

Def. Doc. 1029 (revised)  
(Tōgō)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

vs.

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

TAKAKA RYUKICHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I came to know Mr Tōgō Shigenori in February 1936 when I was a staff officer in the Kwantung Army. Since then I have frequently had opportunities to talk with him.

2. In July 1935, when I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, the Soviet Government informed the Japanese Government that it had no objection to the opening of negotiation for the establishment of a commission for the settlement of disputes on the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundary, but later the progress of the negotiations encountered difficulties on account of the attitude of the Kwantung Army, which insisted that the demarkation of the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundary should first be accomplished before the establishment of such commission, as otherwise the commission would not be able to carry out its task smoothly. Mr Tōgō, then director of the European-Asiatic Bureau, dispatched his section chief Nishi to Hsingking in September 1935 in order to persuade the Kwantung Army, but this ended in no agreement of opinions. At my conversation with Mr Tōgō which took place in Tokyo in February 1936, he referred to this question and said that while the above contention of the Kwantung Army was not unreasonable, it was too much to say that the commission could not function without border demarkation, and he earnestly requested the cooperation of the Kwantung Army for the success of the negotiation, by further stressing that the establishment of such commission would rather accelerate the realization of border demarkation. Thereupon I suggested the idea of establishing simultaneously a commission for the settlement of border disputes and a commission for border demarkation, so that the two commissions could set to work in parallel, to which Mr Tōgō agreed. I also had a talk with Vice-Minister Shigemitsu on this subject and got his consent. On my return to Hsingking I reported the matter to General Itagaki, Vice-Chief of Staff, and next to General Minami, Commander of the Kwantung Army, who both approved of this plan. As a result the Japanese Government began to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Government on this principle.

3. Mr Tōgō became Foreign Minister in the Tōjō Cabinet in October 1941, when I was Director of the Soldiers' Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. When I saw him in the latter part of October at his official residence immediately after his appointment as Foreign Minister, he told me that he had agreed to enter the Cabinet on condition that General Tōjō would also do his best to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to successful conclusion.

4. At the time of the formation of the Tōjō Cabinet, it was generally felt in the War Ministry and the General Staff Office that all the civilian members of the Cabinet were actually under the control of the military. Mr. Tōgō's opinion naturally provoked great disaffection within the military circles when it was revealed that he had declared, at the Liaison Conference held in the first part of November to consider whether hostilities should be opened in case the negotiations ended in failure, that failure of the negotiations would not necessarily mean war, and that the most proper way for Japan to take was to persevere under all difficulties and wait for the opportunity to mature. At that time it was not a rare case that such a state secret was divulged through the General Staff Office to younger officers. A party of radicals in the Army thereupon even maintained that it was an encroachment upon the prerogative of the High Command for a foreign minister to utter such an opinion, and declared threateningly that such a foreign minister should be "disposed of". I recall that I requested Commander Nakamura of the Gendarmerie to protect the person of Mr. Tōgō.

5. Toward the end of October 1941, I had a talk with Mr. Tōgō at his official residence. On that occasion, the Foreign Minister intimated his intention to resign on the ground that he was strongly against war with the United States. I earnestly requested him to retain his office, pointing out that it would be quite impossible to find another person who would resolutely do his utmost to check the outbreak of war in opposition to the Army; that if such a person as Mr. Matsuoka should be recalled to replace him, it would naturally become more difficult to prevent war; and that, should war unfortunately break out, his remaining in office would become all the more necessary in consideration of the national strength of Japan, so that he might be able to seize the earliest possible opportunity to conclude peace.

6. Toward the end of August 1942, Mr. Tōgō sent me his private secretary, Mr. Usui Tanomasa, to convey his opinion, which was, according to Mr. Usui, that the further existence of the Tōjō Cabinet was against the interest of Japan, as it had gradually begun to commit mistakes in the direction of the war. There was, furthermore, the question of the Greater East Asia Ministry, to the establishment of which he was firmly opposed on the ground that it would violate the fundamental principles of Japanese diplomacy. And he revealed to me, through Mr. Usui, his resolution not to resign alone, but to make persistent efforts to the last eventually to bring the Cabinet to general resignation. I expressed my consent, encouraging him to stand out stoutly for the sake of the country, and promised him that I would also resign together with him in case his efforts should end in failure. By the way, it was because Mr. Tōgō was, then, already under the surveillance of the Mikuni Organ, the secret police of the Army, that he did not see me in person.

Nevertheless, Mr. Tōgō resigned alone. I asked him the reason when I saw him in the middle of September that year. His reply was that, although he for his part had fought all he could, he had eventually been compelled to make up his mind to resign alone upon learning from Navy Minister Shimada who had come to see him that the overthrowing of the Cabinet was practically impossible owing to dissention in Court circles.

7. In the middle of July 1945, I called on Mr. Tōgō at his private residence. He was then Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet. I asked him if the restoration of peace was

possible. He replied that he was making efforts in that direction though the time was very late. Then, I had again a chance to see him in the middle of November 1945, when he explained in detail the circumstances attending the termination of the war, and revealed that anyway it was greatly to his satisfaction that battles in Japan Proper had been avoided.

8. On the occasion of my interview with Mr. Tōgō in the middle of July 1945, mentioned above, he declared that he had had no means of knowing the exact time and place of the commencement of hostilities beforehand, the matter being an operational secret, though he had often heard the Naval High Command right before the outbreak of the war, mentioning "surprise attack". He also referred again to the fact that, as he had told me in the middle of December 1941, despite the Naval General Staff's having given the commitment to open hostilities a considerable space of time after the Japanese memorandum to the United States should have been served at 1 P.M., 7 December, Washington time, the actual attack on Pearl Harbor was commenced very shortly after 1 P.M., Washington time; and he told me that Vice-Admiral Itō, Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff, had expressed his sincere regret in this connection when, a few days after the outbreak of the war, the Foreign Minister had reproached him for it.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanaka Ryūichi (seal)

On this 6th day of March, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: Tanaka Ryūichi

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo  
6 March 1947