

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE 1947 .

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2773

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. _____

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

FILE NO. _____

PRESS TRANS _____

U.S.S.B.S. _____

DEFENSE DOC. NO. _____

Court Exhibit
2190-A

Signature _____

Room # _____

Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHIAI A. Kanji.

11 January 1946, Pages 1, 2, 3.

- Q. What year was it when you first went to Manchuria for the first time?
- A. August 15, 1931. I entered Manchuria with Japanese forces as a Colonel and as Commander or Head of the Japanese Special Service Department.
- Q. What were your duties in that capacity, briefly?
- A. First of all, to gain intelligence of the Chinese and as a liaison between the Chinese forces and the Japanese forces - but this was before the war.
- Q. What was the date when the Manchurian Incident began?
- A. September 18. The war or state of hostilities began September 18, 1931. At that time, there was a Captain who was killed. I had to investigate the killing and negotiate with the Chinese forces. That was the particular job I was there for.
- Q. How long did you continue on that assignment?
- A. I was recalled to Tokyo about the 8th of September. I was recalled to Tokyo regarding the killing of this Captain.
- Q. How long after the Manchurian Incident were you assigned as head of the Japanese Special Service Department there?
- A. When I went back, I was relieved of the Special Service Command and was sent over there as one of the staff section of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Is that the Supreme Command of the Kwantung Army?
- A. I was a member of the staff of the Kwantung Army headquarters. On the 23rd, I became head of the City of Mukden.
- Q. What I want is a brief statement or table of your assignments there.
- A. At the end of November, I was sent to Harbin as head of the Special Service organization.
- Q. How long did you stay on that?
- A. Until the last of March 1932. I went as a Brigadier-General. On the first of April 1932, I took command of the

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2.

9th Brigade with the grade of Major-General at Hiroshima. I stayed at Hiroshima from April 1932 to July 1934 and then went to Mukden with the Japanese Special Service Organization.

Q. How long did you stay at Mukden?

A. Until the end of February 1936. Then, I became a Lt.-General and Commander of the 1st Depot Division in Tokyo until March 1937. I then became Commander of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya until August 25, 1937. After that, I went to North China (Peiping to Hankow drive) and the 14th Division became part of the First Army until the first of June 1938 when I was recalled to Tokyo to serve on the staff attached to the Chief of Staff. From August 1938 to June 1939, I was sent to China by the Government to see what I could do about settling the war. I carried on negotiations with TANG SHAO-I and OU SHI FU, who was the original founder of the Kuomintang Party. These people acted as intermediaries between Chiang Kai-Shek. TANG SHAO-I was killed so that the negotiations fell through.

Q. Were you Chief of the Mission?

A. Yes, I was Chief of the Mission.

Q. What was your next assignment?

A. On June, 1939, I became Commander in Chief of the 5th Army in TAONAN, Manchuria, until the following June 1940, when I became Supreme War Councillor. About April 1941, I was made Inspector General of Aviation.

Q. Did you continue as Supreme War Councillor at the same time?

A. Yes.

Q. That went to when?

A. The first part of May 1943.

Q. After that?

A. I became Commander in Chief of the Eastern Army. At the end of March 1944, I became Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore and remained there until the first part of April 1945. I then became Inspector General of Military Training. I arrived in Tokyo on May 10, 1945.

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Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHIMAI A, Kanji.

5 February 1946, Pages 2, 3.

.....

Q. In August 1931, who was the Chief of the first section?
A. The Chief of the first section was ISHIHARA, Kanji.

Q. What was his grade, Lieutenant General?
A. I am not quite sure if his rank was Lt. Colonel or full Colonel.

Q. And who was Chief of the second section in August 1931?
A. The Chief of No. 2 section was ITAGAKI, Seishiro, rank of Colonel. I am not sure about the other sections, but there was one man named KATAKURA, Chu, who might have been one of the section chiefs. I am not quite sure if he was chief of a section or not. My memory is not very clear on that. I cannot think of the other section chiefs.

Q. Now, did your Special Service organization operate under the control or under the direction of the second section, the Intelligence Section?
A. Yes, Special Service organization was part of No. 2 Section.

Q. And you reported to Colonel ITAGAKI?
A. Yes, I did work for Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro.

A. And that was true in August 1931, while you were Resident Official of Mukden?

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. And during that time the second section gave you your order as to what your organization was to do?
A. Yes, that is true. I received my orders from No. 2 Section but they were given by the Commanding General of the Kwangtung Army.

Q. As Resident Official of Mukden - you had that title while being the head of the Special Service organization there, is that correct?

A. When I was Mayor of Mukden I was not the head of the Special Service organization.

Q. When was that, General?

A. I am not quite sure, but I think it was September 21, 1931.

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Excerpts from Interrogation of

DOMIYAMA, Kanji.

5 February 1946, Pages 10, 11.

.....

Q. General, do you still insist that the story you gave me that your sole mission on being sent for on August 18, 1931, was to investigate the murder of Captain NAKAMURA?

A. That was not the only purpose of my going there, but that was the most important.

Q. You told me the other day that was your only purpose.

A. I think that I told you that was my most important job, but since I was the head of Special Service organization I had other duties.

Q. What were those other duties?

A. The other two duties were investigation and liaison with Chinese forces.

Q. What does investigation mean?

A. The investigation consisted of determining the strength of Chinese forces, their training, their communication and the condition in the civilian population.

.....

Q. You were sent from Tokyo to take charge of the Special Service organizations in August 1931, is that correct?

A. I left from Tokyo and travelled through Shanghai, Hankow, Peking, Tientsin and Mukden, arriving at Mukden on the 18th of August.

Q. What date did you leave Tokyo?

A. I cannot recall accurately, but I think it was early part of July.

Q. Why did you make that long swing to go up to Mukden?

A. The Chief of Staff felt that it would be a good idea to find out the conditions in China before taking this post in Mukden, so I took that round-about trip.

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Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHILAKA, Kanji.

12 February 1946, Pages 7, 8, 9.

.....

Q. Right. Now, General, at the time you had this meeting with Henry Pu-yi at Tientsin as you remember in October 1931 you were Mayor or Governor of Lukden, weren't you?
A. Yes.

Q. What were you doing at Tientsin?
A. I was sent there to convey the order from the Kwantung Army Also I was the Mayor but the actual work was delegated to Chao Hain-ro - the work of my office - and then went to Tientsin.

.....

Q. Then you were sent to Tientsin for the specific purpose of contacting Henry Pu-yi, is that correct?
A. That is correct.

Q. Who sent you?
A. By Kwantung Army.

Q. Who issued the order; what person in Kwantung Army headquarters?
A. The commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Was General HONJO still the commander then?
A. Yes, sir, he was.

Q. Did General ITAGAKI have anything to do with it?
A. Colonel ITAGAKI was the Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff.

Q. Well, did he have anything to do with sending you to Tientsin?
A. Yes, order to proceed to Tientsin was issued by General HONJO, the Chief. However, detail as to my meeting with Pu-yi at Tientsin was arranged by Colonel ITAGAKI.

Q. What was Colonel ITAGAKI's order, do you remember?
A. In substance, my instruction was to convey to Fu-yi that should he return to Manchuria the Kwantung Army would welcome his return, and, next, he arranged for my transportation and expenses, etc.

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- Q. Were you to suggest to Henry Fu-yi that the reason why the Kwangtung Army would welcome him back was because they would like to have him head the new puppet government that you were setting up in Manchuria?
- A. I believe the Kwangtung Army must have had that idea in order to save Manchuria, however, I did not have any such idea.
- Q. But you know, didn't you, General, that when you conveyed this welcome greeting to Fu-yi that he would understand that was what it meant, didn't you?
- A. That is true although I did not have my plan; however upon receipt of instruction from the Kwangtung Army I felt that such things would be required to settle the Manchoukuo turmoil where so many factions are competing against each other and causing disturbances. I happened to think of that more than about what the Chief of the Second Section told me at the time.
- Q. Good.
- A. That was to the effect that he warned me that I should not force him to return to Manchoukuo and if he wants to come back it would be fine.
- Q. Why on earth did he warn you to that effect; had you suggested that it might be wise to try to force him?
- A. He definitely told me that there would not be a necessity to bring him back forcibly.
- Q. Well, that does not answer my question, General; answer it please.
- A. Perhaps the Chief of the Second Section might have had some other idea to control the situation in Manchuria even though Fu-yi may not return.
- Q. But why is it that he was afraid you might use force, was that your usual method in handling things like this?
- A. That I don't know. That is up to ITAGAKI.
- Q. Well, answer the last part of that question. Was that your usual method of handling things like this? And by that I mean was it your own personal method or the method of the Kwangtung Army, either one?
- A. I do not know what method the Kwangtung Army used, however, it is my motto that whatever the order I receive I see to it that purpose is accomplished.

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7

Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHICHA, Kanji.

12 February 1946, Page 10.

.....

Q. What was your report regarding the situation in North China that you made to the Kwangtung Army that you referred to a minute ago?

A. Upon my return to the Kwangtung headquarters?

Q. Yes.

A. I don't remember so well, it took place sometime ago; however, I mentioned the fact that the situation in North China remained unsettled, and also a distribution of enemy forces throughout that area meaning Tientsin armies. Also gave information on the subject of how to be ready in case the troops in Manchuria should spread over to North China.

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File No. 48, Serial 24.

Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHMAKA, Kanji.

12 February 1946, Page 11.

.....

Q. General, you know what the Nine Power Treaty is, don't you?

A. I know what that is; however, I don't know as to each provision it contains.

Q. You know, don't you, that it guarantees the sovereignty of China?

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. You knew that in October 1931 when you were sent to contact Henry Pu-yi, didn't you?

A. Yes, of course, I did.

Q. Then you knew, didn't you, that when the Kwantung Army was planning to set up an independent state called Manchoukuo that that was going to violate the Nine Power Treaty, didn't you?

A. Yes, I did, but at that time Japan made some proclamation about her attitude toward the treaty. I do not remember the details of it.

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"The following is an omission from Document 2773".

Evidentiary Document No. 2773*

Page 3a.

Extracts from Interrogation
of DONINAKA, Kanji

5th February, 1946, pages 6, 7, 8.

- Q. Now, General, in our first interrogation my first question was when was it you first went to Manchuria for the first time. Now, your answer was August 15th, 1931.
- A. Yes, I said that, but later changed it to the 18th of August. I corrected you the last time. I had that difference of three days, which I corrected.
- Q. That is the first time you ever were in Manchuria?
- A. Yes, I did go there once long ago. I went in 1911, and that was the first time I set foot in Manchuria.
- Q. And you were not in Manchuria then between 1911 and August 18, 1931?
- A. No. That is not correct. I have been in Manchuria in between I went there once in 1929.
- Q. How long were you there then?
- A. I was there about six months.
- Q. What were your duties then?
- A. At that time I went as an aide to IATSUI Nanao, who is advisor to Marshal Chang Tso-lin.
- Q. Where was Marshal Chang Tso-lin at that time?
- A. At first he was in Peking and later he returned to Mukden.
- Q. You were with the TOKUMU KIKAN?
- A. At that time I had no connection with TOKUMU KIKAN.
- Q. When was your first connection with the TOKUMU KIKAN?
- A. My first connection with TOKUMU KIKAN was 18 August 1931.
- Q. You never had anything to do with it before then?
- A. I had no connection prior to that time.
- Q. Now, as a matter of fact, General, were you not the Resident Official for the Japanese Special Services organisation in Mukden prior to August 18, 1931, and for several years before that time?
- A. No, I was not.
- Q. Prior to August 18, 1931, how much of your army service was in China immediately preceding and continuing before August 18, 1931?
- A. I spent almost 18 years in China, but during that time I had returned to Japan for a short period.

- Q. Most of that 18 years was with the Japanese Special Services organisation, was it not?
- A. No, it was not. Most of the time I was an aide to Lt. Gen. BANZAI. Lt. Gen BANZAI was advisor to Yuan Shih-kei, Li Huang and Feng Yui-Shiang - different Chinese leaders, in other words.
- Q. But during all this time, General, that you spent in China, the only times you got to Manchuria were in 1911, sometime in February or March, 1929, when you stayed for six months as aide to the Advisor to Marshal Chang Tso-lin, and on August 18, 1931, when you finally went over to the Japanese Special Service organisation?
- A. That is true, except in 1911, I just passed through Manchuria, in 1929 I went there as aide to LATSUI, but had no connection with Special Service organisation, and August 18, I went there with the Special Service Organisation.
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- Q. General, what was the connection between Dr. Chao Hain-Fo and the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin on June 3, 1928?
- A. I don't know if there was any connection, but I do know Chao Hain-Fo, who was the advisor to Chang Tso-lin, and I think the date was the 4th of June, 1929.
- Q. The historical record of the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin shows beyond a doubt it was June 3, 1928.
- A. That may be so, but I recall it as 4 June, 1929.
- Q. Does that change the story about when you were in Manchuria during the 1920's?
- A. Yes, it will. I thought it was in 1929 that I was there, but I could be mistaken, but I remembered it to be 1929, so if it was 1928, it would change my story. I am quite sure it was in 1929, and that was the time that Chang Tso-lin was murdered, and I was there at the time.

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Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHIEHARA, Kanji.

5 February 1946, Pages 10, 11.

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A. That was not the only purpose of my going there, but that was the most important.

Q. You told me the other day that that was your only purpose.

A. I think that I told you that was my most important job, but since I was the head of Special Service organization I had other duties.

Q. What were those other duties?

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Q. What date did you leave Tokyo?

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Q. Why did you make that long swing to go up to Mukden?

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Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHII.A.A. Kanii.

12 February 1946, Pages 7, 8, 9.

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Q. Then you were sent to Tientsin for the specific purpose of contacting Henry Fu-yi, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Who sent you?

A. By Kwangtung Army.

Q. Who issued the order; what person in Kwangtung Army headquarters?

A. The commander of the Kwangtung Army.

Q. Was General HONJO still the commander then?

A. Yes, sir, he was.

Q. Did General ITAGAKI have anything to do with it?

A. Colonel ITAGAKI was the Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff.

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- Q. Were you to suggest to Henry Fu-yi that the reason why the Kwangtung Army would welcome him back was because they would like to have him head the new puppet government that you were setting up in Manchuria?
- A. I believe the Kwangtung Army must have had that idea in order to save Manchuria, however, I did not have any such idea.
- Q. But you know, didn't you, General, that when you conveyed this welcome greeting to Fu-yi that he would understand that was what it meant, didn't you?
- A. That is true although I did not have my plan; however upon receipt of instruction from the Kwangtung Army I felt that such things would be required to settle the Manchoukuo turmoil where so many factions are competing against each other and causing disturbances. I happened to think of that more than about what the Chief of the Second Section told me at the time.
- Q. Good.
- A. That was to the effect that he warned me that I should not force him to return to Manchoukuo and if he wants to come back it would be fine.
- Q. Why on earth did he warn you to that effect; had you suggested that it might be wise to try to force him?
- A. He definitely told me that there would not be a necessity to bring him back forcibly.
- Q. Well, that does not answer my question, General; answer it, please.
- A. Perhaps the Chief of the Second Section might have had some other idea to control the situation in Manchuria even though Fu-yi may not return.
- Q. But why is it that he was afraid you might use force, was that your usual method in handling things like this?
- A. That I don't know. That is up to ITAKAKI.
- Q. Well, answer the last part of that question. Was that your usual method of handling things like this? And by that I mean was it your own personal method or the method of the Kwangtung Army, either one?
- A. I do not know what method the Kwangtung Army used, however, it is my motto that whatever the order I receive I see to it that purpose is accomplished.

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Dcc. 277B

File No. 48, Serial 24.

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Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHIMURA, Kanji.

12 February 1946. Page 10.

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Q. What was your report regarding the situation in North China that you made to the Kwangtung Army that you referred to a minute ago?

A. Upon my return to the Kwangtung headquarters?

Q. Yes.

A. I don't remember so well, it took place sometime ago; however, I mentioned the fact that the situation in North China remained unsettled, and also a distribution of enemy forces throughout that area meaning Tientsin armies. Also gave information on the subject of how to be ready in case the troops in Manchuria should spread over to North China.

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File No. 48, Serial 24.

Extracts from Interrogation of

DOHILAH.A, Kanji.

12 February 1946, Page 11.

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Q. General, you know what the Nine Power Treaty is, don't you?
A. I know what that is; however, I don't know as to each provision it contains.

Q. You know, don't you, that it guarantees the sovereignty of China?

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. You knew that in October 1931 when you were sent to contact Henry Pu-yi, didn't you?

A. Yes, of course, I did.

Q. Then you knew, didn't you, that when the Kwantung Army was planning to set up an independent state called Manchoukuo that that was going to violate the Nine Power Treaty, didn't you?

A. Yes, I did, but at that time Japan made some proclamation about her attitude toward the treaty. I do not remember the details of it.

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2773

Date 29 January 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Extracts from Interrogation of
DOIHARA, Kanji - Japan

Date: Jan-Feb. 1946 Original () Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc. Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

DOIHARA, Kanji; ISHIHARA, Kanji; ITABAKI,
Seishiro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Aggression in China; Conspiracy for Aggressive Warfare

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

~~Interrogation~~ Interrogation of 11 January 1946 - DOIHARA gives
his table of assignments in MANCHURIA beginning Aug. 15,
1931.

~~Interrogation~~ Interrogation of 5 Feb. 1946 - DOIHARA explains
his duties of investigation and liaison with Chinese forces.

~~Interrogation~~ Interrogation of 12 Feb. 1946 - DOIHARA gives
information regarding his meeting with Henry P. 41 at
TIENTSIN in October 1931 and the situation in North China.

Analyst: E. Garden

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INTERROGATION OF

General Kenji Doihara

Date and Time: 5 February 1946, 1400-1645 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : General Kenji Doihara
Lt. Colonel William T. Hornaday, Interrogator
1st Lt. George Sonoda, Interpreter
Miss Jewel E. Newman, Stenographer

Questions by : Lt. Col. Hornaday

Lt. Sonoda, having previously been sworn in the same matter, now continues translating from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English in the interrogation.

GEN. DOIHARA : I have forgotten something this morning and I wish I could tell you about it.

COL. HORNADAY: Go ahead.

GEN. DOIHARA: In 1918 between the years 1918 and 1919, a period of about a year I was in Tsihara. I spent a year there as a liaison officer between the Chinese Army and Czechoslovakia in the exchange of prisoners.

TSITSIHAR?
W.T.H.

- Q. Since I talked to you this morning I have checked the War Ministry record and we have your assignments and it bears out what you say about the different times you have been in China--there is a little variation in dates which I realize can be the result of bad memory after so many years--but as to the amount of time you spent in China the War Ministry record confirms what you say.
- A. Because these things happened so many years ago my memory is not clear on the dates but I am not trying to hide anything or tell any lies about events that took place.
- Q. The second section of the Kwantung Army headquarters relied on your Japanese Special Service Organization, Tokumu Kikan, for its intelligence in the Manchurian area before the fighting broke out there, did it not?
- A. I am not sure about this, but it did not only rely on the Special Service Organization for intelligence but it did have its own intelligence gathering organization.

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- Q. What was it called--the one the G-2 Section had of its own?
- A. Since there were only two Special Service Organizations in Manchuria, one in Harbin and one in Mukden, I assumed that they had other than Special Service Organizations for getting intelligence but I do not know what they were or how they operated.
- Q. There was never any conflict or overlapping in work between your own Special Service Organization, Tokumu Kikan, and those of the normal intelligence section of the General Staff?
- A. Since I don't know how this set-up operated I don't know they had any conflicts between the two. I was told about what concerned me at my own post.
- Q. As Senior Officer of the Special Service Organization at Mukden you were called in for conferences by General ITAGAKI regarding intelligence matters which would have to come before your General Staff?
- A. I only reported to the No. 2 Section on arriving in Manchuria and since the time spent there was short I never had any other occasion to confer with the Chief of No. 2 Section.
- Q. Before fighting broke out there in Manchuria did the Kwantung Army General Staff have daily, or nearly daily, General Staff conferences to discuss various phases or various matters, problems confronting their army?
- A. Since I was not included in any of those I do not know if it held any daily meetings, daily conferences.
- Q. If there were such meetings you did not attend them, is that it?
- A. I was not called and I did not attend any of them.
- Q. Now, General, since you were sent expressly to Mukden to investigate the circumstances of the death of Captain NAKAMURA what part did Major MORI have to play in that investigation?
- A. I do not know Major MORI. I and Captain KATAKURA CHU were the only two persons involved in the investigation.
- Q. General, this book that I am handing to Lt. Sonoda is the Lytton Commission Report that I referred to this morning. The report of the investigation of the NAKAMURA case is the official version furnished by your Government to the Lytton Commission in 1932. I am going to ask Lt. Sonoda to read to you what it says in this paragraph I have marked with red on page 64.

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(Here Lt. Senoda translated from the Lytton Report as indicated)

- Q. Wait just a minute. I want to read it in English so that I can get it in the record.

(Here Col. Hornaday read from the report as indicated)

"On July 17, a report of the death of Captain NAKAMURA reached the Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar and, at the end of the month, Japanese officials in Mukden informed the local Chinese authorities that they had definite evidence that Captain NAKAMURA had been killed by Chinese soldiers. On August 17th, the Japanese military authorities in Mukden released for publication the first account of his death (see Manchuria Daily News, August 17th, 1931). On the same day, Consul-General Hayashi, and also Major Mori, who had been sent by the Japanese General Staff from Tokyo to Manchuria to investigate the circumstances, had interviews with Governor Tsang Shih-yi, of Liaoning Province. Governor Tsang promised to investigate it at once."

- Q. Now, General, all other references in the Lytton Commission Report to the investigation of the death of Captain NAKAMURA refer to Major MORI as the investigator, not to you. How do you explain that?
- A. I investigated this with Major (or Captain) KATAKURA and the Consul-General, Hayashi, and I do not know anything about Major MORI. I do not know what went on before my arrival in Mukden but after arriving there I investigated the killing of Captain NAKAMURA with the help of KATAKURA.
- Q. Do you know what the first name of Captain KATAKURA is?
- A. Chu.
- Q. Well, then, in the next paragraph on that page, General, the first two sentences describe the actions of the Chinese in appointing investigators and their actions. The next sentence reads, "Major Mori, who had been conducting an independent investigation on behalf of the Japanese General Staff returned to Mukden on September 4th." I have that sentence outlined with red. (Here the interpreter read and translated the quoted sentence) General, I do not believe that your real mission over there was to investigate the death of NAKAMURA at all. I think it was for other purposes, is that right?

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- A. That is not so. I was ordered by the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to investigate the killing of Captain NAKAMURA.
- Q. The headquarters of the Kwantung Army or the Imperial General Staff?
- A. I received orders from the headquarters of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. I will have to check back but I don't think that is what you told me in our previous interrogation. I think you told me you were sent by the General Staff in Tokyo for the purpose of investigating the NAKAMURA murder.
- A. I was sent from Tokyo attached to the headquarters of the Kwantung Army and received my orders from the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army. Orders would normally come from the War Minister to the Kwantung Army who, in turn, would pass the orders on to me.
- Q. I will have to check the record on that later.
- A. Orders are not given to an individual directly. The orders are sent from the War Minister to the army who, in turn, pass the orders on to the individual.
- Q. You were given no specific orders outside those given to you from Tokyo assigning you to the Kwantung Army?
- A. All I was given was orders to proceed to Kwantung Army headquarters making me the chief of Special Service Organization in Mukden.
- Q. NAKAMURA actually was a spy, wasn't he?
- A. NAKAMURA did not hide his identity and had received his passport from the Chinese Government to make a topographical survey of Manchuria. He was sent to investigate the land between Toan and Mukden. TSITSIHAR?
W.A.H.
- TAOAN OR
TAONAN?
W.A.H.
- Q. Actually, he posed as an agricultural expert and took narcotics with him, didn't he?
- A. That is not so.
- Q. On page 63 of the Lytton Commission Report I am marking the second paragraph from the bottom with red pencil and it reads as follows:
- "Captain Shintaro Nakamura was a Japanese military officer on active duty and, as was admitted by the Japanese Government, was on a mission under the orders of the Japanese Army. While passing through Harbin, where his passport was examined by the Chinese authorities, he represented himself as an agricultural expert. He was at that time warned that the region in which he

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intended to travel was a bandit-ridden area, and this fact was noted on his passport. He was armed, and carried patent medicine which, according to the Chinese, included narcotic drugs for non-medical purposes."

- Q. I am going to have Lt. Sonoda read this entire paragraph to you and you can see what your Government said back in 1932.

(Here the Interpreter read and translated the above passage into Japanese)

- Q. I appreciate, General, that that paragraph is a sifting or a finding of the evidence by the Lytton Commission that was furnished by both Japan and the Chinese and it is not entirely the Japanese official report. The statement that he was an active officer on a military mission was admitted by your Government.

Here the Interrogator spoke to the Interpreter: ("Now, there are several parts in here that I want you to read to him. I will designate them so that the record will be clear as to what parts are read. First of all, there is a summary here of the Chinese efforts to reach a settlement. That is the last paragraph on page 64 and the top two paragraphs at the top of page 65.) Now, I am going to have the Lieutenant read to you the third paragraph on page 65 which starts, 'Consul-General Hayashi, Mukden, was reported on September 12th-13th to have reported', and so on".

(Here the Interpreter read and translated as indicated the following paragraph;)

"Consul-General Hayashi, Mukden, was reported on September 12th-13th to have reported to the Japanese Foreign Office that 'an amicable settlement would probably be made after the return of the investigators to Mukden', especially as General Yung Chen had definitely admitted that Chinese soldiers had been responsible for the death of Captain Nakamura. The Mukden correspondent of the Nippon Dempo Service telegraphed a despatch on September 12th stating that 'an amicable settlement of the alleged murder case of Captain Shintaro Nakamura of the Japanese General Staff Office by soldiers of the Chinese Reclamation Army Corps is in sight'. Numerous statements of Japanese military officers, however, especially those of Colonel K. Doihara, continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory

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solution of the Nakamura case, in view of the fact that Commander Kuan, alleged to have been responsible for the death of Captain Nakamura, had been taken into custody in Mukden by the Chinese authorities, the date of his court-martial having been announced as to occur within a week. Since the Chinese authorities admitted to Japanese consular officials in Mukden, in a formal conference held on the afternoon of September 18th, that Chinese soldiers were responsible for the death of Captain Nakamura, expressing also a desire to secure a settlement of the case diplomatically without delay, it would seem that diplomatic negotiations for attaining a solution of the Nakamura case were actually progressing favourably up to the night of September 18th."

- Q. Now, in regard to this sentence in the paragraph just read, "Numerous statements of Japanese military officers, however, especially those of Colonel K. Doihara, continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Nakamura case, * * *".

Now, in view of the fact that you were Colonel head of the Special Service Organization investigating this death, why would you be issuing stories to the press questioning the sincerity of the Chinese; you were not the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army?

- A. I did not give out any statements questioning the sincerity of the Chinese in arriving at a satisfactory solution. Until the time that I left for Tokyo the Chinese had denied positively that they had any connection with the killing of Captain NAKAMURA. I am quite sure that I did not give out any statements as this report says and until the time I left Mukden, I am not quite sure whether it was the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd of September, the Chinese had denied any connection with the killing of Captain NAKAMURA and there was no settlement in sight. I want to add that I have heard that Commander Kuan had been ordered to report to Mukden for questioning in the case of the death of Captain NAKAMURA.
- Q. General, you realize that we are getting copies of the newspapers back at that time; the Manchurian Daily News, Tokyo papers, and we are going to know definitely what you did say to the Press?
- A. That is all right with me but it is oftentimes the papers misquote.

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- Q. Well, who did quote you without authority? Maybe they are some of the boys who planned this stuff. Let us find out who they are.
- A. The papers were making a lot of mistakes at that time.
- Q. You mean you were not quoted in the newspapers?
- A. I don't recall being quoted in the newspaper at all, although I had been questioned many times by the newspapermen but I never gave any information respecting the situation in Manchuria.
- Q. You never gave the newspapers any information regarding the Manchurian incident? Is that correct?
- A. Is that before or after the Manchurian incident?
- Q. All during this period--especially the period before the fighting broke out.
- A. I have talked to reporters but nothing regarding the case of the death of Captain NAKAMURA.
- Q. Well, you recall, don't you, that during this period the Japanese Press, including the official Government paper in Manchuria, the Manchurian Daily News, was screaming for a solution by force of the different incidents had with the Chinese?
- A. I don't recall any such thing except that the papers were clamoring for a solution of the problem but nothing where force was to be used.
- Q. Did you not feel yourself, General, that the whole thing ought to be settled by force so as to get it over with?
- A. No, I did not think so.
- Q. Then, how do you explain this statement in the Lytton Commission Report? I am referring to the paragraph marked in red on page 66 of the Lytton Commission Report which starts "In the course of September * *". It is the last paragraph in Chapter III.

(Here the interpreter read and translated as quoted below)

"In the course of September, public sentiment regarding the Chinese questions, with the Nakamura case as the focal point, became very strong. Time and again the opinion was expressed that the policy of leaving so many issues in Manchuria unsettled had caused the Chinese authorities to make light of Japan. Settlement of all pending issues, if necessary by force, became a popular slogan. Reference was freely

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made in the Press to a decision to resort to armed force, to conferences between the Ministry of War, the General Staff and other authorities for the discussion of a plan with this object, to definite instructions regarding the execution, in case of necessity, of that plan to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and to Colonel Doihara, Resident Officer at Mukden, who had been summoned to Tokyo early in September and who was quoted by the Press as the advocate of a solution of all pending issues, if necessary by force and as soon as possible. The reports of the Press regarding the sentiments expressed by these circles and some other groups point to a growing and dangerous tension."

- A. I recall that the public clamor was for action and that it tried to get the Kwantung Army to take some action, but as for any plans being formulated I had no knowledge of it.
- Q. But you are still not answering my question. How do you explain your being quoted by the Press as the advocate of the use of force in Manchuria?
- A. I did not advocate using force to settle the issues in question in Manchuria. You can check with the papers at that time and find out and if you will check with people here in Tokyo who are connected with the army or Government will bear out the fact that I did not advocate such policies. I made no statements like that.
- Q. I am going to make a statement that the interpreter will interpret sentence by sentence.

All right, General, I told you the other day that all the possible leads you can suggest, or any one can suggest, would be checked on this investigation. That is what I have been doing since I was here the last time. We are getting more and more information all the time. We are getting the newspapers you suggest, all of them, Tokyo, Manchuria, all of them. We already know that you were quoted at that time in the papers as advocating force in addition to what is said in here in the Lytton Report. In addition, as you know, the interrogation of many other people is going on. As always happens in such cases some of them don't have the kind of courage that you have. Some of them are beginning to talk and tell us things, General. For instance, one who later became a very high official in Manchuria, a Japanese, told us just the other day that General ITAGAKI told him that General ITAGAKI and General ISHIHARA

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planned the Manchurian incidents so as to be able to set up the kind of industrial organizations they wanted where there were resources. HASHIMOTO is talking. KIDO is talking. ARAKI is beginning to talk. The net is beginning to get tighter and tighter. We know now beyond any question already that you Japanese planned those Manchurian incidents. We know that you younger officers in the Kwantung Army, especially, used the NAKAMURA case and the Wanpaoshan incident as excuses for starting the fighting over there. We know that the Special Service Organization had a hand in the original attack on the North Barracks. We have good reason to believe that you were sent over from Tokyo for the purpose of making sure it went right because you were skillful. All right, now General, do you want to just go ahead and let us continue to build this thing up ourselves or are you willing to talk to us now? I gave you the opportunity the other day; this thing is getting tighter.

- A. I am doing all I can to help in this investigation and I am telling you the truth now. I cannot tell you anything that I do not know of my knowledge and I cannot make up anything to tell you. I have told you everything about the activities of the Special Service Organization. And, as far as I know about the Special Service Organization, it had no connection with any activities that led to the Manchurian incident.
- Q. Now, General, I know a great deal about the Special Service Organization. I know, for instance, what Colonel WACHI (or WAJI), in Amoy, Fukien Province, was doing in the narcotics field. I know about your Dr. WADA, or Colonel WADA, in the Portuguese Colony, down near Hongkong, and his activities in espionage. I know about the time when you organized a large gang of ronins and bandits in Tientsin and paid them off in narcotics along in 1934-35 in order to get a new rebellion against Chiang Kai-shek. I know about how you kidnapped Emperor Henry Pu-yi from Tientsin shortly after fighting broke out in Manchuria; how you brought him to a health resort near Port Arthur or Dairen and kept him there until you were ready to make him the puppet emperor. You see, there is a great deal we know and we are learning more all the time, General. I can give you names like SATOMI, alias Li Ming, the head of your big narcotics racket in the Shanghai Area in 1938 or 1939, from your Special Service Organization. I also know about your connections with the Formosan named Paul Yip at Amoy and the efforts made by the Government to get through the Special Service Organization a revolution started down in the Fukien province in 1933 or 1934. I know how your Special Service Organization officer named GENKI went to Amoy to stir up a rebellion in 1932 or 1933. I also know, General, that you went to China or to Manchuria, no it was to China, in 1938 or 1939 as chief of a mission to contact Tang Shao-i and Ou Pei-fu. I know that you did not

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go over there to try to settle--no, you went over there to try to stir up a revolution and it was known as the DOIHARA Kikan. I know that you failed in that mission, General, you lost face and you came back and another officer went over to take your place and was more successful. I know there were other Chinese besides those two who were concerned in the DOIHARA Kikan. Do you want to talk now? Do you want to change any of your story now?

One moment, General, it is necessary to translate for the record, General.

- A. Among those things that were brought up now this is the first time that I have heard any references to narcotics being used by Special Service Organization.
- Q. I understand that but I know the whole story.
- A. About the plans that were set up in Amoy, Fukien, and these various other places, this is the first time that I have heard of it.
- Q. I expected that answer.
- A. I had been given orders that if Henry Pu-yi ever came to Manchuria that I was to welcome him and entertain him but any reference to my taking him to a health resort is false. Of the various other things that were brought up I would like to have you investigate further for I am sure that you will find that they are not true. The reference made to my trip to China and meeting with Tang Shao-i and Ou Pei-fu is correct.
- Q. In other words, they were not representatives of Chiang Kai-shek at all, were they? They were traitors?
- A. I do not consider them as traitors.
- Q. That is just a difference of viewpoint, is it not, General? There was a government in China headed by the Kuomintang Party and Chiang Kai-shek. These men wanted to sell that Government out, did they not?
- A. I do not know about their trying to sell their country but I only know that there were the older men in the country that thought they would be the best ones to approach in settling the question.
- Q. In other words, it was a deal to get them to swing China over to your side and they would become the heads of the Government instead of Chiang Kai-shek? Is that right?

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- A. No such plans as organizing a new country and putting these two men in offices were made. They were just a negotiation to settle the issues peacefully.
- Q. But they were not official representatives from Chiang Kai-shek's Government, were they?
- A. That was not so. They were the official representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. (See certificate of interpreter and certificate of interrogator at end of this interrogation for correction. Also see next interrogation of General DOIHARA of 12 February 1946.)
- Q. They were independent fellows working by themselves, in other words?
- A. The Japanese Government thought that these two men, since one was the oldest member of the Kuomintang Party and the other a military man, that they would be the best persons to approach in negotiating.
- Q. That plan to try to get these fellows to negotiate a peace with Japan was called the DOIHARA Kikan, was it not?
- A. There was no name given to this group. Three of us were sent over there to talk with these two men to negotiate a peaceful settlement.
- Q. The other two who went with you were Vice Admiral Shizue TSUDA and Lt. Gen. Rachieo BANZAI?
- A. That is so.
- Q. There was also a third member of the Chinese that you contacted, a man by the name of Chin Yun-peng along with Tang Shao-i and Ou Pei-fu?
- A. Ching Yuen-pung. I have talked to this man but he was not a very important person and he was not selected as one to be contacted.
- Q. But at least Ou Pei-fu and Tang Shao-i were killed by the Tai Li organization of Chiang Kai-shek's government, were they not?
- A. I know that they were killed but I do not know whether they were killed by the Tai Li.
- Q. The Americans say Dai Li and we get that from the Chinese; there are several ways of pronouncing it, I know. Tai Li is the man who was the principal bodyguard of Chiang Kai-shek and heads the Secret Espionage Organization?
- A. He is something like the Chief of the Japanese TOKUMU Kikan.

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- Q. There are two or three things that I would like to ask you about that are not in connection with what we have just been going over. Now this scroll that I am handing you is--ah, you recognize it-- is our Document No. 14. I want you to explain what it is and the circumstances under which it came to you.
- A. This letter was sent to me by General TANAKA.
- Q. It introduces AIKAWA as a representative of KUHARA? When was that delivered to you, General?
- A. 1929, I think. There is no date given on it.
- Q. We found that out. You remember about when?
- A. I don't recall about when it was except that it was around 1929. How it happened to come about was about that time the Chinese Government Yuan was giving a medal to the Emperor and that General BANZAI was instructed to receive it for the Emperor. Since I was the aide to BANZAI this letter was addressed to me in the absence of General BANZAI, who was in Peking, to introduce AIKAWA.
- Q. To whom?
- A. Introduce him to this Yuan Government.
- Q. Were you not to introduce him to the people in China in connection with the mining industry?
- A. It was to introduce him to the head of the Yuan Government, Yuan Shih-kai.
- Q. The document itself says that AIKAWA'S mission is an enterprise on a large scale and upon a solid foundation to further the Empire's interests in China, doesn't it?
- A. I have forgotten what was in it so I would like to read it over. Since I did not know of any important people or any industrialists I could introduce this man to I just introduced him to the President of the Chinese Government but, in the meantime, the mission that my general was to go on as cancelled and he re-
- w a
- turned thereafter so that released me of responsibility of further introducing AIKAWA to any people he would be interested in.
- Q. What was the secret about this letter, General?
- A. The reason why it was kept secret was to keep the secret from the other big corporations like MITSUBISHI so that we would have no interference from the other big concerns in Manchuria.

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Q. Then you are mistaken about your idea that it was something in connection with a decoration to be given to the Emperor?

(The interpreter explains that when interpreting a bit ago and talking about General BANZAI'S receiving a medal for the Emperor that General BANZAI was absent because of going to receive that medal, and, therefore, General TANAKA'S letter was written to DOIHARA.)

Q. General, who is the Mr. SAKANISHI that is mentioned in this?

A. This reading should have been BANZAI instead of SAKANISHI.

Q. You did not follow instructions very well, did you, General; it says "Confidential, destroy by burning"?

A. Since I was a captain at the time a letter from the General was quite a thing so that instead of burning it I kept it as a souvenir.

Q. Oh, I see. Now, General, I am going to hand you our evidentiary document 465C. I understand that the men shown in that photograph with that document number are Burmese and that one of them was the Burmese Nationalist leader, BA MAW. I want you to explain how he happens to be in a photograph with General TOJO and these Burmese Nationalist leaders.

A. This was a luncheon given by naval officials at the Naval Commissary for the Burmese visitors.

Q. About when?

A. I cannot recall the dates on this.

Q. What year? Can you tell by your insignia and rank? I think it was about the time you were Inspector General of the Air between 1941, and 1943, is that correct?

A. I think it must have been around 1943, the summer of 1943. This man (pointing) should be available for you to question about.

Q. What is his name?

A. General KAWABE.

Q. Well, we are already interrogating General KAWABE so we will probably ask him.

A. He was an aide to me at that time. He was a lieutenant general at that time.

Q. BA MAW is the man sitting on General TOJO'S left, is he?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Who is the Burmese sitting on General TOJO'S right?
- A. I don't recall his name; the names are given on that tissue paper cover, aren't they?
- Q. Yes, all the names are written on it. We will have the translator translate all those names so we won't go into that now. My visit up to your house was a little fruitful. We have lots of excellent photographs of you, General.
- A. Was my family frightened?
- Q. We were very kind to your wife and very courteous to her and we apologized for leaving her house in such an uproar. Now this photograph that I am showing you is a photograph of a group of men in civilian clothes except you and it is called our Document No. 465E.
- A. This is a picture of the members taken of the Generals and Admirals Club in Tokyo.
- Q. About when?
- A. I don't recall when it was taken.
- Q. Do you remember about the year, two years ago, three years ago, four years ago?
- A. I think it must be around 1943 because I had three stars on; I am a full general there. This was taken in the Navy Club, some Navy Ministries Club.
- Q. I see, all right. Well, General, there are a lot more of these pictures which I want to go over with you some day but we won't do it tonight because we don't have time and it is rather late now.
- A. There should have been a lot of pictures there.

WITNESS DISMISSED AT 1645 HOURS

5 Feb 1946

Certificate of Interpreter

I, George Sonoda, 1st Lt., 02037735, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 14 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that on page 11 of said interrogation report in answer to the question, "But they were not official representatives from Chiang Kai-shek's Government, were they?", my recollection is that the answer was "That was so. They were not official representatives of Chiang Kai-shek."

George Sonoda
(Interpreter's Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1946

William T. Hornaday, Lt. Col., Inf.
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

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Certificate of Stenographer

I, Jewel E. Newman, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief."

Jewel E. Newman
(Stenographer's Signature)

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I, William T. Hornaday, Lieutenant Colonel, ASN 0-296682 certify that on 5th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me General Kenji DOIHARA, and according to George Sonoda, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein, except that on page 11 of said interrogation report in answer to the question, "But they were not official representatives from Chiang Kai-shek's Government, were they?", my recollection is that the answer was, "That was so. They were not official representatives of Chiang Kai-shek."

Tokyo, Japan
(Place)

William T. Hornaday
(Name and Rank)
-15- Lt. Col., Inf.

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INTERROGATION OF

General DOIHARA, Kenji (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 5 February 1946, 1000-1150 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General DOIHARA, Kenji
Lt. Col. William T. Hornaday, Interrogator
1st Lt. George Sonoda, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Lt. George Sonoda, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General DOIHARA now continues to interpret from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as required in this proceeding.

Questions by : Lt. Col. Hornaday.

Q. General, I want to get some facts concerning the organization of the Kwangtung Army Headquarters in Manchuria in August 1931, before the fighting broke out there? First of all, who was Commanding General of the Kwangtung Army in August 1931, General HONJO?

A. HONJO, Shigeru.

Q. And his grade was full general?

A. His rank was Lieutenant General.

Q. And who was Chief of Staff, General?

A. MIYAKE, Koji.

Q. Now, was your General Staff in the Kwangtung Army divided into different sections, such as first, second, third and fourth section - the same as ours?

A. It was divided into more than four sections. I am not sure, but I think it was about five sections.

Q. What was the first section?

A. No. 1 was Operations, No. 2 section was Intelligence. I am not sure about this - my memory is not too good.

Q. To the best of your memory -

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DOIHARA Kenji 2/5/46

A. The third section was Supplies.

Q. And the fourth section?

A. No. 4 section, I am not sure, Investigation; No. 5 was, I am quite sure was Replacements. No. 5 also included Communications. I am not sure about this and it may be wrong. Communications and Replacements.

Q. Did you have an Assistant or Vice Chief of General Staff?

A. I am not sure about that, but I am quite sure there was no Assistant Chief of Staff.

Q. In August 1931, who was the Chief of the first section?

A. The Chief of the first section was ISHIHARA, Kanji.

Q. What was his grade, Lieutenant General?

A. I am not quite sure if his rank was Lt. Colonel ^{OK} or full Colonel.

Q. And who was Chief of the second section in August 1931?

A. The Chief of No. 2 section was ITAGAKI, Seishiro, rank of Colonel. I am not sure about the other sections, but there was one man named KATAKURA, Chu, who might have been one of the section chiefs. I am not quite sure if he was chief of a section or not. My memory is not very clear on that. I can not think of the other section chiefs.

Q. Now, did your Special Service organization operate under the control or under the direction of the second section, the Intelligence Section?

A. Yes, Special Service organization was part of No. 2 section.

Q. And you reported to Colonel ITAGAKI?

A. Yes, I did work for Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro.

Q. And that was true in August 1931, while you were Resident Official of Mukden?

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. And during that time the second section gave you your orders as to what your organization was to do?

A. Yes, that is true. I received my orders from No. 2 section, but they were given by the Commanding General of the Kwangtung Army.

DOIHARA, Kenji 2/5/46

- Q. As Resident Official of Mukden - you had that title while being the head of the Special Service organization there, is that correct?
- A. When I was Mayor of Mukden I was not the head of the Special Service organization.
- Q. When was that, General?
- A. I am not quite sure, but I think it was September 21, 1931.
- Q. Was that the date that you arrived in Mukden after your trip the first of September from Tokyo in 1931?
- A. This was the day following the day I returned.
- Q. You arrived then at Mukden on September 20, 1931, from Tokyo?
- A. Yes, it was on the 20th.
- Q. On the night the fighting broke out at Mukden, if I recall, that was the night of September 18 or 19, 1931, where were you?
- A. At that time I was riding the train in Japan.
- Q. Where were you headed for then, General?
- A. I had completed my work in Tokyo and was returning to Mukden. I left Tokyo on the 18th.
- Q. Did you travel any of the distance by airplane?
- A. I used the train.
- Q. How about the crossing of the Japan Sea to Korea?
- A. I went by boat.
- Q. And then by train again up to ^{TNAD} Korea and up to Mukden?
- A. Yes, I went by train, but at Heijo the train was stopped in a place called Fong Hong Chong, a place in Manchuria. Since the fighting had broken out the train was stopped at this location for six hours and then continued on the trip to Mukden.
- Q. The town you mention is south of Mukden?
- A. It is in the southeastern portion of Manchuria near the Korean border.
- Q. Do you remember what date that was when your train was stopped there?
- A. I remember that it was early morning of the 19th of September.

DOIHARA, Kenji 2/5/46

- Q. About what distance is that town from Mukden?
A. I think it is about 250 kilometers from Mukden. I am not positive about that distance.
- Q. But you did not arrive in Mukden until the 20th?
A. As I remember I did not arrive before the 20th. I am recalling this from memory so I am not sure about the time, but it was the morning of the 20th I arrived in Mukden.
- Q. Why did it take so long to go from this border town to Mukden?
A. I was late because I was forced to wait at Fong Hong Chong and also because the train was the first to leave after the trouble had broken out and the train was held up.
- Q. Was the train held up so that troops coming from Korea could go ahead on the Railway line?
A. The Japanese Army tried to suppress a rebellion in the vicinity of Fong Hong Chong. It was along the railroad in the vicinity of Fong Hong Chong that this disturbance took place. I was supposed to return in a hurry, but was held up by this and all subsequent trains were held up by this disturbance.
- Q. About what hour of the morning on the 19th was it that your train arrived at this little town?
A. I do not recall the hour, but it was in the middle of the night and after the train started we traveled through the place at night.
- Q. You arrived there in the dark on the morning of the 19th?
A. Yes; the train was held up at Heijo.
- Q. In Korea?
A. Yes, I stopped about half a day in Heijo during the day.
- Q. What day was that?
A. That was on the night of the 19th. I left Heijo on the night of the 19th.
- Q. That is the night of the 19th and 20th?
A. I was able to leave Heijo on the evening of the 19th, so when I passed through Fong Hong Chong it was the middle of the night.

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- Q. And did you get held up then at Fong Hong Chong?
- A. No, I was not stopped at Fong Hong Chong. We went at slow speed, but we went through there without stopping.
- Q. And there was fighting at Fong Hong Chong then?
- A. There was no fighting at Fong Hong Chong. The Japanese Army was disarming the Manchurian troops.
- Q. There had been fighting there the day before then; is that correct?
- A. There was not exactly fighting - some action had taken place on the morning of the 19th, but the reason why the train was held up was so the Japanese troops would get a chance to disarm the Manchurian troops. I explain that the reason why it took so long to disarm the Manchurian troops was that there were negotiations between the Japanese and the Manchurians first, and these negotiations started on the morning of the 19th. Since I was at Heijo at the time I can not say what time these negotiations took place, but I think they took place on the morning of the 19th.
- Q. Your train was stopped at Heijo on the morning of the 19th?
- A. My train was held up at Heijo around noon on the 19th.
- Q. And the report given for the reason for stopping the train was that there was trouble at Fong Hong Chong, was that it?
- A. Since I was in a hurry to go to Mukden I asked the station-master for the reason for stopping the train, and the answer given to me was there was trouble at Fong Hong Chong.
- Q. Why were you in such a hurry to get to Mukden, General? Was that an order given you in Tokyo?
- A. As I told you before, I came to Tokyo to report on a case to Captain NAKAMURA and when I had completed my business I was returned to Mukden.
- Q. That does not answer my question. I would like to have it answered.
- A. I was not given any orders to return in a hurry to Mukden, but since I was in charge of the Special Services organization I felt I should return in a hurry.

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- Q. Why?
- A. I felt that I could not dally on the way since the fighting in Mukden had started and I felt that I had to return and make contact with Headquarters.
- Q. Now, General, in our first interrogation my first question was when was it you first went to Manchuria for the first time. Now, your answer was August 15th, 1931.
- A. Yes, I said that, but later changed it to the 18th of August. I corrected you the last time. I had that difference of three days, which I corrected.
- Q. That is the first time you ever were in Manchuria?
- A. Yes, I did go there once long ago. I went in 1911, and that was the first time I set foot in Manchuria.
- Q. And you were not in Manchuria then between 1911 and August 18, 1931?
- A. No. That is not correct. I have been in Manchuria in between. I went there once in 1929.
- Q. How long were you there then?
- A. I was there about six months.
- Q. What were your duties then?
- A. At that time I went as an aide to MATSUI Nanao, who is advisor to Marshal Chang Tso-lin.
- Q. That was in 1929?
- A. That was about 1929.
- Q. Do you remember about what month?
- A. I can not recall what month it was. I think it was around February or March.
- Q. Do you feel fairly sure it was in 1929?
- A. I am quite sure it was in 1929.
- Q. Where was Marshal Chang Tso-lin at that time?
- A. At first he was in Peking and later he returned to Mukden.
- Q. You were with the TOKUMU KIKAN?
- A. At that time I had no connection with TOKUMU KIKAN.
- Q. When was your first connection with the TOKUMU KIKAN?
- A. My first connection with TOKUMU KIKAN was 18 August 1931.

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- Q. You never had anything to do with it before then?
A. I had no connection prior to that time.
- Q. Now, as a matter of fact, General, were you not the Resident Official for the Japanese Special Services organization in Mukden prior to August 18, 1931, and for several years before that time?
A. No, I was not.
- Q. Prior to August 18, 1931, how much of your army service was in China immediately preceding and continuing before August 18, 1931?
A. I spent almost 18 years in China, but during that time I had returned to Japan for a short period.
- Q. Most of that 18 years was with the Japanese Special Services organization, was it not?
A. No, it was not. Most of the time I was an aide to Lt. Gen. BANZAI. Lt. Gen. BANZAI was advisor to Yuan Shih-kai, Pi Huang and Fong Yui-Shiang - different Chinese leaders, in other words.
- Q. But during all this time, General, that you spent in China, the only times you got to Manchuria were in 1911, sometime in February or March 1929, when you stayed for six months as aide to the Advisor to Marshal Chang Tso-lin, and on August 18, 1931, when you finally went over to the Japanese Special Service organization?
A. That is true, except in 1911. I just passed through Manchuria, in 1929, I went there as aide to MATSUI, but had no connection with Special Service organization, and August 18, I went there with the Special Service organization.
- Q. Then the answer you gave me on my first interrogations, General, that the first time you were ever in Manchuria was the 18th of August 1939, was not true, is that not correct?
A. I started to tell you I had been in Manchuria before, but at that time I was told that you wanted my history from the time of the Manchurian incident, therefore, I did not tell you about my other trips into Manchuria.
- Q. General, what was the connection between Dr. Chao Hsin-Po and the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin on June 3, 1928?
A. I don't know if there was any connection, but I do know Chao Hsin-Po, who was the advisor to Chang Tso-lin, and I think the date was the 4th of June 1929.

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- Q. The historical record of the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin shows beyond a doubt it was June 3, 1928.
- A. That may be so, but I recall it as 4 June 1929.
- Q. Does that change the story about when you were in Manchuria during the 1930's?
- A. Yes, it will. I thought it was in 1929 that I was there, but I could be mistaken, but I remembered it to be 1929, so if it was 1928, it would change my story. I am quite sure it was in 1929, and that was the time that Chang Tso-lin was murdered, and I was there at the time.
- Q. We will not argue the point. I have the record here. Chao Hsin-Po was in prison in Mukden on the night the fighting broke out there in 1931; was he not?
- A. He was there in Mukden, but was not in prison. He was there as an adviser. I know this person real well, because he is very fluent in Japanese.
- Q. Who was the man in prison whom you released from prison September 20, 1931, or a little later and made Mayor of Mukden?
- A. The man I made Mayor was this Chao Hsin-Po, the man who succeeded me was Chao Hsin-Po.
- Q. Do you remember talking to General McCoy and other members of the Lytton Commission in the spring ^{of 1932} at Chan Chung, Manchuria, and their questioning you about this man and why he was in prison before you made him Mayor?
- A. I was not asked anything concerning whether this man was in prison, or not.
- Q. General McCoy tells me he asked you on what charge the man was in prison and he knew it was a felony charge, and you said it was a political charge and he was a good man. Is that true?
- A. That was not true, so I could not have possibly said that.
- Q. General, we have coming on the way now, and they will soon be here, memoranda of all the conversations and interviews had between the Lytton Commission with you, with General Keisio, General Araki, and all the rest of the military leaders, who were concerned in the Manchurian incident, the record made at

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time of the interviews, so if what you tell me now is not quite straight, it would pay you to give it to me straight.

- A. I have been telling you the truth, and I am not saying anything that is not true.
- Q. You have not been telling me the truth - just the other day your wife told me that the last five or six years before August 18, 1931, you spent a great deal of your time in Manchuria.
- A. My wife must have been mistaken about that because it is not true. She may be mistaken about that and she may have had Peking in mind when she said that. I am not telling any lies. You can check with the Chief of Staff and inquire there if I am telling the truth or not.
- Q. In addition I have here from the War Ministry the complete record of every assignment you have had since May 30, 1903, when you were graduated from the Army Preparatory School.
- A. I may not be correct in all the dates that I gave you, but I am quite sure that the record you got from the War Ministry is correct.
- Q. In addition, this book in front of me is the Lytton Commission report to the League of Nations on Manchuria.
- A. That may be so, but I can not help it if what I remember and what is in that book do not agree.
- Q. If you have read this you will remember that it sets out the Japanese Government's official report on what occurred and the Chinese Government's official report on what occurred. There are many particulars in here which show that what you told me in our first interrogation was not accurate and in some cases/^{shows} it was not true. I will go over them if you wish.
- A. I am trying to recall, to the best of my memory, but I am quite sure the story about Chao Hsin-Fo being in prison is a mistake.
- Q. Do you want to change the story about the time you spent in Manchuria prior to August 18, 1931?
- A. That is the truth, so I don't desire to change it.

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- Q. General, do you still insist that the story you gave me that your sole mission on being sent for on August 18, 1931, was to investigate the murder of Captain NAKANUMA?
- A. That was not the only purpose of my going there, but that was the most important.
- Q. You told me the other day that was your only purpose.
- A. I think that I told you that was my most important job, but since I was the head of Special Service organization I had other duties.
- Q. What were those other duties?
- A. The other two duties were investigation and liaison with Chinese forces.
- Q. What does investigation mean?
- A. The investigation consisted of determining the strength of Chinese forces, their training, their communication and the condition in the civilian population.
- Q. I remember asking you some questions along such lines the other day and you told me that you did not have very good intelligence of the state of the Chinese, except you knew they were strengthening their forces and intensifying their training.
- A. Yes, I said that, and felt that we did not have sufficient intelligence. One of the reasons why that was so, because the time I spent there was so short, which altogether was ten days.
- Q. Your Army had had Special Service organizations set up there long before, had they not?
- A. Yes, that was so.
- Q. Who was in command of it before you came over?
- A. Major General SUZUKI, Yoshimichi.
- Q. And he was relieved when you came over?
- A. Yes, I took over after he was relieved.
- Q. You were sent from Tokyo to take charge of the Special Service organizations in August 1931, is that correct?
- A. I left from Tokyo and traveled through Shanghai, Hankow, Peking, Tientsin and Mukden, arriving at Mukden on the 18th of August.

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Q. What date did you leave Tokyo?

A. I can not recall accurately, but I think it was early part of July.

Q. Why did you make that long swing to go up to Mukden?

A. The Chief of Staff felt that it would be a good idea to find out the conditions in China before taking this post in Mukden, so I took that round-about trip.

Q. And the Chief of Staff was who?

A. KANAYE.

Q. When was Prince KANIN Chief of Staff?

A. Prince KANIN was Chief of Staff after KANAYE, January 1932.

Q. Was it not in the new cabinet that followed the Manchurian incident?

A. It was.

Q. As a matter of fact, General, your mission through China on the way to Mukden was to see if conditions were right for starting the incident, was not that correct?

A. That was not so. It was just to get an idea of the general knowledge of China that I made this trip. That was because I was Regimental Commander for two years and had been out of touch and wanted to learn recent developments in China.

Q. Regimental Commander where?

A. At TAKATA, Japan.

Q. So for two years you had not been in China immediately preceding that trip?

A. No, I had not been in China for two years prior to that time.

Q. When you were in Tokyo or Japan, did you always live at your home in Tokyo?

A. When I was in Tokyo I lived at home. When I was in TAKATA, I had my family with me in TAKATA.

Q. And the personal papers I inquired about the other day, you always kept them at your home, did you?


A. I had no definite place to keep my papers, since I moved around. I was not in the habit of taking papers to my home.

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- Q. Where did you keep them?
A. I left them at my headquarters, either at the office of the Chief of Staff or with the Special Service officer.
- Q. The other day you told me that you had lost so many things because of moving your home around so much; that you had been bombed out.
A. I was not bombed out, but I moved around frequently, so each time I moved I had to discard my papers, except those necessary to keep with me.
- Q. Your wife tells me she has lived in that same house for over five years.
A. Yes, that is true.
- Q. Then the story you gave me the other day is not true, correct?
A. I told you that because I had been moving around in the Army to various places, Shanghai, Dairen, Mukden, etc., so that I was in the habit of moving around.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, 1st Lieutenant George Sonoda, Serial No. O-2037735, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 12 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Subscribed and sworn to before me
this _____ day of _____
1946.

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

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CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, Lt. Col. William T. Hornaday, Serial No. O-296682, certify that on the fifth day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me DOIHARA, Kenji, and according to 1st Lieutenant George Senoda, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Suzano Prison, Tokyo, Japan

W. T. Hornaday
Lt. Col., Inf

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INTERROGATION OF

General Kenji Doihara

Date and Time: 12 February 1946; 1015-1735 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : General Kenji Doihara
Lt. Col. William T. Hornaday, Interrogator
Mr. J. K. Sano, Civilian, Interpreter
1st Lt. George Sonoda (Interpreter)
Miss Jewel E. Newman, Stenographer

Questions by : Lt. Col. Hornaday

Oath given to interpreter by Lt. Col. Hornaday
(Mr. J. K. Sano interpreting)

"Do you solemnly swear (affirm), by Almighty God,
that you will truly and accurately interpret and
translate from English into Japanese and from
Japanese into English, as may be required of you,
in this proceeding."

- Q. General, first of all, last week I was asking you some questions regarding Tang Shao-i and Ou pei-fu. And I was asking you questions whether they were representatives from Chiang Kai-shek's government. I want to make certain of your answer to that question.
- A. They were not the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek's government. However, Tang Shao-i was an influential member of the Kuomintang Party. Ou pei-fu was looked up to as a member of the military group as a soldier.
- Q. Good, thank you. Now I also asked you questions, or rather I told you that we knew about the kidnapping of Henry Pu-yi from Tientsin and bringing him to a health resort near Port Arthur or Dairen. And you answered that you had been given orders that if Henry Pu-yi came to Manchuria you were to welcome him and entertain him but any reference to your taking him to a health resort is false. Is that correct?
- A. That is correct. I have conveyed the instruction from the Kwangtung Army that Pu-yi would be received well should he return to Manchuria.

FILE NO. 48

48-24

MAR 2 REC'D

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- Q. General, do you recall your interview at Changchun with members of the Lytton Commission in 1932?
- A. I remember that incident well. The meeting lasted about one hour or an hour and a half.
- Q. Do you remember that General Frank McCoy, the American member of the Lytton Commission was present at that meeting?
- A. Yes, I think he was there. I think that Mr. McCoy was there. However, there were quite a few other members of the Committee present.
- Q. Now, I have talked to General McCoy here in Tokyo within the last three weeks. He tells me that they questioned you at that time about Henry Pu-yi's coming to Manchuria. The reason why they questioned you was because that they had a report that you had kidnapped Henry Pu-yi from Tientsin. The General told me that when they questioned you about it you said you had been near Tientsin on some business. That, as I remember the date, was in November 1931, some where around the 25th or 26th. Because you were in the neighborhood of Tientsin you called on Henry Pu-yi, who was a very good friend of yours, to pay your respects. While you were visiting with him in his house there was a great deal of shooting going on in the immediate neighborhood and Henry Pu-yi was frightened. He asked you to protect him and save him from his neighbors. For that reason you told him that you would be glad to give him protection and you arranged to bring him by boat to this health resort which, as the General recalled, was near Port Arthur. Do you remember that story?
- A. The fact of having had a talk with the General is true, but the factual situation is not correct as well as the time when it took place I believe it is not correct.
- Q. The time of what took place?
- A. I think it took place the latter part of October instead of toward the end of November.
- Q. That is, your interview with the Lytton Commission or your contact with Henry Pu-yi?
- A. That I had reference to the date of my conference with Pu-yi.
- Q. All right, continue the story.
- A. At the time I met Pu-yi there was no disturbance outside.

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- Q. Do you remember telling your story to the Lytton Commission?
- A. All I remember about what I said was that should Pu-yi return to Manchuria the Kwangtung Army would be ready to receive him well as I said before. At the time I attended the Lytton Commission Conference I do not believe Mr. McCoy asked me that question as you now indicated. Instead, I believe Lytton, himself, propounded that question to me. That is my recollection. At the time when Commissioner Lytton asked me he told me that "Did you not at the point of a pistol force Pu-yi to return to Manchuria?" However, my reply to him was that was not so and I told him that I only met Pu-yi once when I conveyed to him the message from the Kwangtung Army as I said before. And what you said about my taking him to a resort near Port Arthur is not true. I did not mention anything like that to Mr. McCoy.
- Q. Well, did you take him, Henry Pu-yi, from Tientsin to any place else?
- A. I did not.
- Q. Did you furnish him with an escort or personnel to conduct him any place else even though you did not go yourself?
- A. I did not because I went there by myself at that time and I had no subordinate assigned to me.
- Q. Well, you did go to Tientsin then?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You didn't tell me that last week when I talked to you, did you?
- A. Last week the question developed through explanation of incidents that you were mentioning.
- Q. Yes, you started to explain what did happen and you said nothing about going to Tientsin. You said that you had been given orders that if he came to Manchuria you were to welcome him.
- A. But any reference to my taking him to Manchuria was false.
- Q. There must be a misunderstanding because I don't remember the fact of my going to Tientsin is true. What I meant was I conveyed a message to Pu-yi who was at Tientsin then.
- Q. Did the Kwangtung Army, or anybody from the Kwangtung Army, furnish any means of transportation or any personnel to conduct Henry Pu-yi away from Tientsin?

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- A. I don't know whether the Kwangtung Army furnished him with an escort directly or indirectly. However, I believe Pu-yi himself furnished his own escort and the escort consisted, perhaps, of Japanese and of Japanese "ronin".
- Q. How did Henry Pu-yi have contact with any Japanese ronin or any other Japanese?
- A. I believe he had contact with Japanese ronin all the time because the Japanese ronin maintained close contact with him.
- Q. Actually, you used many Japanese ronin as your spies in your Tokuma Kikan?
- A. That is not true. I never used ronin myself. As I said before I did not trust ronin. Therefore, I did not use them at all.
- Q. Well, then, the story that General McCoy has told me is not the story that you gave to the Lytton Commission at the interview. Is that correct?
- A. Maybe I am in error but to the best of my recollection the conversation was held with Commissioner Lytton in person although I am not positive about my statement that I did not have any talk with Mr. McCoy on the subject.
- Q. Let me see if I can refresh your memory a little bit. First of all, General McCoy told me that when the Commission arrived in Manchuria and they began requesting various members of the Kwangtung Army Staff to appear for interview they asked for you. They asked for you repeatedly and every time they asked for you they were politely told it was too bad, they were so sorry, that you had just been sent on another mission. Finally, to their surprise, at the time when they had almost completed their work in Manchuria, and while they were at Changchun you came in to see them one day. General McCoy says he was present at that meeting. He says that, first of all, they permitted you just to tell what you wanted to tell without asking questions. You explained that you had come to Changchun on business and, as was your custom, whenever you were in the neighborhood wherever Henry Pu-yi was located, to stop to pay your respects to Pu-yi who was the Emperor or the President of Manchukuo. You were surprised to learn, in spite of all the publicity that had been given to it in the Manchurian Daily News and other papers and the talk that was going around in official circles that the Lytton Commission was at Changchun.

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You stopped in as you supposed any one in your position should do to pay your respects. You used quite a little bit of time praising Henry Pu-yi, the young Emperor. Then when you had finished talking to whoever it was on the Commission--I don't know, it may have been Mr. Lytton or it may have been General McCoy, any way some one questioned you on two matters. The first was the kidnapping of the Emperor from Tientsin. The second was concerning where you were and what you were doing on the night that the fighting broke out in Mukden. Now, in regard to the first incident, the kidnapping of the Emperor, General McCoy says he heard you tell the story which I related to you here previously this morning. I also talked with Professor George Blakeslee here in Tokyo about three weeks ago who was also a member of the Lytton Commission, councillor to General McCoy. He tells me he was not present at the meeting with you but that he was told immediately after the meeting what transpired and he told me approximately the same story that General McCoy told me. Does that refresh your memory?

- A. Yes, it does. Now, may I speak?
- Q. Yes.
- A. At the time when I called on the Lytton Commission I was just made Major General and appointed to take command of the Hiroshima Division.
- Q. General McCoy told me that, too.
- A. I was on the way to the newly assigned post and I called on them at Changchun where the Japanese Consulate General was. By him I was requested to confer with Lord Lytton's party at the Consulate's office although I am not certain as to the hour of the day.
- Q. That is in all particulars what General McCoy told me.
- A. When I called on the Consulate General's office I was led to a reception hall or parlor and I was sitting there by myself alone. It was very cold and the Lytton Party members all wore overcoats and entered the room where I was sitting by myself. And we exchanged conversation and the statement that I made a special trip to confer with Lytton's party was not correct. I dropped in there on the way to my post.
- Q. You refresh my memory now, General, because that is what General McCoy told me. I was incorrect on that.

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- A. My recollection is not clear as to who asked me questions. That point is not very clear. The question covered practically the same ground as you now asked me, namely, where was I at the time at the beginning of the incident and whether or not I kidnapped him, Henry Pu-yi, at the point of a gun. Until that meeting I had not received any instructions whatsoever from the Kwangtung Army.
- Q. You mean to contact the Lytton Commission?
- A. Yes, nor what to say if and when I met with the Commission and that the fact that I gave answers to their questions as I just said this morning is true.
- Q. Now do you remember telling them the story I first outlined that there was fighting in the neighborhood and Henry Pu-yi asked you to give him protection from his neighbors?
- A. I don't remember mentioning that sort of thing at the time. All I stated to the Commission was that I met Pu-yi once to convey the message of the Kwangtung Army and never said that I met Pu-yi several times.
- Q. No, that was not the question, General. The question was when you did meet him that one time did the things that General McCoy said you said happen actually occur or did you say that to General McCoy or did that actually happen at Tientsin?
- A. I don't remember ever having told him anything like that. Do you mean at the time when I held conversation with Lytton's party?
- Q. Do you remember at that time telling Mr. Lytton anything like General McCoy says you did?
- A. I have no recollection.
- Q. You realize, General, that at the time you had this meeting with the Lytton Commission that a very careful memorandum was made immediately of what you had said to them?
- A. I have no personal knowledge whether that type of memorandum was made or not. I was not paying much attention but, however, I don't think they were writing down anything.
- Q. Not in your presence but immediately afterwards, perhaps. We have made arrangements with Washington to obtain from Geneva, Switzerland, where all those papers were filed, all such papers and we will have all those papers here, I hope, certainly within a few weeks.

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- A. I think if you get them the situation will be clear.
- Q. Right. Now, General, at the time you had this meeting with Henry Pu-yi at Tientsin as you remember in October 1931 you were Mayor or Governor of Mukden, weren't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What were you doing at Tientsin?
- A. I was sent there to convey the order from the Kwangtung Army. Also I was the Mayor but the actual work was delegated to Chao Hsin-po--the work of my office--and then went to Tientsin.
- Q. Then it was at the time then that Dr. Chao Hsin-po was made Mayor of Mukden, was it not?
- A. Yes, that was the time the work of the Mayor's office was transferred to Dr. Chao Hsin-po.
- Q. Then you were sent to Tientsin for the specific purpose of contacting Henry Pu-yi, is that correct?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Who sent you?
- A. By Kwangtung Army.
- Q. Who issued the order; what person in Kwangtung Army headquarters?
- A. The commander of the Kwangtung Army.
- Q. Was General HONJO still the commander then?
- A. Yes, sir, he was.
- Q. Did General ITAGAKI have anything to do with it?
- A. Colonel ITAGAKI was the Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff.
- Q. Well, did he have anything to do with sending you to Tientsin?
- A. Yes, order to proceed to Tientsin was issued by General HONJO, the Chief. However, detail as to my meeting with Pu-yi at Tientsin was arranged by Colonel ITAGAKI.
- Q. What was Colonel ITAGAKI'S order, do you remember?
- A. In substance, my instruction was to convey to Pu-yi that should he return to Manchuria the Kwangtung Army would welcome his return, and, next, he arranged for my transportation and expenses, etc.

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- Q. Were you to suggest to Henry Pu-yi that the reason why the Kwangtung Army would welcome him back was because they would like to have him head the new puppet government that you were setting up in Manchuria?
- A. I believe the Kwangtung Army must have had that idea in order to save Manchuria, however, I did not have any such idea.
- Q. But you knew, didn't you, General, that when you conveyed this welcome greeting to Pu-yi that he would understand that was what it meant, didn't you?
- A. That is true although I did not have my plan; however upon receipt of instruction from the Kwangtung Army I felt that such things would be required to settle the Manchoukuo turmoil where so many factions are competing against each other and causing disturbances. I happened to think of that more than about what the Chief of the Second Section told me at the time.
- Q. Good.
- A. That was to the effect that he warned me that I should not force him to return to Manchoukuo and if he wants to come back it would be fine.
- Q. Why on earth did he warn you to that effect; had you suggested that it might be wise to try to force him?
- A. He definitely told me that there would not be a necessity to bring him back forcibly.
- Q. Well, that does not answer my question, General, answer it, please.
- A. Perhaps the Chief of the Second Section might have had some other idea to control the situation in Manchuria even though Pu-yi may not return.
- Q. But why is it that he was afraid you might use force, was that your usual method in handling things like this?
- A. That I don't know. That is up to ITAGAKI.
- Q. Well, answer the last part of that question. Was that your usual method of handling things like this? And by that I mean was it your own personal method or the method of the Kwangtung Army, either one?
- A. I do not know what method the Kwangtung Army used, however, it is my motto that whatever the order I receive I see to it that purpose is accomplished.

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- Q. You are a good soldier. Now, actually, Henry Pu-yi did come to Manchuria almost immediately after you talked with him at Tientsin, didn't he?
- A. No, it did not happen immediately after my talk with Pu-yi. I think he consulted with his army at Tientsin. I returned to Mukden after meeting with Pu-yi at that time and after holding conferences with representatives of Japanese garrisons there and exchanging information concerning North China and Manchuria what I had and what they had, at the same time taking to the Kwangtung Army what papers they might have had there with them.
- Q. Who? What papers who had?
(The interpreter says "The Japanese Garrison Commander that he contacted at Tientsin?")
- Q. Well, then, your mission was a combined one of contacting Pu-yi and intelligence, wasn't it?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. You were still working with the Japanese Special Service Organization, then?
- A. No, at that time I was not the Chief of the Special Service Organization at Mukden.
- Q. Well, you may not have been chief of it but you were working with them and in the same work, isn't that it?
- A. No, I acted as the Mayor of Mukden.
- Q. How soon after you talked with Pu-yi did he follow you to Manchuria?
- A. I don't remember well but perhaps within a week or ten days after my meeting-as to the date I am not positive. I do not remember well.
- Q. Where did he come to in Manchuria?
- A. After my mission inviting Pu-yi to return to Manchuria I did not have anything to do with him any more. However, I found out that he came to Inkow (Chinese) (Japanese, Eiko).
- Q. What makes you think that he wanted to confer with his own army before deciding whether to accept the invitation--was it because he told you that?
- A. I did not say there was Chinese Army in Tientsin with whom he consulted. That must have been an error.

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- Q. What do you think you said a while ago?
- A. I believe Fu-yi consulted with a man by the name of Cheng Kao-shu who was serving as his personal adviser in all matters.
- Q. What was your report regarding the situation in North China that you made to the Kwangtung Army that you referred to a minute ago?
- A. Upon my return to the Kwangtung headquarters?
- Q. Yes.
- A. I don't remember so well, it took place sometime ago, however, I mentioned the fact that the situation in North China remained unsettled, and also a distribution of enemy forces throughout that area meaning Tientsin armies. Also gave information on the subject of how to be ready in case the troops in Manchuria should spread over to North China.
- Q. How did you find the narcotics situation in the Japanese concession in Tientsin to be when you were there, General?
- A. I don't know anything about the opium situation.
- Q. What about the heroin and morphine situation and the heroin factories in the Japanese concession?
- A. I never heard of anything like that nor do I know anything about it.
- Q. All right. Just to clear the record before we stop for the noon recess, General, you remember the letter that I handed you last week, the scroll letter? I believe it was marked our "Evidentiary Exhibit". There is no number on it, but it was a letter from General TANAKA to you when you were a captain regarding AIKAWA, just to clear the record.
- A. Yes, I remember this scroll because I saw this before.
- Q. Just to clear the record we showed this to AIKAWA this last week and he says it could not have been dated around 1928 or 1929 because he was not in China in 1928 or 1929 but he thinks it might have been around 1918. If this will help you, General, you were made a captain, let us see, on the 31st of August 1913, and you were promoted to major on the 25th of July, 1919, so if you were a captain when that letter was delivered to you it had to be some time between 1913 and 1919--that is the War Ministry's record.
- A. I am positive this letter was received by me when I was still a captain.
- Q. I think it refers to you as a captain in there.
- A. To the best of my memory this must have come to me in the 4th year of Taisho (1915). --- the number 14.

"This Exhibit was later given the number 14.

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- Q. Mr. AIKAWA says that some where around 1915, 1916, 1917 or 1918, some where around there he did make a trip to China to try to locate new sources of iron ore and so that was connected with mining interests.
- A. However, I did not meet Mr. AIKAWA at that time. May I explain further on this letter that the Chinese Special Envoy, by the name of SHU (Chinese, CHO) as mentioned in this letter, was to visit Japan in order to present the Chinese decorations to the Japanese Emperor. However, due to some cause or reason on behalf of Japan this mission was cancelled and he did not come to Japan and this letter though written was never used.
- Q. Oh! Well, that explains why Mr. AIKAWA can't explain, Iain never having seen it before. And I do not think that Mr. AIKAWA had an opportunity to see this.

NOON RECESS AT 1200 HOURS
RESUMED AT 1330 HOURS

- Q. General, you know what the Nine Power Treaty is, don't you?
- A. I know what that is, however, I don't know as to each provision it contains.
- Q. You know, don't you, that it guarantees the sovereignty of China?
- A. Yes, I know that.
- Q. You knew that in October 1931 when you were sent to contact Henry pu-yi, didn't you?
- A. Yes, of course, I did.
- Q. Then you knew, didn't you, that when the Kwangtung Army was planning to set up an independent state called Manchoukue that that was going to violate the Nine Power Treaty, didn't you?
- A. Yes, I did, but at that time Japan made some proclamation about her attitude toward the treaty. I do not remember the details of it.
- Q. Do you remember who made the proclamation? Was it General KOISO?
- A. I don't know--perhaps the Foreign Ministry. My understanding is that Japan made a proclamation concerning the Manchurian incident.

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- Q. Is it your recollection that whoever spoke renounced on behalf of Japan the Nine Power Treaty, that is, absolutely proclaimed the withdrawal of Japan from the provisions of that treaty?
- A. I do not know exactly what it was but my understanding is that the Manchurian incident is the result of self-protection of Japan.
- Q. You don't actually believe that yourself, do you, General? The whole world knows that Japan was looking for an excuse to start the Manchurian incident. But isn't it a fact that Japan itself was looking for an excuse to start a program of aggression with the object in view of setting up Manchuria as a puppet nation under Japan?
- A. It is not true because Japan was not seeking any excuse for creation of an independent state out of Manchuria, or at all, as I said before. In order to understand our situation one must be clear that at that time the internal condition of Manchuria was indeed very precarious.
- Q. We understand that fully, General. We made a long study of that situation. The Lytton Commission made a long study of it. The Lytton Commission Report seems to be pretty fair in the light of history in its summary of the antagonisms that existed in Manchuria. But the Lytton Commission Report also shows that the very morning after the fighting broke out Japanese troops took over the banks, took over all utilities, took over all industries, practically everything that was of importance to the control of Mukden and all the surrounding territory and within a very short period of time took over everything in all of that Manchurian area. As a matter of fact, when you got back to Mukden, on about the 20th of September, all of those things had already been taken over by Japanese troops, hadn't they?
- A. Yes, as far as the City of Mukden was concerned it was under the army's control.
- Q. Yes, the Lytton Commission Report shows that it happened in such a few hours after the fighting broke out that it unquestionably was the result of planning ahead of time; it could not have been organized any other way. Now then, the farther we go with our investigation the more we are inclined to agree that the evidence shows that Japan did not plan that but that Kwangtung headquarters and the Kwangtung Army officers did plan it. Go ahead, explain, if you please.

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- A. I believe there was a plan to meet any emergency because the Kwangtung Army was in charge of the guarding of railroad lines. Besides, Chinese forces were in such a large number whereas our force was less than 10,000 men. Therefore, Japanese interests, including the Japanese residents, would be placed in a very precarious situation unless Japan's army acts promptly upon happening of any incident. Otherwise, it would repeat the sad experience which we had experienced at Nicholaiske which is situated on the Northern Coast of Siberia where the Japanese residents there were annihilated. It is my observation that unless the Kwangtung Army acted promptly and efficiently to cope with that situation with a bigger force to confine their activities locally. Although I do not know what definite plan the Kwangtung Army had because I, as Chief of the Special Service Organization, had no way of knowing plan, if any.
- Q. General, that is the same answer that your Kwangtung Army officers have been giving to the whole world for over fifteen years. It is an affront to the intelligence of the rest of the world and it is an affront to my intelligence. I am disappointed that you continue to insist on it. Just to give you an illustration of how absurd it is--if the Chinese forces outnumbered yours so badly, if yours were so inferior, how did it happen that inside of four hours you were so easily able to beat and completely disarm these Chinese forces in your area? The whole idea is preposterous.
- A. The quality of Chinese soldiers at that time was such that though they may be superior in number if we resorted to that sort of tactics we felt we could meet the situation. Elaborating on what I said, although I do not intend to belittle the quality of the Chinese Army nor cast any reflection on them, but you can readily see, by judging the instances of so many engagements between the large force of Chinese and a small force of Japanese and the results of such engagements, it was possible for the Japanese Army to make such a plan as they did.
- Q. All right, General, I told you last week that I was going to check the newspapers of September 1931 to see if you were quoted in the Press. I have done that and the stories in the papers in 1931, in September, back here in Tokyo, show that the Kwangtung Army leaders were using the NAKAMURA case as an excuse for trying to bring this whole thing to a head. Now, I am going to go over with you some of those stories. But before I do I have one question I want to ask you. I appreciate that

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you may not have known the answer to this at the time, but in preparing to ask you that one question I want to ask this. It is a fact, isn't it, that you were very close to Colonel ITAGAKI in those days?

- A. Yes, I was very close and we graduated together.
- Q. You talked things over pretty frankly with each other about everything in connection with Manchuria in those days?
- A. Before the happening of the Manchurian incident I did not talk with ITAGAKI because there was hardly time to do so because he was in Port Arthur and I was in Mukden and the time which elapsed before break of incident was less than two weeks after I arrived in Mukden. I have talked with ITAGAKI after the incident several times. The fact that I arrived in Mukden on the 18th day of September--
- Q. August?
- A. August--after that date I went down to Port Arthur once on order from the Kwangtung Army to make an investigation of the NAKAMURA incident. I was asked by my predecessor in office to continue the investigation of the NAKAMURA case.
- Q. Well, you told me last week that the only orders you got at Tokyo were to report to the Kwangtung Army headquarters for assignment to the Special Service Organization.
- A. As far as My orders from headquarters were that I was assigned to the Kwangtung Army and I was to report there after making a tour of China.
- Q. Right.
- A. My assignment as Chief of Special Service Organization came from the Kwangtung Army.
- Q. And they came from General ITAGAKI, the Chief of the Second Section, didn't they? That is, he gave you the order himself?
- A. That is the order from the Commander of the Kwangtung Army.
- Q. Yes, from General HONJO..
- A. From General HONJO.
- Q. Yes, but it came down to you through General ITAGAKI, didn't it, because you served under him?
- A. No, sir, I received my order direct from the commander and my rank and that of ITAGAKI was the same at that time. Of course, procedure calls for receiving orders or instructions through ITAGAKI'S office.

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- Q. All right. Then isn't it a fact that you did talk with ITAGAKI at that time?
- A. Of course, I did.
- Q. And he did discuss with you what you were doing in the NAKAMURA case, didn't he?
- A. As far as my order is concerned to investigate the NAKAMURA incident it came from the commander of the Kwangtung Army but when I talked to ITAGAKI he told me that I should do everything possible to gather evidence because we are lacking in evidence needed to prove the NAKAMURA case at the present time.
- Q. Yes, so you did discuss the NAKAMURA case with him and you had quite a little conference with him then and he talked to you about the NAKAMURA case, didn't he?
- A. Absolutely not. Not before the Manchurian incident.
- Q. In other words, you were in there about five minutes and he gave you the orders in the NAKAMURA case and you left, is that it?
- A. That is correct. I went in there and came right out because I was so busy at the Mukden office. I was further instructed by ITAGAKI that I should consult the Japanese Consul General.
- Q. HAYASHI?
- A. HAYASHI and go ahead with it.
- Q. Who gave you the order to go to Tokyo to report on the NAKAMURA case? Didn't that come down to you from General HONJO through General ITAGAKI?
- A. I don't know what procedure they had followed but I received telegraphic instruction from Port Arthur to proceed immediately to Tokyo to make report on the NAKAMURA incident. I do not know whether it came from the commander of the Kwangtung Army or from the Chief of Staff. I was further instructed to take along with me all documents in connection with the NAKAMURA case.
- Q. Where were you when you got those orders--at Port Arthur?
- A. I was in Mukden.
- Q. In Mukden? Didn't you go to Kwangtung Army headquarters before leaving for Tokyo and discuss what you learned with General ITAGAKI or General HONJO or any of the Kwangtung Army officers?
- A. I did not. I returned to Japan directly from Mukden by train.

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- Q. Well, now, we get to the question I wanted to ask you a while ago. In view of the answer that you gave a while ago to the discussion on planned aggressive action by Japanese forces, how do you explain that in 1936 then General ISHIHARA told Mr. AIKAWA that he, ISHIHARA, and General ITAGAKI planned the Manchurian incident so as to be able to set up an independent industrial empire independent of Japan.
- A. I don't know anything about that; I don't know what they planned at all because I was in Harbin about February of 1936. From there I was transferred to Hiroshima for a new assignment. They never told me anything about it.
- Q. I know you weren't present at that interview between AIKAWA and ISHIHARA but ISHIHARA was referring to the plans that he and ITAGAKI made prior to the outbreak of fighting in Manchuria and Mukden in 1931 and you maintain that you knew nothing about that plan?
- A. No, sir, I did not even know there was such a plan as early as 1931 and I went to Hiroshima without any knowledge pertaining to that. However, the only thing I know is that after the Manchurian incident I was sent to have Pu-yi returned to Manchuria without using force as I said before. I, for one, do not believe there was any plan for the Manchurian independence even by judging from what instructions I received, namely, that if Pu-yi does not return to Manchuria without such coercion it would be all right. In other words, they might have had some other alternative in case Pu-yi does not return which, in itself, shows there was no definite plan for Manchuria.
- Q. General, you will surely agree that everything that happened there in Manchuria indicates and points to the careful detailed prior planning that had to take place to accomplish what was done with the remarkable speed and ease with which it was done; it could not have been accomplished any other way.
- A. My observation is that as to the disposition of the Manchurian incident they were at a loss how to handle it, that is, politically. However, militarily they must have had a definite plan.
- Q. Everything points to the fact that they even had it well planned politically, doesn't it?
- A. I do not think so. However, this matter is a difference of opinion but as one who was there and receiving impressions I didn't think so. At the time I left for Japan my observation of the inner working of the Kwangtung Army was unsettled on that point. They are in a state of confusion.

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- Q. KIDO'S diary shows and he is daily telling us now that immediately after news was received that fighting had broken out the Emperor and Premier WATKATSUKI both issued orders to the Kwangtung Army not to go beyond the railroad zone. They were not to go beyond the boundaries of the railroad zone.
- A. I don't know.
- Q. The historical records show that the troops went ahead in spite of such orders and kept pushing out and taking over more territory.
- A. It is true as a necessary strategic step they might have gone beyond the railroad guard zone.
- Q. Why, within a month you were already planning, by your own admission, to get Pu-yi back to set up a new government and you admit yourself that that was a violation of the Nine Power Treaty.
- A. At the time we extended the invitation to Pu-yi to return to Manchuria we did not have any plan in mind to establish an independent nation or anything at all except that we felt it is necessary to restore peace in that area. I further believe that the returning of Pu-yi to Manchuria was to narrow down the domestic fighting and to restore peace there.
- Q. But the fact remains that a few months later you did set up a puppet government and made him the head of it.
- A. I do not know because I was not there. However, from the beginning of the Manchurian incident until about September of the 11th year of Showa Manchoukuo was in a chaotic condition and I think it was in that month (referring to September) Japan recognized Manchoukuo. My memory is not very clear whether it is 11 or 12, but I think it is the 12th year.
- Q. The fact also remains, General, that there was not another time during all your fighting in China when you were able to beat and disarm the Chinese forces with such extreme ease as you did in those early days in Manchuria which is surely evidence that you took them by surprise and caught them off guard. What do you have to say to that? That also defeats your argument that you were doing on a defensive basis. It also shows that the Chinese were doing their level best not to fight back and try to settle this thing without fighting.
- A. Yet Chinese forces often attacked us but the most of our attack was made in anticipation of imminent enemy attack. My own experience in North China, especially near Kaifong, enemy had 20 divisions of enemy forces surrounded us--yet we were able to defeat them.

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- Q. I understand all of that, General, but the fact remains that you never again faced the Chinese and had such slight losses and had such ease in beating them.
- A. Well, I don't know what you mean by that but my understanding is we had considerable casualties, too.
- Q. The record furnished by your government to the Lytton Commission Report on the fighting of that first night around Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931, shows that you only lost two or three men, I think one officer and two men, if I remember correctly, and that was your government's report.
- A. Those are death casualties as I remember.
- A. That might be so at Mukden but right around Changchun casualties were considerable large.
- Q. Yes, by that time the Chinese were alerted and were expecting your attack. I understand that.
- A. Well, I was not there and so that I could not answer you in detail.
- Q. I understand. Now, General, to get to these news stories I was telling you about which show on their face how the NAKAMURA case was being used as an excuse by the Kwangtung Army, I want to tell you that first of all this first story which I copied out of "the Japan Times", Tokyo, issue of Tuesday, 1 September 1931, shows who this MORI, who I thought was Major MORI, and who is so-called in the Lytton Report; shows who he actually is. I marked this story with red pencil, marked "1" so that the stenographer can identify it later for copying in the record. Now, I am going to ask Mr. Sano to read it to you in Japanese so you will understand who this MORI was and you will probably remember him or may have heard of him at least when you hear this story.
- A. I know Kak u MORI. Perhaps he was a statesman.
- Q. All right, read him the statement.

(Here the interpreter read the following news story)

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"The Japan Times", Tokyo, Tues., 1 Sep 31
(Page 1, 4th column,)

"To be or not to be in Manchuria is the question which Japan has now to think about in earnest, according to Mr. Kaku MORI, head of the recent Seiyukai investigation commission of the conditions of Manchuria and Chosen, who reported on the investigation of the commission at a meeting of the Seiyukai leaders Monday afternoon. Mr. MORI, who was former parliamentary vice-foreign minister, also declared that the conditions in Manchuria were practically those immediately preceding a war and that Japan's rights in that territory were collapsing day by day.

"The following is the gist of the conclusion of Mr. MORI'S report: (at a Seiyukai gathering Monday, 5 hours long).

"The Chosen affair and the Wanpaoshan incident were both caused through an inconsistent China policy of our country. The investigation of our commission shows that in Manchuria and Mongolia there exists a threatening antagonism between official and unofficial Japanese and Chinese -----."

"If left alone, Japan will eventually have to quit Manchuria. If we do not want to quit, we will have to consider measures to break through the present conditions. To be or not to be in Manchuria is the question that the Japanese people now have to think about in earnest."

(The last paragraph of this news story has been omitted as it was not read to the witness)

- Q. Let us skip the last paragraph because it doesn't have anything to do with--the main point I want to make is apparently that the Lytton Commission in its report confused you with a Major MORI and this Major MORI must have been the MORI, Kaku mentioned in this story as the head of the investigating commission.
- A. That could be possible.
- Q. Yes. You remember I questioned you about what Major MORI'S part was in this thing and apparently the Lytton Commission Report had Major MORI mistaken for you.
- A. I now recollect this Major MORI was sent to the spot where the NAKAMURA incident took place.

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- Q. Major MORI?
- A. At the time I did not know that officer would be Major MORI but I thought of it later and I think it must have been Major MORI who went there almost simultaneously when I was making trip back to Japan to make report on the NAKAMURA case.
- Q. Well, that was not this MORI, Raku?
- A. This is entirely different. This Raku MORI is a member of the Seiyukai Political Party; he was at the head of it--not an army man.
- Q. Was Major MORI sent by the Imperial General Staff as the Lytton Commission Report said?
- A. He was sent by the Chief Officer of the Chief of Staff on temporary duty.
- Q. From Tokyo?
- A. Yes, sir, from Tokyo. I came home and he went to the place where the NAKAMURA incident took place.
- Q. There is still a conflict because the Lytton Report says he arrived in Mukden on August 17, the day before you say you arrived and that he left to report to Tokyo some time around September 8 or 9th, as I remember it.
- A. I do not know the date but at any rate he came there while I was not there. I did not meet him. But retrospectively I think that report must have had reference to that. I did not meet him so I cannot tell you exactly what happened.
- Q. I see.

HERE THERE WAS A SHORT RECESS

- Q. I understand, General, that you are known as DOIHARA? We have on our record DOIHARA.
- A. My original name as written in the Chinese character was pronounced DOIHARA. However, when I established my own home, in order to eliminate the confusion in the pronunciation, I decided to adopt the pronunciation of DOIHARA as characters written.
- Q. I understand. Now, I am going to have Mr. Sano read to you a story which we got in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Evening Edition, September 12, 1931, page 2, which I have marked in red pencil

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"2" on the page; it is the story at the bottom of the page.

(Here interpreter reads and translates the following)

THE TOKYO ASAHI SHIMBUN, Evening Edition, 12 Sep 31, page 2

CONFERENCE ON RETALIATORY MEASURES
CHIEF OF SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATION DOIHARA IS BUSY

Chief of Special Service, Doihara, Assistant Chief of Staff Ninomiya and Vice Minister of War, Sugiyama, and Military Affairs Section Chief Nagata gathered at the office of Vice Minister of War at 10:30 in the morning of the 11th. Immediately upon hearing detailed report as well as the proposed solution of the Nakamura incident, they discussed for about two hours possible retaliatory measures based upon the force, and adjourned at 1:00 P.M. Colonel Doihara is expected to answer the questions from Chief of Staff relating to the retaliatory measures in the evening of the same day. Thus tension among high ranking officers of the army is increasing.

- A. It is true that I held a conference with MINAMI, War Minister; SUGIYAMA, Vice Minister; KOISO, Chief of Military Affairs; NINOMIYA, Assistant Chief of Staff; KANAYA, Chief of Staff; and reported to each of them in full about the NAKAMURA incident but nothing was said upon the retaliatory measures against the Chinese at all. None of them ever mentioned anything on this subject of retaliation. In those days papers were over-anxious to write exaggerating news. Chinese papers are even worse.
- Q. Would you say that the tendency of the papers in those days to exaggerate your news pertained only to your relations with the Chinese in Manchuria or to everything.
- A. I even suspect that the same attitude in handling even the domestic matters were true.
- Q. Well, this kind of a story appearing in the newspapers must have worried you a great deal didn't it, General, you and the other officers of the General Staff?
- A. I think it must have been very annoying and this was not the only instance.

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- Q. Well, why didn't you issue denials of stories like that then?
- A. I was really busy on my official business calling on various parties and, besides, there is no end to what the newspaper writes and I couldn't issue denials for each time.
- Q. Well you realized, didn't you, that that kind of newspaper story was building up a tense situation--they were just leading to a war?
- A. I think that that is very true. However, such matters as that were supposed to be handled by the headquarters and man like I am running around by orders didn't have much to do with it.
- Q. Actually, you officers in the Kwangtung Army headquarters were darned pleased that your newspapers were building up this tense-ness, weren't you?
- A. Well, we weren't particularly elated over it. In fact, we did not pay much attention to it. And I did not know that the ASAHI carried articles like that. Those days people of Japan were all aroused over the NAKAMURA incident and even my short stay in Japan I was called upon by so many people it didn't give me any time for myself.
- Q. Now, you say that you didn't pay much attention to these stories and that is in spite of the fact that you say that you realized they were building up a tense situation that was leading to war, is that right?
- A. If you are referring to the newspaper articles you have just showed me as a basis of your question, this is the first time that article was referred to me. I did not know then such articles appeared. Until now I did not know such a word as "retaliation" was used in newspaper article.
- Q. As a matter of fact, General, you knew the general type of articles appearing in the papers those days because, undoubtedly, you read the papers when you were back here, isn't that true?
- A. It is true I read newspapers some times--just scanned over it. However, such a gitating news reflecting public opinion then existed against China could be read on paper. The fact of the matter is I have been approached by so many people en route; some asking the question why the army does not take more decisive steps. The situation as I described now had been fully reported to the Chief of Military Affairs.
- Q. KOISO?
- A. HAGATA who was directly under KOISO.

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- Q. AS a matter of fact, General (I want the interpreter to interpret this sentence by sentence) in my search of these newspapers during the period of September 1931 I found that the editorial opinion mostly was influencing the war minister and particularly you fellows in the Kwangtung Army to go slow in riding the question of the NAKAMURA case. The reason for so much evidence in the papers is perfectly obvious was because you army people were agitating this NAKAMURA case way beyond its real importance. It is obvious that the Kwangtung Army headquarters, whether you personally were involved or not I do not care, ITAGAKI, ISHIIHARA, HONJO, had got tired of playing around with the Chinese there and the NAKAMURA case was the excuse for bringing it to a head.
- A. I do not believe that this is true for the reason that the main reason for agitating public opinion was due to the accumulation of incidents such as the NAKAMURA incident, Manpozan (Wanpaoshan) incident; active sabotage against railroad by placing stones on the railroad track or pulling out spikes and politically they denied the rights of the Japanese which were by treaty recognized there in form of denying all Japanese to be engaged in business or in other enterprises. Also, by constructing central railway lines in order to injure the Japanese South Manchuria Railway operation. I have lots more.
- Q. I know. This is the same story that you gave the Lytton Report and which they set out fully. I know it. But the point is there were incidents of aggression. I am not going into an argument about how Japanese were claiming more rights than they had but there were incidents. And the hot heads in the Kwangtung Army, particularly, because they became tired of them, decided to quit negotiating and to use the NAKAMURA case as an excuse to bring it to a head, and particularly the NAKAMURA case. Then let us go ahead with the developing of that viewpoint by showing you just what happened in your own Japanese newspapers at the time. Now, I am going to have Mr. Sano read you the story from The Japan Times, Friday, September 11, 1931, front page, 6th column, which I have marked in red pencil no. 3. It is a long story; now I want him to read all of it except parts which I have marked "omit" which don't have to do with the army's action.

(Here the translator read and translated the following news item)

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"THE JAPAN TIMES, Friday Sep. 11, 1931, front page, 6th clmn.

"MINAMI IS CALLED BY EMPEROR TO EXPLAIN THE NAKAMURA CASE
MILITARISTS STIFFEN ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA AS REPORT COMES IN
START AGITATIONS

"Summoned by His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor, War Minister General Minami reported to the Imperial Palace at 1:30 o'clock Friday afternoon to submit a report on the recent Nakamura case, the recent conditions in China and other matters in his charge to the Throne, according to Rengo.

"During his audience with His Majesty Friday afternoon, the War Minister replied to several questions put to him by His Majesty on the recent situation, it is said.

"A marked stiffening in the attitude of military leaders on the question of the alleged murder in Manchuria of Capt. Nakamura of the General Staff was noted this morning following the arrival in Tokyo Thursday morning, of Col. DOIHARA, chief of the special service station at Mukden.

"Colonel Doihara's arrival also coincided with the starting of a vigorous agitation by various bodies, the Seiyukai having decided to start a nation-wide campaign on Manchurian problems apart from the prefectural electoral campaigns. Six other bodies are holding a joint meeting to adopt resolutions regarding the Nakamura case.

"On his arrival in Tokyo Thursday morning, Colonel Doihara immediately visited the General Staff to report his investigation of the case and the recent conditions in Manchuria to General Hanji Kanaya, chief of the General Staff, and a few other higher staff officers. At one o'clock in the afternoon, he met War Minister General Minami and several other War Ministry officers at General Minami's official residence to make a similar report.

"According to the report of Colonel Doihara as revealed to the press, the Chinese continue to show a strong attitude thinking it impossible for Japan to resort to armed force for economic and political reasons.

"Official information reaching the War Office, it is understood, endorses Colonel Doihara's report and indicate that the Chinese are planning for postponing the settlement of the Nakamura case indefinitely. The recent newspaper report that the second investigation party dispatched by the Mukdenite authorities acknowledged the murder of Captain Nakamura by regular troops has proved entirely unfounded.

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(News stories, DOIHARA: Japan Times, Fri. Sep 11 '31, cont'd)

"Meanwhile the Chinese authorities apparently are utilizing all propaganda facilities to instigate anti-Japanese agitation in Manchuria, it is stated.

"In view of such a situation in Manchuria, the military authorities are awaiting further reports from Major Kanaya who is in charge of the special service station at Mukden during the absence of Colonel Doihara, and expect to decide on concrete measures to be taken to deal with the question in a few days after conferring with the Foreign Office.

"Meanwhile the War Ministry is reported to have decided to hold an army funeral for the late Captain Shintaro Nakamura and Sergeant Nobutaro Isugi, who were murdered together in Manchuria in the recent case in question, at Hibiya Park about September 24 or 25. Major General Bijiro Umezu, Chief of the general affairs department of the General Staff, has been named chairman of the funeral committee for the two victims to make necessary preparations. - - - -"

- Q. You see, General, the story itself shows that the military authorities, by the use of such things as a public funeral, and so on, were using the NAKAMURA case to keep the people agitated. This man NAKAMURA, who went into Manchuria, there is some evidence to show, as a spy and who was without protection of the law, Japan's or any other. At the same time, General, in this newspaper and in other Japanese newspapers here in Tokyo there were editorials, and I read them, calling on the military to slow down on this; this NAKAMURA case did not have the importance in the newspapers that was being given to it by the military. Now, General, if the military was not issuing stories of the kind that have just been read to you, who was?
- A. ~~What~~ I could not tell you who sent out this kind of information. It isn't anything I had anything to do with. Referring to the sum of accounts contained in these newspaper articles it was true that dilatory action on behalf of the Chinese and the denial of the guilt of the murder of Captain NAKAMURA was known to me before I left Mukden and the Japanese authorities, both foreign affairs and the military, decided to come to a definite settlement of these matters but to my personal knowledge there never was any consideration to settle this matter by resorting to force. At the time I left Mukden I was informed that Lt. Col. Kwan (Chinese Kuan) was cited for investigation in connection with the murdering of Captain NAKAMURA.

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- Q. All right, to go ahead to show you just how you military people were building this thing up we have some more newspaper stories here. And I want to remark here that I am fully aware that you undoubtedly at that time knew of the existence of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
- A. That I don't know.
- Q. And that your country was a party signatory to it and that it outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. And, also, by your own admission here today that you knew of the existence of the Nine Power Treaty and that it guaranteed the sovereignty of China.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you want to remark anything about those remarks of mine?
- A. All I know is that the Nine Power Treaty exists because I learned it because it was so publicized. However, I am not a diplomat. I do not know much about the contents of that treaty. However, what we did was for our own self-defense and I consider the case of self-defense based on necessity was outside of the realm of the treaty provisions.
- Q. To go on with this story. The one marked with red pencil no. 4, consisting of two pages, and the top two paragraphs are descriptions of stories found in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun of 12 September 1931, page 2. The third paragraph is a story translated completely and copied from the same paper, dated 15 September 1931, page 1; and the one starting on the bottom of the first page and finished on page 2, dated 16 September 1931, page 1. I will have Mr. Sano read them to you.

(Here the interpreter read and translated the following)

*THE TOKYO ASAHI SHIMBUN, 12 Sep 31, page 2.

A photograph at top of page shows officer standing on platform in theater or auditorium (Japan Young Men's Hall) speaking. It is described as a lecture and protest meeting sponsored by Azabu and Hongo Regimental Officers against the Nakamura incident. Speakers were Regimental C. O., Col. Nakamura, Div. C. G. Hayashi and General Jotaro Watanabe. Talked about preparation and determination of those present to meet with present existing conditions.

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*Same page, Chinese Chief of Staff, talking to Asahi correspondent at Mukden on 11th, admitted that the Japanese claim that Nakamura was murdered was true.

*Same paper, 15 Sep 31, page 1:

*COLONEL DOIHARA HURRIEDLY RETURNS TO MANCHURIA.

Colonel Doihara, who is the chief of special service organization at Mukden, who came to Tokyo in response to telegraphic order from the army to make a report on the case of Captain Nakamura, arrived in Tokyo on the 10th. He has held conferences with Chief of Staff and important officials of the War Ministry as well as Foreign Ministry by presenting his views and receiving over-all policy directives from the army. Colonel Doihara is expected to leave Tokyo station in the evening of the 14th hurriedly returning to his post in order to convey army directives to the commanding general of Kwantung army Honjo.

*Same paper, 16 Sep 31, page 1:

*SHOULD THE NAKAMURA CASE BE WHITENASHED WE WILL RESORT TO FORCE OF ARMS. DECISION MADE AS TO DIRECTIVE FOR CHIEF OF SPECIAL SERVICE DOIHARA BY CONFERENCE HELD AMONG HEADS OF ARMY TODAY.

(Continued on page 2)

*There was held important meeting at the headquarters of Chief of Staff at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the 15th by four heads of army, Chief of Staff Hanaya, his assistant Hinomiya, War Minister Minami and Vice Minister Sugiyama. They discussed policy directives to be handed to Colonel Doihara who is expected to return to Mukden on the night of the 15th. These directives were the result of the report made by Chief of special service organization at Mukden, Colonel Doihara, and report of actual conditions made by Shibayama, Military Consultant of Manchurian warlord, Chang Hsueh-liang (major Kenshiro Shibayama), on the subject of the Captain Nakamura incident and Manchurian problems as well as the future policies for them. AS for the Nakamura incident we shall absolutely support diplomatic negotiations until China will be made to acknowledge responsibility therefor. However, if by any chance at all China should take an attitude to whitewash the case then it is resolved that this matter will be solved even if it is necessary to resort to physical force. This directive was to be given to Colonel Doihara and further discussion was held as to the terms of protests in event Chinese

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acknowledge the guilt of this case. This meeting was adjourned at noon.

*Colonel Doihara Returns Tonight.

*Colonel Doihara, chief of special service organization at Mukden, who had delayed a day to return to destination for the purpose of holding further conference with military adviser Major Shibayama, adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh-lian, who arrived at Tokyo on the 14th, has decided to depart from Tokyo station hurriedly by taking the 9:25 evening train of the 15th.

- A. There is a slight discrepancy as to dates, as well as the facts stated therein. However, in general, what newspaper reported was true and in particular where it has reference to the NAKAMURA matter will be left for the diplomatic negotiations. However, we never discussed anything which the paper states which had reference to the use of physical force if necessary. The report on Major SHIBAYAMA returning to Japan was true. What I remember now about what Major SHIBAYAMA said then agrees with what I reported to the army officials. That is, Chinese authorities are citing the Chinese commander for investigation.
- Q. Well, now, General, who do you think is responsible for giving out stories of that kind to the newsmen?
- A. I do not know where they come from. I do not remember they had information bureau for the army then. Later, I believe, we had information bureau.
- Q. By your own admission, there are so many accurate details in this story that it is obvious that there must have been a military spokesman that gave that story to the newspapers.
- A. Those days newspapermen had access to whatever section or department they wished to go to for information and, no doubt, someone must have given some of them information yet newspapermen more likely or not enlarge upon the information they so may receive.
- Q. In other words, you think that all references to the use of physical force in here are pure fabrication on the part of newspapermen, is that it?
- A. Now, I don't know whether the newspapermen manufactured it or not, but it is possible that some younger officers might have volunteered such a statement themselves. As far as I am concerned I never received instructions to the effect that we had to resort to physical force.

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- Q. All right, then there were younger officers who were talking about the use of force, were there? That is the first time you have ever admitted it.
- A. I do not wish to be quoted as admitting that there were younger officers who did make that type of statement to the newspaper. What I am saying is that it is quite possible some of the younger officers may have made such remarks. At the same time, some of the newspapermen may have exaggerated the situation.
- Q. But you haven't answered my question? I say that you do admit that there were younger officers who were agitating for the use of force?
- A. I was stationed outside of Japan and I was not in a position to know definitely, but what I am saying is I would not be surprised if there were such young officers who thought something like that.
- Q. You knew about such young officer and how they were feeling, didn't you?
- A. I did not know there were such young officers, yet, judging from what happened in the 2-26 insurrection cases. . . .
- Q. In 1936?
- A. At any rate, in the 11th year of Showa. Judging from that I say that would be possible.
- Q. Yes, they were members of the Shimpeitai and also HASHIMOTO'S Sakura-Kai, weren't they?
- A. I did not have personal knowledge of either Sakura-Kai or Shimpeitai as a group, although I learned about them later. However, there were officers who were more hot-blooded.
- Q. You know, General, when I questioned you about your knowledge of the plans you described yourself as a young officer of such low rank and position that you were not entitled to know anything about plans. When I ask you about the young officers who were members of this organization and the hot-bloods you talk about them as being something separate. That is pretty convenient.
- A. As to your first point nobody planned for the Manchurian incident so that there never was anyone who planned it.
- Q. I must interject there that is not what ISEHARA said.
- A. I do not know what he said, but no matter who says what, as far as I am concerned I know there was no plan.

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- Q. To go onto the second point; when you talk about the young officers you forget that you were a young officer... who were members of this organization.
- A. As to the second part what I said was that among the younger officers there might be--such might be the case but I am not saying there was.
- Q. Well, there is lots of stuff I want to question you about but I do not know whether time will permit so I am going ahead with this newspaper story. This story I am going to have Mr. Sano read you I have marked with red pencil number 5; it is on two pages and it is from "The Japan Times" from 13 Sept 1931, front page, 1st column, and it shows that the newspapers were not necessarily agitating for use of force and they did show the facts when it appeared that the NAKAMURA incident could be settled by negotiation.

(Here the interpreter read and translated the following news item)

NAKAMURA AFFAIR WILL BE SETTLED AMICABLY SHORTLY
 OFFICIAL QUARTERS FEEL JAPAN WILL NOT BE FORCED TO RESORT TO ARMS
 OPTIMISM EXPRESSED
 DENIES MUKDEN WARLORD CLAIMED MURDER WAS A FABRICATION OF THIS COUNTRY.

"The recent Sino-Japanese dispute over the alleged murder of Captain Shintaro Nakamura of the General Staff, which has been the cause so considerable agitation during the last few days, is likely to be settled before Japan will be forced to resort to forcible action, it was indicated in official quarters Saturday.

"According to the official information, the Chinese authorities who have been trying hard to disclaim all knowledge of the case from the first, are now apparently willing to admit the occurrence of the affair, thereby making it possible for Japan to settle the incident amicably through diplomatic negotiations.

"When Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden demanded the detention of the commander of the troops who murdered Captain Nakamura lest he should cover his traces, the chief staff officer of the Mukdenite army, it is stated, declared that there was no chance of the commander making good his escape.

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*Major SHIBAYAMA, military adviser to General CHANG Hsueh-liang, the Mukden Warlord, on his way to Tokyo, also expressed an optimistic view in a press interview at Seoul Saturday. The Major is quoted as saying:

'Contrary to press reports, Chang Hsueh-liang has not asserted that the Nakamura case was a fabrication on the part of the Japanese, although he has not yet outwardly acknowledged the affair.'

'The truth is that Chang Hsueh-liang is now awaiting the return of the second investigation party, hoping to settle the question amicably with Japan. Though there are several groups of younger officers who are clamoring for war with Japan, declaring that they have nothing to fear from Japan, the Chinese military leaders are fully aware of the real strength of the Japanese army and I do not think they will ever listen to such propaganda. I know this because Chang Hsueh-liang personally told me that he wanted to settle the question in good time without resorting to armed force.'

*Colonel DOHARA, chief of the special service station at Mukden of the Japanese army, who has been conferring with the army, navy and foreign affairs authorities in Tokyo following his arrival here a few days ago, is reported leaving Monday night to return to his post at Mukden. The Colonel seems to have been to some extent instrumental in preventing any discord between the army, the navy and the Foreign Office in dealing with the Nakamura case and other Manchurian questions."

- Q. Now, General, in our first interrogation you stated that upon your return to Tokyo you reported the results of your investigation in the NAKAMURA case to General KOISO and the inference was that that was all the report you had to make. Now, by the newspaper stories today and your admission, it appears that you conferred with a large number of officials in the War Ministry and in the Foreign Ministry. Now, just what did you report to the War Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, to the best of your recollections?
- A. I do not have any recollection of ever reporting to the Navy Minister.
- Q. I did not say the Navy Minister. I said the War Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.
- A. To the Foreign Ministry I reported on the NAKAMURA incident.

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- Q. What on the NAKAMURA incident?
- A. I don't know in detail what I said but I reported the development of the NAKAMURA case.
- Q. Tell me some of the details that you reported to them?
- A. Well, I think I reported matters concerning the NAKAMURA incident.
- Q. Tell me to the best of your recollection just what you said to them, General, that is what I am trying to get. Do you have time to write out some story about your recollections of what you told the officials in the War Ministry and the Foreign Ministry to give to me later? That is acceptable, if you do.
- A. I have related to you already the general outline of what I know about the NAKAMURA murder case as to where it took place I am sure but who testified what or any other details I would not be able to say. For instance, the names of witnesses I have completely forgotten.
- Q. That is not so important now. It is the all over detailed picture of the NAKAMURA investigation report that you made to the War Ministry officials and Foreign Ministry officials that I would like to have. You have told me details about what you learned of various phases of the NAKAMURA case but I want to distinguish about what you have told me and the report you made to the War Minister and the Foreign Minister. You must have had a great deal of discussion considering what is written in the newspaper; you must have talked a long time; they must have asked you for your recommendation as to what to do; they must have given you instructions as to what to do.
- A. For instance, when I met or anything like that?
- Q. Well that would be helpful in the War Ministry and Foreign Ministry, yes, and what you told them. And what, as far as you can remember, they said to you and what recommendations they asked you for and what instructions they gave you?
- A. If I can't do it in detail but if it is just a rough sketch of it may be I would be able to prepare one.
- Q. I would like it in as much detail as your memory permits.
- A. I have even forgotten the exact date.
- Q. I understand that. Well, if you will do that then I will look forward to getting that from you later, if you will give me an idea as to how much time you would like to have.

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- A. Its being from my own memory I don't think it should take very much time.
- Q. I hope you remember better than that. -- Now to carry on with this newspaper story here is one which was translated by Mr. Sano from the Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, of 16 Sept 1931, page 2. I have marked it with red pencil number 6 and it consists of parts of two pages. I want him to read it to you.

(Here the interpreter read and translated the following news item)

"KUAN REPRESENTING THE CHIEF OF THE 3RD CHINESE DIVISION EVADES RESPONSIBILITY ARMY IS VERY ANGRY ABOUT CHINESE INSINCERITY. MURDER RINGO DISPATCH, 15th.

"According to the report which reached certain place Kuan, representing the chief of 3rd Reclamation Corps, strongly protested against the investigation of the responsible people in the Nakamura case at Che Nan for which army declared: 'this attempt so clearly shows the attitude of Kuan, who does not admit the Chinese guilt, and to have the responsible people to escape, thus it could be considered that they are insincere. Without making this point clear, to enter into official negotiations with them is impossible.'"

"MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA RAILROAD NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HANDLED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY. THIS IS THE INTENTION OF THE ARMY.

"Relative to the murder case of Captain Nakamura, China appears to concede the guilt of the Chinese. However, this marks the beginning of diplomatic negotiations. Unless the Chinese would accept readily the terms of solution which Japan may present to them hereafter, the complication of this case is hardly escapable. The army is still very suspicious whether the Chinese are willing to settle the case. However, utilizing the Nakamura case as an opportunity to clarify all accumulated problems concerning Manchuria and Mongolia in a single stroke, (the army or military leaders acting as a) central control is giving instructions to encourage the government and diplomatic authorities and at the same time is ordering the Kwantung army to have armed forces in the field and the diplomats there to cooperate with each other to achieve a solution. As their first step it seems to be the intention of (the army) to have the foreign ministry deal with the matter of the railroads. At present the railroad negotiations which were started last year with the Northeast

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Government have not shown any progress at all. If this situation is left alone it will be very difficult to foresee when it will be settled. Therefore the Nakamura case should not be missed as an opportunity to renew those negotiations, by having the ministry of foreign affairs take charge. The army is determined to give support from the sidelines for this purpose. Colonel Doihara is instructed to convey this order to the Kwantung army.

A. As to this article I do not remember that I received instruction that all accumulated matters on Manchuria and Mongolia should be settled in connection with the NAKAMURA case. As far as I remember now my instruction was to settle the NAKAMURA case in cooperation with the Consul General and to do everything the army can to help him along to make settlement.

Q. No comment.--Now, then, the next one I am going to have Mr. Sano read you I have marked in red pencil number 7. It comes from "The Japan Times" Wednesday, 16 September 1931, front page, 1st column.

(Here the interpreter read and translated the following news item as indicated above)

*IMPORTANT ORDERS SENT BY ARMY TO MANCHURIA FORCE
COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPANESE AND CHINESE TROOPS IS SOUGHT
MUST PRESERVE PEACE
STEP MUST BE TAKEN IN VIEW OF UNREST OVER BANDITRY, OFFICIALS HOLD

*Having received important instructions to be followed in dealing with the recent dispute over the alleged murder in Manchuria of Captain Shintaro Nakamura of the General Staff, Colonel Kanji DOIHARA, chief of the special service station at Mukden, who has been conferring with the War Ministry and the Foreign Office authorities for the last few days, left Tokyo at 9:25 o'clock last night to return to his post at Mukden.

*At the same time the War Ministry, it is understood, sent important instructions to Lieutenant-General S. Honjo, commander of the Kwantung army regarding the preservation of peace in Manchuria in connection with the Nakamura case.

*Among the terms they are desirous of demanding from the Chinese for the settlement of the Nakamura affair, the military authorities apparently place the greatest importance on guarantees for the future.

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They contend that even if the present case is settled, the Japanese residents in Manchuria will feel uneasy with banditry running rife and Japan's special rights and interests being freely slighted.

"For this reason, the military leaders would request the Chinese troops to cooperate with the Japanese garrison force in keeping order in Manchuria on the strength of a provision in the Kwantung Garrison Ordinance, and Lieutenant-General Honjo and Colonel Doihara have been instructed accordingly, it is said.

"Interviewed on leaving Tokyo Tuesday night, Colonel Doihara intimated that he was empowered to give unreserved counsel to Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden in negotiating with the Chinese for the settlement of the Nakamura affair. The Colonel said:

"I have hitherto felt considerable difficulty in dealing with the NAKAMURA case because it was not clearly prescribed how far I could act in regarding this affair as chief of the special service station, the negotiations for the settlement of this dispute having been left entirely in the hands of the Foreign Office.

"As the result of my recent visit to Tokyo, however, my position in this affair has been made clear and now I shall be able to assist Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden with my unreserved counsel. I shall be able to be present at the meetings between the Consul-General and the Chinese representatives if necessary.

"Therefore, I intend to assist the negotiations both officially and unofficially hereafter. I have also ascertained that the central military authorities are desirous of a speedy settlement of the Nakamura affair and that they have a firm determination for its settlement.

"In case the Chinese should fail to show a sincere attitude to settle the dispute, it is needless to say that the issue will assume a grave importance. Measures to cope with such a development are now being considered, but I am not in a position to make public the nature of such measures.

"I met Major Shibayama, military adviser to Chang Hsueh-liang, the Mukden War Lord, in a conference in Tokyo. Judging from what the Major told me, I think General Chang will have to accept the truth of the case after all, although it will be some time before we shall succeed in obtaining a definite recognition of it from him.

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"This afternoon I received various instructions from Lieutenant-General Sugiama, Vice-War Minister, and Major-General Episo, chief of the military affairs bureau of the War Ministry. But I am not carrying with me the War Minister's instructions to the commander of the Kwantung army."

* * * * *

"Meanwhile the Foreign Office seems to be following its own policy in dealing with the Nakamura affair despite the recent agitation in military circles, and consequently no special instructions have so far been sent to Mukden regarding the same case, it is said."

- Q. General, do you remember making that statement to the Press?
 A. After this being showed to me which has served as a reminder what I have said the gist of the story I confirm. However, that portion where the army would resort to physical force, or in the case of no satisfactory negotiation could be had with the Chinese, or words to that effect, I do not believe I said it and as a whole this news item is presented in a much stronger force than I believe I said at that time.
- Q. General, do you recall making the statement quoted here, "Measures to cope with such a development are now being considered, but I am not in a position to make public the nature of such measures"?
 A. I do not remember making any such assertion, however, I might have said the situation may assume a great importance. However, I do not believe I ever mentioned the statement such as you had interpreted to me.
- Q. Well, General, were measures being considered in event the situation in Manchuria became more aggravated? Were measures being considered for that purpose?
 A. To me there was no measures nor the hint of measures was indicated by the authority.
- Q. Perhaps you are confusing the word "measures" with "plans for force", could that be?
 A. There was no measures whatsoever was contemplated at the time.
- Q. Well, you were planning to settle this thing by negotiation or something, weren't you?
 A. Yes.

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- Q. Well, we have called that "taking measures".
- A. Well, by "measures" it could mean that to produce witnesses or obtain facts, etc.
- Q. You agree with that, do you?
- A. Yes, I agree to that.
- Q. Well, you admit that on the whole you did give a statement similar to that to the newspaper on the date quoted, is that right?
- A. What day is that?
- Q. That you gave on the day of your start to return to Mukden at Tokyo Sta on September 15, Tuesday.
- A. On that point I was to leave on the 15th if memory served me correctly I think the trip was delayed by one or two days. I mean on the date and time indicated here General TATEKAWA left Tokyo.
- Q. Well, General, the other stories ^{which} have already been read to you show that you planned to leave on the 14th and that you stayed over one day to talk to Major SHIBAYAMA.
- A. On that score I am not very clear. At any rate, after I planned to leave Tokyo one or two days' delay was caused.
- Q. The next story which I will have Mr. Sano read to you the next time we are out here appeared in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun on the 16th of September, and it quotes you in an interview made at some point between Tokyo and Kobe on the 15th after you left Tokyo. So we have the date of your departure pretty well established, but the point I am making is did you not make a statement to the Press, regardless of the date, and similar to the one read to you?
- A. Generally, yes, only newspaper write-up appears to be more forcibly presented than I might have stated.
- Q. Well, then, the statement that you made to me last week that you never gave a statement to the Press regarding the HAKAMURA case is not correct. Isn't that right?
- A. What I meant was that I did not discuss the contents of the HAKAMURA case but I responded to the question to the extent that I did at various interviews. By that I meant what policy was adopted in the investigation of the HAKAMURA case not how the investigation being conducted is settled.

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- Q. Well, all right. Now, General, you will write the details of your report as I have requested?
- A. I think this newspaper article reminds me of some things and I think I can prepare one. However, I would not be able to say what I said to any particular person at the particular time.
- Q. That is all right.
- A. It is a general outline, general statement.
- Q. Good. All right. Now, I imagine that I will be fortunate if I get back any more quickly than about a week from now. If that is enough time I will pick it up then. If not, then you can have more time. Oh, you need some paper or something. I will make arrangements in the front office to make sure that you have plenty of paper.

WITNESS DISMISSED AT 1730 HOURS

土肥原賢二 訊問抜萃
/kanji DOHARA/

五四年一月十日頁 三頁 三頁

向貴下が初メテ満洲へ行カレタノハ何年デシタカ、

答、元三年八月十五日 私ハ大佐トシテ日本軍特務部ノ指揮官又ハ長

トシテ日本軍ト共ニ満洲へ参リマシタ。

向其ノ資格デ貴下ノ任務ハ如何イフモノデシタカ 簡單ニ

答、先ツ第一ニ中国軍ニ関スル情報ヲ取得スルコト次ニ中国軍ト

日本軍トノ連絡員トシテ、然レ此ハ戦前ノコトデシタ。

向満洲事変ノ始ツタノハ何月何日デスカ

答、九月十日ソノ戦争又ハ交戦状態ハ一九三二年九月十八日ニ始リ

マシタ、当時殺害サレタ大尉ガ名アリマシタ、私ハコノ殺害ノ調査

ヲシ且中国軍ト交渉ヲセネバリマセンデシタ、私ガ其ノ地ニ在ッ

タノハコノ特殊任務ノタメデシタ。

向如何程ノ期間コノ任務ニ携ツテマシタカ、

答、九月八日頃東京へ呼戻サレマシタ、同大尉ノ殺害ニ関スル東京へ呼戻

向満洲事変後如何程ノ期間現地ノ日本軍特務部ノ長ヲ命

セラレテ居マシタカ、

答、私ハ帰還スルヤ特務部長ノ職ヲ解カレ関東軍参謀部ノ

一員トシテ現地へ戻サレマシタ。

向ソレハ関東軍ノ最高司令部ノコトデスカ

答、私ハ関東軍司令部ノ参謀部員デシタ、二十三日ニ私ハ奉天市

/MUKDEN/ノ長ニナリマシタ。

問 私が尋ネタイノハ現地ニ於ケル貴下ノ任務ニツイテ何同軍中陳述着シラハソノ一覽見表ナリテス。

答 十一月末私ハソノ特務機関長トシテハルビンヘヤラレマシタ。

問 ドレ位ノ同ソノ任務ニ就イテ中マシタカ

答 一九三二年ノ三月末迄テス、私ハ旅團長トシテ参リマシタ。一九三二年四月日ニ私ハ廣島ニ於テ少將ノ階級ヲ九旅團ノ指揮ヲトリマシタ。私ハ廣島ニ一九三二年四月カラ一九三四年七月迄居リソレカラ日東軍特務機関ト共ニ奉天ヘ参リマシタ。

問 奉天ニハドレ位居リマシタカ

答 一九三六年二月末迄テス、ソレカラ中將ニナリ東京ノ一留守師團長ニテリ一九三七年三月迄ソノ任在リマシタ。次イテ一九三七年八月二十五日迄宇都宮ノ十四師團長ヲリマシタ。其後華北(行キ北京、漢口迄)擊(又カ十四師團ハ一九三八年六月日、私が参謀長附ノ参謀トシテ服務スルタメ東京ニ呼戻サレル迄)第一軍ノ部トシテ居リマシタ。一九三八年八月カラ一九三九年六月迄(戦争終結)タメニ私ニ何カ出来ル事ガナイカ試ミルタメ政府ニヨリ中國ヘ派遣サレマシタ。私ハ国民党ノ創設者タル唐紹儀及吳佩孚ト交渉ヲ續ケマシタ。此等ノ人々ハ蒋介石トノ間ノ仲介者トシテ、役割ヲ勤メマシタ。唐紹儀が殺サレタリテ交渉ハ不成功ニ終リマシタ。

問 貴下カ使節團長テシタカ

答 ハイ、私が使節團長テシタ。

(以下次頁)

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問 貴下ノ次ノ任務ハ何デシカ

答 一九三九年六月カラ翌九四〇年六月私ガ軍事参議官ニナルベテ
滿洲北南ノ第五軍總司令官デアリマシタ。一九四一年四月頃私ハ
航空總監トナリマシタ。

問 同時ニ軍事参議官ヲモ兼ネテオマシタカ
答 サウデス。

問 何時マテ其ノ任ニアリマシタカ、

答 一九四三年、五月ノ上旬デス。

問 其ノ後ハ

答 松東部軍司令部官ニナリマシタ。一九四三年三月末ニハシ
シガポールノ第七方面軍司令部官ニナリ、一九四五年四月初旬
迄其地ニ留テオマシタ。ソレカラ教育總監ニナリマシタ。一九
四五年五月十日ニ東京ニ到着シマシタ。

第四十八號綴続編十六、

土肥原賢二ニ関スル訊問ノ抜萃、

一九四六年二月五日、二及三頁。

問 一九三三年八月ニ誰ガ第一課長ヲシテ居マシタカ、

答 第一課長ハ石原世元爾デシタ。

3 問 彼ハドナキ階級デシタ、中將デシタカ、

NO 答 中佐デアッタカ、大佐デアッタカ、明瞭ニハ分リマ
ヤン、

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問一九三二年八月二日誰が第二課長ヲシテ居マシタカ。

答、第二課長ハ板垣征四郎デシテ階級ハ

大佐デシタ。也ノ課ニ就イテハ合リマセン

ガ板垣征四郎デシトイフ氏名ノ人が居マシテ課長ノ一人デアウソカモ知シマセン。

彼ガ課長デアウソカドウカハ明瞭ニハ合リ

マセン。是ニ就イテハ私ノ記憶ハ全ク明

瞭デハアリマセン。他ノ課長ニ就イテハ

思ヒ出セマセン。

問、ソレデハ貴方ノ特務機關ハ第二課即チ

情報課ノ指揮又ハ指導ノ下ニ仕事

ヲシテ居マシタカ。

答、ハイ、特務機關ハ第二課ノ一部デシタ。

問、貴方ハ板垣大佐ニ復命シマシタネ。

答、ハイ、私ハ板垣征四郎大佐ノタメニ仕事ヲ

シテ居マシタ。

問、貴方が一九三二年八月奉天駐在官ヲ

シテ居タ間モサウデシタカ。

答、ハイ、サウデシタ。

問、其ノ時貴方ノ特務機關ガ何ヲナスベ

キカニ就キ第二課カラ貴方ニ對スル命令ヲ

貴方ニ與ヘマシタネ。

答、ハイ、ソウデシタ。私ハ私ノ命令ヲ第二課カラ受

領シマシタガ、私ノ命令ハ関東軍/KWANG TUNG

ARMYノ司令官ニ依リ與ヘラレシタ。

問、奉天ノ特務機關長當時ニ貴方ハ奉天ノ駐在

官トシテ其肩書ヲ持ツテ居リマシタネ、是ハ本當

デスカ。

答、私ハ奉天市長ヲシテ居タ時ハ奉天特務機關

長ハシテ居マセンデシタ。

問、何時奉天市長ヲシテ居リマシタ。將軍。

答、明瞭ニハ分リマセンガ、一九三一年ノ九月二十一日

デアッタト思ヒマス。……。

綴第四十八號、續第十六？

土肥原賢二、訊問書ヨリノ抜萃

一九四六年二月五日

十頁、十一頁。

問、將軍、貴方ハ一九三一年八月十八日ニ貴方が派遣サレタ

唯一ノ使命ハ中村/NAKAMURAノ大尉ノ殺害ヲ調査ス

ルタメデアルト云フ貴方が余ニ語ツタ話ヲ尚主張

シマスカ。

答、其レハ私ガ其處ニ行ツタ唯一ノ目的ヲハアリマセンデ

シタ、然シ其レガ最モ重要ナモノデシタ。

問、先日、貴方ハ其レガ貴方ノ唯一ノ目的ヲアツタト

余ニ語ツタ。

答、其レガ私ノ最モ重要ナハ事デアツタト貴方ニ申上

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ゲタト思ヒマス。然し私ハ、特務機関ノ長ヲアル以上、私
ニハ他ノ要務モアリマシタ。

問、其等ノ他ノ要務トハ何ヲシタカ。

答、其他ノニツノ要務トハ調査及ビ支那軍トノ連絡ヲシタ。

問、調査ト云フノハ何ヲスカ。

答、調査トハ支那軍ノ兵カ訓練連絡及ビ一般住民ノ状態ヲ
確メルコトヲシタ。

問、貴方ハ一九三一年八月ニ、特務機関ノ指揮ヲトルタメニ東

京カラ派遣セラタト云フノハ本当ヲスカ。

答、私ハ東京ヨリ出発シ上海/SHANGHAI/漢口/HANKOW/北京/PEKING/天津/TIENTSIN/奉天/MUKDEN/ヲ旅シ八月十八日ニ奉天/MUKDEN/
ニ到着シマシタ。

問、何時貴方ハ東京ヲ出発シマシタカ。

答、ハッキリト思ヒ出セマセンガ七月ノ上旬ダツタト思ヒマス。

問、奉天/MUKDEN/ニ行くニドウシテソシナニ廻リ道ヲシタ
ノデスカ。

答、參謀長ハ奉天/MUKDEN/ニ於テ此ノ地位ニ就ク前
ニ支那ノ状態ヲ見テ置クノガ良イト考ヘタノデ、ソ
コヲ私ハアノ迂回旅行ヲシタノデス。

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才四号綴連續 番号二四号

土肥 原賢ニ評問調書 抜萃

一九四六年二月十二日 七八九頁

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向 宜敷イ、デハ、大將、貴下が憶エテキル様ニ一九三一年

十月天津デ傳儀トコノ會見ヲシタ時貴下ハ奉

天ノ守長カ又ハ知事デアツタ、デハナイカ。

答、然リ

向 貴下ハ天津テ何ヲシテ居ツカ。

答 私ハ閩東軍ノ命令傳達ニ其處ニ派遣セラレタ。又

私ハ市長デアリマシタガ實際ノ仕事ー私ノ公務上ノ仕事

ーハ趙欣伯 / CHAO HAIN-PO / ニ委託シテソレカラ天

津ニ参シツタノデス

向 ヘンリー傳儀ト連絡スル特殊目的ノ為、ソノ後天津

ニ派遣セラレト云フ事ハ正確デスカ

答 正確デス。

向 誰が行カセマシタカ

答 閩東軍ニ依テ。

向 誰が命令ヲ発シマシタカ。 閩東軍司令部ノ誰デ

シタカ。

7 答 閩東軍司令官

向 其ノ時本庄大將ハ未ダ司令官デシタカ

10. 答 否、彼ガソウデシタ。

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向板垣大將ハ何カソレニ関係シテキマシタカ

答板垣大佐ハ参謀本部ノオニ課長デシタ。

向ソウデスカ。貴下ヲ天津ニ派遣スル事ニキ何

カソレニ彼ハ関係ガアリマシタカ

答ハイ。天津ニ赴ク命令ハ首腦者即チ本庄

大將ニ依ッテ発セラレマシタ。并シ私ノ天津デ傳儀

トノ會見ニ関スル細目ハ板垣大佐ニ依ッテ取計ハレ

マシタ。

向板垣大佐ノ命令ハ何デシタカ記憶シテキマスカ

答私ニ対スル指令ノ要領ハ彼ガ滿洲ニ帰ルラハ実

東軍ハ彼ノ帰還ヲ歓迎スルト云フ事ヲ傳儀

ニ傳達スル事デシタ又次ニ彼ハ私ノ旅行ノ便宜

及ビ費用等ニ於キ準備シテクレマシタ。

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二

問 貴方ガヘニリイ傳儀ノ HENRY DUNN ノニ彼ガ帰リテ来ルノヨリ

東軍ガ歓迎スルダロウト之ヲ理由ニ彼等ガ貴方ガ滿洲ニ樹立シラ、アツク新傀儡政權ノ主席ニ彼ヲ迎ヘタクウラト示唆スルコトニナリテオラス

答 東軍ニ滿洲ヲ救フ爲ニ其考ヘテ懐イテ居タリニ吾等ハイト思ヒニスケレドモ、私ハソノ考ヘテ懐イテ居コサンデシク

問 然レ將軍貴方ガ其ノ歓迎ノ言モヲ傳儀ニ傳ヘタ際、彼ガソレヲ石ノ意味ニシテ解スルダロウト之ヲモトヲ知ニテ居ラセウ、ソノテハアリマセニク

答 私ニ別ニ下心ハアリマセニテシタガ、オ説ノ通リテス、然レシカラ、東軍ウチ指ホクニ見テ多クノ度派ガ互ニ相争ヒ騷擾ヲ醸シテ居ル滿洲國ノ混乱ヲ鎮ルルニ、其ノ様ニ事柄ガ必要ナリテアロウト私ハ思ヒニシク、私ハ當時第一課長ガ私ニ話シタ事柄ニモ増シテ強クソノ考ヘガ向クニ称ナコトニナリタラス

問 宜シイ

答 其ノ意ハ、彼ノ譯者註第一課長ノハ私ガ彼ノ譯者註傳儀氏ノニ滿洲國ヘ帰ルニ強制スヘキデハナイ、彼ガ帰リタガルニラバソノハ結構ダカト私ニ注意ヲシタトイフヲテス

問 一休、彼ハドウシテソノ注意ヲ貴方ニシラシテセウ、貴方ハ強要スルノガ得策ダロウト提言シタコトモアルデマカ

答 彼ノ傳儀ヲ無理ニ連シ帰ルニ必要ハナカラウト明瞭ニ私ニ言ヒニシタ

問 ソノテスカソシハ私ノ同ニ對スル答ニナリマセン、訊ネテ居ルニトニ答

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ヘテ下サイ、何卒

答 多分、第一課長に傳儀が歸ラナクテ、滿洲、聖態ヲ收

拾スル也、安ホヲ持テ居ラノデセウ。

問 ケレドモ貴方ガ強制シテナイウト、彼ガ心配シテキクハドウシ
テ、マラカソシ、称ニ物事ヲ處理スルガ、通常貴方ノ遣
リガ、ダツカカラデスカ。

答 ソレハ私ニ到リマセン、ソレハ板垣/TAGAKIノオノエデス。

問 テハソノ質問、最後部分ニオ答ヘ下サイ、ソノ様ニ物事

ヲ處理スルノガ、貴方ノ何時モ、遣リガ、ダツカノデスカ、ト云フ
ハ、貴方自身ノ個人的ト遣リガ、ダツカガ、モナクテ、東
軍ノ遣リガ、ダツカ、何デスカ、ト云フコトヲ、才訊ネシテ居
ル、デス。

答 私ハ、東軍ガ、何ク云フ遣リガ、執ラナク存ジマセン。

然レ、何事ニヨラズ、命ヲ受ケシ、其ノ目的ヲ達成スル、称
ニ、何ノルト云フノガ、私ノ主義、トノデス。

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上北原賢二、訊問書抜萃

一九四六年二月十二日 一〇頁

問 一寸前ニ貴下が言及サレタ関東軍ニ對シ北支ハ狀況ニ関シテ

貴方がナサツタ報告ハドモナモテシタカ

答 関東軍司令部ニ歸ツタ時ノコトデシマウカ

問 ソウデス

答 ドウモ良ク覺ヘテ居リマセンガソレヨリ少シ前ニソコトガアリ

マシタ。だが、私ハ北支ハ依然不安定ノ状態ニアル事實ト敵軍

即チ天津軍ノ其ノ地域全般ニ對スル配置狀況ヲ述ベテ

ノデアリマシタ。又滿洲ニ居ル軍隊ガ萬一北支ニ擴ガワテ来

タ時ニハ如何ニ對處スベキカト云フ問題ニ関シテモ情報

ヲ與ヘタノデアリマシタ

土肥原賢二評向書抜萃
一九四二年二月十日 二頁

向、將軍貴方ハ九ヶ國條約トイフモノ御存ジテセウ
ネ。

答、其レガドニテモアルハ知ツテ居リマス。併ニ其ノ條約
ニアル一々ノ條項ニツイテハ存ジマセン。

向、ソノ條項ガ中國ノ主權ヲ保証ニテオルクトハ御存
ジテスネ。

答、ハイ、知ツテ居リマス。

向、貴方ガヒシリ一傳儀ト連絡スル爲派遣サレタ一九
三三年十月貴下ハ既ニソノコトヲ知ツテオタルテハ
アリマセンカ。

答、ハイ、勿論知ツテ居リマシタ。

向、テ、貴東軍ガ滿洲國ト稱スル獨立國ヲ樹
立シヤウト計畫シタ時、ソレガ九ヶ國條約ヲ侵犯スル
コトニナルコトヲ御存ジタワタノテスネ。

答、ハイ、知ツテ居リマシタ。然レシキ時日本ハ同條約ニ
スル日本ノ態度ニツイテ何等カノ宣言ヲナシタ事
テス。私ハソノ詳細ハ覺ニテ居リマセン。

* * *