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Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

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February 12, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 60

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

INGERSOLL, Admiral R. E. (Resumed)

11,342

CLAUSEN, Colonel Henry C.

11,475

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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## S. Con Res. 27

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Tuesday, February 12, 1946

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Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack  
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;  
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.  
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Admiral Ingersoll is still on the stand. Senator Ferguson was examining him when we recessed.

## TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL

(Resumed)

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Ingersoll, we knew of a great war being conducted in Europe, and we knew how Hitler had gone into Poland and into Denmark, and so forth, that all of the actions of war had changed, and were unorthodox, did we not?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir. I have almost humorously called the war in the Atlantic as illegal. It was more in the nature of irregular.

Senator Ferguson: Then you want to change your language from yesterday, that the war that we were conducting from August in the Atlantic was irregular rather than illegal?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, I think that is a better description of it.

Senator Ferguson: You use the word "irregular" after I used the expression unorthodox method of Hitler in his attacks without declaration of war.

Admiral Ingersoll: In the Atlantic we were doing some things which only a belligerent does. There had been no



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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declaration of war. We had done a great many things that under international law, as it was understood before the last war, were unneutral, and Germany just did not see fit to declare war on us on many occasions when she could have assumed our acts as unfriendly.

It was apparently to her advantage to have us as a non-belligerent rather than as a full belligerent.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you say that Germany, under international law, as I understand it, had just cause for declaring war from the overt acts that we had been committing?

Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know as to any reason why we were doing these acts without a declaration of war? Was it in any way that Germany was to declare war first?

Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot answer that question, sir. That is a question of high policy, of political policy. The Navy Department was ordered to do certain things, which it did.

Senator Ferguson: As an officer of our Navy, in fact, next to the Chief, you knew that these overt acts were going on?

Admiral Ingersoll: Correct.

Senator Ferguson: And they were all irregular and



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

not in accordance with the old idea of declaration of war?

Admiral Ingersoll: And of international law, as it was understood.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Now, what I am getting at, in asking you these questions is why did not we anticipate the same thing in the Pacific with Japan?

Admiral Ingersoll: There are two reasons for that. One was that we ourselves were not ready, or as ready as we wished to be to go to war in the Pacific.

As a matter of fact, I think it was in November that the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of State, and I believe sent a letter to the President, urging that nothing be done which would precipitate hostilities in the Pacific in order that we would have more time to strengthen our defenses in the Philippines, and to get more strength in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson: Does not that then add strength to the supposition when we were not ready in the Pacific, and knew from all of these messages what was going on, that Japan would take advantage of our unreadiness and attack without a declaration of war?

Admiral Ingersoll: On the 27th of November, I think it

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 was, or rather, the 24th of November -- I am speaking from  
2 memory now -- Admiral Stark's message to the Fleet stated  
3 that an attack could be expected in any direction.

4 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

5 Then on the 27th another message, the so-called warn-  
6 ing message, was sent out?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: But Japan had notified us on the  
9 25th, the deadline message had she not?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: I believe that was the date. I am  
11 not sure that that was addressed to the United States.

12 Senator Ferguson: No, no.

13 Admiral Ingersoll: We picked it up.

14 Senator Ferguson: It was an intercepted message to  
15 her ambassador.

16 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

17 Senator Ferguson: Then they altered it to the 29th,  
18 which was our 30th, was it not?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: No, we would be one day earlier  
20 than she would be.

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Their 29th --

22 Admiral Ingersoll: Is our 28th.

23 The Chairman: That is right.

24 Senator Ferguson: That is right.  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1 They set the 29th as the date, that is correct, is  
2 it not?

3 Admiral Ingersoll: I believe so.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, did anything happen between  
5 November 29 and December 7 that would indicate to your  
6 department that was was not coming?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: On the contrary, Senator, the  
8 information which we received on the Japanese, or from  
9 the Japanese messages, was that they had instructed their  
10 embassies and consulates to burn their codes, and that  
11 was positive evidence that they expected to be at war with  
12 the three nations indicated in those dispatches very soon.

13 Furthermore, the Japanese forces were on their move,  
14 and we had sighted them moving in the Far East.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. That is just what I  
16 want to get at.

17 Here we find them moving in the Far East. We know  
18 that on the 29th, they have stated that that is the last  
19 day, and after that they said "Things are automatically  
20 going to happen."

21 Did not that indicate to you that there were other  
22 movements on foot and not only those that we could see  
23 down in the South Pacific, going to Siam? As a Naval  
24 strategist, did not your department see that there was  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

1  
2 a movement and anticipate that the movement could have  
3 been towards Pearl Harbor?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: There was nothing in the Japanese  
5 movement which we saw which indicated any movement anywhere  
6 except in that direction to where we saw them moving.

7 However, we knew there were troops massed in Formosa,  
8 in the Pescadores, and on the Coast of China, whose most  
9 logical destination was the Philippines.

10 And there might also have been other forces whose  
11 location we did not know, who might be going in any direc-  
12 tion, or that might have been going towards Alaska.

13 Senator Ferguson: So it is the ones that were going  
14 "in any direction" that we did not have the information  
15 on, that we should have anticipated their action rather  
16 than those that we did know their movements into Siam and  
17 into the Kra Peninsula?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: That was the reason that Admiral  
19 Stark put into the war warning message the words -- and  
20 I should digress for a moment.

21 The war warning message was sent to all three com-  
22 manders in chief. It was sent to the Atlantic, to the  
23 Pacific, and to the Asiatic.

24 It was sent for action to Admiral Hart and to Admiral  
25 Kimmel, and it was sent to Admiral King in the Atlantic



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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for information, because the action required by that dispatch was to take a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks in WPL-46, which was the war plan.

It was not sent to Admiral King for action because he was deployed all over the Atlantic at the time and could not do any more.

Senator Ferguson: I am going to come back to that defensive deployment a little later.

Were you familiar, Admiral, with the fact that on the 2nd of December --

Will you show the Admiral Exhibit 37, page 39?

Were you familiar with that message that the President directed, as to the charter of three small vessels?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, I am familiar with that message.

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: You released that message, did you not?

2 Admiral Ingersoll: I am not sure whether I released it  
3 or not, but I had a large part in preparing the message.

4 Senator Ferguson: What was the purpose of that message?

5 It was three small vessels to form a defensive information  
6 patrol. They were to go over into the Camranh Bay, Cape  
7 St. Jacques, and one off the point of Camau.

8 Now I have those marked on here, and they are many  
9 miles away from the Philippines, in fact they are way over  
10 so they can watch the movement into the Malay Peninsula,  
11 are they not?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

13 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us why you wanted to  
14 have these three small men-of-war out in the Gulf of Siam  
15 watching for a movement on the British possessions?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: The reason that we wanted them  
17 there is because it says in the beginning of the dispatch  
18 the "President directs that the following be done as soon  
19 as possible". That was our reason for doing it. Admiral  
20 Stark was told by the President to do it.

21 Senator Ferguson: Was there any reason given by the  
22 President to do it?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: Not that he told me. I do not know  
24 what he told Admiral Stark, except to do this. I do not  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 know whether he told Admiral Stark his reason or not.

2  
3 Senator Ferguson: You had no reason but you prepared  
4 the dispatch?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: Admiral Hart was already conducting  
6 reconnaissance off that coast by planes from Manila.

7 Senator Ferguson: Do you know the reason for the  
8 statement "Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number  
9 Naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and  
10 report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and  
11 Gulf of Siam"? Why did they want to use Filipino crews?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: The only reason I can ascribe to  
13 that is that possibly Admiral Hart did not have sufficient  
14 enlisted men to do it, and it simply authorized him to use  
15 Filipinos to do it, and he could simply take a ship which  
16 was already manned by Filipinos, put Naval officers on it,  
17 put a gun on it, hoist an American flag on it and it would  
18 then be a man-of-war.

19 Senator Ferguson: That is what you were trying to do  
20 at that time?

21 Admiral Ingersoll: That is what we were told to do,  
22 sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: You took it rather as an order?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: That is the reason it starts off  
25 the "President directs that the following be done".



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: This was not something being done  
3 by the Navy as the Navy, it was the Commander in Chief doing it?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: I am sure Admiral Stark would not  
5 have done this unless he had been told.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you see any useful purpose that  
7 could be accomplished by these three small men-of-war as  
8 lookouts there?

9 Admiral Ingersoll: We did not initiate this movement,  
10 sir, and we were getting, I think, so far as Admiral Stark  
11 was concerned, sufficient information from Admiral Hart by  
12 the searches which his planes were making.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now that brings up a certain matter  
14 on planes. Admiral, could you tell me as to whether or not  
15 these were really men-of-war, so if they had been fired on  
16 it would have been an overt act against the United States?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: May I read this again more carefully?

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes. It was to have a cannon and  
19 machine gun.

20 Admiral Ingersoll: It says in the beginning "Minimum  
21 requirements to establish identity as U.S. men-of-war are  
22 command by a Naval officer and to mount a small gun and one  
23 machine gun would suffice."

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Would that have been an overt  
25 act if one of these small boats had been fired on?

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(4)



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Admiral Ingersoll: It would have been.

3 Senator Ferguson: It would have been?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: It would have been an overt act on  
5 the part of Japan.

6 Senator Ferguson: That is what I am talking about. And,  
7 therefore, we would have been in war?

8 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

9 Senator Ferguson: Is that your idea, Admiral? I mean  
10 as far as the overt act was concerned.

11 Admiral Ingersoll: It would have been an incident on  
12 which we could have declared war had we wished to.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Admiral Ingersoll: Of course, our men-of-war had been  
15 fired upon before, like the Panay incident, and we did not  
16 go to war. I do not know whether this would have resulted  
17 in war or not, but it might have resulted in war.

18 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

19 The Chairman: Will the Senator yield to Mr. Murphy?

20 Senator Ferguson: Not at the moment.

21 Mr. Murphy: It is already developed anyway.

22 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, I want you to look at page  
23 2 of Exhibit 78. This is on the 30th of November. Would  
24 you just read that?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: "INDICATIONS THAT JAPAN ABOUT TO







1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: With the machine guns and cannon.

3 Admiral Ingersoll: They would have undoubtedly defended  
4 themselves.

5 Senator Ferguson: That would have been the intention,  
6 is that correct?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: That is a right of self-preservation  
8 which you have.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you look at the previous  
10 message.

11 Admiral Ingersoll: May I enlarge on this one a moment  
12 before I go on?

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Admiral Ingersoll: You have a perfect right to fly  
15 planes over the ocean. You have also a right to send ships  
16 and men-of-war over the ocean. A plane may also approach  
17 a formation if it is a large formation and ascertain what  
18 is going on without being sighted. So that the chances of  
19 an overt incident occurring in the case of a plane search  
20 are very much less than that of a small ship trying to  
21 trail a force.

22 Senator Ferguson: So you would have anticipated that  
23 there would be more danger of an attack on the three small  
24 men-of-war than on these airplanes?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: Much more.

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10:20



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Much more.

3 Admiral Ingersoll: We had a perfect right to observe  
4 what they were doing.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, look at the previous message.

6 Admiral Ingersoll: Do you wish me to read it?

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

8 Admiral Ingersoll: This is from the Commandant of the  
9 14th District to Operations:

10 "FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY BRITISH CONSUL FROM USUALLY  
11 RELIABLE SOURCE. JAPANESE WILL ATTACK KRAKOW ISTHMUS FROM  
12 SEA ON ONE DECEMBER WITHOUT ULTIMATUM OR DECLARATION IN  
13 ORDER TO GET BETWEEN BANGKOK AND SINGAPORE. ATTACKERS  
14 WILL PROCEED DIRECT FROM HAINAN AND FORMOSA. MAIN LANDING  
15 TO BE MADE AT SONGKHLA."

16 Senator Ferguson: That is in line with the same, is  
17 it not?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir, except that it now turns  
19 out it wasn't a good prediction.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, attached to the November 29th  
21 memorandum of conversations of the Department of State I  
22 find this language -- it is headed "Most Secret". It comes  
23 from -- I can't tell. Cordell Hull's initials are on the  
24 paper that it is attached to. But this is the significant  
25 part:



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 "R.A.F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from  
3 Teda Bharu for three days commencing November 29th and our  
4 Commander in Chief, Far East, has requested Commander in  
5 Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance  
6 on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days."

7 Now, that would indicate that that is from the British.

8 Admiral Ingersoll: It is from the British, I think.

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And it is asking our Asiatic  
10 Fleet to send out a reconnaissance on the line of Manila-Camranh  
11 Bay on the same days.

12 Now, that is the day that the deadline was placed, the  
13 29th. So we really expected an attack on the 29th, did we  
14 not?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: We expected an attack when the  
16 Japanese forces which were proceeding around the south end  
17 of Indo-China would land. Whether they landed on the Kra  
18 Peninsula or on Thailand we did not know at that time, but  
19 depending on the speed they were making and the distance  
20 they were away at that time we could predict very closely  
21 what day they might expect to land there.

22 Senator Ferguson: Didn't every message we received  
23 after the 29th indicate to you that the attack was coming,  
24 that there was going to be war?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: After the 27th we were expecting it



1 Witness Ingersoll Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
2 any time, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: You were expecting it any time and  
4 as it moved on, let's say three or four days, didn't you  
5 anticipate that there was a movement on Pearl Harbor, because  
6 it was taking the number of days that it was taking, that  
7 every time a day elapsed it would indicate more that the  
8 movement had been for a longer distance, and therefore  
9 anticipate that it was Pearl Harbor?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: The answer to that is no, it was  
11 not anticipated. Otherwise they would have told them  
12 about it.

13 Senator Ferguson: Who would have told them?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: Admiral Stark would have told  
15 Admiral Kimmel had he had the slightest idea, I think, that  
16 it was probable and that an attack on Pearl Harbor was  
17 impending.

18 Senator Ferguson: So I take it you did not anticipate  
19 that as the days elapsed, an attack of that character?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I testified in the Court of Inquiry  
21 that we did expect that there would be Japanese submarines  
22 off Hawaii, that there would be Japanese submarines off our  
23 Pacific Coast, that they would be on a line of communications  
24 between Pearl Harbor and our Pacific Coast, that there might  
25 be an attack on our outlying possessions, as there were at



1 Witness Ingersoll Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
2 Midway and Guam, and there were submarines off Hawaii,  
3 there were submarines off of the Pacific Coast, and they  
4 were sinking ships, I believe, on the 7th of December between  
5 Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Coast. We did not anticipate --  
6 I say we did not anticipate -- I am sure Admiral Stark did  
7 not anticipate an attack of the character which the Japanese  
8 made at Pearl Harbor, although it was always a possibility;  
9 but he did not anticipate it as a probability.

10 Senator Ferguson: How did you appraise it?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I did not expect an attack of that  
12 character on Pearl Harbor as I testified yesterday.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, I wish you would look at these  
14 two exhibits. They are from the British Admiralty to the  
15 United States on Saturday morning of the 6th.

16 Admiral Ingersoll: Do you wish me to read them, sir?

17 Senator Ferguson: They are in the record. If you  
18 will just refer to them so you will know what is in them,  
19 because I want to ask you some questions about them.

20 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that those reports  
22 were in the State Department on Saturday indicating that  
23 there was to be an attack with 14 hours on the Kra Peninsula?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know whether I saw this  
25 particular dispatch and I can't find my initials on it.



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 However, at that time the Japanese forces were in that area  
3 and the attack might have come, I suppose, with 14 hours  
4 or any time, depending on what hour they selected for their  
5 landing.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, you have indicated that Admiral  
7 Stark and General Marshall gave to the President a memorandum --  
8 I think one is dated on the 5th of November and one the  
9 27th -- at least both of them used the statement "to give  
10 no ultimatum to Japan", is that correct? You are familiar  
11 with that?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: I would like to see the document  
13 if I could to refresh my memory.

14 Senator Ferguson: All right.

15 Admiral Ingersoll: The date of November 28 seems to  
16 stick in my craw at the moment.

17 Senator Ferguson: 16 and 17 are the Exhibit numbers.  
18 While they are getting those exhibits I will ask you  
19 some other questions.

20 This war that we were talking about yesterday and this  
21 morning in the Atlantic was, of course, a Government decision?  
22 It wasn't the Navy alone, it was the Government, our Govern-  
23 ment, that had made the decision?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: Everything that the Navy did in the  
25 Atlantic, except the details of carrying out the various



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 movements, and so forth, was on direction, I presume, from  
3 the President. Of course, there was a certain part which  
4 was a protection of Lend-Lease stuff which we were sending  
5 to Europe.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, priority of goods to the Atlantic  
7 was being used because of what was being done in the Atlantic;  
8 isn't that correct?

9 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't understand what you mean  
10 by "priority of goods", sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you have any priority to  
12 the Atlantic? I am talking about airplanes, ships. Didn't  
13 we send some ships from the Pacific, from Pearl Harbor, out  
14 to the Atlantic?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: We did. The basic strategy of  
16 the war plan in effect, WPL-46, and which was also derived  
17 from ABC-1, was to defeat Germany and Italy first and to  
18 maintain a strategic defensive in the Pacific until we could  
19 defeat Germany and Italy and then concentrate on licking  
20 the Japs. And that was the strategy followed in the war.

21 Senator Ferguson: We are not talking about the right  
22 or wrong of the decision. We are just trying to get the  
23 facts.

24 Admiral Ingersoll: So far as the Navy Department was  
25 concerned, that decision was made for it.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Yes, and it followed out the decision?

2 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, wasn't this true, that because  
4 of what was going on in the Atlantic we had a shortage of  
5 equipment in the Pacific?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: We had a shortage of equipment every-  
7 where. There were certain tasks assigned to the Atlantic  
8 Fleet in that war plan. There were others assigned to the  
9 Pacific. There were tasks assigned to the Asiatic Fleet.  
10 The Chief of Naval Operations having those tasks in view  
11 endeavored to allocate the forces available to him in the  
12 proper proportion which he considered as nearly adequate as  
13 he could, the forces which were sufficient to carry out the  
14 tasks which he had assigned.

15 For that reasons the forces in the Pacific were by no  
16 means as strong as they should have been for an offensive  
17 war, and I think the whole Navy would not have been, at that  
18 time, strong enough to carry on an offensive war in the  
19 Pacific.

20 Senator Ferguson: In other words, if we had had the  
21 entire Navy of the United States in the Pacific --

22 Admiral Ingersoll: At that moment.

23 Senator Ferguson: At that moment, when the war started,  
24 it would not have been sufficient to carry on an offensive  
25 war?







1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 in that hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere.

3 You can't defend the Western Hemisphere, that is our  
 4 West Coast, from a position on the Coast. You can only  
 5 defend it from an advanced position, which was the Hawaiian  
 6 Islands. That was the best central location from which  
 7 the Fleet could cover the Pacific Coast, Alaska, and the  
 8 Panama Canal.

9 If it had been on the Coast, and the Japanese had made  
 10 an attack on Hawaii such as they did, they couldn't possibly  
 11 have caught them even if they had attacked some place on  
 12 the Pacific Coast. If the Fleet had been actually in the  
 13 place of attack and not damaged, it couldn't have caught  
 14 them, because our Fleet as a whole was slower than the  
 15 Japanese fleet.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1           Senator Ferguson: Now, by virtue of the lack of  
2 equipment when the Fleet was at anchor in Pearl Harbor,  
3 it was in a position of peril, was it not?

4           Admiral Ingersoll: I do not consider that it was,  
5 no.

6           Senator Ferguson: You don't consider that it was?

7           Admiral Ingersoll: No.

8           Senator Ferguson: Did it have plenty to defend itself  
9 with while laying in the harbor?

10          Admiral Ingersoll: If all of the measures for the  
11 defense of Hawaii were operating, that is, if the radar  
12 were operating, if the planes in Hawaii had been alerted,  
13 if the Army had been deployed, and if anti-aircraft in  
14 position, if a distant reconnaissance had been conducted  
15 in the most dangerous sector by aircraft, or if surface  
16 pickets had been sent out so that warning of an attack  
17 might have been received in time for the ships to go to  
18 general quarters, in my opinion the fleet was safer in  
19 Pearl Harbor than it would have been at sea, but I do not  
20 wish my answer to be construed that I think it should have  
21 been in Pearl Harbor because there were other circumstances  
22 which might have caused it to be out of Pearl Harbor.

23           But purely from the question of safety, I believe  
24 it was safer in Pearl Harbor than anywhere else.  
25

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WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know at that very time that General Short had previously, on the 28th day of November sent a message to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall which was distributed to the Secretary of War, War Plans and General Marshall, that he had interpreted the message of the 27th as an alert to sabotage and he was alerted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy?

Admiral Ingersoll: I did not.

Senator Ferguson: Would that have made any difference in your last answer, if you had known that the Army which was the one to defend the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was only alerted to sabotage and had so notified the authorities in Washington?

Admiral Ingersoll: Well, in order to know whether the Army had taken proper dispositions, I would have had to have known what their plan against sabotage was, but if it had meant that their planes were all lined up, wing-to-wing, that their anti-aircraft guns were not in positions which they were expected to be, and that their radar was not operating, then I would have said certainly that that was not a proper condition to defend the fleet and it was their responsibility to defend the Islands.

Senator Ferguson: It turns out that that is just what happened, the planes were wing to wing in a sabotage



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h3

1 alert, so they could not be destroyed by sabotage, the  
2 guns were not manned and the ammunition was not there.

3 Now, will you look at exhibits 16 and 17 in relation  
4 to the "no ultimatum."

5 Admiral Ingersoll: After a hurried glance, I remember  
6 it.

7 Senator Ferguson: You remember it now?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: But I should -- may I digress  
9 for a moment to show you how your memory can trick you?  
10

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Admiral Ingersoll: Because I presented at a joint  
13 board meeting on apparently the day before this memorandum  
14 was sent, I presented at that meeting the arguments why  
15 we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back  
16 here to Washington four years later, I had forgotten com-  
17 pletely that I had ever presented such a memorandum at  
18 the Joint Board meeting. The only satisfaction I had was  
19 that it didn't sound silly after four years. And this was  
20 based on that.

21 Senator Ferguson: Sometimes that is the test, isn't  
22 it, as to how it does sound four years later?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

24 Shef  
25 fls  
10:40



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2           Senator Ferguson: Can you let me see exhibit 16? I  
3 want to call your attention to something in it.

4           There was the minutes of a meeting. Yes, here it is;  
5 on the bottom of page 2 of this exhibit 16 I am reading:

6           "Action of the United States in the Far East in  
7 Support of China -- At the request of Admiral Stark,  
8 Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken  
9 at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning,  
10 November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far  
11 Eastern situation."

12           Were you familiar with that?

13           Admiral Ingersoll: I probably was but I have forgotten  
14 it.

15           Senator Ferguson: Did you know that Admiral Schuirmann  
16 had -- here, it says this:

17           "He pointed out that on August 17, following the  
18 President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr.  
19 Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to  
20 Japan that it would be necessary for the United States  
21 to take action in case of further Japanese aggression."

22           Did you ever know that?

23           Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot recall it now unless it  
24 was phrased at the time in some other way in the note which  
25 was not at that time called an ultimatum. I have no recollection.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 tion of anything being called an ultimatum at that time.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know in Peace and War  
4 that this statement is in Peace and War?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: I have never read Peace and War, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Well, I will read it to you.

7 (Reading)

8 "During the August 1941 conference between President  
9 Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain  
10 the situation in the Far East was discussed and it was  
11 agreed that the United States and Great Britain should  
12 take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves  
13 of aggression."

14 Did you ever know that that appeared in Peace and War  
15 published by our State Department on page 129?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: I have never read Peace and War, sir.  
17 I do not know anything that is in there.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, if you had known that that  
19 was our policy and that the President on the 17th, as indi-  
20 cated by Schuirmann -- I am just giving the date that Schuir-  
21 mann indicates -- on the 17th of August, on page 556 of For-  
22 eign Relations, that the President gave to the Ambassador of  
23 Japan a note containing these words, a memorandum contain-  
24 ing these words (Reading):

25 "Such being the case, this Government now finds it



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States."

Admiral Ingersoll: I probably did not know that you have read it, but I never considered that an ultimatum, nor I do not think I ever heard it called an ultimatum. I remember what you have read.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but I was only reading what Schuirmann had said on the 3rd of November 1941 at a meeting.

Admiral Ingersoll: I remember that now.

Senator Ferguson: Now, having in mind what I have read here that the President told to the Japanese ambassador and also what I have read out of Peace and War, the parallel action statement; then having in mind this note of Winant's coming in to us at 10:20 on Saturday morning, having in mind that we were sending out three small men-of-war over to the Gulf of Siam, having in mind the fact that we had sent planes out, how do you account for the fact that we did not antici-



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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pate that Japan, when she was going to attack Great Britain or in the Kra Peninsula would not at the same time consider that parallel action was being taken and that, therefore, she would attack our fleet which was on her flank and the only deterrent in the Pacific for her movement south? How does it come the Navy did not anticipate that?

Admiral Ingersoll: I have said before that we anticipated that the Philippines, Guam and our outlying possessions might be attacked by Japan, as they were. We also anticipated that there would be submarines in the Eastern Pacific. We did not anticipate that -- at least Admiral Stark and myself did not, - that Japan would make an attack on Pearl Harbor of the character that she did.

I do not agree with your statement that the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only deterrent that prevented Japan from going into the Far East.

Senator Ferguson: What was the other deterrent?

Admiral Ingersoll: The Pacific Fleet had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity.

Senator Ferguson: Well, then, as I understand it, that



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 we were almost utterly unprepared for war in the Pacific, on  
3 your last statement.

4 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not agree with that, that we were  
5 utterly unprepared for war. We were unprepared to make an  
6 offensive campaign, to undertake an offensive campaign in the  
7 Pacific and the task that was assigned to Admiral Kimmel in  
8 the war plan stated as follows, so far as offensive action  
9 was concerned.

10 Senator Ferguson: To make raids on the Mandates, were  
11 they not?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, but a raid is not a -- is only  
13 a minor offensive.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, she was to make raids on the  
15 Mandates. They had to have a tra in to make raids, didn't  
16 they, of any distance?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: Well, he had a sufficient train for  
18 minor raids but he did not have a sufficient train, nor  
19 transports, nor troops to proceed across the Pacific and  
20 establish basis and establish the Fleet in the Pacific.

21 Somewhere in this plan, - I cannot put my finger on it,-  
22 is a provision that he was directed to plan for the occupa-  
23 tion of the Marshalls and Carolines and I think that 180  
24 days --

25 Senator Ferguson: That was Truk, was it not, that she



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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was to take Truk in 180 days, or not later, D-Day plus 180 days?

Admiral Ingersoll: I think it was confined only to the Marshalls, sir. I am not certain if Truk was mentioned. However, he would have required a long time for such an advance in force across the Pacific because he did not have the force to do it and we knew it and the Japs knew it, too.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know that Admiral Hart had sent a message to OPNAV, which was your department, on the 6th to this effect?

"Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

Admiral Ingersoll: I probably saw the dispatch but I cannot recall it now.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know that we had assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities?

Admiral Ingersoll: Only as it was provided in the war plan and in ABC-1, that should the United States be involved in war then we would do certain things, we had certain areas allocated for our spheres, but there was nothing in the war plan which obligated the United States, so far as I know, to go to the assistance of Great Britain if Great Britain was attacked. That was a decision which the Navy Department could



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 not make.

3 Senator Ferguson: I understand the Navy Department could  
4 not make it; it had to be made by someone else other than the  
5 Navy Department.

6 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

7 Senator Ferguson: But what I am trying to find out is  
8 whether or not the Navy Department had any information along  
9 this line so that she could have acted?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: I have no information that the Navy  
11 Department had any directions to go to the aid of the British,  
12 we will say, if the British were attacked.

13 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, that would indicate,  
14 then, that all this information about the movement into the  
15 Kra Peninsula was of no value in alerting you here in Wash-  
16 ington in OPNAV because you knew of no commitments that we  
17 had to go to the aid of the British.

18 Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot agree with that statement,  
19 sir, because all our own possessions, such as the Philippines,  
20 were endangered by the concentration of Japanese troops, which  
21 still remained in the Pescadores and the coast of China and  
22 in Formosa. They were a direct threat there and only twenty-  
23 four hours away from the Philippines; also Guam, which is a  
24 little further away.

25 Senator Ferguson: But you did not anticipate an air



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 attack on Hawaii?

3 Admiral Ingersoll: I did not think that an air attack  
4 would be made on Hawaii, no, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: And when you testified to what was  
6 meant by "preparatory deployment" in the dispatch of October  
7 the 16th you said this, and I will read part of your testimony  
8 and ask you whether you agree with it today:

9 "I think the preparatory deployment that would not  
10 constitute provocative action and disclose strategic  
11 intentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal  
12 of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China  
13 Sea area toward the Southeastern Philippines rather than  
14 to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with  
15 the possible exceptions of sending out submarines for  
16 observation."

17 Is that correct?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct so far as carrying  
19 out the tasks prescribed in the war plan. The withdrawal  
20 from the Manila area was a part of Admiral Hart's plan.  
21 Also, "take measures,- whatever measures were necessary for  
22 the security of the Fleet at Hawaii" might be construed also  
23 as a part of a defensive deployment and, as a matter of fact,  
24 Admiral Kimmel in his own war plan had just such measures  
25 prescribed by him at the time we were not at war with Japan,



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 in what he called the first phase.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now let us come back to Washington  
4 on the day of the 6th. Do you remember the 6th of December  
5 in relation to your work, anything happening up until the  
6 time that you went home that was unusual as far as messages  
7 were concerned or information?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: Well, all of those days were busy days.

9 Senator Ferguson: I appreciate that.

10 Admiral Ingersoll: And I cannot pick out now out of the  
11 air a particular thing.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, when did you first learn that  
13 t here was a message coming in, being intercepted from Japan,  
14 that was indicating an answer to the message of Secretary of  
15 State Hull of the 26th of November? You know the message I  
16 am talking about.

17 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes. I never learned that it was  
18 coming in. The first I heard about it was when I was awakened  
19 some time on the very late evening of the sixth or the morn-  
20 ing of the seventh and, as I said before, I do not know whether  
21 it was before or after midnight when I was shown the first  
22 thirteen parts of the message that had been translated.

23 Senator Ferguson: All right.

24 Admiral Ingersoll: I never learned that that message  
25 was coming in and that it was being translated.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: All right. And I assume that you read it that night when they showed it to you?

Admiral Ingersoll: I did.

Senator Ferguson: Now, were there any other messages with it?

Admiral Ingersoll: I do not recall any now.

Senator Ferguson: Was there a pilot message with it?

Admiral Ingersoll: I never heard of a pilot message until I heard them talking about it yesterday.

Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know what we are talking about when we are talking about this pilot message?

Admiral Ingersoll: No, sir, I do not.

Senator Ferguson: I want to show it to you. It is called "pilot" because it merely indicates that there was a message to come and it was to be delivered when they were told to deliver it.

If you will look on the bottom of page 238, it is the message there from Tokyo to Washington, December the 6th.

The Vice Chairman: Of exhibit 1, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, exhibit 1. And it is translated on the 6th of December.

Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know whether I saw that or not; I do not recall it. Being dated the 6th the usual thing would have been I would have seen it on the morning of



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 the seventh, when dispatches of this character were distri-  
3 buted.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, there was a distribution, though,  
5 Saturday night.

6 Admiral Ingersoll: There was a distribution, so far as  
7 I was concerned on Saturday night, of what they told me were  
8 the first thirteen parts of a fourteen part message and they  
9 also told me that those thirteen parts had been or would be  
10 taken to Mr. Knox and to the President.

11 Senator Ferguson: And that being true I assume that  
12 you assumed that it would be taken care of and proper action  
13 would be taken on the thirteen parts.

14 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, and when I read the thirteen  
15 parts there was nothing on which the Navy Department as such  
16 could that night take action. The gist of the thirteen parts  
17 was a restatement of the Japanese position which we had know,  
18 of course, all along.

19 Senator Ferguson: As a matter of fact, the Secretary of  
20 State had turned it over to the Navy and said that he was  
21 through as far as any negotiations were concerned on the 27th,  
22 did he not?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: That was correct. That is, I have  
24 read that he said so.

25 Senator Ferguson: Well, you knew that at the time?



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Ingersoll: I did not know what the Secretary  
3 said at the time but I knew when Admiral Stark sent out the  
4 message of the 27th that so far as the State Department and  
5 the Navy Department was concerned negotiations were finished,  
6 but everything after that was just for the record.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes, just for the record. Now, Ad-  
8 miral, you knew where you had been Saturday evening. You  
9 could be reached at your home.

10 Admiral Ingersoll: So far as I know I was at my home  
11 from the time I left the Navy Department and I do not know now  
12 what time I left the Navy Department. I was there many nights  
13 until eight and nine o'clock in the evening and I do not re-  
14 member now what time I left the Navy Department but I was at  
15 my home.

16 Senator Ferguson: Did you contact Admiral Stark that  
17 evening?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: No, I did not.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you know where he was?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not think I did but I am cer-  
21 tain that after having seen what this thirteen part message  
22 had in it that if the officers who brought it there had men-  
23 tioned Admiral Stark I would have told them not to take it to  
24 him that night because all it had in it was a restatement of  
25 the Japanese position from way back and there was nothing on



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 which the Navy Department as such could have taken action.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know it was of sufficient  
4 importance that Secretary Knox of the Navy got in touch with  
5 the Secretary of State that night and the Secretary of War  
6 and called a conference for ten o'clock Sunday morning?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: I did not know at the time but I pre-  
8 sume that the reason for the conference was because they were  
9 expecting the fourteenth part, which would probably have the  
10 meat in it.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, you say that it only indicated  
12 what you knew before, the thirteen parts; that is, that every-  
13 thing was through, that this was for the record. You read  
14 that from the thirteen parts?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

16 Senator Ferguson: Then why wait on the fourteenth part?  
17 What difference does it make as to what the fourteenth part  
18 said? This was all for the record and you knew what it was  
19 saying.

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know what the fourteenth  
21 part -- I did not know at the time what the fourteenth part  
22 was going to contain, of course.

23 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then you went back to  
24 your home and went to bed. You got up the next morning and  
25 what time did you get down to the office?



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Admiral Ingersoll: I was down there some time between  
3 eight and nine o'clock Sunday morning.

4 Senator Ferguson: And was there a meeting at eight or  
5 nine, between eight and nine o'clock?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: There was no scheduled meeting. Ad-  
7 miral Stark came in somewhere around that time and the offi-  
8 cers began bringing in dispatches. I believe the fourteenth  
9 part was delivered to Admiral Stark that morning.

10 Senator Ferguson: About what time?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Were you at a meeting with Admiral  
13 Stark in his office?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: I was in and out of the office, of  
15 course, all the time. Our offices were --

16 Senator Ferguson: Adjoining?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: Not adjoining, but there was an en-  
18 trance way and the Secretary's room between them and I was  
19 in and out all the time. I have forgotten exactly what we  
20 talked about when he came in or whether we even talked,  
21 whether I even talked to him the moment he came in.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, there was nothing happened at  
23 any meeting where you were present with Admiral Stark on  
24 Sunday morning after the fourteenth part arrived that indicated  
25 war?



Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Witness Ingersoll

1 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not recall that Admiral Stark  
2 after -- in fact, I am certain that Admiral Stark after he  
3 received the fourteenth part of the message did not call me  
4 at that time. I do not think -- or I think that I did not  
5 learn of the contents of the fourteenth part and of the in-  
6 structions to the ambassadors to deliver the whole message at  
7 one o'clock until after Admiral Stark told me of his conver-  
8 sation with General Marshall.

9 Senator Ferguson: So that was some time after 11:30?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: It must have been.

11 Senator Ferguson: After 11:30.

12 Admiral Ingersoll: But I had on my -- when I got down  
13 there in the morning I would have a stack of dispatches as  
14 big as that and things to go over in connection with other mat-  
15 ters of the fleet.

16 Senator Ferguson: It had nothing to do with this four-  
17 teenth part?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: Nothing to do with me. Other matters  
19 of the Department, which were down in my sphere and not up  
20 in the high levels.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether or not Ad-  
22 miral Stark talked to the President that morning?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know.

24 Senator Ferguson: After he talked with General Marshall  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 you had a conversation with him?

3 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes. He told me that he had talked  
4 to General Marshall.

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And did you see General Marshall  
6 on the seventh?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: I did not.

8 Senator Ferguson: What was the conversation that you  
9 had with Admiral Stark after he had talked with General Mar-  
10 shall?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: As I recall, Admiral Stark said that  
12 he had, after seeing the dispatch regarding the delivery of  
13 the Japanese message at one o'clock, that he had called up  
14 General Marshall about it and at first he thought that he would  
15 not send anything to Admiral Kimmel because we had already  
16 sent him a lot of stuff and then he almost immediately changed  
17 his mind and called General Marshall and said he thought they  
18 should send it to Admiral Kimmel and to General Short.

19 Senator Ferguson: And that is the conversation you had  
20 with him that morning?

21 Admiral Ingersoll: That is as I remember it in general  
22 terms, yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes, in substance.

24 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know whether he used those  
25 exact words.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Yes. That is it in substance.

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: We do not expect the exact language.

Admiral Ingersoll: That is the substance, yes.

Senator Ferguson: And you that morning were working on something else and, therefore, there was nothing unusual except this one conversation with Admiral Stark.

Admiral Ingersoll: It is difficult to remember all of the details of a day because the officers, the heads of departments would come in to talk over other matters, there were dispatches to release, to send out, there were telephone calls to answer. I cannot recall the details of everything that happened that morning.

Senator Ferguson: But at least nothing happened that indicated to you about this one o'clock message of delivery being dawn at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll: No. I think that that just did not hit me, that is all.

Senator Ferguson: That just did not hit you.

Admiral Ingersoll: As a matter of fact, I do not know when Admiral Stark told me about the delivery at one o'clock or delivery -- yes, one o'clock.

Senator Ferguson: Do you think it was after the attack that he told you about that?



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Admiral Ingersoll: No.

Senator Ferguson: Some time before?

Admiral Ingersoll: It must have been; I know it was before. Yes, it was before.

Senator Ferguson: But when he discussed it with you nothing hit you, as you say, that one o'clock meant dawn at Pearl Harbor and that that might be an attack there, because war was unorthodox, as we have found out in Europe, as we had found out in the Atlantic, and you were looking for unorthodox things, were you not, at that time?

Admiral Ingersoll: I have said all along, Senator, that I personally did not expect an attack of that kind at Pearl Harbor, so it is natural that it did not occur to me.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you know that Admiral Kimmel was not receiving the magic as far as the purple was concerned and the diplomatic messages?

Admiral Ingersoll: I am not sure whether I knew that or not, sir. That was a part of the mechanics of that complicated system and I do not know whether I knew that Admiral Kimmel was not receiving it or not. I knew, of course, that he was a source of information regarding movements of ships obtained by radio direction finders and analysis of traffic.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll: And I am not certain whether I knew



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 whether he was not getting those dispatches or not. It is  
3 very difficult after four years to know what you now know  
4 as to whether you knew it before that time or whether you  
5 learned it after.

6 Senator Ferguson: I appreciate that. Well, now, that  
7 fact that you knew that he was getting radio messages as far  
8 as finding ships were concerned, - there had been a dispute  
9 between Com 16, which was at the Philippines, and Com 14,  
10 which was at Hawaii, and on the 24th -- I will ask you to  
11 look at the message, whether or not that did not indicate  
12 that they were going to take Com 16's word instead of Com  
13 14's word because they were nearer to Tokyo?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: I am not familiar with the details  
15 on which that dispatch was based.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, is this true then, Admiral,  
17 that when Admiral Stark was there at the office --

18 Admiral Ingersoll: Sunday morning?

19 Senator Ferguson: No, when he was able to be reached,  
20 that you did not get these intercepted messages and that you  
21 did not have full, detailed knowledge of what was going on in  
22 the Pacific?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: What messages are you talking about,  
24 Senator?

25 Senator Ferguson: I am talking about these diplomatic



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 messages in exhibit 1 there, the ship movement messages that  
3 we showed you yesterday, that someone showed you in exhibit 2.

4 Admiral Ingersoll: I saw a great many of those when they  
5 were brought around and I am pretty sure that there are some  
6 that I did not see.

7 Just, for example, what I was talking about yesterday:  
8 I am certain that I did not see at that time any of the dis-  
9 patches from Japan directing their consuls and diplomats to  
10 destroy their codes. There are half a dozen or more, maybe  
11 fifteen or twenty. They brought in to me for release the mes-  
12 sage to our fleets informing them that the codes were to be  
13 destroyed. I remember that very, very distinctly because  
14 that is important. I am absolutely positive that I never saw  
15 the fifteen or dozen messages on which that dispatch was based.

16 So that when I now say that I do not recall seeing this  
17 message, I am not sure that I did see this or that message. I  
18 saw a great many, some of which I remember, and I have seen  
19 other messages which I now recall that I had no recollection  
20 of seeing.

21 I remember one, for example, which reported the movements  
22 of a British battleships up at Puget Sound. I had forgotten  
23 it completely until I saw it in this exhibit and then I re-  
24 membered having seen it. I would have sworn on a stack of  
25 Bibles as high as the Washington monument last July that I



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 never had seen it.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, as I understand it,  
4 then, all these messages were not delivered to you and who  
5 selected the messages to be delivered to you, or was it on  
6 occasions when Admiral Stark was absent that you were shown the  
7 messages?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: The Director of Naval Intelligence  
9 was the one under whom the distribution of these messages was  
10 made and the officers would bring these dispatches around and  
11 they would sometimes leave the folder on your desk or they  
12 would leave it with Admiral Stark's aide and sometimes they  
13 would be clipped to show you an important message. There were  
14 some times where I might be absent from my office for a good  
15 part of the day for conferences or other reasons and I might  
16 have missed a day's messages.

17 Senator Ferguson: Then what I am getting at, how could  
18 anyone evaluate these messages if they were missing some of  
19 them?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: As I told you before --

21 Senator Ferguson: That was not your job.

22 Admiral Ingersoll: (Continuing) -- when I first started  
23 my testimony and when I was describing my duties there, I  
24 did not have original cognizance of war plans, nor of Intelli-  
25 gence nor of communications. I was a funnel through which



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 stuff was relayed to try to take the load off of Admiral  
3 Stark of all the details and that I endeavored to do and that  
4 was a busy job.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, you were working then on the  
6 details. Could you tell us this: Who would know why planes  
7 were not being sent to Pearl Harbor for defense as was being  
8 requested by Admiral Kimmel and if they were being sent else-  
9 where? Who would have charge of that? Would you know about  
10 that if you were handling the details?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, I would know about that but the  
12 actual distribution of planes between the Atlantic and the  
13 Pacific was almost exactly about in accordance with the distri-  
14 bution of forces assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific in  
15 WPL-46. Also, the distribution of ships was almost in accord-  
16 ance with that.

17 Senator Ferguson: What about the distribution of planes  
18 on Lend-Lease, and so forth? Who had charge of that?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot tell you anything about  
20 Lend-Lease, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: So you do not know what proportion  
22 was coming to America for its defense and what was going to  
23 Lend-Lease in the war effort?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot tell you anything about that.

25 Senator Ferguson: You haven't knowledge of that and



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 even though you had charge of the details you cannot give us  
3 that?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: No, sir.

5 Mr. Muppy: Will the Senator yield?

6 Senator Ferguson: Not at this moment.

7 Who represented the Navy on this Lend-Lease?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: Admiral Reeves, I believe, was the  
9 Navy Department's representative on that.

10 Senator Ferguson: But that did not come to you?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: No.

12 Senator Ferguson: Now I want to ask you just a few ques-  
13 tions on the winds execute message. They showed you the ex-  
14 ecute message prior to the 7th, as I understand it; someone  
15 came into your office and showed you the message.

16 Admiral Ingersoll: They showed me what was supposed to  
17 be one at that time.

18 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

19 Admiral Ingersoll: And I believed it.

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And you believed it. Now, you  
21 never knew until after the attack that that was not a genuine  
22 winds message?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know that I ever knew until  
24 some time after the Court of Inquiry last year that that was  
25 not a genuine message. I believed it was.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Yes, you believed it was and, there-  
3 fore, your conduct was based in relation to that message upon  
4 it being a genuine winds message, execute message?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: No, because it came in after the  
6 destruction of the codes and it did not mean anything, par-  
7 ticularly after that. It was not important.

8 Senator Ferguson: That is what you say, but it was not  
9 because you thought it was phoney?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: No.

11 Senator Ferguson: It was merely because it was con-  
12 sidered information, is that correct?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: The use that I made of it was only  
14 that it was a confirmation of the other.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, is J. M. Reeves, -  
16 was he the Admiral in charge of Lend-Lease?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct, sir. He was re-  
18 tired.

19 Senator Ferguson: That is the same man that was on the  
20 Roberts Commission, is he not?

21 Admiral Ingersoll: He is.

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes. So the Admiral who was in charge  
23 of Lend-Lease, the distribution of these planes to Lend-Lease  
24 or to our defense, was the same as the one on the Commission,  
25 there is no doubt about that?







Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 have meant here when they were destroying their codes, that  
3 no overt act would be necessarily committed but they did not  
4 want this country to be in a position to raid their embassy  
5 and take their codes whether or not there was war or not?  
6 Isn't that true?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know why they sent out the  
8 dispatch, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: But would you say that all Navy men  
10 would come to the conclusion that the moment that codes  
11 were going to be destroyed that that meant war between the  
12 countries?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: That was what we construed it and I  
14 think everybody construed it, that it would mean that.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, you know of no one in  
16 the high command in the Navy that construed the destruction  
17 of the codes in any other way than you construed them?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: I think everybody in the Navy De-  
19 partment construed the destruction of the codes as the fact  
20 that Japan expected to be at war very shortly with the three  
21 countries that were involved in that series of messages.

22 Senator Ferguson: Then we come to this conclusion, that  
23 at least on the 4th, - I think that is the date they sent  
24 the messages out, was it not?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: Third or fourth.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2       Senator Ferguson: Third or fourth, that everyone in the  
3 Navy, as far as the high command was concerned, were alerted  
4 that war was going to occur between America and Japan?

5       Admiral Ingersoll: Those instructions were sent to cer-  
6 tain commanders, to the commanders of the fleet, to the naval  
7 attaches in Pekin and to the Marine detachments and others  
8 and the purpose of sending it to them was to inform them that  
9 we expected to be at war, - or that Japan expected to be at  
10 war with those countries in a very short time.

11       Senator Ferguson: And our country was one of them?

12       Admiral Ingersoll: And our country was one of them.

13       Senator Ferguson: Well, then, why didn't you tell them  
14 when you sent out those messages that the Navy Department, the  
15 high command, had interpreted these destruction of code mes-  
16 sages as meaning immediate war? Why did you leave it open  
17 for two constructions?

18       Admiral Ingersoll: It was expected that they would un-  
19 derstand it and if they did not understand it nobody asked any  
20 questions about it. We never had one inquiry from any com-  
21 mander afloat as to what the dispatches from the Chief of  
22 Naval Operations meant or what their import was, nor asking  
23 for any elaboration and in the absence of those we had to  
24 construe that his instructions were understood.

25       Senator Ferguson: Now, will you look on page 45 of



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 exhibit 37? That is the message sent on the 6th and I under-  
3 stand was not delivered until Monday. That is the one read-  
4 ing:

5 "In view of the international situation and the  
6 exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may  
7 authorize the destruction by them of secret and confi-  
8 dential documents now or under later conditions of  
9 greater emergency. Means of communication to support our  
10 current operations and special intelligence should of  
11 course be maintained until the last moment."

12 Did you release or know that that had not been delivered  
13 until Monday?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: Admiral Noyes --

15 Senator Ferguson: At least until after the attack?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: Admiral Noyes and I discussed that  
17 message yesterday, sir, and I think Admiral Noyes is prepared  
18 to give you the answer to it. I cannot answer your question  
19 that it was not delivered on the 6th or the 7th or any other  
20 date.

21 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now let us go to page 40  
22 and 41 of exhibit 37.

23 Admiral Ingersoll: 40 and 41?

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I want to read this and I want  
to ask you a few questions about them. Now, you told me that



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 you did not see these messages, that you were only brought in  
3 certain messages that you released. When did you release  
4 these?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: The one on page 40 I released.

6 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then you did see this one?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

8 Senator Ferguson: You did not see the intercepts is  
9 what you had in mind?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: It says in here that there were --  
11 the consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila,  
12 Washington and London. I did not see all of the dispatches  
13 that were received on which this dispatch was based.

14 Senator Ferguson: All right.

15 Admiral Ingersoll: As a matter of fact, I don't think I  
16 saw any of them.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, it says:

18 "Highly reliable information has been received,  
19 that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yester-  
20 day to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong  
21 Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London"--  
22 now, this is the important part --  
23 "to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and  
24 to burn all other important confidential and secret  
25 documents."



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Didn't that indicate that they were only to destroy most  
3 of them and hold on to certain codes and code machines so that  
4 they could get more information?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

6 Senator Ferguson: And do you say that that meant immed-  
7 iate war?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: I said that they expected to be at  
9 war in a very short time.

10 Senator Ferguson: Just the destruction of a number of  
11 their codes indicated they were going to be at war in a very  
12 short time, was that the interpretation?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: It meant that to us.

14 Senator Ferguson: It meant that to you?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: And apparently that was true because  
16 within five days we were at war.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, it is proven --

18 Admiral Ingersoll: It is proven it was a correct assump-  
19 tion.

20 Senator Ferguson: But you knew that they were keeping  
21 some of the machines because you were getting traffic over it?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: That is right.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now, circular 2444 on page 41, from  
24 Tokyo, 1 December, ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore and  
25 Manila -- not Washington, Washington is not mentioned in



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 this message -- "to destroy machine. Batavia machine already  
3 sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed  
4 destroy. All but one copy of other systems and all secret  
5 documents. British Admiralty London today reports embassy  
6 London has complied."

7 Now, doesn't that still leave in Washington some code  
8 machines and does that mean war?

9 Admiral Ingersoll: It meant they were hanging onto some-  
10 thing until the last moment, that is all it means.

11 Senator Ferguson: And you were waiting for that last  
12 moment?

13 Admirall Ingersoll: This particular dispatch I did not  
14 see. It refers to the details and is largely for the purpose  
15 of enabling the various people who were concerned with  
16 cryptography to know what had gone out and what systems were  
17 being maintained until the last moment.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, this one talked  
19 about machines. The previous one only about codes and it did  
20 not say anything about destroying the machines here in Wash-  
21 ington.

22 Admiral Ingersoll: The purpose of this is for the  
23 experts who do the cryptography to know what particular sys-  
24 tems were being used. The other was for the laity, so to  
25 speak, that did not care whether it was a machine or a code



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 book or what.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you know of a message being sent  
4 out of ONI and the Army to the effect that the embassy here  
5 were burning their codes on the night of the 5th of December?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know whether I saw it or  
7 not, nor whether I knew it.

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you have anything to do with  
9 answering Admiral Hart's inquiry about the Phillips conversa-  
10 tion, that he had with Admiral Phillips?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I will say I had nothing to do about  
12 drafting the reply because I did not sit in on the delibera-  
13 tions for ABC-1 and so certainly would not -- I was not fam-  
14 ilar with it. That would normally have been answered in  
15 the War Plans Division by Admiral Turner, who had original  
16 cognizance of most of that, of matters of that kind and who  
17 was a member of our delegation who sat in on the preparation  
18 of ABC-1.

19 Senator Ferguson: All right. And you did not discuss  
20 with Admiral Stark what our position was in relation to  
21 ABC-1 or ABCD?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: I am not sure whether they were  
23 talking about ABCD-1 at that time or ABC-1.

24 Senator Ferguson: Well, at least you did not discuss  
25 with Admiral Stark as to what our position was going to be



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 if an attack was made in the South Pacific and we were not  
2 attacked?

3  
4 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know whether I discussed it  
5 with him or not. We talked about everything under the sun,  
6 but, of course, it was perfectly clear in everybody's mind  
7 that if the United States' possessions were not attacked that  
8 there was nothing that the Navy Department could do about it  
9 until we got further instructions from somebody.

10 Senator Ferguson: And that is what you had discussed  
11 with Admiral Stark?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know whether I discussed it  
13 or not but everybody understood that position and I do not  
14 know whether a reply was ever drafted to Admiral Hart. War  
15 may have come before the question was answered.

16 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

17 The Vice Chairman: Any further questions?

18 Senator Lucas: I have a few questions.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

20 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Ingersoll, I have a faint recol-  
22 lection of reading something in the public prints back in  
23 1940 or 1941 that you were sent on a very secret mission to  
24 London by the President. Is that correct?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: You are correct except as to your



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 date, sir.

3 Mr. Gearhart: When did that occur?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: Just to show again how memory can  
5 trick a person, Admiral Richardson, I read in the paper, had  
6 testified that I went to London in 1940 when I was Assistant  
7 Chief of Naval Operations and when Admiral Stark was Chief  
8 of Naval Operations. As a matter of fact, I went in December,  
9 very late in December of 1937, when I was Director of the  
10 War Plans Division and when Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval  
11 Operations. Admiral Richardson was perfectly sincere in what  
12 he said.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Well, that was pretty early, before events  
14 began to develop.

15 Admiral Ingersoll: I got there probably, - I believe on  
16 New Year's eve of 1937, so if you want to ask me any questions  
17 about it, sir, my memory is just that much worse. It is eight  
18 years ago. I will be glad to answer anything that you care  
19 to ask me.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Did your mission have anything to do with  
21 anything which later became important and material to the  
22 inquiry that is now being conducted?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: I think it had none whatever. I am  
24 perfectly willing to tell you what I can now. I was sent  
25 over there for two purposes.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering as to whether or not this committee has a right to go into what occurred in London in 1937 that has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Ingersoll: I think it is germane to the inquiry.

Mr. Murphy: Well, if it is germane, all right.

Admiral Ingersoll: There were two purposes. The primary purpose was to investigate and to talk with the British Admiralty officials as to what we could do if the United States and Japan were to find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific.

Mr. Richardson: United States and England.

Admiral Ingersoll: United States and England would find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific, to explore all the means, what means could be used, what arrangements it would be necessary to make in regard to command relationships, in regard to communicating with each other, of establishing liaison officers and preparing certain codes and ciphers, and so forth.

The purpose next of the visit, the other purpose was to take up with the British the question of getting out of the qualitative limitations of the size of battleships which had been stipulated in the London Naval Treaty of 1935 and 1936.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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There was a great deal of mystery about the visit, according to the News Week, I think it was, in which there was no truth whatever in the story in News Week, except that I had gone to London, and when I came back there was considerable curiosity, I believe, on the Hill as to why I had gone and I think it was finally elicited out of Admiral Leahy that I had gone over there to discuss the London Naval Treaty of 1936 with the British.

I brought back with me a paper called, "Record of Conversations" and that paper was signed by Captain Phillips, who was the head of the War Plans Division, the British Admiral who was later Admiral Phillips and killed on the Prince of Wales shortly after the war began.

I was in conversation with -- I had no conversations with anybody but -- I will detail the conversations first.

I saw the charge d'affaire, who was the American charge d'affaire and told him the purpose. He took me to Mr. Anthony Eden, who was the Foreign Minister at that time. He said it was entirely an Admiralty matter and the Admiralty turned me over to the War Plans Division and my only discussions were with the War Plans Division. It was of no higher level than the two Directors of War Plans of the respective Navy Departments.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you mean the War Plans Division of



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 the British?

3 Admiral Ingersoll: The War Plans Division of the British,  
4 Admiralty staff and our own. Captain Phillips and I were  
5 opposite members or parts of our staffs. There were no commit-  
6 ments in this document of any character. It became a dead  
7 cat when ABC-1 was agreed upon, because that superseded every-  
8 thing that was in the record of the conversations, primarily,  
9 of course, because Germany was in the war at that time.

10 So that there was nothing in this talk or any agreements  
11 between the British and ourselves that you might say that was  
12 based on that record of conversations except possibly the  
13 original distribution of codes and ciphers because we got up a  
14 reserve stock which were distributed in case they were needed  
15 anywhere, which gave the communication officers code and  
16 call signs, and so forth.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Did you establish and agree upon a code  
18 for communications subsequent to that visit?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: We took an allied code which the  
20 British already had. The codes were not distributed to our  
21 Navy. They were placed in reserve in various places in Brit-  
22 ish hands. There were a large number here in the British Ad-  
23 miralty so that they could be handled by the communications  
24 officers if they had to use them, but they were never distri-  
25 buted to each other. None of the documents that I speak of,  
I mean call signs and radio intelligence or anything like  
that, - I mean radio frequency organization.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Were the assumptions upon which these conversations were based that the United States and Britain would be in war together?

Admiral Ingersoll: The assumption was that the United States and Great Britain might find themselves both at war with Japan in the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart: And your purpose in going there was to work out a tentative plan as to how each nation would cooperate with the other in the event that should occur?

Admiral Ingersoll: That is right, to find out what we could do, what forces we could expect. The British had to be a little bit careful about it because they did not know at that time whether they were going to have, in a year or two, a European war on their hands, and they could not state definitely what forces they could allocate to the Pacific at that time.

It would depend on whether they were involved in Europe.

Mr. Gearhart: This was in 1937?

Admiral Ingersoll: I got to London, I think, on the New Year's Eve of 1937, so the discussions were in the first two or three weeks of 1938.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, Britain was not then at war with even Germany.

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Admiral Ingersoll: That is what I say.

Mr. Gearhart: She was looking very deeply into the future at the time you entered into these conversations, was she not?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: At that time was war with Japan considered as being more possible than war in the European Continent?

Admiral Ingersoll: As I said, this is eight years ago, sir, and I cannot at the moment tell the exact diplomatic situation that caused the President to send me at that time. I have forgotten just what the international situation as regards Japan was at that time.

Mr. Gearhart: Did you go there to discuss Japan or Germany?

Admiral Ingersoll: Japan only.

Mr. Gearhart: And because England was more disturbed with the possibility of war with Germany, they could not give you definite answers in respect to what they would do in the Pacific in the event they were involved in a war there; is that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll: It referred largely to the numbers of ships that they could send to the Pacific if they were involved at the same time in a war in Europe and in the



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1 Mediterranean. In other words, they could not say de-  
2 finitely how many battleships or how many carriers or  
3 destroyers they could send.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you have said that you discussed  
5 the possibility of the United States and England both  
6 being involved in a war with Japan. Did you discuss  
7 the hypothetical situation of Britain being involved and  
8 the United States not being involved, or the United  
9 States being involved and Britain not being involved?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: No.

11 Mr. Gearhart: All of your discussions were based  
12 upon the assumption that both might be involved; is that  
13 correct?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct, as to what we  
15 could do together.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Was there any discussion of the possi-  
17 bilities that the United States might not be interested  
18 in being on the side of the British, or the British might  
19 not be interested in being on the side of the Americans  
20 in the events that hostilities arose in the Orient?

21 Admiral Ingersoll: These conversations were on a  
22 lower level than that, sir. They were conversations  
23 of the two war plans divisions to get down to brass tacks  
24 as to what we could do in the way of ships, men, and  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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planes.

Mr. Gearhart: Was any other nation drawn into the conversations? For instance, the Dutch?

Admiral Ingersoll: The Dutch did not participate in the discussions. The only way in which the Dutch came into the thing was as to whether or not the Dutch would be allies, or whether we could hope for benevolent neutrality on the part of the Dutch. We did not know what the Dutch would do.

The Dutch were not told about it, as far as I know.

Mr. Gearhart: No representative of the Netherlands sat in on those conversations?

Admiral Ingersoll: No. The only representatives of the United States were myself and the Naval Attache in London, whom I took along so that he could bring along with him what we said, and we could prepare notes when we got through, and we could remember what was said by each party, and there was Captain Philips, and two other officers, and sometimes three or four other officers of the British War Plans Division.

Mr. Gearhart: The Captain Philips you refer to was a British officer?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: He was your opposite there?



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Admiral Ingersoll: He was my opposite over there in War Plans. It was quite a low level conference.

Mr. Gearhart: Were any Naval officers of the French Government present in those discussions?

Admiral Ingersoll: There was nobody present, sir, except two Americans, and most of the time three and sometimes four British officers.

Mr. Gearhart: Who were the Americans that participated with you?

Admiral Ingersoll: Captain Russell Wilsson, the Naval Attache, who is now Vice Admiral Wilsson. I took him along to remember what we had said, and what the British had said, and we wrote it down after each meeting.

Mr. Gearhart: You spoke of two or three Americans.

Admiral Ingersoll: No, two or three British, and sometimes four.

Mr. Gearhart: And yourself and the Naval Attache from the American Embassy in London?

Admiral Ingersoll: That is right.

Mr. Gearhart: Before you returned to Washington, did you have any conversations independently with the French, the Belgians, or the Dutch in which you discussed the same general subject?

Admiral Ingersoll: I never talked about this thing



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h6 1 with anybody except the three or four British officers  
2 that I told you about.

3 Senator Lucas: How about the Irish?

4 Mr. Gearhart: All right. Did you have any discus-  
5 sions with the Irish?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: Unless some of the British officers  
7 were Irish, I do not know.

8 Mr. Gearhart: That is not always so facetious, you  
9 know, because we were having discussions with Ireland  
10 later.

11 Mr. Murphy: What is going on about the Irish here?

12 Mr. Gearhart: And you were sent on that mission by  
13 the President?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir, I was called over to  
15 the White House before I went to London, to receive my  
16 instructions.

17 Mr. Gearhart: As you now remember it, will you tell  
18 us what those instructions were?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: The instructions were to explore  
20 with the British what we could do if we both found  
21 ourselves involved in a war in the Far East with Japan.

22 Also to take up the question regarding the limita-  
23 tion on the size of capital ships which was stipulated  
24 in the London Treaty of 1936. I am not certain whether  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1 I got the latter instructions from the President or from  
2 Admiral Leahy about the capital ships.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Now, will you say whether or not it  
4 was 1936 or 1937 that you made the trip?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: I stated definitely, sir, that  
6 it was in the latter part of December of 1937 that I  
7 arrived in London, I believe on New Year's Eve, of 1937,  
8 and the discussions took place the first two or three  
9 weeks of January, 1938. I was away from Washington exactly  
10 30 days.

11 Mr. Gearhart: You have said over and over again you  
12 wanted to explore what the United States could do, and  
13 what the British could do.

14 Admiral Ingersoll: That is right.

15 Mr. Gearhart: The discussions did not go as far as  
16 what the United States would do, or what the British would  
17 do?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: It was not an agreement. There  
19 was nothing binding on anybody. It was simply to ascertain  
20 what could be done.

21 Mr. Gearhart: It had only to do with possible co-  
22 operative military action?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

24 Mr. Gearhart: I did not know it started so soon.  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
Senator Lucas

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1 Thank you, Admiral.

2 Admiral Ingersoll: As I say, that record of conver-  
3 sations became entirely obsolete when the later agreements  
4 in ABC-1 were in effect in 1940 or 1941.

5 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of  
6 questions.

7 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will  
8 inquire, Admiral.

9 Senator Lucas: Admiral, you are sure you did not  
10 talk about the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7th, 1941,  
11 when you were in London there in 1937?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: I am sure we did not.

13 Senator Lucas: Now, Admiral, all through these hear-  
14 ings there has been an implication that there was some  
15 sort of wrong that we had committed in this country by  
16 having these conversations with the British and Dutch.

17 I would like to ask you what our position would have  
18 been on December 7, 1941, with respect to the English  
19 and Dutch if we had not had some preliminary planning  
20 with these countries prior to that time, on the theory  
21 that Japan might attack both Britain and the United States  
22 at the same time, which she did?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: It would have been indefensible.

24 Senator Lucas: What do you mean by "it would have  
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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been indefensible?

Admiral Ingersoll: Rather inexcusable, not to have done so.

Senator Lucas: Well, would you care to elaborate a little further and give us your reasons, give the committee your reasons as to why it would have been inexcusable? That question has been asked over and over again in these committee hearings, that is, the possibility of having some sort of joint agreement, or the possibility of having some joint warning against Japan has been given here in these hearings, and an inference at least, an implication that it would have been highly improper for us to have done anything of that kind.

That is the reason I want to have you answer that question.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield for a moment?

Senator Lucas: I want him to answer the question first.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead and answer it.

Admiral Ingersoll: The answer is that everybody knew as indicated by this trip that I made to London in 1938, that sooner or later we were all going to be involved in a war in the Pacific which would include the Dutch, the



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1 Chinese possibly, the Russians, the British, and ourselves,  
2 and we had to make preliminary arrangements to explore  
3 what could be done to arrange for a means of communicating  
4 with each other, for establishing liaison, intelligence,  
5 and other things, so if war did come, we would not be  
6 floundering around for months until we got together.

7 Does that answer your question?

8 Senator Lucas: That answers my question.

9 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will the Senator  
10 yield?

11 Senator Lucas: Just a moment. Let me finish. You  
12 had a long, long time with the Admiral, and I just had a  
13 second or two.

14 Senator Ferguson: I consider the insinuations that were  
15 made because of some questions that I asked, and I just  
16 wanted to make it clear on the record.

17 Senator Lucas: You make it clear after I finish,  
18 Senator. If the shoe fits on the question I asked, you  
19 will have to wear it and explain it later.

20 Senator Ferguson: I do not have to make any explana-  
21 tions to you, but I will on this record.

22 Senator Lucas: That is all right. I am part of the  
23 record here.

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Admiral, in the event these plans had not been origi-  
3 nated between the English and the Dutch and this country  
4 you state it would have been indefensible and inexcusable,  
5 and in that I agree with you.

6 Do you further agree with me that if that had not been  
7 done and considering the months that it would have taken  
8 floundering around to then prepare a joint defense against  
9 the peace-loving Japs, that we would have lost probably many,  
10 many men and material, and what not, as the result of our  
11 failure to prepare in advance?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: There is no question that we should  
13 have done just exactly what we did. Of course it was diffi-  
14 cult to estimate just what would have been saved or not,  
15 but there is no question about it, we would have been  
16 floundering about for months until we got together and be  
17 able to co-operate and operate with each other successfully.

18 Senator Lucas: Now I want to ask you one question,  
19 Admiral, with respect to a question that was asked yesterday  
20 by Congressman Gearhart. He said:

21 "Did it not involve the sending of the Fleet down  
22 into the Marshalls before the Jap attack, and we became  
23 involved in this war?

24 "Admiral Ingersoll: I haven't the plan here, but my  
25 recollection of the plan was that the offensive movement



Witness Ingersoll

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Questions by: Senator Lucas

to the Marshalls did not take place until D plus 180."

Can you verify that?

Admiral Ingersoll: I was trying to look for that here.

Senator Lucas: Is that in the War Plans?

Mr. Murphy: Section 3212, Volume 1, of the Naval Narrative, page 103, subsection B.

Admiral Ingersoll: That is the joint plan.

Mr. Murphy: Page 103 of the Naval Narrative, Section 3212.

Senator Lucas: Here is the Navy plan here that was prepared, I think, by Admiral Kimmel, Exhibit 114.

Mr. Murphy: Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5.

Mr. Richardson: He is looking for WPL-46.

Admiral Ingersoll: It should be in the Navy Basic Plan.

Mr. Murphy: Navy Basic War Plan, page 103 of the Naval Narrative.

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes. That says there:

"Prepare to capture and establish control over the Carolines and Marshall Island area and to establish an advance fleet base in Truk."

But there is another place in the plan where the date is given for that. Here it is. It is on page 30, in Section 3215. It says:

"The plan for the execution of task B of paragraph 3212,



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army  
2 troops in addition to the forces of the Pacific Fleet, and  
3 assuming that the Pacific will be scouted on 180 M."

4  
5 Senator Lucas: What does that mean?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: That means 180 days after the  
7 declaration of war, or the declaration of mobilization.

8 There was no mobilization date.

9 Senator Lucas: Now do I understand by that plan, or  
10 that part of the plan that you have just read, that before  
11 any real offensive would be taken by the Pacific Fleet it  
12 would be necessary for them to make proper preparations, and  
13 180 days was required for that purpose?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: It was not only for their preparation  
15 but for the Navy Department to acquire the necessary tankers,  
16 store ships, ammunition ships, troop ships, to train the  
17 troops for amphibious operations, and everything else which  
18 was required in an operation of that magnitude.

19 Senator Lucas: Under those plans were there any parti-  
20 cular reasons why those planes that were under the control  
21 of Admiral Kimmel and were equipped for long-range reconnaissance  
22 should not have been operating as such after the receipt of  
23 the war warning message at least of November 27?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: I answered that question yesterday  
25 by stating I was very much surprised that the attack was not



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 detected. If I had Admiral Kimmel's plan I could read  
3 you something there as one of the reasons why I expected  
4 the planes would be out.

5 Senator Lucas: All right, hand the Admiral the Kimmel  
6 Plan. I want to get that.

7 Admiral Ingersoll: Admiral Kimmel had this thing  
8 divided up into two phases. The first phase was one in which  
9 we were not at war with Japan, and the second phase was  
10 when we were at war with Japan.

11 "Phase I. The initial phase - Japan not in the war."

12 That would be the status from the time the war warning  
13 was sent out, or even before that, until we were at war  
14 with Japan.

15 Phase I-A was the initial task. "Japan in the war",  
16 and Phase II, and so forth, were succeeding tasks. Now  
17 he lays down the following task in his plan for Phase I:

18 "Two initial tasks, Japan not in the war: Complete  
19 mobilization and prepare for distant operations thereafter.

20 "Maintaining all types in constant readiness for distant  
21 service.

22 "Maintain Fleet security at bases and at anchorages,  
23 and at sea.

24 "Transfer the Atlantic reinforcements, if required.

25 "Assign 12 patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Southern and similar forces to Pacific Northeast Naval  
3 Coastal Frontier on M-Day.

4 "Assign two submarines and all submarine rescue vessels  
5 to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.

6 "Protect communications and territory of the Associated  
7 Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power  
8 into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces  
9 and patrol planes, and by the action of striking forces."

10 Senator Lucas: What does he mean by that "striking  
11 forces"?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: That would be anything sent out in  
13 the way of a raid.

14 Senator Lucas: Yes.

15 Admiral Ingersoll: One of the principal things he  
16 speaks of in here, as to why I expected they would have  
17 patrol planes out, was the security of his ships in bases,  
18 at sea, or elsewhere after or during Phase I, which was  
19 Japan not in the war.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, in other words, under the plan  
21 that was agreed upon by the Office of Naval Operations and  
22 Admiral Kimmel in the beginning this was to be a defensive  
23 war in the event Japan struck us?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: I would like to differ with you a  
25 little bit.

Senator Lucas: All right.

(10)

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Admiral Ingersoll: In the first place, it was not  
3 agreed upon with Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel was told  
4 by the Navy Department. Admiral Kimmel did not have to  
5 agree to the plan. He was given certain tasks in the Navy  
6 Basic Plan, so I would not say that Admiral Kimmel agreed  
7 to it. He was just told.

8 Senator Lucas: He was told by the Office of Naval  
9 Operations what to do?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

11 Senator Lucas: And, as I understand it, under that  
12 plan in the event Japan struck us, at least for 180 days  
13 we were to carry on more or less of a defensive war in the  
14 Pacific before we started out on an offensive?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct, sir. There is  
16 also one other task in here which I did not give. It  
17 says:

18 "Guard against surprise attacks by Japan."

19 That was Task M.

20 Senator Lucas: Now, Admiral, if we were not going to  
21 start a real offensive until 180 days after Japan struck us,  
22 can you think of any reason whatsoever that Admiral Kimmel,  
23 who under the joint arrangement out there, had charge of  
24 the long-range reconnaissance planes, should not have had  
25 long-range reconnaissance operating from November 27 on through



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 So the time we struck, with whatever planes we had even if  
3 it were only three?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: I had every reason to expect that  
5 he would do that, and I was surprised that he had not done it.

6 As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised  
7 that the attack had gotten in undetected.

8 Senator Lucas: What reason could be assigned for not  
9 using the planes for long-distance reconnaissance if we were  
10 not going to really start an offensive for some six months  
11 afterwards?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: I think that is a question that  
13 Admiral Kimmel would have to answer. I expected that it  
14 would be done not only because the planes were there, but  
15 because this plan inferred that it was going to be done.  
16 It never occurred to me that it was not being done.

17 Senator Lucas: As I recall, Admiral Kimmel testified  
18 that he was training his planes and his fleet ready for war,  
19 and I got the distinct impression from his testimony --  
20 and I may be wrong -- that he was getting ready to move out  
21 on a moment's notice, and therefore was training his fleet  
22 to fight, and his men to fight.

23 But there cannot be any question that under this war  
24 plan he could not really have taken any kind of a serious  
25 offensive in the Pacific until some six months after the war



1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 began?

(11)

3 Admiral Ingersoll: His first major operation and the  
4 occupation of bases in the Pacific was 180 days. He was  
5 not required to do that just then. He had other tasks there.

6 Senator Lucas: I see counsel shaking his head, and I  
7 do not want to be wrong.

8 Admiral Ingersoll: He had other tasks which would  
9 fully occupy his forces. He could not undertake a major  
10 operation, such as we did later in the war, like the capture  
11 of Guam, or the capture of Saipan, or Iwo Jima, he could  
12 not have done that with the forces he had at that time.

13 Senator Lucas: I agree upon that, too, but in view of  
14 the fact that he could not move forward with a major opera-  
15 tion of any kind, that would be all the more reason, as I  
16 see it, why he should use these planes for reconnaissance  
17 purposes, at least do what he could, rather than use them  
18 all for training, which he testified that he did.

19 Admiral Ingersoll: Frankly, I expected that they were  
20 being used for that purpose, and it never occurred to me  
21 that they were not used for that purpose after the war  
22 warning. I think that is one of the reasons why the Navy  
23 did not send out any dispatches and ask them what they were  
24 doing. We knew more or less, or we expected what they  
25 were going to do from their own plans.



AL-9

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: On page 7385 of the transcript this question was asked by myself of Admiral Kimmel:

"As I understood you to say this morning, on the question of an appropriate defensive deployment, it did not necessarily mean, in your opinion at that time, that you should use these planes for reconnaissance and search?"

And Admiral Kimmel answered:

"No, sir. I might say that the 'appropriate defensive deployment', and 'defensive deployment' used in that letter, I mean that dispatch, was a strategic matter, not a tactical matter. It was a strategic defensive deployment -- I mean our understanding was -- and that was primarily to make sure that when we deployed the Fleet, or put them in any position that they would not take on an offensive character or anything that the Japanese could consider as offensive."

Do you agree with that interpretation of what "defensive deployment" really meant at that particular time, and what the Navy had in mind when they sent out that telegram?

Admiral Ingersoll: The methods that Admiral Kimmel took for the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor were his business. It had nothing to do with the strategic deployment, although you might call it defensive deployment. If he wanted to send out ships around Pearl Harbor, or the Hawaiian Islands, that was his business. He could have done anything



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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in order to make his forces secure there without orders from the Navy Department, and we naturally expected that he was going to do that. That is what you have a Commander in Chief out in the distant areas for.

As I said once before, never did the Commanders in Chief question any of the Naval Operations' directives, or ask for further amplification of them.

Larry follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Now, in that message of November 27, you state:

"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 X."

I understand you to say that it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific at that time to carry on any appropriate defensive deployment that he thought was logical or reasonable or necessary under War Plans 46X?

Admiral Ingersoll: May I have that plan? The Navy basic war plan.

The first task is:

"(a) SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS."

That is an offensive task, although raids on sea communication positions is not a major operation.

Second task:

"(b) PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK."

That is a major operation, and that was the one he was

WARD A PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1 told he would not have to initiate until 180 days after  
2 war came.

3 The next task is:

4 "(c) DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR  
5 DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH  
6 THE ENEMY."

7 That is partially offensive.

8 "(d) SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH  
9 OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155 DEGREES EAST."

10 That is defensive.

11 "(e) DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY 'D'."

12 He didn't have to do anything about that, except that  
13 Samoa was under him and that was the designation of the  
14 category.

15 "(f) DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY 'F'."

16 That meant it was defensive.

17 "(g) PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED  
18 POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED  
19 BY CIRCUMSTANCES AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES."

20 That is a defensive task. He was already engaged  
21 in that at the time war came because he had been issued  
22 orders to escort some ships carrying Army troops to the  
23 Philippines and also some in the direction of Australia.

24 The next task is:  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h3 1       "(h) PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS  
2 IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY  
3 MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING  
4 HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES  
5 IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT  
6 HEMISPHERE."

7       That is wholly a defensive task, although you might  
8 have to conduct offensive operations against forces attempt-  
9 ing to do that, but the task itself is basically defensive.

10       "(i) COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL  
11 FRONTIER FORCES."

12       He did that by being stationed in Hawaii.

13       "(j) ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES DEFINING THEIR  
14 LIMITS FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE."

15       That is simply a technical control over ships passing  
16 through his area.

17       "(k) ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN  
18 THE FLEET CONTROL ZONES."

19       That is also of a technical character.

20       Senator Lucas: Thank you for that explanation, Admiral.

21       One more question.

22       I want to propound one inquiry with respect to codes.

23       There were a number of questions asked by the Senator  
24 from Michigan about codes. There was a message sent on  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1 December 6, 1941 from Commander of the 14th Naval District  
2 to the Office of Naval Operations here in Washington. That  
3 message says:

4 "BELIEVE LOCAL CONSUL HAS DESTROYED ALL BUT ONE  
5 SYSTEM ALTHOUGH PRESUMABLY NOT INCLUDED YOUR 1855."

6 In that message the Commander of the 14th Naval  
7 District was talking about the codes there, I take it?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

9 Senator Lucas: The Commander of the 14th Naval Dis-  
10 trict was Admiral Bloch?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: Did the officials in Washington have  
13 every reason to believe that Admiral Kimmel knew of this  
14 information that Admiral Bloch sent to Washington about  
15 the fact that the local consul had destroyed all but one  
16 code?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: It would be a logical assumption  
18 because Admiral Bloch was a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel.

19 Senator Lucas: Was that true of General Short? Should  
20 General Short have known that same thing? Should General  
21 Short have received that same information from Admiral  
22 Bloch under the arrangement they had there?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know, of course, how  
24 Admiral Bloch got the information. He may have gotten it from  
25



Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1 Army Intelligence, for that matter.

2 Senator Lucas: Anyhow, Admiral Bloch knew on December  
3 6, 1941, that the local consul had destroyed all but one  
4 system of the codes that they were using in Hawaii at  
5 that time, according to this message, that is, Admiral  
6 Bloch knew?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

8 Senator Lucas: So that is the only reply that is in  
9 the exhibits with respect to codes. Those in Hawaii knew  
10 definitely what the Japs were doing at that particular  
11 point, plus the information that you had sent them with  
12 respect to the destruction of codes throughout the world?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: They knew that on that date.

14 There is one thing: I don't know enough about the  
15 Japanese system, but it is, I believe, a fact that no  
16 instructions were sent by Japan to Hawaii to destroy their  
17 codes there. I presume the answer is that it was sent to  
18 the Ambassador in Washington and he was required to  
19 instruct the consulate to do that, and Hawaii was included  
20 in that distribution, although Manila was instructed  
21 separately, and I presume it was so far away, that although  
22 it was a U. S. possession they did not make Washington  
23 responsible for informing Manila to do that.

24 Senator Lucas: That is all.



Witness Ingersoll

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

The Vice Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson: The Senator from Illinois refused to yield at the time that he made certain insinuations about certain questions that I had asked this morning, and had previously asked.

His former tactics had been to interrupt when similar questions were asked.

Now, it isn't always possible in a record of this kind to make a statement as to why you are asking certain questions. This is an investigation of the facts to try to ascertain how this great catastrophe could have happened at Pearl Harbor, and we not be prepared both in Washington and in Pearl Harbor for it.

I have asked certain questions. I make no apology for any question that I have asked in this hearing. My sole purpose has been to try to ascertain the facts. But when a member of this committee makes insinuations that I have an ulterior motive in asking such questions, I feel that it becomes my duty to make on this record crystal clear, not that I have any opinions at the present time on these questions, but as to why I am asking these questions about the agreement with the Dutch and with the British, so the first thing I want to take up -- and I will speak from official



Witness Ingersoll

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1 documents, I will speak only from official documents --  
2  
3 At the present moment I want to cite "Peace and War,"  
4 which is a document prepared by the Department of State.

5 It came out not before Pearl Harbor, but it came  
6 out long after Pearl Harbor. I want to read from page  
7 129. And this relates to why I have asked certain ques-  
8 tions about whether or not there were agreements. This  
9 is on page 129 of "Peace and War."

10 "During the August 1941 conference between President  
11 Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain,  
12 the situation in the Far East was discussed, and it was  
13 agreed that the United States and Great Britain should  
14 take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves  
15 of aggression."

16 Now, Mr. Chairman, you will notice -- and for the  
17 record -- that it said, "it was agreed that the United  
18 States and Great Britain should take parallel action  
19 in warning Japan against new moves of aggression."

20 Mr. Chairman, the record should show that on the  
21 day the President of the United States returned to the  
22 United States that he called in the Ambassador and he made  
23 these remarks and delivered this message to the Ambassador:

24 "Such being the case, this Government now finds it  
25 necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the



Witness Ingersoll

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1 Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance  
2 of a policy or program of military domination by force  
3 or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Govern-  
4 ment of the United States will be compelled to take immed-  
5 iately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward  
6 safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the  
7 United States and American nationals, and toward insuring  
8 the safety and security of the United States."

9 On and after that date, certain correspondence was  
10 exchanged between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
11 and the President of the United States. Part of it is now  
12 in the record. It is clear that we do not have in this  
13 record all replies to that information.

14 Therefore, the record is not complete on that.

15 The Secretary of War, after the Pearl Harbor inquiry  
16 as far as the Army Board was concerned, thought that certain  
17 leads were to be explored -- and this is not out of my  
18 imagination that I am asking these questions, it is out  
19 of the official records of the United States that these  
20 questions are being asked, and it is because we have been  
21 unable to get the answers that I am asking these questions.

22 Now, on page 10 of the Clausen report, "Memorandum  
23 for Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D., subject, Unexplored  
24 Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation:  
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Witness Ingersoll

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1 "In order to assist you in the investigation you are  
2 now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored  
3 leads which, in my opinion, might advantageously be  
4 followed up in order to complete the general picture in  
5 this matter. The present memorandum merely contains  
6 suggestions and will not be construed as a directive, or  
7 as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation."

8 Now, who is speaking those words? Myron C. Cramer,  
9 Major General, U. S. A., the Judge Advocate General.

10 And he was speaking those to a man who he was sending  
11 out to make certain explorations.

12 Now, what does he say? On page 11 of this official  
13 record of the War Department, I find this. This is one  
14 of the unexplored leads and that is why I have been trying  
15 to explore it here, because I find nowhere in this record  
16 that it has been explored, and I think the facts should  
17 all be shown.

18 What is this unexplored lead? It is this:

19 "k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agree-  
20 ment, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands, and whether  
21 Japan was officially advised of this agreement, or discovered  
22 its existence."

23 That is one of the leads that I have been trying to  
24 follow up and to explore.  
25



Witness Ingersoll

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1 Now, let me go to some other leads in this official  
2 document. "C" on page 12:

3 "Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton,  
4 or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U.S. Joint  
5 Action Agreement in which case they would have known that  
6 the 'War with Britain' message would necessarily have  
7 involved the United States in war."

8 That is one of the leads that I have been trying to  
9 follow here and to get some information on. It is upon  
10 the suggestion of the Judge Advocate General of the United  
11 States of America that that lead should be followed.

12 Now, I am going to read another lead, that he also  
13 put in here, No. D, on page 12:

14 "Whether the partial implementation 'war with Britain'  
15 was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's  
16 attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations  
17 and the Chief of Staff, did not know of the Joint Action  
18 Policy."

19 In August, 1941, Mr. Churchill, in a speech, said  
20 this:

21 "It is certain that this has got to stop. Every  
22 effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The  
23 United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive  
24 at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the  
25



Witness Ingersoll

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1 utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We  
2 e earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But  
3 this I must say: that if these hopes should fail, we  
4 shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at  
5 the side of the United States."

6 Mr. Churchill, on the 27th day of January, 1942,  
7 made this statement on the floor:

8 "On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic  
9 conference at which I discussed these matters with Mr.  
10 Roosevelt that the United States even if not herself attacked  
11 would come into a war in the Far East and thus made final  
12 victory sure seem to allay some of these anxieties. That  
13 expectation has not been falsified by the events. It forti-  
14 fied our British decisions to use our limited resources on  
15 the actual fighting fronts.

16 "As time went on, one had greater assurance that if  
17 Japan should run amuck in the Pacific, we should not fight  
18 alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole  
19 of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United  
20 States Fleet concentrated at Hawaii.

21 "It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt  
22 distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon  
23 Singapore, or the attack upon the Dutch East Indies while  
24 leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet."  
25



Witness Ingersoll

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1 Now, it has been my purpose to try to ascertain what  
2 the facts are on this point.

3 What I have been trying to elicit from these wit-  
4 nesses is to find out whether or not those people feel  
5 Admiral Stark and General Marshall knew of these agree-  
6 ments or these understandings, or whatever you want to call  
7 them, as expressed by Myron C. Cramer and Mr. Churchill  
8 and the various other parties.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Ingersoli

2 Now, the record should be clear that if all of these  
 3 facts were known, and I am not now passing upon the facts,  
 4 but if the agreement was understood and known by all parties,  
 5 then it is sure that we, as a committee, should inquire into  
 6 the facts to ascertain whether, if we knew from the message  
 7 of Mr. Winant to the Secretary of State at 10:40 that an  
 8 attack was sure to be made within 14 hours upon the Malay  
 9 Peninsula, then all of our armed forces should have been  
 10 alerted to the fact that it meant not only war with Britain  
 11 or with the Dutch, but whether or not it didn't mean war  
 12 with us.

13 That being true, I am trying to seek out and just  
 14 ascertain the truth, what are the facts. If everyone knew  
 15 about these facts, that there was parallel action, why  
 16 didn't someone in our Navy, why didn't someone in our Army,  
 17 draw the same conclusions as Mr. Churchill drew, that there  
 18 was a great American Fleet, and it seemed very unlikely  
 19 that Japan would attempt "a distant invasion of Malay  
 20 Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon  
 21 the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their  
 22 rear this great American Fleet."

23 Now, as I say, I want the record to show why I have  
 24 been seeking light and facts upon whether or not there was  
 25 an agreement. That is all that I am trying to ascertain.