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Questions by: Senator Brewster

Senator Brewster: That left him with a very large discretion?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Senator Brewster: Now, Admiral Smith before the Hart Committee said he thought there had been too much "crying Wolf", that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson.

Does that express to some extent your feeling as to the situation as far as apprising you of danger was concerned?

Admiral Kimmel: To some extent, yes, because I think you will find Admiral King made a statement that was a sameness to the warnings that went, a sameness, --

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: And I noted that sameness.

Senator Brewster: When did you learn that Admiral Hart was in receipt of the intercepts and of the ability to decode them?

Admiral Kimmel: I learned of that after, sometime after the Naval Court of Inquiry had completed its proceedings. I don't know the exact date.

Senator Brewster: Was there ever any discussion with you or by you about securing decrypting facilities for Pearl Harbor covering the purple or any other code?

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Admiral Kimmel: I didn't know the purple code by that name. I knew in general of the set-up. I knew what we were capable of doing in Washington and I knew that the primary decrypting and decoding was done in Washington by a much larger force than we had at Honolulu and supplying us with the necessary code machines, or what not, whatever might have been necessary, was only a part of the problem. The remainder of it was to supply us with trained and efficient personnel in such numbers as to handle all this.

And it appeared to me then that if all this was being done in Washington and they were supplying me with the information, that that was a solution to the problem.

Senator Brewster: But you did not know that Admiral Hart had these facilities for decrypting and analyzing the code?

Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't know it at the time.

Senator Brewster: In your judgment would it have been feasible for those messages to have been sent to you by courier with practically complete security?

Admiral Kimmel: I could see no reason why there shouldn't have been complete security if they were sent by courier. That is always a thing that you have to balance everywhere, the security as against getting the information where it will do the most good, and I have always been

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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one of the school who feels that the information should be used, taking all the precautions.

We had a naval code which was pretty secure. I don't know whether the Japs ever broke any of them or not. Or anybody else. But certainly sending it by naval courier would have been a very secure method, I should say.

Senator Brewster: And the planes were flying back and forth from the Pacific Coast to Hawaii at that time?

Admiral Kimmel: Quite regularly.

Senator Brewster: So that it would have been a matter of one or two days to get material through under normal conditions?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, even in bad weather they could have done it in four or five days.

Senator Brewster: And had there ever been any difficulty us far as your office was concerned in the leakage of information that was supplied you?

Admiral Kimmel: I don't understand.

Senator Brewster: Had there ever been any difficulty as far as you or your office were concerned in the leaking of information which had been supplied, so that they would have any occasion for concern?

Admiral Kimmel: So far as I know there were no leaks. That is something that no man can answer categorically,

Questions by: Senator Brewster

that there were never any leaks.

Senator Brewster: No. Whether there had ever been any complaint.

Admiral Kimmel: No, there was never any complaint that came to my attention.

Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: There is some testimony about your hearing in Navy wife reporting something about your operating procedures. My impression is that in the record there is something about you putting some kind of a regulation into effect and then shortly afterwards, in a public place in Honolulu, you heard some Navy officer's wife repeat it.

I don't want to misspeak, that is an important statement, but I think I can get you that in the record.

Admiral Kimmel: That is an entirely different type of information from that which we are talking about here.

One of our greatest difficulties out there was the Navy personnel and the Army personnel talking. And I think that is a common trouble that we have everywhere.

As I recall it, I issued some kind of an order cautioning all of them not to talk, to keep their mouths shut, and not to know so much. And I even went to the extent of doing this, we had a Navy directory they used to get out out there,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

and I restricted the distribution of this directory so as it couldn't get into the hands of unauthorized people.

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Witnesss Ki-rel:

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

Senator Brewster: If the so-called "magio" messages were being sent to the British Admiralty by Washington would that affect your opinion as to whether or not they might safely have been entrusted to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Kimmel: I know of no reason why they should not have been supplied to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and I think he was quite as much entitled to them as the British Almiralty was.

Senator Brewster: On page 538 of the Roberts Commission as corrected you were reported as testifying:

"The Secretary of Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by the Department to the Comman Ter-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such warning was not delivered to me indicated that the Administration did not expectan air attack on Oahu."

Is that correct?

Admiral Kimmel: Tes, sir, that is correct, and I would like to all a little. When Mr. wnow care to Honolulu after the attack one of the first things he asked me was, "Did you get the dispatch that the Navy Department sent out on Saturday night?"

Senator Brewster: December the 6th that was.

Admiral Kimmel: December 6th. "Did you get Saturday

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Witness Kirrel

night the dispatch the Navy Department sent out?" I said, "No, I received no such dispatch." "Well, " he said, "we sent you one." "Well," I said, "I am quite certain I did not receive However, there is always a possibility that my communication outfit might slip up and I will check." "Well," he said, "I am sure we sent one to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatio station and we either sent it directly to you or for your information," and then he asked me if I decoded all dispatches . . . 3 going to the Asiatic station.

I told him no, that that was something we did not do normally and that it would be highly improbable that we would try to decode a dispatch addressed only to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic station, but that I would check up,

I did check up and I found that no such dispatch had ever been sent to me and had never been received in my communication organization and I subsequently found that no such dispatch had ever been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatio station.

Senator Brewster: Did you ever take the matter up further with Secretary Knox to find out what was the explanation of that apparent misunderstanding?

Admiral Kimmel: I never did. I had not received the dispatch and at the time I did know it was something that was water over the dam as far as I was concerned. I did not make

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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sent?

any attempt to find out anything more about it at that time. 2 I assured myself that we had never received it and subsequent-3 ly I found that it had never been received in the Asiatic either, so the only conclusion that I could draw was that the 5 dispatch, if it had ever originated, had gotten bogged down в somewhere in the Navy Department, 7 Senator Brewster: But that mat ter has never been suffi-8 ciently explored to find out the basis for the misunderstanding, as far as you know? 10 Admiral Kimmel: As far as I know it has never been. 11 know no more about it than I have told you right now. 12 13 Senator Brewster: Secretary Knox' visit was within a very 14 few days after the event, was it not? 15 Admiral Kimmel: I cannot hear you, sir. 16 Senator Brewster: Secretary Knoxi visit was within a very 17 few days after December 7th? 18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. Secretary Knox, I think he arrived out there on the 12th, it was about the 12th. I be-19 lieve the 12th was the day. 20 Senator Brewster: And he seemed at that time to have a 21

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, he was quite positive at that time.

Senator Brewster: Now, on page 568 of the Roberts testi-

very clear recollection that he understood a message had been

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Witness Kirrel

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

mony you are quoted as saying that the Army radar network "had picked up many unknown planes at or about six A. M."

Was that, to you know, a discrepancy, or what is the explanation of that as distinct from the seven o'clock report?

Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall now, sir. It is quite possible that I had been misinformed as to the time and I think that the testimony which has been subsequently developed is probably better than my testimony. I was merely giving my opinion as far as time goes. I had only been informed about this.

Senator Brewster: When Secretary Knox talked with you at that time regarding the Saturday night message was General Short present so far as you recall?

Admiral Kimmel: I am not sure but I believe he was. Captain Smith was present.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Admiral Kimmel: And I believe Admiral Bloch was present at the same time and Admiral Pye. I am quite sure Captain Smith was there.

Mr. Murchy: The record shows that General Short and Admiral Kimmel were together talking to the Secretary during the conversation and that then the Secretary later talked to General Short separately and went over the line of each officer, but they did talk at length together for some time.

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Witness Kirrel

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

Admiral Kimmel: Well, that is quite true. General Short and the Secretary, Admiral Bloch, Cotain Smith and maybe two or three other people were present during at least one interview we had.

Senator Brewster: I have a message here labeled "Message No. 042000, December 4th", I take 1t. I will show it to you and ask you whether you can interpret it. It loes not mean very much to me (handing document to witness).

Admiral Kimmel: I am afraid you will have to get somebody that knows more about this thing than I do to make sense out of that.

Benator Brewster: Well, I will ask somebody to look it up over the week end and perhaps we can get it.

Admiral Kimmel: I will look it up and try to find out, if I can, something about it.

Senator Brewsters All right.

Admiral Kimmel; I do not recall that message at all.

Senator Brewster: You can take the number of 1t there.

Admiral Kimmel: See if we can find that, what that is.

Senator Brewster: Now, as I gather from your testimony, Airiral Kirrel, you feel that the people in Washington had far less reason to be surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th than you did?

Admiral Kimmel: I think that is a perfectly reasonable

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Witness Kirrel

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

conclusion with the information which they had and which I did not have.

Senator Brewster: I think the testimony of most of them who have spoken regarding this has indicated that they certainly were as much surprised as you, if not more so. attitude of mind of official Washington and in the White House, one excerpt we have bearing directly on it is the New York Times of October 8, 1944 purporting to quote Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt when she stated as follows in what is marked as a direct quotations

"December 7th was just like any of the later D-Days to us. We clustered at the radio and waited for more details but it was far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time."

That impression had been conveyed to you from neither official or unofficial sources, I gather.

Aimiral Kirrel: That thought you mean?

Senator Brewster: Yes, that you were expecting something of this sort for a long time.

Admiral Kimmel: No, and I might add a little here. Another thing that Secretary Knox said to me in the presence of these officers was that they were all surprised in Washington, that nobody in their estimates of what would happen in the Pacific

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Witness Kirrel

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

had ever mentioned an attack on Pearl Harbor, not even Kelly Turner. Those were his words.

Senator Brewster: Does that refer to Admiral Turner?

Senator Brewster: The dispositions of the ships and the slerting effect on December 7th were your best judgment as to the action consistent with your various responsibilities on the basis of information then available to you after careful consultation with your highly competent staff and consideration of all factors; is that statement true?

Admiral Kirrel: Yes, sir, that is absolutely true. I had discussed this thing daily with my staff, not only after November 27th but practically all the time I was out there.

Senator Brewster: Well, this was a continuing decision throughout the preceding eleven months?

Aimiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: In the light of the diplomatic and military situation and the continuing responsibilities to make the Fleet ready for wor, is that correct?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. It was something that we had to re-appraise almost daily.

Senator Brewster: Whether or not the offensive function of the Fleet in the event of war was the reason for its existence?

Witness Kirrel

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. A fleet that was not trained would have been useless.

Senator Brewster: That would be recognized by all com-

Admiral Kimmel: I think so.

Senator Brewster: Would it be possible for anyone to appraise the wisdom of your decisions and the disposition of the Fleet without knowledge of all the offensive functions off the Fleet under the war plan then governing the program of the United States in the event of war?

Admiral Kimmel: I considered my primary responsibilities out there offensive action which we expected and hoped to undertake and no man can get a proper view of my responsibilities and the problems which faced me without having the complete text of the WPL-46 and my operating plan, WPAC-46, which contains not only defensive measures but primarily offensive measures.

Senator Brewster: I call your attention to exhibit 44,

"Copies of Defense Plans", which were submitted to our body,
extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No.

5 and in Section 7 of that, "Tasks, The Pacific Area, Army
Tasks." Then we come to Sub-section 35, "Navy Tasks," in
which we find A, B, C, D and E missing. They go on with
the outlining of F, G and H, with apparently some other initial-

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ling subsequently thereto.

Now, that invited my attention at the time and I asked counsel regarding it as it impressed me that if you were under a responsibility for carrying out offensive action with that fleet you must at least take that into account. I take it that was the purpose of your orders, to be prepared to carry out what your plan specifically called for and subsequently when we secured A, B, C, D and E we found some very considerable responsibilities resting on you which I will read:

"a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

"b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

- "c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.
- "4. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 1550 East.
- "e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying

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Questions by: Sen. Brewster

hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Herisphere. "

Now, those are rather large orders, are they not? Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. And in that connection I might say that prior to the commencement of these hearings we found out what they were submitting to counsel and my counsel went to Mr. Mitchell and pointed out to him that these defensive measures divorced from the others did not give a true picture of my responsibilities, of the problems that faced me; that it was necessary to have these additional things brought to the attention of the committee. After that and when it was distributed to the committee my counsel again went to Mr. Gesell and informed him that we felt that this was not a full presentation of the picture which was necessary to be irawn if they were to find out what my responsibilities were in the premises and beyond that we went no further.

Senator Brewster: Do you know what reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you regarding that matter?

Adriral Kirrel: What, sir?

Senator Brewster: What reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you, regarding that request?

Admiral Kimmel: I do not know as he made any reply, but he did not do anything about it.

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Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Brewster: Well, I am quite interested because I raised this very question early in the hearing as it impressed me that we would be utterly unable to form a balanced judgment on whether or not you had made a wise decision unless we knew what your responsibilities were and if your primary responsibilities were to carry out aggressive warfare all over the Pacific Ocean, out as far as the Malay Perinsula, the Philippines and all that I assure that must be taken into account. I was unable to secure recognition of that by the counsel at the time and I am very much interested to know that you apparently had presented a similar and what seems to me a wellwarranted request and I think that it will be in order to find out, if possible, why it was that this information was not made available to us initially by whoever was responsible.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I don't know anything about it.

Senator Brewster: No, I know you do not.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Mitchell made a statement to the committee that the reason it was not was he thought the corrittee was primarily concerned with defense obligations made as to Pearl Harbor. Then he was pressed by the committee and he and Mr. Gesell then made available to the committee the complete war

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Questions by: Sen. Brewster

plans of the Pacific and the complete plans covering the entire situation and we have that.

Senator Ferguson: Were you through?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Then to I understand counsel had this entire matter before them and only furnished us this deleted version, or 111 they have to go back to the Navy and get the entire matter? And I would like to know whether they requested the entire record at first.

Mr. Murphy: I am sure I cannot answer that. I can only say that Mr. Mitchell said at first all they wanted to present was the defense of Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson: Will counsel find that out?

Mr. Murphy: And then they gave us the whole plan and we have it and have had it for some time.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Hannaford can answer the question specifically.

The Vice Chairman: All right, we will hear from Mr. Hannafort.

Mr. Hannaford: Mr. Chairman, War Plans 46 was received as an exhibit in the Naval Court of Inquiry and all of those exhibits have been a wilable to counsel from the very beginning. We asked the Army and Navy to make extracts from 1t and reproduce them rather than reproduce the entire document, because

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it is very voluminous, and that is the document which is now in evidence as exhibit 44 and it was received and distributed to the corrittee. Thereafter, at the request of the corrittee we had the entire document duplicated and that was also distributed to the committee.

Senator Brewster: When was the latter distribution made? Mr. Hannaford: I cannot tell you that, Senstor. I can check that from the record. I think it was distributed about the time Admiral Turner came on the stand.

Mr. Murphy: Several weeks ago.

Senator Ferguson: Can I inquire from counsel as to whether or not it was counsel's request to leave out certain things, the so-called deployment under 46?

Mr. Hannaford: I cannot tell you that, Senator, because I do not believe I discussed the details of drawing that domument up.

Senator Ferguson: Could we have that topic requested? Mr. Hannaford: Well, there is nothing in writing that I know ofo Senator, requesting how exhibit 44 should be made up.

Senator Ferguson: Then how would the Navy know how to make it up if it was not in writing?

Mr. Hannaford: I assume that 1t was as a result of an oral conversation, Senator.

Senator Brewsters Were you present at this conversation

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Witness Kirrel Questions by: Sen. Brewster 1 with Mr. Gesell and Mr. Mitchell regarding the reproduction 2 of the war plans? 3 Mr. Hannafori: I was not, sir. 4 The Vice Chairman: Well, may I have counsel's attention? 5 The fact is it is already before the committee now. 8 Mr. Hannafori: It certainly is. 7 The Vice Chairman: And has been for several weeks. 8 Mr. Hannaford: It certainly has. 9 Senator Brewster: Well, I would like to have you locate 10 the date when that subsequent one was made available and I 11 will appreciate a statement from Mr. Gesell regarding the con-12 13 versation when this was requested because when I initially re-14 quested this report I was met with a rather firm response. 15 It was intimated that that was not at all essential. I haven't 16 located the point in the evidence where that was done but I 17 hope to. 18 I think you will find we have had it about a Mr. Murphy? 19 month. 20 Senator Brewster: Well, the first copy I received was on 21 November 17th. That was something over three months ago. 22 Mr. Murphy: That was four lays after we were in the hear-23 ing, November 17th.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chalrman, could I inquire as to

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Senator Brewster: Yes.

Witness Kirrel Questions by: Sen. Brewster 1 whether or not the entire plan has been marked an exhibit? 2 Is it exhibit 114 or was it withdrawn? 3 Mr. Masten: That is the implementation of Rainbow 5. 4 WPL 1s 44. 5 Senator Ferguson: Is this in evidence? 6 7 Mr. Masten: No. WPAC. Senator Brewster: What is this? This one has the "114" 8 8 soratched out. Mr. Murphy: We have the complete Pacific war plan. I 10 11 think we have every page and every word of every plan for the 12 Pacific and have had for about a month. 13 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from coun-14 sel whether or not this instrument is now an exhibit in the 15 case, the one that Senator Brewster read from? He read para-16 graph 35 as I recall it. 17 Mr. Masten: It is not. 18 Senator Ferguson: Then I move that it become an exhibit, 19 with an exhibit number lientifying what Senator Brewster real. 20 The Vice Chairman: Let us have counsel identify what it 21 18. 22 Senator Brewster: Well, if the counsel can describe it to 23 their own satisfaction. It is quite a locument. 24 Mr. Richardson: Where did it come from? 25 Senator Brewster: It was given to us by counsel.

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Mr. Murphy: I think the record should also show that each member of the committee has been furnished a list of the exhibits before them and we have had the list covering all of the exhibits for quite some weeks.

Mr. Richardson: This is not an exhibit.

Senator Ferguson: That is what I would like to have made an exhibit.

Mr. Richardson: Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason in the world why this should not be made an exhibit if the corrittee wants to have it made an exhibit. This is WPL Specific. It is not expurgated or changed or modified, it is all here and if this instrument is to be made an exhibit, why, we will send it down and have it duplicated and distribute it to the members of the committee.

The Vice Chairman: My recollection is that it has already been distributed. Every member of the committee has a cony of 1t.

Mr. Murphy: I think the record will show that it was subwitted to the members of the committee with a statement by Mr. Gesell that it was not being refe an exhibit, that it was met her bulky to iuplicate. Each member of the committee got a copy. I think you will find that in the record.

Mr. Richardson: Then there is no reason, Mr. Chairman, why this cannot be made an exhibit and given a number.

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Senator Ferguson: I so move.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered, but with every member of the committee having a copy of it is there any reason for having it copied again?

Mr. Richardson: No. The exhibit number would be 129.

Mr. Murphy: The exhibit was distributed the day that Mr. Keefe cross examined Admiral Stark and he referred to it in his questioning when he spoke of the fortification of Guar.

(The focument above referred to was marked Exhibit No. 129)

Senator Brewster: Admiral Kimmel, you were under some necessity of conserving, so far as possible, your resources on account of the emphasis on the war in the Atlantic, were you not?

Admiral Kimmel: I did not understand quite, sir. I am sorry.

Senator Brewster: You were under the necessity of conserving your resources on account of the emphasis on the war in the
Atlantic. You had been told at various times that the war in
Europe was the primary emphasis under any war plans that we
might carry out, is that not true?

Admiral Kimmel: I think that is a fair statement, yes, str.

Senator Brewster: In your statement of the case on page

10 you included this statement which I would like to read for

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Witness Kirrel

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

purposes of re-emphasis and to invite your further comment as it seems to me to have a considerable significance in connection with the decisions you were obliged to make. (Reading)

"The Joint Army-Navy War Plan primarily emphasized the defeat of Germany. Admiral R. K. Turner, War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, described the objectives of the War Plan in these words:

both the principal Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe.

Was that what you understood to be the policy of the United States during the year preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Kimmel: I did not have that available to me in Pearl Harbor prior to the attack. What I did have available to me was the statement of principles in the Basic War Plan of the Army and Navy, Rainbow No. 5, which is quoted on the fol-

Witness Kirrel

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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Senator Brewster: On page 11.

Admiral Kimmel: And that is not very much different. This is a little franker but not very much different from the statement of principles laid down in the Basic War Plan.

Senator Brewster: Nowo how would you interpret the significance of that statement by Admiral Turner that we were going to initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us? How would we go about that?

Admiral Kimmel: I wouldn't know.

The Chairman: Permit the chair to state at this time that I believe today will be the last day that Mr. Hannaford will be with us as a member of our legal staff. Is that correct, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. Richardson That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: And I feel sure I voice the sentiment of all members of the committee when I express deep regret that we are to lose his valuable services as a member of our legal staff. We appreciate the splendid efforts that he has exerted. He has served with great ability and credit and distinction throughout the period that we have been working on this matter and we regret exceedingly that he has to leave us and we want him to know that he leaves with our deepest appreciation for all that he has done and the valuable services

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that he has rendered the committee.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Could I get the date of this Admiral Turner's memorandum that is quoted on page 10 of Admiral Kimmel's original statement?

The Vice Chairman: Are you prepared to give the Senator that information, Admiral?

Admiral Kimmel: I cannot give you the date immediately but it is in the Hart testimony. You will note the notation at the bottom of the page.

Senator Brewster; Page 251.

Admiral Kimmel: (Reading)

"Hart Testimony, Admiral R. K. Turner, page 251, 252, question 10."

Senator Ferguson: But I wanted the record, if possible, to show at this point the date that that statement was made, not made as a witness but actually made by Turner.

Admiral Kimmel: It was made as a witness by Admiral Turn-er.

Senator Ferguson: That is not the date I want. I want the date that he made it originally, the idea when it was to take place.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I could not give you that. I do

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not know.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I want to make one request of counsel, that they ask the Navy to supply us with a comparative statement of the number of ships in Pearl Harbor during January 1941 compared with December 7, 1941, as to whether or not it is not a fact that there were more ships in the harbor in January of 1941 at one time than there were on December 7, 1941.

The Vice Chairman: Counsel will please take note of that request.

Senator Brewster: It may appear now that the complete copy of War Plan 46 was made availab le to the committee on December 20, 1945 after the original limited copy had been made available to us on November 17th and had been the subject of some discussion, according to the record which the counsel has just furnished re.

May I ask the chairman about the printing of the record, as to what progress is being made? That is quite a job and it would seem essential.

The Vice Chairman: That is a matter that Senator Barkley has been looking after personally and I regret I am not preparei to give that information but I am sure he can.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

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It has been suggested that it might be a good Mr. Keefe: policy to continue these hearings into the night so as to complete Aimirel Kimmel. I wonder if the chair entertains such views?

The Vice Chairman: The chair had not. We have run now till past 4:30, so the committee will now stand in recess until ten o'clock Monday morning.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn can I make one request?

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Before the recess I asked for photostatio copies of the intercepted messages beering date of December 6th regariless of their time of translation. That was over a month ago.

Just before the recess I was called on by Attorney Masten of our counsel and the Army liaison officer. They explained to me what the problem would be in developing the picture that I had asked for and for the accommodation and for the purpose of lightening the work I modified my request considerably. As a result of that interview I was promised those photostatic copies the next day. Three or four weeks have gone by and I haven't received them. I was wondering if somebody has them, if there is somebody on our counsel's staff that can supply me with them.

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The Vice Chairman: Is counsel prepared to give the gentleman the information he is requesting?

Mr. Masten: Mr. Gearhart, it was my understanding that the only thing you wanted, that you had a chance to look at the document which was introduced subsequently, I have forgotten the exact exhibit number, which covers all the intercepts in volume 2, those relating to Hawaii. If there is anything else you want I am sure we will be glad to get it.

Mr. Gearbart: Do I understand that the intercepts that I have asked for have been photostated, each one of the papers relating to the particular intercepts that I have requested, and that they have been introduced in evidence in this case?

Mr. Masten: No, there have been no photostats that -Mr. Gearhart: Well, I know the intercepts that have been
presented to this committee. That is where I got the information that caused me to make the request. What I want is
the photostats of all of those messages which were dated December 6th regardless of their date of translation. I want
to see each paper relating to those, each individual intercept, so that I can make a study of them.

Mr. Masten: As I said the other day, my understanding was that you had abandoned that request and you no longer wanted that; that the data which was subsequently introduced as an exhibit before the committee was all that you wanted.

If you want to change that, we will be glad to cooperate.

Mr. Gearhart: No, I don't want to be understood as changing anything. I am limiting my request to include certain definite messages appearing upon certain pages in the exhibit and you told me and the Army officer assured me that they would be in my hands the next day. A month has gone by and I haven't seen them.

Mr. Masten: Well, we will endeavor to get them for you Monday.

Mr. Gearhart: With that assurance I subside.

The Vice Chairmans The committee stands adjourned until ten o'clock Monday.

> (Whereupon, at 4:35 P.M., Saturlay, January 19, 1946 an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock A. M., Monday, January 21, 1946.)