
	Twenty four pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - 6	558	
Cavalry,	Three thousand horse, - - - -	3,600	9,000
Elephants,	Two hundred, - - - - -	600	1,500
Loose shot,	8,000 for eighteen pounders, - - -	800	
	4,200 for twenty four pounders, - - -	525	
Musquet-ball Cartridges,	for 15,000 men, - - - - -	1,500	
	50 rounds for 5,000 Cavalry and Artillery, - - -	170	
Spirits, Drams,	for 5,000 Europeans, - - - - -	300	
Camp Equipage,	for native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions, - - - - -	352	
	For Europeans, equal to 50 companies, - - -	200	
	Total,	34,793	70,500

Table No. 16.

*SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the un-
dermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry three Maunds;
Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day for 30 Days; without Grain for the
Bullocks.*

SPECIFICATION.

		Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice, For 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including lascars, &c.		20,000	60,000
Ordnance, Brass six pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - - -	44		924
Iron twelve pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - - -	12		564
Eighteen pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - - - - -	10		700
Twenty four pounders, with tum- brils and spare cattle, - - - - -	6		558
Cavalry, Three thousand horse, - - - - -		3,000	9,000
Elephants, Two hundred, - - - - -		500	1,500
Loose Shot, 8,000 for eighteen pounders, - - - - -			680
4,200 for twenty-four pounders, - - - - -			420
Musquet-ball Cartridges, for 15,000 men, - - - - -			960
50 rounds for 5,000 cavalry and artillery, - - - - -			110
Spirits, Drams, for 5,000 Europeans, - - - - -			220
Camp Equipage, for native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions, - - - - -			264
For Europeans equal to 50 companies, - - - - -			200
	Total,	29,100	70,500

ERRATA and ADDENDA,

IN THE

APPENDIX, No. 2.

- Page 14, Last line, and page 15, first line, for " 179,344 bullocks, and 340,266 maunds,"
read 177,136 bullocks and 336,954 maunds.
- Page 15, Paragraph 6, for " 65,422 bullocks," *read* 58,174.
- Page 23, Table No. 4. instead of rice for " 10,000 men," *read* for 1,000 men.
- Ibid.* Third line from the bottom, for " 802" *read* 702.
- Page 29, Table No. 6. One brass six pounder, under maunds, for " 62" *read* 63.
- Page 30, Line 3, Loose shot for 18 pounders, for " 34 bullocks, 51 maunds," *read* 32 bullocks, 48 maunds.
- Page 32, Under the head " Spirits," after the words " 36 bullocks," in place of " *which allows 8 extra drams per month per man,*" *read but allowing for 8 extra drams per month per man, would require 44 bullocks:* and the same proportion is stated for this article throughout these Tables.
- Ibid.* Camp Equipage, native infantry 12 bullocks, to carry the tents.—This number is sufficient for the weight; but, if the walls cannot be conveniently separated from the flies, one bullock must be allowed for each tent of this description.—The proportion of tents for officers, is only for services on which it would be necessary to move lightly equipped.
- Page 33, After " Loose shot 8,000" add 18 pounders.
 Ditto for " 4,000," *read* 4,200, twenty four pounders.
- Page 37, Under the head " Mufquet Ball Cartridges"—for " 150,000 men," *read* 15,000.
- Page 42, Under the head Loose shot, for " 25 to 200" *read* 25 to 300.
- Page 57, Last line, for " every maund" *read* every 2½ maunds.

N. B. In Bengal, the barrels for mufquet cartridges, are usually made to hold 800 rounds each, or 1,600 for a bullock; but the packing boxes or barrels, can be made to suit the strength of different classes of bullocks, whether 2, 2½, or 3 maunds.

In the Tables Nos. 5, 8, and 12, the number of bullocks merely for the draft of the ordnance guns, with their tumbrils, is calculated for Bengal, or 3 maund bullocks, because it is supposed that as many strong bullocks; as can be wanted, for that particular purpose, may be collected, even in a country where the Cattle in general, are weaker, and it is of importance to shorten the line;—but if calculations be required for the draft of ordnance, by 2½ maund bullocks, in proportion to those of 3 maunds, they may be made by the following data;

	<i>3 md. bullocks.</i>	<i>2½ md. bullocks.</i>
One six pounder, with 2 tumbrils,	21	25
One 12 ditto, with 4 ditto,	47	57
One 18 ditto, with 6 ditto,	70	84
One 24 ditto, with 8 ditto,	93	121

APPENDIX.

NUMBER III.

Preliminary Articles of Peace.

“ **P**RELIMINARY articles of a treaty of peace concluded between the
“ allied armies and Tippoo Sultaun.

“ ARTICLE I.

“ One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultaun was in possession
“ before the war, to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent,
“ according to their situation.

“ ARTICLE II.

“ Three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, to be paid by Tippoo Sultaun,
“ either in gold mohurs, pagodas, or bullion.

“ 1st. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid immediately.

“ 2d. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid in three payments, not
“ exceeding four months each.

“ ARTICLE

APPENDIX.

" ARTICLE III.

" All prisoners of the four powers, from the time of Hyder Ally, to
" be unequivocally restored.

" ARTICLE IV.

" Two of Tippoo Sultaun's three eldest sons to be given as hostages for a
" due performance of the treaty.

" ARTICLE V.

" When they shall arrive in camp, with the articles of this treaty, under
" the seal of the Sultaun, a counterpart shall be sent from the three powers:
" Hostilities shall cease, and terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual
" friendship shall be agreed upon."

FINIS.

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