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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

November 27, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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21 MAY 46

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TESTIMONY OF:

HULL, Cordell -- resumed

GRIEW, Joseph Clark -- resumed

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NUMBER

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

S. Con. Res. 27

Tuesday, November 27, 1945

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Hull

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3

When we recessed yesterday, Secretary Hull, I think Mr.

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Cooper was questioning you. You may proceed.

5

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL (Resumed)

6

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Secretary, I notice on page 44

7

of your written statement you said:

8

"On December 6 our Government received from a

9

number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese

10

Fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers and 20 destroyers

11

from Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. This was

12

confirmation that the long threatened Japanese movement

13

of expansion by force to the south was under way. The

14

critical character of this development, which placed

15

the United States and its friends in common imminent

16

danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an im-

17

portant subject of my conferences with representatives

18

of the Army and Navy on that and the following day."

19

You kept the responsible officials of the War and Navy

20

Department constantly advised of any information you received?

21

Mr. Hull: Yes, sir.

22

The Vice Chairman: Anything the State Department had with

23

respect to the situation in the Far East and especially as to

24

Japan?

25

Mr. Hull: I did my best to comply with that function and

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 duty of the State Department, and I am satisfied my associates
3 did likewise. It is due, however, to the Navy to say that
4 they were getting large amounts of information themselves
5 directly -- for example, all the interceptions came to them
6 first. We received information about this threatened danger
7 I think on the 6th from a British dispatch and from dispatches,
8 one or more, of our Consuls and other officials stationed in
9 the Indo-French area, and that whole situation was naturally
10 a matter for discussion, as well as the mere circulation of
11 information among each other.

12 The Vice Chairman: I believe it was on November 7 that
13 you stated that at a Cabinet meeting you spoke at some length
14 covering the situation fully, and it was your opinion that all
15 of the forces of our country should be on the alert and should
16 be expecting any development that might eventuate in the Pacific.

17 Mr. Hull: Yes, and that the military situation might
18 break at any time, and I think the Cabinet agreed entirely to
19 that view, especially when by that stage there was so much in-
20 formation almost daily in the press, dispatches about bitter
21 speeches of Japanese statesmen, dispatches about their con-
22 tinuing their movement down the China Coast to Indochina, and
23 other phases of information which, on their face, indicated
24 clearly what was on hand.

25 The Vice Chairman: One other question, if I may, Mr.

AL-4

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Secretary.

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Evidence was presented to this committee by Admiral Inglis of our Navy, which came from Japanese sources through intercepted messages and from Japanese prisoners who had been questioned, indicating that the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, and the special envoy, Mr. Kurusu, did not know of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and as I recall the statement of Mr. Sumner Welles, he indicated that he thought Ambassador Nomura was sincerely anxious to maintain peace between Japan and the United States but he indicated that he did not have such a high opinion of Mr. Kurusu.

As I understood the testimony of Mr. Grew on yesterday, he indicated that he had a rather high opinion of Mr. Kurusu. I was wondering whether you had any information or whether you desire to give an expression of your opinion as to that situation?

Mr. Hull: I had this impression, in a general way, and that is that they both knew by that time that they were here primarily to prevail on us to abandon our doctrines and policies and yield entire control of the Pacific beyond Hawaii, to and including India, all the important trade routes coming out of the Far East, yield the political, economic and other kinds of arbitrary domination to Japan. That was what they were primarily concerned about, to clear the way for Japan to go

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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forward with her plans of conquest without having to fight us.

So they went considerably in a superficial way along that route. They must have known, from what they said to us so often, so constantly, "We want to hear from you at once or something awful may happen; the situation is explosive now in Japan", and urging us, beyond all the ordinary rules of conversation between two Governments, I think these two gentlemen must have been morally certain, if not absolutely so, that their Government was going on with this movement, that they must clear the way by having us get out of the way, if humanly possible, and if not, they must have known that the Japanese military forces were going on anyhow.

Now as to just when and where they would attack, I would not undertake to say definitely, because I could not. As to whether they, or either of them knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, they may have known or they may not, I would hesitate to say.

The Vice Chairman: The conferences with those two representatives of Japan were continued right up to the time of the attack, were they not?

Mr. Hull: Yes. The main phase of the conference with them was due to the fact that when the President returned from Warm Springs about the 30th of November he asked us to call on the Japanese Government to find why they were concentrating all

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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these troops in Indochina, and other phases relating to that question. They did not make a reply after the first conference, and they did not make a reply I think until about the 5th of December. I could be in error about this date.

However, there was nothing new about our general proposition for a basis of conversations. They made some reference to it and we would not have known but what they were going on with the conversations with us with that as a basis.

That was our last proposal on the 26th. But it will be borne in mind that, according to the interceptions, Kurusu and Nomura were instructed, from about the 27th or somewhere back there, to continue talking with us as though they were in earnest, when they were not.

(3)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

LaCharity follows

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 Witness Hull

2 The Vice Chairman: As I recall the press reports about
3 that time, I think you expressed yourself in rather strong
4 terms to them when you found out about the attack and they
5 had been in conference with you right up to that time.

6 Mr. Hull: Up somewhere -- it must have been up around
7 mid-day, I received a telephone message from the White House
8 stating that there was a report that Pearl Harbor had been
9 attacked. After a preliminary words, I said, "Can you have
10 that confirmed? I have an appointment with the Japanese
11 representatives here in my office at 1 o'clock." He said
12 it had not been confirmed but they would give that attention.
13 The upshot was that the last I heard from that source was that,
14 until the Japanese came in.

15 I discussed before they came whether I would accredit
16 that report as the unquestioned truth of the situation and
17 refuse to admit them or whether in view of the extremely
18 delicate relations I would leave open the one chance in ten
19 or more that the report was not correct. I proceed to receive
20 and confer with them although I felt that the chances were
21 altogether virtually certain that the report was true.

22 So the proposal they made was comprised of a few pages
23 defining the Japanese attitude just the reverse of what it was.
24 It was, "Peace, peace, peace." And then they took our attitude
25 and defined it as just the reverse of what it was.

ACHARITY
WLC

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Senator George

LC2

1 Witness Hull

2 Well, I felt and knew of the extreme probability that the
3 Pearl Harbor report was true. I felt like taking liberties
4 in talking to them about their government in what would not
5 be diplomatic language in ordinary times.

6 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Secretary, do you have any further
7 statement you desire to make?

8 Mr. Hull: I don't know of much more that I can give the
9 committee. Two volumes of publications are here. A 75-page
10 statement was given to you at the outset. Every effort has
11 been made to give you anything we can that is material in connec-
12 tion with your investigation.

13 The Vice Chairman: I thank you.

14 The Chairman: Senator George.

15 Senator George: Mr. Secretary, I merely wish to ask one or
16 two questions.

17 The statement first made in your prepared statement for
18 the committee emphasizes the meeting of November 7th with the
19 Cabinet preceded by a detailed statement of the continuing
20 critical situation in the world and especially with Japan.

21 Now, I would like to read, just briefly, from your state-
22 ment:

23 "On November 7 I attended the regular Cabinet
24 meeting. It was the President's custom either to start
25 off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the

WLC3

1 Witness Hull

Questions by: Senator George

2 Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me
3 and asks whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon
4 pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the
5 international situation. I went over fully develop-
6 ments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that
7 in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that
8 we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere
9 by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President
10 went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate
11 of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet
12 that the critical situation might well be emphasized in
13 speeches in order that the country would, if possible
14 be better prepared for such a development."

15 Now, that was the first Cabinet meeting at which you had
16 drawn special and direct attention to the critical situation
17 developing in the world and especially in the Pacific?

18 Mr. Hull: That was the first recent meeting at least
19 where there had been an elaborate detailed consideration of
20 the situation.

21 Senator George: They previously had been general.

22 Mr. Hull: At all Cabinet meetings with few exceptions
23 either the President or I dealt with some phase of the situation
24 as it was developing.

25 Senator George: Yes.

WLC

1 Witness Hull

Questions by: Senator George

2 Now, Mr. Secretary, on November 25, I read from your
3 statement:

4 " * * * I emphasized the critical nature of this
5 country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the
6 War Council on November 25. The War Council, which
7 consisted of the President, the secretaries of State,
8 War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
9 Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all
10 the information and views which we were currently dis-
11 cussing with our respective contacts and in our respective
12 circles. The highlights in the developments at a particu-
13 lar juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings.
14 At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then
15 had that the Japanese military were already poised for
16 attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate.
17 They were likely to break out anywhere, at anytime, at any
18 place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise
19 in their plans."

20 Now, particularly:

21 "I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached
22 and that safeguarding of our national security was in the
23 hands of the Army and the Navy."

24 Is the committee to understand that you made substantially
25 that statement last read at this meeting on November 25?

1 Witness Hull

Questions by: Senator George

2 Mr. Hull: That is my recollection. I think you will find
3 that right soon after that date, when the Roberts Commission was
4 functioning, I gave that original statement.

5 Senator George: Yes.

6 Mr. Hull: Merely in justice to the Army and the Navy and
7 to the diplomatic branch of the Government, for them to under-
8 stand, which they doubtless did anyhow, that the diplomatic
9 establishment had exhausted its efforts to every practical
10 extent to maintain or preserve peace.

11 Senator George: Yes.

12 Now, again, Mr. Secretary: "On November 25, at the meeting
13 of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which
14 we had made to the Japanese and pointed out that there was
15 practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with
16 Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely
17 to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the
18 matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands
19 of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my
20 judgment that any plans for our military defense should include
21 an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise
22 a central point in their strategy and also might attack at
23 various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts
24 of defense and of coordination."

25 Mr. Hull: That was mainly a repetition of what we had been

1 Witness Hull

Questions by: Senator George

2 saying among ourselves individually and sometimes in groups
3 for a few days prior to that. In other words, I think every-
4 body who was following this closely was obliged to have made
5 their minds by this time about the seriousness of the situation
6 and the imminence of the danger. They knew that Hitler was
7 not going to stop. They knew that the Japanese war party
8 in supreme control in Japan was tied in hard and fast with
9 Hitler, and we didn't know what effect that might have on the
10 Japanese move in addition to their own initiative.

11 So it was a most complicated and delicate and dangerous
12 situation with these factors that would not ordinarily exist
13 in the case of just one country. So after all these discussions
14 back and forth with the Japanese and among ourselves I think
15 everybody reasoned the danger was imminent after their ultimatum.
16 They couldn't have been more definite in that respect. And
17 wherever we met after that we were discussing the increasing
18 dangers and increasing imminence.

19 Senator George: That is, the constantly developing world
20 conditions which were drawing more and more serious?

21 Mr. Hull: Exactly.

22 Senator George: And on these dates that I have directed
23 attention to in your formal statement, you had reached a con-
24 clusion that the matter was largely in the hands of the Army
25 and the Navy, that is, the security of the country?

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Witness Hull

Questions by: Senator George

Mr. Hull: Yes, that was my judgment and I think the developments as they existed during those days, soon after the 20th of November, the Japanese movements forward, plans of attack, I think that confirms fully our estimate of what was imminent at that time.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Hull

Questions by: Senator George
Mr. Clark

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2 Senator George: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

3 The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

4 Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, I want to direct your attention
5 to the decision not to withdraw the Fleet from Pearl Harbor
6 and its preparation for action and its being exposed to attack
7 on account of being based at Pearl Harbor, and in that connection
8 I desire to read you briefly from the testimony of Admiral
9 Richardson when he was being interrogated by the gentleman from
10 California:

11 "Admiral Richardson: Yes, but I think when you con-
12 sider the many, many other things that had to be done
13 before active war operations could be undertaken, the
14 question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was
15 on the West Coast would have little effect on the over-
16 all time, because you had to assemble train, you might
17 have to build some, and you might have to have drydocks,
18 you might have to have repair facilities, you had to have
19 a terrific amount of stores and all kinds of equipment
20 for building roads and airfields and everything else,
21 none of which was ready,***"

22 "So the question of whether it was in Hawaii or
23 whether it was on the West Coast when actual war started
24 it was a matter of no moment, in my opinion, because
25 other things controlled the time of getting ready.

Witness Hull

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 "Mr. Gearhart: Well, considering the other situa-
3 tion, the one which actually happened, by having our
4 Fleet in Hawaiian waters we had our Fleet 2,500 miles
5 closer to the enemy for their sneak attack.

6 "Admiral Richardson: Do you want an opinion on that?

7 "Mr. Gearhart: Yes, unless it is a question of
8 geography, unless it is a matter of going over water, or
9 something else.

10 "Admiral Richardson: In my opinion, Congressman
11 Gearhart, a Japanese Fleet that could cross most of the
12 Pacific Ocean and deliver an undiscovered attack on Pearl
13 Harbor would quite likely have been able to deliver the
14 same attack on Puget Sound

15 "Mr. Gearhart: Well, that is amazing.

16 "Admiral Richardson: But the whole question is the
17 amount of oil they have got in the ships."

18 I wonder if you care to comment on whether such consider-
19 ations as those may have been discussed or entered into the
20 decision not to withdraw the Fleet from Hawaiian waters under
21 existing conditions?

22 Mr. Hull: I should say that, of course, none of us in
23 the State Department would profess to have a technical knowledge
24 of the construction side of the Navy, the matter of enlarging
25 its equipment or its supplies, all that kind of thing are matters

Witness Hull

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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for Navy people primarily and not for a layman.

I knew that we had a most touchy and delicate situation extending around the world and that the opposition was interlocked and working in many devious ways. I thought I knew at the same time as a matter of psychology that the worst bandit, and they were bandits of the most savage type, the leaders of Japan and Germany, the worst bandit as he prowls about and he looks about has always got his eyes open to see if any pistols or any guns or any weapons are in sight. He doesn't like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him. None of us care for that, as a matter of fact. And it was the same way as a matter of psychology with this bunch of overlords who were running rife over the earth.

They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not, and for that reason I thought that, especially after it was out there, I thought that it should stay there.

Mr. Clark: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Shefner follows.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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10:35

Questions by Sen. Lucas

Witness Hull:

Mr. Clark: That is all the questions I have.

The Chairman: Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas: Mr. Secretary, when did you first see the President of the United States on December the 7th, 1941?

Mr. Hull: We had a meeting that evening at the White House. I talked with him over the telephone during the day; I do not recall at this moment whether I was in the White House during the afternoon or not.

Senator Lucas: Do you recall whether or not you talked to him over the telephone on the morning before the attack?

Mr. Hull: He called me.

Senator Lucas: Do you remember about what time?

Mr. Hull: Oh, it was up somewhere, - it was after Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox had left my office and they remained there until --

Senator Lucas: Was that after the --

The Chairman: He had not finished his answer.

Senator Lucas: I am sorry. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Hull: They remained in my office until, I think it was, a little after twelve o'clock, but I am givigg my best impression.

Senator Lucas: Was that before you received word that Pearl Harbor had been attacked?

Mr. Hull: I had not received that word until the Presi-

Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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dent called me. That is the first information I had on the subject.

Senator Lucas: But that morning you did have a conversation with Secretary Knox?

Mr. Hull: And Stimson.

Senator Lucas: And Stimson?

Mr. Hull: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Now, what was the subject of the conversation between the three of you on that morning as you recall?

Mr. Hull: According to my best recollection it was in line with our increasingly frequent conferences over the telephone or in person as the dangers and the threatened outbreak in Japan increased.

For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this information from our consuls and from a British dispatch that this Japanese armada had left its jumping off point and was sailing towards the Kra Isthmus and that Prime Minister Tojo had made a speech some time about that time or a little before, - yes, it was a little before this, but that, along with these actual movements, especially these movements, was the occasion, the chief occasion, I think, of our conference. Tojo's speech was some days before but it shed further light on what was happening then.

Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Well, now, did you see the President of
3 the United States on Saturday, December the 6th?

4 Mr. Hull: Oh, I do not recall at this moment.

5 Senator Lucas: Do you recall whether you had conver-
6 sations with him at that time?

7 Mr. Hull: Oh, I was in touch in some way on each of
8 those days, with somebody at the White House or the Navy
9 and the Army.

10 Senator Lucas: In the conversations that you had with
11 Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of
12 the 7th was there anything said in that conversation about
13 the likelihood of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor?

14 Mr. Hull: Nothing. As you understand, the attack was
15 then on apparently. The fleet was moving towards the Kra
16 Peninsula, which would greatly endanger the situation.

17 Mr. Keefe: Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get
18 your last answer. Will you read it, please?

19 Mr. Hull: I said the attack was under way, according
20 to the dispatches, on the sixth. This fleet was moving, not
21 up north in the Bay of Siam or Thailand, but it was, so far
22 as my impression extended, moving toward the Kra Isthmus,
23 which was probably a threat all the way down towards Singa-
24 pore, down the peninsula, and not far from Malaya.

25 Senator Lucas: Mr. Hull, I was interested in your

1 Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 statement in regard to the conversations you had with the
3 Japanese envoys.

4 You stated that while they apparently were looking at
5 your eyes they were looking over your shoulder, out of the
6 window, to determine the strength of our armed forces and
7 that in dealing with a nation whose leaders were dangerous
8 outlaws the only thing that they considered in these diplo-
9 matic talks was the question of how much military and how
10 much naval power we had.

11 Am I correct about that?

12 Mr. Hull: Yes. That was based on this further view,-
13 and I never criticize anybody for their opinions. I accord
14 to every American full patriotism and the highest motives
15 in dealing with public affairs, but if we had, - we and the
16 British and the peace loving countries had maintained when
17 we saw Hitler moving as he did from 1933 on and when we saw
18 the Japs moving as they did from 1933 on, if we peaceful
19 nations had had sort of a military establishment all we
20 would have had to do at that early stage would have been to
21 turn to them and say, "We don't want you to take that course,
22 we don't want you Japs to go into China on this sort of an
23 outrageous expedition." The chances are overwhelming that
24 they would not have done it but, of course, that is one of
25 the unfortunate phases of human experience.

1 Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Well, I assume from that answer that it
3 is your view that any diplomatic or political relations of
4 Japan with this country was definitely tied in with their
5 own naval and military forces in their homeland?

6 Mr. Hull: Well, Tojo was the head of the whole concern.
7 The military were in control from 1937, when they moved into
8 China, and they controlled the army and officials. They were
9 in supreme control of Japan and everything Japan possessed,
10 including the Navy and its direction.

11 Senator Lucas: Well, therefore am I correct in my as-
12 sumption that as a result of having to deal with a nation of
13 that kind, who tied their diplomatic and political relations
14 with the military and the navy, that it was also necessary
15 for us in dealing with Japan to more or less take a like
16 course and that was one of the reasons why the Fleet was in
17 the Pacific at that time?

18 Mr. Hull: Exactly. That is a part of the psychology.
19 As I tried to make clear a day or two ago, when a nation is
20 dealing with lawless nations and governments, with every
21 kind of dishonest and dishonorable and ulterior purposes in
22 view, that the diplomatic influence is not much stronger than
23 the military organization behind it.

24 Senator Lucas: In other words, the Fleet based in Pearl
25 Harbor was a tremendous factor in our political and in our

1 Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 diplomatic dealings with Japan at that time?

3 Mr. Hull: Oh, I think it was. We do not know, nobody
4 knows with all of those machinations going on daily and night-
5 ly between representatives of Hitler and Tojo, planning every
6 imaginable step, we do not know just how much influence the
7 Navy at Pearl Harbor had in inducing a little more circum-
8 spection on their part and a little more consideration for
9 this nation and this government, but I could not help but
10 feel that it did have that restraining effect.

11 Senator Lucas: Well, a nation that lives on force, the
12 only thing that it fears is force, isn't it?

13 Mr. Hull: Precisely. That is the old saying at least.

14 Senator Lucas: Now, in your manuscript which was pre-
15 pared and presented to this committee I direct your atten-
16 tion to page 15 and I desire to ask one or two questions.

17 You state there that (Reading):

18 "Existing treaties relating to the Far East were
19 adequate, provided the signatory governments lived up
20 to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new agree-
21 ments. But if there was a chance that new agreements
22 would contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President
23 and I believed that we should not neglect that possibil-
24 ity, slim as it was."

25 In other words, as I understand it, and I think the

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Questions by Sen. Lucas

Witness Hull:

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2 English is very clear on it, the agreements that we had in
3 effect at that time were sufficient to keep the peace in the
4 Pacific if Japan had recognized the sanctity of international
5 treaties?

6 Mr. Hull: Oh, we had copper riveted agreements with
7 the Nine Power treaty as the central point in the framework
8 of international relations in the Pacific.

9 As I said, outside of the local agreements, outside of
10 international law, outside of the Nine Power treaty, outside
11 of anything moral that the League of Nations provisions
12 might have affected the mind of a person at all disposed to
13 be law abiding and along with that I think that covers the
14 main structure.

15 Senator Lucas: Now, on that same page you state

16 (Reading):

17 "We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were
18 determined to stand by a basic position, built on
19 fundamental principles which we applied not only to
20 Japan but to all countries."

21 Now, the truth of the matter is that the Ten Point pro-
22 gram was based upon those fundamental American principles
23 that you were talking about in that statement?

24 Mr. Hull: To be sure there is nothing new in it and
25 nothing that any law abiding nation would not be delighted

1 Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 to support and practice.

3 Senator Lucas: And how long has this nation stood upon
4 those fundamental basic principles that you have talked
5 about?

6 Mr. Hull: We have from over an indefinite period in the
7 past stood for all of the doctrines that you see set out.
8 Other law abiding and peaceful nations, law abiding and
9 civilized, have stood for the same thing.

10 Senator Lucas: And that was regardless of what political
11 party was in power, those fundamental basic American
12 principles have been the same?

13 Mr. Hull: Oh, to be sure.

14 Senator Lucas: I direct your attention, Mr. Secretary,
15 to the report of the Army Board that investigated the Pearl
16 Harbor disaster. I will ask you whether or not you were a
17 witness before that Board?

18 Mr. Hull: I was not. I sent some little data to them
19 and I informed them that I would be pleased to appear before
20 the Board at any time on any phase of the matters about which
21 I might make contribution, but they sent word that they
22 would not need my presence before the Board.

23 Senator Lucas: So they never called you as a witness
24 after that?

25 Mr. Hull: No.

1 Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Now, are you familiar with that report,
3 Mr. Secretary?

4 Mr. Hull: Oh, I have been over it.

5 Senator Lucas: Did they ask you for any data or any
6 statement concerning the Ten Point program that was handed
7 to the Japanese by you?

8 Mr. Hull: No.

9 Senator Lucas: In this report in Chapter 4, headed
10 "Responsibilities in Washington," I read the following:

11 "Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of
12 his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he
13 dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to
14 this government, was concerned at the situation, for
15 his diary continues:

16 "We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then
17 I went back to the Department, and I got hold of
18 Marshall."

19 Now, this is the finding of the Board:

20 "Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that
21 was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary
22 of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of
23 Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty."

24 They also in that same report, in the next paragraph
25 or two, state: (Reading)

1810

Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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2 "Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull
3 had made up his mind not to go through with the pro-
4 posals shown the day before to the Secretary of War
5 containing the plan for the 'Three Months' Truce'.

6 "Evidently the action 'to kick the whole thing
7 over' was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese
8 the counter proposal of the 'Ten Points' which they
9 took as an ultimatum.

10 "It was the document that touched the button that
11 started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed
12 it."

13 Now, they have charged in this report by direct charges
14 and by implication and innuendo that you issued the ulti-
15 matum that started the war. I think you have demonstrated
16 to any fair and impartial hearer at this hearing that that
17 just is not true, but would you care to elaborate any further
18 upon these comments?

19 Mr. Hull: That is not a very pleasant topic to me. I
20 strove to cooperate with the Army and Navy Board without suc-
21 cess and then I was gratuitously brought into the picture,
22 apparently on the theory that Tojo and the military element
23 moving abreast with Hitler on a world rampage, were not do-
24 ing so and were not guilty of doing so, but that this gov-
25 ernment of peaceful people, with no preparations in the Paci-

1 Witness Hull:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 fic to fight, with no two-ocean Navy on hand, with only
3 peace appeals for months to the Japs, that this government
4 was the cause and that it forced poor, innocent, peace-
5 minded Tojo and that bunch of savages and outlaws into war.

6 If I could express myself as I would like I would want
7 all of you religious minded people to retire. I stood under
8 that infamous charge for months, when every reasonable
9 minded person knew that the Japs were on the same march of
10 invasion in the Pacific area to get supreme control over it
11 in every way so that we could not even land a boat load of
12 goods on the other side of the Pacific except under extor-
13 tionate terms, - every person knew that they were on this
14 move because if he had not known it in any other way, the
15 heads of their government were telling the world every week,
16 sometimes every two or three days, precisely what they were
17 doing and what they were going to do; and yet, somebody who
18 knows little and cares less, now says, "Why didn't the United
19 States make concessions and save us from the war", when any
20 person knows, and if you look back at the situation as it
21 existed during those last ten, twelve, fourteen days any ra-
22 tional person knows just what the Japs were doing.

23 They were off on this final attack and no one was going
24 to stop them unless we yielded and laid down like cowards,
25 and we would have been cowards to have lain down.

Witness Grew:

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2 The Chairman: Mr. Examiner, your hour is up and the
3 committee appreciates the fact that you have furnished so
4 much information here. The committee feels that probably
5 you are entitled to a rest for two or three days before re-
6 suming and, therefore, counsel will get in touch with you as
7 to when you shall reappear.

8 Mr. Hull: Well, I do not desire to inconvenience the
9 committee in carrying out its schedule in any way. I will
10 do my best to cooperate with you in that respect.

11 The Chairman: The committee appreciates that.

12 Mr. Hull: Thank you very much.

13 The Chairman: Mr. Grew, you may resume.

14 - - -

15 TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW (resumed)

16 Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, before the questions begin may
17 I clarify a point in the record in my testimony of yesterday?

18 The Chairman: Yes, indeed.

19 Mr. Grew: The record indicates that I said, in answer
20 to a question, that after the Cabinet meeting in Tokyo of De-
21 cember 1st I guessed that they had discussed the attack on
22 Pearl Harbor.

23 Now, I cannot recollect exactly how I phrased my answer
24 but it was far from my intention to leave that impression be-
25 cause I did not and could not have guessed that. What I did

Witness Grew:

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2 guess was that the Cabinet may have been discussing the open-
3 ing of hostilities with the United States, but knowing the
4 way that things work in Japan I do not believe for a moment
5 that the military high command would ever have taken the
6 civilian members of the Cabinet into their confidence as to
7 their precise plans.

8 They had every reason to keep those plans in the utmost
9 secrecy, so while I do think that that Cabinet meeting may
10 well have discussed the question of opening hostilities, I
11 do not think that they discussed the question of the attack
12 on Pearl Harbor.

13 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson, I believe, was in the
14 process of examining Mr. Grew when we recessed yesterday.

15 You may proceed, Senator.

16 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, did you correspond with the
17 President when you were in Tokyo as the Ambassador?

18 Mr. Grew: As I recollect it, Senator, I had only one
19 exchange of letters with him. Those have been published.
20 It is possible that I wrote him personally on other occasions
21 but I do not think so. I think that was the only exchange,
22 the exchange published.

23 Senator Ferguson: Where were they published?

24 Mr. Grew: They are published in my book. I think they
25 may have been published in Foreign Relations. I am not cer-

1 Witness Grew:

2 tain of that.

3 Senator Ferguson: Would you have someone check that to
4 see if they are?

5 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. I can give you the date pretty
6 quickly.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

8 Mr. Grew: I will give you the date to check that up.

9 Senator Ferguson: Please. I think on page 360 you have
10 a notation of one.

11 Mr. Gesell: 359.

12 Mr. Grew: What is that?

13 Mr. Gesell: Page 359, on December 14th. Is that the
14 letter?

15 Senator Ferguson: December 14th.

16 Mr. Grew: December 14, 1940 was it?

17 Senator Ferguson: On page number 359?

18 Mr. Gesell: Page 359 of the book.

19 Mr. Grew: Page what?

20 Mr. Gesell: Page 359 of the book.

21 Mr. Grew: Yes, that is correct.

22 Mr. Mitchell: What year?

23 Mr. Gesell: 1940 that is.

24 Mr. Grew: December 14, 1940. Let me see whether there
25 is anything here or not.

1 Witness Grew;

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Mr. Gesell: I am quite sure that is not in Volume 2,
3 since that reports conversations.

4 Mr. Grew: I do not believe it would be in Volume 1.

5 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, could you have Mr. Hamil-
6 ton check that while we go along with some questions on it?

7 Mr. Grew: It does not appear to have been published in
8 Foreign Relations.

9 Senator Ferguson: It does not appear to be published?

10 Mr. Grew: No.

11 Senator Ferguson: Did you furnish copies to Mr. Hull?
12 I am wondering how it would get into Foreign Relations if it
13 went to the President direct.

14 Mr. Grew: Well, I have no record of that. I assumed
15 that I sent copies to the Department of State, probably,
16 without any question.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, will you refer to your
18 letter to the President?

19 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Did you review the foreign relations
21 with Japan as of that time?

22 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I did.

23 Senator Ferguson: What is the substance of the rela-
24 tion? What was the point at issue?

25 Mr. Grew: The point at issue appeared to be stated as

1516

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 follows:

3 "The chief factors in the problem would seem, from
4 this angle" -- that is the angle of the American Em-
5 bassy in Tokyo -- "to be:

6 "(1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win
7 the European war;

8 "(2) Whether our getting into war with Japan would
9 so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the
10 difference to Britain between victory and defeat;

11 "(3) To what extent our own policy in the Far
12 East must be timed with our preparedness program and
13 with respect to the relative strength of the American
14 and the Japanese navies now and later."

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you refer to page 360,
16 where you use this language:

17 "The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not
18 whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program but
19 when."

20 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Will you elaborate on that and ex-
22 plain what you meant there?

23 Mr. Grew: The Japanese had moved out all through East
24 Asia. They were into China, Indo-China and they were in a
25 position to threaten what I considered our vital interests.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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2 They were in a position to threaten the Philippines and they
3 were also in a position to cut off one of the life lines to
4 Great Britain for her supplies to enable her to continue the
5 war.

6 Senator Ferguson: Are you through with your answer?

7 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Would it be fair to say that at that
9 time you saw in the near future a war between the United
10 States and Japan?

11 Mr. Grew: Senator, during all my period in Tokyo I
12 was doing everything in my power to prevent a war between the
13 United States and Japan, up to the very end. As I said yes-
14 terday, that is the only position that I think any diplo-
15 matic representative should take.

16 Senator Ferguson: It is not a question of questioning
17 your motives at all. I just wanted to know whether that sen-
18 tence would indicate that at that time you saw a war between
19 the United States and Japan and it was only a question of
20 when the war was going to be?

21 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I do not think that that is the whole
22 story. It was a question of whether we were going to be
23 able to take steps which would prevent a war between the
24 United States and Japan, which would prevent a war between
25 the United States and Japan.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Well, I will read another sentence
3 from page 360 of your book:

4 "We are bound eventually to come to a head-on
5 clash with Japan."

6 It is not quite the whole sentence that I am reading.

7 The Chairman: I suggest you read the whole paragraph,
8 Senator.

9 Senator Ferguson: All right, I will read the whole
10 paragraph.

11 Mr. Grew: Which paragraph is that, Senator?

12 Senator Ferguson: Will the Ambassador read the para-
13 graph?

14 Mr. Grew: On page 360?

15 Senator Ferguson: (Reading) "It therefore appears
16 that sooner or later* * *".

17 Mr. Grew: Yes. (Reading)

18 "It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless
19 we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw
20 bag and baggage from the entire sphere of 'Greater East
21 Asia including the South Seas' (which God forbid), we
22 are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with
23 Japan."

24 Now, that clash need not have been a military clash.
25 In other words, it was always my hope that the economic

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 measures which we had taken against Japan would finally bring
3 Japan to a position where she might come to a reasonable agree-
4 ment with us.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, you were warning the
6 President that it would be necessary for America to take some
7 definite steps along definite lines if we were to prevent
8 a military clash with Japan?

9 Mr. Grew: Yes.

10 Senator Ferguson: And that Japan would have to take
11 certain steps?

12 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. I said that I thought that there
13 were risks involved both in a positive policy and a laissez
14 faire policy, but I thought that the risks of a laissez faire
15 policy were greater than the risks of a positive policy.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, was it a question then when we
17 should take these steps?

18 Mr. Grew: Well, this letter was written in December
19 1940.

20 Now, the record shows that our step on freezing Japan-
21 ese assets took place on July 25, 1941, but in the meantime
22 during that period we were tightening up, as I recollect it,
23 all along the line in our embargoes of commodities to Japan
24 which the Japanese could use for military purposes.

25 Senator Ferguson: When did we freeze aviation gas for

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Japan?

3 Mr. Grew: The date on which we put on an embargo on oil?

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, on aviation gasoline.

5 Mr. Grew: Aviation gasoline?

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Do you know when that was?

7 Mr. Grew: That, I think, is contained in Foreign Rela-
8 tions.

9 Senator Ferguson: Was it July 31, 1940?

10 Mr. Grew: I could not say that, confirm that date with-
11 out looking it up. "July 31, 1940, announcement of limitation
12 by the Western Hemisphere of the exportation of aviation
13 gasoline."

14 Senator Ferguson: That was at least a limitation on the
15 exporting to Japan of aviation gasoline?

16 Mr. Grew: That was what, sir?

17 Senator Ferguson: A limitation at least?

18 Mr. Grew: Oh, yes.

19 Senator Ferguson: Was it an absolute prohibition of any
20 gasoline?

21 Mr. Grew: That is right.

22 Senator Ferguson: Aviation gasoline. All right.

23 Now, what was the President's reply to your letter of
24 December 1940?

25 Mr. Grew: The President's reply is published on page

1821

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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359 of my book.

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Senator Ferguson: Well, what would you say was a fair appraisal, without reading the whole letter?

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Mr. Grew: Well, the President's appraisal was that the whole problem was a global problem and that every development in any part of the world would affect other parts of the world.

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In other words, he said: (Reading)

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Senator Ferguson: Did he agree or disagree with your opinion?

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Mr. Grew: He says at the beginning of his letter:

"I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusion."

Senator Ferguson: Now, can you give us the reason why

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 you corresponded directly with the President rather than
3 through Mr. Hull and the State Department?

4 Mr. Grew: I had been in the United States on leave of
5 absence in 1931 and when I saw the President he said, "When
6 you have some thoughts on the situation drop me a line."
7 In other words, this letter was written to him at his invi-
8 tation.

9 Senator Ferguson: You say in 1931 that he suggested
10 that?

11 Mr. Grew: No, 1939.

12 Senator Ferguson: 1939.

13 Mr. Grew: I was here in the summer and autumn of 1939.

14 Senator Ferguson: I misunderstood you.

15 Mr. Grew: 1939.

16 Senator Ferguson: I misunderstood you. In 1939 he sug-
17 gested that and then you wrote him?

18 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: At that time were you of the opinion
20 that Japan would fight or were they bluffing?

21 Mr. Grew: I never thought that Japan was bluffing,
22 Senator.

23 Senator Ferguson: From what you heard and what you saw
24 in Japan you were of the opinion then that they were not
25 bluffing?

1823

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Mr. Grew: I was.

3 Senator Ferguson: That they would fight under certain
4 conditions?

5 Mr. Grew: Under certain circumstances.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you ever notify the State
7 Department or the President as to what those circumstances
8 were that they would fight for or under?

9 Mr. Grew: Senator, my reports to the State Department
10 were continuous and many. I was constantly expressing my
11 views to the Department of State and the Secretary of State.
12 I cannot tell you without an examination of the records
13 whether and when that particular point was covered.

14 Senator Ferguson: But would it be a fair appraisal of
15 your communications to the State Department that you had told
16 them that Japan was not bluffing, that they would fight under
17 certain circumstances and you related from time to time the
18 circumstances?

19 Mr. Grew: I think the record shows that completely,
20 Senator; from my arrival in Japan in 1932 I quoted to you
21 yesterday a statement which I made in a letter to Mr. Stim-
22 son, the Secretary of State at that time, shortly after my
23 arrival in Japan, in which I said the Japanese Army has been
24 built for war and it wants war and I said it would be crimin-
25 ally somnolent for us to close our eyes to any possible
eventualities in the Far East.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 Senator Ferguson: On page 4219 of your testimony before
3 the Army Board, I notice that you give this as part of your
4 answer:

5 "Frankly, I could not answer that question without
6 looking into it, but I am sure that everything I wrote
7 was not published by any means."

8 What did you have in mind by that statement? You better
9 look at the whole answer.

10 The Chairman: The Chair suggest you might also look at
11 the question that you answered in order to get the context.

12 Mr. Grew: I would just like to read the record on that.

13 Senator Ferguson: If the Chairman please, the witness has
14 the whole instrument before him.

15 The Chairman: Yes.

16 Senator Ferguson: There is no desire to get an answer
17 except as to what he had in mind.

18 The Chairman: The Chairman simply wants him to refresh
19 his recollection as to the question that he was answering, so
20 he may have the whole thing in mind.

21 Senator Ferguson: Does the Chair think the witness might
22 need his memory refreshed?

23 The Chairman: That is an academic question. I was merely
24 suggesting that he look at the question that he was asked in
25 order to refresh his recollection.

WLC2

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Mr. Grew: Yes. The question was: "Do the various books
3 to which you made reference in your testimony convey all the
4 information that you conveyed to Washington on the likelihood
5 of war?"

6 And I replied, according to the record: "I could not say
7 that, I do not believe, because I sent a great deal of material
8 during all of that time to the State Department both by telegram
9 and by written dispatch, and it would have been impossible,
10 within the confines of two volumes" -- I was referring to our
11 Foreign Relations -- "to have published all of that material.
12 I think the highlights have been published, but I could not say
13 it has all been published. Frankly, I could not answer that
14 question without looking into it, but I am sure that everything
15 I wrote was not published by any means. It would have been
16 practically impossible to publish the tremendous volume of
17 reports that I sent in during those ten years."

18 Senator Ferguson: Who would determine as to what was
19 to be published in the books?

20 Mr. Grew: I think that would have been determined by
21 the various officials. I cannot tell you, because I had nothing
22 to do with the publishing.

23 Senator Ferguson: You would have no part in it?

24 Mr. Grew: I would have nothing to do with the publication
25 of Foreign Relations.

WLC3

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: I will ask you to refer to Foreign
3 Relations in May of 1939. It is in relation to a telegram
4 to the Department of State containing a message from the
5 Foreign Minister.

6 Mr. Grew: Will you tell me what page that is, Senator?

7 Senator Ferguson: Just a moment.

8 Mr. Grew: May 18, 1939, Volume I?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes. That is the message from the
10 Foreign Minister.

11 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I have that before me.

12 Senator Ferguson: Now, you notice that the message is
13 published in Volume II.

14 Mr. Grew: The first document in Volume II?

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Then, the reply of the Secretary of
18 State to this message is on pages 6 to 8 of that same volume.
19 Will you look at the reply?

20 Mr. Grew: Yes.

21 Senator Ferguson: It says:

22 " * * *this Government is sincerely interested in the
23 suggestion contained in Your Excellency's message, and
24 in giving further consideration to that suggestion would
25 be pleased to have such further information as Your Excel-

WLC
4

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 lency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying
3 and making more definite Your Excellency's concept as to
4 the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating
5 the situation in Europe."

6 Now, did the Prime Minister at that time give you a more
7 definite statement than the one that is stated there in the
8 book?

9 In other words, do you know whether or not the Japanese
10 Government ever gave you the "definite concept" requested in
11 the Secretary of State's reply?

12 Mr. Grew: Well, sir, I do not believe that the Prime
13 Minister gave me any further information on this correspondence
14 at that time.

15 Senator Ferguson: Could I ask counsel to search the files
16 to see whether or not there is any information on that?

17 Mr. Gesell: We will do that, Senator.

18 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall, Mr. Grew, to refresh
19 your memory, that there was a definite statement and that it
20 is not printed in the book?

21 Mr. Grew: To which statement do you refer? The press
22 releases?

23 Senator Ferguson: No, I am referring to the statement
24 that the Prime Minister gave you in May of 1939.

25 Mr. Grew: Yes, as far as I am aware, that is the complete

WLC5

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 statement.

3 Senator Ferguson: Have you access now to the Secretary
4 of State's files?

5 Mr. Grew: Have I what?

6 Senator Ferguson: Access to the Secretary of State's files.

7 Mr. Grew: No, I am out of the Department now, I have no
8 contact with the Department.

9 Senator Ferguson: So, you could not help us to get that?

10 Mr. Grew: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Now, you referred to a green light
12 telegram in your book. Do you recall that?

13 Mr. Grew: That was merely a phrase which I applied to it
14 informally.

15 Senator Ferguson: Will you turn to your book, to where you
16 have that in your book?

17 Mr. Grew: That is published also, I think, in Foreign
18 Relations.

19 Senator Ferguson: I think you said it was one of the most
20 important telegrams that you had sent.

21 Mr. Grew: That was in December, 1940, I think. That was
22 sent in December.

23 Senator Ferguson: Was it December or September, 1940?

24 Mr. Grew: It is September, 1940.

25 Senator Ferguson: Will you look at page 334 of your book?

LWC65

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Mr. Grew: Yes, I have it here.

Senator Ferguson: And that is what you call the green light telegram?

Mr. Grew: It is.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Grew

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2 Senator Ferguson: Now will you see whether or not it
3 is? What else do you say about it there, about it being im-
4 portant?

5 Mr. Grew: In Foreign Relations?

6
7 Senator Ferguson: Will you see whether it is in Foreign
8 Relations, among the white papers?

9 Mr. Grew: It does not appear to be in Foreign Relations.
10 It might possibly be in Peace and War.

11 Senator Ferguson: Peace and War is there before you.
12 Will you look and see whether it is in Peace and War?

13 Mr. Grew: There is a telegram in Peace and War that I
14 sent from the Embassy in Tokyo on September 12, 1940, published
15 on page 569. That was not the precise telegram referred to,
16 however.

17 Senator Ferguson: So it is not in Peace and War or in
18 Foreign Relations.

19 Now getting back to your telegram, will you tell me
20 something about that telegram? What is it? What does your
21 book say about it?

22 Mr. Grew: It is a fairly long comment here.

23 Senator Ferguson: Do you refer to it as one of your
24 most important documents?

25 Mr. Grew: Yes, I do.

Senator Ferguson: What is that language?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: What?

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Senator Ferguson: Read that language about the importance of the instrument.

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Mr. Grew: In the last part of that telegram I said:

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"If, by a firm policy, we can maintain conditions in the Pacific in statu quo until such time as Britain may be successful in the European war, Japan will be confronted with a situation which will render it impossible for the present outlook of opportunism to remain dominant. After that time it might be feasible to set about a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific to the permanent benefit both of the United States and of Japan -- on a just basis. Until the time when a thorough going regeneration of outlook takes place in Japan, only a show of force, coupled with the intention to utilize it if necessary, can effectively conduce to the attainment of such an outcome, as well as to the future security of the United States.

"In view therefore of actual conditions here in Japan, and the present outlook, it is my belief that the time has arrived when a continuance of the use of patience and restraint by the United States may and probably will tend to render relations between the United States and Japan increasingly uncertain. I

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 cherish the hope that, if the Japanese Government and
3 people can be brought to believe that they are overplaying
4 their hand, eventually the pendulum will swing the other
5 way, at which time it will be possible to reconstruct
6 good relations between our country and Japan. To me
7 the alternative appears hopeless."

8 Senator Ferguson: I will read from page 334 what you
9 said, if you will just check it:

10 "Another important event, from my point of view,
11 was the sending to Washington in September of what I
12 can only call my 'green light' telegram, perhaps the
13 most significant message sent to Washington in all the
14 eight years of my mission to Japan."

15 Now will you tell us why you describe it in that way?

16 Mr. Grew: Because, Senator, I felt that the time had come
17 to apply economic measures against Japan, and that it precisely
18 what was done.

(7) 19 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for it not being
20 in Foreign Relations, if it is so important?

21 Mr. Grew: Senator, frankly, I had nothing whatsoever to
22 do with the preparation of Foreign Relations. I was not in
23 a position at that time to have anything to do with it, so I
24 do not know.

25 Senator Ferguson: Does the committee have a copy of your

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 diary?

3 Mr. Grew: No, sir, the diary was a purely personal and
4 private document. The important parts of my diary are published
5 in my book, what I call the highlights.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand, Mr. Grew, the committee
7 does not have access -- I am talking about counsel for the
8 committee -- does not have access to your diary to determine
9 what might be important to this committee?

10 Mr. Grew: Senator, I would like to have the record
11 straight on this, if you will permit me.

12 Senator Ferguson: I wish you would make the record
13 straight.

14 Mr. Grew: I will read a copy of my letter to Mr. Mitchell,
15 the General Counsel.

16 Senator Ferguson: You may read it.

17 Mr. Grew: This is dated November 12, 1945.

18 "My dear Mr. Mitchell:

19 "I have received your letter of November 8 enclosing
20 a copy of a letter of November 6 from Senator Brewster,
21 as well as a copy of your reply to the Senator. Mr.
22 Brewster requested you in his letter to secure for him a
23 copy of the 13 volumes of my diary from which my book
24 'Ten Years in Japan' was prepared. Your inquiry of the
25 State Department brought the answer that there is nothing

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 of the kind in its possession.

3 "You may be sure that I shall do everything in my
4 power to facilitate, support and further the nationally
5 important work of the Joint Committee and to be helpful
6 in every way to Senator Brewster and the other members
7 of the Committee. I strongly believe that all the facts
8 bearing upon the Pearl Harbor attack should be brought
9 out and laid before the American people, and that no
10 pertinent material should be concealed. You yourself
11 can depend equally on my full cooperation in eliciting
12 these facts.

13 "The few official documents contained in my book
14 'Ten Years in Japan', which was published in 1944, were
15 taken not from the diary but from two official publica-
16 tions already issued in 1943 by our Government: 'Peace
17 and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941' and
18 'Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941'
19 in two volumes. All official documents that passed
20 between the Department of State and the Embassy in
21 Tokyo covering the period of my ambassadorship to Japan,
22 both incoming and outgoing, are on file in the State
23 Department and, under the President's directive as
24 published, any and all of these documents pertinent to
25 the investigation are presumably available to the Joint

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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"As to the diary itself, this is in no respect an official document. It is a private work, headed 'Daily Personal Notes', containing my own personal records and prepared for my own guidance in analyzing and assessing day to day developments. The diary is in the nature of a private sketch book in which the main lines of my eventual official reports to the Secretary of State were traced, and it contains many inaccurate and sometimes misleading statements, hurriedly jotted down from day to day, which had to be ironed out and, so far as possible, corrected or confirmed before taking shape in my official reports. Only the official reports should therefore govern. Private matters of interest only to my family and myself are, as in any diary, contained in it, and it includes furthermore frank comments on individuals, comments which can only be regarded as of a strictly personal and private character and which I am in honor bound not to reveal.

"It is my belief that all of the material in my diary which would be helpful to the investigation of the Joint Committee has been published in my book 'Ten Years in Japan'. To make assurance doubly sure, however, I have carefully examined these daily personal notes

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 covering the months immediately preceding the attack
2 on Pearl Harbor, and I have found no comment or material,
3 other than that already published, which would, in my
4 opinion, be helpful to any phase of the Committee's
5 investigation. It is my belief that all of the main
6 facts on this subject, so far as my own observations
7 and reports from Tokyo are concerned, have been published
8 in the four volumes mentioned above."

9
10 Senator Ferguson: Now will you repeat what those four
11 volumes are?

12 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. I just want to see whether there
13 is something else in this letter that would be pertinent.

14 Senator Ferguson: I would ask you then to read the last
15 of your letter.

16 Mr. Grew: Just the last paragraph:

17 "If there is any further phase of this subject
18 which Senator Brewster or any other member of the Joint
19 Committee would like to explore and will let me know,
20 I will with pleasure cooperate to the best of my ability."

21 Those four volumes are:

- 22 1. Peace and War
- 23 2. United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, published in
24 1943.
- 25 3. Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941,

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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in two volumes, also published in 1943.

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4. My book entitled "Ten Years in Japan".

4

5

Senator Ferguson: Of course the last, your book Ten Years in Japan is not an official publication.

6

Mr. Grew: No, sir, it is not an official publication.

7

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Senator Ferguson: Now do I understand that you submitted your diary to the State Department to determine what you might put in this book Ten Years in Japan?

10

Mr. Grew: That is always done, Senator, especially in wartime. That, to my recollection, is done in every case.

11

12

Senator Ferguson: That was not my question. My question was: Did you submit it to the State Department?

13

14

Mr. Grew: I submitted the manuscript of my book.

15

Senator Ferguson: Did they take anything out?

16

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Mr. Grew: I do not think they made any actual demand, but they suggested that certain passages might be eliminated; some of them because they could have caused embarrassment or actual danger to individuals sometimes, where they might have been misinterpreted by the Foreign Governments, and points of that kind.

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Frankly, after receiving the suggestions of the Publications Committee in the Department of State I found myself in entire accord with it. There is nothing that I reluctantly withdrew.

JLC

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conversation with them
3 about the green light telegram of September, 1940?

4 Mr. Grew: I do not recollect any precise conversation
5 on that subject.

6 Senator Ferguson: I might ask counsel. Has counsel ever
7 seen that telegram? Do we have a copy of it?

8 Mr. Mitchell: What telegram do you refer to?

9 Senator Ferguson: The telegram of September, 1940. I
10 have been referring to it for quite a while.

11 Mr. Mitchell: We have never seen it.

12 Senator Ferguson: Will counsel get us a copy from the
13 State Department file?

14 Mr. Mitchell: We will try.

15 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, what is a fair appraisal of
16 that telegram of September, 1940? What were you trying to do,
17 and why did you try to do it?

18 Mr. Grew: I think the passage that I read to ers
19 the appraisal of the telegram.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, why did you come to write it?
21 Why did you send it to the State Department?

22 Mr. Grew: Because I was continually sending to the State
23 Department my views about the situation and, in many cases,
24 recommendations, steps which I thought ought to be taken. That
25 is the duty of any ambassador abroad.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Do you think your diary may have helped
3 counsel to obtain from the files, which I understand are very
4 voluminous, some of the important documents? For instance,
5 this document?

6 Mr. Grew: I do not think so, Senator. I think, as I say,
7 the highlights of the correspondence appear in my diary and
8 then the running comment from day to day of what I was thinking
9 at the time. I think the diary would not be an appropriate
10 document in this investigation, and I would like to explain
11 why, if I may.

12 Senator Ferguson: I wish you would.

13 Mr. Grew: You will find in my book, on page 348, under
14 date of November 1, 1940, I made the following entry in my
15 diary:

16 "In the light of fast-moving developments I scarcely
17 dare read back in the diary nowadays because of its many
18 inconsistencies which show it up for the patchwork sort
19 of day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our
20 thoughts and our information, some of it reliable and
21 some of it wholly unreliable, at any given moment -- the
22 moment of writing. It shows how often we are groping
23 and fumbling in the dark. Less and less are we able to
24 know what is going on behind the scenes, simply because
25 many of our reliable contacts are no longer available and

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand often
3 doesn't know what the left hand is doing."

4 Senator Ferguson: Of course, when you were referring
5 there to "we", you were talking about the Embassy in Tokyo?

6 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I was.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did you send that information to the
8 State Department, the substance of it?

9 Mr. Grew: Oh, certainly. I reported to the State Depart-
10 ment that our Japanese contacts, sources of information were
11 falling away simply because they were being very carefully
12 watched by the secret police and most of them did not dare
13 come to the Embassy any more, they did not dare meet me outside,
14 and even when I went to the Tokyo Club, which was sort of a
15 neutral meeting ground for Japanese and foreigners, I found
16 the Japanese I knew would quietly slip away into other rooms
17 or corners, they just did not want to be seen talking to me,
18 they did not dare. Therefore, it was extremely difficult,
19 under those circumstances, for us to keep in touch with every-
20 thing that was going on there.

21 Senator Ferguson: Of course, that brought you to the con-
22 clusion that things were getting serious between the two countries,
23 that matters were growing worse, and much worse, between the two
24 countries?

25 Mr. Grew: Well, "worse" to the extent that the totalitarian

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 regime was working in full force and the secret police was
3 controlling all Japanese individuals.

did

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, did I understand that they had a
5 totalitarian government in Japan as early as you are talking
6 about? I understood you yesterday to say you considered it
7 came in when Tojo came in.

8 Mr. Grew: I said when Tojo came in, it was a complete
9 military dictatorship, and everything was leading in that direc-
10 tion for a long time, but up to that point there were pressure
11 groups in Japan who had to be listened to, and were listened to,
12 and I would not say that it was completely a totalitarian regime
13 up to that moment.

14 Senator Ferguson: But they had to have the secret police
15 at that time?

16 Mr. Grew: They always had the secret police. It was just
17 a question to what extent they should intensify it. They were
18 functioning.

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LARRY FWS

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1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: In 1941, in the spring, were you getting
3 any information from the British as to the military activities
4 of the Japanese?

5 Mr. Grew: I cannot state any definite information,
6 Senator, but, of course, I came in close with my various diplo-
7 matic colleagues, and in many cases we exchanged information.
8 That is one of the ways we were able to keep in touch. So
9 I have no doubt that during the period you mention my British
10 colleague occasionally passed on to me information in his posses-
11 sion as I did to him.

12 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall any information with
13 relation to the Japanese being nearer Singapore, that you
14 obtained from the British?

15 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I do not recall any precise informa-
16 tion at this time.

17 Senator Ferguson: You do not recall any specific informa-
18 tion that you may have received on the Japanese military
19 movements at or near, toward, Singapore?

20 Mr. Grew: No, I do not recall any precise information on
21 that subject.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever get any information in
23 relation to any landings of troops on the Kra Peninsula?

24 Mr. Grew: Japanese troops?

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes; or on the isthmus.

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1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Mr. Grew: You mean after they had been landed?

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes, or of their landing. I am talking
4 about prior to December 7.

5 Mr. Grew: Well, no, sir. It would be utterly impossible
6 for any foreigner in Japan to acquire information of something
7 that the Japanese military were going to do. We might guess
8 that they were going to do it, but certainly not know until it
9 had been done. All those steps were shrouded in military
10 secrecy.

11 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand then that you discounted
12 anything that came in relation to the Jap movements because you
13 believed that no such information could get out of the war
14 authorities, military or naval authorities?

15 Mr. Grew: Very little such information did come out.
16 Of course, when information did reach me I sifted it and assessed
17 it on the basis of my other knowledge, and in that light I was
18 able to decide whether it was authentic or not.

19 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you only send only what you
20 believed to be authentic to the State Department?

21 Mr. Grew: I was in the habit of reporting a great deal to
22 the State Department. Sometimes only rumors, as in the case of
23 that telegram of January 27.

24 Senator Ferguson: That is the Peruvian --

25 Mr. Grew: The rumor that in case of trouble they would

WLC3

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson ¹⁶⁴⁷

1 attack Pearl Harbor. I sent many telegrams and dispatches of
2 that kind. In many cases it was utterly impossible to confirm
3 those rumors.

4 Senator Ferguson: By the way, did you ever get a reply to
5 that Peruvian message?

6 Mr. Grew: I did not.

7 Senator Ferguson: That was nothing unusual, that you did
8 not get a reply?

9 Mr. Grew: That was not unusual.

10 Senator Ferguson: You don't recall though any information
11 in the spring of 1941 from the British about landings or to-be-
12 landings on the Kra Peninsula or Kra Isthmus?

13 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I do not recall any specific information
14 in that respect.

15 Senator Ferguson: Well, were there rumors of troop move-
16 ments at that time?

17 Mr. Grew: Well, we knew from a variety of sources that
18 the Japanese had moved down, were moving out all through that
19 area there, and, frankly, we were ready for anything, but if
20 the Japanese were going to land in a certain place at a certain
21 time we in all probability would not and could not know.

22 Senator Ferguson: That brings me now to the note of
23 August 17. Are you familiar with that note?

24 Mr. Grew: Note from whom, sir?

25 Senator Ferguson: From the United States to Japan. It is

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 the parallel action. It is the note of August 17.

3 Mr. Grew: August 17.

4 Mr. Gesell: 1941.

5 Senator Ferguson: 1941.

6 Mr. Gesell: Page 556.

7 Mr. Grew: All of these papers, Senator, were as a rule
8 cabled over to me; the records of conversations and letters.

9 Senator Ferguson: Are you familiar with the particular docu-
10 ment?

11 Mr. Grew: I shall have to read it first.

12 Senator Ferguson: Would you read it so that you become
13 familiar with it?

14 Mr. Grew: (perusing paper.) Yes, I recall that document
15 perfectly.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you refer to your message
17 of August 18 -- no. I have in mind the conversation you had
18 with Toyda on August 18.

19 Mr. Grew: Yes.

20 Senator Ferguson: 1941.

21 Mr. Gesell: Page 560.

22 Mr. Grew: I have it.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I am fully familiar with that note; that record of conversations with the Foreign Ministers.

Senator Ferguson: Will you check and see whether or not it is in the white papers?

Mr. Grew: It is in Foreign Relations.

Senator Ferguson: But not in the white paper?

Mr. Grew: What do you call the white paper?

Senator Ferguson: The Peace and War.

Mr. Grew: That was an incomplete publication but I will see.

It does not appear to be in the volume Peace and War.

Senator Ferguson: I want to show you an article in the New York Times on August 13, Mr. Grew.

Will counsel pass him the article?

(The article was passed to the witness.)

The Chairman: What year is that?

Mr. Murphy: 1941.

The Chairman: 1941.

Mr. Grew: Yes, Senator, I have seen it.

Senator Ferguson: Are you familiar with that article?

Mr. Grew: Well, I have heard about it recently. I haven't read the whole article, no, but I know the pith of it.

Senator Ferguson: You know the what?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: I know the principal point in it.

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Senator Ferguson: Yes.

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Mr. Grew: The report that the British Ambassador and I made representations to the Japanese Foreign Minister --

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Senator Ferguson: Will you talk into the microphone, please.

8

Mr. Grew: Pardon me.

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I believe the principal point in it is a report that the British Ambassador and I had made representations to the Japanese Foreign Minister.

11

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Senator Ferguson: Along what line?

13

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Mr. Grew: It appears to be an indication that any action by Japan which would threaten the independence of Thailand would be of concern both to the American and British Governments.

15

16

Senator Ferguson: Who is the by-line; under what name?

17

Mr. Grew: It is under the by-line of Otto D. Tolischus.

18

Senator Ferguson: Do you know him?

19

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

20

21

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conversations with him from which that could be written?

22

Mr. Grew: I often had conversations with him.

23

Senator Ferguson: From which that could be written?

24

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Mr. Grew: No, sir. I would like to point out that in this article it is stated, "It was understood in political

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 circles here today." It was understood. In other words that
2 is not a --

3
4 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you have any conversation
5 with him from which that could be written?

6 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I did not.

7 Senator Ferguson: Would you say then that that was not
8 a true statement?

9 Mr. Grew: I can refer to my records. I made a point of
10 keeping a record of my calls at the Foreign Office in Japan.
11 My calls on the Foreign Minister in August were, August 1,
12 August 15, 18, and 22. And I have the subjects discussed at
13 that time -- just a moment.

14 No, sir, I find conferences with the Foreign Minister
15 only on August 15, 18 and 22. Of course, a good many talks
16 were going on also between members of my staff and subordinate
17 officers in the Japanese Foreign Office. I only saw the
18 Foreign Minister on most important matters.

19 Senator Ferguson: What am I to understand, that that is
20 a true statement or not a true statement, that you did have
21 such a talk with the Foreign Minister or you did not?

22 Mr. Grew: In the light of my own records, I did not.

23 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever taken up the question
24 involved in that article with Japan?

25 Mr. Grew: I have no recollection of having done so.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever had any information from
3 the State Department that that was our understanding?

4 Mr. Grew: That that was taken up by the State Department?

5 Senator Ferguson: No, that that was where they stood on
6 the proposition, that they stood as stated in the article?

7 Mr. Grew: That is a matter on which I would have to
8 consult the records.

9 Senator Ferguson: Will you consult the records so that
10 you can give us information on that?

11 Mr. Grew: I will. As to whether I was ever informed
12 by the State Department?

13 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

14 Mr. Grew: That they took this position?

15 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

16 Mr. Grew: As to the independence of Thailand?

17 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

18 As I understand it, you don't recall ever taking it up
19 with the Japanese Government.

20 Now, going back to the note of the 17th of August, 1941,
21 do you know when that first came to your attention?

22 Mr. Grew: I couldn't tell you the date on which it came
23 to my attention, but, as I say, most of these documents and
24 records of conversations were telegrams to me. I am not sure
25 that they were in every case, but generally they were. I

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 couldn't answer that question without examining the files of
3 the Department of State and see whether they did actually send
4 that information to me.

(3) 5 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you ever take that note up
6 with the Japanese Government? You have a memorandum, you say,
7 that you talked to them on the 18th. What did you talk about
8 on the 18th?

9 Mr. Grew: I have the record here, sir.

10 I saw the Foreign Minister August 15:

11 "I told the Minister that I was supporting the
12 representations made by the Secretary of State to the
13 Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 13, with
14 regard to recent cases of interference with American
15 rights and interest in Japan and in Japanese occupied
16 areas in China and I thereupon read to the Minister
17 and left with him a copy of the Department's telegram
18 with the exception of paragraph numbered three. I
19 then discussed this situation at length, pointing
20 out the fact that these cumulative interferences with
21 American citizens and American interests were assuming
22 a serious aspect both in Japan and in Japanese occupied
23 areas in China and emphasizing the radical discrepancy
24 between this treatment of American officials and citizens
25 of their activities by the Japanese and our treatment

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 of Japanese officials and subjects and their activities
2 in the United States. I expressed the belief that relief
3 from these interferences could be obtained only by the
4 communication by the Japanese Government to Japanese
5 authorities and Japanese sponsored authorities of
6 categorical instructions to desist from the interferences
7 and obstructions under complaint."

8 Senator Ferguson: What is the date?

9 Mr. Grew: That was on August 15.

10 Senator Ferguson: August 18, just glance at that. Did
11 it relate to the note of August 17?

12 Mr. Grew: On August 18 the Minister asked me to come to
13 see him and it was a very long conference which lasted two
14 hours and a half and the whole question of Japanese relations
15 was therein discussed.

16 Senator Ferguson: Did you discuss the note of the 17th?

17 Mr. Grew: Nothing was said about Thailand in that
18 conversation.

19 Senator Ferguson: No. Was anything said about the note
20 of the 17th where the British and the United States Governments
21 were to take parallel action?

22 Mr. Grew: No, sir, nothing whatsoever was said about that.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did you know about that at the time,
24 on the 18th?
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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: Did I -- I don't quite understand -- did I know that that action --

Senator Ferguson: That Britain and the United States had agreed, or at least there were promises, that we were to take certain parallel action.

Mr. Grew: I would have to consult the record.

Senator Ferguson: Will you read the last paragraph on page 556. It may refresh your memory as to what I am talking about.

Mr. Grew: Of Foreign Relations?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Grew: 556?

Senator Ferguson: 556.

Mr. Grew: That was the statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador.

"Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American Nationals

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 and toward insuring the safety and security of the
3 United States."

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, my question is did you take that
5 matter up with anyone in Japan?

6 Mr. Grew: I do not think I did so. I have no record
7 of having done so but if I did so I certainly would have re-
8 ported that step to the Department of State and they would have
9 it on file. I do not recollect having done so.

10 The Chairman: It is now 12:00 o'clock. Before recessing
11 the Chair would like, if the committee is willing, inasmuch
12 as paragraphs have been read from Mr. Grew's letter to the
13 President, of December 14, and the President's reply of January
14 21, the Chair will ask that the full text of both those letters
15 be printed in the transcript of the record at this point.

16 (The letters referred to are as follows:)

17 Dear Frank:

18 ... About Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be
19 increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown some
20 day, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to
21 our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

22 The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this
23 angle, to be:

24 (1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European
25 war;

Witness Grew

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(2) Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat;

(3) To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.

Those are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a

Witness Grew

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2 forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

3 History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always
4 swinging between extremist and moderate policies, but as things
5 stand today we believe that the pendulum is more likely to
6 swing still further toward extremes than to reverse its direction.
7 Konoye, and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but
8 under present circumstances no Japanese leader or group of
9 leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to
10 survive.

11 Our own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination
12 in meeting every Japanese step with some step of our own has
13 been eminently wise, and that policy has sunk deep into
14 Japanese consciousness. But while important elements among
15 the Japanese people deplore the course which their leaders are
16 taking, those elements are nevertheless inarticulate and power-
17 less and are likely to remain so. Meanwhile the Germans here
18 are working overtime to push Japan into war with us. I have
19 told Matsuoka point-blank that his country is heading for
20 disaster. He has at least seen that his efforts to intimidate
21 us have fallen flat and have had an effect precisely the reverse
22 of that intended.

23 It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we
24 are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and
25 baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including

AL-11

Witness Grew

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2 the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually
3 to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

4 A progressively firm policy on our part will entail
5 inevitable risks -- especially risks of sudden uncalculated
6 strokes, such as the sinking of the Panay, which might inflame
7 the American people -- but in my opinion those risks are less
8 in degree than the far greater future dangers which we would
9 face if we were to follow a policy of laissez faire.

10 In other words, the risks of not taking positive measures
11 to maintain our future security are likely to be much greater
12 than the risks of taking positive measures as the southward
13 advance proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great majority
14 of the American people are in a mood for vigorous action. The
15 principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must
16 call a halt to the Japanese program, but when.

17 It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that
18 if we take measures "short of war" with no real intention to
19 carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary,
20 such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese,
21 who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive,
22 on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight
23 if called upon to do so will our preliminary measures stand
24 some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity
25 for war -- the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

Witness Grew

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If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting of Japan's present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of normal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem.

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "new structure" is in an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

... You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and I am profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived of your clear vision, determination, and splendid courage in piloting the old ship of state.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

The White House
Washington
January 21, 1941

Dear Joe:

I have given careful consideration to your letter of December 14.

First, I want to say how helpful it is to have your over-all estimates and reflections -- based as they are upon a rare combination of firsthand observation, long experience with our Japanese relations, and masterly judgment. I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions.

I also want you to know how much I appreciate your kind words of congratulation on my re-election and your expression of confidence in my conduct of our foreign affairs.

As to your very natural request for an indication of my views as to certain aspects of our future attitude toward developments in the Far East, I believe that the fundamental proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. We are engaged in the task of defending our way of life and our vital national interests wherever they are seriously endangered. Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front and takes advantage

Witness Grew

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2 of every opportunity to contribute to our total security.

3 You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem
4 of our attitude toward Japan the question whether our getting
5 into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in
6 Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory
7 and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must
8 consider whether, if Japan should gain possession of the region
9 of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the
10 chances of England's winning in her struggle with Germany
11 would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British
12 in those isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves
13 not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but
14 also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British
15 Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for
16 their sustenance and to bring into operation against their
17 enemies economic, military, and naval pressures on a world-wide
18 scale. They live by importing goods from all parts of the
19 world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources.
20 They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out
21 locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military,
22 and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance
23 of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply to their
24 enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the
25 full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve

1 Witness Grew

2 center of the Empire.

3 The British need assistance along the lines of our
4 generally established policies at many points, assistance
5 which in the case of the Far East is certainly well within
6 the realm of "possibility" so far as the capacity of the
7 United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in
8 the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving
9 them assistance toward ensuring our own security must envisage
10 both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent
11 a closing of channels of communication to and from various
12 parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply
13 will not be denied to the British and be added to the assets
14 of the other side.

15 You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the
16 questions whether and when Britain is likely to win the
17 European war. As I have indicated above, the conflict is
18 world-wide, not merely a European war. I firmly believe, as
19 I have recently declared publicly, that the British, with
20 our help, will be victorious in this conflict. The conflict
21 may well be long and we must bear in mind that when England
22 is victorious she may not have left the strength that would
23 be needed to bring about a rearrangement of such territorial
24 changes in the western and southern Pacific as might occur
25 during the course of the conflict if Japan is not kept within

1 Witness Grew
2 bounds. I judge from the remarks which appear at the bottom
3 of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of your letter that you,
4 too, attach due importance to this aspect of the problem.
5 I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the
6 problems which we face are so vast and so interrelated that
7 any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms
8 of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must
9 emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we cannot
10 lay down hard-and-fast plans. As each new development occurs
11 we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide
12 when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make
13 use of our resources.

14 With warmest regards,

15 As ever

16 Franklin D. Roosevelt

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18 The Chairman: The committee will stand in recess until
19 2:00 o'clock.

20 (Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken
21 until 2:00 o'clock of the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW -- resumed

Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, may I interpose a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permission? I think I can clear up one question that came up during his examination.

Senator Ferguson: There were quite a number.

Mr. Gesell: This may be helpful. The question came up with green light dispatch. We made an inquiry over the noon recess and find that an extract and paraphrase of that green light dispatch will be found printed as Document 182 at page 569 of Peace and War, and inasmuch as that is an extract, we have obtained from the State Department the entire text of the dispatch, and we wish to offer that in evidence, in order that the record will be complete. This would be Exhibit 26.

Senator Ferguson: Could you explain why this instrument was not among those delivered to us before by the State Department, if it was Mr. Grew's most important instrument?

Mr. Gesell: Our inquiry into State Department documents has been confined to the year 1941.

Senator Ferguson: Do I understand then that the counsel had made no request for anything back of 1941?

Mr. Gesell: We have not requested any of Mr. Grew's dispatches back of 1941, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Had the committee requested any State

1 Department records back of 1941?

2 Mr. Gesell: I think there may have been a few instances
3 where we have gone behind 1941, but very few.

4 Senator Ferguson: Will counsel state for the record the
5 reason for that limitation?

6 Mr. Gesell: Senator, the effort was to stay around the
7 period which we thought was of major concern to the committee,
8 the events leading up to Pearl Harbor.

9 The Chairman: In view of the fact that extracts have been
10 referred to and Mr. Grew has been examined about it, don't you
11 think, counsel, that the instrument itself ought to go into the
12 transcript of the hearing instead of being an exhibit?

13 Mr. Gesell: I think that would be a good idea, Senator.

14 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Senator, I would like to have it
15 read at this time.

16 The Chairman: It may be read at this time, but I think
17 it ought to go into the transcript of the hearing and not simply
18 filed as an exhibit. With the consent of the committee, that
19 will be the order.

20 Senator Ferguson: Would counsel read it into the record
21 so Mr. Grew will be familiar with it? I have not had time to
22 read it.

23 Mr. Gesell: Perhaps, Mr. Grew could read it.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right. Let Mr. Grew read it.

25 Mr. Grew: I have a copy of it here.

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: You have a copy?

3 Mr. Grew: Yes.

4 Senator Ferguson: All right. Read it.

5 The Chairman: You may read it, Mr. Grew, if you wish.

6 Mr. Grew: Read the whole thing?

7 The Chairman: Read the whole document.

8 Mr. Grew: All right.

9 This is a telegram to the Secretary of State.

10 "827 September 7, 9 p.m.

11 "Strictly Confidential."

12 Mr. Keefe: What is the date of that again, please?

13 Mr. Grew: September 12, 1940.

14 Senator Ferguson: Does your book give the date of it, Mr.
15 Grew?

16 Mr. Grew: Does what, sir?

17 Senator Ferguson: Does your book state the date?

18 Mr. Grew: No. I used the substance of the telegram
19 in the comment in my diary on October 1, but it was only
20 the substance, it was not the text.

21 Senator Ferguson: In your book, it is under date of October
22 1, 1940?

23 Mr. Grew: That is right, yes, sir. The telegram was
24 sent on September 12.

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 "One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele" --

3 Senator Ferguson: Just one moment, Mr. Grew, if I might
4 interrupt.

5 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: There would not be any way of telling
7 that the instrument that you speak about on page 334 was the
8 one of September 12, 1940?

9 Mr. Grew: That is in my book?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I mean without your information.

11 Mr. Grew: No, you are quite right. I used that merely
12 as comment in my diary. I considered in September was one of
13 the most momentous periods in Japanese history and in American-
14 Japanese relations. I discussed the general situation and then
15 I referred to the material used in that telegram, although it
16 was not the telegram itself.

17 Senator Ferguson: Thank you.

18 Mr. Grew: Shall I proceed to read?

19 Senator Ferguson: I wish you would.

20 The Chairman: Yes.

21 Mr. Grew: "One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele
22 concerning (?) in Japan conveyed in Peiping's 300,
23 August 31, 3 p.m., recently received here by mail, have
24 had my careful attention. In general terms I believe
25 that Mr. Steele's observations are well founded and

Witness Grew

1 sound, a belief which applies equally to the important
2 considerations advanced in the final two paragraphs of the
3 summary of Mr. Steele's statement."

4 I think, in order to make this perfectly clear, that
5 telegram would probably be helpful to the committee and could
6 be produced undoubtedly, Mr. General Counsel.

7 Senator Ferguson: I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel
8 get a copy of it.

9 The Chairman: Is that the telegram from Mr. Steele?

10 Mr. Grew: No, sir, that is a telegram from our then location
11 in Peiping, No. 300, August 31, 3 p.m. That could be found in
12 the files and could be produced.

13 The Chairman: The counsel will produce it for the record.

14 Who was Mr. Steele, if I might inquire?

15 Mr. Grew: Mr. Steele was a prominent correspondent of the
16 Far East. He was on one of the Chicago papers. I am not quite
17 sure at the present time which -- I think the Chicago Daily
18 News, but I am not quite sure. He had a high reputation in the
19 Far East.

20 The Chairman: All right, go ahead.

21 Mr. Grew: "His thesis that 'firmness is the soundest and
22 safest American naval policy' and that 'the risks involved
23 are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States'
24 is however of such far-reaching gravity as to deserve care-
25 fully studied analysis and comment. In presenting the

1 Witness Grew

2 present trend of my thoughts on this general subject I have
3 constantly in mind the fact that the shaping of our policy
4 vis a vis Japan must depend upon the broader viewpoint
5 of the administration in Washington and upon many factors
6 which may not be apparent to this Embassy.

7 "Two. The situation and circumstances which led
8 to the series of exploratory conversations with the former
9 Foreign Minister Arita (my 400, June 3, noon) and to the
10 recommendations for considering steps leading toward the
11 negotiation of a new treaty of commerce with Japan (my 562,
12 July 11, 9 p.m.) have now obviously passed. I earnestly
13 hope that the time will come when I shall feel justified
14 in renewing those recommendations, but with the fall of
15 the Yonai cabinet and the radically altered policy and
16 outlook of the present set up in Japan, further initiative
17 on our part in proposing conciliatory measures at the
18 present time would appear to be futile and unwise.

19 "Three. Whatever may be the intentions of the present
20 Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that the army
21 and other elements in the country see in the present
22 world situation a 'golden opportunity' to carry into
23 effect their dreams of expansion; the German victories
24 have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently
25 they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great

1 Witness Grew

(end)

2 Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (*)
3 in a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate
4 Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is
5 still acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical
6 strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of
7 far flung control in the Far East; they have discounted
8 effective opposition on the part of the United States
9 although carefully watching our attitude. The ability
10 of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control
11 those elements has been and is doubtful.

12 "Four. Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the
13 outburst of exhilaration which greeted the new Government
14 on its inception. The Japanese Government, the army and
15 navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may
16 not defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I
17 have constantly emphasized to my Japanese contacts in the
18 plainest language and now to add to that dawning realiza-
19 tion, they see the United States and Great Britain steadily
20 drawing closer together in measures of mutual defense
21 with the American acquisition of naval bases in British
22 possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the
23 British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They
24 hear reports of our haste to build a two-ocean navy and
25 of our considering the strengthening of our naval bases

1 Witness Grew

2 in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of
3 Singapore. These developments and rumors are having
4 their logical effect on Japanese consciousness. On the
5 one hand they tend to emphasize the potential danger
6 which Japan faces from eventual positive action by the
7 United States and Great Britain acting together (the
8 danger of combined Anglo-American measures has long
9 been appreciated in Japan as evidenced by efforts to
10 avoid irritating the United States and Great Britain
11 simultaneously) or by the United States alone. On the
12 other hand they furnish cogent arguments for those
13 elements in Japan who seek economic and political
14 security by obtaining markets and source of raw materials
15 wholly within the control of Japan. As for Germany,
16 the Japanese are beginning to question whether even a
17 victorious Germany would not provide a new hazard to
18 their expansionist program both in China and in the
19 southward advance. Meanwhile the future position and
20 attitude of Soviet Russia is always an uncertain factor
21 in their calculations. These various considerations are
22 beginning to give them concern.

23 (Signed) "Grew."

24 The asterisk appearing hereinabove indicates apparent
25 omission.

Witness Grew

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2 A telegram received from Tokyo dated September 12, 1940,
3 received 2:15 p.m., to Secretary of State, Washington.

4 "828, September 12, 10 p.m.

5 "High pressure diplomacy, especially in the Nether-
6 lands East Indies, will continue, but the fact that the
7 Japanese Government was able even temporarily to restrain
8 the military forces from their plans for a headlong in-
9 vasion of Indo-China indicates a degree of caution which
10 I do not doubt was at least partially influenced by the
11 attitude of the United States. What Mr. Steele describes
12 as the 'nibbling policy' appears likely to continue until
13 the world situation, and especially the attitude of the
14 United States, becomes clearer.

15 "Five. In previous communications I have expressed
16 the opinion that sanctions by the United States would
17 set Japanese-American relations on a downward curve. It
18 is true that our own newly instituted program of national
19 preparedness now justifies measures which need not fall
20 within the realm of outright sanctions. On the other
21 hand we must envisage the probability that drastic
22 embargoes on the export of such important products as
23 petroleum, of which the United States is known to possess
24 a superabundance, would be interpreted by the Japanese
25 Government and people as actually (?) sanctions which

Witness Grew

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2 might and probably would lead to some form of retaliation.
3 The risks which Mr. Steele sees as 'much less
4 than is commonly supposed in the United States' will
5 depend less upon the careful calculations of the
6 Japanese Government than upon the uncalculating 'do
7 or die' temper of the army and navy in case they should
8 attribute to the United States the responsibility for
9 the failure of their expansionist plans. Such
10 retaliation might take the form of counter measures
11 by the Government but there would be even greater likeli-
12 hood of some sudden stroke by the army or navy without
13 the Government's prior knowledge or authorization.
14 These risks constitute an imponderable factor which
15 cannot at any given moment be weighed with assurance.
16 It would be short, however, to deny their existence or
17 to proceed with the formulation of policy and the
18 adoption of measures without giving these potential
19 risks full consideration and determining the wisdom
20 of squarely facing these risks.

21 "Six. In the ensuing observations I am carefully
22 considering both of the fundamental purposes of my
23 mission, namely the protection and advancement of
24 American interests and the maintenance of good relations
25 between the United States and Japan. When these two

1 Witness Grew

2 desiderata conflict, the preponderant emphasis to
3 be placed on the one or the other is a matter of high
4 policy which does not lie within my competency. My
5 object is merely to place before the administration
6 in Washington the outstanding factors in the situation
7 as we see them from the angle of this Embassy. Having
8 carefully set forth the inevitable hazards involved in
9 a strong policy I now respectfully turn to the hazards
10 involved in a laissez faire policy.

11 "Seven. In discussing the specific question of
12 American-Japanese relations it is impossible to view
13 that problem in its proper perspective without considering
14 it as part and parcel of the world problem which, briefly,
15 presents the following aspects; (A) The United States
16 and Great Britain are the leaders of a great group of
17 English speaking nations around the world standing for
18 a 'way of life' which is being appallingly threatened
19 today by a group of Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia and
20 Japan whose avowed purpose is to impose by force of
21 arms their will upon conquered peoples. In attempting
22 to deal with such powers the uses of diplomacy are
23 in general bankrupt."

24 A telegram received from Tokyo dated September 12, 1940,
25 received 7:12 p.m., to Secretary of State, Washington.

Witness Grew

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been deterred from taking greater liberties with American interests only out of respect for our potential power; it is equally (*) that she has trampled upon our rights to a degree in precise ratio to the strength of her conviction that the American people would not permit that power to be used. Once conviction is shaken it is possible that the uses of diplomacy may again become accepted.

"(d) If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunist philosophy to maintain the upper hand. At a moment it might then be possible to undertake a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem on a fair, frank, and equitable basis to the lasting benefit of both the United States and of Japan. Until such time as there is a complete regeneration of thought in this country, a show of force, together with a determination to employ it if need be, can alone contribute effectively to the achievement of such an outcome and to our own future security.

(Signed) "Grew."

(The asterisk herein above indicates apparent omission)

1 Witness Grew

2 A telegram received from Tokyo, dated September 12, 1940,
3 received at 5:56 p.m., to the Secretary of State, Washington.

4 "830, September 12, midnight.

5 "Eight. Passing from the general to the specific
6 problem that now confronts us, and with the foregoing
7 picture in mind, I applauded the timeliness of the
8 instructions contained in the second part of Department's
9 331. August 23, 6 p.m. concerning the Shanghai defense
10 sectors. The Department will have seen from my 791,
11 September 4, 11 p.m. paragraph No. two that the Foreign
12 Minister's complaint as to alleged threats on our part
13 was met with the statement that what we have in mind is
14 'a logical reciprocal adjustment of international rela-
15 tions'. I feel that the appropriate time has come to
16 proceed, gradually but progressively, with that adjust-
17 ment. In the present situation and outlook I believe
18 that the time has come when continued patience and
19 restraint on the part of the United States may and
20 probably will lead to developments which will render
21 Japanese-American relations progressively precarious.
22 It is my hope that if the Japanese Government and people
23 can be led to believe that their hand is being overplayed,
24 there will eventually ensue a reverse swing of the pendulum
25 in which a reconstruction of good relations between the

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Witness Grew

United States and Japan will be possible. The alternative seems to me to be hopeless.

"Nine. The foregoing analysis, which has been drafted with care over a period of several days, has the expressed complete concurrence of the Naval, Military and Commercial Attaches and all other members of the immediate staff of this Embassy.

"(End of message)

(Signed) Grew."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, that was a very well
considered instrument.

You had spent considerable time on that instrument and
it was well considered?

Mr. Grew: I had.

Senator Ferguson: And will you give us the specific
reason, if you had one, for sending it?

Mr. Grew: I can't say that there was any specific reason
other than my duty to express to our Government from time to
time my understanding of the situation in Japan and the Far
East and from time to time my representations as to what
policy could be followed in Washington.

Senator Ferguson: You wanted Washington to have the in-
formation that they might know how you felt.

Mr. Grew: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Now, is it true that that was a change
of attitude as far as you were concerned?

If you will look at page 272 of your book, I would like
to have you read into the record what your attitude was on
12-5-38 on that same question.

I think it is expressed in "meanwhile there were buzzings"***

Mr. Grew: "Meanwhile there were buzzings as to possible
financial help to Chaing Kai Shek from American and British
sources, and discussions as to possible economic measures

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 against Japan. As to the latter, no matter how much I might
3 personally like to see retaliation for the things that Japan
4 is doing to us and to our interests in the Far East, I have
5 consistently recommended against such measures unless we are
6 prepared to see them through to their logical conclusion, and
7 that might mean war, for sanctions are always a potential
8 incentive to ultimate war. The British, at least some British,
9 believe that Anglo-American economic sanctions would bring
10 Japan to her knees in short order. I disagree with that thesis.
11 I know Japan and the Japanese pretty well. They are a hardy
12 race, accustomed throughout their history to catastrophe and
13 disaster; theirs is the 'do or die' spirit, more deeply in-
14 grained than in almost any other people. They would pull in
15 their belts another notch and continue. They can live on rice
16 and, if necessary, fight on rice. The deprivation of oil, rubber
17 and other necessities of war might cramp their style, once
18 their considerable supplies had given out, but it would take
19 a long time to bring about capitulation, I think.

20 "Foreign support to Chaing Kai Shek is another matter
21 altogether, and this does not need to be done officially, no
22 matter what official blessings might accompany the unofficial
23 act.

24 "Thus lay the land up to the end of November."

25 1938.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, can you state to the committee what there was that changed you from that statement and belief in 1938 to the statement of September 12, 1940?

Mr. Grew: Well, a great deal of water had gone over the falls, Senator, between those two messages; there was two years between them. The Japanese Army was steadily encroaching further into the Far East and into East Asia. They were potentially threatening our vital interests. And from that point of view the situation had very much changed indeed. That, I think, was the main reason why I sent that telegram, but one must remember that my so-called "green light" telegram was not something which had developed in a question of a few hours or a few days. It meant a progressive line of thinking over a period to the apex of the situation.

Senator Ferguson: You wanted the State Department to know of your change?

Mr. Grew: Oh, very definitely.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I will ask you to look on page 359 of your book, the letter beginning "Dear Frank", on that same page. That is to the President?

Mr. Grew: 359?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

The Chairman: That is on page 359 but the following page looks like 358; the pages seem to be misnumbered there.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: It is all right in my copy, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. Grew: That is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940.

Senator Ferguson: I ask you to read where it begins "After eight years of effort". Read that paragraph.

Mr. Grew: This is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940:

"After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward

(2)