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**IN RULE & MISRULE**


**BRIG-GEN. C. R. BALLARD, C.B.**

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RUSSIA IN RULE AND MISRULE







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RUSSIA IN RULE  
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A SHORT HISTORY

BY BRIG.-GENERAL C. R. BALLARD  
C.B., C.M.G.

MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN ROUMANIA

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1920

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

PHYSICS 435

## FOREWORD

BY GENERAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON, BART.,  
G.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL BALLARD has asked me to write a foreword for this book, and I comply with his request the more readily for three special reasons: he was a contemporary of mine when a student at the Staff College some twenty odd years ago; he was a member of the Directing Staff of the College when I was Commandant shortly before the Great War; and as Chief of the Imperial General Staff I was responsible for his despatch to the East front in 1917.

The Revolution in Russia burst on the world as such a complete surprise, at a time crowded with other important events, that one was inclined to accept it as an isolated fact and not as the climax of a long series of accumulating causes.

The problem of Russia, as it appears to-day, is so vast and composed of so many confused elements that it is but imperfectly understood by the ordinary man; yet the future of Russia, whether she recovers herself or falls to pieces, must have an important influence on Europe, and the study of her history, of her national characteristics, her present situation, and future possibilities will well repay the time spent on it.

The author has attempted, successfully I think, to

present in a handy form the salient points in the history of Russia from early times to the present day. He does not claim more for his book than that it should serve as a basis for further study, and a book that deals in a little over two hundred pages with the history of a huge country for a period of a thousand years, including the Great War and the Revolution, can only be in the nature of a *précis*. But it is a *précis* written in a lucid and interesting manner, which will help the reader to understand more clearly the meaning of the events that are passing day by day in Russia, and will prove useful to anyone desirous of making a thorough study of the subject.

Brigadier-General Ballard is well qualified to describe the events referred to in the later chapters of the book, as he had the advantage of being personally in touch with Russian affairs during the momentous year of 1917. He is therefore able to give the impressions that he gained first-hand from those who played a prominent part in the drama. This alone makes the book worth reading, as one learns something of what were the aspirations, the hopes, the fears, and the disappointments of the patriotic Russians in the first year of the Revolution.

W. R. ROBERTSON,  
*General.*

COLOGNE,  
*9th October 1919.*

## THE APOLOGY

WHAT does the British public know about Russia? We know that our fathers fought in the Crimea, and we therefore started life with a strong prejudice against Russia; this was fostered by the stories we heard in the nursery: the Tsar was a wicked tyrant; innocent people (they were always innocent) were sent to Siberia to suffer appalling tortures—and so forth.

About 1880 there was the Jingo agitation in England, "The Russians were at the gates of Herat." We had no idea where Herat was, but obviously the Russians had no business to be there—the newspapers said so.

Later still, in our own time, there was war between Russia and Japan. All our sympathies were on the side of Japan, until we found that Russia was not going to be victorious; our feelings then turned into a mild contempt, and we wrote articles on the Russian want of organisation and military skill.

Then came the first big change of opinion.

In August 1914 we suddenly found that the Tsar was our ally against Germany. It appeared that all our former views were delusions of the worst kind—the newspapers said so. The Tsar was a humane and liberal-minded monarch; his one desire was to educate his people up to a point where they could be given self-government; his generals had learnt the lessons of

the Japanese war, and were the best strategists in Europe; his soldiers were brave and stout; the Kossacks were the finest cavalry in the world. Long live the Tsar!

Our enthusiasm knew no bounds, and during the autumn of 1914 all our hopes were founded on the Russian steam roller.

The months went by; the steam roller, after an occasional spasmodic jerk, stood still or even went the wrong way. But we were not downhearted; it appeared that the Russians only lacked munitions, and that could soon be put right. Things were beginning to look rather better after Brusiloff's advance in 1916, when suddenly we had to revise our opinions for the second time.

The Revolution had become a fact.

The revolutionaries still proclaimed themselves our allies, so we had to make the best of them, and did so just as enthusiastically as before. It now appeared that our late appreciation of the Tsar was all wrong; he meant well, but was hopelessly stupid and obstinate; his Court had been ruled by a profligate priest; half his generals were traitors, the rest were thoroughly incompetent. But the nation and the soldiers were brave and bold and wanted to get on with the war. That, indeed, was the real cause of the revolution. Now we would see what a free and democratic Russia could do. Long live the Revolution! Long live the sons of freedom!

The months went by; the sons of freedom were busy talking. But we told ourselves to have just a little patience; we must give the bright young democracy time to settle down to its new state of activity and progress.

More months went by; the bright young sons of freedom were chiefly occupied in killing each other; they had accepted their freedom in a broad-minded way, each man for himself, and were making the most of it. It was a little disconcerting.

Then at the end of 1917 we found that Russia was making an inglorious peace. The last illusion had gone.

Who was to blame? In England that depended on our personal point of view. Our conservatives naturally blamed the Revolution. Our socialists blamed the other belligerents, including Great Britain, who had not hastened to make peace and to turn the nations into lambs and their swords into ploughshares.

This book is an attempt to throw a little light on matters from the Russian point of view. I was sent to the Eastern Front in May 1917 because I was supposed to know something of the Russian language; this, by the way, turned out to be another illusion—I am ashamed to say how long it was before I could talk with anything like fluency. But I had no lack of practice; the Russians were always hospitable to British officers, and were eager to discuss the news and air their views. I collected material enough for many volumes; some of them might be more dramatic than this book; there were tragedies of indescribable horror; there were even comedies, whose complications would rival a nightmare, but there is no room for them here.

My sources of information are entirely Russian. The historical notes are extracted from the standard histories of the Russian Universities, by the celebrated historians Ivanoff and Kluchevsky; the dates and facts regarding the revolution are taken from Russian newspapers and pamphlets; the rest is from conversations with Russians.

I owe infinite gratitude to Colonel Iliine and his wife for the trouble they took in collecting information for me and assisting me in translations and type-writing.

This book is neither wide nor deep, but it has a very good moral. And the moral of it is, that Russia is a big country that deserves our attention for many reasons; we ought to study its history, its geography, its national characteristics, its present situation, its future possibilities. My object is to make the study easy by setting forth a few of the elementary facts.



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
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# THE EARLY PRINCES



Boris Godounoff	. 1598-1605	Vasiely Shouisky	. 1606-1610
Ljedmitry	. 1605-1606	The Troublous Times	. 1610-1614

## CHAPTER I

### THE EARLY PRINCES

1. THE first date which an English schoolboy learns is "William the Conqueror—1066." Russian history may be said to begin about the same date, or a little earlier; before that everything is only legendary.

Somewhere about the second and third centuries the Goths swept over the country, and afterwards they themselves were driven out by the Huns. A small tribe of Goths managed to hide themselves away in the Carpathian Mountains and escaped annihilation; they grew and prospered and became the Slav race. The Slavs spread in all directions, and include the Russians, Poles, Serbs, and Bulgars.

It was about the sixth century that they settled in South Russia; they were under the domination of the Variags, who seem to have been slightly more advanced in civilisation; it is not certain whether these Variags were Scandinavians or another tribe of Slavs—this is a question of violent dispute between Russian historians. The Slavs revolted against their Variag masters and drove them out; there

followed some centuries of unrest and disorder, and then the Slavs invited the Variags to return and govern them in order to restore peace to the land.

2. THE VARIAG PRINCES.—About 900 A.D. the first Variag or Russ<sup>1</sup> princes arrived; their line reigned until nearly 1600 A.D., and the broad divisions of this period are as follows :—

A.D. 900 to 1300.—While Kiev was the capital.

A.D. 1230 to 1480.—The period of the Tartar yoke.

A.D. 1300 to 1600.—The gradual development of Moscow as capital.

Roorik was the founder of the line. He settled in Novgorod, 100 miles south of the present Petrograd (not to be confounded with Nijni Novgorod). Askold and Dir, his companions, pushed southwards and founded Kiev.

Egor, son of Roorik, and Oleg, his guardian, came to Kiev, killed Askold and Dir, and settled in Kiev as their capital. Oleg died, and Egor then reigned alone; his wife St Olga was converted to Christianity.

Sviatoslav was a warrior prince; he toured

<sup>1</sup> The word Russ was taken from the name of a small river, tributary of the Dnieper. On its banks lived a tribe who became known as the Russians, and the name gradually spread.

the Caucasus and the Balkans and was killed in a battle near the Dnieper rapids while returning to Kiev.

3. St Vladimir drove out his brothers and became an absolute ruler. At first a fervent idolater, he soon felt the weakness of idolatry and became a searcher after the truth; he began to consider other religions and got into touch with Mahomedans and Jews, and with both Byzantium and Rome. At this time the split between Eastern and Western Churches had not become official, but the differences were already strongly marked. The Popes insisted on the use of the Latin language in the Church, and Vladimir rejected this as unpractical for a national religion. He sent a commission of ten wise men to travel, with orders to make inquiries about religions and their influence on the various countries. In Byzantium (Constantinople) there reigned two Greek princes, Constantine and Vasiely, and Vladimir sent to ask for the hand of their sister in marriage. The princes replied that it was unfitting that a Christian princess should marry a heathen; and this seems to have decided Vladimir. He consented to be baptised and then married Anna in 988 A.D. and became a fervent Christian. An ancient manuscript describes the scene:—

“And St Vladimir ordered that the chief idol of Kiev, Peroon, God of Thunder, be tied to a horse's tail and dragged down to the River Dnieper; on the

journey it was beaten with rods by appointed persons. The idolators in mighty fear followed their idol to the river and wept bitter tears. Thus they dragged the image of Peroon down to the river and flung it in the water. And St Vladimir gave orders that the idol be watched until it was swallowed up in the rapids, so that no man might pull it out from the water and make it an object of worship. After these things St Vladimir ordered that all the inhabitants of Kiev should assemble next morning on the banks, and his officers proclaimed that if any disobeyed this order it would be counted as treason against them. Hither, then, assembled at the appointed hour, with St Vladimir and the priests, a great multitude. And in the waters of the Dnieper a great baptism of the heathen took place; and on the spots where had stood the idols the prince began to build churches."

This summary conversion of a nation to a new faith had wide-reaching results. Not only did it affect all their ideas of morality and their duties to their neighbours, but it also led them into touch with the Greeks, and this was the first step towards enlightenment and civilisation. Till this time writing was unknown in Russia; two of Vladimir's wise men, St Kyrrill and St Mephod, invented an alphabet to suit the Russian language and thus laid the earliest foundation of Russian literature. Greek masons were called in to build churches and taught Russia the rudiments of architecture and decoration. Christianity had also an effect on the political situation; the priests soon acquired influence over the masses, and as they were under the orders of the Metro-



politan the Church became a strong instrument of discipline in the hands of the prince.

4. The sons of St Vladimir fought desperately among themselves for the succession; Sviatopolk hired murderers to assassinate three of his brothers, but he himself was afterwards defeated and driven into exile by Yaroslav. To history Yaroslav is known as "the Wise"; he was devoted to learning and had many books translated from the Greek; he founded the first library in Kiev and built churches, monasteries, and schools. He also built many towns and took steps to have them populated. But the chief monument to his memory consists in a code of laws, called "Russian Rights," which was the first ever compiled in the country. The only punishment laid down was fines, whose magnitude varied with the offence. For the murder of a court dignitary the fine was 80 pounds of silver; if the victim were an ordinary man it was reduced to 40 pounds, if a woman to 20 pounds. The relations of the victim received a bit of the fines, but the prince seems to have got a good revenue out of them.

Yaroslav the Wise extended his connection with foreign courts; one of his daughters married Henry I. of France, and his other children married Polish, Norwegian, Hungarian, Greek, and German royalties. The sons of Yaroslav, although warned by their wise father of the perils of discord, soon

quarrelled over the inheritance, and for many years there were disorders, which were aggravated by the invasions of neighbouring tribes, and by famines which resulted from bad harvests and locusts.

At last some sort of order was re-established, when Vladimir Monomach came to the throne. He was energetic, just, and wise, and was certainly one of the best of the early princes. He was learned and wrote a delightful book of morals for the benefit of his sons.

But he was in advance of his times; his dislike for murders was considered quite priggish, and soon after his death his family reverted to the good old days and fought each other for the succession.

These quarrels were the natural outcome of the system of inheritance. The now extensive state was divided up into several principalities, in each of which ruled a prince of the royal family. These principalities were graded in order of importance; Kiev was the chief one, and the "Big Prince" of Kiev was recognised as sovereign over all the rest; his eldest son was Prince of Novgorod, the second important town; younger sons ruled in Vladimir and elsewhere. When the Big Prince died his son succeeded him, leaving Novgorod to number two, and so on; this caused a general change all round whenever a death occurred. Such was the theory, but it was rarely observed in practice. A younger son could miss out several intermediate steps if his elder relations

fell victims to the epidemic of assassination, which was very infectious. Princes rarely remained long in any particular principality, and, feeling that they would move on, they took little interest in the local affairs and got as much as they could out of their temporary jobs. The disadvantages of the system are obvious, and this was the main cause of the decay of Kiev. Another cause was its position; though well placed for commerce on the Dnieper, which was the main route north and south, it was too near the Steppes; these boundless plains stretched away to the east and were infested by wandering tribes who made constant raids on any outlying settlement. In consequence, such people as wished to open up new agricultural districts began to move farther and farther northwards out of reach of the robbers.

Andrew Bogolovsky was the first to change the old order of things; when his turn came to move to Kiev he preferred to remain in his northern principality and settled in Vladimir, about 100 miles east of Moscow. He brought from Kiev the holy ikon of the Virgin, which legend declared was the work of the Evangelist St Luke, and built a cathedral for it. The chair of the Metropolitan was transferred from Kiev to the new cathedral. Andrew's son was sent to Kiev as viceroy, and thus the old connection between Kiev and the title of "Big Prince" was severed. Andrew was a lover of autocracy, and firmly restricted the power

of his nobles ; but eventually fell a victim to a conspiracy which they formed against him. He was succeeded by his brother, Vsevolod II., who was energetic and crafty, and did much to strengthen the position of the northern province and the new capital.

5. THE TARTAR YOKE.—The Tartars were a nomad race who came from somewhere north-west of China, and were a branch of the Monghols. They were not agriculturalists, but lived on the produce of their flocks and herds. Originally they were divided into many tribes and “hordes,” but in the thirteenth century the renowned Temoochun obtained power over the whole race and became an absolute despot, with the title of Chief Khan. He started by subduing part of Northern China, and then turned westwards ; a part of his force moved round the south of the Caspian Sea, crossed the Caucasus, and invaded the steppes of Southern Russia. These steppes were inhabited by various barbarous tribes who were hostile to Russia, but some of the Russian princes decided to help them against the eastern invader ; in a battle near the Sea of Azov the Russians suffered a crushing defeat. This took place in 1223, but the Tartars stopped there, and the real invasion did not begin till 1235.

Temoochun was dead, and his grandson Batye commanded the forces which advanced from the Urals on Ryasan (100 miles south-

east of Moscow). This was an invasion by a complete nation; women and children, flocks and herds, accompanied the army. No estimate can be given of their numbers, which must have been enormous and were easily able to overpower the sparsely populated Russia. Their power was augmented by their discipline, which was remarkable and very severe; they were properly organised into units. Each unit of 10 men had its leader, and the bigger units consisted of 100, then 1000, and finally 10,000 men. There were also special scouts for advanced guards. Cowards were punished with death, and the leaders were tortured if their commands failed in their duty. Each soldier carried a bow and arrows, also an axe and a rope (which was used in the construction of battering rams). The higher ranks had curved swords, spears, and armour; even their horses carried armour.

No Russian force could stand against them in the open, and the war consisted for the most part in a series of sieges. They took Ryasan, Moscow, and Vladimir, and sacked them with awful barbarity. The Big Prince, Yourie II., had fled from Vladimir and collected a force with which he gave battle in 1238 on the banks of the Sith, but he himself was killed and his army was routed. After this the Tartars turned southwards. In 1240 they took Kiev, which practically completed the conquest of Russia. They then pushed westwards into Hungary. At this time

Frederick II. was Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire; thoroughly alarmed at the "yellow peril" he made frantic appeals to Western Europe for help, but without much result; Louis IX. of France definitely refused, and other rulers did very little. The town of Olmutz (100 miles north of Vienna) made a wonderful resistance, and, encouraged by this, the Austrians and Checs showed opposition. The Tartars seem to have been content for the time, and returned into South Russia; here they settled, but retained something of their nomad habits; in summer they wandered about the steppes, feeding their flocks, and in winter they went down to the shores of the Caspian and the Black Sea. They founded the town of Sarai, near Astrakan, and it became the headquarters of the so-called "Golden Horde." An Italian monk called Plano-Carpini, who was sent by the Pope as an emissary and missionary, visited the Golden Horde in 1246 and has left some very valuable historical memoirs. He describes the savage tyranny of the Khan and the abject slavery of his subjects. Every tribe had to contribute yearly a certain number of slaves, male and female, for his personal retinue, which was very large.

But there was a curious feature of the Tartar domination; having thoroughly subdued the Russian princes, they then allowed them to remain and govern in their own way, only demanding heavy yearly tribute. This tribute

was paid in slaves, horses, and money; if a man had three sons one of them had to be given up as a slave, and a large percentage of unmarried men and women were also taken. A regular census was made in the most systematic way, and torture or death awaited those who sought to conceal themselves or their property.

The Tartars had very vague ideas of religion themselves and were evidently quite tolerant; for they did not interfere with the Church and even exempted the priests from tribute. One of the khans, who was apparently a bit of a philosopher, said to a missionary, "We Tartars believe there is a God in whom we live and die, but as God has given to the hand various fingers so He has given to the nations various paths to salvation; He gave you writings which you don't observe; He gave us our soothsayers whom we obey, and we live in peace."

The Russian princes had to go in person to the Golden Horde to do homage to the Khan, and there, in return for valuable presents, they received the Yarlik, or badge of office which entitled them to reign.

In their relationship to the Tartars the Russian princes were entirely subject; but they were threatened at the same time by other foes from the north and west.

These were first the Swedes; in 1240 Alexander Nevsky defeated them on the bank of the Neva (from which he derived his title of

Nevsky). This was considered a decisive victory and averted all danger from this quarter for many years.

The second opponents were the German Knights; these were Orders of Knights Templars who spread along the coast of the Baltic and founded Riga and other towns. Alexander Nevsky defeated them in 1242.

The third danger came from farther south; the provinces of Volhynia and Galicia had formerly been under the younger sons of the Big Prince, but gradually separated from Russia and several times attacked Kiev, and even threatened the whole Russian state; they had some brilliant leaders and sometimes were very formidable, but they underwent constant changes. Later on they joined the kingdom of Poland, but broke away again. They were at the height of their strength about 1400, under a prince called Vetovgt, who was the hero of many adventures. At one time he reigned over a strip of country which extended from the Baltic near Riga right down to the Black Sea near the mouth of the Danube.

6. THE MOSCOW PRINCES. — Moscow had gradually been growing in importance; the troubles in Kiev and the south had driven the population northwards; Moscow was on one of the main routes, and many of the travellers decided to stay there. The Metropolitan, who quitted Kiev in 1299 for Vladimir,



soon afterwards moved again to a new stone church which had been built in Moscow. The princes of Moscow belonged to one of the younger branches of the royal family, but they were capable and foreseeing, and in many ways increased the importance of their town and their own wealth. The Big Prince had left Vladimir for Tver (100 miles north-west of Moscow), but in this town some of the Khan's emissaries were killed in a riot; the Khan called on Ivan Kaleeta of Moscow to help him to punish the offenders and gave him the Yarlik of the Big Prince. There seems to have been little opposition to this, and Moscow became the recognised capital of Russia from that time. The tyranny of the Tartars lay heavy, yet in one respect they contributed to peace and order, for the Yarlik was considered as the insignia of the reigning prince, and there were fewer wrangles over the succession than formerly.

DMITRY DONSKOY was the first prince who was able to put up a fight against the Tartars. He collected an army which is said to have been 200,000 strong, and on 8th September 1380 he completely defeated the Khan in the battle of Koulikovo on the banks of the Don. This was a remarkable victory, and was the beginning of a new phase; the Tartars had been the aggressors for 140 years; true, they still continued to receive the tribute and to raid, and it was not till a hundred years later that they were finally defeated; but this battle

restored the Russian morale and aroused hopes which were eventually realised.

Ivan III. was a powerful prince and may be regarded as the first ruler of all Russia. Novgorod, which had been for centuries the most independent of Russian towns, was absorbed into the Moscow principality, and the whole of the northern states came under his influence. His reign was also remarkable for the advance in culture, especially in architecture, which was brought about by his marriage with Sophia Paleologus.

In 1543 the Turks had taken Constantinople and driven out the Paleologi; one of the family, with his daughter Sophia, took refuge in Rome, where they were hospitably received by Pope Pius II. This prelate conceived a plan for the union of the Eastern and Western Churches, chiefly with a view to opposing any further advance by the Turks. He therefore suggested a marriage between Ivan III. and Sophia, hoping that Sophia, who had been under his influence, would help to forward the union. With immense pomp and a large suite of Italians Sophia went to Moscow and the marriage was celebrated. But the hopes of Pius II. were disappointed; Ivan III. looked upon himself as the successor of the Paleologi and the head of the Eastern Church; he was warmly supported by his Metropolitan and priests, and refused even to discuss the union.

The Italian Renaissance, however, had left its mark on Sophia; she was horrified at the

miserable appearance of her new home after the lordly palaces and churches of Italy, and at her instigation Ivan called in masons and architects who soon transformed his capital. Walls were erected round the Kremlin and two cathedrals were built by the Italians which served as models for other churches throughout the country.

At last Ivan III. felt himself strong enough to throw off the Tartars' yoke. For some time the power of the Chief Khan had been weakening and two sections had broken away from the Golden Horde; there were now new khans, in the Crimea and in Kazan (400 miles east of Moscow), and they not only did not act in unison with the Chief Khan, but were often found in open opposition. The Kazan Tartars the nearest to Moscow were the most troublesome, but the Russians had now the upper hand and were able to keep them confined to their own territories except for an occasional minor raid. By clever diplomacy Ivan arranged friendly terms with the Crimean Khan. Then he took the definite step of refusing homage and tribute to the Golden Horde.

The Chief Khan collected his forces and moved against Moscow; Ivan, with the blessings of the Church and the support of his nation, moved out to meet him. Moscow was declared to be in a state of siege, and the Princess Sophia and the treasury were sent northwards out of danger. There was no decisive battle. Ivan's strategy was sound but

cautious; after some manœuvring he took up a strong position on the River Oogra, 100 miles south-east of Moscow, commanding the fords. Neither side cared to attempt the crossing in face of the enemy, and so they remained on opposite banks for some time. The Khan had kept up the spirits of his army by declaring that he was only waiting for the river to freeze so that he might attack the Russians, but when the frost came he found they were still too strong for him; he blamed his allies for failing to support him and retreated southwards; he was shortly afterwards murdered by a minor khan. After his death the Golden Horde dwindled rapidly, and in 1502 finally disappeared. Ivan III. had freed Russia for ever from the Tartar yoke.

7. Ivan IV., "the Terrible," is one of the outstanding personalities of Russian history, and was a very extraordinary man. He was only three years old when his father died in 1533. For fourteen years the boyars of the court held all the power in their hands and quarrelled fiercely over it between themselves. At first Ivan's mother, Elena Gleensky, was the regent, and her lover, Telepneff, held the power; Elena died in 1538, it is said by poison, and Telepneff ended his life in prison. The other boyars then fought for supremacy and there were "troublous times." They encouraged the young prince in wanton cruelty; one of his amusements was to throw

live animals out of the top windows of the palace; another was to gallop recklessly about the streets, knocking down helpless bystanders. The nobles applauded such feats; they entirely neglected his education, behaved in his presence with licentious freedom, and even reviled the memory of his mother.

It is not surprising that the child grew up harsh and "terrible," and only looked forward to the day when he could take the power into his own hands. But there was another and curious side to his character: he educated himself, and was an earnest student of history, from which no doubt he picked up his very shrewd ideas about government. When only seventeen years old he insisted on taking the power on himself and on getting married. His first wife was Anastasia Románoff, and it was this connection which afterwards started the House of Románoff on the throne. And so, in 1550, we find Ivan supreme in Moscow, a clever and resolute prince who did much for Russia, and at the same time a savage tyrant in his court. His chief reforms were in the Church, where he carried out some drastic and necessary improvements in the morals and habits of the monasteries. He issued a new code of laws, and suppressed to some extent the bribery in the law courts. He abolished some of the worst privileges of the provincial governors.

The chief event of his reign was the siege and capture of Kazan (400 miles east of

Moscow); the intermittent warfare between Eastern Russia and the Kazan Tartars broke out once more in 1548, and Ivan made his preparations for an expedition on a large scale to finish the matter. In 1552 he surrounded and besieged Kazan; the walls were solid, and it was necessary to undermine them and blow them down with gunpowder before a breach could be made. The 30,000 Tartars defended themselves desperately, but the Russians had 150,000 men, and once they had succeeded in breaking into the town the enemy was soon overwhelmed.

There was nearly constant war on the other frontiers—against the German Knights of Livonia, whom Ivan defeated; against the Poles and Swedes, who were able to prevent Russia from obtaining an outlet on the Baltic; and the Crimean Tartars formed a threatening and sometimes active danger on the south.

Towards the end of the reign an enterprising leader called Ermak, at the head of some 800 Kossacks, crossed the Ural Mountains; he reached a small town called Siberia, which has since given its name to the immense stretch of Northern Asia which lies between the Urals and the Pacific. At that time Siberia was the capital of a small Khan. The Tartars were utterly confounded at the effect of firearms, which they had never even heard of before, and Ermak easily captured the town. He was the pioneer of the Russian conquests in Asia.

In 1563 the first printing press was erected in Moscow, but was hardly a success. It took the printers ten years to get out the first edition. Then the local scribes were afraid that such a rapid rate of production might spoil their honest trade, so they burnt down the whole establishment.

Another small but interesting event deserves our notice. A fleet of sturdy English mariners was wandering round the north of Russia, in search of China; only one ship escaped the perils of the Arctic Ocean and cast up somewhere on the northern coast. The skipper, by name Chancellor, was probably the first Englishman who stepped on Russian soil. He was taken to Moscow, where Ivan must have treated him well, for after he had been back to England he appeared again in Russia, two years later, for purposes of trade.

Ivan IV. was entirely unrestrained in his passions; with his own sceptre he killed his eldest son on account of some small contradiction. He was "a cruel man of a cruel age." The Russian historian has no defence for him, but makes a note that in this century other kingdoms were also the scenes of cruelty; Henry VIII. was king of England and beheaded some of his wives (Ivan had seven wives, Henry only six); the reign of "bloody Mary" was notorious for religious prosecution, and people were burnt at the stake; in France there was the massacre of

St Bartholomew; in Spain the Inquisition was making the Church infamous; in Italy the Borgias had made poison a fine art.

Ivan's son Feodor was the first "Tsar"; up to this time the Moscow rulers held only the title of prince; Peter I. took the title of emperor. The line of the old princes ended with the sons of Ivan the Terrible. His eldest son he himself had killed. The second son, Feodor, reigned from 1584 to 1598, but died childless.

The third son, Dmitry, died in 1591 in circumstances which are shrouded in mystery, and which had important results. There are three versions of the affair. The first says it was a mere accident; the small prince was playing with other children at a game which consisted in throwing a long knife into a marked-out ring; he was subject to fits, and in one of these he fell on the knife and received fatal injuries; this version was officially reported by a commission appointed to investigate. The second version was that the boy was murdered by assassins hired by Boris Godounoff, brother-in-law to the Tsar; Boris hoped that if the prince were out of the way he might himself succeed to the throne, and this actually happened later on; this version was, of course, supported by the enemies of Boris. The third version was that the prince was never killed at all; the body found in the palace yard was one of his playmates. This version was put forward by



various pretenders who afterwards came forward and claimed to be the prince. Most Russian historians support the first version.

8. THE TROUBLOUS TIMES.—On the death of Feodor, his wife's brother, Boris Godounoff was formally elected Tsar by the "Zemsky Sobor," or representative meeting in Moscow. He was a humane and enlightened ruler. He died in 1605.


The first pretender then appeared and proclaimed himself Dmitry; he is known to history as "Ljedmitry," the "false Dmitry." He collected supporters in Poland and was accepted by the Moscow mob as the Tsar; he entered Moscow and was crowned. There is some evidence that Ljedmitry really believed himself to be the prince, and the widowed Tsarina Martha officially stated that she recognised him as her son. He was by no means a bad ruler, and distinguished himself by his energy and wit. But the boyars were discontented, and with Shoosky at their head they formed a conspiracy against Ljedmitry and murdered him. It is said that after his death Martha changed her opinion and disavowed him as her son.

There followed some years of chaos. The boyars formed a party and proclaimed Shoosky Tsar, but they were unpopular and reactionary. A pretender, Ljedmitry II., collected an army of the lower classes, and for a year and a half threatened Moscow. Sigismund III. of Poland

thought he could take advantage of the disorder to grasp the sceptre of Moscow, and sent an army into Russia. The Patriarch of Moscow and the Church bitterly opposed Sigismund, as he was a Roman Catholic and they had always feared the influence of Rome. These were the principal parties; there were minor ramifications, but their history is only tiresome. At last public feeling, weary of the anarchy, raised a popular party which got possession of Moscow and established a Zemsky Sobor for the election of a Tsar. This assembly took a long time in coming to a decision, but eventually elected Michael Feodorovich Románoff, a youth of sixteen years of age, great nephew of Ivan the Terrible's first wife.

The newly elected Tsar was not in Moscow; probably for purposes of personal safety, his friends had sent him away to the village of Domineno. A pretty legend, probably true, is told about this. A party of Poles heard of his whereabouts and set out to murder him, hoping thereby to annul the elections and renew the disorders in the country. They were seeking their way to the village and were about two miles from it when they met an old peasant, Ivan Susaneen, and his son-in-law, who offered to guide them. The old man, scenting danger, sent his son-in-law to warn the young Tsar to escape while he himself led the murderers through the forest all the night. In the

morning they realised that they had been tricked, and cut him to pieces. For this fine example of devotion the name of Ivan Susaneen is revered throughout Russia as that of Joan of Arc in France.




## LIST OF EVENTS—CHAPTER II

A. D.

- 1613-1645. Michael Feodorovich.  
1645-1676. Alexis.  
1676-1682. Feodor.  
1682-1725. Peter the Great.  
1682-1689. Regency of the Princess Sophia.  
    1696. Capture of Azov.  
    1697. Voyage of Peter I. to Holland and England.  
1700-1721. The Great Northern War.  
    1703. The Foundation of St Petersburg.  
    1709. Victory over Charles XII. at Poltava.  
    1711. Unsuccessful Turkish War.  
    1718. Death of the Tsarevich Alexis.  
    1721. Peter assumes the title of Emperor.  
1725-1727. Catherine I., wife of Peter I.  
1727-1730. Peter II., grandson of Peter I.  
1730-1740. Anne, niece of Peter I.  
1740-1741. Ivan VI., great-great-nephew of Peter I.  
1741-1761. Elizabeth, daughter of Peter I.  
1761-1762. Peter III., grandson of Peter I.  
1762-1796. Catherine II., wife of Peter III.  
1768-1774. First Turkish War.  
    1775. The Pougacheff Rebellion.  
    1783. Conquest of the Crimea.  
1787-1791. Second Turkish War.  
    1795. Final division of Poland between Russia, Prussia,  
        and Austria.  
1790-1801. Paul.  
    1799. Suvoroff's campaign in Italy against the French.

# THE HOUSE OF ROMÁNOFF

IVAN IV., the Terrible = ANASTASIA ROMÁNOFF,  
Her brother, Nikita.



*Note.*—The order of succession after Peter the Great was very irregular. The numbers in brackets (1) to (8) are put in as an assistance.

## CHAPTER II

### THE HOUSE OF ROMÁNOFF

9. FOR some seventy years there is little of interest to relate. This does not mean that Russia was enjoying peace and quiet; on the contrary, there was almost continual warfare either with the Swedes, Poles, or Kossacks. But in the end there were no great alterations in the map. Middle Europe was in the throes of the Thirty Years' War; this originally rose out of religious quarrels between the German Catholics and Protestants, but various allies were drawn into it on both sides. The famous Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden was a champion of Protestantism; his kingdom at that time included a large stretch of Northern Germany. His energies were so taken up by his struggles in that great war that he had little time for operations on a large scale against Russia.

It was in this century that the Kossacks began to be formidable. They were originally Russian pioneers who had pushed forward in the south and south-east in the direction of the Don. At first they were so insignificant that the Moscow Government took little

interest in them and they were allowed to settle in the Don region as free landowners. But they rapidly increased in numbers and wealth, and the Government regarded them with envy and mistrust; they were jealous of their independence and resented any interference. They were exceedingly difficult to deal with because they could always escape into the boundless wilds of the south-east. They also had several strongholds, the most famous of which was that formed by the "Zaparojnie"; this was on an island on the Dnieper, about 150 miles south of Kiev; it was surrounded by rapids, and the secret of the access to the place was so carefully kept that for many years nobody was able to get at them. The word "Zaparojnie" means "Dwellers beyond the rapids."

10. PETER THE GREAT.—Historians have compared Peter with Alexander of Macedon, Frederick of Prussia, and Napoleon of France—the other "Greats" of the world's history. He was born to the purple, and did not make his own way as Napoleon did; as a tactician he was not so brilliant as the others, but as a reformer, organiser, and constructor, he left monuments to his name which fully equalled their achievements. The keynotes to his character were boundless energy, strength of will, and an insatiable thirst for knowledge; and as he was ever ready to profit by the experience and knowledge of others, his



energy was always progressive. He was in turn a military organiser, a commander of armies, a naval architect, a social reformer, a town builder, a traveller, a carpenter, and many other things besides; his reign of thirty-six years is crammed with events.

Peter was born in 1672; he was the third son of Alexis, who had two sons and seven daughters by his first wife, but Peter was the only child of the second wife, Nathalia. The eldest son, Feodor, reigned from 1676 to 1682, and on his death there were "troubles." The next brother Ivan was physically and mentally deficient. The Patriarch and nobles made a public appeal to the Moscow crowd, asking which of the two princes they would prefer as Tsar; there was some division of opinion, but eventually Peter was consecrated by the Patriarch. The troubles, however, were by no means ended. Peter's half sister, the Princess Sophia, was a young lady who possessed considerable character and cherished high ambitions; she had been active in politics in the time of her brother Feodor, and she had many adherents. She succeeded in raising a serious mutiny in the "Strailtsi," or Palace Guards. The Strailtsi broke into the royal quarters and killed most of Peter's relations, but Peter and his mother escaped. In the end the riot was quelled when all the demands of the mutineers had been granted, and it was agreed that Ivan and Peter should be joint Tsars with Sophia as regent. But

the Strailtsi were still in a state of ferment and soon broke out again; Sophia, who had gained her ends by their help, found that it was no easy matter to satisfy their demands and keep them in order. She was eventually forced to leave Moscow with the two young Tsars and take refuge in the strong Troitsky Sergievsky monastery and appeal to the country for help. She collected a force which was strong enough to deal with the Strailtsi, and by her cleverness and resolution she restored the situation and returned to Moscow.

In order to prevent Peter's mother and her relations from obtaining influence she was sent, with her son, to the village of Preobrajensky, and it was here that Peter received his education. The historians agree that the absence from Moscow had an excellent effect; Peter lived in the open air and developed rapidly; he was free to choose his own companions. He formed a regiment out of his playmates, at first for mere children's games, but later for serious study of military science; this regiment afterwards became the famous Preobrajensky Guards. Another amusement consisted in boatsailing, and this developed into a passion for the sea. These amusements brought him into touch with foreigners who were brought in as instructors, and rooted in his mind the conviction that other countries were far advanced in science and technical skill, and that Russia was badly in need of enlightenment.

Sophia would have liked to retain the power in her own hands, but when Peter reached the age of seventeen his relations became more and more prominent, and it was evident that there would be a struggle between them and the princess. Sophia believed they had formed a plot against her. Peter, on the other hand, was told that she had incited the Strailtsi to murder him and his mother. He now took refuge in the Troitsky Sergievsky monastery; he was supported by most of the nobles and the Patriarch; he had his Preobrajenskies at his disposal. The Strailtsi and most of her adherents deserted Sophia and she was forced to give way; she was sent to a monastery and Peter henceforward ruled alone; his brother Ivan died in 1695. Peter's first campaign was against the Turks in the town of Azov; it was a triumph of energy and forethought. Finding that his first efforts did not promise success, he collected a force of 26,000 engineers and workmen for the construction of a flotilla. He was then, in 1696, able to approach the town both by land and sea, and after a bombardment the Turks capitulated. In 1697 Peter started on his first journey abroad and visited Prussia, Holland, and England. His chief object was to study shipbuilding, but he interested himself in everything that he came across and was tireless in his search for information. He was invited to England by William III., who intended to entertain him royally and prepared a palace for him and his

suite ; Peter, however, preferred a small house in Deptford near the shipbuilding wharves. He was present at some naval manœuvres, visited the theatre, went to Oxford, held long discussions with Anglican bishops and representative Quakers, and studied every sort of factory ; he was particularly interested in the Mint. He enlisted into his service over sixty artificers of different trades and sent them off to Russia through Archangel.

On his way back he went to Vienna, but hearing that the Strailtsi had become mutinous in Moscow, he was obliged to cut short his travels and hasten home. Before his arrival the rising had been subdued, but Peter made a determined investigation into the affair and mercilessly punished the mutineers. His half-sister Sophia, who had been privy to the conspiracy, was forced to take the veil, and that put an end to her activities. The Strailtsi were disbanded and the household troops were henceforward known as the Guards.

*The Great Northern War.*—Convinced that the Baltic was “the window to Europe,” Peter now devoted himself to opening it. He concluded peace with Turkey and arranged an alliance with Denmark and Poland against Sweden. This war lasted from 1700 to 1721 with varying fortunes, but in the end Peter gained his object and forced the Swedes to give him a footing on the Baltic coast. The king of Sweden was Charles XII. ; born in 1682, he was ten years younger than Peter,

and in the beginning of his reign he drove his people to despair by his eccentricities; with his young companions he amused himself by letting loose hares in the House of Parliament, and hunted them with dogs while his legislators were engaged in serious debate; another amusement was to break the windows of serious inhabitants. But as soon as he appeared in the theatre of war he showed the most brilliant qualities as a leader, and soon acquired a reputation throughout Europe for invincibility. He attained the zenith of his wonderful career in 1707 when still only twenty-five years old; he had completely smashed up the Danes, Saxons, and Poles, and even the Holy Roman Empire was alarmed.

At the beginning of the war between Charles XII. and Peter, the raw Russian troops were no match for the well-trained Swedish veterans. Charles gained an important victory, and, thinking that he had finished with the Russians, he himself went on to attack the Saxons. But the war with Russia had only just begun; in 1702 Peter collected all his forces and commanded them in person; he began to defeat the Swedes in a series of battles and sieges by which he gained the banks of the River Nova.

In the spring of 1703 he founded the fortress of St Petersburg and soon afterwards began to drain the marshes and lay out the town which before the end of his reign had

become the capital. He devoted himself to this congenial work, and it is one of the most remarkable of his constructive achievements.

Charles, having crushed the Saxons and Poles, now turned his attention once more to Russia.

His plan against Peter was to move by the south, hoping that the Turks would join him in Ukraina; he also expected to find allies in the Kossacks, as their famous leader Mazeppa had promised to help him; but in both these hopes he was very much disappointed; only a few of the Kossacks followed Mazeppa, and the Turks took no part in the war. Charles besieged Poltava (180 miles east of Kiev), and Peter, who had for a long time been refusing battle, at last felt he was strong enough to fight it out. The decisive battle was fought outside Poltava on 27th June 1709 and ended in a glorious victory for Peter's young army. Charles XII. and Mazeppa escaped to Turkey but 9000 Swedes fell on the field, and 3000 more were taken prisoners. This great day definitely turned the tide against the Swedes; in later years the Russians took from them Riga, Revel, and Viborg, and established themselves firmly on the Baltic shores.

In 1710 the Turks, instigated by Charles XII., declared war on Russia; in order to prevent them from invading his country Peter moved quickly down south into Moldavia. In this expedition he was unsuccessful. The Turks moved large forces against him and

nearly forced him to capitulate with his whole army. The Turkish Vizier, however, was heavily bribed (chiefly, it is said, by Peter's wife, who sold her jewelry for the purpose) and was thereby persuaded into making a treaty which was very advantageous to the Russians in the circumstances. But Peter had to give up with bitter regret the town of Azov, his earliest conquest, and thus Russia lost all footing on the Black Sea.

Charles XII. succeeded in getting back home from Turkey but found his kingdom in dire straits. His various enemies had occupied all the Swedish possessions in Germany and also the Baltic shore in Finland; in despair he proposed peace, but before the terms could be arranged he died. It is of him that the poet wrote: "He left a name at which the world grew pale, to point a moral or adorn a tale." His sister Ulrica carried on the war till 1721, and was then forced to make a treaty by which the Russians realised all their ambitions in the north. It was a triumph not so much of military skill as of personal determination on the part of Peter who had forced his nation to persevere in the war.

*The Emperor.*—During the festivities which celebrated the end of the great northern war Peter assumed the title of Emperor. In England we often refer to subsequent Russian sovereigns as "the Tsars," but that title is really a misnomer, and is not used in Russia. As the Holy Roman Empire disappeared

in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the other empires of Austria, France, Germany, and Britain were all of later dates, the Russians regarded themselves as the oldest and greatest empire in Europe and were jealous of the title.

Peter's reforms are too many to be treated in any detail. At the beginning of his reign the standing army consisted of a few bad regiments of Strailtsi and there was no fleet at all; at the end of it there was a standing army of over 200,000 men and a fleet of 48 ships and nearly 800 small craft with 28,000 sailors. In his reforms he was merciless in regard to private or vested interests, and thought only of the general interests of the State. Thus he ruthlessly cut down the privileges of the aristocrats but encouraged and endowed the mercantile and manufacturing classes. He had no use for the idle rich, and insisted that they should serve the State either in a military or civil capacity.

In his early youth Peter was married to Eudoxia, by whom he had a son Alexis; this first wife was thoroughly uncongenial, and he divorced her by sending her into a monastery to take the veil. He afterwards married Catherine, a woman of low birth, to whom he was very devoted; by her he had two daughters. His son Alexis was brought up by Eudoxia and was not in agreement with his father at all; Peter's reproaches and beatings, which were not light, had no effect



upon him. In 1711 he married, but his wife died, leaving a son and a daughter. Peter then told Alexis that he must either reform or give up all hopes of reigning, for Peter himself had worked too hard and valued his reforms too highly to give his undertakings over to an unworthy successor. After a great deal of bickering Alexis succeeded in escaping to Austria, where he asked the Emperor to protect him from his father's wrath; the Emperor agreed, and refused to deliver him up at Peter's demand; but later on Peter's emissaries persuaded the prince to return to Moscow by promising him pardon. Alexis formally renounced his rights and gave a list of those who had helped him in his escape. Further investigation proved that he was continuing to intrigue with the reactionaries and the Emperor Charles, and therefore a special court was appointed for his trial. This court condemned him to death for treason, but before the sentence could be carried out the prince died in the "Peter and Paul" fortress in St Petersburg; there is little doubt that his death was caused or at least hastened by the tortures to which he was subjected in order to extort confessions. Peter's only other son died in the following year, 1719.

11. THE SUCCESSORS OF PETER THE GREAT.  
 —The next half dozen rulers of Russia were all either women or children, and the real power was exercised by court favourites.

Peter had decreed that each emperor had the right to nominate his successor, who need not necessarily be the next of kin. This, of course, gave rise to discord; those who had influence with the proper heir naturally asserted that Peter had no right to make such a decree. The result was that the party which happened to be the strongest for the moment nominated a ruler and supported him until it was upset by a *coup d'état*; the opposing side then got an innings. The sequence of rulers, therefore, became very complicated, and will best be understood by a glance at the genealogical table, which shows the various relationships. The reigns are uninteresting in comparison with the epoch-making rule of Peter the Great.

Peter was succeeded by his wife. Catherine was a peasant girl in the service of a pastor who lived near Riga. When the Russians were driving the Swedes out of that part of the country Catherine fell into Menshikoff's hands as part of the booty of war. When Peter visited his general to congratulate him on his victories, he was immediately captivated by the beauty of the peasant girl and married her at once. She never learned to read or write, but she was an excellent and economic housewife, a good hostess, and she thoroughly devoted herself to Peter; she was his constant and cheerful companion, even on his military expeditions, and often calmed him in his outbursts of temper. She never

forgot her humble origin and was generous to her old friends; especially was she grateful to Menshikoff, through whom she had risen from a cottage to a throne, and it was he who held the power during her reign.

Menshikoff himself had risen from the gutter; as a small boy he sold pies on the street; his brightness and energy attracted first one of the nobles and then Peter himself, and he quickly rose to be Peter's right hand man. As an army commander he showed ability, and he flung himself with enthusiasm into all Peter's schemes. But his ambition and greed were overwhelming, and when the restraining hand of Peter was removed his domineering spirit broke all bounds.

Catherine I. only survived her husband two years and was succeeded by Peter II. The young Emperor was only eleven years old, and Menshikoff took upon himself the regency and considered himself supreme; he took Peter into his own palace and forced him into a betrothal with one of his daughters, though the unfortunate youth hated Menshikoff and felt no attraction towards his prospective bride. Menshikoff's vanity had apparently made him careless; Peter, with unexpected resolution, issued his own orders direct to the Guards, and the powerful regent was arrested and sent to Siberia where he ended his life. It is said that he possessed 100,000 peasants, six towns, and some millions of money. In 1730 Peter II. died of smallpox.

The usual intrigues followed, and Anna was placed on the throne after she had signed certain conditions limiting her power; these conditions she threw aside immediately afterwards. Her favourite was the infamous Biron, whose memory is execrated by the Russian nation as the most unjust and tyrannous of rulers. His system of spies for a long time held in check the various conspiracies formed against him, and for most of Anna's reign of ten years he held his place and did his worst.

On Anna's death he became regent to the young Emperor Ivan VI., and his story was very much the same as Menshikoff's; he betrothed Ivan to one of his daughters; was upset by a conspiracy, arrested by the Guards, and followed Menshikoff into exile. The intrigues continued; in less than a year Ivan VI. had been dethroned and imprisoned by Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great.

Elizabeth's reign of twenty years was more peaceful as regards internal affairs; there were favourites at court, but they were less conspicuous than Menshikoff and Biron, and less unpopular. Chief among them was Alexis Rasoumovsky; he was the son of a Kossack farmer; as a choir boy in the village church he attracted the attention of a travelling nobleman who brought him to St Petersburg. He became the favourite of Elizabeth, and there seems to be no doubt that she was privately married to him; the small church

where the ceremony was performed is still pointed out in Moscow. His relations, especially his brother, were loaded with honours, but he himself took little part in politics and seems to have contented himself with his music and personal comforts.

In foreign affairs the chief event was Russia's participation in the Seven Years' War. The growing power of Prussia had excited the jealousy of her neighbours, so Austria, France, Saxony, and the Swedes formed an alliance against Frederick the Great. It is said that Elizabeth joined the alliance chiefly because Frederick had indulged in some personal witticisms at her expense which were carefully reported to her. At terrible cost the Russian armies gained some victories and actually entered Berlin for a short time. But there were disagreements between the allied generals, and before any decisive victory could be gained Elizabeth died and her successors refused to take any part in the war and withdrew their armies.

Peter III. and his wife, Catherine II., had both received German education, and could not even speak Russian. Peter in his habits and views remained a foreigner, but Catherine threw herself heart and soul into her adopted country, learnt the Russian language well, and became a thorough Russian. The political disagreements between her and her husband were aggravated by personal dislike, and finally Catherine put herself at the head of the

Guards and forced Peter to abdicate in her favour; he was interned in a fortress and a few days later he "died."

12. CATHERINE II. — Catherine was the daughter of a minor German prince, Anhalt-Serbst, and she reigned thirty-six years. She was energetic and well-educated, and was infinitely more capable than any of her immediate predecessors; she ardently admired Peter the Great, and tried to follow his policy in everything. She was intensely patriotic, and set herself to improve the condition of her people; in administration and education a certain amount was done, but in her well-meant endeavours to make everybody happy she sometimes fell into serious blunders. There is no doubt that the condition of the serfs in her reign was worse than it had ever been before.

The notable events were two wars with Turkey and the conquest of Poland.

The first Turkish war was in 1770. Roumiantseff led a Russian army into Moldavia, and near the Danube gained two brilliant victories over the Turks and their allies, the Tartars. In the following year the Tartars were subdued in the Crimea, and that peninsula was joined to Russia. One of Catherine's favourites, the great Potyomkine, was sent as governor of the south, and he firmly established the Russian power on the coast of the Black Sea.

The second Turkish war was from 1789 to 1791. The hero of it was Suvoroff; chiefly by his own genius he gained the celebrated victories of Rymnic and Focshani, and captured the fortress of Ismail near the mouth of the Danube.

Suvoroff is one of the most popular figures in Russian history; in his small and delicate body there was the soul of a lion. He was a stern martinet, but his careful interest in the welfare of his soldiers endeared him to their hearts and they worshipped him. For himself he refused all personal comforts; he slept on a straw bed and fed out of a camp kettle; at the same time he was fond of a joke, and a thousand anecdotes are told of his humour and his eccentricities. He was one of Catherine's real friends.

*The Fall of Poland.*—While the power of Russia had been steadily rising, that of Poland had been on the decline.

One cause of this was the enmity between the Slav and Roman Churches; the population of Poland was divided between the two, and though constant attempts were made to form a union they never came to anything; the ambitions of the two sides were too strong and they thoroughly mistrusted each other. But the worst curse of Poland was its aristocracy. The constitution was a limited monarchy, but all power was really in the Sejm or House of Lords; the kings were elected by this assembly, and so were, of

course, dependent on the nobles who voted for them. An absurdity was that one vote was sufficient to block the passage of any law, and so the legislative body did nothing but wrangle, and no measure of reform had the least chance of being passed. The nobles were intensely selfish and ambitious, and never succeeded in pulling together over anything, so the State was torn to pieces by secret intrigues and open rebellions. The opposing parties, regardless of any patriotic feeling, called in foreign powers to support them, and this gave Russia, Prussia, and Austria interests in Polish affairs of which they took full advantage. The result was that Poland was three times divided up between these three states. In 1794 a Russian army under Suvoroff finally defeated the Polish patriotic Kostyusko, and the third and last division of Poland then took place. This brought the Russian frontier on the West to that line, where we find it in our own days.

On the South-Eastern Front there was a very serious rebellion of the Kossacks under the pretender called Pougacheff. He gave himself out as the Emperor Peter III., and proclaimed that he had come to restore the old religion and customs of the country; he began to do so by murdering the landowners and their families; he was joined by thousands of malcontents and overran the whole of the south-east; the small frontier forts were much too weak to withstand him, and in some cases the garrisons went over to his side; he



took the towns of Samara, Saratov, and Kazan. Catherine was forced to send a regular army to deal with the rebellion and it was suppressed. Pougacheff was taken prisoner and beheaded in Moscow in 1775.

At the end of the reign Russia was stronger than it had been since the days of Peter the Great. In her private life Catherine II. was kind-hearted, generous, and impulsive; but no amount of whitewashing can make her a saint; her love affairs were numerous and she scarcely took any trouble to conceal them.

13. PAUL I. was already forty-two years old when his mother died. He had long been quite estranged from Catherine, and had not been allowed to take any part in the affairs of State. His policy was reactionary. He sent away all her statesmen from the court, and even dismissed Suvoroff from the army. But a year later all was changed; Russia entered the alliance against the French, and Suvoroff was recalled and reinstated.

The revolution in France had thrown over the House of Bourbon and had then worn itself out. The young genius Buonaparte was grasping the power which had passed so rapidly from hand to hand. By his wonderful campaign of 1796 he had driven the Austrians out of Northern Italy; he had then dashed off to Egypt. Russia joined the coalition, of which the other members were Austria,

England, and Turkey. A combined army of Russians and Austrians was to move into Italy, and Suvoroff was given the command; to his great joy it is said that England insisted on this appointment against the wishes of the Emperor Paul. The campaign was brilliant but unfortunate; Suvoroff defeated the French General Moreau and cleared most of the French out of Northern Italy. But he was in constant disagreement with the Austrian war council; his original and enterprising proposals raised their horror and alarm, and he found them such obstructionists that he was finally forced to part company and act alone. For this his force was too small. After bitter recriminations between Paul and the Austrian Emperor Francis, Suvoroff was ordered to take his army back to Russia; he made a famous march over the St Gothard pass in order to effect a junction in Switzerland with some reserves which were coming from Russia. Paul made peace with France in 1800.

In 1801 Paul fell a victim to a curious conspiracy formed by his own nearest friends. Ivanoff passes over the affair in silence. Other authors have stated that Paul, who was always despotic and capricious, had become quite abnormal; his friends must have noticed that he was growing worse and they decided that he ought to abdicate in favour of his son. A party of courtiers, headed by Count Palen and Orloff, forced their way into his bedroom at night and placed their demands

before him; they had no intention of using violence or murdering him, but Paul turned on them with angry reproaches and threats. It is not clear how the affair went, but Paul was killed on the spot.



## LIST OF EVENTS—CHAPTER III

A. D.

- 1801-1825. Alexander I.
  - 1805. Campaign of Austerlitz.
  - 1807. Campaign of Friedland. Peace of Tilsit.
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## CHAPTER III

### RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

14. ALEXANDER I. was the beloved grandson of Catherine II., who personally superintended his education and selected for him a Swiss tutor named Lagarp who had great influence over the early life of the young prince. Lagarp was a liberal-minded man, widely read and with strong views on the duties and responsibilities of a monarch. On coming to the throne, Alexander formed the "Intimate Committee" which was a sort of informal Privy Council; the four members of it were young and active statesmen, and though the Committee only lasted for three years it carried out some wide reforms. The old system of so-called "Colleges" which had transacted Government business was reformed into ministries which corresponded to the ministries in England: Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, War, Admiralty, Justice, Finance, Commerce and Education. Education received special attention and much money was spent on it. The most remarkable of the assistants of Alexander was the celebrated

Speransky. The son of a priest, he was first a school teacher and then became a clerk to a member of the Senate; his capability and application soon brought him to notice and he was quickly promoted, and for six years he acted as a sort of unofficial prime minister. He worked out many projects for reform, but before they could be carried out he lost his position, and his reforms actually amounted to very little. He was an ardent admirer of French literature and French methods, and his projects were based on the "Code Napoleon"; he had so much connected himself with the French that when Napoleon threatened war in 1812 he fell into disfavour and was abruptly dismissed.

15. THE FIRST FRENCH WARS.—The early years of Alexander's reign were spent in continual warfare. Soon after his accession a treaty was made with France, in 1802, but it could not be lasting, and as Napoleon became more and more aggressive a new coalition was formed against him. Napoleon had dreamed dreams of the invasion of England; he had collected a magnificent army in the camps round Boulogne; through his telescope he had gazed longingly at the white cliffs of Dover. But he had to admit the impossibility of realising his hopes. With his usual abrupt energy he turned his forces to another direction, made a wonderful march across France into Bavaria and caught the Austrians only

half prepared. Within five weeks from his move from Boulogne he had surrounded and captured at Ulm a force of some 80,000 men under General Mack; he then pushed on to Vienna. The Emperor Francis had appealed to Russia for help and a Russian army was marching to his assistance, but it was too late even to make a fight for Vienna. The Austrians evacuated their capital and moved northwards, joining the Russians 60 miles to the north. Alexander himself was with his army; the two emperors now decided to give battle to the invader. Napoleon had entered Vienna in triumph and then followed up the Austrians. After a few minor engagements the decisive battle took place at Austerlitz on 2nd December 1805. On a cold and misty morning the two armies faced each other, a valley lying between them. Napoleon's tactics were characteristic; by a clever feint on his right he succeeded in enticing the allied left wing down into the valley; as the "sun of Austerlitz" dispersed the morning fog he realised that the allies had left a weak spot between their left wing and centre; he flung his strong reserves into this fatally weak gap and thereby broke the enemy's front and achieved a great tactical victory. The allies' losses were heavy in men and guns, still heavier was the loss of prestige. Napoleon seemed to be irresistible, and the Russians and Austrians felt compelled to make peace. Napoleon next turned against Prussia and



had even more brilliant successes. In the decisive battle of Yena (1806) he routed the Prussian army and proceeded to overrun the country. Alexander again hastened to the rescue, but was again too late. Napoleon entered Berlin, behaved with extreme harshness to the Court, and forced the Prussians into an unwilling alliance with himself. Then he moved on to attack the Russians. Near the western frontier of Russia two bloody battles were fought at Eylau and Friedland; the first was indecisive, the second was another tactical victory for Napoleon. Alexander suggested peace, and a historic meeting was arranged on a raft on the river at Tilsit. The result was a peace in which Alexander acknowledged Napoleon as Emperor of France; he also pledged his country to join Napoleon's "continental system," the object of which was to prevent English goods entering the continental markets, and so to ruin the "nation of shopkeepers." Alexander seems to have been completely fascinated by the personality of Napoleon, and for some time cherished the warmest admiration for him; but this feeling was by no means shared by the Russian nation.

The next few years were occupied with wars against Sweden and Turkey. They dragged on without important features. In the end Russia obtained Bessarabia in the south and the whole of Finland in the north.

*The Moscow Campaign.*—All these wars

shrink into insignificance in comparison with the mighty campaign of 1812.

After his brilliant achievements in Austria and Prussia, Napoleon had lost his head; his stupendous conceit could not brook the slightest opposition, and such opposition was all the more galling if it in any way favoured his one unconquerable enemy, England. Alexander had bound himself to the continental system, but his people did not observe the terms of the treaty; they needed English goods, and England was the best market for their own raw material. The trade, therefore, continued, and Alexander soon permitted it tacitly. English goods passed through Russia into Austria and Prussia; Russian merchants were doing a roaring trade. At the same time there were other causes of disagreement, and Napoleon decided that he must decisively crush Russia.

He collected, in East Prussia, the biggest organised army the world had ever seen—over half a million of men. In June he began his march of 600 miles to Moscow. The Russians could only muster 200,000 men for immediate opposition, and their general, Barclay de Tolly, withdrew without giving battle. Napoleon's advance was not as rapid as he had intended; his army was so large that it had to be divided up into three separate commands, and he could not personally superintend every movement as had hitherto been his invariable custom. His subordinate commanders, especially his brother

Jerome, were unaccustomed to act on their own initiative, and nervously awaited his detailed instructions. The result was a good deal of unnecessary delay, which enabled the Russians to make an orderly retreat, fighting only a few rearguard actions. This strategic retirement, however, did not please the nation and the army; Barclay de Tolly was unpopular, and was obstructed by Prince Bagration, the commander of the southern wing, who disliked and envied him. Alexander had to give way to the general discontent and appointed Kutusoff supreme commander-in-chief. The new commander was popular and energetic, but when he recognised the situation he was forced to admit the soundness of Barclay de Tolly's strategy, and he continued to retire. Only the increasing discontent of the nation and the definite orders of Alexander forced Kutusoff to give battle. At Borodino, 60 miles west of Moscow, a battle was fought on 26th August. Prince Bagration, commanding the left wing, was killed. The Russians extol, as heroes of the day, Ermoloff, Barclay de Tolly, and Osterman. The losses on both sides were heavy. Military critics are of opinion that Napoleon was not in his best form and did not use his reserves with his usual resolution. The Russians stood fast all day against the French attacks, but Kutusoff resolved not to continue the battle, and on the next day continued his retreat. Moscow was evacuated without further fighting.

Napoleon, having reached the ancient capital in the very heart of the country, considered his victory complete and fully expected Alexander to sue for peace; he waited, however, in vain. The country was thoroughly aroused, and the Emperor not only made no proposals himself, but he absolutely forbade Kutusoff to enter into any negotiations, however favourable.

The halt in Moscow was fatal to Napoleon; his army looted the town, and as a natural consequence lost its discipline; supplies were wasted and the French were threatened with starvation. Napoleon could not believe in the resolution of Alexander, and from day to day sat awaiting proposals of peace. After a whole month of inaction he lost all patience and himself sent emissaries to Kutusoff who, however, refused even to receive them.

The Russians in the meantime had increased their forces, and moving round the south of Moscow began to act against the French lines of communication. The bitter Russian winter was coming on, and at last Napoleon, in furious exasperation, was obliged to order a retreat. It is said that in his rage he gave orders that the walls of the Kremlin were to be blown in; the explosion for some reason or other did not come off, but the rumour of the attempt was widely spread and added to the determination of the Russians.

The story of the historic retreat is well known. The frosts began earlier than usual, and between cold and hunger the French lost

thousands every day. The Kossacks and Russians hung on to their flanks and rear. The French army was now a mob, every man acting for himself and selfishly seeking his own safety; even the wonderful Imperial Guards lost all signs of its discipline; only a small rearguard, under the heroic Ney, maintained some degree of order, and from time to time faced the enemy. Napoleon himself left his army and fled to Paris. Out of 500,000 men who had entered Russia only some 40,000 ever came out again. More than all, Napoleon's reputation for invincibility had received a staggering blow and the nations who had long endured his tyranny now rushed to arms again. Prussia led the way; Sweden, with Napoleon's former marshal, Bernadotte, as its newly elected king, attached itself to Prussia and Russia. Napoleon hastily gathered a raw army in France and moved into Prussia again to retrieve his fortunes. He had some successes, but then the Austrians joined his other enemies and the odds against him became too heavy. He began to retire, but was forced to give battle at Leipzig, and after a three days' struggle he received a crushing defeat. Leipzig is considered one of the decisive battles of the world.

Napoleon was forced to defensive strategy in his own country. The allies on a wide front entered France. On the north were the Swedes under Bernadotte; in the centre the Prussians under Blucher; farther south the

Russians and Austrians; on the Spanish frontier the English, after their long campaign in the Peninsula, had beaten the French badly at Vittoria and were following up their success on the French soil. Napoleon, in his desperation, performed wonderful feats of strategy which have been the admiration of all critics of war; but the forces against him were overpowering and he had to abdicate. The allies entered Paris and concluded peace.

In 1815 Napoleon again broke loose, and the alliance was again formed against him; the Russians sent an army westwards, but it did not arrive in time to take part in the final campaign of Waterloo.

In the last part of the reign we find an entire change of politics and change of character in Alexander. He was a man of highly-strung temperament, and under the influence of Lagarp and Speransky he had been full of enthusiasm and energy; but the defeat at Austerlitz, where he himself had witnessed the rout of his army, had left an impression which was deepened by the horrors of the Moscow campaign. He was mentally worn out and sought for peace and quiet. He thought that order could be restored to the country by reverting the old order of things, and his policy was therefore reactionary and repressive. In hopes of keeping the Poles quiet he had given them a degree of Home Rule which was for those days a liberal measure; but the Poles are as fond of a grievance as an Irishman, and their new

Parliament was the theatre of "stormy scenes" which quite disenchanted Alexander. The bright dreams of his early youth were dispersed, and there were no more reforms in his reign.

In order to obtain personal peace he took refuge in solitude and in a mystical form of religion. Legend says that even in 1812 he had called in a monk called Avel who was supposed to possess the gift of prophecy. This monk foretold the entry of the Russians into Paris and thus strengthened the resolution of Alexander not to treat with Napoleon. In 1815 he was much influenced by a certain Baroness Krudener who was an advanced mystic. Sceptics were of the opinion that she was a tool of the wily Austrian diplomatist Metternich. There seems to be no doubt that she persuaded Alexander to enter Metternich's scheme of the Holy Alliance, which was founded between Austria, Prussia, and Russia; its objects were to oppose any further outbursts by the unsettled French, and also to suppress any revolutionary or even progressive movements in their own.

Alexander had no sons and his two daughters had died in childhood. The natural heir was therefore his brother Constantine; but this brother had made a morganatic marriage and renounced all claims to the throne. The succession, therefore, fell to his younger brother, Nicolas I.

The extent to which Russia was engaged in

the Napoleonic wars may be roughly seen from the following list of them :—

- 1796. Campaign of Rivoli; in Northern Italy. Russia not engaged. Against the Austrians.
- 1798. Suvoroff's campaign in Northern Italy. The Russians in alliance with Austria. This was not really a "Napoleonic war," as Napoleon himself was at the time in Egypt.
- 1800. Campaign of Marengo in Northern Italy. Russia not engaged. Against the Austrians.
- 1805. Campaign of Austerlitz. Russia in alliance with Austria.
- 1806. Campaign of Yena. Against the Prussians. Russia took no part.
- 1807. Campaign of Friedland. Russia alone against Napoleon.
- 1809. Campaign of Wagram. Against the Austrians. Russia took no part.
- 1812. Campaign of Moscow. Russia alone.
- 1813. Campaign of Leipzig. Russia was really at the head of the allies, Austria, Prussia, and Sweden.
- 1814. Campaign in France. As in 1813.
- 1815. Campaign of Waterloo. Russia mobilised, but was not in time to take part.

This list includes all Napoleon's campaigns



except Egypt (1798) and the Peninsula (1808-1814). Out of the eleven campaigns Austria took part in seven, Russia in six, Prussia in four. But the campaign of Moscow was the turn in the tide of Napoleon's career; the allies no longer feared him as before and the French had lost a good deal of their confidence. The Russians consider that they were the real conquerors of Napoleon and the saviours of Europe.

16. It was those wars which brought Russia into the circle of European politics. Up till nearly the end of the eighteenth century Russia was almost as unknown and inaccessible as the Arctic Circle is to-day. It was a difficult country to travel in; Moscow is 600 miles from any frontier and Petrograd is 400; there were no paved roads. The Russians talked their own language and no other; it is interesting to note that the Russian word for a German is Nyemetz, which means a "dumb man"; in bygone days the simple Russians had met on their western frontier strange people who could not talk a comprehensible language and had dubbed them "the dumb men," which name has stuck to them even unto this day. Only a very few Russians had ever travelled abroad.

But during these great wars Russian armies had been marching through Austria, Prussia, Italy, and France. They had seen new nations, heard new languages, and become

accustomed to travel ; in society it became the fashion to talk French ; the celebrated authors Pushkin and Lermontoff knew English and were much influenced by English authors, especially Shakespeare, Byron, and Walter Scott. The Russians had seen the overthrow of the French kings and of the upstart line of Napoleon ; they had discussed constitutions, had talked of freedom, and had compared themselves with other states. Peter I., the Great, had given them the first rousing which shook them out of their old groove, but that was rather a spasmodic movement, and they only had his word for the superiority of Western civilisation ; now they had seen that civilisation with their own eyes, and the effect of this widening of their horizon was distinctly progressive.

But there was another effect in exactly the opposite direction. Alexander I. and Nicolas I. were both amiable personalities, and they had some liberal-minded ministers ; each in turn had projected some reforms, but each was thoroughly frightened by the upheavals in France, and honestly sought to save Russia and the Russian dynasty from similar fates.

Nicolas I. was especially reactionary. Ivanoff says :—

“ In his relations with Western Europe the fundamental principle of the Emperor was war against the revolutionary movement. He strove to support power wherever it existed, to strengthen it where it was weak, and to defend it when open attacks were made

upon it. When the July revolution broke out in France (1830) Nicolas fully intended to send an army into Western Europe to restore the tottering governments which had been set up; it was only domestic troubles in Poland which frustrated this intention."

17. THE TURKISH WARS.—We have seen that it was the French wars which brought Russia into touch with Continental Europe; it was, however, the Turkish question and Turkish wars which brought her into touch with England. These were three in number:—

1. The war of 1828; Russia was in alliance with France and England—chiefly with the object of freeing Greece from the Sultan.
2. The Crimean war of 1854-55, in which France and England were on the other side.
3. The "war of liberation" in 1877-78.

These wars all aroused intense interest in England.

Of the first Ivanoff writes as follows:—

"Our relations with Turkey had important and complicated results. They began with disagreements which arose from the refusal of the Turks to observe the treaties they had made with us. At the same time the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula was convulsed by the insurrection of the Greeks against the Turkish rule. For some time the Greeks, left to themselves, were unable to wage the unequal war. They had two alternatives: first to submit again to the heavy yoke of servitude; second to put them-

selves under the protection of England, which, during the ministry of Canning, had begun to show them sympathy, but not, be it understood, without a considerable amount of self-interest. Nicolas I. arranged a treaty with England and France, by which the three powers decided to take on themselves the business of pacifying the East; this was known as the treaty of London. They offered to mediate: Turkey did not even reply. A second appeal had no result. Then the Powers sent their fleets against Turkey and burnt and destroyed the Turkish fleet at the naval battle of Navarino (1828). The Sultan called on the Mahomedan world to support him, and the war on land began in the spring of 1828. Crossing the Danube, our main army took in succession the Turkish fortresses, including Shumla and Varna; then moved through the Balkan mountains and occupied Adrianople, the second town of Turkey. The Sultan asked for peace; by the treaty of Adrianople, Greece finally obtained her independence. Certain advantageous terms were also obtained for Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia. The terms were moderate on the whole. 'Our moderation will close the mouths of the backbiters and will reconcile us with our own consciences'—so wrote the Emperor to his victorious general. But in spite of our moderation the jealousy of our late allies was easily aroused. Our successes had alarmed the experienced Metternich, and in England and France there was a silent but deep antagonism."

Russia had shown "moderation" in the peace terms, but the successes of her armies had rather turned the heads of the Emperor and his ministers; undoubtedly he looked upon himself as supreme in the East and began to take an interest in Constantinople. England

and France were alarmed, but France for the time being was occupied with her own affairs.

18. THE CRIMEAN WAR.—From a purely military point of view the campaign in the Crimea was an insignificant affair. It lasted only about a year; the forces on either side never amounted to over 100,000 men, and there were no outstanding achievements in strategy or tactics. But in spite of this it excited enormous interest throughout Europe; it was the first clash of arms between European powers since the final downfall of Napoleon, forty years before. And of course it marked a very definite stage in our relations with the mighty empire of the Tsar, and gave a strong anti-Russian tendency to all our policy for the next fifty years. It is therefore worth while to consider it.

We in England have never had any doubt that the whole matter arose out of the desire of Nicolas I. to become master of Constantinople. His own subjects were equally aware of his desire though it was not openly stated. He began by claiming that the Greek Church should have certain advantages over the Roman Catholics in Palestine, and he sent Prince Menshikoff to make demands to the Porte which the latter immediately granted. Menshikoff then put forward further demands, which amounted to giving to the Tsar a formal protectorate over all Christian subjects of

Turkey, and the Porte, prompted by England, refused.

On 2nd July 1853 Russian troops occupied the principalities on the northern bank of the Danube which are now known as Roumania; at that time they were under Turkey, and in October war was declared. But little action was taken at once. In October English and French fleets entered the Dardanelles. On 30th November the Russian Black Sea fleet destroyed a small Turkish squadron at Sinope. In February, England and France, as allies of Turkey, demanded the evacuation of the principalities, and in March they both declared war. Everything pointed to a campaign on the Danube, but at this moment the action of Austria created a diversion; the young Emperor, Francis Joseph of Austria, was understood to be very friendly to the Tsar, who had counted at least on his neutrality if not on his support. But Austria now showed distinctly hostile tendencies; 50,000 troops were massed on the frontier at points where they would seriously threaten the flank of any Russians who crossed the Danube. The Russians had already commenced the sieges of Silistria and Shumla, where a few Turks, aided by a very few English officers, were making a gallant stand. But in view of the threat from Austria these sieges were raised and the Russians retired northwards out of the principalities. Austria never declared war, and took no further part in the operations.

But meanwhile the English and French had mobilised troops and collected fleets of transports, and the Governments decided that they would put an end to the Russian menace, once for all, by destroying the Russian Black Sea fleet and the big arsenal and dockyard of Sebastopol. It was felt that this would cripple any Russian advance for many years to come.

The allied forces of England, France, and Turkey therefore made a landing on the west coast of the Crimea, about 25 miles north of Sebastopol, on 18th September 1854.

The British forces only amounted to 25,000 men, but were gradually increased till they were 30,000. The commander-in-chief was Lord Raglan, a veteran who had lost an arm at Waterloo. Most of his staff and his regimental officers were on service for the first time, and had been brought up to the methods of the Napoleonic days. They have been severely censured for the miseries of the first six months, while, on the other hand, their friends maintained that the fault lay entirely with the War Office and Government; so strong was the feeling in England that Lord Aberdeen and his Ministers were forced to resign in January 1855 and were succeeded by Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and others.

The one successful feature of the opening stages was the action of the British navy; our ships were better and more numerous

than those of the other allies, and the transport work, in spite of bad weather and bad harbours, was on the whole good.

The French began with 25,000 men and later on had up to 80,000. Their first commander-in-chief was St Arnaud, who died of cholera soon after the landing; he was succeeded by Canrobert, who resigned the command in May 1855 to the more resolute Pelissier.

The Turks supplied a contingent of 8000, under Omer Pasha. Later on the Sardinians joined the other allies and sent an army of 20,000 men.

Against these the Russians had a garrison of 35,000 in the strong fortress of Sebastopol and a field army of 25,000. Prince Menshikoff was in command of the whole, but the best known name in connection with the siege is that of Todleben. This was a young colonel of Engineers, only thirty-six years of age, who, by his indomitable energy and skill, inspired the defenders and caused infinite annoyance to the allies.

Todleben himself wrote an account of the campaign many years later. Both in facts and opinions it differs very materially from the works of the English authors, Kinglake and Hamley; but in those days the collection of information was by no means an exact science, and it is probable that a good deal of exaggeration crept into both sides, coloured, of course, by national sentiment.



On 18th September 1854, the allies had completed their landing and begun their march southwards towards Sebastopol. On the 20th they met the Russians, who had taken up a strong position on the south bank of the River Alma, and after a tough battle the allies were completely victorious and drove the Russians from the field. The English lost 2000 men, the French 1300, and the Russians put their own losses at 5700.

The harbour of Sebastopol is formed by a deep creek about four miles long and over half a mile across. The town, docks, arsenal, and barracks were all on the south shore, but the forts extended all round the harbour. The allied generals decided that an attack on the forts on the north side would be expensive, and even if successful would not give them complete possession of the more important southern shore. They therefore marched right round and established themselves on what was known as the "Upland," on the south of the town, and there the troops were camped for over a year. The British had the tiny harbour of Balaclava as their base, while the French used Kamiesh Bay.

Menshikoff closed the mouth of the harbour by sinking ships in it; he left a strong garrison of 35,000, to hold the forts and town, and then with a field army of about 25,000 men he marched off to the north-east in order to keep open communications with Russia, and to worry the allies by operating in the open.

It was this force which fought the celebrated battle of Balaclava on 25th October. The English had employed nearly all their men in the trenches against the town, and had only left a small garrison to guard their base seven miles away. Menshikoff therefore sent a force to cross the Tchernaya and make a dash for Balaclava. As soon as the formidable nature of the attack was seen, Lord Raglan ordered troops from the Upland to march to meet it. The cavalry, of course, were the quickest on the scene, and they were ordered to charge with a view to recovering some ground which had been lost, and holding the enemy till our infantry could come up. Lord Lucan, who commanded the Cavalry Division, and Lord Cardigan, who commanded the Light Brigade, had misgivings about what they were expected to do, especially as the written order of Lord Raglan was rather vague; but Captain Nolan, the aide-de-camp who carried the order, was insistent that the commander-in-chief wanted the attack at once, and so the famous charge was made. But it was a mere handful of cavalry, 600 strong, charging into a force of all arms, and could only end in a retreat, after a few of the Russian gunners had been cut down. The Light Brigade lost 247 men and about 500 horses. But the Russians had failed in their attack on our base.

On 5th November Menshikoff made one more attempt with his field army; on this occasion he also used part of the garrison,

which was to sally out and join the field force at a point known as Mount Inkerman, near the north-east corner of the Upland. It was a badly fought battle as far as the various generals were concerned: the Russians did not time their junction properly, and so attacked "piecemeal"; the English had no scouts to bring them information and half the troops stood looking on expecting other attacks, while one weak division, only 3000 strong, stood against 15,000. But the faults of the staffs were redeemed by the gallantry of the ranks; on a narrow strip of ground, covered with rocks and scrub, the infantry masses fought on a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, and the British lasted out against heavy odds until the French came up to their assistance and the Russians were then beaten back. The English lost 2400; the French 900; the Russians nearly 12,000.

This was the last offensive movement of the Russians, and from that time the campaign consisted of siege operations. But for the next four months the position of the allies was very precarious from various causes: cholera had been devastating the camps, and in December there were 8000 men down with disease, while the health of the remainder was very bad; the ground on the Upland became a quagmire, and a hurricane swept away nearly all the tents and sank twenty-one of our vessels in Balaclava, with all their precious stores.

The Emperor Nicolas is supposed to have said that he had at least two good generals to fight for him—*Janvier* and *Février*—and there is no doubt that the British army found them the most deadly of their foes. In February the sick amounted to 14,000, while on the Upland we had only 11,000 men fit to carry arms. But fortunately for us the French had received reinforcements which brought them up to over 70,000, and they were able to take over part of our trenches and give our men a little relief. And the nation in England had grasped the situation; the Secretary for War had been writing severe letters to Lord Raglan about the failures of his staff, but his replies were so strong that the matter was taken up in Parliament, and what amounted to a vote of censure on the Government was carried with a majority of 157 on 26th January. The Cabinet resigned, and Lord Aberdeen was replaced by Lord Palmerston, who took wide measures to relieve the sufferings of our men. Hospitals received special attention, and the name of Miss Florence Nightingale will be forever remembered for the wonderful work which she and her assistants carried out. The Upland was converted into a huge camp of huts; a proper transport corps was organised for the distribution of supplies, the rations were increased and improved; by April the army had regained its health and its fighting efficiency.

Meanwhile the siege operations had been

carried on vigorously on both sides. The Russians had as many men as they pleased to use for garrison and engineering work; and though their forts and batteries were often knocked to pieces by the allied bombardment, they were always rebuilt again within twenty-four hours by the energetic Todleben. There was a continuous warfare of mines and counter-mines. The first intense bombardment by the allies was made in April, and is said to have caused 6000 casualties in the crowded Russian trenches; it lasted ten days, but no assault followed. On 7th June the new French commander-in-chief, Pelissier, planned an attack to capture the Russian advanced works, including the important Fort Mamelon, and after severe fighting in which the fort was taken, re-taken, and then finally taken and held, the Russians were driven back to their main line of defences. The Russians believed that this assault was intended to capture the whole fortress, and claimed a victory because they had only lost some advanced posts. Be that as it may, they were undoubtedly the victors when the next assault was made on 18th June; the allies' troops attacked in strength but gained no permanent footing anywhere, and were driven back with a loss of 5000 men. Lord Raglan, whose health had been failing, was much distressed over this failure and he died on 26th June; he was succeeded by General Simpson.

On 15th August the Russians made one

more attempt to attack the allies from outside, in the direction of Balaklava; but the allies were now well entrenched and the attack never really developed. The intense bombardment began again on 5th September, and on the 8th the final assault was made; the French with great gallantry captured the Malakoff, which was the most important of all the forts as it commanded most of the others. The other attacks had only partial success. The French lost 7500; the English 2300; the Russians nearly 13,000. Even before this the Russians had realised that their position was hopeless and had built a bridge across the harbour with a view to withdrawing to the northern shore. The loss of the Malakoff redoubt finally decided them; they blew up their arsenals, sank their remaining ships, and evacuated the town.

The allies were now masters of the town which they had set themselves out to conquer, but it was difficult to see what was to be done next. The Russians had a large army on the northern shore, and could make a fighting retreat to the north as far as the allies chose to follow them. The roads were bad, and the Russian winter was again coming on; the military commanders, including even the energetic Pelissier, felt that further fighting might only lose the great moral advantage they had already won. So Russia had lost heavily; in the Crimea alone the casualties amounted to 150,000, while in the interior of Russia

hundreds of thousands had died from disease and exhaustion on the line of march.

Both sides, therefore, were willing enough to arrange an armistice, which was followed by the Treaty of Paris, signed on 30th March 1856.

19. ALEXANDER II., THE LIBERATOR.—Alexander II. came to the throne on the death of his father in the middle of the Crimean War, and he had to see it through. After that followed a period of peace and reform. But for the sake of convenience it is as well to finish the story of the Turkish wars and to consider the war of 1877, though it did not take place till nearly the end of the reign.

The successes of Russia in 1828 had aroused the distrust of England of the growing power of Russia; in the Crimean War this distrust had broken out into open opposition; in the next war, though we took no part in the operations, our sympathies were all on the side of the Turks.

The real causes of the third war belong to the pages of secret diplomacy, and would be interesting if they were ever revealed. The causes openly put forward by Russia for the declaration of war are thus described by Ivanoff:—

“At the end of the Crimean War the Turkish Porte had undertaken not to suppress its Christian subjects, and to give them equal rights with the Mahommedans. But in spite of these promises the

position of the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula did not change for the better. Finally, in 1876, various oppressions provoked a revolt of the Slavs inhabiting two Turkish provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the following year, Montenegro and Serbia joined in the rising. This effort for freedom appealed to the sympathy of all Russia. In spite of heroic resistance the Serbs could not hold out, and only the interference of the Emperor Alexander II. prevented the Turks from wreaking the most cruel vengeance. An armistice was declared between Serbia and Turkey. But even after this the Turks continued their excesses; they suppressed an attempted uprising in Bulgaria, and began to carry out wholesale massacres of the unhappy population. The Emperor wished, at all costs, to help the Slavs of the Balkans, but he did not want to resort to arms, and hoped to arrange matters by diplomatic conversations. At his request a conference was assembled in Constantinople, consisting of delegates from the European Powers, with a view to present certain demands to the Sultan. These demands called on the Sultan to carry out reforms which would lead to better relations between Turkey and the Slav subjects. Instigated by England, Turkey rejected these demands, after which war became inevitable."

In England the matter became a question of party politics. The Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Beaconsfield, looked upon the Russian sympathies for suffering Christians as high-faluting hypocrisy; he believed that the Emperor's object was to take Constantinople and extend his empire over the whole of the Balkans; this would enormously increase Russia's population and wealth, and would give her a position on the Mediterranean which



would threaten the Suez Canal and our communication with India. His policy was therefore to strengthen Turkey and maintain the balance of power. Mr Gladstone, being in opposition, naturally took the opposite view. With all his eloquence he appealed to humanity to assist the suffering; he wrote a stinging brochure on the "Bulgarian Atrocities" which created much interest in Russia; he accused Beaconsfield of cynical materialism, and based his own position on the principle of freedom, and so forth. Beaconsfield scarcely took the trouble to argue whether the Emperor was honest or not; he based his position on the simple principle that a strong Russia was a definite threat to the British Empire, and therefore he literally put his money on Turkey.

It seems probable that these two English statesmen were both right and both wrong. The Emperor honestly sympathised with the sufferers; the excesses of the Turks were enough to arouse the horror of anybody. But at the same time his hopes of Constantinople as the reward of his humanity were not without effect.

The story of the war is soon told. The Russians crossed the Danube without difficulty in the year 1877, and pushed forward their advanced guards right up to the crest of the Balkans on the Shipka Pass. Then a curious development took place. Osman Pasha, with a Turkish detachment, shut himself up in Plevna, which was dangerous to the Russian lines of

communication; he entrenched himself with extraordinary skill, and his methods seem to have foreshadowed the modern trench warfare. The Russians attacked in mass formation and were thrown back with heavy losses; twice again they repeated their mass attacks and suffered so heavily that they were forced to recognise that the mud walls of Plevna were impregnable; they, therefore, surrounded it and proceeded to starve it out. After an heroic defence of four and a half months Osman Pasha's supplies were exhausted; he made one desperate attempt to cut his way out, but failed, and had to surrender with the remains of his army. Once this obstacle was overcome the Russians had not much difficulty; they made a skilful crossing over the Balkans and pushed the Turks back to within eight miles of Constantinople. The Sultan saw no hopes of saving his capital and sued for peace.

The Emperor was loath to abandon the fruits of his hard-won success; but England and Austria threatened to join Turkey, and the position in Russia was difficult; the nation was much disturbed at the heavy losses, which are said to have amounted to 500,000 men; the Russian generals were blamed by the public for useless sacrifices in front of Plevna; the army seems to have lost confidence in its leaders. Only the young General Skobelev, the "white general on the white horse," came out of the war with any credit or popularity. So the Emperor decided to accept a conference

which was assembled at Berlin under the presidency of Bismarck.

The Berlin Conference declared Serbia, Roumania, and Montenegro absolutely independent; Bulgaria was to be a principality under the suzerainty of Turkey. The Russians had to be content with the glory of having freed the smaller Balkan states, and got no territorial acquisitions; they laid the blame for this on England, in which, no doubt, they were quite correct.

The feeling throughout Russia was one of general discontent; the Government and the military party were disgusted with the outcome of the Berlin Conference; the populace was sullenly angry over what was considered the mismanagement of the war—and still more so from the fact that the great sacrifices had led to so little; the interest of the masses in the suffering Balkans evaporated when they found that they would get nothing out of the business for themselves. The popularity which the Emperor had gained by his many and bold reforms received a serious set-back. It was about this time that the Terrorists began to be formidable, and no doubt the general discontent added much to their numbers.

20. THE LIBERATION OF THE SERFS.—The Russian system of servitude called “Krepostnaia Zavisimost” had grown up in a peculiar way. In the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries, Russian colonists began to spread southwards towards the Black Sea. In order to populate the newly won regions, the poor peasants were at first encouraged to move down there and settle; these pioneers suffered from raids by their turbulent neighbours, the Tartars, and other nomad tribes of the steppes, but their agriculture prospered on the rich southern plains, and they found life easy on the whole. The movement became so popular that the northern states were becoming depopulated; the landowners were being ruined because they had no labourers left, and they could not pay their taxes. They appealed to the Government, and stern laws were passed forbidding the peasants to leave the estates on which they were born; in addition they were compelled to work so many days a week for the benefit of the landlord. Later on, laws were made to enable a landowner to transfer, or in other words to sell, his peasants to another landowner. This, of course, was practical slavery. A man's wealth was reckoned by the number of peasants he "possessed," and a young lady's dowry would be perhaps fifty peasants. It was not so bad as the American slavery of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, because individual slaves were not supposed to be sold; a whole village might be transplanted from one estate to another, but the families were not often broken up. Still it was slavery, and the abuses were so many and so obvious that reform had often been dis-

cussed. Catherine II. had dreamt of it, but bungled it. Alexander I. and Nicolas I. had made projects. Alexander II. finally carried them out. It was not, however, done in a hurry; there was the natural opposition from the landowners, and the Manifesto of Liberation was not published till 19th February 1861.

Other reforms in this reign were many. Town councils and district councils were established on something like English lines. Big changes were made in the procedure of law; hitherto all cases were heard in secret, and a peculiarity was that all the proceedings were conducted on paper; the prosecutor submitted a written statement of his case, the defendant replied in writing; the cases naturally dragged on for years, and there was no appeal. The law courts were now remodelled on a system like our own.

In 1874 a decree was issued enforcing universal military service. Since the time of Peter the Great recruits had been drawn entirely from the peasants and townfolk. Although Peter himself had imposed obligatory service on the upper classes, this had soon disappeared through the various exemptions which were granted to anybody who had influence at court. Service was for twenty-five years, which of course meant that the unfortunate recruit said goodbye to his family practically for ever; the service was hard, punishments were vicious. In fact, the

state of any army private was often much worse than that of a serf. In 1859 the period of service was reduced to fifteen years. In 1874 the whole system was changed. All the youths who attained twenty years of age formed "the class" of a year; a certain number, irrespective of rank, were chosen by lot to form the new batch of recruits; the remainder were free from service in peace time but were liable to be called up in case of war. Service with the colours was for only six years, after which the soldier was passed into the reserve for nine years.

Up to this time Russia had been far behind the rest of Europe in railways, telegraphs, and postal services. Railways were started by private companies, most of which at first went bankrupt through the dishonesty of their servants; but by the end of the reign some 12,000 miles were in running order. The postal and telegraphic services were brought well up to date. A fine service of river steamers was started on the Volga and other navigable rivers which abound in Russia. Much was done in the way of education.

*The Expansion of Russia.*—The inhabitants of the Caucasus had always given trouble, and constant small expeditions had to be sent against them. The situation was much the same as on our own north-west frontier of India; the mountaineers took refuge in their inaccessible mountains when regular troops approached and afterwards came out again

to raid and create disorder. Fortunately, however, one of their leaders called Shamleen managed to acquire power over all the scattered tribes, so when an army moved against him and took him prisoner the whole district submitted, and since then it has been reasonably quiet. This took place in 1864.

In this reign also great strides were made in Central Asia, and Russia gradually reached the boundaries which are shown on modern maps.

The inevitable Polish revolution took place in 1864, but was subdued without difficulty.

21. Alexander III. has been called the Peacemaker by his admirers; his reign was more peaceful than those of his predecessors. When he came to the throne the position of the country was not strong. The Berlin Conference had dealt hardly with Russia, and it was evident that the European Powers were united in looking on Russia with suspicion. The finances were in a bad way. The first effect of his father's reforms had worn off and the country was not happy.

The reign is remarkable for two movements: first, the financial reforms begun by Vishnegradsky and carried on by Witte; second, the rapprochement with France.

Count Witte was a really great financier; his detractors say that he raised the revenue chiefly through developing the sale of drink, which was a Government monopoly. To some

extent that is true, but there were other and daring financial operations which were very profitable. At the beginning of the reign there was a budget deficit of over £4,000,000 sterling, and constant loans were required to meet the expenditure, while the development of the country had to wait for want of cash. At the end of the reign there was a surplus of nearly £10,000,000, and money was being poured out on railways, harbours, and other aids of industry. The factories, mines, and oil-fields had increased their output to an enormous extent. And, more important than all from the national point of view, the industries were kept in Russian hands and worked with Russian capital. Up till 1880 the most lucrative business had been in the hands of the practical Germans, who were rapidly spreading their control in every direction; the conservative Russians could not compete with these enterprising and hard-headed foreigners. Alexander III. and Witte determined to put a stop to this German invasion; they imposed heavy duties on certain imports, gave liberal privileges to Russian firms, and encouraged the "Nationalist" movement. This was regarded by the malcontents as reactionary; they pointed out that even the first reformer, Peter the Great, had encouraged foreign mechanics and foreign industry, and they complained of the narrowness of Alexander's views. Count Witte boldly declared that the policy of Peter the



Great was no longer applicable ; two centuries previously Russia had been in a state of darkest ignorance and needed teaching in the most elementary subjects ; now, however, such teaching was easy to obtain if people had the energy to apply themselves ; it was not from ignorance that Russians failed, but from apathy and want of application. By keeping out foreigners, he wanted to force the Russians to develop themselves and their industries. His policy was therefore "Russia for the Russians."

It was partly due to a fear of a German industrial invasion that Alexander was brought into close friendship with France. The French have not the same instinct for pushing business connections into other countries, and he had no fears in this respect. At the same time there had been a treaty made in 1872 between Germany and Austria which afterwards grew into the Triple Alliance ; the guiding influence of this was first Bismarck and afterwards the Kaiser, William II. Alexander thought it was time to secure an ally in Europe. The French, in spite of their republicanism, love a fête with all the charming enthusiasm of their nature, and were delighted to show their beautiful capital in the most hospitable mood to their new friends. The Entente which has meant so much to the world was founded there in 1892. It was not till the next century that the personal influence and charm of King Edward VII. broke down the barriers

which had so long separated the British and French nations and completed that Entente of Powers whose loyalty to each other struck dismay into Germany in August 1914. But the policy of Alexander III. was quite clear even as early as 1893; he impressed it strongly on his son Nicolas, and it must be for ever placed to the credit of the latter that, in spite of German machinations and in spite of the strong influence of his German wife, he never wavered in his love for the Entente. If only he had known how to select ministers to give effect to his policy the history of the world would be written differently.

In 1891-92 there was a failure of the harvest which caused real famine and brought up again the agrarian problem. The Government was prepared to be very generous to the peasants, but insisted on keeping the control in its own hands; it encouraged the activities of the local zemstvos and gave them certain measures of self-government, but at the same time insisted that the local landowners and officials should exercise a guardianship over them. This to some extent appeased the peasants themselves, but only acted as an irritant to their leaders and agitators; these latter were afraid that the Government would gain in popularity and their own influence would be thereby diminished. The agitation, therefore, increased. All generosity was denounced as weakness and bribery, but at the same time the agitators demanded more.

This action of the Government was typical of all the reforms of this reign and the next. The needs of the people were carefully studied but their leaders were ignored ; this naturally put the leaders against accepting graciously the very reforms which they themselves had advocated. The fact is that both Witte and Stólýpin suspected the honesty of most of the leaders, and thought they were only using the agricultural problem as a means of stirring up discontent with a view to revolution. Their action, therefore, shows a curious mixture of generosity and tyranny which is extolled by one side and execrated by the other.

## EXPLANATIONS OF THE SKETCH OF THE CRIMEA.

1. The Allies (British, French, and Turks) landed about twenty-five miles north of Sebastopol on 18th September 1854, and moved southwards.

2. *20th September.*—The Allies attacked the Russians, who were barring the way on the River Alma, and drove them into Sebastopol.

3. *25th and 26th September.*—The Allies made a flank march round the east side of Sebastopol and bivouacked on the Upland. The British used Balaclava as their base, the French used Kamiesh Bay.

4. *25th October.*—Russians from the north-east crossed the River Tchernaya and tried to take Balaclava. Charge of the Heavy and Light Brigades. Russians driven off.

5. *5th November.*—Russians from the north-east again crossed River Tchernaya and attacked the bivouacks of the British near Mount Inkerman. Russians from inside the town assisted. Russians driven off after a bloody battle.

6. Regular siege operations were begun against the town. It was defended by many forts, including Fort Malakoff, Fort Mamelon, The Redan, Flagstaff Bastion, Central Bastion. Siege operations continued all winter.


7. *7th June.*—French capture Fort Mamelon.

8. *18th June.*—Unsuccessful assault of the forts by the Allies.

9. *28th June.*—Death of Lord Raglan, the British Commander-in-Chief.

10. *8th September.*—The final assault. Fort Malakoff, which was the key to the whole position, was captured by the French.

11. *9th September.*—The Russians evacuated the other forts and the town and crossed the harbour to the north side.



MAP OF THE CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN.





## CHAPTER IV

### THE STATE OF RUSSIA BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

22. To simplify the story as far as possible, the reign of Nicolas II. is considered in four separate chapters: the first deals with the general state of the country; the second with the bare events of the reign; the third with the revolutionary movement; and the fourth with the actual days of the Russian Revolution.

The first three chapters of this book are mostly extracted from the *History of Russia* by the celebrated Ivanoff; only a few additions have been thrown in from outside, chiefly regarding the Napoleonic and Crimean wars. Ivanoff was a learned and accurate author, but he wrote with an object; his work was the standard history for use in schools and universities, and his object was to educate good little boys to grow into loyal subjects of their Emperor. He was liberal-minded in his judgments, and was too careful a historian to mis-state facts, but undoubtedly he draws a veil of charity over anything that tends to show up the darker side of Tsarism. For



instance, he extols the energy and patriotism of Peter the Great and Catherine II., but leaves out "domestic details"; he gives at length the reforms of Alexander II. and Count Witte; but only half-a-dozen lines are devoted to the Nihilists, and there is no attempt to grapple with the revolutionary movement, no mention even of the facts; he did not want to draw the attention of young Russia to such things.

23. THE COURT. — The personality of Nicolas II. has been described many times. Those who knew him fairly well are agreed that he was not a strong character, but at the same time, like many weak men, he could be extremely obstinate. He had been brought up to look upon his throne as a divine inheritance which it was his duty to preserve and to hand on to his son; and therefore, though he hated public functions and affairs of State, he was very jealous of his autocratic powers. He was anxious for the good of his people, but when any reforms were pressed on him from outside he immediately became suspicious of them. His one strong feeling was his love for his son, to whom he was entirely devoted. Apart from this his qualities were mostly negative; he was shy, indolent, with no particular interests or amusements. He hated work. Officers who have had to put papers in front of him have told me that he rarely bothered to read them; he would ask the

officer what they were about, and then if the explanation were long, he would show signs of boredom; obviously he wanted to sign and get done with it. The following untrue story was current among the officers of his staff.

Once upon a time the Minister of Home Affairs brought for his signature a decree cutting down the number of new recruits; he began to explain that more peasants were required on the land. The Emperor cut him short, saying: "I agree with you; I quite agree," and signed. The Minister of War was waiting, and came in as the other went out; he put forward a scheme for *raising* the number of recruits by 100,000, and began to point out the necessities of the army; again the Emperor cut him short—"You are right; I agree with you entirely." At that moment the Empress, who as usual had been listening at the door of the study, called out that he must not sign two diametrically opposite decrees—Nicolas immediately turned to her and cried, "I agree with you; I agree."

It was probably due to this distaste for trouble that he never had a real friend; he had many loyal servants who were devoted to his interests, but those who were honest felt it their duty to talk plainly about such things as the influence of Raspoútin. Nicolas himself had no affection for Raspoútin, but it would have cost him trouble and hysterical scenes to get rid of the man; therefore it was less trouble to let him remain, and those of his

court who spoke plainly were met with peevish coldness. He seems to have had almost a fear of meeting some of them, like a spoilt child fearing a lecture. So they were either sent away or, rebuffed by his coldness, they gave up their efforts. And if he would not listen to his own relations and courtiers, still less would he pay attention to honest liberals like Gouchkoff and Rodzianke when they wanted to warn him of his danger. He thus became surrounded by people whose only ambition was to retain their own power, and who had made up their minds to make themselves agreeable regardless of the true interests of the Emperor and his country. There were a few exceptions; Witte and Stolypin were of the same mind as himself regarding the sacredness of the throne, so, being strong men, they were able to press on him some reforms. But the others left him in a state of ignorance which went on increasing; as matters grew worse even the second-rate men left him. In the end he was surrounded by a set of wilful liars—Sturmer, Sukhomlinoff, Protopopoff, and the like—who helped him to avoid all painful facts and kept him in complete ignorance, not only of the state of the nation, but also of their own machinations.

Such a Government was enough to provoke a revolution without any of the other causes which in this case contributed to it.

We see him, then, almost a recluse in his garden at Tsarskoye Selo—sometimes playing

with his children ; sitting long hours at dreary meals ; estranged from nearly all his relations ; shy and nervous with strangers ; wandering down the path of least resistance marked out by his wife and her favourites.

In 1894 he had married Princess Alice of Hesse, a great grand-daughter of Queen Victoria ; on her baptism into the Orthodox Church she took the name of Alexandra Feodorovna.

It was not a marriage of affection, and for the first ten years they had few interests in common. The Empress chose her own friends and spent her time in their society ; chief among them was an officer of the Guards who cared little for politics, and consequently she took small part in the affairs of State. In 1903, however, a complete change took place ; the officer had died, and her chief favourite became Anna Vyroubova. Then in 1904 her son Alexis was born ; both the parents were overcome by joy, and were brought together by their devotion to their heir. But this natural and laudable devotion had most unfortunate results for the State ; the boy was delicate from his birth, and his mother, in her anxiety over his health, resorted to any adviser who could give her comfort by working on her credulity and superstition. She had always had a strain of superstition ; it is said that in 1903 she had called in a French monk called Phillipe de Lyon to "suggest" that her unborn child should be a son. Later she gave

way to superstition to such an extent that it became sheer madness and brought her under the influence of a man like Raspoútin. It was brought about by Anna V ýroubova. This woman was the daughter of a court official, and had been a lady-in-waiting; she married a naval officer called V ýrouboff, but he divorced her after some unsavoury scandals. She remained on at court, and though she was neither attractive nor clever, she undoubtedly understood the weaknesses of her royal mistress and took advantage of them. Alexandra could not part with her for a moment; she had to sleep in the bedroom of the Empress to soothe her nervous insomnia; it is said that sometimes no one else would be admitted for days at a time. It was well known at court that a word from "la V ýroubova" could dismiss a minister, promote another, or banish a grand-duke. Such a woman, devoid of all morals, was a fit partner in crime for Raspoútin, and they played into each other's hands with an audacity which deceived nobody but the royal couple and a few hysterical madwomen.

24. RASPOÚTIN.—This brings us to the unpleasant history of Raspoútin. It is a real and important page of Russian history, and must be told if a clear idea is to be given of the court and of the feeling of society towards it. Scores of pamphlets have been published on the subject; most of them entering into disgusting and perhaps exaggerated

details. It is hard, however, to exaggerate the appalling iniquity of the man, a mixture of blasphemy and obscenity which seems at first incredible ; unfortunately it is true. The following account of him is the most mild of the versions, and even the most devoted monarchists admit that they cannot contradict it.

Gregoire Raspoutine was born in 1871, son of poor parents who lived in the village of Pokrovsk in Siberia. The family name "Raspoutine" means "tramp"; it had been given to his father or grandfather in the official records because they could give no other account of themselves. The two friends of his misspent youth were Striapcheff and a gardener called Barnabe. As a young man he was early in trouble with the authorities, and the village records show that he was flogged for perjury and for assaults on girls. A parish priest then reproved him, and, pretending to repent, he spent some time in a monastery where he learnt some jargon about religion, on which he afterwards based his blasphemies. He then left the monastery and posed as a wandering priest ; such persons are not uncommon in that superstitious country, where they are accepted as the fakirs are in India. By claiming inspiration and appealing to the superstition, Raspoutine acquired influence, especially over women ; he proclaimed himself as a faith healer, and then gave vent to his passions, preaching a theory that "Salva-

tion is in repentance, and the greater the sin the greater the repentance; if therefore we sin, we are preparing the way to that repentance."

One of his victims tried to avenge herself and his other dupes, and made an attempt to murder him; she succeeded in wounding him severely, but he recovered. The more sober peasants sent in formal complaints against him, but this only acted as an advertisement for him, and his fame spread, fanned by curiosity.

By some means he arrived in Petrograd and got introduced into the salons of the intriguers of the bureaucracy. Perhaps some of them were really carried away by his jargon of piety, others accepted him as a mystic of exceptional powers, others still availed themselves of the licence which he preached and practised; finally, even those who saw through his utter falseness decided to make use of him as a useful partner in their intrigues. Amongst the latter were "la Výroubova"; she became his mistress and confidante. She reported to the Empress his powers as a healer and he was received at court.

This, at least, was remarkable in the man that he could divine the human frailty of individuals, and he made the most of this gift, with a mixture of ambition, greed, and lust. He worked on the unfortunate Empress by playing on her love for her son; he posed before her as a saint of mystical and supernatural powers, and gained her complete confidence. He alone could soothe her nervous

feelings, and she found comfort in doing penance before him.

The scandals, however, reached such a degree that even the weak Emperor had to listen to his better advisers, and Raspoútin was ordered to leave the court. It is said that he departed calmly, saying that he knew that he would be recalled. And events proved that he was right. Soon after his departure the Tsarevitch became suddenly ill; it is impossible to say whether this was a coincidence or whether, as many assert, Raspoútin had concerted with Madame V́yroubova to arrange this convenient illness. The Empress became hysterical and demanded his return; he came back more powerful than ever.

His influence at court and his connection with Madame V́yroubova enormously increased his circle of devotees. His audacity became boundless. The stories of the orgies which he inaugurated in the houses of Petrograd are too horrible for repetition, but there is no doubt that they are true. He was undoubtedly the master of Russia; his enemies were exiled and persecuted—amongst them were the highest in the land. It is a fact that he played a considerable part in getting the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaevich deprived of the command of the army, because the Grand Duke would have none of his advice or his insolence. A comrade of his youth, the illiterate gardener Barnabe, was actually *consecrated a bishop*.



The Emperor himself had at first accepted Raspoûtin as a useful means of soothing the excitements of his wife, but later he found himself called upon to issue the most capricious orders at the wishes of the "holy father" and Madame Výroubova, and he was undoubtedly sick of the tyranny which this precious pair exercised through the Empress. He absented himself by taking refuge in the headquarters of the army, where he felt himself freer, and escaped from the unpleasant scenes which he hated. But there is not the least evidence that he had any knowledge of the final plot.

The plot against Raspoûtin was the work, not of revolutionaries but of the strongest supporters of the autocracy, who were sane enough to see that the scandals could not be suppressed. The English and French presses, careful not to mention anything that could hurt the feelings of our ally, were discreetly silent on a subject which was notorious throughout Russia. In the Douma there were public references to the "occult and sinister influences at court"; in society the question was discussed secretly but earnestly. It was obvious that no influence, no persuasion, could suppress the abominable power of Raspoûtin, and it was therefore decided by the friends of the monarchy that he must be done away with. The conspirators were headed by Pourichkévitch, an honest conservative; his chief associates were the Grand Duke Dmitri

Pávlovitch, cousin of the Emperor, and Prince Yoússoupoff, husband of a niece of the Emperor. On the 30th December 1916 Prince Yoússoupoff invited Raspoútin to a supper at his palace at which the best of the aristocracy would be present; the favourite fell into the trap. Whatever the details may have been Raspoútin was killed that night.

The Empress was in despair and tried her utmost to wreak vengeance on the conspirators. The Grand Duke Dmitri was exiled to Persia; Prince Yoússoupoff was banished from Petrograd. But the extraordinary infatuation had not been extinguished, and Alexandra looked for another supporter in her misery, and found a substitute for Raspoútin in the infamous Protopopoff. This man had originally been a radical member of the Douma; as a sop to the progressives he was made Minister for Home Affairs, but had then recognised that the power lay in the hands of the Empress and her favourites, and he made himself their creature. It is said that he even claimed to be a sort of reincarnation of Raspoútin and offered himself as a divine protector of the Tsarevitch. His power, however, was short-lived; in less than two months the regime to which he had sold himself was swept away and he found himself the most execrated of all the enemies of the revolution.

25. THE ROYAL FAMILY.—The near relations of the Emperor can best be seen

from the genealogical table. Few of them took any part in politics; in fact most of them spent their time abroad, either from preference or by order.

The brother of the Emperor, the Grand Duke Michael, made a morganatic marriage and was banished in consequence, but returned to Russia at the outbreak of the Great War. However blind the Empress might be to the scandals of her own circle, she was strict in her views regarding other people, and it was due to her that he had been sent away.

The Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaevich commanded the Guards before the war and was commander-in-chief of all the Russian forces during 1914 and 1915. He was a thorough soldier and a martinet. The idea that the Imperial Guards were a set of incompetent rakes is entirely an invention of the socialists, who assumed that any form of extravagance must be accompanied by incapacity. It is true that they were extravagant to a degree which would shock our susceptibilities in England, but it is not true that they were ignorant or lazy; I knew some scores of them personally, and found them capable, keen, and very highly educated. They were proud of their men, and there was much healthy competition between the various squadrons and companies. The Grand Duke sent incapables into retirement without mercy, and promotion went by merit.

As a commander-in-chief he was, of course,

much praised by the English and French presses. He was popular in the army, though at times he had bursts of very bad temper. It is difficult to imagine a commander in a more unfortunate position than his; the ministers of war had so mismanaged all questions of munitions, supplies, and transport, that he found himself, though with a large army at his disposal, constantly defeated by the better organised and better equipped Germans. The history of those years has yet to be told, it cannot be gathered from the bare records of the official communiqués; until the facts are known it is impossible to pass any judgment on the strategic ability of Nicolas Nicolaevich. He was a brave and honest soldier. His dismissal was due to court intrigue and not to any failures on his part.

The other relations of the Emperor do not call for mention.

The society of Petrograd was brilliant and charming. The first time I went out to dinner I sat next a lady who looked as if she thought of nothing except her clothes and her bridge parties, and I was prepared to condescend from the heights of British superiority. Conversation began in French; it goes without saying that she talked it like a Parisienne, while on my side it was French as she is spoke in an English public school. Madame saw that I was not very quick in the uptake and came to my assistance:—"Do give me a lesson in English, I have had no practice for ever so

long." It turned out that she spoke English perfectly and knew more about Shakespeare, Byron, and Macaulay than any English woman; she admitted with shame that she knew German equally well, but "only enough Italian to talk to a music master"; she had studied higher mathematics. British superiority was a little staggered. This is no exaggeration and no exception, and I do not know how it comes about: either they have much quicker minds than we have or else they have a far better system of education; they seem to have been taught everything except golf and fox-hunting. At the same time there are no spectacles or blue-stockings among them—very much the reverse.

The Russians are more musical than we are. In London there is one Opera House, and occasionally a travelling company wheezes out "Faust" or "La Bohème" in the Provinces. In Russia, every big town has its Opera, which draws crowded houses nearly all the year round, especially for their beloved Tchaikowsky.

26. THE PEASANTS.—The southern part of Russia is a rich agricultural country, but the science of agriculture requires education, experience, capital, and business instincts. The average landowner of fifty years ago was very deficient in all these respects, and deserves most of the abuse which has been heaped upon him. His education was much behind the times; experience had taught him a few

simple rules about the rotation of crops, and so on, but when times were bad or he wanted to raise some ready money he broke all rules and "took it out of the soil." He was recklessly extravagant, and so far from having any capital to invest in his property, he had generally mortgaged it for all he could get. If, in spite of his carelessness, a good year brought him in some cash, he often spent it in dissipation. A few of the richer landowners could afford to engage capable stewards who, in many cases, were Germans; they had good animals for ploughing and transport work, and especially if they were anywhere near a railway they made big fortunes. But railways were few, and other modern aids to agriculture, such as steam ploughs and threshers, were unknown, and the country was under-developed.

The socialists solved the problem by the simple formula, "Give the land to the peasants," and some experiments were actually made in this line; but first results were bad. The deficiencies of the landowner were exaggerated in the peasant; in a hurry to pay off his preliminary expenditure, he took it out of the soil. Sometimes he had cattle for ploughing, but often was reduced to scratching with a hand plough; after a bad year he had not enough grain left for sowing, and so got into the hands of the Jews. The question of transport was a tremendous difficulty. A few of the more experienced and hard-headed moujiks did well, but the majority were children in

regard to business; in a few years they had ruined their farms and told themselves they had had bad luck and had got a poor piece of ground.

The next experiments were made in "obshchienies"—the word means "communalities." The village was a self-governing community, and owned the ground round itself; but, in order to give the individual an interest in the ground, it was parcelled out into allotments. These allotments, of course, varied in value; a large village owned a wide extent of ground, and so some of the outlying allotments would be miles away, and the holders had to spend many hours daily in walking to and from their work. The question of transport to the distant allotments also made a great deal of difference in their values. Various schemes were introduced to overcome the difficulty. For instance, each man's allotment might consist of three or four small parcels of ground, one near the village, the others farther and farther away; this was a fairer distribution, but it was awkward for one man to work three or four widely separated patches. Then the holdings were allotted for a temporary tenure of so many years, after which there was a general redistribution; but this scheme was worst of all for, towards the end of his tenure, a peasant took it out of the soil and left his successor to make the best he could of it. In fact there was infinite vexation and discontent, and the "obshchienies" were not a success.

The Government, however, persisted in its efforts, and before the war great improvements had been effected. The chief among these were the railways, the Peasant's Bank, the "zemstvos."

The zemstvo is a co-operative society; it borrowed money from the Government at very easy rates and helped the small holders with implements and transport; in some cases it managed his business affairs and helped to do away with the Jew middleman; it worked the nursery gardens and gave out at very low rates, or even free, fruit and vine saplings. It established model farms and arranged agricultural shows for purposes of education.

With another officer I did a short motor tour in Bessarabia, and it did not require the eye of an expert to recognise that agriculture receives plenty of attention there. Every yard of the soil is either cultivated or under timber; vineyards and orchards abound and are carefully tended. The only obvious shortcoming was in the matter of roads; they are practically never metalled, and when we were overtaken by a thunderstorm our car stuck hopelessly in the rich mud. We were twenty miles from anywhere, and were reduced to spending the night in a peasant's hut. But, except for the fleas, we were very well off. There was a roaring fire at which we dried ourselves; the peasants were cheery, and in exchange for cigarettes they produced fresh eggs and milk, and we were soon on the best



of terms. Compared with some Irish huts it was clean, airy, and civilised.

It is generally admitted that Bessarabia is the most advanced province of Russia, but in other parts improvements were appearing before the war, and there are no doubt immense possibilities in the future.

In 1905 Great Britain received more wheat from Russia than from any other country in the world. The crop in Russia was just about equal to that of the United States. Great Britain paid to Russia £9,000,000 for wheat.

A Bessarabian landowner, who was evidently a man of business and had made a large fortune himself, told me that he calculated that the agricultural products of Russia could be easily doubled with a little more organisation.

Take it all round, the Russian peasants were not badly off and deserve less commiseration than other classes. They nearly always had enough to eat, except in very bad years; they are well housed, and have fires to keep them warm in winter; their clothes, though not too clean, are not rags; every peasant has his "touloup," a rough fur coat of sheepskin. It is true they work terribly hard in summer, but in winter, when the ground is frozen, they have plenty of time to themselves. Their amusements are few, and, it must be confessed, generally take the form of drink.

They cannot complain of neglect on the part of the Government; committees were

constantly sitting to consider reforms, and money was not grudged. A peasant could buy a farm for himself if he could produce about one-tenth of the price; the rest he borrowed at very low rates from the zemstvo. When a peasant failed it was generally from sheer lack of business instinct; it was not want of thrift, for they had none of the extravagance of the landowners, and sometimes they had a shrewd idea of striking a bargain; but they were desperately conservative and would not understand that modern implements soon repay the outlay. Though education is spreading they have still a long way to go in that respect.

The working classes in the towns naturally come more into touch with civilisation with its advantages and disadvantages. They were better educated than the peasants, but worse housed and worse fed.

Count Witte was the chief reformer in industry as Stólypin was in agriculture. Government inspectors were appointed, and some regulations were made about the hours of work, employment of children, and so on. There were frequent strikes, and the trades unions were evidently modelled on British lines. I was talking with a workman who was surprised at my fluency in the language because I understood what he meant by the words "strikebreaker," "lockout," and "boycott"; he had been under the impression that

these words, which he pronounced exactly as we do, were purely Russian.

During the war the prices of living rose and life was terribly hard for the factory hands. In January and February 1917 long queues of men and women stood in the snow outside the provision shops, and often waited in vain. It was the hunger of the masses that provoked the actual outburst of the revolution.

## CHAPTER V

### THE REIGN OF NICOLAS II.

27. SHORTLY after his accession on 17th January 1895, Nicolas II. received the representatives of the zemstvos and town councils, and in his speech he made a declaration of his policy: "Let everybody understand that I will devote all my energy to improving the state of the people, but will preserve the supreme power as firmly and unbendingly as my late father."

In the same month an extra sum of £70,000 was allotted for the development of parish schools, and much activity was shown in the educational department.

As one means of assisting the agriculturists Nicolas turned his attention to Siberia and the East, hoping to develop immense tracts of rich country, and thereby provide land for colonisation; this would relieve the more congested districts, and at the same time increase the production of the country. It was, of course, the Eastern policy which led to the war with Japan. A cartoon of the time shows the shade of Peter the Great appearing to

Nicolas II. to ask for the news. Nicolas says: "You opened the window to Europe; I am going to open one to the East." Peter replies: "Better shut it, my boy; a window on each side makes a devil of a draught."

The Boxer rising of 1900 gave Russia an excuse to demand certain concessions from the Chinese; Manchuria was occupied by Russian garrisons, and a Russian Governor was established in Mukden. The Japanese were afraid that the Russian forces would penetrate into Korea, and they determined to oppose such a movement. The Marquis Ito went to St Petersburg to endeavour to come to an agreement, but without success. Various treaties complicated the questions. In the first place, Japan in 1902 had made a treaty with England which provided that either nation should observe a strict neutrality if the other were attacked by one opponent, but should give assistance to the other if the latter were attacked by two or more Powers. Russia replied to this by making a similar treaty with France. These treaties very nearly gave rise to a general European war; the Chinese were longing to avenge themselves on Japan, and would have been willing to join Russia, but in this case England was bound to join the Japanese. This, in turn, would have forced France to take the other side, and the complications would have been unending. Russia was not anxious for this, and therefore, in order to allay the suspicions of Europe, "entered

into conversations with China, with a view of evacuating Manchuria," thereby, of course, meaning to do nothing of the sort.

The Japanese were too clever to be bluffed. They saw that in any campaign in the East Russia would be entirely dependent on the Trans-Siberian Railway. This railway had been carried through to Vladivostock, but was only a single line, and did not go round Lake Baikal. This entailed all the difficulties and delays of shipment across the lake. The Russians were busy on it, and had they been able to double the track and lay a line round the lake it would have made an enormous difference in the campaign. The Japanese therefore decided to force a decision before the work could be completed. In August 1903 they began to press for the evacuation of Manchuria; Russia tried to postpone matters by proposing spheres of influence and mutual concessions. But apparently the Russian General Staff must have been quite confident, for the attitude of the Government was strong. The Japanese now saw that it would come to a war, and therefore decided to have the war at once. In January 1904 they sent an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the Russian garrisons from Manchuria; it was firmly worded. Russia made no reply. The Japanese Ambassador left St Petersburg. There was no declaration of war, but both sides adopted the attitude of combatants.

Russia was quite unprepared; the bureau-

crats of St Petersburg could not believe that a small Asiatic nation would dare to take up arms against their mighty Empire. Even the departure of the Japanese Ambassador did not shake them out of their confidence. Not only had they made no general preparations for a difficult campaign, they did not even warn their forces of the possibility of danger.

In February, the Japanese destroyers began operations by attacking the Russian fleet in Port Arthur; many ships were sunk or disabled and the remainder were blockaded in the harbour; in the course of a few days Japan had complete command of the Eastern seas, and this enabled her to transport her army in perfect safety.

The Russians made an effort to delay the enemy on the Yalu, but were defeated. The shock of these two reverses on land and sea began to reveal the true state of affairs to Russia. The Japanese mobilisation and transport work was a marvel of practical forethought, and furnished many useful hints in preparing the British mobilisation regulations which worked so smoothly in 1914.

After the battle of the Yalu the Japanese, under Nogi, were able to cut off Port Arthur and proceed to a regular siege by land and sea.

At the same time the First Army, under Kuroki, turned northwards to face the Russians who were descending from Mukden to relieve Port Arthur. Operations were delayed on

both sides by the difficulties of manœuvring large forces in a mountainous country devoid of roads. The Japanese again showed their superiority in this, and were able to force a big battle at Lioyang, which lasted for several days in October 1904. Kuropatkin, the Russian general, was forced to retire on Mukden.

There was no longer any hope of relieving Port Arthur, and it was a question of how long it could hold out. General Stoessel capitulated in January 1905. In the fortress at that time there were 30,000 men fit for action and 15,000 sick and wounded. The Court of Inquiry which afterwards made an investigation into the circumstances recorded the opinion that the fortress might have held out longer.

The fall of Port Arthur was in itself a triumph for Japan and opened the way to further victories; the army of Nogi, which had been employed in the siege, was now free to reinforce Marshal Oyama and brought his force up to 320,000 men. Kuropatkin had 380,000, but they were inferior in organisation and equipment. Oyama attacked at Mukden, and the battle, which lasted fourteen days, ended in another victory for the Japanese.

The Russian nation was horror-struck; the Government naturally blamed the unsuccessful commander-in-chief, and Kuropatkin was relieved by Lienevich.

The sole remaining hope for Russia now lay



in the Baltic fleet. If this fleet could recover for them the command of the Eastern seas the Japanese would be cut off from their reinforcements and supplies, while the Russians could still get theirs by the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Government therefore despatched the Baltic fleet under Admiral Rodjestvensky on its long voyage round the Cape of Good Hope into Japanese waters.

But it was an effort of despair. To begin with, the ships were not of the latest types, and by the time they reached the East they were more fit to go into dry dock than into action. Admiral Togo met them in the Straits of Tsushima in May 1905, and in the course of a few hours gained a decisive naval victory.

From this moment Russia could have no hopes of retrieving the situation. At the same time the Japanese had been forced to tremendous efforts to contend with their big enemy, and their reserves were not inexhaustible—in fact, though they had by far the best of things up to this moment it was hard to see how they could deal a decisive blow. Both sides, therefore, were not unwilling to accept the mediation of President Roosevelt of the United States. In August 1905 the peace delegates assembled. Count Witte represented Russia; on 5th September peace was signed. Russia had to give up Port Arthur, Dalny, and half of the island of Saghalien. Manchuria was evacuated and given back to China.

28. At the beginning of the war, when the first news was received of the sudden attack on Port Arthur, it was generally believed that this was a quite unjustifiable move on the part of the Japanese, and, except in the extreme revolutionary circles, there were outbursts of patriotism and sympathy towards the Emperor. But this feeling began to wear off; it gradually became evident that the Government had rushed into the war in the most light-hearted manner, without appreciating the heavy task before it. The defeats of the army followed one upon another, and the Russian exchange was falling quickly in the European bourses. Serious people first tried to suggest reforms, and they openly urged that the Emperor must take the nation into his confidence if he expected national support.

The Government recognised that concessions must be made and some liberal decrees were issued, chiefly regarding the relaxation of the censorship and the liberty of public meetings.

Meanwhile the revolutionaries naturally made the most of the unpopularity of the Government and became very active. In June 1904 the Prime Minister, Pleveh, was assassinated. In the autumn of the same year a priest called Gapon became famous in St Petersburg; he is now believed to have been a secret agent of the police; at the time he advertised himself as a leader of the masses. A general strike of the working classes was organised, and in January 1905 the strikers

marched to the Winter Palace to present a petition; riots followed, and the Guards fired on the mob, killing and wounding over 2000 persons. This tragedy, combined with the fall of Port Arthur which had just occurred, struck despair into all classes. Nicolas II. was horrified, and himself headed the subscription list which was opened for the sufferers from the riot.

Even Count Witte, strongest of supporters of the autocracy, felt that a constitution must be given, and began to work out schemes for the Douma. This was to be a Lower House of Parliament; the Upper House was to consist of the Senate, which was already in existence, but from this time half the members were to be elected while the other half were to be nominated by the Emperor. The Douma was never a success. The Conservatives looked upon it as dangerous, the Liberals felt that it did not really represent the country, while the Radicals regarded it as a half-hearted measure wrung from the unwilling Government by the threats of the working classes. The story of it is closely connected with the revolutionary movement and will be mentioned in the following chapters.

## 29. THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE ENTENTE.

—It was well known in Russia that English sympathies had been all on the side of Japan, and this aroused a considerable amount of ill-feeling. For a time this annoyance towards

England had the effect of throwing the Russians into closer connection with the Germans, and in 1906 a treaty was made with them, chiefly regarding affairs in the Balkans, but in reality with a view of leaving England without a possible ally in Europe. It was the moment of England's "splendid isolation," which might have led to serious results if it had not been for the personal charm and diplomacy of Edward VII. In the course of a few months he produced an entire change in the attitude of Russia towards England. Colonel Iliine, who was at that time master of the household of the Grand Duchess Olga (sister of Nicolas II.), gave me the following details, of which he was a personal witness. King Edward was at Carlsbad in September 1907, and there met the Grand Duke Michael (brother of Nicolas II.) and the Grand Duchess Olga, and made himself particularly agreeable to them. They were travelling incognito, and were going on to Sorrento in Italy. When they were leaving Carlsbad, Admiral Fisher (who was then First Sea Lord) came to the station to see them off, and there told them that H.M.S. *Minerva* had been ordered to Sorrento on purpose to meet them. They travelled very quietly through Italy, and in Rome they were met by nobody except the Russian Ambassador. But as they arrived in Sorrento H.M.S. *Minerva* steamed in and fired a royal salute. Next day the Grand Duke and his sister lunched on board and were

received with the highest possible honours. They were much touched by the reception they received and by the graceful attentions shown to them by King Edward, and from that time the Russian Court threw itself with enthusiasm into the Triple Entente. The Russian press at the same time published glowing accounts of the reception at Sorrento which attracted much attention. In fact there was an entire reaction of feeling throughout the country, and the bitterness caused by the Japanese war was forgotten, and the old enmity towards Austria and Germany began to assert itself again.

This enmity took a serious form in the following years. In 1909 Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in a very high-handed way. Russia was prepared to protest, but Germany openly supported Austria, and the Russians, quite unprepared for a big European war, were obliged to give way. The Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, retired and was succeeded by Sazonoff. This capable minister was the originator of the Balkan alliance which attacked Turkey in 1912; but the jealousy between the Balkan States prevented the alliance from being a real success, and in fact the allies were soon fighting against each other. The Bulgarians and Serbs were very successful at first against the Turks, and soon overran Macedonia and Adrianople. Macedonia was the rock on which they split; without waiting for diplomatic discussions of

the questions involved the two armies began to quarrel, and then found themselves definitely at war with each other. The Serbs were entirely successful, and the various parties proceeded to arbitration. Delegates were sent to St Petersburg. Up to this time the Bulgarians had looked upon Russia as their saviour from the Turkish oppressors, and expected great things from Russia on this occasion. They were, however, disappointed. Sazonoff was sufficiently clear-headed to see that King Ferdinand of Bulgaria had hoped to settle matters to his own liking by force of arms, and had only applied for arbitration and assistance when he found he had failed. Sazonoff was therefore not prepared to support all the ambitions of that wily monarch, and the Bulgarians began to look elsewhere for help. Naturally enough King Ferdinand turned to Austria, and this brought about the situation in the Balkans which had so much influence on the Great War.

This situation was roughly as follows. Austria wanted to keep Serbia cut off from the sea, hoping thereby that Serbia might remain entirely under Austrian vassalage in matters of commerce. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, furious against the Serbs and disappointed in his hopes from Russia, was ready to avenge himself on both by siding with Austria and Germany. Roumania was neutral; the feeling in the country was opposed to Germany, but her position, be-

tween Austria and Bulgaria, was too dangerous, and the fate of Serbia was a serious warning against any premature action. Besides this there was a large number of Roumanians who, without being pro-German, were distinctly anti-Russian, and it was long before the diplomatists of the allies could influence them into coming in on our side.

30. THE OPENING OF THE GREAT WAR.— There is no doubt that Germany had deliberately planned a war for the autumn of 1914. The Kaiser was hoping to play the game of the great Bismarck, that is to say he intended to defeat his enemies one by one, first France, then England. In Russia the possibility of war with Germany and Austria had been discussed for some time. In 1913 the Douma had voted large sums for the army, and the whole country was much less surprised to find itself at war than we were in England. Unfortunately, in spite of this feeling, the preparations were totally inadequate, for Raspoútin was at the height of his power, and General Sukhomlinoff, the Minister for War, was entirely incapable; accusations of treachery against him and his wife were current throughout the country.

In June 1914 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, was assassinated in Herzegovina. This furnished Germany with an excuse for the war, though there is little doubt that even if this event

had not occurred some other pretext would have been found. Austria immediately presented an ultimatum which would have reduced Serbia to complete vassalage; forty-eight hours were given for reply, and in the meantime all communications were cut off between Serbia and the other Powers. To avoid a general war Serbia accepted all the conditions except those which did away with her independence. In St Petersburg there was at once a conviction that war was unavoidable, but the Tsar still hoped to put it off; he telegraphed to the Kaiser asking him to influence Austria to accept arbitration. The Kaiser definitely refused to put any pressure on his ally. Russia, therefore, proceeded to mobilise an army on the Austrian Front, and Austria and Germany started mobilising at the same time. On 31st July Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia, demanding immediate demobilisation and giving twenty-four hours for an answer. Russia did not reply, and on 1st August Germany declared war. Austria, however, waited; the Triple Alliance between Germany and Austria and Italy was by its terms purely defensive; if Russia made the declaration Italy was bound to support Austria, but if the declaration were made by Austria then Italy was not compelled by the terms of the treaty. But after seven days Austria, pressed by Germany, made a declaration, and Italy for the time being remained neutral.



*The Russian Operations.*—No attempt can be made here to give an account of the operations on the Eastern Front; no proper history of them has yet been written from the Russian point of view. But the outstanding features will be briefly mentioned in order that the various currents of feeling in the country may be understood.

1914.—The Russian mobilisation was good; the scheme had been worked out by General Loukowsky, who was a very capable officer.

In August and September an advance was made into East Prussia; it was, however, quite understood that it was only something in the nature of a big cavalry raid, with the object of relieving the pressure on Paris by drawing off a portion of the German forces. The Russians were quite prepared for the retirement which followed. But this retirement was badly carried out and resulted in serious losses which ought to have been avoided. General Renenkampf, the Russian commander, was unpopular, and the whole affair was regarded as badly managed. It had, however, a certain amount of effect in distracting the Germans from their attempt to reach Paris.

Far more important and more successful was the movement against the Austrians. This began, at the end of August, with the big battle of Galicia, which lasted five days, and was fiercely contested. It took place on a wide front north of Lemberg. The Russian commander was General Ivanoff, and he was

opposed by the full force of the Austrian army. In this battle more than a million and a half men took part. At first the Austrians pressed back the Russian centre, but then General Brusiloff, with the 8th Army, pushed forward on the Russian left, and turned the southern flank of the Austrians, who were completely defeated. They retired in confusion, losing 80,000 prisoners and an enormous amount of equipment. The Russians followed them up through Galicia, taking the town of Lvoff and advancing as far as Przemisl and the line of the River San. Early in November they pushed farther forward, as far as Cracow, leaving a force to watch Przemisl. In December the Austrian right, which had retired southwards into Hungary, moved across the Carpathians and threatened the Russian left and rear. This forced them to withdraw as far as the River Dunaetz, where they stood fast from December to April.

The battle of Galicia and the big advance which had followed it caused immense enthusiasm in Russia. The allies must be for ever grateful for the efforts which Russia made during those months when France was struggling desperately against the well-prepared onslaughts of the Germans, and a handful of English were fighting against heavy odds in the historic battle of Ypres. The Russians have every right to be proud of their achievement, but it was fated to cost them dear; they exhausted all their reserves

of ammunition, and the next year was one of disaster.

1915.—On 4th April Przemisl surrendered. As a matter of fact this success was not expected by the Russians; they had had no shells to spare for a serious bombardment of a strong fortress, and had only invested the town with a force of observation. The garrison still amounted to 108,000 men, and they had a large number of heavy guns and plenty of ammunition. The Russians had not even enough men on the spot to take over the forts and guard the prisoners.

In the beginning of May, Mackensen began his great advance and continued it until the end of August, by which time the Russians had been forced back to a line running roughly from Riga to Tarnopol. There they stood throughout the winter.

The retreat caused consternation throughout the country. As early as January there had been murmurs of treachery, and there was a great deal of talk about Raspoútin in the army. By the end of August the consternation had grown into a panic, and there followed what was known as "the ministerial leap-frog." General Sukhomlinoff, who undoubtedly deserved most of the blame that has been thrown at him, was dismissed, and General Polivanof succeeded him. Several other strong ministers were appointed, including such excellent men as Samarin and Prince Sherbatoff, and had they been able to retain their positions

they might have saved the situation, for Russia was still full of fight. But the influence of Raspoútin was all against anything in the shape of honest effort, and in less than three months, Sazonoff, Krivoshain, Ignatieff, Samarin, and others had all found their positions impossible, and had left their places to such men as Sturmer and his friends, and the changes were more frequent than ever. For the first time in the war feeling was strong against the dynasty.

In August, the commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke Nicolas, had also been dismissed and sent to take over the minor position of the commander on the Caucasian Front. The Tsar proclaimed himself commander-in-chief, with General Alexeieff as chief of staff.

31. 1916. In January Alexeieff decided to try an advance in order to restore the morale of his army, which had been considerably lowered by the events of 1915. But it was too soon, and was not a success; the attack was made to the south of Tarnopol, and very severe fighting took place for over a month, after which the Russians were obliged to take breath.

In March the Germans were making their determined effort towards Verdun, and the allied councils were hoping that Russia would be able to do something to relieve the pressure; Alexeieff was the truest and most self-sacrificing of allies, and had mortal man been able

to do anything, most assuredly he would have done it. But the spring months are just the time when movements on a big scale are impossible on the Russian Front; there are no metalled roads at all, and as the ground thaws the tracks become quagmires. Therefore, for the next three months, Alexeieff waited in patience. The time, however, was by no means wasted; he devoted himself to the training of the troops and, in some corps, a wonderful improvement took place. At the same time it was arranged that Lord Kitchener should visit Russia to give the War Ministry the benefit of his experienced advice. The loss of H.M.S. *Hampshire*, with Lord Kitchener and his staff on board, was perhaps the most fatal thing that ever happened to Russia. He had the insight to understand the horrible situation that existed in Petrograd and in the army; he had the influence and strength to deal with that situation as no Russian could do; he had the wisdom and experience to work on sound lines. He had nothing to fear from Raspoútin, Sturmer, and the like; the Emperor and Alexeieff were longing for his assistance. His loss was irreparable.

In the beginning of June began the celebrated advance of Brusiloff. As a matter of fact this was only intended as a diversion, and the main attack was intended to take place farther north in the direction of Kovel; but the Germans up there were very strongly entrenched and stood firm, so the attempt

there was given up and Brusiloff's movement developed into the main advance. It was made on a front of about 150 miles, from Dubno to Czernovich; four armies were employed, and, beginning from the north, they were the Special Army, then the 8th, 7th, and 9th in that order. The fighting was very severe and the Russians lost heavily, but the success was tremendous. They took over half a million of prisoners and an enormous quantity of guns and equipment of all sorts.

But though the Russian soldiers fought right gallantly and achieved brilliant successes, it was noticeable that they did not recover their morale to any extent. Undoubtedly the German propaganda was cleverly worked and its sinister influence was spreading throughout the ranks. The Russian peasants were ignorant to an incredible degree; their officers did not understand the value of instructing the men on the general situation; the greater part of the news was received from German sources and was, of course, coloured to suit their plans. The men heard that the French had lost all heart at Verdun; that the English, splendidly equipped and with elaborate preparations, had launched what was meant to be a decisive attack on the Somme; that they had taken a mere handful of prisoners and had then been repulsed with heavy losses; that France and England were now demanding more sacrifices from Russia, and so on.

By the end of August Brusiloff's effort had

spent itself; it had dealt a blow to the Austrians from which they never really recovered, but the chief enemy, Germany, was still strong.

On 28th August, Roumania came in on the side of the allies. For various reasons the Roumanian Government had been unable to take action earlier. In the first place there was the same lack of munitions as in all other countries at the beginning of the war; and though England was trying to rectify this, the difficulties of transport caused innumerable delays; there was the long journey by sea to Archangel, then the long journey through Russia on badly organised railways; finally, a change of gauge at the Roumanian frontier. In the second place Roumania is an agricultural country; if the peasants were taken too soon from the fields the whole harvest of the year would have been sacrificed. Had Roumania been able to come in at the beginning of July, when Brusiloff's successes were at their height and the English were pressing on the Somme, the history of the next few months might be written differently. But as it was, the enemy had time to take breath, and the Roumanian assistance appeared to the Russians to be of little use. The Germans shrewdly made the most of their opportunity; after their failures at Verdun and in Galicia they badly wanted a success to raise their spirits, and they saw that their best chance was against the inexperienced and poorly

equipped newcomers. They collected sufficient forces to throw back the Roumanians from Transylvania and proceeded to overrun Vallachia.

The effect of this was disastrous. Three whole Russian armies (the 4th, 6th, and 9th) had to be sent down to save the situation, and the Germans were stopped on the line of the Carpathians and the River Sereth. Once more the German propagandists insinuated that Russia was being bled for the sake of an ally, while to the Roumanians they suggested that Russia had played them false and failed to keep her promises.

The winter of 1916-17 was severe. The extra piece of front in Roumania, which amounted to about 600 miles, meant that extra men had to be employed in the trenches. The successes of the Russian advance were forgotten in the tragedy of Roumania and the year ended in gloom. The rest of the story belongs to the period of the Revolution.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

32. IN the days of Catherine II. there lived two so-called "Protestants," by name Radishcheff and Novikoff, who are regarded as the fathers of the revolutionary movement. Their Protestantism was not in the religious sense of the word : in England we would have called them radicals. They issued pamphlets about slavery and the rights of humanity, and dreamed of a new Russia. They had few followers.

The French Revolution gave rise to a wave of liberalism, which appealed very much to the educated classes. The conspiracy against Paul I. (see para. 13) aroused intense interest and was the first step in terrorism.

Then the Moscow campaign called forth the patriotism of the nation, and Alexander I. had the support of all classes. But later on the tide of liberalism set in again ; in 1824 it took a definite form in a secret society which is generally referred to as the "Decabrists," and was the first secret society of which there are any authentic records. When Alexander I. died there was some confusion about the succession, because his next brother, Constantine,

had renounced his rights, and Nicolas was known to be a reactionary. Nicolas was at the time in the Crimea. Half of the officers in St Petersburg swore allegiance to Constantine, and the Decabrists took advantage of the confusion to raise a rebellion in December 1830 (from which they got their name). A considerable number of the Guards joined them. The rebellion was suppressed with severity, and the investigation showed that many people in high social circles were involved. It is believed that the great author Pushkin was a sympathiser, though nothing was proved against him. Some of the conspirators were executed, others were sent to Siberia and became the first "martyrs."

The movement spread, and the French Revolution of 1848 gave it a new impulse. The police discovered another secret society under a leader called Petrachévsky; about forty members were condemned to death, but most of them were reprieved except Pétrachévsky himself.

The Crimean War was the next event that had an effect on the movement. The failure of the imperial troops brought Nicolas I. into unpopularity with all classes, and the doctrines of Voltaire, Spencer, and Darwin were openly preached. The word *Intelligents* began to come into use; they included all those who had university education, and were mostly advocates, doctors, engineers, and professional men; at first the small landowners and mercan-

tile classes held aloof, but later on they were well content to be classed as Intelligents. They never had any central organisation ; their activities were chiefly confined to articles in the journals. They were progressive without being revolutionary.

Nicolas I. instituted the secret police, to deal with political offences. The whole of the police force was a department in the Ministry of Home Affairs, and consisted of three sections—1st, General Police ; 2nd, Detective Police ; 3rd, Secret Police. The organiser was a German called Count Benckendorff. The secret police are often referred to as the Third Section, and the head of it was selected with special care. At first only a small organisation, the Third Section rapidly developed, and the head of it was one of the most important and powerful men in Russia.

About 1850 the Nihilists appeared. We in England generally group all the Russian revolutionaries under the general title of Nihilists, and even in Russia the word is often used loosely, but generally it is a misnomer. The real Nihilists were a small sect of comparatively harmless people who had no organisation for terrorism ; they may be called decadent disciples of Jean Jacques Rousseau. They advertised themselves by wearing eccentric clothes ; they grew their hair long and did not wash ; and generally they only excited the amusement of small boys and the contempt of older people. Their beloved authors were

Heine and a Russian called Piésareff. They preached the abolition of all authority and of all conventions of society, and aimed at what they called "healthy egoism." In Tourgenieff's well-known novel, *Fathers and Sons*, a clever character sketch is given of a typical Nihilist. The word Nihilist was first used about 1858, and the sect died a natural death about 1870.

Under the influence of the great reforms of Alexander II. many of the Intelligents went over to the side of the Government. There was still a movement towards socialism, but there were different ideas as to how best it could be attained. Moderate people were content to press for extensions of the reforms, and they acted by distributing pamphlets of socialist propaganda.

But the more violent were not content to wait, and the Terrorists came into existence; their argument was that the evolution of freedom had long been retarded by the use of violence, and that therefore it could be forced forward by applying the same means against the Government. The society was known as the "Naródnaya Vólya" (The Will of the People). After one or two unsuccessful attempts they succeeded in assassinating Alexander II. in 1881. One of the assassins was arrested on the spot, and the secret police unravelled the conspiracy. Many of the prisoners were executed; among them was a girl of twenty-five, Sophía Peróvskaya, daughter of a minister of state; she was hung. Other

conspirators were exiled ; some escaped abroad, and from that time there were terrorists' organisations in Paris and Berlin. These latter got into touch with socialism in Germany, which gradually changed some of their views ; their objects became more pronounced ; they aimed at a change not only of the constitution but of the social structure ; at the same time their means to those objects became less violent, and terrorism dropped out for the time being.

The reforms of Count Witte had a quietening effect for a time. In 1900 the German socialists split into two sections, the Maximalists and the Minimalists, and the Russian movement followed their example. The words "Bolshevik" (Maximalist) and "Menshevik" (Minimalist) came into use.

In 1900 there was a big movement among the students. There was no open rebellion, but seditious meetings were held and pamphlets were issued. A large number of the leaders were forcibly enlisted in the army. This was a spark in the gunpowder ; terrorism appeared again ; the Bolsheviks gained in popularity and the *Naródnaya Vólya* was reconstructed. Their organisation was good, and of course very secret. They commanded large financial support and were very active. They planned the assassinations of the Grand Duke Sergius Alexándrovitch (uncle of the Emperor and Governor of Moscow), the Prime Minister Plevch, the ministers Bogalepoff and Trepoff, and many other officials. The

secret police doubled their precautions and employed more spies, but could not stamp out terrorism.

Then came the Japanese war, which added to the unpopularity of the Government.

In 1905 the first general revolution took place. It was organised by the *Naródnaya Vólya* and was joined by the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries. (See para. 38.) But the army only took part in local mutinies in the fortress of Cronstadt and the garrison of Kiev. There was also a serious mutiny on the ship-of-war *Potyómkin*; the crew killed all their officers, shelled Odessa, and then took their ship to the Roumanian port of Constanza; here the crew escaped on shore and disappeared; the ship was sent back to Russia by the Roumanian Government.

There were extensive strikes on the railways and in the postal and telegraph services.

Count Witte, the Prime Minister, persuaded Nicolas II. to sign the Manifesto of 17th October 1905. This charter, which has been compared to the Habeas Corpus Act, was the first step towards a constitution. It provided for a House of Parliament, called the Douma; but the suffrage was very limited.

This concession, however, did not stop the discontent. The "Soviets," or committees of workmen, began to appear; in St Petersburg there was a central soviet of which the

President was the now famous Trotsky. The Government used the army against the soviets and the revolution broke out again. In November and December 1905 barricades were raised in the streets of Moscow, arsenals were looted, and there was a great deal of street fighting. It was two weeks before the rising could be suppressed. The Guards were sent along the railway lines to every station and shot the strikers.

Count Witte was perfectly determined to crush the disturbances, but he wanted to give peace to the country; he broadened the suffrage very considerably in the hopes that this would have a sedative effect.

On 27th April 1906 the Douma met. It is said that the elections had been quite free and were not influenced in any way by the Government. There was a strong radical majority; there were very few conservatives, and not many socialists. They immediately formulated two demands: first, a general amnesty for all political offenders; second, the appropriation of the land for the peasants at reasonable rates.

These demands were refused by the Emperor. When the debates on the land question were in progress the peasants were excited by the speeches of the socialists and began to grab the properties of the landowners, and the disturbances began afresh.

Stólýpin, who was the new Minister for Home Affairs, persuaded Nicolas II. to dis-

solve the Douma, and this was done on 9th July 1906. Most of the members went to Viborg in Finland, and thence issued a manifesto to the nation; it called for the re-establishment of the Douma, and demanded that no taxes should be paid till this was done. The disturbances increased throughout the country; banks and post-offices were looted, estates were pillaged, and there were many murders of landowners.

Stólýpin was very energetic and followed the general policy of Witte; his worst enemies acknowledged that he was honest and capable; his friends maintained that he was the greatest patriot Russia has produced. But he was quite ruthless in crushing agitation; he arrested about 250 members of the Douma, who were tried and sentenced to three months' imprisonment each. He established gallows in every district for the execution of agitators, and in the next five years it is said that 15,000 people were hanged; the gallows were called "Stólýpin's neckties."

At the same time he left the peasants alone, considering that they had been misled by the agitators, and applied himself to working out the celebrated "Stólýpin reforms." He issued decrees to provide for the transfer of the land to the people through the "Peasants' Bank," which was financed by the Government. In each district a commission was appointed to arrange the transfers. The local zemstvos were given wide powers and financial



support (see para. 26). A big organisation was founded for sending destitute peasants as colonists to the rich parts of Siberia, where they received free land and money to start farming. The peasants were appeased by these concessions.

In 1911 Stólypin was assassinated (see para. 35).

During the next three years the government was milder, but there is no doubt that Russia was on the eve of another general revolution when the big war broke out. This, however, called forth the patriotism of the nation again; the Germans were hated, and the Emperor issued some decrees which for the time gained over the Intelligents and many socialists. Chief among these decrees was one suppressing the sale of drink. This was a Government monopoly, and some idea of the evil which "vodka" has worked may be gathered from the fact that the revenue from this source alone was a milliard roubles (£100,000,000) yearly. This decree was very popular with the better classes. Another popular measure was the promise of freedom to Poland. But the effect of this early enthusiasm wore off. The German successes aroused angry murmurs about the inefficiency of the War Office and the staff. Traitors and spies were found in high places. The cost of living rose. The Germans worked their propaganda with skill and effect.

The revolution of March 1917 was no surprise for those who knew anything of Russia.

33. THE CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION.—A statesman of the old régime gave me his opinion as follows. He had been much in England and was fond of comparing our institutions with theirs. He was much disappointed that the allies had not intervened in Petrograd and admitted that he was in a bad temper. His language was much too violent for literal translation.

“It is quite a mistake to suppose that the revolutionary movement came from down-trodden lower classes. Of course your socialists assume that this was the case; the first article of their belief is that no man can be happy in this world of sin without a vote, and therefore they argue that the Russian peasant was the most miserable of beings. You have a legend that Nelson once put up his telescope to his blind eye in order not to see a certain signal. That was the typical action of a typical Briton. You are a very intelligent and capable race, but when you do not want to see a thing you are as blind as a beggar. I once tried to argue with an advanced English politician who had been abusing Russia; I asked him what he thought of the Stólypin reforms—he knew nothing of them. I then asked him if he knew how much the Government had advanced to the Peasants’ Bank—he had no idea. Finally I asked him if he knew that seven-eighths of the population of the British Empire have no votes, and that in India, which to my mind is the best governed country in the world, though there are no votes, there is less crime, less drunkenness, less vice

than in London, Liverpool, or Glasgow. I am afraid that at the end of our conversation each of us thought the other a lunatic.

“If he had attacked me about the factory hands he would have had firmer ground to go on; the state of our working people in the towns was bad. But there were excuses for the Government even here. The factories in Russia sprang up like mushrooms not many years ago, and legislation could not keep pace with the development. In the wilds of America pioneers push forward ahead of civilisation and establish rough forms of justice in out-of-the-way places until the Government has time to come along and take up its duties. In something of the same way the factories got ahead in Russia and were governed or misgoverned by the capitalists while Petrograd was trying to work out laws to meet the case.

“But the real leaders of the revolutionary movement were the Intelligents, and they had cause to complain not of actual cruelty, but of a sort of suppression which weighed heavily. Every man in this world has dreams of military glory, of political power, of wealth, of something. In England there are no artificial obstacles to prevent a man from realising such dreams; if he has brains and energy he may rise from the ranks to be a commander of armies, a cabinet minister, a prince of commerce. In Russia such cases have occurred but only very rarely. The bureaucracy of Petrograd was a charmed circle; brains and energy had a certain value once you were inside it, but favouritism and influence were the deciding factors; it was a ‘Government of Salons.’

“The middle class men of real ability found themselves up against an impregnable wall of caste; they knew that their rulers were men of smaller minds than themselves, and they resented it. They were the leaders of the movement, a small class of earnest

and capable men. They had plenty of adherents from other classes. First there were the dreamers and fanatics who wanted to air their views. Next they were joined by a large number of people who fancied themselves clever and wanted to blame the Government for their failure in life. Finally, I am sorry to say, the movement became popular, fashionable, and this brought in recruits in thousands, especially from the youth of the country. It is hard for Englishmen to understand this feeling. Your young men, like all others, want to distinguish themselves and to excite the admiration of the other sex—well, the best way for them is to become cricket or football players. It is well known that at Cambridge nobody can say who are the best scholars of the year, but everybody knows the names of the cricket eleven. Society ladies keep their best smiles for the heroes of Lord's and Hurlingham. The little shopgirl in the provinces would much sooner attend a football match than a political meeting.

“In Russia we had none of that. The Russian girl would only laugh in scorn at a young man who seriously rolls in the mud after a bit of leather. Upon my soul, I don't know whether to laugh at you or not, but there is no doubt that the field of sport is a useful outlet for would-be heroes. Our university students were undeveloped physically and overdeveloped mentally; if they wanted to be bloods they had to join the revolutionaries; it was popular to be ‘agin the Government’; if a youth was watched by the secret police he became a hero at once, if he went to prison he became a little god. Some of them, no doubt, were carried away by the oratory of the leaders and were deeply in earnest; but you may take it from me that a big majority cared little for the principles, and only thought of the glory to be got out of them.

“Then the Great War brought matters to a head.

The whole country was full of enthusiasm; the soldiers were brave and honest and enduring, but there was no leadership to make use of them, for the bureaucracy could not rise to any emergency. As the war dragged on from blunder to blunder, people wanted to know who was to blame, and were ready to listen to the answer of the revolutionaries. There were scandals at court to give a definite object to the general discontent.

“In the last stage it was a movement of a whole nation, and that was just what spoilt it. If only one party had grasped the power firmly from the very first the revolution might have been a success. But, unfortunately, we were all in it; we started by making allowances for each other’s little failings; then we broke up into parties, and then—well, you know the rest.

“The French Revolution took the same course. It started with high-minded debates in the Jacobin clubs, and in the first National Assembly there were men like Lafayette and Mirabeau and the disciples of Rousseau; then those kind of men disappeared; their king was executed; the Sans-culottes established a reign of terror; the country was tired of it, but it took a Buonaparte to restore the situation. We are getting through the first stages and have reached the reign of terror. We are waiting for Buonaparte.”

34. The following was the view of an advanced socialist:—

“The revolutionary movement was the outcome of simple reason, of plain logic. The Russians are a very highly educated race; that surprises you, because the education is not so general as in England or Germany, and there are still millions of peasants who cannot read or write. But I am talking of higher education. There are ten universities in Russia; at

Moscow University alone there are 14,000 students; there are hundreds of specialists' schools; the courses of study are severe and the students are earnest. So we had a large class of men and women with brains and culture; they had studied history, philosophy, political economy, commercial economy, and they had pondered over these things. Yet this class was governed at the will of one man; they had no voice in his election, no vote in the choice of his ministers, they never knew what was going on in his councils. I am not talking about personalities at all; the late emperor was neither a Solomon nor a Biron; there are people who have made all sorts of accusations against him and his ministers, but that is not the point. My point is that there were no safeguards in the Russian constitution; the Government might be all very well to-day, but to-morrow there might be a tyrant on the throne with all the vices and devilries of which mankind is capable, and his ministers might be thieves and profligates; they would have the secret police to trump up charges against individuals who opposed his will, and a standing army to shoot down any collective opposition.

“Such a possibility cannot be contemplated in the twentieth century. The Intelligents wanted to be honest citizens, helping the Government and working for the good of the country; but the situation turned them into revolutionaries, and that was the real cause of the movement. You must not confound it with the other revolutions of bygone days, which sprang from quite different sources. Ivan VI. and Peter III. were dethroned by risings of the Guards; those were revolts against unpopular personalities. There were revolts of the masses, the result of hunger or of some particular injustice; such was the Pougacheff rebellion. There was the Terrorist movement, the work of a handful of desperadoes. And people naturally enough think that we had some connection or some ideas in

common with movements like those. On the contrary, we reject them in theory and practice. The Intelligents had no thought of calling in violence; the inherited privileges of Petrograd could not stand against the rights of a cultured nation, and were bound to give way.

“You ask me, then, why the revolution has been such a dismal failure. That is easy to explain. It is often said now that the revolution spoilt the war. I say that it was the war that spoilt the revolution. Russia in her agony brought forth a premature and deformed child. Or let me put it in another way: the revolution of 1917 was *not* the revolution of the Intelligents; it was a revolution of the old type, of an army sick of mismanagement, of a society horrified by the scandals at Court. The revolution of the Intelligents *has not yet taken place*; it has been retarded by the events of 1917, but it will come, and Russia will take her proper place among the nations.”

My friend was speaking after the event; he was horrified at the atrocities of the Bolsheviks, and so was very anxious to clear himself of any blame or participation in the matter. But I am inclined to suspect that in March 1917 he was waving flags in the streets and cheering for “any old Revolution.” It is to be hoped that his prophecy will come true.

Still there is no doubt that it was those wild promises of the Intelligents which aroused the greed of the masses and destroyed their discipline; so by the time the revolution of the wise men really comes off, it is to be hoped that they will have added a little common sense and business capacity to their logic.

35. A university professor gave me the following:—

“Socialism was instilled into our young men of Russia very early in their careers. At the schools the boys formed what may be called reading clubs—at first for the exchange of light literature; the authorities had no objection at first, but when it became evident that the literature was taking a socialistic and sensational form they began to discourage them. The clubs were then converted into secret societies, which, of course, added to the excitement and appealed to the boys. There were secret societies all over the country; their activities took four forms: first, secret meetings; second, the distribution of secret pamphlets; third, the collection of money for ‘martyrs’; fourth, the assistance of refugees who were in hiding from the police. It was almost like the Boy Scout movement, though, of course, with quite different principles. They were trained in secret methods, secret passwords, to cover up a trail, sometimes to disguise themselves. When a lad was arrested by the police he was interrogated, and had to know how to lie in order not to betray his friends. The socialistic pamphlets were not by any means confined to dull theories and sermons, there was plenty of sensational reading, chiefly about the martyrs. For instance, there was the case of Maria Petróva; she was a young and beautiful girl who was arrested in 1897; while she was under detention a certain police official fell in love with her and made advances; she took the oil out of a small hand lamp, poured it over her clothes, and then burnt herself to death. The Government tried to hush up the case, but the secret printing presses issued thousands of pamphlets giving a dramatic account of the whole story. Mass meetings were held by the students, and many of them swore to avenge her.



“Such was the atmosphere in which young Russia was brought up. Highly-strung lads were naturally carried away. I know of cases where boys criticised their own parents for luxury and idleness, refused to accept money from them or live at their expense, and disappeared into the labyrinths of the secret societies or into Siberia. There were extraordinary cases of fanaticism—as an example the case of the murder of Stólypin may be quoted:—

“A young Jew called Bagroff decided to avenge the martyrs by killing Stólypin; he was rich, clever, and well educated; for three years he patiently laid his plans so as to carry out the murder in the most dramatic way. He played the role of a double provocator, that is to say, he first joined the secret societies and gained their confidence, and then joined the secret police and betrayed his fellow conspirators; but the whole time he kept his main object in view, and had no accomplices in it. His information to the police was correct and valuable; he himself afterwards admitted that he had procured the conviction of three or four hundred revolutionaries, but he insisted that he had only given up those who were weak members or bad socialists, and ‘had never betrayed a good man.’ He must have carried out his plans with wonderful skill and secrecy, for neither side had any doubts about him. He was quickly promoted in the police, and was at last appointed as the special detective responsible for the safety of Stólypin himself. He had now gained the position he desired, and decided to carry out his main object. He invented an imaginary woman whom he called Nina. He told the police that she was a desperate criminal who intended to assassinate the Emperor when she could get a favourable opportunity; and as he knew her by sight his chief work would be to trace her and get proofs against her. In August 1911, Stólypin, who was then Prime Minister, accom-

panied the Emperor on a state visit to Kiev; on the evening of the 31st, they were present at a gala performance in the Opera House. Bagroff told Stólypin that he expected that Nina would make an attempt that evening, and the house was filled with detectives. During the first entr'act Bagroff moved along to the first row of the stalls, and there talked with Stólypin; he pretended to be watching the circle and gallery for Nina. During the second entr'act he again approached Stólypin, and suddenly drawing a revolver fired three shots at him at four yards' distance. The first shot missed Stólypin and wounded a musician in the orchestra, the second hit Stólypin in the hand, the third in the neck. The wounds were fatal, and Stólypin died in six days; to make the matter more certain poisoned bullets had been used. Bagroff made no effort to escape; at his trial he gave a full account of all his machinations. He was content that his vengeance had taken a sensational form. It is said that he laughed on the scaffold.

“This extraordinary story was an extreme case, but no doubt there were thousands of smaller cases of similar fanaticism.

“Therefore in 1917 everything was ripe for revolution. The Intelligents ought to be the backbone of every Government working for the necessary reforms; instead of that their policy was wholly destructive. The army was discontented. The agitators easily worked up the passions of the very ignorant masses. It is true there had been a strong feeling against Germany, but this had lost its sting because the whole country was thinking so much of internal affairs that it had no time to be worried over other things.

“So the policy of destruction triumphed, and its natural result was anarchy.”

## CHAPTER VII

### THE EVENTS OF THE REVOLUTION

36. IN this chapter all dates are given in the old style or Russian calendar. This is because all the newspapers and journals used that style, and the Russians all talk of 2nd March as the day of abdication. According to us it was on 15th March.

The Douma reassembled on 14th February 1917. The Government expected disturbance, and sections of soldiers were stationed at important points, in some cases with machine guns. The 14th, however, passed off quietly.

On the 23rd and 24th, there were meetings of a violent character which the police dispersed; there were some killed and wounded. The crowds consisted of workmen from the suburbs and women clamouring for bread; there does not seem to have been any organised movement.

*25th February.*—There was another big meeting in the Znamenskaya Square; the Kossack patrols looked on without interfering; about 4 P.M. a squad of mounted police arrived to charge the mob; the

Kossacks joined the people and helped them to drive off the police, killing the police officer. There was a scene of wild excitement as the crowd embraced the Kossacks and cheered them.

*26th February.*—The meetings were resumed, and for the first time machine guns were used against them; there were some hundreds of victims.

A decree from the Emperor was published adjourning the Douma till April.

The Douma had an extraordinary sitting and passed a notable resolution declaring that the Douma would not adjourn and that all members must continue to attend.

This was revolution.

*27th February.*—The news of the revolution of the Douma became known and created immense enthusiasm. A general strike was declared, and the whole of the working masses turned out to parade the streets.

A large part of the garrison, including some Guards, went over to the side of the Douma; during the course of the week they were joined by practically all the troops in Petrograd and by many detachments from the neighbourhood. After some half-hearted opposition they took the military depots and the main artillery park and put their own sentries over them.

The Peter and Paul fortress was taken and became the headquarters of the revolution. Several prisons were rushed and the prisoners

set at liberty. The office of the Third Section was burnt with all its archives.

Delegates representing 25,000 soldiers marched to the Douma and were received by the president, Rodzianko, who read to them the following unanimous resolution of the House :—

“The demand of the moment is for the abolition of the old power and for a new power to replace it. In the work of forming the new power the Douma will take an active part. But it is above all necessary to restore order and tranquillity.”

At 1 P.M. the Prime Minister, Prince Golitzin, telephoned to Rodzianko that he had resigned. This was understood to mean that the Cabinet gave up all idea of opposing the Douma.

The houses of several of the ministers were searched, but they had all disappeared except one, who was arrested.

Just before midnight the Douma, which had been sitting all day, issued a list of twelve members who were to form a temporary Executive Committee for the government of the country. This committee at once issued the following proclamation :—

“The present difficult circumstances have been brought about by the measures of the old Government. The Executive Committee of the members of the Douma have found themselves compelled to take into their own hands the restoration of order. They accept full responsibility for their decisions and are

confident that the population and army will help them in their task of establishing a new government which will gain the confidence of the people and act in accordance with their wishes."

"(Signed) RODZIANKO.

During the night an appeal was issued to the inhabitants of Petrograd calling on them to maintain order and not to destroy Government buildings or offices.

The Soviet of Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies was established, and elected as president, Cheidsi, and as vice-presidents, Kerensky and Skobelev. This soviet had a long-sounding Russian title (the E. C. R. and S. Deputies); for convenience it will here be referred to as the R. S. Soviet. It was really a sort of unofficial Lower House, while the Douma formed the Upper House. The R. S. Soviet elected its own executive committee, which was also a sort of unofficial Cabinet, and issued proclamations and orders quite independently of the Government; but as its president was a member of the Government it was hoped that the soviet would be managed by him and Kerensky. As a matter of fact the R. S. Soviet was a thorn in the side of the Government from the first day; many of the members were quite illiterate and had been chosen for the violence of their attitude. They delighted in inventing means of advertising their victory over the old regime.

Their first step was to issue the famous

Order No. 1 which limited the powers of officers, abolished insignia of rank, and generally broke down the discipline of the army. They published programmes from time to time demanding extreme measures of socialism. They had behind them the mob and the garrison of Petrograd, and by degrees most of the army, and they were jealous of their powers. The Government could not afford to oppose or ignore them. It was undoubtedly their pressure which gradually pushed all responsible men out of the Government and left it in the hands of the extreme Lefts, who were ready to make any promises and do anything as long as they were left in power. Kerensky afterwards declared that he was all for discipline, but on this day he was not man enough to oppose the Order No. 1.

*28th February.*—The day was chiefly spent in parading the regiments which had joined the revolution. These parades were enthusiastic but orderly, and they were addressed by members of the Douma.

I have a collection of reports of speeches made about this time. There was plenty of talk about patriotism and love for the Fatherland, but scarcely a word was said about continuing the war; it is noticeable that from the first this was not a subject which appealed to the mob. No mention can be found of the Germans. Freedom was, of course, the popular topic, then appeals for unity and

order, and the speakers could always get a cheap laugh by references to the Emperor; it is, however, noticeable that members of the Executive Committee were still restrained in their language about the court.

Several ministers were arrested, including Protopopoff and Sturmer; also some generals and numerous police officials.

The post and telegraph offices were occupied.

Rodzianko sent two telegrams addressed to all the generals and admirals holding high commands. In the first he merely informed them that "in the absence of the Cabinet the administrative power has passed into the hands of the Douma." In the second he appealed for their support and for the maintenance of order; he said that the army ought to continue to protect the Fatherland as bravely as hitherto, and called on all ranks to do their duty.

*1st March.*—The Academy of the General Staff (350 officers), the Artillery School, the Life Guard Grenadiers, and many regiments formally put themselves under the command of the Executive Committee.

A mass meeting of naval and military officers was held at the War Office and passed a resolution supporting the Douma.

There was no longer any doubt that the army in Petrograd had joined the revolution.

News was received that Moscow and Harkoff were in the hands of the revolution-



aries, and that local committees had been formed. Other towns soon followed the example.

Several more ministers were arrested, including General Soukhomlinoff; he was taken under escort to the Douma, where the soldiers were hardly restrained from assaulting him; his epaulettes were torn off.

37. THE ABDICATION.—The newspapers had ceased to appear, and the news that leaked out from Petrograd was all of the vaguest description. The Imperial train was lying at Mohileff (330 miles south of Petrograd), where the Army Headquarters were established. The Prime Minister, Golitzin, had demanded authority to adjourn the Douma, and this had been granted as a matter of course. Protopopoff, Minister for Home Affairs, had telegraphed on the 24th that he could quell the disturbances. But the news was more alarming day by day, and the Emperor decided to return to Tsarskoye Selo.

On the way a telegram was received that the railway to the northwards was in the hands of the revolutionaries, and it was decided to move to Pskof (150 miles southwest of Petrograd) in order to be in touch with the Headquarters of the Northern Army. The train arrived at Pskof on the night of the 1st, and it was in the railway station that the Act of Abdication was signed on 2nd March.

General Rouzky, commanding the Northern Army, received a message from Rodzianko telling him that two members of the new Government were on their way to Pskof; these were Gouchkoff and Shoulgin. The latter was editor of a newspaper in Kiev, and was afterwards well known to British officers in South Russia. He has written an account of the scene in which he took so leading a part:—

“As our train arrived in the station (it was at 10 P.M.) an equerry came into our compartment and said: ‘His Majesty awaits you.’ It was only a few steps to the Imperial train. I was in no way excited; we had reached that stage of physical fatigue and nervous tension when nothing seems astonishing or impossible. I only felt uneasy at the idea of presenting myself in my grimy and unshaven condition to the Emperor; I must have had the appearance of one of those prisoners whom the mob had liberated before setting fire to the prisons. We entered a brilliantly-lit saloon-carriage hung with pale green cloth. The Minister of Court (Frederics) and General Narishkine were there; General Rouzky came in a few moments later.

“The Emperor appeared at once, in the uniform of one of the Kossack regiments. He looked as calm as usual. He shook hands and received us pleasantly rather than coldly. He sat down and asked us to be seated.

“Gouchkoff began to speak. I had been afraid that he would be pitiless and would say something cruel, but I was soon reassured. He talked for some time, very clearly, and making his points in good order. He said nothing of the past and spoke only of the present, trying to make his listener understand

the state in which the country now found itself. He spoke with downcast eyes, and seemed to find it easier to get to the end of his painful speech without looking at the Emperor. He ended by saying that the only solution was the abdication of the monarch in favour of his son, with the Grand Duke Michael as regent.

“The Emperor replied; his voice and manner were much calmer than those of Gouchkoff, who had been forced into emphatic language by the terrific importance of the moment. Nicolas II. spoke as if of something quite ordinary:—

“‘Yesterday and to-day I have been reflecting and have decided to abdicate. Until three o’clock to-day I was ready to do so in favour of my son, but since then I have felt that I cannot separate myself from him.’ He paused for a moment, and then went on in the same tranquil tone: ‘I hope you will understand me. That is why I have now decided to resign in favour of my brother.’ He stopped as if waiting for an answer.

“I said, ‘This proposal surprises us; I therefore beg you will allow me to consult for a moment with Gouchkoff.’ The Emperor agreed, and we moved to one side.

“When we came back Gouchkoff said that he had not the strength to oppose the feelings of a father, and that he thought that any pressure in that direction was out of the question. It seemed to me that an expression of satisfaction crossed the face of the monarch we had just dethroned. For my part, I declared that the wish of the Emperor, though not in accordance with the wish of the Douma, was quite admissible.

“The Emperor then asked if we could guarantee that the abdication would restore order in the country, and if it would not, on the contrary, provoke new outbursts. We replied that, as far as could be

foreseen, we did not anticipate any trouble of that sort.

“The Emperor then rose and went into the next compartment; at about 11.45 P.M. he came back carrying some sheets of paper.

“‘Here is the Act of Abdication,’ he said, ‘read it’; and we read:—

“‘By the grace of God we, Nicolas II., Emperor of all the Russias, Tsar of Poland, etc., etc., declare to all our faithful subjects:—

“‘In the days of the mighty struggle against the exterior enemy who, for three years, has been trying to overwhelm our Fatherland, God has thought fit to send another and painful trial. Interior troubles threaten to have a fatal repercussion on the further course of the war. The destinies of Russia, the honour of our heroic army, the welfare of the people, all the future of our dear Fatherland, demand that the war shall be carried on, at all costs, to a victorious end. Our cruel enemy is making his final efforts, and the moment is near when our gallant army, in concert with our glorious allies, will finally defeat him. In these moments, so decisive for the life of Russia, we have felt it due to our conscience to facilitate the union and organisation of all the forces of the nation for the rapid realisation of victory.

“‘It is for this reason that, in accordance with the Douma of the Empire, we have thought it right to abdicate and lay down the supreme power.

“‘Not wishing to be separated from our dear son, we bequeath the heritage to our brother, Michael Alexandrovich, giving him our blessing on his succession to the throne. We call on him to govern in full accord with the representatives of the nation sitting in the legislative assemblies, and to give his inviolable oath to the well-loved Fatherland.

“ ‘ We appeal to all the faithful sons of the country to fulfil their sacred and patriotic duty by obeying the monarch in this painful moment of national trial, and we call on them to help him, with the representatives of the nation, to lead Russia into the path of prosperity and glory.

“ ‘ GOD SAVE RUSSIA.’

“ It was a noble document, and I felt ashamed of the draft which Gouchkoff and I had hastily prepared in the train. Two or three copies were made on the typing machine, the Emperor signed in pencil, and the Court Minister countersigned in ink.

“ After we had read and approved I think we shook hands, but at the time I was very much moved and it may be that I am mistaken.

“ The time had come to part. At that moment it seemed to me there were no bitter feelings on either side. For my part I felt an immense pity for this man who had by one action redeemed all the faults of the past.”

The Imperial train went back to Mohileff. The Provisional Government decided that they must arrest the dethroned Emperor, and they sent some members to carry out their orders. On 9th March Nicolas II. returned to Tsarskoye Selo as a prisoner.

The Grand Duke Michael declined to accept the throne which his brother had resigned to him : it is doubtful, in any case, whether he would have been able to hold it.

The revolution was over, and all power was in the hands of the Provisional Government and the R. S. Soviet.

On 3rd March the ambassadors of England, France, and Italy officially informed Prince Lvoff that they were authorised to enter into diplomatic relations with the new Government.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE FIRST GOVERNMENT

38. BEFORE carrying on the story of events it is as well to consider the parties into which the country now divided itself. I have tried as far as possible to avoid bringing into the story a lot of names which convey nothing to English ears.

The parties of the Douma had been roughly as follows. The extreme Rights were supporters of the old regime and were reactionary. Next to them came the Nationalists, who had dreams of an extended empire and were conservative. The Octobrists were more progressive, and their chief plank was a constitution on the basis of the decree of 17th October 1905. The constitutional democrats, as their name implies, stood for the constitution with wide democratic reforms; they are generally known as the Kadets, because the first two letters of the Russian words for their Russian name are KA and DE. The left consisted of the social democrats, who were really republicans, but before the revolution any orator who ex-

pressed his views too openly was of course arrested.

After the revolution the three first parties disappear, and the revolutionaries could proclaim any programme they pleased. There were many parties, with various shades of opinion, but those who really counted were the Kadets, the Social Revolutionaries, and the Bolsheviks.

The Kadets now formed the right. They included those who secretly longed for a monarchy, but were content to accept the revolution for the time being. They were anxious to continue the war to a victorious end; they wanted, at all costs, to maintain social order and to avoid anarchy. At first they were popular enough because of their former reputation. Their eloquent leader Miliukoff had been the boldest in pointing out to the Douma the scandals of the Raspoútin influence; he had demanded wide reforms, and had been looked upon as the leader of all the progressive parties; his popularity and power were immense. But as soon as the court influence was removed Miliukoff was the first to see that the swing of the pendulum might carry Russia into anarchy, and he at once put his weight into an attempt to maintain a sane equilibrium.

The Kadets were joined by the officer class, and this of itself was enough to bring them into suspicion with the R. S. Soviet. Then all those who had a stake in the country, the



landowners, the merchants, and even the revolutionary Intelligents began to be alarmed at the wild programmes of the Lefts, and therefore prepared to support the Kadets. Their opponents branded them as counter-revolutionaries, and probably half of them deserved the name. They were well organised.

The Intelligents, on the other hand, never had any party organisation and were never a real political party. They were a class which had been opposed to the old regime even violently, but they were moderate republicans, and were soon horrified at the course of events. Before the end of 1917 there was not an Intelligent in the country who did not long for the return of the Kadets. They may be compared with the French Girondists.

The Social Revolutionaries, commonly known as the S. R.'s, were now the left centre. In general they demanded the abolition of all property and class distinctions, the confiscation of the land without payment, the nationalisation of factories and mines. They did not press for a separate peace, but they believed that their dazzling propositions would soon spread over the rest of creation, and that a general peace would not only come quickly, but would abolish armies for ever from a world of international brotherhood. Many of them were honest fanatics who really believed their dreams might come true. Others were mere agitators who sought for power by appealing to the passions of the

people. Most of the leaders had been in prison or in exile. But they had different views of the paradise they were aiming at, and had not a sufficiently strong organisation to keep them united. As they were mostly people of peaceful intentions, who thought they could arrange the world by their own eloquence, they had no chance against the more robust methods of the Bolsheviks.

The above two parties and their ramifications all pinned their hopes on the "Ouchredietelnoye Sobranie," which was to be a preliminary parliament, elected by universal suffrage, and was to settle the future constitution of the country. The elections for this parliament took place in October, but it never assembled.

The Bolsheviks were the extreme lefts. The truth must be admitted that they were the most honest party in Russia. They knew what they wanted and meant to get it. What they wanted was power for themselves.

Their methods were delightfully simple; they saw that bayonets would have more weight than arguments, and therefore they laid themselves out to get the support of the army. This was not difficult. The soldiers had lost their discipline and their morale and were sick of the war. The Bolsheviks therefore demanded immediate peace at all costs, arguing that it was only the hated Emperor who had wanted war, and therefore now that

he was gone there could be no reason to go on fighting. They did not trouble to enter into the discussion of the conditions; they knew that the mass of the army would care nothing about the details. Thus they secured the support of an enormous number of men who were at the moment armed and equipped. Next they knew that they must have an organisation to control this mass. Again there was no difficulty. The committees were a ready-made organisation for the distribution of orders. The R. S. Soviet had been in the hands of the Bolsheviki from the first day of its existence. The subordinate committees were soon persuaded, bribed, or forced into submission. Thus they had a magnificent organisation which spread not only through the army but also over the working classes. It was especially effective for destructive or obstructive purposes; they could order a massacre of officers or a general strike on the railway. This latter was a powerful method of embarrassing any other party that happened to be in power.

We therefore find the unhappy Kerensky talking admirable sentiments, but dancing to quite another tune. He was assuring the English and the French journalists of his loyalty to the Entente, and was promising our representatives to restore the efficiency of the army; at the same time he was being pushed by the R. S. Soviet from one concession on to another; this at first deprived

him of the support of the Kadets and officers, and in the end left him alone.

In order to keep up an appearance of government by the masses, the Bolsheviks advertised themselves as the "Government of the Soviet," but, as a matter of fact, it was an intense concentration of power in the hands of two or three men. There was no disunion in their ranks, no arguments against the power of the dictators; they did not talk, they acted. When anybody became dangerous to them, they branded him as a counter-revolutionary, and had him shot.

It is difficult to say how far they were acting in definite concert with the Germans, but, in any case, their programme fitted in admirably with the plans of Berlin. The German propagandists, during the first few months, showed wonderful skill. Their methods were, of course, quite unscrupulous, and their arguments inconsistent and often contradictory, but that did not matter when it was merely a question of influencing the mass of the army. They held out the hand of brotherhood to Russia, called for peace, and went into all sorts of strange bypaths to corrupt the minds and confuse the judgment of the soldiers.

In Chapter VII. mention was made of Shoulgin, who was one of the two members of the Douma who received the abdication of the Emperor. In spite of this he is an ardent monarchist, and in one of his trenchant articles

he sums up all socialists as follows :—“ There is only this slight difference between them : the Bolsheviks do those things which the Mensheviks only talk about.”

**39. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.**—Free Russia dates itself from 2nd March because on that day the Emperor signed his abdication and the first Provisional Government was formed and proclaimed. The events of 1917 which followed may be grouped into three periods :—

The first period, from March to June. All good Russians started by making an honest attempt to get the best out of the revolution ; the various parties were consenting to sink their differences for the good of the common cause. But this happy state of affairs could not last ; the extremists were too violent and the moderates gradually dropped out, sick of the endeavour to reconcile the irreconcilable. The big question at issue was really the discipline of the army.

The second period, from July to the end of October, may be called the Kerensky period. The extremists of both sides made forcible attempts to grasp power. Kerensky defeated them in turn by playing them off against each other, but, of course, he thereby incurred their hatred, and as all the moderates had now disappeared, he was left practically alone. The third attempt at open force was therefore successful.

The third period is that of the Bolsheviks.

The most prominent members of the first Government were as follows:—

*President and Home Affairs.*—Prince G. E. Lvoff. He belonged to a small party called the Agriculturalists.

*Foreign Affairs.*—P. N. Miliukoff (Kadet).

*War.*—A. B. Gouchkoff (Octobrist).

*Finance.*—M. V. Tereshchenko (Kadet).

*Justice.*—A. F. Kerensky (Social Revolutionary).

The Government immediately issued a proclamation stating its programme as follows:—

1. Full amnesty to all political prisoners, including those arrested for terrorism, mutiny, and agrarian crimes.
2. Freedom of speech, of the press, of trades or other unions, of all kinds of meetings.
3. The abolition of all social and religious privileges. The equality of men.
4. The immediate election of a parliament by universal suffrage which should decide the future constitution of Russia.
5. The abolition of the police. Their place to be taken by national militia with elected officers.
6. Local governments to be elected by universal suffrage.
7. The retention in Petrograd of all the

troops which had joined the revolution up to 2nd March.

8. The grant of free civil and political rights to all soldiers as far as discipline and military service would permit.

These last two paragraphs were very popular, and were doubtless inspired by the R. S. Soviet. By this means the garrison of Petrograd escaped any further duty at the Front, and its loyalty to the Government was thereby assured.

It is to be noted that there was no mention of the war, of the allies, of the Germans, in this first programme of Free Russia.

All the arrangements for the organisation of the new government were completed by about 3 P.M. on 2nd March. With a list of the new ministers in his hands, Miliukoff went into the Catherine Hall, where there was a mass meeting of soldiers, sailors, and the public, and made an important speech, from which the following points are extracts :—

“ We meet in an historic moment. Only three days ago we were a modest opposition, and the Russian Government appeared to be all-powerful. Now that Government has fallen into the mud from which it sprung, and I and my friends are called by the revolution, the army, and the nation to the honourable position of first ministers in the National Cabinet. [Loud applause.] How could this event occur which lately seemed so improbable ?

“ How has it happened that the Russian Revolution has been almost the quickest and most bloodless of

all revolutions in the history of the world? It is because history knows no other government so stupid, so dishonourable, so cowardly, so treacherous as that which has just been overthrown. . . .”

. . . [He then appealed for unity and afterwards read out the list of ministers. The names of Lvoff and Gouchkoff were received with no enthusiasm; the Kadets were received with mixed hoots and cheers; Kerensky's name was received with tremendous applause. He then went on to speak of the constitution.]

“ . . . I cannot yet give you the details of our programme. You ask about the dynasty? I know my answer will not please all. The former despot who has brought Russia to dissolution will abdicate or be dethroned. [Loud applause.] His power will be transferred to a regent, Prince Michael. [Prolonged uproar—cries of dissent.] The heir will be Alexis. [Uproar—cries of ‘Down with the Romanoffs, down with princes, that is the old regime.’] Yes, the old regime which perhaps you do not love, and which perhaps I do not love. But the question at present is not who loves what. We cannot remain without a decision regarding the form of government. We propose a parliamentary and constitutional government. [Tremendous uproar—cries of ‘Long live the Republic.’] Perhaps other people would prefer something else, but if we stop to argue there will be civil war and the overthrown regime will return to power. But our choice is not irrevocable; you will find that the final decision will be made by a freely elected assembly. . . .”

Mr Miliukoff tried to make a few more remarks about freedom, but the uproar increased, and he broke down. His speech had produced a staggering effect. The people were shouting, “What does it mean? We have



worked and worked, and now he tells us that the monarchy still hangs round our necks!"

The tumult in the hall spread to the streets, and there was very nearly a riot of a bad kind. Some representatives of the soldiers' and workmen's organisations rushed to Miliukoff, who was forced to make a hurried explanation that his statements about the regency were only his personal views, and did not come from the Government. After this explanation the mob gradually became quieter.

There is no doubt that this outburst had a great influence on the further action of the Government; there were no more references to regencies or limited monarchies.

There is no doubt that all classes were practically unanimous in calling for the abolition of the old regime, and for the moment there was none so poor to do it reverence. But that was the limit of their unanimity. So the new Government was not a happy one.

In addition to the party feelings in Petrograd difficulties arose from the action of the revolutionaries in other big centres. In Ukraina, Kuban, the Crimea, and other places, "independent republics" were proclaimed; the local agitators were not prepared to submit themselves to the authority of Petrograd, and saw their opportunity to establish their own importance by forming governments of their own. By far the most important of these

was Ukraina. With its centre at the ancient capital Kiev, Ukraina embraced the whole of the southern portion of Russia. For more than a century the Ukrainians had been demanding Home Rule and National Rights. Now their chance had come to assert themselves, and there is little doubt that they received pecuniary aid and moral support from Germany. The prominent leaders were Grushevsky, Vinitshenko, and Petlura, who formed a local government, which called itself the Rada. Grushevsky had been a professor in the Austrian University at Lemberg, and even before the war was well known as an Austrophil. Vinitshenko was a clever writer of short and dramatic stories. They were sufficiently shrewd to see that popular opinion was all on the side of Socialism, and the main points of their programme were practically identical with those of the Government of Petrograd. But at the same time they could only maintain their own positions by appealing to local sentiment, and they therefore proclaimed their independence at the top of their voices, and refused to take any orders from the Provisional Government.

As a matter of fact, this movement had little effect on the general situation, for it was only an agitation by a handful of adventurers. But it did add to the embarrassments of those who were striving to keep the country together, and it was the first definite form of opposition to the revolutionary party of Petrograd.

But the big question before the country was the continuation of the war. The Kadets had honestly believed that the revolution would sweep away the traitors, and would pave the way for a determined effort for victory; they recognised that an army without discipline is not an army, and that experience and training are necessary in the higher ranks. The social revolutionaries talked vaguely of victory, but they were too far committed to "the equality of man" to support the experienced generals who had served under the Tsar. The extreme Lefts, who played only for popularity, cared nothing for victory or the national aspirations of Russia; they therefore appealed openly to the demand for "Freedom" from all discipline. It was therefore the question of discipline in the army which brought the Government to discord, and then to grief.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY

40. IN most parts of the army the first news of the revolution was received from German sources; each army corps had a wireless telegraphy installation which picked up the German communiqués. At first it was generally believed that this was only another case of German provocation; it is interesting, however, to note that the news was quite correct in this instance, and that the Germans were much better informed than the allies. Then the telegram was received which stated that the Committee of the Douma had taken over the government of the country, and it was evident that the change had really taken place. At first this news produced little effect at the Front; it was thought that the Emperor and his incapable Government had been forced to make way for better men, and it was believed that such a change would certainly be for the better. The senior officers at once accepted the new regime; the whole army was required to take an oath of loyalty to the new Government, and did so without

protest. Nothing was known of the state of affairs in Petrograd, and the whole thing was regarded much as we regard a change of ministry in England.

When it was evident that the new Government included a socialist element and had permitted the Soviet to issue independent orders, there was a revolt of feeling among the officers, who felt they had been tricked. Then followed the celebrated Order No. 1 of the Soviet, destroying all discipline, and immediately afterwards a crowd of specialist agitators spread along the Front and harangued the newly established committees. Worse than all was the effect produced by the reinforcements which were sent up to the Front from the towns in the rear, where the fury of the revolution had burst with savage force. The position of the officers became worse from day to day.

Matters came to a head through an incident in the 9th Army. A batch of reinforcements came up to the 26th Corps wearing all sorts of ribbons and insignia of revolutionary colours, which the Corps Commander ordered them to remove while on parade. The soldiers broke into open mutiny and wounded the Corps Commander. General Lechitsky, the able Commander of the 9th Army, then came and paraded the men; at first they received him with the usual cheers, but at the end of his speech they refused to deliver the Commander of the Corps, whom they kept arrested. Gouch-

koff, the Minister of War, was at that time in Jassy; Lechitsky at once reported to him, but he refused to take action, and therefore Lechitsky immediately resigned; his resignation was followed by that of many others, and it became evident that the senior officers would not be able to act with the new Government.

Gouchkoff has been very severely blamed for his weakness at this period. He had in his time rendered valuable services to his country; he had been a member of the Douma, where he was leader of the Octobrists; then he was President of a Commission of Industry, which was appointed to organise the factories of the country for military purposes; his position then was something like that of our Minister of Munitions, and he was generally considered to have done as much as could be expected. His appointment as Minister of War was well received and great things were hoped from him. But he had been in Petrograd at the time of the revolution, and probably knew, much better than the officers at the Front, the temper of the revolutionaries. In March and April he was either playing for popularity or was swept along by the forces which surrounded him; in any case, he failed to support the senior officers. But by the end of April he himself recognised that matters were going too far and he resigned, to make room for Kerensky.

In Petrograd the split between the Government and the Soviet was growing more pro-

nounced, and by the end of May Miliukoff and the other Kadets had resigned. The Coalition Government was then formed, including four pronounced socialists, with Kerensky as Prime Minister and Minister of War. About the same time Lenin and Trotsky came from Germany and captured the Soviet.

Kerensky was at first well received in the army; he toured the Front and made speeches to the troops, and generally showed an intelligent interest in the situation. He was a very fine speaker, and knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of his audience; he insisted on "War to a victorious finish," which pleased the officers, and at the same time held out brilliant pictures of the fruits of the revolution for the benefit of the ranks; he was clever enough to avoid all topics which were likely to arouse friction. I regret that I never had an opportunity of hearing him, for many officers have told me that his speeches were really inspiring, and that if there had been a dozen Kerenskies in each army the enthusiasm would have been sufficient to counteract the other evils. But one man can do little in an army of ten millions, and in the second place he was a voice and nothing more. While he talked, the Soviet was busy acting.

41. THE ARMY.—In June 1917, for the first time, I made a tour of that part of the Russian Front which was in Roumania; it ran along the crest of the Carpathians, then cut across

to Galatz, and thence followed the Danube down to the sea. I was accompanied by a clever Russian officer who was most useful in helping me to understand everything we saw.

The impression that "the army of freedom" left upon me was too bad for words to express. While still one hundred miles behind the line we met a division on the march, and I very nearly turned back at once in order to telegraph to London the hopeless state of the Russian army.

The British retreat from Mons was not a pretty sight from the drill sergeants' point of view: the units were mixed up; tired and footsore men could not keep their places in the ranks, and many of them had lost their equipment. But they were always ready to turn and make a fight of it; and those who can see below paint and pipeclay would always be proud to command such men. The Russian division, marching on a good high road, a hundred miles away from shot or shell, was a far more depressing sight. The only men who were moving in any kind of formation were parties carrying scarlet banners: "Long live the Revolution"; the rest were strung out along the road for over twelve miles. Here and there a young officer was walking along by himself in a shamefaced way, but there were no senior officers to be seen at all. About thirty per cent. of the men had no rifles; but all were loaded up with what looked like miscellaneous loot.



In the trenches the disorder was not so apparent; the weather was fine, there was no firing, and life looked comfortable. Some divisions maintained a show of respect for the officers, but in others the men were taking a delight in humiliating their commanders, and exhibiting their own ideas of freedom.

We were well received wherever we went, and all ranks were eager to talk and argue.

The staffs were better than I expected; somehow I had got an idea that they were rather uneducated in modern staff duties. This was not the case, but it must be admitted they were having an easy time as far as the enemy were concerned, and their work was infinitely more simple than in our army in France. The divisions very rarely changed places in the trenches, and so the corps and army staffs had none of the worries of working out constant reliefs. Information was easily collected, because half a dozen deserters would come over every night, and, as they were willing to give all the news they had, they made the work of the Intelligence very simple. There was practically no firing, perhaps a dozen rounds of gun-fire would be heard in the day, and this, of course, did away with transport worries about the supply of ammunition and the collection of wounded. The divisions were so widely spread out that there seemed to be no difficulty about billets. Only an overworked brigade major or staff-captain in France can appreciate

what it means to say—"No reliefs, no casualty lists, no billeting."

The Engineers were very good. There were bridges over the Sereth, some of them a couple of hundred yards long, which had been well and quickly built. The carpentering in the trenches and dug-outs was very fair as far as we saw, especially in the Carpathians, where timber was plentiful.

The regimental officers varied very much; in some cases, especially in the cavalry, they were cheery and confident, but in many infantry regiments they were of poor class, and admitted they were in fear of their own men and never went near them.

In many cases all the work of the regimental staffs had been left in the hands of the committees.

These committees were the pet children of the revolution. At first they were intended to represent the views of the men regarding internal economy, something like the Sergeants' Mess Committee of an English battalion; and if there had been any discipline to keep them within bounds, they might have been really useful, for no doubt the officers were out of touch with the men. But even as early as June 1917 they had got entirely out of hand and were the cause of all the mischief in the army; some of the orders they issued were incredibly foolish, and nobody could punish them or disregard them. Each company, regiment, division, corps, army, and front had its com-

mittee, and there were countless others in every station and town in the rear. General Scherbatcheff, the capable commander of the Roumanian Front, told me that in all Russia there were about 850,000 men employed in committees; each man received 5 roubles (10 shillings) a day extra pay; army committees received 10 roubles. They did not work in the trenches, in fact they did no work of any kind, unless continuous talking can be regarded as serious business. In fact, a seat on a committee was as soft a job as the heart of any loafer could desire.

If the situation had not been tragic it would have been funny. They were always ready to receive British officers, and I have never heard of a case in which they were insolent; but they would ask questions by the hour. They used to get reams of revolutionary propaganda served out from Petrograd and elsewhere, and these formed the basis of their "heckling"; a great deal of the propaganda was inspired by Germany, and some of the documents came straight over from the enemy's lines. Proceedings were something like a village debating society, and were strictly "in order"; they began with "question time." The questions touched every topic under the sun; for some reason (doubtless a German one) they were very fond of Ireland. "Will mooshoo"—it was the fashion on the Roumanian Front to address honourable members as "mooshoo"—"Will mooshoo explain why Irishmen are

forced to fight for England?" I replied that mooshoo was misinformed; there was no compulsory service in Ireland, but that several very fine Irish divisions of volunteers were fighting side by side with other Britons against the common enemy. Mooshoo scratched his head and asked why, in that case, the British Government had refused to allow labour delegates to attend some conference in Stockholm; I asked for notice of the question. I think my honourable friend was shy about committing himself further, because he was not sure in his own mind whether Stockholm was the capital of Ireland, or Ireland was the capital of Stockholm. Then we sat down to consider a model constitution, which would provide beer and baccy for everybody. It was all quite serious and good-natured, but it was sad to see these men, fine fellows most of them, passing silly resolutions and interfering with work.

The interference was appalling; one case which I can vouch for may be quoted as an example of many. In October 1917 plans were made for a local attack by a combined force of Russians and Roumanians. The two staffs worked out the scheme together in perfect accord, and all the orders were issued in much the same way, though with not so much detail, as in France. A Russian force, about a brigade, was to seize and hold the enemy's front position; a Roumanian brigade was then to follow up and go right through

and swing to the left, in hopes of cutting off an Austrian salient and thereby making a bag of prisoners. General Averescu showed me his scheme and was very confident of success. When the hour for the infantry assault arrived nothing happened. It turned out afterwards that the Russian operation orders had been discussed by a committee; the orders were not communicated to them till the last moment for fear that they might get into the hands of spies; the committee considered themselves tacticians and declared that the basis of a good attack is that all troops should advance simultaneously; they therefore gave *their* orders that the Russians should not move before the Roumanians. The Russian Corps commander was General Nekrasoff, a fine old soldier who was later on murdered by Bolsheviks. He galloped up and urged the men to attack, leading them in person. But of course it was too late and the enemy had got the alarm, so a very promising little show came to nothing. The committee, as a matter of course, went unpunished.

The physique of the men was very fine; they are tall, lusty fellows, and would compare well with any army in the world. The cavalry horses were magnificent—every one of them looked fit to be put in a hunting stable; the Government had imported very good blood and kept stud sires at low fees. The men rode fairly well, rather too loosely for riding school tastes, but without pulling their horses

about. The Kossacks are absurdly overrated; they are good fellows and brave, but their education in musketry and technical subjects is very elementary, and in horse management and trick riding they are far below an Indian cavalry regiment.

Take it all round there was plenty of good material there, but there was no doubt that discipline had vanished, and as a fighting force the Russian army had no value at all. The Germans, of course, knew it. I am convinced they could have broken through the front at any time after June 1917. But they also knew that the Russian army would dissolve of its own accord, and they did not think it worth while to lose even a few men in hastening the dissolution. They made two offensives in 1917, at Marashesti and Riga, but these were comparatively minor affairs.

The British War Cabinet was well aware of the situation, but gave orders that Russia must "Keep up an end" as long as possible in order to give time for the Americans to come in effectively. So we went through the rather dismal farce of "bucking them up" and propaganding as long as possible. The end, however, was already in sight, and it is only surprising that it did not come sooner; I repeat that the Germans could have brought it about any time they liked after June 1917.

42. *July* 1917.—To get back to the story of events. It was recognised at the Stafka (the

Russian General Headquarters) that unless a success could be obtained the army would fall to pieces, and therefore plans were made for an attack which was to take place south of Tarnopol. It was originally meant to take place at the end of May, but for various reasons was postponed from time to time. In June Alexeieff resigned, and Brusiloff was appointed commander-in-chief. At last, on 1st July, the attack was actually launched, and at first it met with a success which surprised even the most sanguine. Assisted by some British armoured cars under Commander Locker Lampson, the Russians easily broke through the first lines of the Austrians, who showed little resistance and surrendered in thousands. In the first couple of days the advance reached a maximum depth of over twenty miles and the prisoners amounted to 40,000. But this success did not last long; ammunition and rations ran short in the front lines, and the transport was not good enough to keep up the supply. Kerensky rushed round exhorting the men to further efforts, but the advance had spent itself, and the reaction began. The blame for any mismanagement was of course laid on the officers "of the old regime," and the men openly criticised their superiors, sometimes to their faces. I remember being asked at the time if England and France were going to do nothing to support this brilliant success, and it was evident that German agents were busy. So,

after a halt of a week or so, it only required a small effort on the part of the enemy to turn the tide.

On 6th July began the retirement which soon turned into the most disorderly rout that has ever been seen during the whole of the war. Arms and equipment were thrown away; officers who tried to stop the flight were shot by their own men, and no resistance was shown anywhere. Had the enemy been in a position to continue the advance there seemed to be no limit to the distance they might go, and even now it is difficult to say why they stopped; it can only be guessed that their transport was unable to keep up. Whatever the cause may have been they came to a halt near their former line, and the Russians had time to draw their breath and consider their disaster.

On 15th July part of the Petrograd garrison mutinied and tried to turn out the Provisional Government in favour of the Soviet. But General Korniloff was at that time commander in Petrograd, and through his strong influence the greater part of the garrison stood loyal and the mutiny was suppressed with little bloodshed. But no serious punishment was dealt out either to the mutineers or to the cowards of Tarnopol. The meetings in Petrograd were more numerous than ever and were addressed by the most violent of the agitators; they declared that war to a victory would only be to the advantage of France,



England, and the capitalists, in fact, it would be fatal to the revolution, and they therefore demanded peace at once "without annexations or indemnities." Such cries appealed to the rabble, and the country found itself slipping into the abyss of anarchy.

Just a small amount of comfort was gained from the operations on the Roumanian Front. The Roumanian army, after its disastrous retreat from Vallachia, had had six months' rest. General Berthelot, with a staff of over 300 officers, had come out from France to give the Roumanians the benefit of their experience of modern warfare. The cheery and optimistic general was an ideal man for the task, and his unfailing good humour and tact were just the qualities required to inspire the unfortunate Roumanians with fresh hope and determination. The French officers threw themselves with enthusiasm into their new work, and in the first six months of 1917 the Roumanians had reorganised, equipped, and trained fifteen very useful divisions. The Roumanian commander-in-chief, General Prezan, now found himself in a position to think of offensive action, and an attack was planned, in conjunction with some Russian troops, for the middle of July. Everything seemed to be ready, and some preliminary artillery work had already been done when the news of the Tarnopol disaster was received. No one could tell how far the enemy's advance would go, no one could guess what the Russian troops on the Roumanian Front might do—so,

with bitter regrets, the proposed attack had to be abandoned.

But the Germans had evidently been well informed that such an attack was pending, and had collected considerable reserves to meet it. General Mackensen, who commanded them, hearing of the Russian rout at Tarnopol, thought that he could score a cheap success and finish with Roumania for ever. In July he therefore began an attack which developed into the fiercely-fought battle of Marashesti, between the Carpathians and the River Sereth. The Roumanians bore the brunt of the attack, and did so with honour; on their right were the 7th and 8th Russian Corps, probably the two best corps in the whole Russian army; one or two of the regiments were infected by Bolshevism and gave way, but, on the whole, these two corps put up a good resistance which was by far the most creditable effort ever done by the army of the revolution. For a fortnight the Germans attacked with fury, but only gained a few miles of ground, and in doing so they completely wrecked ten of their divisions.

The battle of Marashesti was a distinct victory for the Roumanians, and saved the situation for the next four months.

## CHAPTER X

### THE KORNILOFF AFFAIR

THE "Army of Committees" had broken up into a terrified mob. Even the Preobrajensky Guards, the pet regiment of Peter the Great, the heroes of every Russian campaign, disgraced themselves.

What was to be done? Kerensky has written a book on the subject, called *The Korniloff Affair*. I have studied it carefully, and practically the whole of this chapter is extracted from it; the references are to the pages in the Russian edition of the book; I do not know if there is an English translation.

Kerensky himself recognised that freedom had gone too far in the army, and that discipline must be restored. He loudly extols the resolute action of the Provisional Government, and points out that *immediately after* the disaster they issued strong orders on the subject of discipline. But his own defence reveals two fatally weak spots. First, the wise Provisional Government only recognised the need of such discipline *after* the painful lesson of Tarnopol; he never explains why

these steps were not taken beforehand. Second, though he was forced to recognise the need of discipline he was not going to let the army generals have any say in the matter ; according to his own words (p. 8) :—

“The Government had to watch carefully that the natural reaction against the maximalism of the Left did not change into the maximalism of the Right.”

A council was assembled at the Stafka on 16th July. Kerensky himself was present ; also the Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Alexeieff, the late commander-in-chief ; Brusiloff, the actual commander-in-chief ; Denekin, and other senior officers.

This council was an affair of tremendous importance, because it brought out quite clearly the fact that the army chiefs had no confidence in themselves or their men under the present system. Kerensky himself recognised this (p. 10) :—

“Alas, not a single great leader revealed himself at this council, not even a single military specialist who could answer to the requirements of modern warfare. But I am convinced that they did not reveal themselves, not because they could not, but because they did not want to. All the failures and misfortunes of the last three years of war were forgotten. According to these generals the cause and origin of the July disaster was the revolution and its effect on the Russian soldier. And so Russia and the Provisional Government were left at this important moment without leaders and without advice.”

This last sentence of Kerensky's is untrue.

The generals were ready to give advice—in fact it was given: Denekin gave it very strongly; Kerensky himself says (p. 14):—

“While the others were reserved Denekin behaved as a straightforward and simple soldier; he came out with a speech which none of the others would have dared to pronounce in the presence of the head of a Government; the old regime would scarcely have begun to listen to such a speech. There were personal attacks on myself. He demanded the immediate suppression of the elected committees, the enforcement of the full power of officers, the re-establishment of the old orders regarding the saluting of officers—such was the programme of Denekin! In other words it was the re-establishment of the old order of things.”

Kerensky noticed that the other generals all tacitly agreed with Denekin, but as the advice did not suit his book he wipes it out as “entirely ridiculous opinions and propositions,” and states that the Government was “left without advice.” So the Prime Minister and his generals parted in mutual disgust.

It is a matter of opinion whether any good would have come of it if Kerensky had followed the advice. The army was in such a rotten condition that perhaps it was already too late; and probably this was in Kerensky's mind, for he says (p. 15):—

“The position was such that events might develop with fatal rapidity, unless there was a strong hand felt along the whole front; but on the other hand I had to reckon with the fact that the appointment of a man with Denekin's programme would at once

have provoked an outburst in the whole mass of the ranks."

However that may be, there can be no doubt that after this conference the position was hopeless; Kerensky had definitely rejected the advice of the experienced military men, and he never asked for it again. He shut himself up with a lot of civilian politicians, who proceeded to govern the army from the political point of view. Kerensky went back to Petrograd and appointed Korniloff commander-in-chief. Korniloff had been Commander of the 8th Army, and then for a few days commander-in-chief of the South-Western Front. He had not been present at the painful conference, but he immediately showed that he was of just the same opinion as the other generals. On the day after his appointment he telegraphed his "demands" for the re-establishment of discipline, and the imposition of the death penalty for desertion and cowardice. Kerensky was in a fix. He quite realised the necessity for some sort of order, but he did not want to appear to be yielding to a mere general; he says (p. 21):—

"Some of the Government wanted to accept Korniloff's demands in full; but I myself and the majority thought that the demands could only be material for the consideration of the Government, and that we could not change our principles, *i.e.*, we must adopt the necessary measures by degrees and in such a way so as not to provoke unnecessary excitement in the country."

It was obviously Kerensky's duty to accept Korniloff's demands or else to dismiss him; he did neither one thing nor the other. Presumably his reasons were, first, that he agreed in his own heart with the proposals, and second that there was nobody else to take Korniloff's place.

So for over a month this impossible and unpractical state of affairs dragged on; Kerensky says (p. 26):—

“From this time I received every week from General Korniloff some kind of ultimatum. I repeat that against these demands and against this manner of dealing with the Supreme Power *I waged the most resolute war from the first day to the last. . . .* But in these long weeks full of strained warfare it is impossible for anyone to find even one case of active opposition to the staff on the part of the Provisional Government. . . . The war of the Government with Korniloff expressed itself, so to speak, in passive defence, and did so in such a way that he and his adherents did not succeed in going one step beyond the bounds laid down by the Government; and all his attempts to bring his demands to life, using the Government as a means, ended in complete failure.”

In other words Korniloff was expected to command the army, but was not to ask the Government for any assistance.

Kerensky's book contains nearly 200 pages, but it is all on the same lines as the above extracts. He keeps on repeating that he was all for discipline, strong measures, and efficiency, but he also keeps on blaming the generals for

asking for what he himself approved on the page before.

The unfortunate country was therefore divided into two distinct camps; the commander-in-chief, and with him all officers of experience and training, demanded discipline; Kerensky and his politicians, while making some shuffling admissions about the desirability of discipline, resolutely refused to carry out the proposals of the commander-in-chief. The natural result was that Kerensky and Korniloff undermined each other's positions to such an extent that they both fell into the hole.

Between the 11th and 15th August a big conference was held at Moscow; representatives of all parties were present; there was plenty of oratory, but it all came to very little. The object of the Government was (p. 64) "not to force any events and not to provoke any explosions." Kerensky talked a lot about the earnest intentions of the Government to restore the efficiency of the army, but all definite questions about the death penalty and the powers of officers were successfully shirked.

Korniloff's position was quite clear throughout. He saw that the elements of disorder were spreading; shameful cowardice had been shown at the front and went unpunished; in the rear there were thefts, arson, and insubordination, equally unpunished. He naturally appealed to the Minister of War for assistance



and power; immediately on his appointment he stated his proposals; to emphasise them he followed up with the "weekly ultimatum." Nothing was done. He predicted that the Bolsheviks would finally become so strong that they would overturn the Government, and in this prediction he was perfectly correct, as events proved.

He therefore decided on the desperate step of open action to force a decision. He wanted to establish real power in the country, and thought that the best form of it would be a dictatorship. Personal ambition did not enter into his considerations; he was willing to be a dictator himself, but was equally willing to support a directory. Even Kerensky admits that Korniloff was quite sincere, and was only actuated by a sense of patriotism (p. 5): "I consider it my duty to emphasise that I never doubted his love for the Fatherland; I saw that the cause of his action was not malignant intention but absolute inexperience in politics."

Korniloff ordered a mixed force to move towards Petrograd; it consisted of the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the Tousemnaia Division, which is formed of Mahommedans from the Caucasus; these troops were chosen because it was thought that they had not been contaminated by the Bolshevik propaganda; the force was commanded by General Krimoff. His orders were, in case of any Bolshevik agitation, to occupy Petrograd, disarm the

garrison and population, and drive out the committees.

Korniloff, however, intended to act quite openly, and to keep Kerensky informed of his intentions. The chief intermediary between Korniloff and Kerensky was Lvoff; he had been a minister, but had resigned his post in July.

Lvoff had his first conversation on the subject with Kerensky about 22nd August (pp. 101 and 102). He said that Kerensky had lost the support of all parties, and must now rely on actual force, also that he, Lvoff, could assist Kerensky if the latter would consent to certain alterations in the Government; he emphasised that he was in a position to give assistance. Kerensky naturally wanted to know who was behind Lvoff, but the latter replied that he was not able to divulge more until he knew Kerensky's views. Kerensky said: "Before I give my views I must know with whom I have to deal—who it is that speaks—what he says—in whose name you speak." Lvoff replied: "That means you will enter into conversation if I tell you this." Kerensky said: "Tell me more definitely what you want to know from me, and why." With this the first conversation ended; Lvoff was left under the impression that Kerensky was ready to reopen the question, so he went back to the Stafka on 24th August.

On 25th August, Lvoff had a long talk with Korniloff, and it was arranged that he

should go back to Kerensky with definite proposals.

The 26th August was an important day; Lvoff went back to Petrograd and had his second conversation with Kerensky and laid the whole matter before him. Kerensky gives the following account of it (p. 105):—

“On 26th August, about 6 P.M., Lvoff came into my official study, and after a long talk about my position and his wish to save me, he made the following statement on behalf of General Korniloff. The general warned me that the Government would find no support against the Bolsheviks; that personally he could not answer for my life except at the Stafka; that further continuance in power of the Provisional Government was impossible—therefore he proposed that I should urge the Government to hand over all authority to the commander-in-chief and declare martial law throughout Russia; I myself, and Savinkoff, my assistant, should proceed at once to the Stafka; that we should both be appointed to posts in the new Government.

“I could scarcely believe that Lvoff was serious, but when I was convinced of this I resolved to get confirmation of Lvoff's mission. I asked him to state Korniloff's points on paper. He showed readiness, confidence, and quickness in agreeing, and wrote as follows:—‘General Korniloff proposes (1) to declare a state of siege in Petrograd; (2) that all civil and military power be handed over to the commander-in-chief; (3) that all ministers resign, including the Prime Minister, and hand over the business of their offices to their assistants until a Cabinet has been formed by the commander-in-chief.’

“While Lvoff was writing I was thinking. It was necessary to establish formally the connection

between Lvoff and Korniloff so that the Government could take decisive steps the same evening."

In order to confirm Lvoff's mission they decided to go together and have a talk with Korniloff over the direct wire. Arrangements were made to call up Korniloff at 8.30 P.M. They then parted for the moment; this conversation had taken place between 6 and 7 P.M.

At 8.30 Kerensky and Korniloff were each at their ends of the direct wire, but Lvoff had not arrived. Kerensky decided to carry on without him. The official record of the conversation is on record, and runs as follows:—

"The Prime Minister awaits General Korniloff.

"General Korniloff is at the apparatus.

"*Kerensky*—'Good evening, General. This is Kerensky and Lvoff. We want you to confirm that Kerensky can act in accordance with the representations made by Lvoff.'

"*Korniloff*—'Good evening, Kerensky; good evening, Lvoff. Yes, I confirm the outline of the situation which I gave to Lvoff, and again declare that the events of the last few days demand a very definite and immediate decision.'

"*Lvoff*—'I, Lvoff, ask you is it necessary to take that decision which you asked me to communicate personally to Kerensky? without this personal confirmation from you Kerensky hesitates to believe in it.'

"*Korniloff*—'Yes, I confirm that I asked you to communicate to Kerensky my urgent request that he should come to the Stafka.'

"*Kerensky*—'I understand your reply as confirming the message conveyed to me by Lvoff. It is

impossible to do this and to come to-night. I hope to come to-morrow; do you want Savinkoff too?’

“*Korniloff*—‘I urgently beg that Savinkoff will come with you. What I said to Lvoff about you applies equally to Savinkoff. I beg you not to put off your departure later than to-morrow. I entreat you to believe that only the feeling of the importance of the moment forces me to urge you so strongly.’

“*Kerensky*—‘Am I to come only in the case of an uprising of which there are rumours, or in any case?’

“*Korniloff*—‘In any case.’

“*Kerensky*—‘Good-bye; we will meet soon.’

“*Korniloff*—‘Au revoir.’”

After this conversation, which had taken place from the Ministry of War, Kerensky met Lvoff, and they went back together to his house; on the way Kerensky told Lvoff that he had decided to go to the Stafka after all. When they got back to Kerensky’s study, he succeeded in getting Lvoff to repeat their conversation of the afternoon, while a third person was concealed in the room as a witness.

At 10 P.M. Lvoff was arrested by order of Kerensky.

Some capital has been made by Korniloff’s friends of the fact that Kerensky said to Korniloff that Lvoff was present at the telephonic conversation, and spoke in his name. This, however, is not important; it was purely accidental that Lvoff did not turn up in time, and doubtless the conversation would have gone just the same way had he been present. The really important point of this conversation

is the impression it left on Korniloff. He had sent Lvoff with his definite proposals; he of course gathered that Lvoff had arranged the whole matter with Kerensky, who had merely come to the telephone in order to get a personal confirmation, and had then clearly stated that he would come to the Stafka, and hoped they would soon meet. Korniloff therefore thought that he was acting with the full consent of Kerensky. When he afterwards found out that this was not the case, he and his adherents accused Kerensky of a deliberate change of plans which amounted to a betrayal.

Kerensky hotly defends himself, and declares that he never gave any consent to Korniloff's main propositions, and never dreamed of accepting his proposals. This is no doubt quite true, as far as it goes; he so distrusted Korniloff and the Stafka that he never dreamed of acting in close conjunction with them. But there is no doubt that on 26th August he did state that he would come to the Stafka, and thereby deliberately gave Korniloff the impression that he knew all about the plans and agreed with them. So he has only himself to blame if his opponents accused him of treachery, when they found he had deceived them. Alexeieff, the most moderate and accurate of men, afterwards said in a letter that the participation of Kerensky was indisputable. And this was the universal opinion of the better class of Russians.

Kerensky by his "slimness" had discovered

the plot and was able to defeat it—but at the same time he signed the death warrant of his own Government and destroyed any faith which anybody still felt towards himself. When the Bolshevik rising came there was not an officer, not a responsible person, who would support him or even sympathise with him.

Prince Troubetzkoy was with Korniloff during the conversation, and he carries on the story as follows :—

“Korniloff heaved a sigh of relief. ‘Well,’ I said, ‘so the Government agrees with you entirely.’ ‘Yes,’ he said, and presuming that between himself and the Prime Minister there was the fullest agreement he at once issued orders in confirmation of the plans already conceived for the movement of the necessary forces on Petrograd.”

On 26th August, after the arrest of Lvoff, Kerensky called a meeting of the Government and made a report; it was decided to dismiss Korniloff. The meeting was stormy; two members of the Cabinet resigned on the spot; Kerensky was empowered to take steps to deal with any action by Korniloff.

On 27th August a telegram was sent to Korniloff ordering him to hand over his command to the chief of staff.

Korniloff considered he had been betrayed; he had acted quite openly in telling Kerensky of his intentions, and up to this moment he had honestly believed that he and Kerensky would together be able to pull Russia out of

the mess. But finding at the last moment that Kerensky had been playing with him he lost his temper—he was always impulsive and hot-headed. His advanced troops under Krimoff were already on their way to Petrograd, and he himself was fairly committed to the venture. He therefore decided to carry on; he refused to hand over his command, and published a declaration appealing to the nation and army for support.

Miliukoff, Alexeieff, and others strongly urged Kerensky to compromise, and offered themselves as emissaries to Korniloff; they knew that the Bolsheviki were dangerous, and they did not want to have a split between the army officers and the more reasonable republicans.

Kerensky, however, refused all mediation. He looked on the whole movement as a personal attack on himself and he threw himself into the arms of the Left by proclaiming Korniloff as a "counter-revolutionary" and appealing to the Soviets for support.

The rest of the story is soon told. General Krimoff, who was leading the 3rd Cavalry Corps on Petrograd, was the most honest of men, and quite convinced, as was Korniloff, that he was on his way to assist the Government with the full assent of Kerensky. But when he arrived some twenty miles from the capital he found the railway torn up. He himself went straight on by motor to consult with Kerensky, and had an interview which lasted for some time; when he came out from



it he immediately went and shot himself. The news of this tragedy spread consternation in his force, and the Bolshevik propagandists soon persuaded the men to avoid all further action.

Kerensky can boast that he defeated the Korniloff movement if that brings him any satisfaction.

The Korniloff affair has been considered at length because it is a definite milestone in the progress of the revolution. The first phase had ended when Miliukoff and the Kadets left the Cabinet in July, and Kerensky found himself supreme. During the second phase, the officers were hoping against hope to redeem the honour of Russia, and they submitted to much indignity in order to serve their country and the allies. From this moment, however, a great change was observable; they had lost all hope. Scarcely a single officer of any capability remained at his post, and the regimental officers gave up all attempts to check the current of anarchy in the army.

Verhovsky was appointed Minister of War. He was a young officer, only thirty-seven years of age, of undoubted ability, but he had an unenviable reputation in the army. He was of good birth and had been educated in the Imperial Corps of Pages, which was the special college for the sons of the aristocracy. Even there he had gained notoriety through his dealing with revolutionary circles. In the

first years of the war he gained distinction in the field and was personally congratulated by the Emperor, to whom he expressed the most grateful and devoted loyalty. But as soon as the revolution broke out he played for popularity with the new Powers. He has written a book, with a view of explaining his wisdom and his foresight, but it is quite unconvincing. He was looked upon by the officers as dishonest, and his appointment was the final stage in the disorganisation of the army.

From this moment the success of the Bolsheviks was assured.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE BOLSHEVIKS

THE "Korniloff affair" collapsed at the end of August (old style), but the Provisional Government dragged out its existence for another couple of months. It was, however, only on sufferance. The German forces could have done anything they liked from without, and the dangers from within were even more threatening and more obvious. Kerensky had scarcely a friend left in the country; as has already been explained, the officers looked upon him as their worst enemy; the soldiers were captivated by the promise of peace held out by the Bolsheviks; the country was sick of the general state of uncertainty. His only supporters were the embassies of the allies. The members of our War Cabinet in England were well aware of the situation, but knowing that the Bolsheviks were pledged to immediate peace, their only hope, as far as Russia was concerned, was that the evil day might yet be postponed a little longer. They therefore made the best of matters by maintaining friendly relations with the Provisional Govern-

ment, and offering it some good advice which was not taken. But even this support involved Kerensky in fresh difficulties; he could count upon it only as long as he maintained an apparently firm attitude on the question of the war; but as his old promises about the land and the distribution of wealth had lost the charm of their first attraction, the only cry that would now appeal to the masses was "Peace at once," and that cry he would not utter.

The Bolsheviks had no such scruples and made the most of the situation. The cry for peace was raised in every committee, and the R. S. Soviet was the only real power in the land.

Kerensky appointed himself commander-in-chief with General Dukhonin as his Chief of Staff at the Stafka. Some schemes were started to appease the discontent of the troops, but were hopelessly ineffective. First Verhovsky recognised that the army of ten millions could not be fed; he therefore thought that it would be politic to reduce the numbers, which would, at the same time, ease the question of supplies and allow some of the malcontents to go home. So he issued an order to demobilise all men over forty years of age. This made confusion worse confounded. The men heard of the order and started to carry it out without waiting for any arrangements to be made by the staff. They simply left the trenches and walked to the nearest

railway station; there they seized the trains and turned out anybody who happened to be in them, and then forced the driver to move eastwards. The effect of this sudden rush of a couple of million men on the already disorganised railway system defies description. Every station and every approach to a station was blocked by seething masses of soldiers who were ready to shoot anybody who attempted to control them or restore order. Besides those who, by Verhovsky's order, were to be demobilised, hundreds of thousands of others took the opportunity to desert; there were no records to show whether they belonged to the demobilised classes or not, and there was nobody who dared or cared to arrest a deserter. In October anarchy reached its zenith.

Another scheme of Verhovsky's was to "nationalise" the forces. Up to this time the Kossacks were a distinct force, but other nationalities, such as Poles, Ukrainians, and Tartars, were mixed up in the ranks. The new idea was to regroup them and form complete divisions of Poles, etc. This produced further disorganisation. The only immediate effect was that each nationality established its own committees everywhere, and the number of committees was thereby trebled. But in other respects the scheme only furnished another excuse for desertion; the men left one unit saying they were going to join their national division, and then proceeded home.

In October the R. S. Soviet issued some proclamations, obviously aimed at the Government, insisting on quite impossible programmes which included universal peace and internationalism. It was evident that Lenin and Trotsky were getting ready for action.

On 25th October (old style) the Provisional Government was sitting in full assembly, discussing the Austrian suggestions for peace which had just been issued from Vienna. Suddenly the news was brought in that the mutiny had broken out. The ministers immediately began to reckon up the forces on whom they could rely, and found that they consisted of the Cadets of the Military College and the Women's Death Battalion!

Kerensky then explained that he had foreseen the rising and had collected troops at Gatchina to deal with it, so he must at once proceed thither to place himself at their head. He therefore went off as hard as he could to Gatchina, which lies thirty miles southwest of Petrograd. The other members of the Government were arrested and taken to the Peter and Paul fortress; on the way their hats and cloaks were snatched from them and they themselves were nearly torn in pieces. The rabble then made for the Winter Palace, whence they ejected the Women's Battalion, and then took to looting the place, especially the cellars. Freedom was advancing with rapid strides.

The troops at Gatchina consisted chiefly of Kossacks collected from the Northern Front. Lenin immediately sent a detachment of sailors against them, and the two forces entrenched themselves opposite each other, and remained inactive. Kerensky pushed on down to Pskov, which was the headquarters of the Northern Front and had an interview with its Commander Cheremisoff, asking him for more support. Some troops were put into a train and Kerensky went back with them to Gatchina. But there he found that in his absence the Kossacks had made friends with the sailors, and they told him plainly that they would no longer protect him. Kerensky fled; it is believed he escaped in disguise to Sweden.

Lenin and Trotsky were now supreme, and they set about their job in a business-like way which, in spite of its frightfulness, was almost refreshing after the methods of the Provisional Government. They owed their power entirely to the R. S. Soviet, but having gained their object they had no further use for that turbulent assembly, so their first step was to get rid of it. To keep up the pretence of popular and socialist government they made proclamations; first, that all power belongs to the people; second, that the people would exercise that power through the soviets; third, that the soviets should send the delegates to Petrograd to form "the Soviet of Soviets"; but this assembly was

to meet only once in every six months. During the intervals the executive work of Government would be carried on by the "National Commisars" under the Presidency of Lenin; these commisars were of course his own men. Boiled down to facts, all this meant that Lenin and Trotsky were joint autocrats.

Krilenko was appointed commander-in-chief, and he immediately sent a telegram to Dukhonin ordering him to despatch delegates to the German Headquarters to arrange an armistice. Dukhonin replied that he did not recognise the authority of Krilenko, and that he himself would continue to direct the army. So the force of sailors was sent off by train to within about forty miles of the Stafka and thence proceeded on foot.

Dukhonin had some troops at the Stafka, including the Georgievsky regiment, formed of men who had received the cross for valour; but even these refused to take his orders. Then the Ukrainian Government thought that this was an opportunity to show its independence, and invited the army headquarters to take refuge in Kiev. Most of the staff went there, and with them the allied military missions, but for some reason Dukhonin himself remained on at Moghilev. He was about to get into a railway carriage there when the sailors arrived and murdered him.

Krilenko came to the Stafka and took up the business of commander-in-chief. He



issued a proclamation on the lines of immediate peace "without annexations or contributions." Everybody knew what that meant, and the army proceeded to demobilise itself.

In accordance with their promises Lenin and Trotsky proceeded to treat for peace, and of course had to accept such terms as Berlin chose to give them. They had no army left with which to put up any further resistance; and even if they had had the men they had no officers to organise or command them.

Germany had defeated her biggest and most populous opponent—not by square fighting, not by diplomatic skill, but by insidious propaganda, by treachery, by appealing to all the selfish passions of ignorant masses, by making use of all the means which would foster discontent, disorder, and finally anarchy. And their agents did their work well—let there be no doubt about that. It is true that Germany has now been defeated by the gallant troops of the allies; it is true that, as I heard one excited orator put it, "the German propagandists sowed seeds which have come home to roost." But it is also true that they understand the game of propaganda, they know its value, and are quite unscrupulous in their use of it, and they do not mean to let it drop.

## CHAPTER XII

### CONCLUSION

IT is not my intention to carry the story of events beyond the end of 1917, when Lenin and Trotsky succeeded in grasping the power and establishing the Red Terror. But more than a year has passed since they began their reign, and the present state of Russia is a fine object-lesson for the rest of civilisation. The following are a few of the outstanding facts which can be proved over and over again if proof be required :—

1. There is no system of public justice in Russia. The Law Courts are closed ; there is no redress for wrong of any kind. There are no laws except the will of the Commissars.

Military courts sit to deal out summary justice for mutiny or political offences, but they are not constituted under any laws.

2. The churches are closed. The monasteries have been plundered and the priests butchered. Christianity,

though not definitely forbidden, is discouraged—it is “counter-revolutionary.”

3. There are no public postal telegraph or telephone services.
4. The whole of the factories have been taken over by the Government: less than half of them are now working; these which are working do so at a loss.
5. The Government paper money has fallen to something under 10 per cent. of its face value. Before the war £1 would purchase about 10 roubles; it would now purchase anything over 100 roubles.
6. The purchasing power of the rouble may be roughly put at 1 per cent. of its face value. A big loaf of good bread which formerly cost less than one rouble would easily fetch 100 roubles now, if such a thing as a big loaf existed.
7. The Government pays a soldier of the Red Guard 500 roubles a month, in addition to feeding, clothing, and boarding him. It pays skilled workmen 1500 roubles a month. No private individuals can afford to keep servants or labourers, as the wages are prohibitive.

8. The Press is not literally "censored" because there is no organisation for that sort of thing. But if anybody publishes anything against the present regime he is taken out and shot. In the same way there is no freedom of speech.
9. Personal liberty does not exist. Every individual may be forced to serve, either in the army or elsewhere, at the will of the Commissars. Nobody can leave a town without all sorts of passports which he has to bribe the officials to give him.
10. There are no elections of any kind, and the people have no voice in the Government.

At the beginning of their reign, Lenin and Trotsky, though they did not deign to excuse themselves, allowed a certain amount of excuses to be made for the general state of distress. It was explained that this was due to the war in some way—and that they intended to put everything right on a democratic basis as soon as the war (which was the work of capitalists) was over. In the meantime their chief object was to crush anything "counter-revolutionary." And there is no doubt that they deliberately encouraged crime among their followers in order that they might be committed, body and soul, to the

side of Terrorism. Take, for instance, the death of the Tsar; had he been judged by a revolutionary court it is possible that he might have been considered guilty of crimes against the State and been executed—but in that case it would have been only a political execution and the judges could have shuffled out of their responsibility. Instead of that the Tsar and his family were deliberately murdered, without trial and with a barbarity which is too horrible for description. The murderers can never be excused on political grounds, they are outside the pale of humanity. Lenin permitted this and thousands of similar cases in order to establish in the country a class of desperadoes who know that their only safety lies in anarchy, and that if justice and order be re-established they will have to pay the penalty for their crimes. It is on these criminals that Lenin and Trotsky rely; assisted by them the Red Terror holds sway.

Lenin and Trotsky may fool the extreme democrats of other countries by talk about the will of the people and the danger of counter-revolution, but the Russian nation has no longer any delusions about its present Government; perhaps a small percentage of the people are still contented with the present rule. The criminals are free from arrest, the Red Guards are well paid and lack nothing, clever agitators are making a good living, men who were failures in life before the revolution have risen to high places merely through their

fervent adherence to the Commissars—such people make plenty of noise and will support the present rule; but they know, even better than the rest, that it is nothing but an autocracy.

## APPENDIX I

### WHO'S WHO IN THE REVOLUTION

THE following brief notes have been collected from time to time regarding some of the more prominent personalities whose names appear in the previous pages :—

ALEXEIEFF.—Of very good family. He served as a regimental officer in the war of 1877; then passed through the War Academy, which is the Russian equivalent of the English Staff College. After serving in the Staff of Petrograd he was appointed a professor at the War Academy. He was a very fine lecturer on military history, and made a speciality of the Suvoroff campaigns. In the Japanese War he was a Director of Operations in the 3rd Army; afterwards Director of Operations in Petrograd, Chief of the Staff of the Kiev Military District, and Commander of the 13th Corps.

In the Great War he began as Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front; then commanded the North-Western Front; then replaced the Grand Duke Nicolas at the Stafka.

He was very clever and had a wonderful memory. The only criticism ever passed on him was that he went into too much detail himself and would not leave things to his staff. He was universally beloved in the army, and it was a great shock to the officers

when he left the Stafka in June 1917. He died in the autumn of 1918, aged about sixty-five.

**BRUSILOFF.**—Served in the Regiment of Grenadier Cavalry; then Commandant of the Officers' Cavalry School; was a great friend of the Grand Duke Nicolas, who appointed him to the command of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. He served on the staff at Warsaw, and then commanded the 12th Corps.

In the Great War he started as Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army, and distinguished himself; then he commanded the South-Western Front. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief at the Stafka when Alexeieff withdrew, but after the Tarnopol disaster he was replaced by Korniloff.

He was considered clever and resolute, though not very highly trained.

**KORNILOFF.**—Was the son of a Kossack peasant. Gained his commission in 1892, and went through the War Academy, passing out at the top of the list which was considered a very fine performance. He served on the staff in various places, especially in Turkestan; was on the staff in the Japanese War, and received the St George's Cross for valour.

In the Great War he began as Commander of the 48th Division. During Mackensen's advance in 1916 he was taken prisoner, but escaped after extraordinary adventures; afterwards commanded the 25th Corps. On the outburst of the revolution he was made Commandant of Petrograd, but soon gave up the appointment, apparently in disgust. His further career is given in Chapter X.

Was murdered by the Bolsheviki. Was about forty-seven years old at his death. It is worthy of note that even before the revolution he had the reputation for strong liberal and even republican tendencies. He



was not a favourite with the old regime. This makes it more remarkable that he was the most pronounced upholder of discipline in the army.

He was known to be obstinate and quick-tempered; it is said of him that he was a fine commander but a difficult subordinate.

DENEKIN.—Of the same age as Korniloff, and was in the same class at the Artillery School. In the Great War he started as Director of Operations of the 8th Army; afterwards he commanded the 4th Rifle Brigade for two years at the Front, and had the most brilliant record of any Brigade Commander. He received two St George crosses and the sword of honour of the St George, and again the sword with diamonds which is the rarest distinction in the Russian army. His brigade especially distinguished itself in Brusiloff's advance in 1916, and altogether took 68,000 prisoners.

Afterwards he commanded the 8th Corps from August 1916 to March 1917. He was then Chief of Staff at the Stafka under Alexeieff; then relieved Korniloff on the South-Western Front.

During the time of the Korniloff affair he remained loyal to Korniloff and was arrested.

IVANOFF.—Was the son of a warrant officer. Distinguished himself in the Japanese War as Commander of the 3rd Corps; afterwards commanded the Kiev district.

In the Great War he started as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front and commanded in the first great Galician battle. He is said to have been particularly cool in the first Russian retreat and to have saved many stores by his foresight. He was afterwards attached to the personal staff of the Emperor.

LECHITSKY.—Son of a parish priest. He com-

manded a battalion in the Japanese War with great brilliancy. He did not go to the War Academy but was exceedingly clever. When some disorders took place in the First Guards Division he was appointed to command it as he had the reputation of being a strong disciplinarian; at first he was unpopular as he had not been a Guardsman, but in the end he gained the esteem of all ranks by his just and resolute rule.

He commanded the 9th Army throughout the war, but resigned soon after the revolution.

LOUKOMSKY.—Served on the staff before the war. Worked out the details of the mobilisation scheme, which were considered very good. Was assistant to the Minister of War, but was flung out in April 1916 because he protested strongly against the corruption in the department. Commanded the 32nd Division in Brusiloff's advance, and received the St George Cross for the taking of Chemartz. Afterwards Director of Operations at the Stafka, Commander of the 1st Army Corps, and Chief of Staff at the Stafka under Brusiloff and Korniloff.

He was a stern martinet; about fifty years of age. He also remained loyal to Korniloff and refused to take over the command at the order of Kerensky.

### *Political Personalities*

RODSIANKO.—Of very good family. Served in the Chevalier Guards. He was President of the 4th Douma, where he was very popular. He spoke very strongly to the Emperor on the subject of the Raspoutine influence. At the beginning of the revolution he was president of the Executive Committee which took over the Government, but was not a member of the Provisional Government and soon dropped out of view.

GOUCHKOFF (Octobrist). — Son of a Moscow merchant; his mother was a French lady. Was President of the 3rd Douma and leader of the Octobrists. He made a special study of military matters, and came out with very severe criticisms on Sukhomlinoff and the army administration which gained him a great reputation. He was President of the Committee of Industry, which was appointed to organise the factories of the country for the production of war materials, and was generally supposed to have done as much as could be expected. Was the first Minister of War in the Provisional Government, but resigned after a couple of months.

MILIUKOFF. — Leader of the Kadets. Was a Professor in Moscow University and wrote a celebrated book on the history of Russian culture. Lectured a great deal abroad. Made a special study of Balkan questions, and was very well known and liked in Bulgaria. Speaks perfect English. First Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, but resigned in June and became a strong opponent of the extreme Lefts.

KERENSKY.—Son of school inspector in Turkestan. His mother is said to have been a Jewess. He practised as an advocate in the town of Volsk, in the Tambov Government, but without much success. Was elected a member of the 4th Douma, where he gained an immense reputation for eloquence and advanced socialist views. Very popular with the Petrograd mob. In the Provisional Government was Minister of Justice, then of War, then Prime Minister. About forty years of age. Very highly strung and excitable.

LENIN.—Leader of the Bolsheviks. Was a land-owner in the Simbirsk government, but lost his

money. His real name was Oulianoff, and he was practically the only pure Russian among the Bolshevik leaders. He was a clever author. Was obliged to flee to Switzerland on account of his socialistic tendencies, and spent many years there. A member of the so-called Internationals. On the outbreak of the revolution he returned to Russia; but again fled to Finland because the Government intended to arrest him. For some time he disappeared, but came back to Petrograd in July, and Kerensky could no longer take action against him.

**TROTSKY.**—Bolshevik. Real name, Bronstein, a Jew from Bessarabia. His education was paid for by a charitable person who recognised his precocity as a boy. Became well known as a journalist. Like Lenin he had to flee to Switzerland, and since that time he has been closely associated with Lenin. About forty years old.

**KRILENKO.**—Bolshevik. A Jew. Little is known of him except that he was commissar in the 9th Army, and there disposed of considerable sums of money which he is suspected to have drawn from German sources. Is said to be stupid and hysterical. About thirty-two years old.

## APPENDIX II

THE following is a rough translation from a Russian magazine :—

“ He worshipped her with all the enthusiasm of his simple nature, but only from afar ; she was to him a goddess, so beautiful, so pure, so far above him, that even in his dreams he had never imagined that he could call her his own. He sometimes listened with bated breath while others talked about her—of her loveliness, her tenderness, her virtue ; and then when he caught a glimpse of her in the cathedral he felt that she was the impersonation of all his ideals.

“ She was really his own. It had come about so suddenly that he could scarcely realise his own fortune. They sat for hours, hand in hand, while she told him of her love ; she cared nothing for luxury or wealth, she had always wanted to marry a working man and chiefly in order to *help* him ; their little house would be a bower of cleanliness and homely comfort, there was everything there that she could want, as long as she could make him happy. But it was not only of themselves that she spoke ; she was so happy herself that she wanted all the world to share her happiness ; she was full of sympathy for all the suffering, especially for the old and weak, and for little children ; and she talked of

wonderful plans which sounded quite simple and which they would carry out together — always together. And he felt small and narrow and rough while he listened to her hopeful eagerness; she was far more glorious than even his imagination had painted her—and she was all his own.

“Three months had passed. He had to admit to himself that she was not a good housekeeper; their little home was untidy, even dirty, and she had not got the knack of keeping it in order. She was extravagant too—at least the money disappeared quickly and she could not account for it. There was still plenty of talk about a wonderful future when they got properly settled down—but her voice sounded harsher as she spoke of it, and when he saw her in the morning, with her slatternly dress and frowsy hair he could not help feeling that some of the enchantment had gone.

“It was a few weeks later when he returned one evening with a sullen face and gloomy eyes; he had lost his job. He was always a good skilled workman, and a favourite of the foreman’s; but they had warned him lately, more than once, about unpunctuality and carelessness—and finally he found himself turned out. With a shamefaced air he crept into the house and told his story. She lay across the untidy bed, there were no chairs left in the room, and laughed long and shrilly—

“‘Give you the sack, did they? Lord. Give you the sack? Well, there ain’t no use fussing, so buck up, old dear, and have a little drop of comfort.’

“She laughed again, fumbled under the mattress and pulled out a black bottle. He gazed at her, horror-struck, for a moment, and then stretched out his hand. For the first time in his life he went to bed drunk that night.

“It was a few weeks later. The drunken woman sat and screamed curses at him—

“‘You’ve got to get me money, I tell you. Ain’t I your wife? ’Twas you who came and wanted me, and now I’m yours; I belong to you, my lad, and *you belong to me*—I’ll never leave you. Why should other women have money and furs and wine while I sit starving in this pig-sty. There is a house along there—come here, lad, while I tell you’——

“With the bottle between them they sat and whispered late into the night and then he stole out.

“It was early dawn when he stumbled back. She lay half dressed across the bed, breathing heavily, her eyes half open. It gave him a shock, for in the dim light she looked just a little like that other woman who lay in the rich house down the street; her eyes had had that same glassy stare, and there had been cruel blue marks on her white throat after the diamonds had come off it, and then she lay still, very still.

“He roughly shook the woman in front of him, and flung into her arms a bag full of jewels and money. Then, without washing the blood from his hands, he reached for the brandy and got on to the bed.

“He was a Russian working man.

“Her name was Revolution.”





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