


RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO



ANSWER TO MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION QUESTIONNAIRE #16

DEFENSE OF THE MAIN JAPANESE ISLANDS AGAINST AIR ATTACKS

SUBMITTED BY THE NAVY

RESTRICTED



I Japanese estimate of allied capabilities and intentions with respect to air attacks on the main Japanese islands.

Other than a slight possibility of an air attack by an allied Task Force, no other threat seemed to exist.

II The U.S. Attack on JAPAN in April 1942.

- A. The Japanese had advance intelligence about this attack.
- B. After this attack, the Japanese changed their plan for the defense of the main island. A special order directed that the air force Units (in JAPAN) assigned to operational action against allied Task Forces (including Training Units) be trained for such duty.
- C. No air units were withdrawn from overseas due to the attack.
- D. No units intended for overseas duty were held in JAPAN.

III The initial Japanese estimate on B-29's.

- A. We first learned about the B-29 in August 1942.
- B. We estimated that about April 1943 was the earliest possible time the B-29 and B-32 could be employed against JAPAN.
- C. Air defense measures taken against B-29 attacks.

I Air units assigned to air defense.

On 1 March 1944 the 302nd. KOKUTAI in YOKOSUKU Naval District was assigned to air defense. On 1 August 1944, the 332nd. KOKUTAI in KURE Naval District and the 352nd. KOKUTAI in SASEBO Naval District were assigned to air defense.

D. The disposition of picket boats

In the beginning of the war, we assigned picket boats to patrol the waters East and North of JAPAN against U.S. Task Force. When the B-29 attacks seemed impending, we changed the disposition of the 22nd. Division (about 60 picket boats) moving them 600 knots South of JAPAN

E. Ground air defense System.

We gradually set up a round lookout system using both radar and observers, and also strengthened our AA gun installations and AA control stations.

IV Army and Navy Plans.

A. The tactical units and the Army-Navy Command set-up for the air defense of JAPAN.

I Although the air defense of JAPAN was primarily the responsibility of the Army, the Navy was responsible for air defense of the Naval districts and the areas which the Guard District Commandants Controlled.

The C in C of the Combined Fleet was also responsible for defense against approaching enemy Task Forces and for attacking enemy bases.

II On 1 March 1944, the 302nd. KOKUTAI in YOKOSUKA N.D. was assigned to anti B-29 defense. On 1 August 1944, the 332nd. KOKUTAI in KURE N.D. and the 352nd. KOKUTAI in SASEBO N.D. were likewise assigned.



III From 11 July 1944 to 19 February 1945, the interception units attached to the YOKOSUKA, SASEBO and KURE Naval District (302nd., 332nd., and 352nd. KOKUTAI) operated under the command of the CINC of the Army General Defense Command (BOEISO SHIREIKAN).

IV When the ferocity of the B-29 attacks increased in March 1945, it became impossible for our Naval Air Unit to combat both air attacks and the task force attacks. All the fighter KOKUTAI in the Navy were organized and assigned to interception duties on 5 March the 83rd. Air Flotilla under the 3rd. Air Fleet, in Central JAPAN; on 23 March the 72nd. Air Flotilla under the 5th. Air Fleet and assigned to Western HONSHU, SHIKOKU, and KYUSHU; and on 5 June the 71st. Air Flotilla under the 3rd. Air Fleet and assigned to Eastern JAPAN.

V Ground Air Defense was under each Naval District Commandant throughout the war.

VI The 22nd Division was attached to the Northeast Area Fleet and was responsible for patrolling for U.S. Task Forces. However, on 1 April 1945 it was attached to the combined Fleet and assigned to patrol the Southern waters for B-29's and Task Forces.

B. As of 1 June 1944 the Navy received no special orders besides the general order assigning homeland air defense to Naval District guard Unit.

V Japanese Navy Operational Aircraft assigned to Air Defense of JAPAN from June 1944 to August 1945.

AREA DATE	KANTO PLAIN	CHUBU AREA	OSAKA KOBE	KURE AREA	KYUSHU	TOTAL
June 44	60	0	0	40	40	140
July	60	0	0	40	40	140
Aug.	60	0	0	40	40	140
Sept.	60	0	0	40	40	140
Oct.	60	0	0	40	40	140
Nov.	80	10	0	0	40	130
Dec.	100	10	0	5	50	165
Jan. 45	100	10	20	5	50	185
Feb.	100	10	40	10	50	210
March	40	10	40	80	100	270
April	40	20	20	80	250	410
May	60	30	40	40	350	420
June	150	30	40	40	250	510
July	150	30	110	40	230	560
Aug.	150	100	110	40	230	630

NOTE: Up to January 1945 there were only specially assigned air defense KOKUTAI, but after that other fighters KOKUTAI participated in air defense formally after July 1945. The whole Naval Fighter force was assigned to air defense.

VI Night fighters,

A. The following fighter units were trained and equipped for night fighting.

1 Unit (24 planes), 302nd KOKUTAI  
 1 " (12 planes), 332nd "  
 1 " (12 planes), 352nd "



- B. 1. There was no change in the number of units used from 1 June 1944 to the end of the war.
2. At first we used GEKKO Night fighters (Irving II). When production of GEKKO ceased around October 1944, we were supplied with SUISEI model 12 (Judy 12), type O fighter (ZEKE 52) GINGA (FRANCIS 11). However, GEKKO was considered the best night fighter.
- C. The planes were equipped with offset guns to increase the effectiveness of their fire power. At the end of the war, the GEKKO and the GINGA were equipped with 4 X 20 mm guns the SUISEI with 2 X 20 mm guns and the type ZERO with 1 X 20 mm guns.
- D. The offset gun is usually placed behind the observer's seat at an angle of elevation of 60 degrees - 75 degrees above the axis. When two or more offset guns are used, they are set up parallel in one place. This gun is a fixed type gun. There were about 5 experimental planes equipped with radar.

VII There were no jet-propelled or rocket-driven air craft used against B-29's.

VIII See Appendix 1.

IX Army-Navy Cooperation.

A. Exchange of intelligence

To plan for the rapid transmission of intelligence, adjacent Army and Navy air defense Hqs. will either exchange staff officers or have one man assigned the additional duty of obtaining intelligence from the opposite service. Liaison officers and Mco's. will be placed on detached duty with the opposite service.

B. Command of the air defense fighter units.

From 11 July 1944 to 19 February 1945, the KOKUTAI assigned to air defense were under the command of the Army General Defense Commander (BOEISO SHIREIKAN). After 19 February 1945, they were ordered by the Combined Naval Force (KAITGUN SOTAI) to cooperate closely with the Army.

C. The Army and the Navy cooperated on the development of the SHUSUI, a new experimental rocket-driven plane.

D. Both services used each others airfields for interceptor missions.

X Conservation of Aircraft for the defense of JAPAN against a U.S. land attack.

A. On 13 July 1945 after the OKINAWA campaign, the Imperial Hq. (DAIHONEN) made the decision to conserve aircraft.

B. Although we planned to conserve our KOKUTAI, the interceptor planes were ordered to make mass attacks. Since our fuel supply was very low at that time, we could not intercept every enemy attack. Consequently, we launched mass attacks only when we felt we could win good results.

XI The organization of the Army and Navy early warning systems.

A. Observers out at sea

The Navy was responsible for this and assigned the 22nd. Picket Boat Division. In August 1944 they set up headquarters at YOKOHAMA and moved observers to the waters South of JAPAN. Due to the fierce attacks of the American fighters, patrol planes, and submarines, and the movements of the U.S. task force off the coast of JAPAN after the fall of IWO JIMA, we were unable to continue using picket boats after June 1945.



B. Radar (Early Warning Radar)

Our radar was located both on the coast of JAPAN and on the outlying islands. Before the B-29 attacks, the Navy used these for anti-submarine protection but when the B-29 attacks began they were converted for air defense use. Besides reporting radar intelligence to the Army - Navy central Hq., The radar stations reported this information to all units concerned after trying to check their information with the nearest radar station. Furthermore the CP of the KOKUTAI responsible for air defense checked with the nearest Army or Navy radar station (within a radius of about 120 knots).

C. Ground observer.

This was primarily the Army's responsibility. The Army and Navy Hqs and units concerned exchanged all intelligence gained from observation posts.


D. We used radio to transmit all intelligence

XII The effect of Allied jamming on Japanese radar.

- A. The decision of the Allies to send out fighter planes in advance of the bombers caused us a great deal of difficulty. When fighters were sent out early it was impossible to attack (the bombers). Very often it was very difficult to determine the direction (KANTO Area, CHOSU Area, etc.) of the American bombing attack.




Appendix no. 1. The system used for ground control of interception in the KANTO Area.



Note: Although orders to fighters were transmitted directly to them by radio telephone from the YOKOSUKA Naval District Control Station, they were also transmitted from the 302nd KOKUTAI CP at ATSUGI when liaison was inadequate.



Appendix no. 1. The system used for ground control of interception in the KANTO Area.



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