THE CREED OF EPICTETUS

ULYSSES G. B. PIERCE

THE CREED OF EPICTETUS

THE
CREED OF EPICTETUS

AS CONTAINED IN THE
DISCOURSES, MANUAL AND
FRAGMENTS

SYNTHETICALLY ARRANGED
AND EDITED BY
ULYSSES G. B. PIERCE, PH.D.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY
THE FAITH OF A STOIC

BOSTON
THE BEACON PRESS
25 BEACON STREET

VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY
BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK

O THE GREAT BENEFACTOR WHO POINTS OUT THE WAY! TO TRIPTOLEMUS ALL MEN HAVE ERECTED TEMPLES AND ALTARS, BECAUSE HE GAVE US FOOD BY CULTIVATION; BUT TO HIM WHO DISCOVERED TRUTH AND BROUGHT IT TO LIGHT AND COMMUNICATED IT TO ALL, NOT THE TRUTH WHICH SHOWS US HOW TO LIVE, BUT HOW TO LIVE WELL, WHO OF YOU FOR THIS REASON HAS BUILT AN ALTAR OR A TEMPLE, OR HAS DEDICATED A STATUE, OR WHO WORSHIPS GOD FOR THIS? BECAUSE THE GODS HAVE GIVEN THE VINE, OR WHEAT, WE SACRIFICE TO THEM: BUT BECAUSE THEY HAVE PRODUCED IN THE HUMAN MIND THAT FRUIT BY WHICH THEY DESIGNED TO SHOW US THE TRUTH WHICH RELATES TO HAPPINESS — SHALL WE NOT THANK GOD FOR THIS?

DISCOURSES, I. iv.

PREFACE

This volume is the outcome of a thesis presented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the George Washington University in part satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The writer has been led to think that others might be interested in the results of a study which for many years has been an unfailing source of help and inspiration. And it is with the hope that this assurance from others may not be without some grounds that the book is sent forth.

Ulysses G. B. Pierce.

Washington, D. C.

CONTENTS

Book Three

THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL

Book Four

LEARNING AND DOING

Book Five

THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD

Book Six

REWARDS AND PENALTIES

Book Seven

THE GREAT CHANGE

PART TWO—THE CYNIC

Book One

THE WAY OF THE CYNIC

INTRODUCTION

THE FAITH OF A STOIC

INTRODUCTION

THE FAITH OF A STOIC

THE saying that great men commonly have short biographies finds ample warrant and abundant illustration in the case of Epictetus. For of this noble soul, whose words of wisdom have afforded strength and inspiration to the choice spirits of many generations, we know neither the year of birth nor that of death. Even his parentage is unknown to us. Indeed, it is by no means certain that his real name has not been supplanted by what looks like a sort of nickname.

Of the outward life of Epictetus little more is known than that he was born of obscure parents at Hierapolis. While the year of his birth can only be inferred, the fact that he was teaching in the reign of Domitian makes it probable that he was born about the middle of the first century. In the reign of Nero Epictetus was taken to Rome as the slave of Epaphroditus. By his master — say rather his owner — Epictetus was given an education: perhaps because he was not strong enough for manual labor, perhaps because the youth showed signs of unusual promise, or it may be, as is most likely, simply because his owner, like many of his day, was taken with

the fancy and fashion of possessing an accomplished slave. But, however that may be, educated he was. Epaphroditus sent the young man to the philosophical lectures of C. Musonius Rufus, the eminent and leading Stoic expounder in Rome.

And most fortunate Epictetus was in coming under the teaching and influence of so able a philosopher and so wise a teacher. And happily we are not without some intimation of the high regard that Epictetus felt for his teacher. Rufus must have been a Stoic of no mean ability and amply endowed with the power of teaching and inspiring his pupils. For Epictetus pays his master this high tribute: "He used to speak in such a way that every one of us sitting there supposed that some one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man's faults." [1]

Upon the death of Epaphroditus, Epictetus, it would seem, obtained his freedom. For we find Epictetus teaching philosophy in Rome, and there bringing to his work the same rare gifts that he had so warmly praised in Rufus. Upon the banishment of the philosophers by Domitian, Epictetus betook himself to Nicopolis, where he became the acknowledged leader of the Stoic school, continuing his labors until his death at a good old age.

So far as is known, Epictetus wrote nothing; at least no writing of his has been preserved.

[1] Discourses, III. xxiii.

His discourses have come down to us through the reports of one of his pupils. For if Socrates had his Plato, Epictetus had his Arrianus. Flavius Arrianus, not unknown for his public services as senator and consul and for his literary attainments as historian of Alexander the Great, was an admiring and devoted disciple of Epictetus. And it is to the amplification and publication of his lecture notes that we are indebted for what we have of the discourses of Epictetus. We say, for what we have; for unfortunately half of these reports has been lost, four books only being preserved to us.

As these reports have come down to us, they are the amplified notes of a zealous and faithful student rather than the formal and accurate transcript of philosophical lectures. As a matter of fact, they were not prepared with a view to publication, but were made solely for the student's own use. So Arrian confesses: "I neither composed the Discourses of Epictetus in such a manner as things of this nature are commonly composed, nor did I myself produce them to public view any more than I composed them. But whatever sentiments I heard from his own mouth, the very same I endeavored to set down in the very same words, as far as possible, and preserve as memorials, for my own use, of his manner of thinking and freedom of speech. These discourses are such as one person would naturally deliver from his own thoughts, extempore, to another; not such as he would prepare

to be read by numbers afterwards. Yet, notwithstanding this, I cannot tell how, without either my consent or knowledge, they have fallen into the hands of the public." [2]

It is thus evident that Arrian did not publish his notes of the lectures of Epictetus as a finished literary product; and they ought not so to be judged. They are rather the intimate and personal records made by an apt and admiring disciple. One compensation is that it is likely that thus we get more of the style and spirit of Epictetus than would be the case if the notes had been carefully revised. As it is, the discourses are free and vigorous, and seem to throb with life.

And yet after this is said, it is no disparagement to add that Arrian was more faithful in recording than he was skillful in arranging the discourses of his teacher.[3] These reports, naturally enough, abound in repetitions and redundances. Nor is any order to be detected in the arrangement of the subject-matter. The sublime and the commonplace often lie side by side and the most diverse themes are sometimes considered in the same chapter. What Apollo said of Daphne's unkempt tresses is true here: "If so charming in disorder, what would they be if arranged!"

Of all this Arrian himself was doubtless quite as sensible as his modern critic. Indeed it was

[2] Arrian to Lucius Gellius.

[3] So Davidson: "According to modern notions, Arrian would not be regarded as a good editor." Stoic Creed, p. 29.

presumably to correct these defects and to call order out of chaos that Arrian later prepared the now familiar Encheiridion or Manual. This is an abridgment or condensation of the Discourses, bringing within the compass of half a hundred short sections the main features of the teaching and philosophy of Epictetus. The style of the Manual is somewhat formal and ponderous, though well suited to its purpose. As compared with the reports of which this is an abstract, the Manual lacks spontaneity and inspiration. It is Law rather than Gospel. Nevertheless its brevity and its more systematic arrangement have done much to popularize the noble thoughts of which it is the depository. For generations the Manual has been regarded as a sort of Vade Mecum. More than one choice spirit has, so to speak, slept with the little book under his pillow. Translated into a score of languages, the Manual has enjoyed an immense vogue and it is still a great power for those seeking leading and light.

It is, however, to be feared that with not a few their knowledge of Epictetus is limited to the reading of the Manual, while the vast and varied stores of wisdom contained in the Discourses are overlooked. This is to be regretted not only because it narrows the field of thought, but also because it distorts the ideas of Epictetus. The Manual needs a certain perspective in order to be of the highest service; it presupposes the background furnished by the Discourses. Without this, the Manual, brave and noble as it is, seems

harsh and arid. It is as if one should commit to memory the Epistle of James, and leave the Gospels unread.

To others Epictetus is known only through fragmentary selections from the Discourses and the Manual. Indeed it is not unlikely that many admirers of the great Stoic know Epictetus only through these selections. While these are often chosen with good judgment and are more or less representative of the wisdom and genius of Epictetus, they nevertheless fail to give to the reader an adequate idea of the scope, variety and continuity of his thought.

For these reasons it is certain that Epictetus has not yet come to his own. Nor will he take his rightful place among the world's spiritual benefactors and deliver to his readers his full message, until a twofold service is rendered to the reports of his discourses as they have come down to us.

In the first place, there is much in the teaching of every sage that is necessarily local and of but passing interest and concern. In his criticism of Wordsworth, Matthew Arnold says: "To be recognized far and wide as a great poet, to be possible and receivable as a classic, Wordsworth needs to be relieved of a great deal of the poetical baggage which now encumbers him. To administer this relief is indispensable, unless he is to continue to be a poet for the few only, a poet valued far below his real worth by the world." [4]

[4] Essays in Criticism.

In a measure true of most teachers, this observation applies with special force to the works of Epictetus as we have them. For in his discourses there are many allusions and references that have little interest for the modern reader. The effect of these is to confuse, if not to discourage, the reader and to distract his attention from what was really uppermost in the mind of Epictetus. His message will be found to gain immensely when thus relieved of irrelevancies and allowed to reach the reader with the least possible resistance.

In the second place, his teaching needs to be arranged in a natural and orderly way, that step by step the reader may ascend to the summit of his thought. Not otherwise can we fully comprehend his thought with all its grounds, its many implications, and its logical conclusions.

It is to this twofold task of elimination and systematization, an undertaking as delicate as it is difficult, that the present work addresses itself. The aim is not to gather a volume of selections, but so to organize and present his thought that Epictetus may communicate to his readers "the truth which relates to happiness." [5]

The method employed toward this desired end is somewhat different from any hitherto adopted. Ignoring Arrian's division of the material into the Discourses and the Manual, as also his arrangement of the Discourses in books and chapters, the entire subject-matter has been resolved

[5] Discourses, I. iv.

into its thought elements. Thus analyzed, the material has in turn been organized and assembled by its own power of attraction. It is hoped that by this means some contribution may be made towards enabling Epictetus to give plain, coherent, and adequate utterance to his faith.

And what is that faith? What are its qualities? What is its value to us? Without attempting to formulate dogmatic answers to these questions, it is fitting to lay before the reader such material as shall enable him to reach his own conclusions.

At the outset it should be observed that the teaching of Epictetus recognizes two distinct grades of discipleship. He has in mind two orders, so to speak, a lay and a clerical, an outer and an inner circle of adherents. These two orders, as we have called them, are (1) the Stoic, and (2) the Cynic. All Cynics were Stoics, as all priests are churchmen; but not all Stoics were Cynics, as not all churchmen are called to the priesthood. For, in the view of Epictetus, the Cynic is a Stoic with a special calling, fitness, and mission.

It is of primary importance to recognize this division; and the failure to do so has introduced into the teaching of Epictetus no little confusion and has led to much distortion and misunderstanding. It is the more necessary to urge this distinction since it has usually been ignored. Even so great an authority as Zeller speaks of the Cynic as the ideal philosopher or Stoic ex-

ample.[6] And the mistake has been repeated by most writers on the subject, it being assumed that what was said of the Cynic was applicable to all Stoics alike.[7] Further on we shall have occasion to note how this misunderstanding has vitiated much that has been written on the subject; and we shall have to question some of the judgments based upon this misapprehension.

What Epictetus has to say concerning the Cynic is practically confined to the famous twenty-second chapter of the third book of the Discourses as preserved to us by Arrian. From this it appears that the Cynic must have a distinct call to that life. For he who without distinct prompting from God aspires to so high and holy a calling thereby renders himself hateful to the divine Power. The Cynic, like the poet, is born, not made; or at least not self-made. He must be called, even foreordained. For there is the element of destiny in it. Desire and resolve alone are insufficient. The same Power that ordained the sun to be sun, and not satellite — that Power calls the Stoic to become the Cynic. Cosmic fate enters into the matter. The willingness to lead the precarious life of mendicancy, the impulse to go about reproving and exhorting, these in themselves are no warrant for the Cynic. He may become a Stoic who chooses: to become a Cynic is above our choice. Many may be called — by themselves: but few are chosen by God.

Nor is this "call" a mere vagary. For the

[6] Phil. Greece, III. S. 752. [7] See pp. xlvi–xlviii.

Cynic must be amply endowed by God for his high vocation. Physically, he must be able to live the life of self-denial and self-discipline and not only to survive, but to thrive. His fair countenance and healthful body must bear unmistakable witness that God has called him. Mentally, the keen perceptions of the Cynic and his freedom from every form of prejudice and intellectual timidity are evidences of his divine calling. Morally, the Cynic must be pure and blameless. Not a word of blame for God or for man is ever to escape his lips or to sully his heart. Though beaten like an ass, he is to joy in his tribulations and to love those who persecute and despitefully use him. Clearer than the sun must be his conscience, his only fortress and refuge. Others may hide themselves and seek cover, but not so the Cynic. Not even in a glass house does the Cynic live: he abides in the open, the sky his only roof, the corners of the world his walls. Socially, the Cynic must be unattached. He is to love One and One only, even Him who called him. There is to be no attachment to things or persons, the severing of which would bring distraction, pain, regret, or responsibility. The Cynic therefore is to be unmarried, foregoing the obligations of family life for the prior obligations of his high calling. Likewise he is to be exempt from civil and military service, seeing that already the Cynic is occupying the highest possible office, to which he has been appointed by God.

Thus endowed and commissioned, the Cynic is to go about reproving and exhorting men. He is to fear not the face of man, but with the fearlessness of a Hebrew prophet he is to denounce evil in low places and in high. With unerring judgment he is to show men wherein lurk the perils of life and wherein lies their real good. Ever on the alert, the Cynic, without fear or favor, is to point out the way to freedom, happiness, and prosperity. And to crown all, the Cynic is himself to be a living example of all that he has said and counselled, that in him men may behold every fear banished, every appetite mastered, and every hope realized.

It must be obvious that Cynicism, thus delineated by Epictetus, is not for the world, but for the chosen few. And it is an evidence of the sanity and sagacity of the great Stoic that the matter lay perfectly clear in his mind. It is his interpreters who have confused his teaching, as there will be occasion to note. There could be no world, if every one were a Cynic: this would be a better world, were there even a few such Cynics as contemplated by Epictetus.

Passing now from the Cynic to the Stoic, we may examine his general teaching and give some consideration to the ideas that constituted the working faith which Epictetus labored to instill into the minds of all those who sought his guidance.

"In the beginning God." So it might well be said of the leading ideas of Epictetus. This is

indeed the central thought of his system, from which all other ideas have been thrown off, like planets from the sun. To ignore this or to minimize it is at the outset to misunderstand the great Stoic, while rightly to apprehend this is to find ready entrance into the mind of Epictetus. So he himself says: "We are first to learn that God is." [8] While he does not undertake to present in philosophical order the various "arguments" for the being of God, there are yet few forms of this argument that he fails to recognize and utilize. They are, however, widely scattered through his discourses and are presented in such form as would appeal to the general audience that he addressed.

Naturally enough therefore Epictetus invokes the *argumentum ad hominem.* Do not words themselves bear witness to the existence of God? And does not the language of men imply a natural conviction of His being? Otherwise how came these words to be adopted into the vocabulary of men? Moreover does not the customary conduct of men imply the belief in God? Is not life itself a voyage, the great adventure? "No man sails from port without having sacrificed to the Gods and invoked their help." [9] And do not sowing and tilling the field involve faith in an underlying Law? "Men do not sow without having called on Demeter." [10] And furthermore

[8] Discourses, II. xiv. [9] Discourses, III. xxi.
[10] Discourses, III. xxi.

is it not generally conceded that the chief end of man is to follow the Gods? "But if there be no Gods, how can the following of the Gods be an end?" [11] Now this language and these customs are employed by men in general, and they have not seen fit to drop the language or to abolish the customs; they therefore constitute a witness to man's natural belief in the existence of God. Such is the *argumentum ad hominem* as employed by Epictetus, and it is embellished with fervid, if simple, rhetoric.

Moreover the evidence of teleology is not overlooked by Epictetus. He lays stress upon the evidences of design in nature. "From the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the work of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does, then, each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not invisible things . . . demonstrate Him? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance." [12] This seems like an anticipation of Bacon's oft quoted words: "I had rather believe all the fables . . . than that this universal frame is without a mind. . . . It is true that a little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism; . . . but when it beholdeth the chain of them,

[11] Discourses, I. xii. [12] Discourses, I. xvi.

confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." [13]

Then, again, the visible world with its many and various effects demands an adequate cause. Something from nothing is bad mathematics and worse philosophy. Do not nature's laws necessitate a Lawgiver? Is nature automatic, self-moved? Or is there a Prime Mover? God is: He is the Force and the Power within and behind visible nature. "For how else do plants, as if at the command of God, when He bids them, flower in due season? And how else at the waxing and waning of the moon, and the approach and withdrawal of the sun, do we behold such a change and reversal in earthly things?" [14]

Nor did the argument from analogy escape Epictetus. Bishop Butler might have found in the great Stoic many ideas kindred to his own. Is not the universe a great and teeming city? "Has it no Governor? And how is it possible that a city or a family cannot continue to exist, not even for the shortest time, without an administrator and guardian, and that so great and beautiful a system should be administered with such order and yet without a purpose and by chance? There is, then, an Administrator." [15] And that Administrator is none other than God. With satire as keen as it is delicate Epictetus likens those who fail or refuse to perceive this

[13] Essay XVI. Compare Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II. xxxiv.

[14] Discourses, I. xiv. [15] Discourses, II. xiv.

unto the behavior of people at a country fair. Most of the visitors are content to wander about and admire the cattle and to inquire the price of fodder: while the discerning ones meditate upon the purpose of the exhibit and admire the executive ability rendering the exposition possible.[16] Even so is the world: many observe only the phenomena; some few penetrate into the meaning of phenomena and thereby find God.

But Epictetus does not stop here. The supreme witness to the being of God is found, not in the laws and phenomena of external nature, but in the mind and constitution of man. For into man God has put a portion of Himself. "You are a fragment of God, you have in yourself something that is a part of Him."[17] The moral nature of man testifies to the being of God. That moral nature man did not make: it the rather makes him.

For man is endowed with the sense of loyalty to the Good: he willingly acknowledges the obligation, and adopts the word *ought*. Just what particular thing it may be his duty to do or to forego is a matter to be determined by education and experience; that being an intellectual question, in no wise affecting the prior sense of obligation. Epictetus states the matter thus: "He has done well, he has not done well; he is unjust, he is just; . . . who does not use these names? Who among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he defers the use of

[16] Discourses, II. xiv. [17] Discourses, II. viii.

the words about lines or sounds? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already taught as it were by nature some things on this matter, and proceeding from these, we have added to them self-conceit. For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it to particulars? You do. Do I not, then, adapt it properly? In that lies the whole question. . . . For if men possessed this power of adaptation . . . what would hinder them from being perfect?" [18] In other words, the moral nature of man functions through the organ of his intellect; and that intellect must be trained: howbeit, that moral nature which thus functions is itself the presence of God in the soul of man. Thus Epictetus anticipates modern thought; and the words of Martineau seem an echo of the thought of the great Stoic: "The revelation of authority, this knowledge of the better, this inward conscience, this moral ideality — call it what you will — is the presence of God in man." [19] Further on we shall have occasion to speak more fully of this and to point out some of its practical applications by Epictetus.[20]

But if God is, so also His Providence orders and directs all things.[21] For Epictetus summarily rejects the idea that God is simply the First Cause; he cannot rest in the thought that God cares only for the great things and has no

[18] Discourses, II. xi.
[19] Seat of Authority, p. 105.
[20] See pp. xli–xliv.
[21] Discourses, II. xiv.

concern with the ordinary affairs of men; nor is he satisfied with the suggestion that God rules over men by impersonal general laws: Epictetus is satisfied with nothing less than the words of Homer:

"I move not without Thy knowledge." [22]

His God must be also his Father. For the universe, as the name implies, is one: one in authorship, one in substance. One law governs and pervades the whole. "Is not God able to oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive from all a certain communication? And is the sun able to illuminate so large a part of the All . . . and He who made the sun itself . . . being a small part of Himself compared with the whole, cannot He perceive all things?" [23] It is as if Epictetus had read the words of the Psalmist:

"He that formed the eye, shall He not see?" [24]

No easy-going faith is here however. For if there is a Providence, the implications are weighty. If there is a Providence, then to blame God is to dethrone Him. Like Job, the Stoic must stalwartly refuse to "curse God." All judgment and criticism must be withheld. Hence submission and resignation have a large place in the teaching of Epictetus. As the educated per-

[22] Discourses, II. xii. [23] Discourses, I. iv.
[24] Psalm XCIV. 9.

son does not spell words as he happens to wish, but spells them as they should be spelled; so the man who is morally educated submits joyfully to Providence. "To be instructed is this, to learn to wish that everything may happen as it does." [25] "Would you have anything other than what is best? Is there anything better than what pleases God?" [26] But this submission, while complete and unreserved, is not blind and servile. It involves, to be sure, self-surrender and hardship; but these are a part of man's moral discipline and are for his highest good. "For this purpose He leads me at one time hither, at another time sends me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, and sick; leads me into prison, not because He hates me, far from Him be such a meaning, for who hates the best of his servants? nor yet because He cares not for me, for He does not neglect any even of the smallest things; but He does this for the purpose of exercising me and making use of me as a witness to others." [27] Furthermore the doctrine of Providence involves active co-operation upon our part. Many writers have overlooked this, thus misconstruing the teaching of Epictetus.[28] He places great emphasis upon submission to the will of God, and it is one of his favorite themes. But it should be observed that the will to which we are to submit is the will which demands active co-operation upon our part in the work of the world. Thus the

[25] Discourses, I. xii.
[26] Discourses, II. vii.
[27] Discourses, III. xxiv.
[28] See pp. xlv–xlvi.

submission is twofold, passive and active; being at once resignation and co-operation.

It must be obvious that here is no conventional and perfunctory faith. And it is well nigh incredible that so careful a student as Dr. Bussell should characterize this teaching as "a vague and pietistic doctrine."[29] For no one can seriously contemplate this faith of Epictetus without recognizing that, so far from being "vague and pietistic," it was to him a solemn and holy truth, carrying with it serious implications.

First of all, if God is, He is to be acknowledged and to be worshipped. And one of the most beautiful and appealing of all the passages in Epictetus is the chapter where he calls upon all to join in the hymn of worship and praise.[30] Zeller seems to have missed this entirely, when he says: "The true worship of God, according to their view, consists only in the mental effort to know God, and in a moral and pious life."[31] Without conceding this to be so mean a thing, it is but fair to say that Epictetus would have objected to the word "only." For he taught that everyone should give formal expression to his faith in God and should take part in acts of worship. "To make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits according to the custom of our fathers . . . is a thing which belongs to all to do."[32] Epictetus was fully aware that with-

[29] Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 85.
[30] Discourses, I. xvi.
[31] Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 343.
[32] Manual XXXI.

out "a moral and pious life," formal acts of worship count for nought; but he also knew that the godly life craves expression in worship. "Had we but understanding, should we ever cease hymning and blessing the Divine Power, both openly and in secret, and telling of His gracious gifts? . . . and upon you, too, I call to join in this selfsame hymn." [33] Yet this worship must be no vague nor vain thing. For it must kindle in man the passionate desire to become, so far as in him lies, like unto Him whom he worships. "If the Deity is faithful, he too must be faithful; if free, beneficent, and exalted, he must be so; and, in all his words and actions, behave as an imitator of God." [34]

It is by virtue of this belief in the universal Providence that we have the Stoic conception of the World Citizen. We are to name ourselves after the most lordly of our dwellings, not after the most miserable. Therefore Epictetus commends to us the habit of Socrates who, upon being asked what was his native place, was wont to claim, not Athens or Corinth, but the universe.[35] And with Epictetus this is no mere figure of speech, but a truth leading to many practical conclusions. For thus man is to regard himself as a living member of the universe, a citizen not an alien, a fellow-member not merely an integral part.[36] The world is his Fatherland, and every

[33] Discourses, I. xvi. [34] Discourses, II. xiv.
[35] Discourses, I. ix. Compare Lowell's, The Fatherland.
[36] Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII. 13.

spot is Home. "Can any man," he asks, "cast me out of the universe? He cannot; but whithersoever I may go, there will be the sun, and the moon, and there the stars, and visions, and omens, and communion with the Gods." [37] And being members of the family universal, we are to hold nothing as profitable for self that does not contribute to the good of the whole. For as the foot is useless and dead save as a member of the body, so the individual fulfils himself only through this universal relationship.[38] To keep this kinship inviolate and to suffer nothing to sever this relationship must be the constant aim. The good man, accordingly, is he who submits himself to God just as the good citizen submits himself to the laws of the state.[39]

A direct inference from the belief in God as Father relates to the nobility and worth of man. For by origin, nature, capacity, vocation, and destiny man's divine ancestry is witnessed. If he could fully appreciate this truth, never would he think meanly or ignobly of himself.[40] If kinship with Cæsar would exalt one, what should be the elation upon knowing that we are sons of God! And should not this avail to rescue us from all despondency and to set us free from all fear? [41] For says he: "Think you that God intended His own son to be enslaved?" [42]

With this faith, clearly perceived and vigor-

[37] Discourses, III. xxii.
[38] Discourses, II. x.
[39] Discourses, I. xii.
[40] Discourses, I. iii.
[41] Discourses, I. ix.
[42] Discourses, I. xix.

ously held, it was inevitable that Epictetus should condemn human bondage. Here again the learned Zeller is mistaken when he says that the Stoics never condemned slavery.[43] On the contrary Dr. Rolleston is more nearly correct, when he credits Epictetus with being the first Pagan thinker to condemn slavery.[44] But the great Stoic could do no otherwise, believing as he did in the fatherhood of God and its corollary the brotherhood of man. "How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave? Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from above? But if you have been put in any such high place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? Will you not remember who you are, and whom you rule? that they are kinsmen, brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus? But, you say, I have purchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in what direction you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the pit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men? but towards the laws of the Gods you are not looking." [45] And again the same high, clear note is sounded, when he says: "As he who is in health would not choose to be served by the sick, nor for those who dwell with him to be sick; so neither would a free man endure to be served

[43] Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 329.
[44] Teaching of Epictetus, p. 205. [45] Discourses, I. xiii.

by slaves or for those who live with him to be slaves." [46] And still again Epictetus states it thus logically: "What you avoid suffering, do not attempt to make others suffer. You avoid slavery: take care that others are not your slaves. For if you endure to have a slave, you appear to be a slave yourself first. For vice has no community with virtue, nor freedom with slavery." [47] It will be observed that these are not mere rhetorical outbursts, but the deliberate convictions of one who believed in God and feared not to face the logic of his faith.

What at first may appear to be a lapse from this faith in the dignity and worth of man is found in the Stoic doctrine of the "Open Door." This is, of course, a euphemism for suicide. And from the rather smooth recitals of Zeller and others one might infer that it was the custom of Stoics to end their lives upon the slightest provocation. So Zeller says: "Zeno, in old age, hung himself, because he had broken his finger; Cleanthes, for a still less cause, continued his abstinence till he died of starvation." [48] Such recitals have been repeated by many writers until they have gained considerable credence. But the matter is not so simple as these instances would make it appear. For if suicide was a part of the Stoic program, why should Zeno have delayed his exit until his ninety-eighth year? And why should Cleanthes have waited until four score

[46] Fragment, XLIII. [47] Fragment, XLII.
[48] Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 336.

years had rolled over his head before availing himself of so easy an escape?

While it is true that the general opinion of that time condoned, if it did not counsel, under certain conditions, self-emancipation from the flesh, it is also true that the weight of Stoic teaching and example was against the practice.[49] Marcus Aurelius, notwithstanding some troublesome allusions to the subject, refused to pass through the "Open Door," even when the smoke in his cabin was most dense.[50] And so far as Epictetus is concerned, we are not left to surmise what his views were; for this very question came up in his class room. One of the students is represented as saying: "Epictetus, we can no longer endure being bound to this poor body . . . and for the sake of the body complying with the wishes of these and of those. . . . Allow us to be released at last from these bonds by which we are bound and weighed down." [51] To this Epictetus answers: "Friends, wait for God: when He shall give the signal and release you from this service, then go to Him; but for the present endure to dwell in this place where He has put you. Short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for those who are so disposed. . . .

[49] So Merivale: "Nothing would be more erroneous than to suppose that this was a principle of the Stoics or was a distinguishing practice of the sect." History of the Romans under the Empire. Vol. VII. Ch. lxiv.

[50] "The cabin is full of smoke, and I quit it." Meditations, V. 29.

[51] Discourses, I. ix.

Wait then, do not depart without a reason." [51] And upon another similar occasion he says: "For, on the other hand, God does not wish it to be done, and He has need of such a world and such inhabitants in it." [52] And the teaching of Epictetus was amply seconded by his life and example. So far from seeking release from the toils and cares of life, he rescued a waif exposed for death, and took it into his humble abode where he reared the child as his own — his sole descendant. The noble Stoic endured to the end, remaining like a sentinel at his post until dismissed by his Commander.

It must now be evident that to Epictetus the being of God and man's kinship with Him were no sentimental vagaries. One cannot fail therefore to be surprised that Bussell should regard this relationship between God and man as little more than "a verbal kinship between the soul and its Maker." [53] Certainly Epictetus felt the need of something other than that. To him, indeed, the relationship is void, "if there be no communication to men, yea, even to mine own self." [54]

But does man, in fact, possess any organ for such communication? Specifically, then, we may ask, How does God function in man? To this question Epictetus has his own plain and definite answer. Man by nature has two elements

[52] Discourses, I. xxix.

[53] Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 33.

[54] Discourses, I. xii.

blended in his constitution: he is physical in common with the brutes; he is also rational, thus being set apart from the brute creation and allied consciously to the Divine.[55] The universal Reason thus functions through the reason of the individual. So Epictetus represents God as saying to him: "Had it been possible, Epictetus, I would have made both that body of thine and thy possessions free and unimpeded, but as it is, be not deceived: it is not thine own; it is but finely tempered clay. Since then this I could not do, I have given thee a portion of Myself, in the power of desiring and declining and of pursuing and avoiding, and, in a word, in the power of dealing with the things of sense." [56]

This thought is fundamental with Epictetus. The Ruling Faculty, of which he speaks so often, is that God-given power whereby we deliver moral judgments. This moral sentiment, divinely implanted in man, is the organ of communication between God and the soul. Epictetus states it thus: "God hath placed at every man's side a Guardian, the genius of each man, who is charged to watch over him, a genius that cannot sleep, nor be deceived. To what greater and more watchful guardian could He have committed us? So when ye have shut the doors and made darkness in the house, remember never to say that ye are alone; for ye are not alone,

[55] "Certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body; and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature." Bacon, Essay XVI.

[56] Discourses, I. i.

but God is there, and your genius is there; and what need have these of light to mark what ye are doing?" [57]

This inborn moral sentiment is called by many names, the Ruling Faculty being the common term. It is also identified with the conscience, as when Epictetus says: "When we are children our parents deliver us to a pedagogue to take care on all occasions that we suffer no harm. But when we are become men, God delivers us to our innate conscience, to take care of us." [58] Again, this God-given faculty is called a Prophet or Diviner; as when he asks: "Have I not within me a Diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil?" [59] At other times this organ is identified with the power of Choice and with the Will. But whatever expression is used, what Epictetus has in mind is that faculty by which we translate sense impressions into their moral value. "For wine and oil give thanks to God, but remember that He has given you something else better — the power of using them, proving them, and estimating the value of each." [60]

[57] Discourses, I. xiv. Compare Marcus Aurelius: "Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide a portion of Himself." Meditations, V. 27.

[58] Fragment, XCVII. Compare Cicero: "The judge will bear in mind that he has God for a witness, that is, as I think, his own conscience." De Officiis, III. x. Compare also Milton, Paradise Lost, III. 194–7:

"And I will place within them as a guide
My umpire Conscience; whom if they will hear,
Light after light well used they shall attain,
And to the end persisting safe arrive."

[59] Discourses, II. vii.

[60] Discourses, III. xxiii.

Thus, in a word, God communicates with the soul of man through the Conscience, this being the Ruling Faculty, whose office it is to render man "capable of using conformably to nature the appearances presented." [60]

This at once introduces us to the formula, To live according to nature. But what is the nature in accordance with which we are to live? With the elder Cynics the phrase meant the return to the unrestrained life of those who recognized no civil obligations. But with the Stoic school it was quite otherwise. In their view, to live according to nature is to live according to human nature; and to live according to human nature is to live according to that nature at its best; and that nature is at its best when it is virtuous: hence to live according to nature is to live according to virtue. Thus Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, says: "To live according to nature is to live according to virtue, for nature leads us to this point." [61] Similarly Epictetus says: "What is a man's nature? To bite, to kick, to throw into prison and behead? No! but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well." [62] Here is no idealization of the brute forces of nature or longing for a return to the fancied freedom of primitive life. On the contrary, the nature in accordance with which we are to aspire to live is the moral and social nature of man at its highest. "It is enough," Epictetus says, "for the brutes to eat and to drink, and to do all the

[61] Diogenes Laertius, VII. liii. [62] Discourses, IV. i.

other things which they severally do. But for us, to whom God has given also the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. . . . But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His works; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature." [63]

This passage should be sufficient refutation of the charge that with Epictetus "Man no more *acts;* he only *contemplates.* And this is his highest pleasure; and therefore his highest duty." [64] At least one cannot help admiring the ingenuity that enables a writer in so few words so thoroughly to misrepresent the teaching of Epictetus. The criticism is a remarkably succinct statement of what the great Stoic did not teach. For so far from encouraging men to rest in passive contemplation, he was constantly urging men "to do good and to co-operate with others." [62] Therefore he says: "I ought not to

[63] Discourses, I. vi. Compare the lines of Matthew Arnold:

"Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
And in that *more* lie all his hopes of good."

[64] Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 108.

be free from affections like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations both natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen." [65]

Accordingly, to live conformably to nature involves the fulfilment of our social nature; seeing that it is only through society and the meeting of these larger obligations that man realizes himself. He is therefore to take his place and to discharge his duties as a friend, neighbor, citizen, parent. Here again the statement of Zeller [66] that Epictetus dissuaded from matrimony is a curious inversion of the facts. He palpably misunderstands the single passage cited as his authority for such a conclusion. The words he quotes are from the famous twenty-second chapter of the third book of the Discourses. Herein Epictetus says: "As the state of things now is, like an army prepared for battle, is it not necessary that a Cynic should be without distraction? . . . We do not find the affair (matrimony) mightily suited to the condition of a Cynic." Now the conclusion of Zeller is found to be quite without warrant, when it is remembered that in this passage Epictetus is not speaking of the Stoics in general, but of the Cynics exclusively. Now, as we have said,[67] the Cynic was to the Stoic what the Priesthood is to the Church.

[65] Discourses, III. ii. Compare Marcus Aurelius: "Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social creature." Meditations, IX. 16.

[66] Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 324.

[67] See pp. xxiv–xxvii.

And Epictetus no more taught that all Stoics should forego marriage than the Church teaches that celibacy is the condition for all its members. Detached from the world, and with uncompromising devotion to the moral ideal, the Cynic is to regard himself as the father and brother of all men, justifying this by his teaching and exemplifying it in his character and conduct. Only those are called to be Cynics who, foregoing the ordinary relationships of life, are by circumstances, physical fitness, mental endowments, and moral insight and courage, qualified to endure its austerities and to exemplify its stern ethics. Zeller is not the only critic of Epictetus who has utterly misapprehended this matter.

In confirmation of this contention, it is to be noted that the serious charge that Epictetus himself brought against the Epicureans was precisely what Zeller alleges against Epictetus. Epictetus represents the Epicureans as saying to him: "We were not to marry, nor to have children, nor to engage in public affairs." To this Epictetus answers: "What will be the consequence of this? Whence are the citizens to come, &c." And such doctrines Epictetus deems to be "bad, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becoming to women."[68] For, in the view of the teacher, the chief duties in life are: "Engaging in public business, marrying, the production of children, the worship of God, the care of our parents, and generally, having desires, aversions,

[68] Discourses, III. vii.

pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do these things, and according to our nature." [68] Thus the aim of Epictetus was to encourage such individual and social conduct as would "keep us constant in acts which are conformable to nature." [68]

In brief, then, to live according to nature is, in the words of Epictetus himself: "To perform the duties of a citizen, to fill the usual offices, to marry and to rear children. . . . To use according to nature the appearances that encounter thee, not missing what thou pursuest, nor falling into what thou wouldst avoid, never failing of good fortune, nor overtaken of ill fortune, free, unhindered, uncompelled, agreeing with the administration of Zeus, obedient unto the same, and well pleased therein; blaming none, charging none, able of thy whole soul to say:

"Lead me, O Zeus, and Thou, O Destiny." [69]

The life according to nature is its own justification and its own reward. It seeks not to have, but to be. Fidelity, modesty, piety, magnanimity, these justify themselves by every approach toward them; while every lapse from virtue carries within it its own punishment. The teaching of Cleanthes [70] that virtue should be sought for its own sake, without being influenced by fear or hope by any external influence, was adopted by Epictetus and embellished with all his

[69] Discourses, II. xxiii. [70] Diogenes Laertius, VII. liii.

rhetorical power. This is the Stoic doctrine of equivalents, antedating by centuries Emerson's "Compensation." Thus the Ruling Faculty is at every step complete in itself, the balance being struck with every moral transaction. The mind gets all it pays for: pays for all it gets. "For wherever you have deviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately, not from anything external, but from the action itself." [71] Contrariwise, the highest compensation for the life according to nature is that "of being conscious that you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed you are performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say to himself, Now whatever the rest may say, this I am doing; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if He has a soldier such as He ought to have, a citizen such as He ought to have." [72]

It may be that this doctrine of moral equivalents, or the sufficingness of virtue, is the explanation why Epictetus has so little to say about the

[71] Discourses, IV. xii. [72] Discourses, III. xxiv.

Compare Marcus Aurelius: "Not as in a dance and in a play and in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete if anything cut it short; but in every part and wherever it may be stopped, the rational soul makes what has been set before it full and complete, so that it can say, I have what is mine own." Meditations, XI. I. "When a man has done anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted conformably to his nature, and he gets what is his own." *Ibid.*, IX. 42.

immortality of the soul. Certain it is that the question as it confronts us did not perplex him. Every day and every act being complete in itself, the soul's ledger always standing perfectly balanced, Epictetus was not constrained to enter into lengthy argument about the immortality of the soul. Of the future there was no *need,* the present being always complete in itself. This does not mean that he disbelieved in what we call the "future life"; but rather that any such extension of human life was amply covered by his faith in the rationality of the universe. Accordingly he asks: "Is God, then, careless of His servants, His witnesses, whom alone He useth to show forth what He is, and that He governeth all things well, and is not careless of human things? and that to a good man there is no evil, neither in life nor in death?"[73] What Epictetus contemplates in this regard is not knowledge and certitude, but trust and loyalty. "Wherefore," he says, "a good man and true cares only how he may fill his post with due discipline and obedience to God. Wilt Thou that I continue to live? Then will I live, as one that is free and noble, as Thou wouldst have me. But hast Thou no further need of me? I thank Thee! Up to this hour have I stayed for Thy sake and none other's: and in obedience to Thee I depart, as Thy servant, as one whose ear is open unto what Thou dost enjoin, what Thou dost forbid."[74]

[73] Discourses, III. xxvi. [74] Discourses, III. xxiv.

"For," says Epictetus, "being appointed to such a service, do I still care about the place? and do I not entirely direct my thoughts to God and to His instructions and commands?" [74] And some there are who will regard this high faith and sublime obedience as themselves subtle and satisfying evidence of the life immortal.[75] But however that may be, Epictetus would have men face the future without question and without fear, resting in his assurance: "To nought that thou needest fear, wilt thou go. There is no Hades, no fabled rivers of Sighs, of Lamentations, or of fire: but all things are full of Beings spiritual and divine." [76]

From the foregoing it must be obvious that such a faith as Epictetus contemplates is not to be attained in a day or without great effort. Nor does the great Stoic so imagine. He indulges no illusions on the subject. The life according to nature must obey the universal law of growth. "Nothing great," he warns us, "is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time. Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in an hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily?" [77] The path of virtue is a path of progress. For

[75] So Bernard: "When man arrives at such a conception . . . as Epictetus reached, he is well on his way to believe in a life to come." Great Moral Teachers, p. 130.

[76] Discourses, III. xiii. [77] Discourses, I. xv.

virtue not only may be taught, but it must be taught. The moral heights cannot be scaled, but are to be gained only by a long and tortuous ascent. Towards these moral summits the teacher himself leads the way, at once guide and companion; and Epictetus gives his followers certain definite instructions regarding what is at best a long and difficult journey.

At the outset it should be observed that Epictetus holds out no false and alluring hopes to those who seek his instruction. There is no royal road to philosophy. The disciple must come prepared to "scorn delights, and live laborious days." He must be willing to be laughed at and mocked.[78] Like an athlete, he must go into training. He should count the cost ere ever he enter the lists. For Epictetus wishes no half-hearted disciples. "You must watch, you must labor; overcome certain desires; quit your familiar friends, submit to be despised by your servant, to be held in derision by them that meet you, to take the lower place in all things, in office, in positions of authority, in courts of law. Weigh these things fully, and then, if you will, lay to your hand." [79]

Therefore the first step of progress is the laying aside of all self-assurance and complacency. The disciple must become a fool, in order that he may become wise: he must empty himself of all vanity before he can be filled with wisdom. "Wouldst thou be good?" he asks; "then first know that

[78] Manual, XXII. [79] Discourses, III. xv.

thou art evil." [80] Therefore the beginning of philosophy is the consciousness of our own weakness.[81] For the class room is a clinic, the disciple is a patient. He is sick, though he does not realize how seriously. The teacher is a physician who is so to heal and strengthen the patient that he shall return to the world "with a capacity to endure, to be active in association with others, to be free from passions, free from perturbation, with such a provision for the journey of life that he shall be able to bear well the things that happen and derive honor from them." [82]

Moreover the disciple is cautioned not to announce the fact that he is "taking a course in philosophy." He is to make no proclamation of his new resolve, and is not to speak much of things philosophic. "Fruit grows thus: the seed must be buried for some time, hid, grow slowly in order that it may come to perfection. Let the root grow, then acquire the first joint, then the second, and then the third: in this way the fruit will naturally force itself out." [83] Accordingly there are to be no pretences or professions: for may be the seed will never sprout! "Strive that it be not known what you are: be a philosopher to yourself a short time." [83] By this method the good name of philosophy will not be endangered, and also the disciple may be saved some humiliation. Epictetus commends to his pupils the behavior of Socrates, to whom

[80] Fragment, III.
[81] Discourses, II. xi.
[82] Discourses, III. xxi.
[83] Discourses, IV. viii.

people were wont to come asking an introduction to some philosopher!

Epictetus next recommends that the new resolve be aided by a new mental and moral environment. As physicians advise a change of climate, so the disciple should make for himself a new and congenial atmosphere. "Do you also introduce other habits than those which you have: fix your opinions and exercise yourself in them. Fly from your former habits, fly from the vulgar, if you intend ever to begin to be something." [84] This may involve the breaking of old associations and the severing of former friendships; but nothing must be suffered to stand in the way of the disciple's progress. "For no man is able to make progress, when he is wavering between opposite things; but if you have preferred this to all other things, if you choose to attend to this only, give up everything else." [85]

The law of use and disuse is also invoked by the teacher. By this law old manners and habits vanish away through disuse, and new habits are established by continuous practice. Here is the law: Darwin could have stated it no more clearly: "Every skill and faculty is maintained and increased by the corresponding acts; as the faculty of walking by walking. And thus it is in spiritual things also. When thou art wrathful, know that not this single evil hath happened to thee, but that thou hast increased the aptness to it, and, as it were, poured oil upon the fire. Wouldst

[84] Discourses, III. xvi. [85] Discourses, IV. ii.

thou then be no longer of a wrathful temper? Then do not nourish the aptness to it, give it nothing that will increase it, be tranquil from the outset, and number the days when thou hast not been wrathful . . . but if thou hast saved thirty days, then sacrifice to God in thanksgiving." [86] Thus it is that old and vicious habits may be extirpated and wholesome manners developed.

Self-examination also has an important place. The disciple must watch himself as he would an enemy. He must know how the matter stands with himself. Epictetus commends to his followers the lines of Pythagoras:

> Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes
> Before each daily action thou hast scanned;
> What's done amiss, what done, what left undone;
> From first to last examine all, and then
> Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice.[87]

Epictetus also avails himself of the law of auto-suggestion. The principles of philosophy are to become part of ourselves, finding lodgment in the subconscious and becoming a second nature; so that these principles may uphold and guide one even in sleep or in despondency.[88]

Furthermore the power of visualization is utilized. The disciple is to have always before him the form and type of character to which he aspires, the mental picture of the perfection toward which he would grow. As a sort of

[86] Discourses, I. xviii.
[87] Discourses, III. x.
[88] Discourses, III. ii.

super-self this image must transform us into its own likeness. "When, therefore, thou art about to meet anyone, especially one of those that are thought high in rank, set before thy mind what Socrates or Zeno would do in such a case. And so thou wilt not fail to deal as it behoves thee with the occasion." [89] "For," says Epictetus, "though thou be no Socrates, yet as one that would be a Socrates it behoveth thee to live." [90]

This recital of methods, by no means exhaustive, will suffice to show how seriously Epictetus regarded the matter. For what he contemplates is nothing less than the highest virtue of which man is capable and the fulfilment of the promise of our spiritual nature. So he admonishes us: "Hold thyself worthy to live as a man of full age and as one who is pressing forward; and let everything that appeareth the best be to thee as an inviolable law." [91] Thus the wise man and good is to educate and discipline his moral faculties until he is emancipated from the thraldom of appearances and finds himself superior to the pressure of circumstance. Such an endeavor issues in tranquillity, magnanimity, freedom; and the Stoic, "while imprisoned in this mortal body, makes fellowship with God his aim." [92] And it is one of the anomalies of literature that the best portrait of such a Stoic as was

[89] Manual, XXXIII. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VI. 48.

[90] Manual, L.

[91] Manual, L.

[92] Discourses, II. xix.

contemplated by Epictetus remained to be painted by a Christian poet:

> He is the freeman whom the truth makes free,
> And all are slaves beside. There's not a chain
> That hellish foes confederate for his harm
> Can wind around him, but he casts it off
> With as much ease as Samson his green withes.
> His freedom is the same in every state;
> And no condition of this changeful life,
> So manifold in cares, whose every day
> Brings its own evil with it, makes it less:
> For he has wings that neither sickness, pain,
> Nor penury can cripple or confine.
> No nook so narrow but he spreads them there
> With ease, and is at large. The oppressor holds
> His body bound, but knows not what a range
> His spirit takes, unconscious of a chain,
> And that to bind him is a vain attempt
> Whom God delights in, and in whom He dwells.[93]

After this survey of the field of his thought, it will be natural to give some consideration to the quality of the mind of Epictetus, noting certain characteristics of his teaching and observing the temper of his mind. For the genius of a teacher is revealed quite as much by the quality of his thought as by its content.

The reader of Epictetus cannot fail to be impressed with the sturdiness and robustness of his mind. There is the heroic in him. His words, as Richter said of Luther, are half battles. They have in them the clang of the battle-axe. They stir the blood like the bugle-call to arms. The faith of this Stoic is no easy-going, complacent,

[93] Cowper, The Task.

calculating creed. Over the portal of his thought there might well be inscribed the caution, Abandon all cowardice and ease, ye who enter here. And as if to warn the frivolous, Epictetus says: "Some men, having heard a philosopher, desire that they also may become philosophers. Friend, bethink you first what it is that you would do. . . . Think you to be a philosopher while acting as you do? Think you to go on thus eating, thus drinking, giving way in like manner to wrath and displeasure?"[94] Thus the teaching of Epictetus is a summons and a challenge. His philosophy is not an anodyne or an anæsthetic, but a stimulant and a caustic. "The philosopher's school," he admonishes us, "is a surgery; you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain."[95] Cowardice, effeminacy, profligacy — vices traceable to the softness of the moral tissue — these are the besetting sins against which Epictetus directs his sturdy and vigorous words.

When Zeller says[96] that the Stoics made no protest against the prevalent profligacy, he overlooks the fact that a whole chapter[97] of the Discourses is devoted to the condemnation of adultery and that there are few rebukes more scathing than that given by Epictetus to a man of letters who had been found guilty of violating the sanctity of marriage.[98] The whole weight of the teaching of the great Stoic was against profligacy

[94] Discourses, III. xv. [95] Discourses, III. xxiii.
[96] Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. p. 308.
[97] Discourses, II. iv. [98] Page 136 of this volume.

and kindred vices. The man of lax and easy morals will find little consolation in Epictetus. Not peace, but a sword; not repose, but conflict, is what he offers us. "Remember," he says, "that God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you against a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be an Olympian conqueror." [99] Nor is the contest an unequal one. For he asks: "Have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens in life? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received endurance?" [1] "Great is the contest," he jubilantly exclaims, "divine the task — for kingship, for freedom, for prosperity, for tranquillity." [2] Thus Epictetus, never mistaking gymnastics for ethics, teaches that the highest fortitude and the severest test of endurance lie in the utter subordination of sensual to spiritual impulses. It is this ethical severity that so commended Epictetus to the early Church that versions of the Manual were prepared, substituting scriptural for Pagan names, and commended to the use of monastic bodies.

But it must not be inferred that the faith of Epictetus is a grim and sombre one. There is in him nothing morbid and morose. His message, severe and unrelenting as it is, is yet a message of hope and of good cheer. Epictetus is no weeping prophet. He is no gruff and austere

[99] Discourses, I. xxiv.
[1] Discourses, I. vi. [2] Discourses, II. xviii.

hurler of denunciations. Like Balaam, he is called to bless, not to curse. If he makes heavy demands upon us, it is because he believes that we are able to meet those demands, seeing that man is "naturally noble, magnanimous, and free."[3] If he looks forward with courage and with hope, it is because he is persuaded that "Whithersoever I may go, there will be the sun, and the moon, and there the stars, and visions, and omens, and communion with the Gods."[4] The grounds of his optimism are not physiological and temperamental, the mere exuberance of animal spirits, but spiritual and abiding. For the real test of a teacher's optimism is to be found, not in the assertions he makes, but in the temper of mind he induces. Judged thus, few readers will recognize in Epictetus that "devout, though despairing, Theism" with which he is charged,[5] when they recall what courage he induces and what lofty purposes he encourages. The reader of Epictetus will agree rather with Dr. Hicks: "Not more firm is the conviction of the Hebrew Psalmist that all things must go well, since the Lord reigneth."[6]

And this suggests another quality of the mind of Epictetus, namely, his religious fervor. We shall do him scant justice if we see in him only the eloquent lecturer and the sturdy moralist. For no one can read the discourses of Epictetus with understanding and with sympathy without

[3] Discourses, IV. vii. [4] Discourses, III, xxiii.
[5] Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics, p. 28.
[6] Stoic and Epicurean, p. 18.

becoming aware that he is in the presence of one to whom God is very near and to whom religion is an everlasting reality. We feel indeed that his lips have been touched with a coal from the altar; and his words seem to carry with them a sort of scriptural authority. Many passages suggest the inspiration of the prophet: they sing and soar. What could be more strong and tender, what words breathe a freer and more divine air than these: "Seeing that most of you are blinded, should there not be someone to fill this place, and sing the hymn to God on behalf of all men? What else can I, that am lame and old, do but sing to God? Were I a nightingale, I should do after the manner of a nightingale. Were I a swan, I should do after the manner of a swan. But now, since I am a reasonable being, I must sing to God: that is my work: I do it, nor will I desert this my post, as long as it is granted me to hold it; and upon you, too, I call to join in this selfsame hymn."[7] Thus Epictetus summons us to a devotion that is as earnest as it is reasonable. With its ethical sturdiness and its spiritual tenderness, the mind of Epictetus suggests the Gothic: and it is no mean or small company that from generation to generation has found strength and beauty in the sanctuary of his thought.

It should furthermore be observed that simplicity marks the thought of Epictetus; a simplicity characterizing alike the substance and the

[7] Discourses, I. xvi.

form of his discourse. The character of his audience doubtless did much to shape his thought and to encourage forms of speech readily understood. Moreover Epictetus appears temperamentally averse to abstract forms of thought and impatient of verbal refinements. "Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics," he says, "come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defense of common consent. If I had a dispute about a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests. With what evidence, then, am I satisfied? With that which belongs to the matter in hand. How indeed perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain: for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. How do you know it? When I intend to swallow anything, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own." [8] Thus the appeal he makes is to individual and to common experience. To that also he addresses himself. The result is that he uses homely and vivid figures of speech, clothing his thought in language which, while not always non-philosophic, is simple and directed to the average mind. His thought and speech, therefore, are not those of the Academy, but of the Porch: they are the words of one who speaks in the open and whose concern is for the throngs in the highway of life.

[8] Discourses, I. xxvii.

It remains to call attention to the eminently practical character of the mind of Epictetus. Here is no dreamer of dreams, no propounder of riddles. He indulges in no mystical vagaries or transcendental refinements. He plants his feet firmly on the solid earth, that he may stand squarely and lift the more. When asked how one may eat acceptably to God, his answer is with the directness of an arrow: "If he can eat justly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately, and orderly, will it not be also acceptably to the Gods?" [9] Nor shall any sophistical questions turn him from his course. "What do I care," he says, "whether all things are composed of atoms or of similar parts, or of fire and earth? Is it not enough to know the nature of the good and the evil, and the measures of the desires and the aversions, and also the movements towards things and from them; and using these as rules to administer the affairs of life, but not to trouble ourselves about the things beyond us? For these things are perhaps incomprehensible to the human mind; and if any man should even suppose them to be in the highest degree comprehensible, what then is the profit of them?" [10] Epictetus is obviously no theorist. "What is philosophy?" he asks, only to answer, "Is it not a preparation against events which may happen?" [11] One's progress in philosophy is therefore to be measured, not by his ability to discuss

[9] Discourses, I. xiii.
[10] Fragment, CLXXV.
[11] Discourses, III. x.

theorems, to dissolve syllogisms, or to propound and answer hypothetical questions, but by his capacity for endurance and for moral discipline. "Is it for this," he asks, "that young men shall leave their country and their parents, that they may come to this place and hear you explain words? Ought they not to return with a capacity to endure, to be active in association with others, free from passions, free from perturbation, with such a provision for the journey of life as shall enable them to bear well the things that happen and derive honor from them? The carpenter does not come and say, Hear me talk about the carpenter's art; but having undertaken to build a house, he makes it, and thereby proves that he knows the art. You also ought to do something of the kind; eat like a man, drink like a man, marry, rear children, do the office of a citizen, endure abuse, bear with an unreasonable brother, bear with your father, bear with your son, neighbor, companion." [12] Thus it is that Epictetus views the world as a man of practical affairs and never allows himself to be drawn aside by theoretical or unsocial considerations. Steadily and singly he holds us to the ethical ideal, and in all the relations of life he demands a fidelity as beautiful as it is practical.

It is these qualities of mind and heart, so perfectly fused that they pass undistinguished, that made Epictetus the great moral and spiritual force that he was in an age that sorely needed his

[12] Discourses, III. xxi.

guidance. And it is these qualities of his teaching, reinforced by an example so noble that even his adversaries dared not assail it, that justify us in regarding Epictetus as the Evangelist of Stoicism.

And for the same reasons it was inevitable that the teachings of Epictetus should exert a profound influence upon Christian civilization. This is recognized by Döllinger,[13] who ranks Epictetus as second only to Aristotle, among ancient thinkers, in his influence upon succeeding generations. Nor is this strange. For the teaching of Epictetus registered the high-water mark of the tide of Pagan religious thought at the time when Christianity was in its formative stage. And as the rising faith drew to itself converts, the new disciples brought with them many ideas and forms of thought that were characteristic of the teaching of Epictetus. Thus gradually and unconsciously Christianity received into itself a Stoic strain;[14] such indeed being presupposed by some of the New Testament writers.[15]

[13] Gentile and Jew. Vol. ii., p. 128.

[14] "The most important of moral terms, the crowning triumph of ethical nomenclature, conscientia, the internal, absolute, supreme judge of individual action, if not struck in the mint of the Stoics, at all events became current through their influence." Bishop Lightfoot, Epistle to the Philippians, p. 303. See also the illuminating chapter (xvii.) in Arnold's Roman Stoicism.

[15] "The study of the discourses of Epictetus is an indispensable starting-point for a true understanding of the teaching of St. Paul. Better than any other work of antiquity they reveal to us the mind and thoughts of the

Furthermore the influence of the teaching of Epictetus began to find expression in general literature, both poetry and prose, until many Stoic conceptions gained a permanent place in the thoughts of men. Thus the influence of Epictetus became diffused, forming a part of our literary and religious inheritance.

Nor is the influence of Epictetus yet spent. A census of his admirers and debtors would surprise us with the number and character of those to whom the Stoic teacher has "brought to light and communicated, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well." [16] At present Epictetus is widely read; and wherever he is read, his words become a power for the enfranchisement and ennoblement of the mind. For the great ideas that constitute the essence of his faith are precisely the convictions that are sorely needed by us in our moral endeavors. By urging these thoughts and fixing these convictions in the mind, Epictetus still renders a service of inestimable value; while the spirit that he communicates is that which most conduces to true, lofty, and generous behavior.

There are, without doubt, heights of speculation to which Epictetus is a stranger. Mazes of philosophical thought there are which he is utterly unable to penetrate. There are sublime experiences to which he cannot conduct us; as also

social circles to which the Apostle chiefly addressed himself." Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. v., p. 324.

[16] Discourses, I. iv.

there are spiritual graces that he knows not of. But on the open plain, and on the highway of everyday life, Epictetus knew well the most direct path. And a good guide and companion he is withal. The verdict of Matthew Arnold, spoken of Marcus Aurelius, is even more true of Epictetus: "In general, the action he prescribes is action which every sound nature must recognize as right, and the motives he assigns are motives which every clear reason must recognize as valid. And so he remains the especial friend and comforter of all clear-headed and scrupulous, yet pure-hearted and upward-striving men, in those ages most especially that walk by sight, not by faith, but yet have no open vision. He cannot give such souls, perhaps, all they yearn for, but he gives them much; and what he gives them, they can receive." [17]

[17] Essays in Criticism, Marcus Aurelius.

THE CREED OF EPICTETUS

PART ONE — THE STOIC

BOOK ONE

THE INDWELLING GOD

Explanation of References and Abbreviations

The author has availed himself of Mrs. Carter's translation of the Discourses, Manual and Fragments of Epictetus, and of that by George Long, as also of the selected translations by T. W. Rolleston, and of the volume by Hastings Crossley. All selections are referred to their sources. References to the Discourses are by Book and Chapter, while passages from the Manual are cited by section, and the Fragments by number. The name of the translator follows the reference.

The following abbreviations are used:

D — Discourses; M — Manual; F — Fragment.

THE INDWELLING GOD

CHAPTER I

IMITATORS OF GOD

CONCERNING the Gods, there are some who say that a divine being does not exist; and others, that it exists indeed, but is idle and uncaring, and hath no forethought for anything; and a third class say that there is such a Being, and He taketh forethought also, but only in respect of great and heavenly things, but of nothing that is on the earth; and a fourth class, that He taketh thought both of things in heaven and earth, but only in general, and not of each thing severally. And there is a fifth class, whereof are Odysseus and Socrates, who say:

> Nor can I move without Thy knowledge.

Before all things, then, it is necessary to investigate each of these opinions, whether it be justly affirmed or no. For if there be no Gods, how can the following of the Gods be an end? And if there are Gods, but such as take no care for anything, then also how can the following of them be truly an end? And how, again, if the Gods both exist and take care for things, yet

if there be no communication from them to men, yea, and even to mine own self?[1]

Therefore the philosophers say that we are first to learn that there is a God, and that His providence directs the whole; and that it is impossible to conceal from Him, not only our actions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We are next to learn what the Gods are: for such as they are found to be, such must he, who would please and obey them to the utmost of his power, endeavor to be. If the Deity is faithful, he too must be faithful; if free, beneficent, and exalted, he must be free, beneficent, and exalted likewise; and, in all his words and actions, behave as an imitator of God.[2]

[1] D. I. xii. Rolleston. [2] D. II. xiv. Carter.

CHAPTER II

IN HIS IMAGE

WHY art thou ignorant of thine high ancestry? Why knowest thou not whence thou camest? Wilt thou not remember, in thine eating, who it is that eats, and whom thou dost nourish? Unhappy man! thou bearest about with thee a God, and knowest it not! Thinkest thou I speak of some god of gold and silver, and external to thee? Nay, but in thyself thou bearest Him, and seest not that thou defilest Him with thine impure thoughts and filthy deeds. In

the presence even of an image of God thou hadst not dared to do one of those things which thou doest. But in the presence of God Himself within thee, who seeth and heareth all things, thou art not ashamed of the things thou dost both desire and do, O thou unwitting of thine own nature!

But wert thou a statue of Phidias, an Athena or Zeus, then wert thou mindful both of thyself and of the artist; and if thou hadst any consciousness, thou wouldst strive to do nothing unworthy of thy maker nor of thyself. But now that Zeus hath made thee, thou carest therefore nothing what kind of creature thou showest thyself for? Wilt thou dishonor such a Maker, whose work thou art? Nay, not only did He make thee, but to thee alone did He trust and commit thyself. Wilt thou not remember this, too, or wilt thou dishonor thy charge? But if God had committed some orphan child to thee, wouldst thou have neglected it? Now He hath given thee to thyself, and saith, I had none more worthy of trust than thee; keep this man such as he was made by nature — reverent, faithful, high, unterrified, unshaken of passions, untroubled.[1] And wilt thou not preserve him such?[2]

[1] D. II. viii. Rolleston. [2] D. II. viii. Carter.

CHAPTER III

BODY AND SOUL

IF a man could be thoroughly penetrated, as he ought, with this thought, that we are all in an especial manner sprung from God, full surely he would never conceive aught ignoble or base of himself. Whereas if Cæsar were to adopt you, your haughty looks would be intolerable; will you not be elated at knowing that you are the son of God? Now however it is not so with us: but seeing that in our birth these two things are commingled — the body which we share with the animals, and the Reason and Thought which we share with the Gods, many decline towards this unhappy kinship with the dead, few rise to the blessed kinship with the Divine. Since then every one must deal with each thing according to the view which he forms about it, those few who hold that they are born for fidelity, modesty, and unerring sureness in dealing with the things of sense, never conceive aught base or ignoble of themselves: but the multitude the contrary. Why, what am I? — A wretched human creature; with this miserable flesh of mine. Miserable indeed! but you have something better than that paltry flesh of yours.[1]

What saith God? Had it been possible, Epictetus, I would have made both that body of thine and thy possessions free and unimpeded,

but as it is, be not deceived: — it is not thine own; it is but finely tempered clay. Since then this I could not do, I have given thee a portion of Myself, in the power of desiring and declining and of pursuing and avoiding, and in a word the power of dealing with the things of sense. And if thou neglect not this, but place all that thou hast therein, thou shalt never be let or hindered; thou shalt never lament; thou shalt not blame or flatter any.[2]

Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them, and pray to the Gods.[3]

[1] D. I. iii. Crossley.
[2] D. I. i. Crossley.
[3] D. I. i. Long.

CHAPTER IV

THE ALL-SEEING

A CERTAIN man having inquired how one could be persuaded that every one of his actions is observed by God, Doth it not appear to you, said Epictetus, that all things are united in One? What then? Think you not that a sympathy exists between heavenly and earthly things? For how else do plants, as if at the command of God, when He bids them, flower in due season? And how else at the waxing and waning of the moon, and the approach and withdrawal of the sun, do we behold such a change and reversal in earthly things? But are the

plants and our bodies so bound up in the whole, and have sympathy with it, and our spirits not much more so? And our souls being thus bound up and in touch with God, seeing, indeed, that they are portions and fragments of Him, shall not every movement of them, inasmuch as it is something inward and akin to God, be perceived by Him?

But you are able to meditate upon the divine government, and upon all divine and human affairs. And shall not God have the power to overlook all things, and be present with all, and have a certain communication with all? But is the sun able to illuminate so great a part of the All, and to leave so little without light,— that part, namely, which is filled with the shadow of the earth — and shall He who made the sun, and guideth it in its sphere — a small part of Him beside the Whole — shall not He be capable of perceiving all things?

Moreover God hath placed at every man's side a Guardian, the genius of each man, who is charged to watch over him, a genius that cannot sleep, nor be deceived. To what greater and more watchful guardian could He have committed us? So, when ye have shut the doors, and made darkness in the house, remember never to say that ye are alone; for ye are not alone, but God is there, and your genius is there; and what need have these of light to mark what ye are doing? [1]

If thou rememberest that God standeth by to

behold and visit all that thou doest, whether in the body or in the soul, thou surely wilt not err in any prayer or deed; and thou shalt have God to dwell with thee.[2]

[1] D. I. xiv. Rolleston. [2] F. CXX. Crossley.

CHAPTER V

THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION

OF religion toward the Gods, know that the chief element is to have right opinions concerning them, as existing and governing the whole in fair order and justice; and then to set thyself to obey them, and to yield to them in each event, and submit to it willingly, as accomplished under the highest counsels. For so shalt thou never blame the Gods, nor accuse them, as being neglectful of thee.

But this may come to pass in no other way than by placing Good and Evil in the things that are in our own power, and withdrawing them from those that are not; for if thou take any of these things to be good or evil, then when thou shalt miss thy desire, or fall into what thou desirest not, it is altogether necessary that thou blame and hate those who caused thee to do so.

For every living thing was so framed by Nature as to flee and turn from things, and the causes of things, that appear hurtful, and to follow and admire things, and the causes of things, that appear serviceable. For it is impossible that

one who thinketh himself harmed should delight in that which seemeth to harm him, even as he cannot delight in the very harm itself.

And thus it comes that a father is reviled by his son when he will not give him of the things that appear to be good.[1] When, then, the Gods appear to hinder us in this, we revile even them, and overthrow their images and burn their temples; as Alexander, when his friend died, commanded to burn the temples of Æsculapius.

Therefore if a man place in the same thing both profit and holiness, and the beautiful and fatherland, and parents and friends, all these things shall be saved; but if he place profit in one thing, and friends and fatherland and kinsfolk, yea, and righteousness itself some other where, all these things shall perish, for profit shall outweigh them.[2] For where advantage is, there also is religion.

Thus he who is careful to pursue and to avoid as he ought, is careful, at the same time, of religion.[1] But to make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor carelessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do.[3]

[1] M. XXXI. Rolleston.
[2] D. II. xxii. Rolleston.
[3] M. XXXI. Long.

CHAPTER VI

DIVINATION, FALSE AND TRUE

THROUGH an unreasonable regard to divination many of us omit many duties. For if I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my duty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination? Have I not within me a Diviner, who has told me the nature of good and evil, and has explained to me the signs of both? What need have I, then, to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds.[1]

Wherefore, when we ought to share a friend's danger or that of our country, we must not consult the diviner whether we ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you that the signs of the victims are unlucky, yet reason prevails that even with these risks we should share the dangers of our friend and of our country. Therefore attend to the greater diviner, the Pythian God, who ejected from the temple him who did not assist his friend when he was being murdered.[2] The woman therefore, who intended to send by a vessel a month's provisions to a friend in banishment, made a good answer to him who said that Domitian would seize what she sent. For she replied, I would rather that Domitian should seize all than that I should fail to send it.

Thus we should come to God as to a guide: as a traveller inquires the road of the person he

meets, without any desire for that which turns to the right hand more than for that which turns to the left; for he wishes for neither of these, but for that only which leads him properly. So we make use of our eyes, not persuading them to show us one object rather than another, but receiving such as they present to us. For would you have anything other than what is best? Is there anything better than what pleases God? [1]

[1] D. II. vii. Long. [2] M. XXXII. Long.

CHAPTER VII

THE KINSHIP OF GOD AND MAN

IF those things are true which are said by philosophers concerning the kinship of God and men, what else remains for men to do than after Socrates' way, who never, when men inquired of him what was his native country, replied Athens or Corinth, but the universe. For wilt thou say that thou art an Athenian, and not rather name thyself from that nook alone into which thy wretched body was cast at birth? Is it not plainly from the lordlier place, and that which contains not only that nook and all thy household, but also the whole land whence the race of thine ancestors hath come down even to thee, that thou callest thyself Athenian or Corinthian? [1]

He that hath grasped the administration of the World, who hath learned that this Community,

which consists of God and men, is the foremost and mightiest and most comprehensive of all:—that from God have descended the germs of life, not to my father only and father's father, but to all things that are born and grow upon the earth, and in an especial manner to those endowed with Reason (for those only are by their nature fitted to hold communion with God, being by means of Reason conjoined with Him)—why should not such an one call himself a citizen of the world? Why not a son of God? Why should he fear aught that comes to pass among men? Shall kinship with Cæsar, or any other of the great at Rome, be enough to hedge men around with safety and consideration, without a thought of apprehension: while to have God for our Maker, and Father, and Kinsman, shall not this set us free from sorrows and fears?[2] How was Socrates affected by these things? As it became one persuaded of his being truly a kinsman of God.[3]

[1] D. I. ix. Rolleston.
[2] D. I. ix. Crossley.
[3] D. I. ix. Carter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GREAT VOCATION

SHALL we not remember what we have heard from the philosophers? For they say that the universe is one Polity, and one is the substance out of which it is made; and that all things

are full of love, first of the Gods, then of men, that are by nature made to have affection towards each other. And man, they say, is magnanimous by nature, and hath also this quality, not to be rooted to one spot, nor grown into the earth, but able to go from place to place, like Hercules, who went about the whole earth —

> All disorders of men and orderly rule to see,

casting out and purging the one, and bringing in the other in its place.

And how many friends, think you, he had in Thebes? how many in Argos? how many in Athens? and how many did he gain in his journeyings? And he left not his family as orphans; for he knew that no man is an orphan, but that there is an Eternal Father who careth continually for all. For not of report alone had he heard that Zeus is the Father of men, whom also he thought to be his own Father, and called Him so, and all that he did, he did looking unto Him.[1]

But who would Hercules have been if he had sat at home? But nothing was dearer to him than God; and for this reason he was believed to be the son of God, yea, and was the son of God. And trusting in God, he went about purging away lawlessness and wrong. But thou art no Hercules, and canst not purge away evils not thine own? nor yet Theseus, who cleared Attica of evil things? Then clear away thine own. From thy breast, from thy mind, cast out, instead of Procrustes and Sciron, grief, fear, covetous-

ness, envy, malice, avarice, effeminacy, profligacy. And these things cannot otherwise be cast out than by looking to God only, being affected only by Him, and consecrated to His commands.[2]

[1] D. III. xxiv. Rolleston. [2] D. II. xvi. Rolleston.

CHAPTER IX

MAN THE MASTERPIECE

IS it possible that no man should be able to learn, from reason and demonstration, that God made all things in the world and the world itself, unrestrained and perfect, and all its parts for the use of the whole? All other creatures are indeed excluded from the power of comprehending the administration of the world; but a reasonable being hath abilities for the consideration of all these things, both that itself is a part, and what part.[1]

For it is enough for the animals to eat and drink, and rest and breed, and do whatever else each of them performs, but to us, to whom the faculty of observing and studying hath also been given, these things are not enough; but unless we act after a certain manner and ordinance, and conformably to the nature of man, we shall never attain the end of our being. For God hath constituted every other animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for tilling the land, another to yield cheese, another to some kindred use; for which

things what need is there of the observing and studying of appearances, and the ability to make distinctions in them?

But man He hath brought in to be a spectator of God and of His works, and not a spectator alone, but an interpreter of them. Wherefore it is shameful for a man to begin and to end where creatures do that are without Reason; but rather should he begin where they begin, and end where Nature ends in ourselves. But she ends in contemplation, in observing and studying, in a manner of life that is in harmony with Nature. See to it, then, that ye die not without having been spectators of these things.[2]

[1] D. IV. vii. Carter. [2] D. I. vi. Rolleston.

CHAPTER X

THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE

FROM everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities: the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them.

If God had made colors, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been

their use? On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? Who is it, then, who has fitted this to that and that to this? From the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. And do not visible things, and the faculty of seeing and light, demonstrate Him?

You take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all of you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works of God before him, will you not desire to see and understand them? Will you not perceive, either, what you are, or what you were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty of sight?[1] And yet there is no one thing in the frame of Nature but would give, at least to a reverent and grateful spirit, enough for the perceiving of the Providence of God.[2]

[1] D. I. vi. Long. [2] D. I. xvi. Rolleston.

CHAPTER XI

THE WORLD SPECTACLE

OUR way of life resembles a fair. The flocks and herds are passing along to be sold, and the greater part of the crowd to buy and sell. But there are some few who come only to look at the fair, to inquire how and why it is being held, upon what authority and with what object. So, too, it is in this great Fair of life, some, like the cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but the fodder. Know all of you, who are busied about land, slaves, and public posts, that these are nothing but fodder. Some few there are attending the Fair, who love to contemplate what the world is, what He that administers it. Can there be no Administrator? is it possible, that while neither city nor household could endure for a moment without one to administer and see to its welfare, this Fabric, so fair, so vast, should be administered in order so harmonious, without a purpose and by blind chance? There is therefore an Administrator. What is His nature and how does He administer? And who are we that are His children and what work were we born to perform? Have we any close connection or relation with Him or not?

Such are the impressions of the few of whom I speak. And further, they apply themselves solely to considering and examining the great as-

sembly before they depart. Well, they are derided by the multitude. So are the lookers-on by the traders: aye, and if the beasts had any sense they would deride those who thought much of anything but fodder![1] Conversing among such men, therefore, thus confused and thus ignorant, it is worth while to ask one's self continually, Am I, too, one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How do I conduct myself?[2]

[1] D. II. xiv. Crossley. [2] D. II. xxi. Carter.

CHAPTER XII

DOXOLOGY

WHAT words suffice to praise or to set forth the works of God? Had we but understanding, should we ever cease hymning and blessing the Divine Power, both openly and in secret, and telling of His gracious gifts? Whether digging or ploughing or eating, should we not sing the hymn to God:

> Great is God, for that He hath given us such instruments to till the ground withal:
> Great is God, for that He hath given us hands, and the power of swallowing and digesting; of unconsciously growing and breathing while we sleep!

Thus should we ever have sung: yea, and this, the grandest and divinest hymn of all:

Great is God, for that He hath given us a mind to apprehend these things, and duly to use them!

What then! seeing that most of you are blinded, should there not be someone to fill this place, and sing the hymn to God on behalf of all men? What else can I, that am lame and old, do but sing to God? Were I a nightingale, I should do after the manner of a nightingale. Were I a swan, I should do after the manner of a swan. But now, since I am a reasonable being, I must sing to God: that is my work: I do it, nor will I desert this my post, as long as it is granted me to hold it; and upon you too I call to join in this selfsame hymn.[1]

[1] D. I. xvi. Crossley.

BOOK TWO

THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY

THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

CLASS ROOM AND CLINIC

A CERTAIN Roman having entered with his son and listened to one lecture, This, said Epictetus, is the manner of teaching; and he was silent. But when the other prayed him to continue, Epictetus spake as follows:

It is hateful to be confuted, for a man now old, and one who, perhaps, hath served his three campaigns. And I too know this. For you have come to me now as one who lacketh nothing. And what could you suppose to be lacking to you? Wealth have you, and children, and it may be a wife, and many servants; Cæsar knows you, you have won many friends in Rome, you give every man his due, you reward with good him that doeth good to you, and with evil him that doeth evil. What still is lacking to you?

If, now, I shall show you that you lack the greatest and most necessary things for happiness, and that to this day you have cared for everything rather than for what behoved you: and if I crown all and say that you know not what God is nor what man is, nor Good nor Evil; — and what I say of other things is perhaps endurable, but if I say that you know not your own self, how

can you endure me? And yet what evil have I done you? Unless the mirror doth evil to the ill-favored man, when it shows him to himself such as he is, and unless the physician is thought to affront the sick man when he may say to him, Man, dost thou think thou ailest nothing? Thou hast a fever: fast to-day and drink water. And none saith, What an affront. But if one shall say to a man, Thy pursuits are inflamed, thine avoidances are mean, thy purposes are lawless, thine impulses accord not with nature, thine opinions are vain and lying — straightway he goeth forth and saith, He affronted me.[1]

Now the philosopher's school is a surgery: pain, not pleasure, you should have felt therein. For on entering none of you is whole. One has a shoulder out of joint, another an abscess: a third suffers from an issue, a fourth from pains in the head. And am I then to sit down and treat you to pretty sentiments and empty flourishes, so that you may applaud me and depart, with neither shoulder, nor head, nor issue, nor abscess a whit the better for your visit?[2] Nay, but you ought to return with a capacity to endure, to be active in association with others, to be free from passions, free from perturbation, with such a provision for the journey of life with which you shall be able to bear well the things that happen and derive honor from them.[3]

[1] D. II. xiv. Rolleston.
[2] D. III. xxiii. Crossley.
[3] D. III. xxi. Long.

CHAPTER II

ENTERED APPRENTICE

IF thou set thine heart upon philosophy, prepare straightway to be laughed at and mocked by many who will say, Behold, he hath suddenly come back to us a philosopher; or, How camest thou by that brow of scorn? Now do thou cherish no scorn, but hold to those things that seem to thee the best, as one set by God in that place. Remember, too, that if thou abide in that way, those that first mocked thee, the same shall afterwards reverence thee; but if thou yield to them, thou shalt receive double mockery.[1]

If therefore thou wouldst advance, be content to let people think thee senseless and foolish as regards external things. Wish not ever to seem wise, and if ever thou shalt find thyself accounted to be somebody, then mistrust thyself.[2] And when someone shall say to thee, Thou knowest naught, and it biteth thee not, then know that thou hast begun the work.[3] But if it shall ever happen to thee to be turned to outward things in the desire to please some person, know that thou hast lost thy way of life. Let it be enough for thee in all things to *be* a philosopher. But if thou desire also to seem one, then seem so to thyself, for this thou canst.[4]

And if one shall bear thee word that such an one hath spoken evil of thee, then defend not thy-

self against his accusations, but make answer, He little knew my other vices, or he had not mentioned only these.[5]

When thou hast adapted thy body to a frugal way of living, flatter not thyself on that, nor if thou drinkest only water, say, on every opportunity, I drink only water. And if thou desirest at any time to inure thyself to labor and endurance, do it to thyself and not unto the world. And do not embrace the statues; but sometime when thou art exceeding thirsty take a mouthful of cold water, and spit it out, and say nothing about it.[6]

For the position and character of the philosopher is this: he looketh for benefit or hurt only to himself. He blameth none, he praiseth none, he accuseth none, he complaineth of none; he speaketh never of himself, as being somewhat, or as knowing aught. When he is thwarted or hindered in aught, he accuseth himself. If one should praise him, he laugheth at him in his sleeve; if one should blame him, he maketh no defence. If he is thought foolish or unlearned, he regardeth it not. In a word, he watcheth himself as he would a treacherous enemy.[7]

---

[1] M. XXII. Rolleston.
[2] M. XIII. Rolleston.
[3] M. XLVI. Rolleston.
[4] M. XXIII. Rolleston.
[5] M. XXXIII. Rolleston.
[6] M. XLVII. Rolleston.
[7] M. XLVIII. Rolleston.

CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNER'S PERSONAL APPEARANCE

IT betokens a dull nature to be greatly occupied in matters that concern the body; but these things should be done by the way, and all attention given to the mind.[1] Howbeit I had rather a young man in his first movements towards philosophy should come to me with his hair curled than dishevelled and foul. For a certain impression of the beautiful is to be seen in him, and an aim at what is becoming; and to the thing wherein it seemeth to him to lie, there he applies his art. Thenceforth it only needs to show him its true place, and to say, Young man, thou seekest the beautiful, and thou dost well. Know, then, that it flourishes there where thy Reason is; there seek it.

But if one come to me foul and filthy, and a moustache down to the knees, what have I to say to him? with what image or likeness can I draw him on? For with what that is like unto Beauty hath he ever busied himself, so as I may set him on another course, and say, Not here is Beauty, but there? Will you have me tell him, Beauty consists not in being befouled, but in the Reason? For doth he even seek Beauty? hath he any impression of it in his mind?

For we ought not even by the aspect of the body to scare away the multitude from philoso-

phy; but by his body, as in all other things, a philosopher should show himself cheerful, and free from troubles. But if he have the countenance and garb of a condemned criminal, what God shall persuade me to approach to philosophy which maketh such men as this? [2]

[1] M. XLI. Rolleston. [2] D. IV. xi. Rolleston.

CHAPTER IV

THE SHORTER CATECHISM

CAN you tell me to whom you have committed the care of your horses? Was it, then, to any chance-comer and one inexperienced about horses? By no means.

Well then, to whom are your gold and silver vessels and raiment entrusted? Neither are these committed to any chance person.

And your body, have you already sought out one to whom to commit the care of it? And that also one who is experienced in training and medicine? Assuredly.

Are these the best things you have, or do you possess aught that is better than all of them? What thing do you mean? That, by Zeus, which useth all these, and approveth each of them and taketh counsel. Is it the soul, then, that you mean? You have conceived me rightly; it is even this. Truly I hold that I possess in this something much better than everything else.

Can you, then, declare to us in what manner you have taken thought for your soul? For it is not likely that a wise man like yourself would overlook the best thing you possess, and use no diligence or design about it, but leave it neglected and perishing? Surely not. But do you provide for it yourself? and have you learned the way from another, or discovered it yourself?[1] For as, in walking, you take care not to tread upon a nail or turn your foot, so likewise take care not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And if we were to guard against this in every action, we should undertake the action with the greater safety.[2]

[1] D. II. xii. Rolleston. [2] M. XXXVIII. Carter.

CHAPTER V

MAN'S INVINCIBLE NATURE

BELIEFS which are sound and manifestly true are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those who deny it are compelled to make use of it.

Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, employeth the very thing that is being abolished. For what saith he? Be not deceived, O men, nor misguided nor mistaken — there is no natural fel-

lowship among reasoning beings, believe me; and those who speak otherwise deceive us with sophisms.

What is that to thee? let us be deceived! Will it be the worse for thee if all other men are persuaded that we have a natural fellowship with one another? Nay, but much the better and safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, and watch at night for our sakes? Why dost thou kindle thy lamp and rise early? why dost thou write so many books, lest any of us should be deceived about the Gods, in supposing that they cared for men? or lest anyone should take the essence of the Good to be any thing else than Pleasure? For if these things are so, then lie down and sleep, and live the life of a worm, wherefor thou hast judged thyself fit. What is it to thee how other men think concerning these matters, whether soundly or unsoundly? What hast thou to do with us?

What, then, was it that roused up Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write the things he wrote? What else than Nature, the mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature, that drags the man, reluctant and groaning, to her will. For, saith she, since it seems to thee that there is no fellowship among men, write this down, and deliver it to others, and watch and wake for this, and be thyself by thine own deed the accuser of thine own opinions! So mighty and invincible a thing is man's nature.[1]

[1] D. II. xx. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VI

THE WORKMAN AND HIS MATERIALS

EVERY art is wearisome, in the learning of it, to the untaught and unskilled. Yet things that are made by the arts immediately declare their use, and in most of them is something attractive and pleasing. For if you are by where one is learning music, it will appear the most painful of all instructions; but that which is produced by the musical art is sweet and delightful to hear, even to those who are untaught in it.

And we conceive the work of one who studies philosophy to be some such thing, that he must fit his desire to all events, so that nothing may come to pass against our will, nor may aught fail to come to pass that we wish for. Whence it results to those who so order it, that they never fail to obtain what they would, nor to avoid what they would not, living, as regards themselves, without pain, fear, or trouble; and as regards their fellows, observing all the relations, natural and acquired; as son or father, or brother or citizen, or husband or wife, or neighbor or fellow-traveller, or prince or subject. Such we conceive to be the work of one who pursues philosophy.[1]

And now, said Epictetus, I am your teacher and ye are being taught by me. And I have this aim — to perfect you, that ye be unhindered,

uncompelled, unembarrassed, free, prosperous, happy, looking unto God alone in all things great and small. And ye are here to learn these things, and to do them. And wherefore do ye not finish the work, if ye have indeed such an aim as behoves you, and if I, besides the aim, have such ability as behoves me? What is here lacking? When I see a carpenter, and the wood lying beside him, I look for some work. And now, here is the carpenter, here is the wood — what is yet lacking? Is the thing such as cannot be taught? It can. Is it, then, not in our power? Yea, this alone of all things is. Wealth is not in our power, nor health, nor repute, nor any other thing, save only the right use of appearances. This alone is by nature unhindered; this alone is unembarrassed. Wherefore, then, will ye not make an end? Tell me the reason. For either the fault lies in me, or in you, or in the nature of the thing. But the thing itself is possible, and indeed the only thing that is in our power. It remains that I am to blame, or else ye are; or, to speak more truly, both of us. What will ye, then? Let us at length begin to entertain such a purpose among us, and let the past be past. Only let us make a beginning.[2]

[1] D. II. xiv. Rolleston. [2] D. II. xix. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VII

LEARNING THE RULES

HE did well, rightly, not rightly, he failed, he succeeded, he is unrighteous, he is righteous — which of us spareth to use terms like these? Which of us will defer the use of them till he hath learned them, even as ignorant men do not use terms of geometry or music? Do I not, then, apply them rightly? But here lies the whole question.

For now since you think you apply these things rightly, tell me, Whence have you this assurance? Because, you say, it seems so to me. But to another it seems otherwise — and he, too, doth he not think his application right? What else doth a madman do, than those things that to him seem right? Have you, then, aught better to show for your application than that it seemeth so to you?

Behold, the beginning of philosophy is the inquiry into that which seems, whether it rightly seems; and the discovery of a certain rule, even as we have found a balance for weights, and a plumb line for straight and crooked. Seeming, then, doth not for every man answer to Being; for neither in weights nor measures doth the bare appearance content us, but for each case we have discovered some rule. And here, then, is there no rule above seeming? And how could it be that there were no evidence or discovery of things

most necessary for men? There is, then, a rule. And wherefore do we not seek it, and find it, and, having found it, henceforth use it without transgression, and not so much as stretch forth a finger without it? For this it is, I think, that when it is discovered cureth of their madness those that mismeasure all things by seeming alone.

What is the subject about which we shall inquire? Shall it be Pleasure? Submit it to the rule, cast it into the scales thus: Now the Good must be a thing of such sort that we ought to trust in it. And we ought to have faith in it. And ought we to trust in anything which is unstable? Nay. And hath Pleasure any stability? It hath not. Take it then, and fling it out of the scales, and set it far away from the place of the Good. Thus are things judged and weighed, when the rules are held in readiness. And the aim of philosophy is this, to examine and establish the rules. And to use them when they are known is the task of a wise and a good man.[1]

[1] D. II. xi. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VIII

CHILD AND MAN

IT is the action of an uninstructed person to lay the fault of his own bad condition upon others; of one entering upon instruction, to lay the fault on himself.[1] The one says, I am un-

done on account of my child, my brother, my father; but the other, if ever he be obliged to say, I am undone! reflects, and adds, On account of myself. If therefore we would always incline this way, and, whenever we are unsuccessful, would lay the fault on ourselves, I engage we should make some proficiency.[2]

But as it is, we have from the beginning travelled a different road. While we were still children, if haply we stumbled as we were gaping about, the nurse did not chide us, but beat the stone. For what had the stone done? Ought it to have moved out of the way for your child's folly? Again, if we find nothing to eat after coming from the bath, never doth the tutor check our desire, but he beats the cook. Man, we did not set thee to be a tutor of the cook, but of our child — him shall you train, him improve. And thus, even when full-grown, we appear as children. For a child in music is he who hath not learned music, and in letters, one who hath not learned letters; and in life he is a child who is undisciplined in philosophy.[3]

[1] M. V. Carter.
[2] D. III. xix. Carter.
[3] D. III. xix. Rolleston.

CHAPTER IX

THE AIM OF INSTRUCTION

HE who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed with this intention: How shall I follow the Gods in all things? How

shall I be contented with the divine administration? And how can I become free? And to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that everything may happen as it does. And how do things happen? As the Disposer has disposed them.

But, you say, I would have everything result just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. For me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. If it were not so, it would be of no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man's whim.

Remembering, then, this disposition of things, we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may change the constitution of things, — for we have not the power to do it, nor is it better that we should have the power, — but in order that, as the things around us are what they are and by nature exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things which happen. For can we escape from men? and how is it possible? And if we associate with them, can we change them? Who gives us the power? What, then, remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce with them? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit to them,

and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to nature?[1]

Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life.[2] In a word, desire nothing other than that which God wills. But if you envy and complain, and are jealous, and fear, and never cease for a single day complaining both of yourself and of the Gods, why do you still speak of being educated? Will you not unlearn all these things and begin from the beginning, and see that hitherto you have not even touched the matter? And then commencing from this foundation, will you not build up all that comes after, so that nothing may happen which you do not choose and nothing shall fail to happen which you do choose?[3]

[1] D. I. xii. Long.
[2] M. VIII. Long.
[3] D. II. xvii. Long.

CHAPTER X

THE SPHERE OF PHILOSOPHY

YOU are sailing to Rome (you tell us) to obtain the post of Governor of Cnossus. But when did you ever take a voyage for the purpose of reviewing your principles and getting rid of any of them that proved unsound? Whom did you ever visit for that object? What time did you ever set yourself for that? Did you ex-

amine your principles when a boy? And at what moment would you have endured another examining your principles and proving that they were unsound? What then am I to say to you? Help me in this matter! you cry. Ah, for that I have no rule. What do philosophers have rules for, then? Why, that whatever may betide, our ruling faculty may be as Nature would have it, and so remain. Think you this a small matter? Not so! but the greatest thing there is. Not so, you think; this is only a flying visit; while we are hiring the ship, we can see Epictetus too! Then on leaving you cry, Out on Epictetus for a worthless fellow, provincial and barbarous of speech!

Whether you will or no, you are poorer than I! What then do I lack? What you have not: Constancy of mind, such as Nature would have it to be: Tranquillity. Patron or no patron, what care I? but you do care. I am richer than you: I am not racked with anxiety as to what Cæsar may think of me; I flatter none on that account. This is what I have, instead of vessels of gold and silver! Your vessels may be of gold, but your reason, your principles, your accepted views, your inclinations, your desires are of earthenware.

To you, all you have seems small: to me, all I have seems great. Your desire is insatiable, mine is satisfied. See children thrusting their hands into a narrow-necked jar, and striving to pull out the nuts and figs it contains: if they fill the hand, they cannot pull it out again, and then they fall

to tears. Let go a few of them, and then you can draw out the rest. You, too, let your desire go! covet not many things, and you will obtain.[1]

[1] D. III. ix. Crossley.

CHAPTER XI

THE FRUIT OF PHILOSOPHY

BE not elated in mind at any superiority that is not of yourself. If your horse were elated and should say, I am beautiful, that would be tolerable. But when you are elated and say, I have a beautiful horse, know that it is at an excellence in your horse that you are elated. What, then, is your own? This — to make use of the appearances. So that when you deal according to Nature in the use of appearances, then shall you be elated, for you will then be elated at an excellence that is your own.[1]

When therefore some one may exalt himself in that he is able to understand and expound the works of Chrysippus, say then to thyself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing whereon to exalt himself. But I, what do I desire? Is it not to learn to understand Nature and to follow her? I inquire, then, who can expound Nature to me, and hearing that Chrysippus can, I betake myself to him. But I do not understand his writings, therefore I seek an expounder for them. And so far there is

nothing exalted. But when I have found the expounder, it remaineth for me to put in practice what he declares to me, and in this alone is there anything exalted. But if I shall admire the bare exposition, what else have I made of myself than a grammarian instead of a philosopher, save, indeed, that the exposition is of Chrysippus and not of Homer? When, therefore, one may ask me to lecture on the philosophy of Chrysippus, I shall rather blush when I am not able to show forth works of a like nature and in harmony with the words.[2]

For it is not these small arguments that are wanted now: the writings of the Stoics are full of them. What, then, is the thing that is wanted? A man who shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to his words. Assume, I intreat you, this character, that we may no longer use in the schools the examples of the ancients, but that we may have some example of our own.[3]

[1] M. VI. Rolleston.
[2] M. XLIX. Rolleston.
[3] D. I. xxix. Long.

CHAPTER XII

THE TEST OF CULTURE

THE material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty, and the body is the material for the physician; the land is the

matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil, and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the banker is not allowed to reject Cæsar's coin, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself.[1]

Turn your mind at last to these things; attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty. Consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other faculties, and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals, you will have the ruling faculty such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.[2]

Therefore I cannot call anyone industrious if I hear only that he reads or writes; nor even if he adds the whole night to the day do I call him so, unless I know to what he refers it. For if he does it for fame, I call him ambitious: if for money, avaricious; if from the desire of learning, bookish; but not industrious. But if he refers his labor to his ruling faculty, in order

to treat and regulate it conformably to nature, then only I call him industrious.

If you perceive any of those things which you have learned and studied occurring to you in action, rejoice in them. If you have laid aside ill-nature and reviling; if you have lessened your harshness, indecent language, inconsiderateness, effeminacy; if you are not moved by the same things as formerly, if not in the same manner as formerly, you may keep a perpetual festival; today because you have behaved well in one affair; tomorrow, because in another.[3]

[1] D. III. iii. Long.
[2] D. IV. vii. Long.
[3] D. IV. iv. Carter.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DIVINE CONTEST

YOU would fain be victor at the Olympic games, you say. Yes, but weigh the conditions, weigh the consequences. You must live by rule, submit to diet, abstain from dainty meats, exercise your body perforce at stated hours, in heat or in cold; drink no cold water, nor, it may be, wine. In a word, you must surrender yourself to your trainer, as though to a physician. Then in the hour of contest, you will have to delve the ground, it may chance dislocate an arm, sprain an ankle, gulp down abundance of yellow

sand, be scourged with the whip — and with all this sometimes lose the victory. Count the cost — and then, if your desire still holds, try the wrestler's life.

And thus some men, having seen a philosopher and heard him discourse, desire that they also may become philosophers. Friend, bethink you first what it is that you would do, and then what your own nature is able to bear. Think you to be a philosopher while acting as you do? think you to go on thus eating, thus drinking, giving way in like manner to wrath and to displeasure? Nay, you must watch, you must labor; overcome certain desires; quit your familiar friends, submit to be despised by your slave, to be held in derision by them that meet you, to take the lower place in all things, in office, in positions of authority, in courts of law. Weigh these things fully, and then, if you will, lay to your hand; if as the price of these things you would gain freedom, tranquillity, and passionless serenity.[1]

For the combat before us is not in wrestling, but the combat is for good fortune and happiness themselves.[2] Great is the contest, divine the task, for kingship, for freedom, for prosperity, for tranquillity. Be mindful of God, call Him to be thy helper and defender.[3] Go to Socrates, and consider what a victory he at last found that he had gained over himself; what an Olympian victory; so that, in truth, one may justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man! thou who

hast conquered, not these boxers and gladiators, but thyself! Over such a victory as this a man may justly be proud.[4]

[1] D. III. xv. Crossley.
[2] D. III. xxv. Long.
[3] D. II. xviii. Rolleston.
[4] D. II. xviii. Long.

CHAPTER XIV

WHAT THE WORLD CANNOT GIVE

YE see now, how that Cæsar seemeth to have given us a great peace; how there are no longer wars nor battles nor bands of robbers nor of pirates, but a man may travel at every season, and sail from east to west. But can Cæsar give us peace from fever? or from shipwreck? or from fire? or from earthquake? or from lightning? aye, or from love? He cannot. Or from grief? He cannot. Or from envy? He cannot. Briefly, then, Cæsar cannot secure us from any of such things. But the word of the philosophers doth promise us peace even from these things. And what saith it? If ye will hearken unto me, O men, wheresoever ye be, whatsoever ye do, ye shall not grieve, ye shall not be wroth, ye shall not be compelled or hindered, but ye shall live untroubled and free from every ill.

Whosoever hath this peace, which Cæsar never proclaimed (for how could he proclaim it?), but which God proclaimed through His word, shall he not suffice to himself? For he beholdeth and

considereth, Now can no evil happen to me; for me there is no robber, no earthquake; all things are full of peace, full of calm; for me no way, no city, no assembly, no neighbor, no associate hath any hurt.[1] Whithersoever I go, it shall be well with me; for in this place it was well with me, not because of the place, but because of the opinions which I shall carry away with me. For these no man can deprive me of. Yea, these only are mine own, whereof I cannot be deprived, and they suffice for me as long as I have them, wherever I be, or whatever I do.[2]

[1] D. III. xiii. Rolleston. [2] D. IV. vii. Rolleston.

BOOK THREE

THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL

THE KINGDOM OF THE WILL

CHAPTER I

THE ADORNMENT OF THE WILL

A CERTAIN young man, a rhetorician, having come to Epictetus with his hair dressed in an unusually elaborate way, and his attire much adorned, Tell me, said Epictetus, think you not that some dogs are beautiful, and some horses, and so of the other animals? And men too — are not some beautiful and some ill-favored? Whether, then, do we call each of these beautiful for the same reasons and in the same kind, or each for something proper to itself? You shall see the matter thus: Inasmuch as we observe a dog to be formed by nature for one end, and a horse for another, and, let us say, a nightingale for another, we may in general say, not unreasonably, that each of them is then beautiful when it is excellent according to its own nature; but since the nature of each is different, different also, it seems to me, is the manner of being beautiful in each.

What is it, then, that makes a man beautiful? Is it not that which, in its kind, makes also a dog or a horse beautiful? What, then, makes a dog beautiful? The presence of the virtue of a dog. And in a man is it not also the presence of the

virtue of a man? And, O youth, if thou wouldst be beautiful, do thou labor to perfect this, the virtue of a human being. But so long as thou neglectest this, though thou shouldst seek out every device to appear beautiful, thou must of necessity be ugly. For thou art not flesh and hair, but a Will: if thou keep this beautiful, then wilt thou be beautiful. See what Socrates saith to Alcibiades, the most beautiful and blooming of men. And what saith he? Curl thy locks? Nay. But, Set thy Will in order, cast out evil doctrines.[1]

Young man, thou seekest the beautiful, and thou dost well. Know, then, that it flourishes there where thy Reason is; there seek it, for this is what thou hast in thyself of choice and precious.[2] Resolve at last to seek thine own commendation, to appear fair and beautiful in the eyes of God; desire to become pure with thine own pure self, and with God.[3]

[1] D. III. i. Rolleston.
[2] D. IV. xi. Rolleston.
[3] D. II. xviii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER II

THE PRIMACY OF THE WILL

DID God give thee eyes for nothing? And was it for nothing that He mingled in them a spirit of such might and cunning as to reach a long way off and receive the impression of visible forms — a messenger so swift and faithful?

Was it for nothing that He gave the intervening air such efficacy, and made it elastic, so that being in a manner strained, our vision should traverse it? Was it for nothing that He made light, without which there was no benefit of any other thing?

Be not thou unthankful for these things, nor yet unmindful of better things. For seeing and hearing, and for life itself, and the things that work together to maintain it, do thou give thanks to God. But remember that He hath given thee another thing which is better than all these — that, namely, which useth them, which approveth them, which taketh account of the worth of each.

For what is that which declareth concerning all these faculties how much each of them is worth? Is it the faculty itself? Heardst thou ever the faculty of vision tell aught concerning itself? or that of hearing? Nay, but as ministers and slaves are they appointed, to serve the faculty which useth them. How then shall any other faculty be greater than this, which both useth the others as its servants, and the same time approveth each of them and declareth concerning them?

For which of them knoweth what itself is, and what it is worth? Which of them knoweth when it behoves to make use of it, and when not? What is that which openeth and closeth the eyes, turning them away from things which they should not behold, and guiding them towards other things? Is it the faculty of vision? Nay,

but the faculty of the Will. What is that which closeth and openeth the ears? — that in obedience to which they become busy and curious, or, again, unmoved by what they hear? Is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than that of the Will. Wilt thou affirm, then, that thou hast aught better than the Will?

What then? Shall any man contemn the other faculties? God forbid! — that were senseless, impious, thankless toward God. But to each thing its true worth. But if one ask me which is the best of existing things, what shall I say but that it is the faculty of the Will, when it is made right? For this is that which useth all the other faculties, both small and great. When this is set right, a man that was not good becomes good: when it is not right, the man becomes evil. This is that whereby we fail or prosper — whereby we blame others, or approve them; the neglect of which is the misery, and the care of it the happiness, of mankind.[1]

[1] D. II. xxiii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER III

THINGS AND THEIR USE

THINGS are indifferent, but the uses of them are not indifferent. How, then, shall one preserve at once both a steadfast and tranquil

mind, and also carefulness of things, that he be not heedless or slovenly? If he take example of dice players. The numbers are indifferent, the dice are indifferent. How can I tell what may be thrown up? But carefully and skilfully to make use of what is thrown, that is where my proper business begins.

And this is the great task of life also, to discern things and divide them, and say, Outward things are not in my power; to will is in my power. Where shall I seek the Good, and where the Evil? Within me — in all that is my own. But of all that is alien to thee call nothing good nor evil nor profitable nor hurtful, nor any such term as these. For where there is aught that concerns me, there none can hinder or compel me; and in those things where I am hindered or compelled the attainment is not in my power, and is neither good nor evil; but my use of the event is either evil or good, and this is in my power.[1]

But now having one thing in our power to care for, and to cleave to, we rather choose to be careful of many things, and to bind ourselves to many things. And being thus bound to many things, they lie heavy on us and drag us down. So, if the weather be not fair for sailing, we sit down distraught and are ever peering forth to see how stands the wind. It is north. And what is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall seem good to it, friend; or to Æolus. For it was not thee, but Æolus, whom God made steward of the winds.

What then? It is right to devise how we may perfect the things that are our own, and to use the others as their nature is. And what, then, is their nature? As it may please God.[2]

[1] D. II. v. Rolleston. [2] D. I. i. Rolleston.

CHAPTER IV

THE HEART AND ITS TREASURE

BE not deceived: nothing is so dear to any creature as its own profit. Whatsoever may seem to hinder this, be it father or child or friend or lover, this he will hate and abuse and curse. For Nature hath never so made anything as to love aught but its own profit: this is father and brother and kin and country and God. When, then, the Gods appear to hinder us in this, we revile even them, and overthrow their images and burn their temples; as Alexander, when his friend died, commanded to burn the temples of Æsculapius.

Therefore, if a man place in the same thing both profit and holiness, and the beautiful and fatherland, and parents and friends, all these things shall be saved; but if he place profit in one thing, and friends and fatherland and kinsfolk, yea, and righteousness itself some other where, all these things shall perish, for profit shall outweigh them. For where the *I* and the *Mine* are, thither, of necessity, inclineth every living

thing: if in the flesh, then the supremacy is there; if in the Will, it is there; if in outward things, it is there. If I set Myself in one place and Virtue some other where, then the word of Epicurus waxeth strong, which declareth that there is no Virtue, or, at least, that Virtue is but conceit. But if mine *I* is where my Will is, then shall I be the friend I should be, or the son or the father. For my profit then will be to cherish faith and piety and forbearance and continence and helpfulness; and to guard the bonds of relation.[1]

[1] D. II. xxii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER V

THE FRIENDSHIP OF VIRTUE

WHEN you see friends or brothers that seem to be of one mind, argue from this nothing concerning their friendship; nay, not if they swear it, not if they declare that they cannot be parted from each other. For in the heart of a worthless man there is no faith; it is unstable, unaccountable, victim of one appearance after another. But try them, not as others do, if they were born of the same parents and nurtured together, and under the same tutor; but by this alone, wherein they place their profit, whether in outward things or in the will. If in outward things, call them no more friends than faithful or steadfast or bold or free. For that opinion

hath nothing of humanity that makes men bite each other, and revile each other, and haunt the wildernesses, or the public places, like the mountains, and in the courts of justice, to show forth the character of thieves; nor that which makes men drunkards and adulterers and corrupters, nor whatever other ills men work against each other through this one and only opinion that They and Theirs lie in matters beyond the will.

And of you, whosoever hath longed either to be a friend himself or to win some other for a friend, let him cast out these opinions, let him hate them and drive them from his soul. For otherwise ye may do all things whatsoever, even as friends are wont to do, and dwell together, and voyage together, and be born from the same parents, for so are snakes; but friends, they are not, nor are ye, so long as ye hold these accursed doctrines.

But if you hear, in sooth, that these men hold the Good to be there only where the Will is, where the right use of appearances is, then be not busy to inquire if they are father and son, or brothers or have long time companied with each other as comrades; but, knowing this one thing alone, argue confidently that they are friends, even as they are faithful and upright. For where else is friendship than where faith is, where piety is, where there is an interchange of virtue? [1]

[1] D. II. xxii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOMAIN OF THE WILL

BEING naturally noble, magnanimous, and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are in his power, and the other things are in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will, and that those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if a man thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he desires and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean.[1]

Remember, then, that if you hold that only to be your own which is so, and the alien for what it is, alien, then none shall ever compel you, none

shall hinder you, you will blame no one, accuse no one, you will not do the least thing unwillingly, none shall harm you, you shall have no foe, for you shall suffer no injury.[2]

What hinders a man who has clearly comprehended these things from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, enduring that which has already happened, and quietly awaiting everything which can happen?[1]

[1] D. IV. vii. Long. [2] M. I. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VII

PASSWORDS

WHEN thou art going in to any great personage, remember that Another also from above seeth what goeth on, and that thou oughtest to please Him rather than the other. He then who seeth from above asketh thee:

In the schools what didst thou use to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace? I used to say that they are things indifferent.

What then dost thou say of them now? Are they changed at all? Art thou changed then? No.

Tell Me what things are indifferent. The things which are independent of the will.

Tell Me also what followeth from this. The things which are independent of the will are nothing to me.

Tell Me also about the Good; what was thine opinion? A will such as we ought to have and also such a use of appearances.

And the end, what is it? To follow Thee.

Dost thou say this now also? I say the same now also.

Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember these things; and thou wilt see what a youth is who hath studied these things when he is among men who have not studied them.[1]

For why should a man be struck with awful admiration of those who have great possessions, or are placed in high rank? What will they do unto us? The things which they can do we do not regard: the things which we are concerned about they cannot do. Who then, after all, shall command a person thus disposed?[2]

[1] D. I. xxx. Long. [2] D. I. ix. Carter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAY TO THE HEIGHTS

THE difficulties of all men are about external things, their helplessness is about externals. What shall I do? how will it be? how will it turn out? will this thing happen? will that? All these are the words of those who are turning themselves to things which are not within the power of the will. For is not that which will happen independent of the will? And the na-

ture of good and evil, is it not in the things which are within the power of the will? Is it not in your power, then, to treat according to nature everything which happens? Can any person hinder you? No longer, then, say to me, How will it be? For however it may be, you will dispose of it well, and the result to you will be a fortunate one.

But that this may be done, a man must bear no small things, nor are the things small which he must go without. This is the nature of the thing: nothing is given or had for nothing. And where is the wonder? In order, then, to secure freedom from passion, tranquillity, to sleep well when you do sleep, to be really awake when you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious about nothing, will you spend nothing and give no labor? Do you expect to have for nothing things so great? You cannot have both external things after bestowing care on them and your own ruling faculty: but if you would have those, give up this. If you do not, you will have neither this nor that, while you are drawn in different ways to both.

Why then are you anxious? why do you lose your sleep? Why do you not straightway, after considering wherein your good is and your evil, say, Both of them are in my power? Neither can any man deprive me of the good, nor involve me in the bad against my will. Why do I not lay me down in peace? For all that I have is safe. As to things which belong to others, he

will look to them who gets them, as they may be given by him who has the power. Who am I who wish to have them in this way or in that? is the power of selecting them given to me? has any person made me the dispenser of them? Those things are enough for me over which I have power: I ought to manage them as well as I can: and all the rest, as the Master of them may choose, even God.[1]

[1] D. IV. x. Long.

CHAPTER IX

THE SECRET OF TRANQUILLITY

LET a man transfer his opinions to things dependent upon the will, and I will engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things around him.[1] But what are the things about which we are busy? Externals. And have we any doubt, then, why we fear or why we are anxious? What, then, happens when we think the things which are coming on us to be evils? It is not in our power not to be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious. Then we say, O Lord, how shall I not be anxious? Well, then, has He given to you nothing in the present case? Has He not given to you endurance? has He not given to you manliness? But we neither study these things nor care for them. For if we had feared, not death

or banishment, but fear itself, we should have studied not to fall into those things which appear to us evils.[2]

Now little children, if they cry because their nurse has left them for a while, straightway forget their sorrows when they are given a small cake. Wilt thou be likened unto a little child? Nay! for I would not be thus affected by a little cake, but by right opinions. And what are these? They are such as a man should study all day long to observe — that he be not subject to the effects of anything that is alien to him, neither of friend, nor place, nor exercises; yea, not even of his own body, but to remember the Law, and have it ever before his eyes.

And what is the divine Law? To hold fast that which is his own, and to claim nothing that is another's; to use what is given him, and not to covet what is not given; to yield up easily and willingly what is taken away, giving thanks for the time that he has had it at his service.[3] These are the laws, these the statutes, transmitted from God. Of these one ought to be an expositor, and to these we ought to be obedient.[4]

---

[1] D. III. iii. Long.
[2] D. II. xvi. Long.
[3] D. II. xvi. Rolleston.
[4] D. IV. iii. Carter.

CHAPTER X

WHAT EVERY MAN SEEKS

WHAT is that which every man seeks? To live secure, to be happy, to do everything as he wishes, not to be hindered nor compelled. What, then, is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. Have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends upon yourself only and cannot be taken from you? What has God given to you as your own and in your own power? He has given to you the things which are in the power of the will: He has put them in your power, free from impediment and hindrance.[1] For if God had made that part of His own nature which He severed from Himself and gave to us, liable to be hindered or constrained, He would not have been God, nor would He have been taking care of us as He ought.[2]

In our own power He has placed that which is the best and the most important, the use of appearances. For when this is rightly employed, there is freedom, happiness, tranquillity, constancy: and this is also justice and law, and temperance, and every virtue. But all other things He has not placed in our power. Wherefore also we ought to be of one mind with God, and making this division of things, to look after those

which are in our own power; and of the things not in our power, to intrust them to the Universe, and whether it should require our children, or our country, or our body, or anything else, willingly to give them up.[3]

If, therefore, any be unhappy, let him remember that he is unhappy by reason of himself alone. For God hath made all men to enjoy felicity and constancy of good.[4] If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you need blame no man, accuse no man. All things will be at once according to your mind and according to the mind of God.[2]

[1] D. IV. i. Long.
[2] D. I. xvii. Crossley.
[3] F. CLXIX. Long.
[4] D. III. xxiv. Crossley.

CHAPTER XI

TRUE FREEDOM

IF thou wouldst be free, if thou hast thine heart set upon the matter according to its worth, ponder on this, on these convictions, on these words. And what marvel if thou purchase so great a thing at so great and high a price? For the sake of this that men deem liberty, some hang themselves, others cast themselves down from the rock; aye, time hath been when whole cities came utterly to an end: while for the sake of the freedom that is true, and sure, and unassailable, dost thou grudge to God what He gaveth, when He claimeth it? Wilt thou not

study, as Plato saith, to endure, not death alone, but torture, exile, stripes — in a word, to render up all that is not thine own? Else thou wilt be a slave amid slaves, wert thou ten thousand times a consul; aye, not a whit the less, though thou climb the Palace steps. And thou shalt know how true is the saying of Cleanthes, that though the words of philosophy may run counter to the opinions of the world, yet have they reason on their side.[1]

And that thou mayest know that this is true, as thou hast labored for those things, so transfer thy labor to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make thee free. Purge thine opinions, so that nothing cling to thee of the things which are not thine own, that nothing grow to thee, that nothing give thee pain when it be torn from thee. And while thou art exercising thyself thus, say not that thou art philosophizing, for this is an arrogant expression, but that thou art presenting an asserter of freedom: for this is really freedom.[2]

[1] D. IV. i. Crossley. [2] D. IV. i. Long.

CHAPTER XII

FREEDOM AND SERVITUDE

WHAT! a man may say, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free, I whom no man can purchase? I am also of

senatorial rank, and a friend of Cæsar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves. In the first place, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandmother and all your ancestors in an ascending series! But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you are a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it?

And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with complaining, with groans? Has this nothing to do with slavery? Did you never flatter any person? What else is this but slavery? Whomsoever it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought and sold. For he is our master who has in himself the power over anything which is desired, either to give or to take it away.

When therefore you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man is not free; and not only if he does this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government or a consulship: and call those men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call

great slaves, as they deserve to be.[1] For what difference does it make by what thing a man is subdued, and on what he depends? [2]

Whoever, then, wishes to be free, let him neither wish for anything nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does not observe this rule, he must be a slave.[3] To this let all your reasoning tend; and you will know that thus only are men made free.[4]

[1] D. IV. i. Long.
[2] D. II. xvi. Long.
[3] M. XIV. Long.
[4] D. III. xxvi. Long.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FREEMAN

YOU then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, indeed, and pray to be free. But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? Not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him, to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real Country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any

man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of all the world, but he remembered that everything which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by Him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes: I do not consider the poor body to be my own, I want nothing, law is everything to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free.

And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, take Socrates. And observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act! It is not possible to save such a man's life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful,

is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive.[1]

[1] D. IV. i. Long.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ONLY WAY

WHEN thou shalt see a man honored above others, or mighty in power, or otherwise esteemed, look to it that thou deem him not blessed, being carried away by the appearance. For if the essence of the Good be in those things that are in our own power, then neither envy nor jealousy hath any place, nor shalt thou thyself desire to be commander or prince or consul, but to be free. And to this there is one road — scorn of the things that are not in our own power.[1]

For thou wilt know by experience that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet attained them there is an imagination that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present; for freedom is acquired, not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire.[2]

Choosing anything else than this, thou wilt fol-

low with groaning and lamentation whatever is stronger than thou, ever seeking prosperity in things outside thyself, and never able to attain it. For thou seekest it where it is not, and neglectest to seek it where it is.[3] For this law hath God established, and saith, If thou wouldst have aught of good, have it from thyself.[4]

[1] M. XIX. Rolleston.
[2] D. IV. i. Long.
[3] D. II. xvi. Rolleston.
[4] D. I. xxix. Rolleston.

CHAPTER XV

PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION

LIFT up thine head, as one delivered from slavery. Dare to look up to God and say: Deal with me henceforth as Thou wilt; I am of one mind with Thee; I am Thine. I reject nothing that seemeth good to Thee; lead me whithersoever Thou wilt, clothe me in what dress Thou wilt. Wilt thou have me govern or live privately, or stay at home, or go into exile, or be a poor man, or a rich? For all these conditions I will be Thine advocate with men.[1]

For God hath set me free: think ye that God purposed to allow His own son to be enslaved?[2] For I am free, and the friend of God, so as to obey Him willingly; but I must not value anything else, neither body, nor possessions, nor fame; in short, nothing. For it is not His will that I should value them. For if this had been

His pleasure, He would have made them my good, which now He hath not done; therefore I cannot transgress His commands.[3]

By me all these things have been examined; no man hath power on me. I have been set free by God, I know His commandments, henceforth no man can lead me captive. I have a Liberator such as I need, and judges such as I need. For I hold what God wills above what I will. I cleave to Him as His servant and follower; my impulses are one with His, my pursuit is one with His; in a word, my will is one with His.[4]

---

[1] D. II. xvi. Rolleston.
[2] D. I. xix. Long.
[3] D. IV. iii. Carter.
[4] D. IV. vii. Rolleston.

BOOK FOUR

LEARNING AND DOING

LEARNING AND DOING

CHAPTER I

SIGNS OF PROGRESS

THE philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with learning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For it is one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to eat. That which has been eaten is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it; but you have no other advantage from it. If then we shall not put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the expositors of the opinions of others.[1]

First, therefore, digest the thing, and show us some change in your ruling faculty, as athletes show in their shoulders by what they have been exercised and what they have eaten. You also ought to do something of the kind; eat like a man, drink like a man, marry, do the office of a citizen, endure abuse, bear with an unreasonable brother. Show us these things, that we may see that you have in truth learned something from the philosophers.

You say, No; but come and hear me read philosophical commentaries: I will expound to you the writings of Chrysippus as no other man can. Is it for this that young men shall leave their country and their parents, that they may come and hear you explain words? [2]

Where, then, is progress? If any of you turns to his own will, to exercise it and to improve it by labor so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; if when he rises in the morning, he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice — this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain.[3]

[1] D. II. ix. Long.
[2] D. III. xxi. Long.
[3] D. I. iv. Long.

CHAPTER II

SEEMING AND BEING

THOU shalt never proclaim thyself a philosopher, nor speak much among the vulgar of the philosophic maxims; but do the things that follow from the maxims. For example, do not discourse at a feast upon how one ought to eat,

but eat as one ought. And as sheep do not bring their food to the shepherds to show how much they have eaten, but digesting inwardly their provender, they bear outwardly wool and milk; even so do not thou, for the most part, display the maxims before the vulgar, but rather the works which follow from them.[1] For some, as soon as they have assumed a cloak and grown a beard, say, I am a philosopher. First strive that it be not known what you are: be a philosopher to yourself a short time.

For this reason Euphrates well used to say, A long time I strove to be a philosopher without people knowing it; and this was useful to me. For first, I knew that when I did anything well, I did not do it for the sake of the spectators, but for the sake of myself: I ate well for the sake of myself; I had my countenance well composed, and my walk; all for myself and for God. Then, as I struggled alone, so I alone also was in danger: in no respect through me, if I did anything base or unbecoming, was philosophy endangered; nor did I injure the many by doing anything wrong as a philosopher. For this reason those who did not know my purpose used to wonder how it was that, while I conversed and lived altogether with philosophers, I was not a philosopher myself! And what was the harm for me to be known to be a philosopher by my acts, and not by outward marks? For if one is so deaf and blind that he cannot conceive even Vulcan to be a good smith unless he can see the cap on his head, what is the

harm in not being recognized by so foolish a judge?

So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher by most persons; and they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers! Was he vexed? And did he say, And do you not think that I am a philosopher? No; but he would take them and introduce them, being satisfied with one thing, namely, with being a philosopher.[2]

Let it therefore be enough for thee in all things to *be* a philosopher.[3] And if thou wouldst do good to men, do not chatter to them, but show them in thyself what manner of men philosophy can make.[4]

---

[1] M. XLVI. Rolleston.
[2] D. IV. viii. Long.
[3] M. XXIII. Rolleston.
[4] D. III. xiii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER III

THE MARKS OF A PHILOSOPHER

SUCH a one, you say, is a philosopher. Why? Because he wears a cloak and long hair. And so, when people see any of these acting indecently, they presently say, See what the philosopher doth. But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to say that he is no philosopher. For if indeed the idea which we have of a philosopher and his profession were to wear a cloak and long hair, they would say right; but, if it be rather to keep himself free from faults, since

he doth not fulfil his profession, why do they not deprive him of his title?

For this is the way with regard to other arts. When we see anyone handle an axe awkwardly, we do not say, Where is the use of this art? See how ill carpenters perform. But we say the very contrary. This man is no carpenter, for he handles an axe awkwardly. So, if we hear anyone sing badly, we do not say, Observe how musicians sing; but rather, This fellow is no musician. It is with regard to philosophy alone that people are thus affected. When they see anyone acting contrary to the profession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title; but laying it down that he is a philosopher, and then assuming from the very fact that he behaves indecently, they infer that philosophy is of no use.

What, then, is the reason of this? Because we pay some regard to the preconception which we have of a carpenter and a musician and so of other artists, but not of a philosopher, which being thus vague and confused, we judge of it only from external appearances. And of what other art do we take up our judgment from the dress and the hair? Hath it not theorems too, and materials, and an end, to distinguish it? What, then, is the subject-matter of a philosopher? Is it a cloak? No; but reason. What his end? To wear a cloak? No; but to have his reason correct. What are his theorems? Are they how to get a great beard or long hair? No; but rather, as Zeno expresses it, to know the elements

of reason, what each of them is in particular, and how they are adapted to each other, and what are their consequences.

Why, then, will you not first see whether, by acting in an unbecoming manner, he answers his profession, and so proceed to blame the study? Whereas now you say, from what he appears to do amiss, Observe the philosopher! As if it were decent to call a person who doth such things a philosopher![1]

[1] D. IV. viii. Carter.

CHAPTER IV

PEDANT OR SCHOLAR

REMEMBER that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of learning. For to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. What is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse; and saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as salutations and power are things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read? Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly

fellow and incapable of enduring labor. But if you refer reading to the proper end, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life?

But it does secure this, the man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it. And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Cæsar or Cæsar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do something: I will go then with the purpose of observing the rules which I must keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things external.

Come, when you have done these things and have attended to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read a thousand verses or written as many? For when you eat, are you grieved because you are not reading? Are you not satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by reading, and so with bathing and with exercise? Why, then, do you not act consistently in all things? If you maintain yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm, and steady; if you do not envy those who are preferred before you; if surrounding circumstances do not strike you with fear or admiration, what do you want? Books? How or for what purpose? For is not the reading of books a preparation for living? And is not living itself made up of certain other things than this?

But we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in a way conformable to nature the appearances presented to us; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said and in being able to expound it to another. But if we read what is written about action, not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well; if we read what is said about desire and aversion, in order that we may neither fail in our desires nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we read what is said about duty in order that we may do nothing irrationally; we should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts. Then we should be reckoning not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon, Today I have read so many verses; but we should say, Today I have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my co-operation with others. And so we should thank God for what we ought to thank Him.[1]

[1] D. IV. iv. Long.

CHAPTER V

FOR USE IN EMERGENCY

WE should have all our principles ready to make use of on every occasion. At dinner, such as relate to dinner; in the bath, such as

relate to the bath; and in the bed, such as relate to the bed. Again, in a fever, we should have such principles ready as relate to a fever; and not, as soon as we are taken ill, to lose and forget all. We should retain these, so as to apply them to our use; and not merely to repeat them aloud.[1]

For what is philosophizing? Is it not a preparation against events which may happen? What, then, should a man say on the occasion of each painful thing? Thus he should speak: It was for this that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. Then do you show yourself weak when the time for action comes? Now is the time, let us say, for the fever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it well; now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your power? who shall hinder you? The physician will hinder you from drinking; but he cannot prevent you from bearing thirst well: and he will hinder you from eating; but he cannot prevent you from bearing hunger well.

But, you say, I cannot attend to my philosophical studies. And for what purpose do you follow them? Is it not that you may be happy, that you may be constant, is it not that you may be in a state conformable to nature and live so? What hinders you when you have a fever from having your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the thing, here is the test of the philosopher. For this also is a part of life, like walking, like sailing, like journeying by land, so also is fever. Do you read

when you are walking? No. Nor do you when you have a fever. But if you walk about well, you have all that belongs to a man who walks. If you bear a fever well, you have all that belongs to a man in a fever. And what is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame God or man; not to be afflicted at that which happens, to await death well and nobly. He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this: and if he does these things, he has what belongs to him.[2]

We ought to have these rules in readiness, and to do nothing without them; and we ought to keep the soul directed to this mark.[3]

[1] D. III. x. Carter.
[2] D. III. x. Long.
[3] D. IV. xii. Long.

CHAPTER VI

THE CITADEL OF THE MIND

DO you look to others, and hope for nothing from yourself? Ought you not to demonstrate those things which make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way they wish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in the administration of the universe? If you choose to have these things, you will have them everywhere, and you will live in full confidence. Confiding in what? In that alone in which a man can confide, in that which is secure, in that which is not subject to hindrance,

in that which cannot be taken away, that is, in your own will. Relying on what? Not on reputation nor on wealth, but on your own strength, that is, on your opinions about the things which are in your power and those which are not. For these are the only things which make men free, which raise the head of those who are depressed, which make them look with steady eyes on the rich and on tyrants.[1]

In this way those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers, and say: What trouble these men are now taking for nothing! our wall is secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources. These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable; but nothing else than his opinions makes a man's soul impregnable. For what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so safe, or what honor so free from assault? All other things everywhere are perishable, easily taken by assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. And do we not remember that no man either hurts another or does good to another, but that a man's opinion about each thing is that which hurts him, and is that which overturns him? Why, then, do we not choose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, and withdraw ourselves from that which is perishable and servile, and labor at the things which are imper-

ishable and by nature free? For this power is given by God to every man.[2]

[1] D. III. xxvi. Long. [2] D. IV. v. Long.

CHAPTER VII

THE POWER OF REASON

WHEN some person asked Epictetus how it happened that since reason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, the progress in former times was greater, he answered: Do not mix things which are different, and do not expect, when you are laboring at one thing, to make progress in another. But see if any man among us when he is intent upon this, the keeping himself in a state conformable to nature and living so always, does not make progress. For you will not find such a man.[1]

For what is more reasonable than for those who have labored about anything to have more in that thing in which they have labored? See if they have more than you in that about which you have labored, and which they neglect. But if they exercise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this, and that they do all?

But, you say, since I care about right opinions, it is more reasonable for me to have power. Yes, power in the matter about which you do

care, namely, in opinions. The case is just the same as if, because you have right opinions, you thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better than an archer. But now you say that you are occupied with other things, that you are looking after other things; but the many say this truly, that one act has no community with another.

But do you, if indeed you have cared about nothing except the proper use of appearances, as soon as you have risen in the morning, reflect: What do I want in order to be free from passion, and free from perturbation? What am I? Am I a poor body, a piece of property? I am neither of these. But what am I? I am a rational creature. What, then, is required of me? Reflect on your acts: Where have I omitted the things which conduce to happiness? What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial? what have I not done as to these things which I ought to have done?[2] Thus you will know what power reason has.[3]

[1] D. III. vi. Long.
[2] D. IV. vi. Long.
[3] D. II. xxi. Long.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ROD OF HERMES

IS there any advantage, you ask, to be gained from men? From all, even from a reviler. What advantage doth a wrestler gain from him

with whom he exercises himself before the combat? The greatest. Just in the same manner I exercise myself with this man. He exercises me in patience, in gentleness, in meekness. Is my neighbor a bad one? He is so to himself; but a good one to me. He exercises my good temper, my moderation.

This is the rod of Hermes. Touch with it whatever you please, the saying is, and it will become gold. Not so; but, Bring whatever you please, and I will turn it into good. Bring sickness, death, want, reproach. All these, by the rod of Hermes, shall turn to advantage.

What will you make of death? What but an ornament to you; what but a means of your showing, by action, what the man is who knows and follows the will of nature? What will you make of sickness? I will show its nature. I will make a good figure in it; I will be composed and happy. I will not flatter my physician. I will not wish to die. What need you ask further? Whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, respectable, and eligible.[1] For whichever of these things happens, it is in my power to derive advantage from it.[2]

[1] D. III. xx. Carter. [2] M. XVIII. Carter.

CHAPTER IX

THE CHAMPION

DIFFICULTIES are the things that show what men are. For the future, on any difficulty, remember that God, like a master of exercise, has engaged you with a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be a conqueror, like one in the Olympic games.[1] He says to you, Come now to the combat. Show us what you have learned, how you have wrestled. How long would you exercise by yourself? It is now the time to show whether you are of the number of those champions who merit victory, or of those who go about the world, conquered in all the games.[2] For no man, in my opinion, has a more advantageous difficulty on his hands than you have, provided you will but use it as an athletic champion does his antagonist.[1]

Then I run over every circumstance of an athletic champion. He has been victorious in the first encounter: what will he do in the second? What if the heat should be excessive? What if he were to appear at Olympia? So I say in this case. What if you throw money in his way? He will despise it. What if he be tried by popular fame, calumny, praise, death? He is able to overcome them all. This is my unconquerable athletic champion.[3]

[1] D. I. xxiv. Carter.
[2] D. IV. iv. Carter.
[3] D. I. xviii. Carter.

CHAPTER X

THE DISCIPLINE OF THE SENSES

WHEN thou hast received the appearance of some pleasure, then, as in other things, guard thyself lest thou be carried away by it. Delay with thyself a little, and let the thing await thee for a while. Then bethink thee of the two periods of time, one when thou shalt be enjoying the pleasure, the other, when, having enjoyed it, thou shalt afterwards repent of it and reproach thyself. And set on the other side how thou shalt rejoice and commend thyself if thou abstain.

But if it seem reasonable to thee to do the thing, beware lest thou have been conquered by the flattery and the sweetness and the allurement of it. But set on the other side how much better were the consciousness of having won that victory.[1]

By opposing these remedies thou shalt conquer the appearance, nor be led captive by it. But at the outset, be not swept away by the vehemence of it; but say, Await me a little while, thou Appearance; let me see what thou art, and what thou hast to do; let me approve thee. And then permit it not to lead thee forward, and to picture to thee what would follow; else it shall take possession of thee, and carry thee whithersoever it will. But rather bring in against it some other

fair and noble appearance, and therewithal cast out this vile one.[2]

With respect to this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise himself, and to this end we should direct all our efforts.[3] For when dealing with these subjects a man must guard himself from delusion, so that not even in dreams may any appearance that approacheth us pass untested.[4] If we practised this, and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning to night, something indeed would be done.[3]

[1] M. XXXIV. Rolleston.
[2] D. II. xviii. Rolleston.
[3] D. III. iii. Long.
[4] D. III. ii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER XI

USE AND DISUSE

EVERY skill and faculty is maintained and increased by the corresponding acts; as, the faculty of walking by walking. Thus, if thou hast lain down for ten days, then rise up and endeavor to walk a good distance, and thou shalt see how thy legs are enfeebled. In general, then, if thou wouldst make thyself skilled in anything, then do it; and if thou wouldst refrain from anything, then do it not, but use thyself to do rather some other thing instead of it.

And thus it is in spiritual things also. When thou art wrathful, know that not this single evil hath happened to thee, but that thou hast increased

the aptness to it, and, as it were, poured oil upon the fire. For it is impossible but that aptitudes and faculties should spring up where they were not before, or spread and grow mightier, by the corresponding acts.

Wouldst thou, then, be no longer of a wrathful temper? Then do not nourish the aptness to it, give it nothing that will increase it, be tranquil from the outset, and number the days when thou hast not been wrathful. I have not been wrathful now for one, now for two, now for three days; but if thou hast saved thirty days, then sacrifice to God in thanksgiving.[1] For the habit at first begins to be weakened, and then is completely destroyed. Over such a victory as this a man may justly be proud.[2]

[1] D. II. xviii. Rolleston. [2] D. II. xviii. Long.

CHAPTER XII

THE BLADE AND THE EAR

NOTHING great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time.[1] Fruit grows thus: the seed must be buried for some time, hid, grow slowly in order that it may come to perfection. Let the root grow, then acquire the first joint, then the second, and then the third; in this way then the fruit will naturally

force itself out.[2] Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in an hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily?[1]

But what does Socrates say? As one man, he says, is pleased with improving his land, another with improving his horse, so I am daily pleased in observing that I am growing better. Who, then, among you has this purpose?[3]

That which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true, then, that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I for this reason take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me. I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Crœsus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.[4] For if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point.[5]

[1] D. I. xv. Long.
[2] D. IV. viii. Long.
[3] D. III. v. Long.
[4] D. I. ii. Long.
[5] D. I. iv. Long.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ACCEPTABLE TIME

WHEN you let go your attention for a little while, do not fancy that you may recover it whenever you please; but remember this, that by reason of the fault of to-day your affairs must necessarily be in a worse condition for the future. First, and what is the saddest thing of all, a habit arises of not attending; and then a habit of deferring the attention, and always driving off from time to time, and procrastinating the prosperous life, propriety of behavior, and the thinking and acting conformably to nature. Do you not perceive that when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to call it back?[1] And you will at last be reduced to so weak and wretched a condition, that you will not so much as know when you do amiss; but will even begin to make defences for your behavior, and thus verify the saying of Hesiod:

> With constant ills the dilatory strive.[2]

To what, then, am I to attend? To those universal maxims which you must always have at hand, and not sleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, or converse without them. These maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them; but direct the soul to this mark.[1]

What then? is it possible to be free from faults?

It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by never remitting this attention we shall escape at least a few errors. But now when you have said, To-morrow I will begin to attend, you must be told that you are saying this, To-day I will be shameless, I will be passionate and envious. See how many evils you are permitting yourself to do! If it is good to use attention to-morrow, how much better it is to do so to-day! If to-morrow it is to your interest to attend, how much more is it to-day, that you may be able to do so to-morrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day.[3]

[1] D. IV. xii. Carter.
[2] D. II. xviii. Carter.
[3] D. IV. xii. Long.

CHAPTER XIV

THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN

WHAT does it signify to me, says Epictetus, whether the universe is composed of atoms or uncompounded substances, or of fire and earth? Is it not sufficient to know the essence of good and evil, and the proper bounds of the desires and aversions; and, besides those, of the active powers; and by making use of these as so many certain rules, to order the conduct of life, and bid these things which are above us farewell? For they are, perhaps, incomprehensible to human

understanding; but if one should suppose them ever so comprehensible, still what is the benefit of them when comprehended? And must it not be said that he gives himself trouble to no purpose, who allots these things as necessary to the character of a philosopher?[1]

Favorinus tells us how Epictetus would also say that there were two faults far graver and fouler than any others — inability to bear, and inability to forbear, when we neither patiently bear the blows that must be borne, nor abstain from the things and the pleasures we ought to abstain from. So, he went on, if a man will only have at heart these two words, BEAR and FORBEAR, and heed them carefully by ruling and watching over himself, he will for the most part fall into no sin, and his life will be tranquil and serene.[2]

[1] F. CLXXV. Carter. [2] F. CLXXIX. Crossley.

CHAPTER XV

THE TRUE STOIC

SHOW me a Stoic, if you can. You can show an endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them with equal accuracy?[1] Who then is a Stoic? — in the sense that we call that a statue of Phidias

which is modelled after that master's art? Show me a man in this sense modelled after the doctrines that are ever upon his lips. Show me a man that is sick — and happy; in danger — and happy; on his death-bed — and happy; an exile — and happy; in evil report — and happy! Nay, if you cannot show me one fully modelled, let me at least see one in whom the process is at work — one whose bent is in that direction. Show me a human soul, desiring to be of one mind with God, no more to lay blame on God or man, to suffer nothing to disappoint, nothing to cross him, to yield neither to anger, envy, nor jealousy; one that while still imprisoned in this dead body makes fellowship with God his aim.[2]

Give me one who stands forth a champion of this cause, and says, All else I renounce, content if I am but able to pass my life free from hindrance and trouble; to raise my head aloft and face all things as a free man; to look up to heaven as a friend of God, fearing nothing that may come to pass! What I desire is to be free from passion and from perturbation; as one who grudges no pains in the pursuit of piety and philosophy, what I desire is to know my duty to the Gods, my duty to my parents, to my brothers, to my country, to strangers. Point out such a one to me, that I may say, Enter thou into possession of that which is thine own. For thy lot is to adorn Philosophy.[3]

[1] D. II. xix. Long.
[2] D. II. xix. Crossley.
[3] D. II. xvii. Crossley.

BOOK FIVE

THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD

THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD

CHAPTER I

DUTIES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT

DUTIES are universally measured by relations. Therefore you will find the corresponding duties, if you accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations.[1]

Remember that you are a son. What does this character promise? To consider that everything which is the son's belongs to the father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor to say or to do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can.[2] But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature made akin to a good father? No; but to a father. Maintain, then, your own position towards him, and do not examine what he is doing, but what you must do that your will shall be conformable to nature.[3]

After this, know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due to make concessions; to be easily persuaded, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which are independent of the will, but readily to give them

up that you may have the larger share in what is dependent on the will.[2] Your brother may have a greater part of the estate in land; will he, then, have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection?[4]

Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, if you are a youth, if you are an old man, remember this; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties.[2] We must remember, therefore, who we are, and what name we bear, and endeavor to direct the several offices of life to the rightful demands of its several relations; and then, in complying, to preserve our own character.[5]

[1] M. XXX. Carter.
[2] D. II. x. Long.
[3] M. XXX. Long.
[4] D. III. iii. Long.
[5] D. IV. xii. Carter.

CHAPTER II

THE WORLD CITIZEN

THOU art a citizen of the world. What, then, doth the character of a citizen promise? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature. For they would never put themselves in motion nor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole.[1]

For knowest thou not, that as the foot alone

is not a foot, so thou alone art not a man? And we are not solitary and disunited from others. For to the foot I shall say that it is according to Nature that it be clean; but if thou take it as a foot, and not as a solitary thing, it shall beseem it to go into the mud, and to tread on thorns, and perchance to be cut off, for the sake of the whole; otherwise it is no longer a foot.

And some such thing we should suppose about ourselves also. What art thou? A man. Look at thyself as a solitary creature, and it is according to Nature to live to old age, to grow rich, to keep good health. But if thou look at thyself as a man, and as a part of a certain Whole, it may become thee now to have sickness, now to sail the seas and run into peril, now to suffer need, and perchance to die before thy time. For in the bounds of such a universe, in such a throng of inhabitants, it cannot but be that different things of this nature should fall on different persons.[2]

Wherefore the wise and good man, having investigated all these things, will submit his own mind to Him that governeth the Whole, even as good citizens submit to the laws of their State.[3]

[1] D. II. x. Long.
[2] D. II. v. Rolleston.
[3] D. I. xii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER III

THE SACRED VOCATION OF TEACHING

SUCH a one hath a school, you say, and why should not I have one? These things are not effected in a careless and fortuitous manner. But there must be age and a method of life and a guiding God. Is it not so? No one quits the port or sets sail till he hath sacrificed to the Gods, and implored their assistance; nor do men sow without first invoking Ceres. And shall anyone who hath undertaken so great a work as teaching undertake it safely without the Gods? And shall they who apply to such a one apply to him with success?

What are you doing else, man, but divulging the mysteries? And you say, There is a temple at Eleusis, and here is one too. There is a priest, and I will make a priest here; there is a herald, and I will appoint a herald too; there is a torch-bearer, and I will have a torch-bearer: the words said, and the things done shall be the same. Most impious man, is there no difference? Are these things of use out of place and out of time? A man should come with sacrifices and prayers, previously purified, and his mind affected with a sense that he is approaching to sacred and ancient rites. Thus the mysteries become useful; thus we come to have an idea that all these things were appointed by the ancients for the instruction

and correction of life. But you divulge and publish them, without regard to time and place, without sacrifices, without purity.

These things are to be approached in another manner. It is a great, it is a mystical affair; not given by chance, or to everyone indifferently. Nay, mere wisdom, perhaps, is not a sufficient qualification for the care of youth. There ought to be likewise a certain readiness and aptitude for this, and, indeed, a particular constitution of body; and above all a counsel from God to undertake this office, as He counselled Socrates to undertake the office of confutation; Diogenes, that of authoritative reproof; Zeno, that of dogmatical instruction.

But you set up for a physician, provided with nothing but medicines, and without knowing, or having studied, where or how they are to be applied. Such a one had medicines for the eyes, you say, and I have the same. Have you, then, a faculty too of making use of them? Do you at all know when and how and to whom they will be of service? Why, then, do you act at hazard? Why are you careless in things of the greatest importance? Why do you attempt a matter unsuitable to you? Leave it to those who can perform it, and do it honor. Do not you, too, bring a scandal upon philosophy by your means, nor be one of those who cause the thing itself to be calumniated.[1]

Such is the affair about which you are deliberating. Therefore, if you please, for heaven's

sake defer it; and first consider how you are prepared for it. But if you imagine it to be what it really is, and do not think yourself unworthy of it, consider how great a thing you undertake.[2]

[1] D. III. xxi. Carter. [2] D. III. xxii. Carter.

CHAPTER IV

AFFECTION, COUNTERFEIT AND REAL

WHEN he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had a wife and children. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further how he felt under the circumstances. Miserable, the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect? for men do not marry and rear children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. But I, the man replied, am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, that I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home until a person sent me news that she had recovered. Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right? I acted naturally, the man replied.

And Epictetus said: Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature? Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction with affection? Well, then, to leave your sick child and to go away is not rea-

sonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with affection. Did you, then, since you had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when you ran off and left her? And has the mother no affection for the child? Ought, then, the mother also to have left her? And the nurse, does she not love her? Ought, then, she also to have left her? And the teacher, does he not love her? Ought, then, he also to have deserted her? And so should the child have been left alone and without help on account of the great affection of the parents and of those about her? Or should she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor cared for her? Now this is unfair and unreasonable, not to allow those who have equal affection with yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do because you have affection. If you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affectionate as to leave you alone and desterted? And would you wish to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affection you would always be left alone in sickness? Or would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved by your enemies — and deserted by them? But if this is so, it results that your behavior was not at all an affectionate act.[1] Even a sheep will not desert its young, nor a wolf; and shall a man?[2]

[1] D. I. xi. Long.

[2] D. I. xxiii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER V

SOCIETY IN SOLITUDE

HE who is alone is not therefore solitary; even as he who is in a great company is not therefore not solitary. When, therefore, we have lost a brother or a son or a friend on whom we were wont to rest, we say that we are left solitary, and oftentimes we say it in Rome, with such a crowd meeting us and so many dwelling about us. For the solitary man, in his conception, meaneth to be thought helpless, and laid open to those who wish to harm him. Therefore when we are on a journey we then, above all, say that we are solitary when we are fallen among thieves; for that which taketh away solitude is not the sight of a man, but of a faithful and pious and serviceable man.

For if to be solitary it sufficeth to be alone, then say that Zeus is solitary. And so some say. For they comprehend not the life of a man who is alone, setting out from a certain natural principle, that we are by nature social, and inclined to love each other, and pleased to be in the company of other men. But none the less is it needful that one find the means to this also, to be able to suffice to himself, and to be his own companion.

For as Zeus is His own companion, and is content with Himself, and considereth His own

government, what it is, and is occupied in designs worthy of Himself; thus should we be able to converse with ourselves, and feel no need of others, nor want means to pass the time; but to observe the divine government, and the relation of ourselves with other things; to consider how we stood formerly towards the events that befall us, and how we stand now; what things they are that still afflict us; how these, too, may be healed, how removed; and if aught should need perfecting, to perfect it according to the reason of the case.

Whoso hath these things to think on, and seeth the sun and the moon and the stars, and rejoiceth in the earth and the sea, he is no more solitary than he is helpless.[1]

[1] D. III. xiii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VI

AS IT APPEARS TO OTHERS

WHOEVER clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every act is his opinion whether the thing appears good or bad — whoever remembers this will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel with any man.[1]

When therefore one may do you an injury, or speak ill of you, remember that he either does

it or speaks it believing that it is right and meet for him to do so. It is not possible, then, that he can follow the thing that appears to you, but the thing that appears to him. Wherefore, if it appear evil to him, it is he that is injured, being deceived. Setting out, then, from these opinions, you will bear a gentle mind towards any man who may revile you. For say on each occasion, So it appeared to him.[2]

What need, then, have I to be troubled? No one is the master either to procure me any good or to involve me in any evil; but I alone have the disposal of myself with regard to these things. I have not pleased such a one. Is he my concern, then? Is he my conscience? Why, then, do I trouble myself any further? But, you say, he is thought to be of some consequence. Let him look to that, and them who think him so. But I have One whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey. He hath intrusted me with myself, and made my choice subject to myself alone, having given me rules for the right use of it. If I follow the proper rules in syllogisms, I do not regard nor care for anyone who says anything contrary to them. Why, then, am I vexed at being censured in matters of greater consequence?[3]

[1] D. I. xxviii. Long.
[2] M. XLII. Rolleston.
[3] D. IV. xii. Carter.

CHAPTER VII

SELF-PERSUASION

I AM grieved, a man says, at being pitied; and these persons do not pity me for the things for which it would be proper to pity me, I mean for my faults, but they pity me for my poverty, for not possessing honorable offices, for diseases and deaths, and other such things.

Are you, then, prepared to convince the many that not one of these things is an evil, but that it is possible for a man who is poor and has no office and enjoys no honor to be happy? But it is impracticable to attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been able to do, namely, to convince all men what things are good and what are bad. Is this power given to you? This only is given to you, to convince yourself; and you have not convinced yourself.

Then I ask you, Do you attempt to persuade other men? and who has lived so long with you as you with yourself? and who has so much power of convincing you as you have of convincing yourself? and who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? How, then, have you not convinced yourself in order to learn? Is this what you have been earnest about doing, to learn to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be abject, and to be free? Have you not heard, then, that there

is only one way which leads to this end, to dismiss the things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others? For another man to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it? A thing independent of the will. Then it is nothing to you. When, then, you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are convinced about good and evil?

Then are you surprised if they pity you, and are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have that which is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they have: but they are satisfied with their own, and do not desire what you have: since if you were really convinced that with respect to what is good it is you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have thought of what they say about you.

Will you not, then, letting others alone, be to yourself both scholar and teacher? Reason thus with yourself: The rest of mankind will look after this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives in a state contrary to nature; but to me no man is nearer than myself. I am poor, but I have a right opinion about poverty. Why, then, do I care if they pity me for my poverty? I am not in power, but others are; and I have the opinion which I ought to have about having and not having power. Let them

look to it who pity me. Do I now care about what others will say of me, whether I shall appear to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy?[1]

[1] D. IV. vi. Long.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ROYAL ROAD

WHEN a man was consulting him how he should persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied:

Philosophy does not propose to procure for a man any external thing. If it did, philosophy would be allowing something which is not within its province. For as the carpenter's material is wood, so the matter of the art of living is each man's life. What then, do you say, is my brother's? That belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece of land. But philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance, she says, I will maintain the governing part conformable to nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she says.[1]

But my brother ought not to have treated me so. Very true; but he must see to that. However he treats you, you are to act right with regard to him, for the one is your concern, the other is not.[2]

Then the man, who was consulting him, said, I seek to know this, How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature?[1] Why shall I direct thee? hath not God directed thee? And what direction, what word of command didst thou receive from Him when thou camest thence? Hold fast everything which is thine own — covet not that which is alien to thee. And faithfulness is thine, and reverence is thine: who, then, can rob thee of these things? who can hinder thee to use them? With such counsels and commands from Zeus, what wilt thou still from me? Am I greater than He? am I more worthy of thy faith? But if thou hold to these things, of what others hast thou need? Bring forward the things thou hast often heard, bring the things that thyself hast spoken, bring what thou hast read, bring what thou hast pondered.[3] What then saith Antisthenes? Hast thou not heard? —

> It is a royal thing to do right
> And to be ill spoken of.

What, then, hinders the same thing being done in this case also?[4]

---

[1] D. I. xv. Long.
[2] D. III. x. Carter.
[3] D. I. xxv. Rolleston.
[4] D. IV. vi. Long.

CHAPTER IX

THE TWO HANDLES

EVERY matter hath two handles — by the one it may be carried; by the other, not. If thy brother do thee wrong, take not this thing by the handle, He wrongs me; for that is the handle whereby it may not be carried. But take it rather by the handle, He is my brother, nourished with me; and thou wilt take it by a handle whereby it may be carried.[1]

Wilt thou not bear with thine own brother, who hath God for his Father, as being a son from the same stock, and of the same high descent? Wilt thou set thyself up for a tyrant? Wilt thou not remember what thou art, and that these are by nature thy relations, thy brothers, that they are the offspring of God?[2]

[1] M. XLIII. Rolleston. [2] D. I. xiii. Carter.

CHAPTER X

THE COMPASSIONATE SOUL

WHY have we indignation with the multitude? They are robbers, one saith, and thieves. And what is it to be robbers and thieves? It is to err concerning things good and evil. Should not, then, this robber, or this adulterer,

be destroyed? By no means, but take it rather this way: This man who errs and is deceived concerning things of greatest moment, who is blinded, not in the vision which distinguisheth black and white, but in the judgment which distinguisheth Good and Evil — should we not destroy him? And thus speaking, thou shalt know how inhuman is that which thou sayest, and how like as if thou saidst, Shall we not destroy this blind man, this deaf man?

For if it is the greatest injury to be deprived of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every man is a Will such as he ought to have, and one be deprived of this, why art thou still indignant with him? Pity him rather, be not inclined to offence and hatred. How hast thou suddenly become so wise?[1]

A guide, when he hath found one straying from the way, leads him into the proper road, and does not mock him or revile him, and then go away. And do thou show such a man the truth, and thou shalt see that he will follow. But so long as thou dost not show it, mock him not, but be sensible rather of thine own incapacity.[2]

Which of us will not admire Lycurgus, the Lacedæmonian? For having lost an eye at the hands of one of the citizens, and having received the young man from the people that he should punish him as he would, he refrained from this; but having taught him and proved him to be a good man, he brought him into the theatre. And

when the Lacedæmonians marvelled, he said, I received this man from you insolent and violent; I give him back to you mild and civil.[3]

[1] D. I. xviii. Rolleston.
[2] D. II. xii. Rolleston.
[3] F. LXVII. Rolleston.

CHAPTER XI

THE VALIANT SOUL

BUT, you say, there are some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are there none at the Olympian games? Are you not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you not abundance of noise, clamor, and other disagreeable things? But I suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure.

Well, then, have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens in life? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen, if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens?

Having observed these things, look to the faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty that Thou pleasest; for I have means given to me by Thee and powers for honoring myself through the things which happen. But you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what does happen: and then you blame the Gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us these faculties, by which we shall be able to bear everything that happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good King and a true Father, He has put them entirely in our own power.[1]

Having these things free and your own, will you make no use of them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom? but sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to Him who gave them, and not acknowledging your Benefactor; and others, basely turning yourselves to complaints and accusations of God? Yet I undertake to show you that you have qualifications and occasions for greatness of soul and a manly spirit.[2]

[1] D. I. vi. Long.

[2] D. I. vi. Carter.

CHAPTER XII

THE PEACEABLE SOUL

THE wise and good man never quarrels with any person. For he remembers well that no man has in his power another man's ruling principle. He wishes therefore for nothing else than that which is his own. And what is this? Not that this or that man may act according to nature; for that is a thing which belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a condition conformable to nature. This is the object always set before him by the wise and good man.

How, then is there left any place for quarrelling to a man who has this opinion? Is he surprised at anything which happens? and does it appear new to him? Does he not expect that which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than what actually befalls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they may do which falls short of extreme wickedness?

Such a person has reviled you. What then is given you to do in answer to this? When did he learn or in what school, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it? Since, then, he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shall he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest?[1] But

shall not I hurt him who has hurt me? Consider what hurt is, and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will, and the evil also in the will, see if what you say is not this: Since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust act to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves something of this kind?[2] For if I think about it as I ought, how shall it then do me any damage?[3]

What then? would you have me to be despised? By whom? by those who know you? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and modest? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What is that to you? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not his art. Why, then, are you still disturbed? Why do you not come forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all men, whatever they may do? These opinions make love in the family, concord in the state, peace among nations, and gratitude to God.[1]

[1] D. IV. v. Long.
[2] D. II. x. Long.
[3] D. III. xx. Long.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CONTENTED SOUL

BUT, thou sayest, when shall I see Athens and the Acropolis again? Wretched man! doth not that satisfy thee which thou seest every day? Hast thou aught better or greater to see than the sun, the moon, the stars, the common earth, the sea? But if withal thou mark the way of Him that governeth the whole, and bear Him about with thee, wilt thou still long for cut stones and a fine rock? What, then, wert thou doing in the school? What didst thou hear, what didst thou learn? Why didst thou write thyself down a philosopher, when thou mightest have written the truth, as thus: I made certain beginnings, and read Chrysippus, but did not so much as enter the door of a philosopher?

For how shouldst thou have aught in common with Socrates or with Diogenes? Dost thou think that these men lamented or were indignant because they could not dwell in Athens or in Corinth, but, as it might chance, in Susa or Ecbatana?[1] Thinkest thou that Diogenes would have flattered the pirates that they might sell him to some Athenian, that sometime he might see that beautiful Piræus, and the Long Walls, and the Acropolis? Art thou unwilling to live in Rome and desirest to live in Greece? And when thou must die, wilt thou then also fill us with thy

lamentations because thou wilt not see Athens nor walk about in the Lyceum?[2] What harm hath philosophy done thee, that thou shouldst give a proof by thine actions that philosophy is of no value?

If thou art at Gyaros, do not represent to thyself the manner of living at Rome; how many pleasures thou used to find there, and how many would attend thy return; but be thou intent on this point, how he who liveth at Gyaros may live with spirit and comfort at Gyaros. And if thou art at Rome, do not represent to thyself the manner of living at Athens, but consider only how thou oughtest to live where thou art.[3] Athens is a good place; but happiness is much better.[4]

[1] D. II. xvi. Rolleston.
[2] D. III. xxiv. Long.
[3] D. III. xxiv. Carter.
[4] D. IV. iv. Long.

CHAPTER XIV

THE STOIC AND THE STATE

LET no wise man estrange himself from the government of the state; for it is both impious to withdraw from being useful to those that need it, and cowardly to give way to the worthless. For it is foolish to choose rather to be governed ill than to govern well.[1]

Let such thoughts never afflict thee as, I shall not do my part in serving my country. For what

is this service? Thy country shall not have porticos nor baths from thee, and what then? Neither hath she shoes from the smith, nor arms from the cobbler; but it is enough if every man fulfil his own task. And if thou hast made one other pious and faithful citizen for her, art thou, then, of no service? Wherefore, neither shalt thou be useless to thy country. What place, then, can I hold in the state? Whatever place thou canst, guarding still thy faith and piety. But if in wishing to serve her thou cast away these things, what wilt thou profit her then? [2]

For thou wilt do the greatest services to the state, if thou shalt raise, not the roofs of the houses, but the souls of the citizens: for it is better that great souls should dwell in small houses than for mean slaves to lurk in great houses.[3] If therefore thou dost propose to adorn thy city by the dedication of monuments, first dedicate to thyself the noblest offering of gentleness, and justice, and beneficence.[4]

And not with the stones of Eubœa and Sparta let the structure of thy city walls be variegated; but let discipline and teaching penetrate with order the minds of citizens and statesmen. For with the thoughts of men are cities well established, not with wood and stone.[5] And even as the Spartan Lycurgus did not fence the city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants with virtue, and so preserved the city free forever; thus do thou confirm the dwellers in the city with good-

will, and faith, and friendliness, and no harmful thing shall enter in; no, not if the whole army of evil were arrayed against it.[6]

[1] F. CXXXI. Carter.
[2] M. XXIV. Rolleston.
[3] F. LXXXI. Long.
[4] F. LXXX. Long.
[5] F. LXXXII. Rolleston.
[6] F. XLV. Rolleston.

CHAPTER XV

THE CHIEF END OF MAN

THE great point in life is to learn what is the principal thing, and upon every occasion to follow that and to make it the chief object of our attention, and to consider other things as trifling in comparison with this.[1] The substance of the hand is flesh, but the main things are the works of the hands. And thus in man, too, it is not meet to value the material, this flesh, but the main things. What are these? To take part in public affairs, to marry, to fear God, to care for parents, and, in general, to pursue, to avoid, to desire, to dislike, as each of these things should be done, as Nature made us to do. And how made she us? To be free, generous, pious. And to these things let pleasure be subject as a minister, a servant, and that she also may aid in works that are according to Nature.[2]

But what is done in the world? As if a man journeying to his own country should pass by an excellent inn, and the inn being agreeable to him, he should stay, and abide in it. Man, thou hast

forgotten thy purpose; thy journeying was not for this, but through this. But, thou sayest, this is pleasant. And how many other inns are pleasant, and how many meadows? yet merely for passing through. But thy business is this, to do, thyself, the duties of a citizen. For thou art not come into this world to choose out its pleasanter places, but to dwell in those where thou wast born, and whereof thou wast appointed to be a citizen.

And so in some wise it is with this matter. Thy business is to make thyself fit to use the appearances that encounter thee according to Nature, not missing what thou pursuest, nor falling into what thou wouldst avoid, never failing of good fortune, free, unhindered, uncompelled, agreeing with the governance of Zeus, obedient unto the same, and well-pleased therein; blaming none, charging none, able of thine whole soul to utter those lines:

Lead me, O Zeus, and Thou, Destiny![3]

---

[1] D. II. xxiii. Carter.
[2] D. III. vii. Rolleston.
[3] D. II. xxiii. Rolleston.

BOOK SIX

REWARDS AND PENALTIES

REWARDS AND PENALTIES

CHAPTER I

THE LAW DIVINE

THERE are certain penalties fixed as by law for those who disobey the divine administration.[1] And the law divine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the severest punishments from those who commit the greatest crimes. They who falsely call themselves Roman citizens are severely punished; and should those who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing and name as Stoic get off unpunished?

And what does this law say? Let him who pretends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a vain-glorious man: let him who disobeys the divine administration be base, and a slave; let him suffer grief, let him be envious, let him pity; and, in a word, let him be unhappy and lament.[2]

As Zeus has ordained, so act: if you do not act so, you will feel the penalty, you will be punished. What, do you ask, will be the punishment? Nothing less than not having done your duty: you will lose the character of fidelity, modesty, propriety.[3] For thus you will be fighting

against God, you will be opposing Zeus and will be placing yourself against Him in the administration of the universe; and the punishment of this fighting against God and this disobedience shall you yourself pay, both by day and by night, being startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having your tranquillity depending on others.[2] Do not look for greater penalties than these.[3]

For what other is a greater punishment than this to him who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word, to be disappointed and unhappy? Would you not release yourself from these things? But if you do not, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you, and you must serve him as an evil genius.[4] For wherever you have deviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately, not from anything external, but from the action itself.[5]

[1] D. III. xi. Long.
[2] D. III. xxiv. Long.
[3] D. III. vii. Long.
[4] D. IV. iv. Long.
[5] D. IV. xii. Long.

CHAPTER II

RUIN AND RECOVERY

NO man is bad without suffering some loss and damage.[1] And what, say you, do I lose? Do men lose nothing but money? Is not

modesty to be lost? Is not decency to be lost? Or may he who loses these suffer no damage? You, indeed, perhaps no longer think anything of this sort to be a damage. But there was once a time when you accounted this to be the only damage and hurt; when you were anxiously afraid lest anyone should shake your regard from these discourses and actions. See, it is not shaken by another, but by yourself. Fight against yourself, recover yourself to decency, to modesty, to freedom. If you formerly had been told any of these things of me, that anyone prevailed on me to do such things, would not you have gone and laid violent hands on the man who thus abused me? And will you not now help yourself? For how much easier is that assistance! You need not kill or fetter or affront or go to law with anyone, but merely to talk with yourself, who will most readily be persuaded by you, and with whom no one has greater credit than you.

And, in the first place, condemn your actions; but when you have condemned them, do not despair of yourself, nor be like those poor-spirited people who, when once they have given way, abandon themselves utterly, and are carried along as by a torrent. Take example from the wrestling masters. Has the boy fallen down? Get up again, they say; wrestle again till you have acquired strength. Be you affected in the same manner. For, be assured, there is nothing more tractable than the human mind. You need but will, and it is done, it is set right; as, on the con-

trary, you need but nod over the work, and it is ruined. For both ruin and recovery are from within.[2]

[1] D. II. x. Long. [2] D. IV. ix. Carter.

CHAPTER III

WHAT MAKES AND UNMAKES A MAN

AS Epictetus was saying that man is made for fidelity, and that whoever subverts this subverts the peculiar property of man; one of those who pass for men of literature happened to come in, who had been found guilty of adultery. But, continued Epictetus, if, laying aside that fidelity for which we were born, we form designs against the wife of our neighbor, what do we do? What else but destroy and ruin — what? Fidelity, honor, and sanctity of manners. Only these? And do we not ruin neighborhood? Friendship? Our country? How am I to consider you, sir? As a neighbor? A friend? What sort of one? As a citizen? How shall I trust you? Or suppose you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold even that of a servant? What would you have us do with you?[1]

Surely we should meet together and lament over such a man; so great are the evils into which he hath fallen. Not, indeed, that we should lament for his birth, or for his death, but in that while living he hath suffered the loss of his own true possessions. I speak not of his pa-

ternal inheritance, not of his land, or his house (for not one of these things is the true possession of a man); but of his human qualities, the stamps of his spirit wherewith he came into the world. Even such we seek for also on coins, and if we find them we approve the coins; if not, we cast them away. What is the stamp of this sestertius? The stamp of Trajan. Then give it me. The stamp of Nero? Fling it away — it will not pass, it is bad. And so here too. What is the stamp of his mind? He is gentle, social, forbearing, affectionate. Come, then, I receive him, I admit him to citizenship, I receive him as a neighbor, a fellow-traveller. See to it only that he have not Nero's stamp. Is he wrathful, revengeful, complaining? Doth he, when it may seem good to him, break the heads of all who stand in his way? Why, then, didst thou say that he was a man? Shall everything be judged by the bare form? But the outward shape doth not suffice to make a man, but he is a man only if he have a man's mind.[2]

For the peculiar property of man is in social disposition, fidelity, honor, stedfastness, judgment. If these are preserved and remain well fortified, then man himself is preserved likewise; but when any of these is lost and demolished, man himself is lost also. This is human undoing; this is the siege; this the overthrow; when right principles are ruined, when these are destroyed.[3]

[1] D. II. iv. Carter.
[2] D. IV. v. Rolleston.
[3] D. I. xxviii. Carter.

CHAPTER IV

PROMISE AND FULFILMENT

TO fulfil the promise of a man's nature is itself no common thing. For what is a man? A living creature, say you; mortal and endowed with Reason. And from what are we set apart by Reason? From the wild beasts. And what others? From sheep and the like. Look to it, then, that thou do nothing like a wild beast, for if thou do, the man in thee perisheth, thou hast not fulfilled his promise. Look to it, that thou do nothing like a sheep, or thus too the man hath perished. What, then, can we do as sheep? When we are gluttonous, sensual, reckless, filthy, thoughtless, to what are we then sunken? To sheep. What have we lost? Our faculty of Reason. And when we are contentious, and hurtful, and angry and violent, to what are we sunken? To wild beasts.[1] Some of us thus inclining become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous: some become like lions, savage and bestial and untamed. And what else is a slanderer and a malignant man than a fox or some other more wretched and meaner animal?[2] Through all these things the promise of the man's nature hath been ruined.

But each thing is increased and saved by the corresponding works — the carpenter by the practice of carpentry, the grammarian by the study

of grammar; but if he use to write ungrammatically, it must needs be that his art shall be corrupted and destroyed. Thus, too, the works of reverence save the reverent man, and those of shamelessness destroy him. And works of faithfulness save the faithful man, and the contrary destroy him.[1] For when is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a dog preserved? When each fulfils what its nature promises. Where is the wonder, then, that man should be preserved and destroyed in the same manner?[3]

[1] D. II. ix. Rolleston.
[2] D. I. iii. Long.
[3] D. II. ix. Carter.

CHAPTER V

THE DECEITFULNESS OF RICHES

IT is difficult for a rich person to be right-minded, or for a right-minded person to be rich. For rightness of mind invites to frugality and the acquisition of things that are good; but riches invite to prodigality, and seduce from rightness of mind.[1] And thus, surely, do also, as the philosophers say, the infirmities of the soul grow up.

For when thou hast once been covetous of money, if Reason, which leadeth to a sense of the vice, be called to aid, then both the desire is set at rest, and our ruling faculty is re-established, as it was in the beginning. But if thou bring no remedy to aid, then shall the soul return no more

to the first estate; but when next excited by the corresponding appearance, shall be kindled to desire even more quickly than before. And when this is continually happening, the soul becomes callous in the end, and through its infirmity the love of money is strengthened.

For he that hath had a fever, when the illness hath left him, is not what he was before his fever, unless he have been entirely healed. And somewhat on this wise also it happens in the affections of the soul; certain traces and scars are left in it, the which if a man do not wholly eradicate, when he hath again been scourged on the same place, it shall make no longer scars, but sores.[2]

If I can acquire wealth, and lose not piety, and faith, and magnanimity withal, show me the way, and I will do it. But if ye will have me lose the good things I possess to compass things that are not good at all, how unjust and unthinking are ye! But which will ye rather have — money, or a pious and faithful friend? Then, rather, take part with me to this end; and ask me not to do aught through which I must cast away those things.[3]

For as it is better to lie straitened in a narrow bed and be healthy than to be tossed with disease on a broad couch; so also it is better to contract yourself within a small competence and be happy than to have a great fortune and be wretched.[4]

[1] F. XXI. Carter.
[2] D. II. xviii. Rolleston.
[3] M. XXIV. Rolleston.
[4] F. XXIV. Long.

CHAPTER VI

THE PURCHASE PRICE

KEEP this thought in readiness, when you lose anything external, what you acquire in place of it; and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss; neither if you have got an ox in place of a sheep nor in place of idle talk such tranquillity as befits a man.[1]

Is some one preferred before thee at a feast? Then, if this is good, it behoves thee to rejoice that he hath gained it; but if evil, be not vexed that thou hast not gained it; but remember that if thou act not as other men to gain the things that are not in our own power, neither canst thou be held worthy of a like reward with them. For how is it possible for him who will not hang about other men's doors to have a like reward with him who doeth so? or him who will not attend on them with him who doth attend? or him who will not flatter them with the flatterer? Thou art unjust, then, and insatiable, if thou desire to gain those things for nothing, without paying the price for which they are sold. But how much is a lettuce sold for? A penny, perchance. If anyone, then, will spend a penny, he shall have lettuce; but thou, not spending, shalt not have. But think not that thou art worse off than he; for as he has the lettuce, so thou the penny which thou wouldst not give.

And likewise in this matter. Thou art not invited to some man's feast? That is, for thou gavest not to the host the price of the supper; and it is sold for flattery, it is sold for attendance. Pay, then, the price, if it will profit thee, for which the thing is sold. But if thou wilt not give the price, and wilt have the thing, greedy art thou and infatuated. Shalt thou have nothing, then, instead of the supper? Thou shalt have this — not to have praised one whom thou hadst no mind to praise, and not to have endured the insolence of his door-keepers.[2] For nothing can be gained without paying for it. Wherefore say to thyself, For so much peace is bought, this is the price of tranquillity.[3]

[1] D. IV. iii. Long.
[2] M. XXV. Rolleston.
[3] M. XII. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VII

FOR WHAT WILL YOU SELL THESE?

IT is for you who know yourself, and how much you are worth to yourself, to say at what price you will sell yourself: for men sell themselves at various prices.[1] The other day I had an iron lamp placed beside my household gods. I heard a noise at the door, and on hastening down found my lamp carried off.[2] He paid, however, this price for the lamp, that in exchange for it he consented to become a thief; in exchange for it to become faithless.[3]

Consider at what price you sell your own will.[1] By continually remembering this, you will preserve your own character such as it ought to be. Otherwise consider that you are spending your time in vain; and all that you are now applying your mind to, you are going to spill and overset. And there needs but little and a small deviation from reason to destroy and overset all. A pilot doth not need the same apparatus to overset a ship as to save it; but if he turns it a little to the wind, it is lost: even if he should not do it by design, but only for a moment be thinking of something else, it is lost. Such is the case here too. If you but nod a little, all that you have hitherto collected is gone.

Take heed, then, to the appearances of things. Keep yourself awake over them. It is no inconsiderable matter that you have to guard, but modesty, fidelity, constancy, exemption from grief, fear, perturbation; in short, freedom. For what will you sell these?[4]

[1] D. I. ii. Long.
[2] D. I. xviii. Crossley.
[3] D. I. xxix. Crossley.
[4] D. IV. iii. Carter.

CHAPTER VIII

THERSITES OR AGAMEMNON

TO this point you must attend before all others: not to be so attached to any of your former acquaintances or friends as to condescend to the same behavior with them; otherwise you

will undo yourself. But if it comes into your head, I shall appear odd to them, and they will not treat me as before; remember that there is nothing to be had for nothing.

Choose, then, whether you will be loved by those you were formerly, and be like your former self; or be better and not meet with the same treatment. For, if this is preferable, immediately incline altogether that way, and let no other kinds of reasoning draw you aside; for no one can improve while he is wavering. If, then, you prefer this to everything, if you would be fixed only on this, and employ all your pains about it, give up everything else. Otherwise this wavering will affect you both ways: you will neither make a due improvement, nor preserve the advantages you had before. For before, by setting your heart entirely on things of no value, you were agreeable to your companions. But you cannot excel in both kinds, but must necessarily lose as much of the one as you partake of the other. If you do not drink with those with whom you used to drink, you cannot appear equally agreeable to them. Choose whether you would be a drunkard and agreeable to them, or sober and disagreeable to them.

Choose which you will. For if it is better to be modest and decent than to have it said of you, What an agreeable fellow! give up the rest; renounce it, withdraw yourself, have nothing to do with it. But if this doth not please you, incline with your whole force the contrary way. Act all that is consequent to such a character,

and you will obtain what you would have. But characters so different are not to be confounded. You cannot act both Thersites and Agamemnon. If you would be Thersites, you must be hump-backed and bald: if Agamemnon, tall and handsome, and a lover of those who are under your care.[1]

[1] D. IV. ii. Carter.

CHAPTER IX

HOLDING ONE'S OWN

IF a man has frequent intercourse with others, he must either become like them, or change them to his own fashion. A live coal placed next to a dead one will either kindle that or be quenched by it. Such being the risk, it is well to be cautious in admitting intimacies of this sort, remembering that one cannot rub shoulders with a soot-stained man without sharing the soot himself. What will you do, supposing the talk turns on gladiators, or horses, or prize-fighters, or (what is worse) on *persons,* condemning this and that, approving the other? Or suppose a man sneers or jeers or shows a malignant temper? Has any among us the skill of the lute-player, who knows at the first touch which strings are out of tune and sets the instrument right? Has any of you such a power as Socrates had, in all his intercourse with men, of winning them over to his own convictions?

Till, then, these sound opinions have taken firm root in you, and you have gained a measure of strength for your security, be cautious in associating with the uninstructed. Else whatever impressions you receive upon the tablets of your mind in the School will day by day melt and disappear, like wax in the sun. Withdraw, then, somewhere far from the sun, while you have these waxen sentiments.[1] For you must know that it is no easy thing for a principle to become a man's own, unless each day he maintain it and hear it maintained, as well as work it out in life.[2]

[1] D. III. xvi. Crossley. [2] F. LXXII. Crossley.

CHAPTER X

THE UNFAILING LAW

THE law of nature and of God is this: Let the better be always superior to the worse. In what? In that wherein it is better. One body is stronger than another; and a thief than one who is not a thief. Thus I, too, lost my lamp because the thief was better at keeping awake than I. But he bought a lamp at the price of being a thief, a rogue, and a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain, and much good may it do him!

Hence the most excellent and equitable law of God, that the better should always prove superior to the worse. Ten are better than one. To what purpose? For chaining, killing, dragging where

they please. Thus ten conquer one in the instance wherein they are better. In what, then, are they worse? When the one hath right principles and the others have not. For can they conquer in this point? How should they? If we were weighed in a scale, must not the heavier outweigh?

Well; but one takes me by the coat and draws me to the Forum. And then all the rest bawl out, Philosopher, what good do your principles do you? See, you are dragging to prison; see, you are going to lose your head! And, pray, what rule of philosophy could I contrive, that when a stronger than myself lays hold on my coat I should not be dragged? Or that when ten men pull me at once and throw me into prison, I should not be thrown there? [1]

But, you say, the unjust man has the advantage. In what? Money. Yes, for he is superior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, and is watchful. What is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage over you in being faithful, in being modest. You will not find it to be so; but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you have the advantage. I once said to a man who was vexed because another was fortunate, Would you be willing to resort to such means as he did? Heaven forbid, he said, that that day should ever come! Why, then, are you vexed, if he receives something in return for that which he sells? Or how can you consider him happy who acquires those things by such means as you abominate? Or what wrong does Provi-

dence in giving the better things to the better men? Is it not better to be modest than to be rich? Why, then, are you vexed, man, when you possess the better thing?

Always remember, then, and have in readiness the truth, that this is a law of nature, that the superior has the advantage over the inferior in that wherein it is superior; and you will never be vexed.[2]

[1] D. I. xxix. Carter. [2] D. III. xvii. Long.

CHAPTER XI

THE AMPLE RECOMPENSE

KNOW you not that a good man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right? What advantage is it to him, do you ask, to have done right? And what advantage is it to a man who writes to write as he ought? The advantage is to have written it. Is there no reward then? Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy? For these purposes being introduced by the Gods into the world, and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want nurses? Know you not that he who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is?[1]

As the sun does not wait for prayers and incantations to be induced to rise, but immediately shines and is saluted by all: so do you also not wait for clappings of hands, and shouts and praise to be induced to do good, but be a doer of good voluntarily.[2]

Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that of being conscious that you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed you are performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say to himself, Now whatever the rest may say, this I am doing; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if He has a soldier such as He ought to have, a citizen such as He ought to have. Being appointed to such a service, do I still care about what men say about me? and do I not entirely direct my thoughts to God and to His instructions and commands?

Having these thoughts always in hand, and exercising them by yourself, and keeping them in readiness, you will never be in want of one to comfort and strengthen you. Only do not make a proud display of it, nor boast of it; but show it by your acts; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and happy.[3]

---

[1] D. I. xxiv. Long.
[2] F. LXXXVII. Long.
[3] D. III. xxiv. Long.

CHAPTER XII

STATUTES AND ORDINANCES

ORDAIN for thyself forthwith a certain form and type of conduct, which thou shalt maintain both alone and, when it may chance, among men.[1] And abide in thy purposes as in laws which it were impious to transgress. And whatsoever any man may say of thee, regard it not; for neither is this anything of thine own.

How long wilt thou delay to hold thyself worthy of the best things, and to transgress in nothing the decrees of Reason? Thou hast received the maxims by which it behoves thee to live; and dost thou live by them? What teacher dost thou still look for to whom to hand over the task of thy correction? Thou art no longer a boy, but already a man full grown. If, then, thou art neglectful and sluggish, and ever making resolve after resolve, and fixing one day after another on which thou wilt begin to attend to thyself, thou wilt forget that thou art making no advance, but wilt go on as one of the vulgar sort, both living and dying.

Now, at last, therefore, hold thyself worthy to live as a man of full age and as one who is pressing forward; and let everything that appeareth the best be to thee as an inviolable law. And if any toil or pleasure or reputation or the loss of it be laid upon thee, remember that now is the

contest, here already are the Olympian games, and there is no deferring them any longer, and that in a single day and in a single trial ground is to be lost or gained.

It was thus that Socrates made himself what he was, in all things that befell him having regard to no other thing than Reason.[2] When, therefore, thou art about to meet anyone, especially one of those that are thought high in rank, set before thy mind what Socrates or Zeno had done in such a case. And so thou wilt not fail to deal as it behoves thee with the occasion.[1] For thou, albeit thou be yet no Socrates, yet as one that would be a Socrates, so it behoveth thee to live.[2]

[1] M. XXXIII. Rolleston. [2] M. L. Rolleston.

BOOK SEVEN

THE GREAT CHANGE

THE GREAT CHANGE

CHAPTER I

DEATH AND THE ORDER OF NATURE

WILT thou say that any word is of ill-omen that betokeneth some natural thing? Say that it is of ill-omen to speak of the reaping of ears of corn, for it betokeneth the destruction of the ears — but not of the universe.[1] For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that they may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped? But this is a curse upon ears of corn, never to be reaped. So we must know that in the case of men, too, it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped.[2]

For all these things are changes from the former estate to another; no destruction, but a certain appointed order and disposition. Here is parting for foreign lands, and a little change. Here is death — a greater change, not from that which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now.[1] To nought that thou needest fear, wilt thou go. There is no Hades, no fabled rivers of Sighs, of Lamentations, or of fire: but all things are full of Beings spiritual and divine.[3]

[1] D. III. xxiv. Rolleston. [3] D. III. xiii. Crossley.
[2] D. II. i. Long.

CHAPTER II

DELIVERANCE FROM THE FEAR OF DEATH

WHENEVER death may appear to be an evil, have ready the thought that it is right to avoid evils, and that death is unavoidable. For what shall I do? whither shall I flee from it? Declare to me the place; declare to me the men among whom I shall go, to whom death comes never near; declare to me the charms against it. If I have none, what would ye have me do? I cannot escape death — shall I not then escape the fear of death? shall I die lamenting and trembling? [1]

For death is nothing terrible; if it were so, it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the opinion we have about death, that it is terrible, that is wherein the terror lieth.[2] Do you not know that the origin of all human evils and of mean-spiritedness and cowardice is not death, but rather the fear of death? [3] For take away the fear of death, and you will know what calm and serenity there is.[4]

It is right, then, that we should turn our boldness against death, and our fearfulness against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary: death we flee from, but as to the state of our opinion about death we are negligent, heedless, indifferent. These things Socrates did well to call bugbears. For as to children, through their inex-

perience, ugly masks appear terrible and fearful; so we are somewhat moved for no other cause than as children are affected by these bugbears. What is death? A bugbear. Turn it round; examine it: see, it does not bite. Now or later that which is body must be parted from that which is spirit, as formerly it was parted. And wherefore? That the cycle of the world may be fulfilled; for it hath need of a present and of a future and of a past.[5]

What, then, is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the most becoming, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For whoever is delivered from sorrows, and fears, and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude.[6]

[1] D. I. xxvii. Rolleston.
[2] M. V. Rolleston.
[3] D. III. xxvi. Carter.
[4] D. II. xxvii. Long.
[5] D. II. i. Rolleston.
[6] D. II. i. Long.

CHAPTER III

THE ORDINANCE OF DEATH

ALAS, you say, that ever Socrates should suffer such things from the Athenians! What do you mean by Socrates? Express the fact as it is. That ever the poor paltry body of Socrates should be carried away and dragged to prison; that ever anyone should give hemlock to the body of Socrates, and that it should expire![1] If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am dif-

ferent from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear; and if he has not yet learned that man is not flesh nor bones nor sinews, but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs them.

Why, then, do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the matter of the body to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? What is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? What new thing or wondrous is going to happen?[2] Can any one cast me out of the universe? He cannot; but whithersoever I may go, there will be the sun, and the moon, and there the stars, and visions, and omens, and communion with the Gods.[3]

[1] D. I. xxix. Carter.
[2] D. IV. vii. Long.
[3] D. III. xxii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER IV

ACT WELL THY PART

REMEMBER that thou art an actor in a play, of such a part as it may please the Director to assign thee; of a short part, if He choose a short part; of a long one, if He choose a long one.

And if He will have thee take the part of a poor man or of a cripple, or of a governor, or a private person, mayest thou act that part with grace! For thine it is to act well the allotted part, but to choose it is Another's.[1]

Or let us do as setting out on a voyage. What is it possible for me to do? This — to choose the captain, the crew, the day, the opportunity. Then a tempest has burst upon us; but what doth it concern me? I have left nothing undone that was mine to do; the problem is now another's, to wit, the captain's. But now the ship is sinking! and what have I to do? I do only what I am able — drown without terror and accusing of God, but knowing that that which has come into being must also perish. For I am no Immortal, but a man, a part of the sum of things as an hour is of the day. Like the hour I must arrive, and, like the hour, pass away.[2]

For as whom did God introduce thee here? Did He not introduce thee as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe His administration, and to join with Him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Wilt thou not, then, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when He leadeth thee out, go with adoration of Him and with thanks for what thou hast heard and seen?[3]

[1] M. XVII. Rolleston.
[2] D. II. v. Rolleston.
[3] D. IV. i. Long.

CHAPTER V

UNDER ORDERS

EVEN as in a sea voyage, when the ship is brought to anchor, and you go out to fetch in water, you make a by-work of gathering a few roots and shells by the way, but have need ever to keep your mind fixed on the ship, and constantly to look round, lest at any time the master of the ship call, and you must, if he call, cast away all those things, lest you be treated like the sheep that are bound and thrown into the hold: so it is with human life also. And if there be given wife and children instead of shells and roots, nothing shall hinder us to take them. But if the Master call, run to the ship, forsaking all those things, and looking not behind. And if thou be in old age, go not far from the ship at any time, lest the Master should call, and thou be not ready.[1]

My friends, wait upon God. When He himself shall give the signal and release you from this service, then are ye released unto Him. But for the present, bear to dwell in this place, wherein He has set you. Short, indeed, is this time of your sojourn, and easy to bear for those that are so minded. For what is there terrible to one who thus makes nothing of the body and the possessions of it?[2]

To the good soldier there fails not one who gives

him pay, nor to the laborer; and shall such a one fail to the good man? Is God, then, careless of His servants, His witnesses, whom alone He useth to show forth what He is, and that He governeth all things well, and is not careless of human things? and that to a good man there is no evil, neither in life nor in death? How else is this than as when a good general gives me the signal for retreat? I obey, I follow, praising my Leader and hymning His works. For I came when it pleased Him, and when it pleaseth Him I will go.[3]

[1] M. VII. Rolleston.
[2] D. I. ix. Rolleston.
[3] D. III. xxvi. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VI

SAFE PASSAGE

THUS do the more cautious of travellers act. The road is said to be beset by robbers. The traveller will not venture alone, but awaits the companionship on the road of an ambassador, or a proconsul. To him he attaches himself and thus passes by in safety. So doth the wise man in the world. Many are the companies of robbers and tyrants, many the storms, the straits, the losses of all a man holds dearest. Whither shall he fly for refuge — how shall he pass by unassailed? What companion on the road shall he await for protection? Such and such a wealthy

man, of consular rank? And how shall I be profited, if he is stripped and falls to lamentation and weeping? And how if my fellow-traveller himself turns upon me and robs me? What am I to do? I will become a friend of Cæsar's! in his train none will do me wrong! In the first place — O the indignities I must endure to win distinction! O the multitude of hands there will be to rob me! And if I succeed, Cæsar too is but a mortal. While should it come to pass that I offend him, whither shall I flee from his presence? To the wilderness? And may not fever await me there? What then is to be done? Cannot a fellow-traveller be found that is honest and loyal, strong and secure against surprise? Thus doth the wise man reason, considering that if he would pass through in safety, he must attach himself unto God.

How understandest thou *attach himself to God?* That what God wills, a man should will also; that what God wills not, neither should he will.[1] When thou hast such a Guide, and thy wishes and desires are the same as His, why dost thou still fear?[2]

[1] D. IV. i. Crossley. [2] D. II. xvii. Long.

CHAPTER VII

THE GOOD WARFARE

DO you not know that human life is a warfare? One man's duty is to mount guard, another must go out to reconnoitre, a third to battle; all cannot be in one place, nor would it be even expedient. But you, instead of executing your Commander's orders, complain if aught harsher than usual is enjoined; not understanding to what condition you are bringing the army, so far as in you lies. If all were to follow your example, none would dig a trench, none would cast a rampart around the camp, none would keep watch, or expose himself to danger; but all turn out useless for the service of war. Thus it is here also. Every life is a warfare, and that long and various. You must fulfil a soldier's duty, and obey each order at your commander's nod: aye, if it be possible, divine what he would have done; for between that Commander and this, there is no comparison, either in might or in excellence.

Wherefore a good man and true cares only how he may fill his post with due discipline and obedience to God. Wilt Thou that I continue to live? Then will I live, as one that is free and noble, as Thou wouldst have me. But hast Thou no further need of me? I thank Thee! Up to this hour have I stayed for Thy sake and none other's: and

in obedience to Thee I depart, as Thy servant, as one whose ear is open unto what Thou dost enjoin, what Thou dost forbid.[1] I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the Commander.[2] Whatsoever place or post Thou assignest me, Sooner will I die a thousand deaths, as Socrates said, than desert it.[1] For, being appointed to such a service, do I still care about the place? and do I not entirely direct my thoughts to God and to His instructions and commands?[3]

[1] D. III. xxiv. Crossley.
[2] D. III. xxvi. Long.
[3] D. III. xxiv. Long.

CHAPTER VIII

NUNC DIMITTIS

DOST thou that hast received all from another's hands, repine and blame the Giver, if He takes anything from thee? Why, who art thou, and to what end camest thou here? Was it not He that brought thee into the world; was it not He that made the Light manifest unto thee, that gave thee fellow-workers, and senses, and the power to reason?

And how brought He thee into the world? Was it not as one born to die; as one bound to live out his earthly life in some small tabernacle of flesh; to behold His administration, and for a little while to share with Him in the mighty march of this great Festival Procession? Now therefore

that thou hast beheld, while it was permitted thee, the Solemn Feast and Assembly, wilt thou not cheerfully depart, when He summons thee forth, with adoration and thanksgiving for what thou hast seen and heard?

Nay, but why did He bring one into the world on these conditions? He hath no need of a spectator who finds fault with his lot! Them that will take part in the Feast He needeth — that will lift their voice with the rest, that men may applaud the more, and exalt the Great Assembly in hymns and songs of praise. But the wretched and the fearful He will not be displeased to see absent from it: for when they were present, they did not behave as at a Feast, nor fulfil their proper office; but moaned though as in pain, and found fault with their fate, their fortune and their companions; insensible to what had fallen to their lot, insensible to the powers they had received for a very different purpose — the powers of Magnanimity, Nobility of Heart, of Fortitude, of Freedom!

Nay, but I would fain have stayed longer at the Festival. Ah, so would the mystics fain have the rites prolonged; so perchance would the crowd at the Great Games fain behold more wrestlers still. But the Solemn Assembly is over! Come forth, depart with thanksgiving and modesty.[1]

[1] D. IV. i. Crossley.

CHAPTER IX

VALEDICTORY

SINCE we must by all means die, a man cannot be found but he will be doing somewhat, either tilling or digging or trading or governing.[1] What, then, wouldst thou be found doing when overtaken by death? If I might choose, I would be found doing some deed of true humanity, of wide import, beneficent and noble. But if I may not be found engaged in aught so lofty, let me hope at least for this — what none may hinder, what is surely in my power — that I may be found raising up in myself that which had fallen; learning to deal more wisely with the things of sense; working out mine own tranquillity.[2] I would fain be found engaged in the task of liberating mine own will from the assaults of passion, from hindrance, from resentment, from slavery.[3] If death surprises me thus employed, it is enough if I can stretch forth my hands to God and say: [2]

Have I in aught transgressed Thy commands? Have I in aught perverted the faculties, the senses, the natural principles that Thou didst give me? Have I ever blamed Thee or found fault with Thine administration? When it was Thy good pleasure, I fell sick — and so did other men: but my will consented. Because it was Thy pleasure, I became poor — but mine heart rejoiced. No power in the State was mine, because Thou

wouldst not: such power I never desired! Hast thou ever seen me of more doleful countenance on that account? Have I not ever drawn nigh unto Thee with cheerful look, waiting upon Thy commands, attentive to Thy signals? Wilt Thou that I now depart from the great assembly of men? I go: I give Thee all thanks that Thou hast deemed me worthy to take part with Thee in this assembly: to behold Thy works, to comprehend this Thine administration.[3] For that Thou didst beget me, I thank Thee for that Thou hast given: for the time during which I have used the things that were Thine, it sufficeth me. Take them back and place them wherever Thou wilt! They were all Thine, and Thou gavest them me.[2]

Such I would were the subject of my thoughts, my pen, my study, when death overtakes me.[3] For what life is better and more becoming than that of a man who is in this state of mind? And what end is more happy?[4]

[1] D. IV. x. Rolleston.
[2] D. IV. x. Crossley.
[3] D. III. v. Crossley.
[4] D. IV. x. Long.

PART TWO — THE CYNIC

BOOK ONE

THE WAY OF THE CYNIC

THE WAY OF THE CYNIC

CHAPTER I

THE CHARACTER OF THE CYNIC

ONE of his pupils, who seemed to be drawn towards the way of Cynicism, inquired of Epictetus what manner of man the Cynic* ought to be. And Epictetus said, Let us look into it at leisure; for it is not such as it seemeth to thee.

First, in things that concern thyself, thou must appear in nothing like unto what thou now doest. Thou must not accuse God nor man; thou must utterly give over pursuit, and avoid only those things that are in the power of thy will; anger is not meet for thee, nor resentment, nor envy, nor pity; nor must a girl appear to thee fair, nor must reputation.

For it must be understood that other men shelter themselves by walls and houses and by darkness when they do such things, and many means of concealment have they. One shutteth the door, placeth someone before the chamber; if anyone should come, say, He is out, he is busy. But in place of all these things it behoves the Cynic to shelter himself behind his own piety and rever-

* See Introduction, pp. xxiv–xxvii.

ence; but if he doth not, he shall be put to shame, naked under the sky. This is his house, this his door, this the guards of his chamber, this his darkness. For he must not seek to hide aught that he doeth, else he is gone, the Cynic hath perished, the man who lived under the open sky, the freeman. He hath begun to fear somewhat from without, he hath begun to need concealment; nor can he find it when he would, for where shall he hide himself, and how? And if by chance this tutor, this public teacher, should be found in guilt, what things must he not suffer! And fearing these things, can he yet take heart with his whole soul to guide the rest of mankind? That can he never: it is impossible!

But before all things must his ruling faculty be purer than the sun, else he must needs be a gambler and cheater, who, being himself entangled in some iniquity, will reprove others. For see how the matter stands: to these kings and tyrants, their spearmen and their arms give the office of reproving men, and the power to punish transgressors, yea, though they themselves be evil; but to the Cynic, instead of arms and spearmen, his conscience giveth this power.[1] Why, then, should he not dare to speak boldly to his own brethren, to his children, in a word, to his kindred?

This is the character, this the undertaking of a Cynic.[2] Dost thou see how thou art about to take in hand so great a matter?[1]

[1] D. III. xxii. Rolleston. [2] D. III. xxii. Carter.

CHAPTER II

THE CALL OF THE CYNIC

CONSIDER ,more closely, know thyself, question thy genius, attempt nothing without God. For whosoever shall without God attempt so great a matter desireth only to behave himself unseemly before the people. For in no well-ordered house doth one come in and say to himself, I should be the steward of the house; else, when the lord of the house shall have observed it, and seeth him insolently giving orders, he will drag him forth and chastise him. So it is also in this great city of the universe; for here too there is a Master of the house who ordereth each and all. Thou art the Sun, saith He; thy power is to travel round and make the year and the seasons, and to increase and nourish fruits, and to stir the winds and still them, and temperately to warm the bodies of men. Thou art able to lead the army against Ilion; be Agamemnon. Thou canst fight in single combat with Hector; be Achilles. But if Thersites came forth and pretended to the authority, then either he would not gain it, or, gaining it, he would have been shamed before many witnesses.

And about this affair, do thou take thought upon it earnestly, for it is not such as it seemeth to thee. I will take to myself, thou sayest, a wallet and staff, and I will begin to go about and

beg, and to reprove everyone I meet with. If thou conceivest the matter on this wise, far be it from thee — go not near it, it is not for thee. But if thou conceivest of it as it is, and holdest thyself not unworthy of it, then behold to how great an enterprise thou art putting forth thine hand.[1]

[1] D. III. xxii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER III

THE CYNIC AND HIS BODY

IT is not given to every man to become a Cynic. Wisdom alone, it may be, will not suffice: a man needs also a certain measure of readiness — an aptitude for the office: aye, and certain bodily qualities.[1] For if the Cynic shall appear consumptive, meagre, and pale, his witness hath not the same emphasis. Not only by showing forth the things of the spirit must he convince foolish men that it is possible, without the things that are admired of them, to be good and wise; but also in body must he show that plain and simple and open-air living are not mischievous even to the body. Behold, it behoveth him to say, even of this I am a witness, I and my body. So Diogenes was wont to do, for he went about radiant with health; and with his very body he turned many to good. But a Cynic that men pity seems to be a beggar — all men turn away from him, all stumble

at him. For he must not appear squalid; so that neither in this respect shall he scare men away; but his very austerity should be cleanly and pleasing.[2]

Such is the Cynic who is honored with the sceptre and the diadem by Zeus. But see whose work it is, the work of Zeus, or of him whom He may judge worthy of this service; that he may never exhibit anything to the many, by which he shall make of no effect his own testimony, whereby he gives testimony to virtue:

> His beauteous face pales not, nor from his cheeks
> He wipes a tear.[3]

[1] D. III. xxi. Crossley.
[2] D. III. xxii. Rolleston.
[3] D. IV. viii. Long.

CHAPTER IV

THE LONG-SUFFERING OF THE CYNIC

TRULY the Cynic must be so long-suffering as that he shall seem to the multitude insensate and a stone. For this very agreeable circumstance is linked with the calling of a Cynic; he must be flogged like an ass, and, being flogged, must love those who flog him, as though he were the father or brother of all mankind. Not so, but if one shall flog thee, stand in the midst and shriek out, O Cæsar, what things do I suffer in the Emperor's peace! Let us take him before the pro-consul. But what is Cæsar to the Cynic?

or what is a pro-consul? or what is any other than He that hath sent him hither, and whom he serveth, which is Zeus? Doth he call upon any other than God? Is he not persuaded, whatsoever things he may suffer, that he is being trained and exercised by God? Hercules, when he was exercised by Eurystheus, never deemed himself wretched; but fulfilled courageously all that was laid upon him. But he who shall cry out and bear it hard when he is being trained and exercised by Zeus, is he worthy to bear the sceptre of Diogenes? And will such an one presently accuse God who hath sent him, as having used him ill? For of what shall he accuse Him: that his life is seemly, that he manifests God's will, that he showeth forth His virtue more brightly?

For the Cynic remembers that the worse must needs be vanquished by the better, whereinsoever it is the worse; and the body is worse than the multitude — the weaker than the stronger. Never, then, doth the Cynic go down to any contest where it is possible for him to be vanquished, but he yields up all that is not his own, and contends for nothing that is subject to others. Is his assent ever hasty; or his desire idle; or his pursuit in vain; or his avoidance unsuccessful; or his aim unfulfilled? Doth he ever blame, or cringe, or envy? This is his great study and design; but as regards all other things, he lies on his back and snores, for all is peace. There is no thief of his will, nor tyrant; but of his body? yea; and of his chattels? yea, and also of his authority

and his honors. What, then, are these things to him? But where there is question of the will and the use of appearances, then you shall see how many eyes the Cynic hath, so that you may say that compared with him Argus was blind.[1]

[1] D. III. xxii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER V

THE OFFICE OF THE CYNIC

THE Cynic is, in truth, a spy of the things that are friendly to men, and that are hostile; and having closely spied out all, he must come back and declare the truth. And he must neither be stricken with terror and report of enemies where none are; nor be in any otherwise confounded or troubled by the appearances.[1]

But no one ever sends a timorous spy, who, when he only hears a noise or sees a shadow, runs back, frighted out of his wits, and says, The enemy is just at hand! So now if he should come and tell us, Things are in a fearful way, death is terrible; banishment, terrible; calumny, terrible; poverty, terrible; run, good people, the enemy is at hand! — we will answer, Get you gone, and prophesy for yourself; our only fault is that we have sent such a spy.

Diogenes, who was sent as a spy, told us other tidings. He says that death is no evil, for it is nothing base; that defamation is only the noise

of madmen. And what account did this spy give us of pain? Of pleasure? Of poverty? He says that to be naked is better than a purple robe, to sleep upon the bare ground is the softest bed, and gives a proof of all he says by his own courage, tranquillity, and freedom; and, moreover, by a healthy and robust body. There is no enemy near, says he. All is profound peace. Look upon me, says he. Am I hurt? Am I wounded? Have I run away from any one?[2] Take notice of me, that I am without a country, without a house, without an estate, without a servant; I lie on the ground; no wife, no children, no coat, but only earth and heaven and one sorry cloak. And what do I want? Am not I without sorrow, without fear? Am not I free? Did any of you ever see me disappointed? Did I ever blame God or man? Did I ever accuse any one? Have any of you seen me look discontented? How do I treat those whom you fear, and of whom you are struck with awe? Is it not like sorry slaves? Who that sees me doth not think that he sees his own king and master?[3] This is such a spy as he ought to be.[2]

[1] D. III. xxii. Rolleston.
[2] D. I. xxiv. Carter.
[3] D. III. xxii. Carter.

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMISSION OF THE CYNIC

THE Cynic is an herald from God to men, declaring to them the truth about good and evil things; that they have erred, and are seeking the reality of good and evil where it is not; and where it is, they do not consider. He must then be able, if so it chance, to go up impassioned, as on the tragic stage, and speak:

O men, whither are ye borne away? What do ye? Miserable as ye are! like blind men ye wander up and down. Ye have left the true road, and are going by a false; ye are seeking peace and happiness where they are not, and if another shall show you where they are, ye believe him not. Wherefore will ye seek it in outward things? It is not there! It is there where ye deem it not, and where ye have no desire to seek it. For did ye desire, ye would have found it in yourselves, nor would ye wander to things without, nor pursue things alien, as if they were your own concerns. Turn to your own selves. See that there is in you something that is by nature free. This, miserable men, must ye perfect; this have a care to, in this seek for the Good.

Thinkest thou he is a mere meddler and busybody in rebuking those whom he meets? As a father he doth it, as a brother, and as a servant of the Universal Father, which is God. When

he knows that he hath watched and labored for men, and lain down to sleep in purity, and sleep hath left him yet purer; and that his thoughts have been the thoughts of one dear to the Gods, of a servant, and a sharer in the rule of Zeus — wherefore, then, shall he not take heart to speak boldly to his brothers, to his children, in a word, to all his kin? [1]

[1] D. III. xxii. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VII

THE BURDEN OF THE CYNIC

WHEREFORE will ye seek the Good in outward things? It is not there. In possessions? It is not there, and if ye believe me not, lo, Crœsus! lo, the wealthy of our own day, how full of mourning is their life! In authority? It is not there, else should those be happy who have been twice or thrice consul; yet they are not. Whom shall we believe in this matter? You, who but look on these men from without, and are dazzled by the appearance, or the men themselves? And what say they? Hearken to them when they lament, when they groan, when by reason of those consulships, and their glory and renown, they hold their state the more full of misery and danger! In royalty? It is not there; else were Nero happy, and Sardanapalus; but not Agamemnon himself was happy, more splendid

though he was than Nero or Sardanapalus. And what saith himself? I am distraught, he saith, and I am in anguish; my heart leaps forth from my bosom. Miserable man! which of thy concerns hath gone wrong with thee? Thy wealth? Nay; but thou art rich in gold and bronze. What aileth thee then? That part, whatever it be, with which we pursue, with which we avoid, with which we desire and dislike, thou hast neglected and corrupted. How hath it been neglected? He hath been ignorant of the true Good for which it was born, and of the Evil; and of what is his own, and what is alien to him. O unhappy mind of thee! of all things alone neglected and untended.

In what, then, is the Good, seeing that in these things it is not? Come, then, do ye not naturally conceive it as great, as precious, and that cannot be harmed? What kind of material, then, will ye take to shape peace and freedom? Turn to your own selves, and see that there is in you something that is by nature free. This, miserable men, must ye perfect; this have a care to, in this seek for the Good.[1] For this law hath God established, and saith, If thou wouldst have aught of good, have it from thyself.[2]

[1] D. III. xxii. Rolleston. [2] D. I. xxix. Rolleston.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CYNIC AND THE WORLD

GIVE me, said Epictetus, a city of wise men, and perhaps no one will easily come to the Cynic way: for whose sake should he embrace it? However, if we do suppose such a thing, there is nothing to hinder his marrying and begetting children; for his wife will be even such another, and his father-in-law such another, and thus will his children be brought up.

But things being as they now are, as it were in order of battle, must not the Cynic be given wholly and undistracted to the service of God, being able to go about among men, and not bound to private duties, nor entangled in ties which, if he trangress, he can no longer preserve the aspect of honesty and goodness; and if he obey them, he hath lost that of the missionary, the spy, the herald of the Gods? Where shall I thenceforth find that king, whose whole business is the common weal? And thus inquiring, we do not find it, in this condition of the world, a purpose of chief concern for the Cynic.

How, then, shall the Cynic be preserving the community? Shall the command of an army withdraw a man from marriage and fatherhood, and he shall not be thought to have gained nothing for his childlessness, but the kingship of a Cynic shall not be worth what it costs? It may

be we do not perceive his greatness, else these things would not have moved us, nor should we have marvelled if a Cynic will not marry nor beget children. Man! the Cynic hath begotten all mankind, he hath all men for his sons, all women for his daughters; so doth he visit all and care for all.

If it please thee, ask of me also whether the Cynic shall have to do with affairs of public polity. Dost thou seek a greater polity than that in whose affairs he is already concerned? Will it be greater if he come forward among the Athenians to say something about ways and means — he, whose part it is to discourse with all men, Athenians, Corinthians, Romans alike, not concerning ways or means, nor concerning peace or war, but about happiness and unhappiness, about good-fortune and ill-fortune, about slavery and freedom? And of a man that hath his part in so great a polity will you ask me if he shall attend to public affairs? Ask me also if he shall be a ruler; and again I shall say, What rule can be greater than his? [1]

[1] D. III. xxii. Rolleston.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARNOLD, E. VERNON. Roman Stoicism. Cambridge University Press, 1911. Contains extended general bibliography. Article Epictetus in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.

ASMUS, R. Quaestiones Epicteteae. Freiburg, 1888.

BERNARD, EDWARD RUSSELL. Great Moral Teachers. (Confucius, Gotama, Socrates, Epictetus). London, 1906.

BOILEAU. Epictetus: His Morals, with Simplicius, his Commentary and Life. London, 1700.

BONHÖFFER, ADOLF. Epictet und die Stoa. Stuttgart, 1890. Die Ethik des Stoïkers Epictet. Stuttgart, 1894.

BRACE, C. LORING. The Unknown God. New York, 1890.

BRANDIS, CHRISTIAN AUGUST. Article Epictetus in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography.

BRAUNE, A. Epictet und das Christenthum, 1889.

BRUNS, IVO. De Schola Epicteti. Kiel, 1897.

BUSSELL, F. W. Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics. London and New York, 1910.

CARTER, ELIZABETH. Moral Discourses of Epictetus. London, 1758.

CASPARI, E. De Cynicis qui fuerunt aetate imperatorum Romanorum. Chemnitz, 1896.

CHÉDIEU, P. J. EMILE. Le Manuel, traduit du grec. Paris, 1847.

CROSSLEY, HASTINGS. Golden Sayings of Epictetus. London, 1903.

DAVIDSON, WILLIAM LESLIE. The Stoic Creed. Edinburgh, 1907.

DAVIS, CHARLES H. STANLEY. Greek and Roman Stoicism and Some of its Disciples. Boston, 1903.

ESTES, DANA. Noble Thoughts of Epictetus. Boston, 1909.

FARRAR, FREDERIC WILLIAM. Seekers after God. London, 1868.

GROSCH, G. Die Sittenlehre des Epictetus. Wernigerode, 1867.
HERFORD, C. H. The Stoics as Teachers. London, 1889.
HEUMANN, CHRISTOPH AUGUST. De Philosophia Epicteti. Iena, 1703.
HICKS, ROBERT DREW. Stoic and Epicurean. New York, 1910.
HIGGINSON, THOMAS WENTWORTH. Works of Epictetus. Boston, 1865.
HOLLAND, FREDERIC MAY. The Reign of the Stoics. New York, 1879.
HYDE, WILLIAM DE WITT. From Epicurus to Christ. New York, 1905.
LONG, GEORGE. The Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion and Fragments. London, 1848.
MATHESON, PERCY EWING. The Discourses of Epictetus. Oxford University Press, 1916.
ROLLESTON, THOMAS WILLIAM. The Teaching of Epictetus. London, 1886.
ROUSE, W. H. D. Words of the Ancient Wise. 1906.
SANFORD, J. The Manual of Epictetus. Translated from the French. London, 1567.
SCHENKL, H. Die epiktetischen Fragmente. Wien, 1888. Epicteti Dissertationes. Teubner, 1898.
SCHRANKA, E. M. Der Stoïker Epictetus und seine Philosophie. Frankfurt, 1885.
SCHWEIGHAEUSER. Epicteteae Philosophiae Monumenta. Leipsig, 1799.
SIMPLICIUS. Encheiridion with Commentary. Norembergae, 1529.
SMITH, B. E. Selections from the Discourses, Manual, and Fragments of Epictetus. Translated from the Greek. New York, 1900.
SPALDING, J. L. Glimpses of Truth, with Essays on Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Chicago, 1903.
STANHOPE, G. Dissertationes, Fragmenta, et Enchiridion, cum Commentario Simplicii. Paris, 1840.
STUHRMANN, J. De vocabulis notionum philosophicarum ab Epicteto adhibitis. Neustadt, 1885.
THEOPHRASTUS. Epicteti Dissertationes, Fragmenta, et Enchiridion. Graece et Latine. Paris, 1842.
THUROT, CHARLES. Epictète, Manuel. Paris, 1892.

Upton, Joannis. Enchiridion. Ex editione Joannis Upton accurate expressum. Abredoniae, 1760. Philadelphia, 1792.

Wallace, William. Article Epictetus in Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition.

Zahn, Theodor. Der Stoïker Epiktet und sein Verhältniss zum Christenthum. Erlangen, 1895.

Zeller, Edward. Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Translated by Reichel. London, 1892.

INDEX

INDEX