

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 in Empire waters.

3 On the morning of the attack and shortly after the attack  
4 a report was received by radio that a Jap carrier had been  
5 sighted to the south. This later proved incorrect. It was  
6 the cruiser Minneapolis operating under Admiral Brown. Shortly  
7 after that report was received and while we were still uncer-  
8 tain, the Fleet Intelligence Officer ran over to the plotting  
9 board with radio bearings and stated, "Here they are" and he  
10 out them into the southward. Present at the plotting board  
11 were Admiral Kimmel, Captain McMorris, the War Plans Officer,  
12 Captain Delaney, the Operations Officer, and myself. For  
13 that reason the search was ordered to the south.

14 The Fleet Intelligence Officer's explanation of that  
15 later is, as we knew at the time, radio bearings from a single  
16 station were then and may still be subject to only one error,  
17 that is an error of 180 degrees. That was Layton's explana-  
18 tion the last time I talked to him and shortly after Pearl  
19 Harbor.

20 The statement is made that the Japs knew all the funda-  
21 mentals of naval warfare. I think this war has proved that  
22 they did not.

23 As for Mr. Thurston and the station KGU: It is true  
24 that KGU did send out this warning to keep the streets clear,  
25 to permit freedom for the military, to keep cool, summoning

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 the Red Cross, and so on, but when the attack struck the tele-  
3 phone system of Honolulu was blocked because the Honolulu  
4 Advertiser had not been delivered that morning and everyone  
5 was calling for his paper. The radio was carrying on as usual  
6 with morning music. I left the house and was informed later  
7 by my wife that the music was interrupted and KGU announced  
8 "Pearl Harbor under attack", then went on with the music for  
9 something like one hour before it gave the instructions what  
10 to do. Where it got those instructions I do not know.

11 As for the appointment of Captain Layton, I do not know  
12 anything of that except that when Admiral Reeves had the Fleet  
13 in 1935 and 1936 and Admiral J. O. Richardson was his Chief  
14 of Staff, Layton was on the Pennsylvania, was known to be a  
15 Japanese language student, was the officer usually sent to  
16 board an incoming Japanese naval vessel. He had the high re-  
17 spect of Admiral Richardson.

18 About surprise inspections: Surprise inspections were  
19 never held on Mondays. Surprise inspections referred to the  
20 Captain's inspection on Saturday morning, which was always  
21 held, unless the ship were fueling or taking on board ammuni-  
22 tion, it was held from 9:30 until 11:30 in the morning. All  
23 that it involved was the inspection of the crew and of the  
24 living quarters and of a few other compartments. It did not  
25 involve the inspection of double bottoms.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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The system was that a division commander just before morning quarters at 9:30 would send a signal to a ship stating "You will receive a surprise inspection this morning", and then accompanied by the Captain of another ship of the division and of an inspection crew of many officers the Admiral would go to that ship under inspection and while he inspected the crew and the living quarters the younger officers would go to the engine room and to various parts of the machinery spaces and store rooms.

The inspection was brief. A very brief report was put in on it. The Captains liked this inspection because it gave them an opportunity to exchange ideas with other ships and they would come back and make improvements in their own and, consequently, get less reprimand perhaps from the Admiral on his next inspection.

A question has been asked this morning whether carrier planes could take off from the carriers while in Pearl Harbor. Planes were never on the carrier decks in Pearl Harbor. They were flown off, sometimes as much as two hundred miles, but always before entry and were dispersed into air fields at Ewa and other places where they could continue their training in case the carrier were to remain for a long time.

When the carrier sortied from Pearl Harbor the planes joined her at sea. This practice had been going on long

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 before Pearl Harbor.

3 The Utah may have been mistaken by the Japanese for a car-  
4 rier. Her deck was flat and covered by 12 by 12 lumber because  
5 she was used for bombing purposes, bombing from the air. To  
6 them from the mountains she may have appeared to be a carrier.  
7 She was occupying the berth of the Enterprise and I believe  
8 that she received the torpedoes intended for the Enterprise.

9 The question was asked this morning whether a ship had  
10 been alerted at sea. Ships at sea were always alerted and  
11 the moment the Salt Lake City sortied from Pearl Harbor she  
12 was automatically alerted by Admiral Kimmel's order 2-CL-41,  
13 which is an exhibit before this committee. She then went to  
14 Condition 3, and I would like to explain that Condition 3 is  
15 ample on a ship at sea. It is quite different from a shore  
16 establishment.

17 At Condition 3 the aircraft battery of the ship is manned,  
18 ammunition is at the guns, lookouts are stationed. There is  
19 an air patrol of some kind in the air from the ship's own  
20 planes if from no other source, so that a surface enemy could  
21 be sighted when many miles out of range. It is only a very  
22 few minutes to go from Condition 3 to a full alert manning  
23 all guns. It is obviously unnecessary to man turret guns  
24 when there is no possible enemy within range.

25 In confirmation of what Captain Zacharias has said, he

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 never arrived before a board of nine Admirals in accordance  
3 with the old, regular Navy selection system. The last officer  
4 selected by that system was the top man in 1911, so that his  
5 failure of promotion cannot be blamed upon the Navy promotion  
6 system, as it exists except in time of war.

7 The Fleet Intelligence Officer did evaluate all of the  
8 information he had and bring it to the Commander-in-Chief every  
9 day and when other task force commanders or type commander  
10 were in port and came to the Admiral's morning conferences the  
11 Fleet Intelligence Officer invariably on a chart which covered  
12 one whole wall of the room explained the information received  
13 by Intelligence and his evaluation of where the enemy was and  
14 what he was doing.

15 Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

16 The Chairman: Having been unavoidably absent during the  
17 Admiral's testimony I am not advised of his testimony. There-  
18 fore, cannot at this time make any inquiries and therefore I  
19 will not do so at the moment. Congressman Cooper?

20 The Vice Chairman: No questions now.

21 The Chairman: Senator George?

22 Senator George: I have no questions on the points covered  
23 by Admiral Smith. If there are any questions asked on any  
24 other matters I may have a few questions later.

25 The Chairman: Congressman Clark?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Mr. Clark: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

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The Chairman: Senator Lucas?

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Senator Lucas: I have no questions.

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The Chairman: Mr. Murphy?

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The Vice Chairman: He just stepped out.

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The Chairman: Senator Brewster?

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(No response.)

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The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart?

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Mr. Gearhart: The Admiral's testimony was very clear.

11

I do not have any questions at this time.

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The Chairman: Senator Ferguson?

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Senator Ferguson: Admiral, Admiral Kimmel when he was on the stand related a conversation that he had with Secretary Knox in relation to a message being sent on the 6th. Were you present at that conference or conversation?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I was.

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Senator Ferguson: Will you explain that?

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Admiral Smith: I remember that, I believe, word for word because it impressed me so at the time.

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Admiral Kimmel, General Short, Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye had been in conference all morning and I had been invited to join up at twelve o'clock and be there for lunch. I joined them in a small room. Present in addition to those mentioned were the Secretary of the Navy and his aide, Captain Beattie.

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Witness Smith

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2       Secretary Knox made a statement, - I don't know what had  
3 been discussed before my arrival, but Secretary Knox made a  
4 statement, "I don't believe anyone in the War Department or  
5 in the Navy Department expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor,  
6 not even Kelly Turner." He then said, "But did you not re-  
7 ceive on the Saturday preceding Pearl Harbor a warning mes-  
8 sage that we had learned surreptitiously that Kurusu and No-  
9 mura had been directed by their home government to deliver  
10 their final message to Mr. Hull at one o'clock on Sunday, De-  
11 cember 7th?"

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

12       Everyone in the room said "No". Whereupon Secretary Knox  
13 stated, "That is strange. I know that such a message was sent  
14 to Hart and I thought it was sent to you."

15       Senator Ferguson: Did he say when it was sent, Saturday  
16 or Sunday?

17       Admiral Smith: I understood him to say Saturday, the  
18 night before.

19       Senator Ferguson: The night before.

20       Admiral Smith: But I checked it later on with Admiral  
21 Hart and found he had never received it either.

22       Senator Ferguson: Did you see all of the messages that  
23 came to Admiral Kimmel?

24       Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

25       Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether they were considered

1 Witness Smith Questions by: Sen. Ferguson  
2 and did you pass judgment on the war warning message?

3 Admiral Smith: I was at the conference when it was dis-  
4 cussed, yes, sir. I saw all of his messages, I saw every  
5 letter that he wrote or received to or from Admiral Stark.

6 Senator Ferguson: Can you tell us the impression that  
7 the war warning message had on you, what it meant to you as  
8 a war warning?

9 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Would you do that?

11 Admiral Smith: We had had many warnings but this warning  
12 as analyzed, if written in letter form by the War College  
13 System and the system in use in the Fleet, would have been in  
14 two paragraphs.

15 Paragraph 1, "Information:

16 "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization  
17 of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive  
18 move by Japan is expedited within the next few days. The  
19 number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organiza-  
20 tion of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedi-  
21 tion against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula  
22 or possibly Borneo."

23 Paragraph 2: Which is always the action paragraph:

24 "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prepara-  
25 tory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform



1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 . District and Army authorities."

3 That meant to me, since all previous warnings had been to  
4 the effect that the attack was bound to the southward, toward  
5 the Kra Peninsula and a previous message about an attack, an  
6 aggressive attack in any direction, including the Philippines,  
7 in my mind confined the possible attack to that area and this  
8 message warned us to take a defensive deployment so that we  
9 could carry out our tasks in the war plan, the first of which  
10 would have been a raid on the Marshalls. It did not convey  
11 to me that we were likely to be attacked.

12 Senator Ferguson: Was there an opinion of the group that  
13 were studying this message expressed at that time?

14 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us what that opinion was?

16 Admiral Smith: There was general discussion. Always in  
17 a case of that kind Admiral Pye if in port and always Admiral  
18 Bloch as previous Commander-in-Chief, with the members of the  
19 staff who were concerned, and they reached the same agreement  
20 that I have told you of and there was no opposition that I  
21 recall.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did the staff have daily staff confer-  
23 ences?

24 Admiral Smith: Not every day, no, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did they have them prior to the 7th?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: And if so what date?

4 Admiral Smith: They had them practically every morning,  
5 Admiral Kimmel had certain members of his staff, not the en-  
6 tire staff, in his office. It is my recollection there was  
7 a staff meeting on the morning of the 27th before this mes-  
8 sage was received.

9 The message was received some time in the afternoon and  
10 Admiral Bloch was sent for and did not come. I believe it  
11 was the only conference he missed. He had been to the hos-  
12 pital to see his wife. He was represented by Captain Earle.  
13 I believe Admiral Halsey was there but am not certain. The  
14 message was sent by courier, by Captain Layton to General  
15 Short and on the following morning, to the best of my recol-  
16 lection, there was a full conference between Admiral Kimmel  
17 and General Short and the principal members of their staffs  
18 and that this conference lasted all morning.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you see the message that went to  
20 General Short in relation to that on the 27th?

21 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. That was brought over by  
22 Captain Earle.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did that change your opinion in any  
24 way as to your opinion on this?

25 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you have the same opinion about that instrument?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Was the relationship good between the officers and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor?

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Admiral Smith: Very good, yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: What were the relations between your organization, the Navy, and the Army? Was it good or was it not cooperative?

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Admiral Smith: It was good and Admiral Kimmel and General Short were together very frequently. Sometimes Admiral Kimmel would go over to see him. There was liaison between the Fleet gunnery officer and the Army, the Fleet aviation officer and the Army Air Force. The two staffs did not get together very frequently except in the presence of the Commanding General and Admiral Kimmel.

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Senator Ferguson: Were these liaison officers competent to do the job between the two, to have coordination between the two services?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. I believe every member of Admiral Kimmel's staff has since been promoted. They had to be competent to serve with him.

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Senator Ferguson: And I take it that included your own promotion?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral Smith: Well, I hope so. I don't know.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I mean you were on his staff.

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You were speaking of those on his staff. You have been promoted after that?

Admiral Smith: I had been promoted before that. I had been selected by the Navy Board of Selection in September 1941, some time after I became Chief of Staff, but I had not yet made my number when Pearl Harbor struck and when I was promoted it was dated back to November 1941.

Senator Ferguson: Just the one promotion, that is the only one you have had since Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith: Well, I have been made Vice Admiral since. That was March 1945.

Senator Ferguson: So there were really two promotions after Pearl Harbor as far as you are concerned?

Admiral Smith: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Now, were you familiar with the demands for more material and more men by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were there such demands?

Admiral Smith: There were very many of them. In fact, we sometimes thought he was sending in too many. He was demanding radar, all kinds of late materials, more planes, anti-

Witness Smith

Questions by : Sen. Ferguson

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2 aircraft guns, more men and stability of officers.

3 Of course, we realized that men trained in the Fleet had  
4 to be sent to new construction and his principal demand was  
5 that they send men out for training to over complement ships  
6 so that taking experienced men out and sending them home to  
7 new construction would not handicap the efficiency of the  
8 ship. In the last message I remember he asked for something  
9 like 20,000 men, I think it was, or perhaps 19,000, nine  
10 thousand to fill up the Fleet and ten thousand additional  
11 for training. He did not get them.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 Senator Ferguson: Prior to Pearl Harbor were you in on  
13 the conversations in relation to taking ships from the Paci-  
14 fic to the Atlantic?

15 Admiral Smith: Moving ships from the Pacific to the  
16 Atlantic, that movement was made after I was Chief of Staff.  
17 There was no conference on the subject. We simply received  
18 orders to do so.

19 Senator Ferguson: Were there some ships returned after  
20 Pearl Harbor?

21 Admiral Smith: After Pearl Harbor I believe everything  
22 we sent was returned with the exception of two light cruisers,  
23 the Brooklyn and the Philadelphia. The carrier Yorktown, -  
24 in fact two cruisers of that type, the three battleships New  
25 Mexico, Idaho and Mississippi and the destroyers were promptly

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 returned to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor.

3 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Smith, do you know of anything  
4 that you could give this committee to help us in deciding the  
5 question before it as to how this surprise attack could happen  
6 at Pearl Harbor and we not be prepared for it?

7 Admiral Smith: I might say for one thing, not as an ex-  
8 planation of Pearl Harbor but in the interests of the future.  
9 I believe there was entirely too much secrecy in all branches  
10 of the government connected with national defense. I see no  
11 use in breaking a cipher unless you use its contents.

12 I can think of one incident to explain what I mean by  
13 "too much secrecy".

14 Senator Ferguson: Will you do that?

15 Admiral Smith: In about May 1941, while we were at sea  
16 in exercises, the Commander-in-Chief was in my cabin when we  
17 received from the Chief of Naval Operations a dispatch direct-  
18 ing us to send two divisions of cruisers and two squadrons of  
19 destroyers to Samoa to stand by for distant reconnaissance and  
20 to occupy the torpedoes of these destroyers with the Mark VI  
21 exploder. The Commander-in-Chief was not informed where  
22 these ships were going and did not know until they received  
23 their direct orders from Washington after their arrival in  
24 Samoa.

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Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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The Commander in Chief asked if I knew the meaning of the term "Mark VI Exploder" because he did not, and I told him that I had a suspicion that it was an exploder for the magnetic head of a torpedo. I gave as my reason for this the fact that 15 years previously I had been in charge of torpedo manufacture at Newport and we then had an order for a new type of torpedo to use a magnetic head. The torpedo was very successful. The magnetic exploder which had been tested proved an absolute failure.

Captain Hart, now Senator and Admiral Hart, was the inspector in charge at Newport. He promptly called in the engineers of the Westinghouse Company to design a magnetic head that would work, and their engineers were there frequently and would return to their laboratories, all at no expense to the Government, to attempt to develop this device.

I left Newport in 1929 and was never able to learn whether that torpedo head had proved successful.

Senator Ferguson: And you were a Captain at that time?

Admiral Smith: I was a Commander when I had the torpedo desk, the torpedo I manufactured. In 1939 I asked an officer who was in a position to know what results had been obtained and he said that the head was successful but was so secret that it could not even be talked about.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Kimmel then sent for the Fleet Gunnery Officer,  
Captain Kitts.

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Senator Ferguson: Do I understand this was an order  
from Washington that you received?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: You were trying to interpret it?

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Admiral Smith: We were trying to fulfill the contract  
for 250 torpedoes equipped with that head, and I dare say  
many contracts followed.

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On the receipt of this message on the Pennsylvania  
Admiral Kimmel sent for the Fleet Gunnery Officer and asked  
if he knew the meaning of the words "Mark VI Exploder".  
Captain Kitts had spent most of his career in gunnery. He  
is now Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. He  
admitted to me that he had never heard of a magnetically  
exploded head.

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Admiral Draemel then in command of the destroyers  
of the Pacific Fleet was sent for, and he stated that he  
had never heard of such a device. The exploders we found  
on our return to port were in the storehouse on the  
submarine base and certain submarine officers had been  
given instruction on how to use them. There was a test  
stand of some sort to indicate whether they were active or  
inactive, and all were tested out before being issued.



Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Now shortly before Pearl Harbor a squadron of submarines was moved from Pearl to Cavite and these were equipped with this new magnetic device. I am informed that early in the war the heart of many a submarine captain was broken when he fired these torpedoes and they passed under the ships without exploding, when they were designed to explode under the ship and blow her belly through the smokestack. They all ran deeper than they were supposed to run.

Now in my opinion had we not been so secret about that device and had taken some of them out and tested them we would, of course, have had a much more effective weapon.

I believe that this matter of secrecy has some bearing also on Pearl Harbor. All of these magic messages -- none of which I ever heard of until I arrived here before this committee and listened to the testimony -- these messages should certainly have been sent to the commander in the field, and to permit him and his staff to evaluate the information they received. I think it is admitted that all the Naval brains are not concentrated in Washington.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Smith

Admiral Kimmel had a staff and many good advisers in the Pacific Fleet. He had no chance to evaluate this information which I learned was available in Washington.

I believe there was a state of mind in Washington that the war is in the Atlantic. In fact, one letter received after Pearl Harbor but written before, stated something to the effect, "I know you need more men, and would be glad to give them to you, but they are not available; and remember the war is in the Pacific and we here in the Atlantic think that you are sitting pretty."

The Chairman: You do not quite mean that. You mean the war is in the Atlantic, don't you?

Admiral Smith: "The war is in the Atlantic, and you in the Pacific are sitting pretty," yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Have you since then read over the diplomatic messages in Exhibit 1, and the messages in Exhibit 2, the so-called ship movement messages?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I have heard them read before this committee.

Senator Ferguson: And that is what you are now referring to?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, particularly the bomb plot message of 10 October, and the two deadline messages of 25 November and 29 November, and the one o'clock message.

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Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And the 13-part message, or whatever it is.

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well now, do you have a judgment that if you had seen those messages, you would have had a different idea about what was going to happen at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith: The deadline messages would have indicated war, but not necessarily Pearl Harbor. The message dividing Pearl Harbor into five sectors, and demanding information even to the detail of reporting at least twice per week, when two large ships were tied up abreast, would certainly have indicated to us that Pearl Harbor was a dangerous place for our fleet to remain. I believe had that message been received, the fleet would have spent most of its time at sea, with small detachments in port.

The message about the delivery at one o'clock, meaning, 7:30 at Pearl Harbor, and about midnight in the Philippines would have been a matter for grave discussion. I cannot say now that we would have known that to mean an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but I think it very likely that someone in the conference would have advanced that idea, and the matter could have been discussed and evaluated, and I think most certainly any land radar would have been

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
Mr. Keefe

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1 manned at that time, and I believe that planes would have  
2 been ready for take-off, or might have been in the air  
3 rather than grouped.  
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5 Senator Ferguson: That is all I have.

6 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

7 Mr. Keefe: I have just one question, Admiral. In all  
8 the discussions relative to the construction or interpreta-  
9 tion of these messages which were received by the Navy at  
10 Pearl Harbor, the Staff of Admiral Kimmel was advised,  
11 and discussed what the meaning of those messages was?

12 Admiral Smith: Invariably, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: And any determination which was made by  
14 the Commander in Chief, while that determination was his  
15 fundamental responsibility, necessarily arose as the result  
16 of those discussions had with his staff members?

17 Admiral Smith: Always, and at the end of the confer-  
18 ence, the War Plans Officer, or the Operations Officer would  
19 be directed to draw up the paper or plan, and that paper  
20 or plan, when drawn up, would be brought to me, slight  
21 changes might be made in discussion among the War Plans  
22 Officer, the Operations Officer, and me, and then the  
23 paper would be taken in to Admiral Kimmel for signature.

24 To my knowledge, he never issued any plan entirely on  
25 his own. The staff was always in on the discussion.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe  
The Chairman

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Mr. Keefe: Well, of course, the reason for my asking that question is perfectly obvious I think. The responsibility for Pearl Harbor has heretofore been placed largely upon General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and no responsibility in any of these findings that I have read has been placed upon the distinguished members of the staff of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Smith: That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, while it is true that the determination of war plans for any orders to be issued, was the function and responsibility of the Commander in Chief, whatever he did resulted from the joint conference with his staff officers?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, that is true.

Mr. Keefe: That also is true of the Army, in its operations there, is it not?

Admiral Smith: I would expect it to be so, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is all.

The Chairman: The Chair would like to ask a question or two, prompted by Admiral Smith's comments here.

I do not know just what prompted your comment upon Captain Zacharias' failure to be promoted. Evidently that was prompted by a question that was asked before I came in.

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 The Chairman: You said that he had no complaint  
3 at his failure to be promoted according to the rules that  
4 prevail in time of peace.

5 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

6 The Chairman: And I gather from that there may have  
7 been a different situation in time of war. My impression  
8 is that both in the Navy and Army, nearly everybody has  
9 been promoted on account of the war, because of their  
10 services. Lieutenants in the army, second lieutenants,  
11 have become majors, and lieutenant colonels, and some of  
12 them colonels, and men low down in rank in the Navy have  
13 become vice admirals, and so on.

14 I do not know that there is any reason for that, and  
15 I do not know as it is pertinent to what had happened at  
16 Pearl Harbor, but I am wondering whether, in view of that  
17 general course during the war of promoting the men in the  
18 Army and Navy time and time again, that Captain Zacharias'  
19 precocity, or disposition to give to his superior officers,  
20 or even go over the heads of some superiors to give his  
21 opinions to others had anything to do with his failure to  
22 be promoted during the war.

23 Do you know anything about that?

24 Admiral Smith: I do not. I would have to see his  
25 record. I know he is very smart and he is a very brilliant

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman

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Japanese student, and has been studying Naval Intelligence during most of his career. I know that he has had the necessary sea duty for promotion, but I have never served with him at sea and don't know what his record in that respect is.

If I might say so, in the peacetime system, the board looking over the officers for promotion has available their entire record, the entire records of the officers concerned from the date they graduated from the Naval Academy. Under the wartime system of promotion -- and I do not know what it is -- these records cannot be available because the opinions are asked of officers at sea in both oceans and it is not possible for them to see the written record. The time of officers required to look over the many records would take too many officers away from their jobs. It is true that promotion in wartime has been very rapid in both the Army and Navy, but there has been a great deal of selectivity in the Navy from Captain to Flag rank. There are many good officers who have not been promoted to Flag rank.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Smith

Questions by: The chairman

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The Chairman: I make no point of it, I do not know anything about it, but in view of the fact that this man graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912, has given 37 years in the Navy and he was a Captain, I believe, at the time he says that he gave this information or his views back in 1941 -- he was made a Captain in 1939 -- that he is still a Captain when practically everybody else who has been in the Navy that long has been promoted, and I am just wondering whether something failed to click there, whether it is his fault or the fault of those who are responsible for promotion? I still insist that it has nothing to do with what happened prior to Pearl Harbor, but inasmuch as you mentioned it awhile ago, evidently in response to a question that I did not hear, I am wondering whether there is some sort of penalty that has been assessed because he took it upon himself to communicate his views to some of his superiors?

Admiral Smith: That conversation referred to the last few questions asked of Captain Zacharias when some of the members of the committee asked for his opinion why he had not been promoted and he stated that he had not come before a regular Navy Selection Board. I merely confirm that. I am not qualified to express an opinion on why he was not promoted.



Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: I appreciate that. Were you present during the entire conference between Captain Zacharias and Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I was.

The Chairman: My recollection is that Admiral Kimmel stated that that conversation lasted an hour and a half and that Captain Zacharias also stated it lasted an hour and a half, whereas you say it only lasted about 15 minutes.

Admiral Smith: I am positive of that.

The Chairman: How do you reconcile that?

Admiral Smith: I did not know that Admiral Kimmel did stay an hour and a half.

The Chairman: My recollection is he said he thought he recalled it lasted about that long. It may have just seemed that long to him, but my recollection is he said that he recalled it lasted about that long, and I understand Captain Zacharias fixed the same length of time. That is a pretty wide difference as to the length of the conversation.

It may not be material, but I am wondering whether you were there all the time?

Admiral Smith: There were so many administrative details to my job that I never spent an hour and a half out of that office without growling, unless in one of Admiral

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman

2 Kimmel's conferences, and I do recall that I stayed through  
3 this conference because I remained and talked to him after-  
4 ward.

5 The Chairman: After Captain Zacharias left?

6 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

7 The Chairman: Well, now, one other question. It has  
8 been testified here by Admiral Stark and Admiral Wilkinson  
9 and Turner, and also the Chief of Staff of the Army and his  
10 assistants, in regard to these magic messages, that one  
11 of the reasons why they did not transmit them to Hawaii  
12 was their fear that the Japanese might discover that they  
13 were being intercepted and in the interest of safety they  
14 did not transmit them.

15 Your position is, as I understand it, and that of  
16 Admiral Kimmel, that they should have been sent regardless  
17 of that, that that risk should have been taken and they  
18 should have been transmitted to Hawaii.

19 Now if that had been done, or if in a similar circumstance  
20 an evaluation made in Washington through messages received  
21 by the high ranking officers in the Army and Navy had fixed  
22 an evaluation on this situation and that had gone out, as  
23 it is claimed in this case they did send out their evalua-  
24 tion of the situation based upon these messages, if the  
25 messages actually had gone and Admiral Kimmel and General

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman

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Short had assessed a different evaluation on them so that there would have been a conflict between Washington and the field, which evaluation would have taken precedence?

Admiral Smith: The one in the field.

The Chairman: The one in the field?

Admiral Smith: Yes, because the Field Commander was carrying the responsibility.

The Chairman: Would that precedence go to the extent of the action in the field countermanding the directions of the high ranking officers in the War and Navy Departments?

Admiral Smith: Throughout the war the evaluations were made and the operations executed by orders in the field, and I never heard of any conflict with Washington.

The Chairman: I am wondering if there had been a conflict based upon the same information, whose orders and directions would have been entitled to precedence or priority in controlling what happened in the field. I can understand that where an officer is in the field he has a wide discretion to exercise his own judgment under circumstances that may arise, but where in the office of the Chief of Staff, or the Chief of Naval Operations, based upon information received, an evaluation is made and that is sent out in the field with instructions as to what to do, that same information had been sent in the field and the Commanding Officer

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman

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there had reached a different conclusion to what ought to be done, without any further communication between Washington and the field, which would have taken precedence? Which would have been carried out?

Admiral Smith: Well, Senator, I do not know in what legal position that Commander in Chief would have found himself, but I do know that every Commander in Chief with whom I have served would take action on his own evaluation if he thought he was in danger, just as a ship's captain will drop out of formation if he thinks the formation is in danger; he is then on his own, and I have never heard of anyone being hanged for it.

The Chairman: Being what?

Admiral Smith: Being hanged for it, or punished for it.

The Chairman: I am not talking about being hanged, I am trying to determine, from the information available at both ends of the line, whose commands, whose directives were to be obeyed in the event there is a different assessment or evaluation. I believe there is nothing that succeeds like success, and even if the Commander in the field violated instructions from Washington and gets away with it and succeeds in it nobody raises any question, but suppose he acts on his own judgment and violates the direction

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman

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from Washington and it turns out to be bad judgment, then what would happen? It might be an academic question, but it is entirely possible that that might arise, and it might have arisen here.

Admiral Smith: I do not know that that is laid down. Of course the general plan is issued from headquarters in the Navy Department and the details of carrying it out are the responsibility of the officer in the field. That is one reason I believe that our Fleet has been so successful.

If an operation is planned and something comes up that the enemy changes his plan, the task force commander at sea is entirely free to depart from the plan laid down for him and to get the enemy where he can find him.

Larry follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Chairman  
Senator Lucas

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2 The Chairman: Yes, I agree, but in that case even  
3 I suppose it would be the duty of the Commanding Officer  
4 in the field to advise the Department in Washington what  
5 it was doing.

6 Admiral Smith: Immediately.

7 The Chairman: That is all.

8 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question or  
9 two?

10 The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

11 Senator Lucas: Admiral, how many meetings did the  
12 staff officers of General Short and the staff officers  
13 of Admiral Kimmel have from February on? I am talking  
14 about the combination of the two, joint meetings.

15 Admiral Smith: I should say an average of once in  
16 two weeks.

17 Senator Lucas: There wasn't any specific time.

18 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: For these meetings?

20 Admiral Smith: No, sir. They would be called, but the  
21 meetings between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were  
22 much more frequent than that.

23 Senator Lucas: I understand that.

24 Now, you said in your testimony in answer to questions  
25 by Senator Ferguson that you had certain joint staff

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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meetings from time to time, as I recall.

Admiral Smith: Not regular meetings, no, sir.

Senator Lucas: Not regular meetings?

Admiral Smith: Not regular.

Senator Lucas: This message of November 27, which was the war warning message, as I understand it, didn't mean very much to you as Chief of Admiral Kimmel's staff?

Admiral Smith: Frankly, not much more than the others had, no, sir.

Senator Lucas: What would it indicate to a reasonable prudent commander when it starts out by saying "This is a war warning message"?

Admiral Smith: Well, I have heard others testify here that they never heard the expression used before in an official message. It is quite true. But when you look back through the messages that preceded it, they were war warnings also.

Senator Lucas: I have read all of these messages, and I heard Admiral Kimmel's testimony along that line and I heard him quote from different messages, but there isn't a single one of those messages that Admiral Kimmel quoted which directly states in such terms, it seems to me, as given to the command at that time.

It starts out by saying "This is a war warning message."

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Now, I don't what construction you, as Chief of Staff, would place upon those words.

Admiral Smith: Then it told us what to do.

Senator Lucas: That is right.

Admiral Smith: We were already prepared to do that.

Senator Lucas: Yes.

Admiral Smith: But we couldn't go ahead with it. Had we received a message "Mobilize," or "Execute WPL-46", that would have meant something. WPL-46 would have meant war.

"Mobilize" wouldn't have meant war.

Senator Lucas: That message caused you to have a meeting of the two staffs, the following morning, did it not?

Admiral Smith: Yes. We had a meeting not only on that but at the same conference discussed the replacement or reinforcement of the Marines on the outlying islands by Army troops. That is one reason the conference was so large, that we had the head of the Army Air Force there, because planes were also considered.

Senator Lucas: That was discussed at the same conference?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: That was one of the reasons for calling



Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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it?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. I believe that same matter had been discussed on the 27th.

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Senator Lucas: It has been disclosed, Admiral, that the Navy lost 105 planes in the raid and the Army I think lost something like 95. Can you tell the committee, how those planes, the naval planes were dispersed at the time?

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Admiral Smith: I cannot in detail, but I believe that that may be explained by the fact that Ford Island has such a limited field, it is impossible to put large numbers of planes on it without having them very, very closely bunched. There is no place to disperse them.

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I believe that is one reason. And of course the Japs concentrated on Ford Island.

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Senator Lucas: Well, I understand Admiral Bellinger will be here, and he can tell us about that.

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Admiral Smith: It may be possible also that the Navy had more planes than the Army.

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Senator Lucas: One other question before you retire, sir.

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Did you know that General Short was alerted to sabotage?

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Admiral Smith: No, sir. I knew he was alerted.

23

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Senator Lucas: Why didn't you know that, as Chief of Staff?

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Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1           Admiral Smith: I have inquired since I have been  
2 here. I find there was an order issued called Operation  
3 Procedure, or something of that sort, and it was issued  
4 only very shortly before Pearl Harbor, I believe it was  
5 in the month of November, possibly on the 5th, in which  
6 the Army prescribed these three types of alerts. That  
7 letter went to Admiral Bloch because in the defense of  
8 the Island Admiral Bloch was the Naval Base Defense Officer  
9 and his control post and his patrols had to work with the  
10 Army.

11           I have checked up with several members of the staff  
12 now on duty in this vicinity and none of them recall having  
13 seen that letter of that procedure. I doubt if it ever  
14 reached the Commander in Chief's office.

15           Senator Lucas: Well, would that be of some interest  
16 to you had you known that General Short was alerted only  
17 to sabotage in view of the fact that it was General Short's  
18 duty to protect the Fleet while it was in the harbor?

19           Admiral Smith: It might have, yes, sir.

20           Senator Lucas: It might not have.

21           Admiral Smith: Of course, I did know that what the Army  
22 seemed to fear most was sabotage.

23           Senator Lucas: Was that what the Navy feared also?

24           Admiral Smith: No, sir. The Navy was -- Admiral  
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Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Kimmel was offensive-minded, and he was thinking of what  
2 he could do in attacking when the time came. The Navy  
3 did not fear sabotage because the saboteurs could not  
4 get near the Navy.

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Senator Lucas: Do you know why it was, if the Navy  
6 didn't fear sabotage, that General Short 's No. 1 order  
7 was sabotage?

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Admiral Smith: Well, his problem was much different.

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Senator Lucas: His problem was different, but his  
10 main problem, as I understand it was the defense of the Fleet  
11 when it was in Harbor. That was his main duty, was it not?

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Admiral Smith: That is correct.

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Senator Lucas: As I understand, you say that the ques-  
14 tion of sabotage was not important from the standpoint of  
15 the Fleet, even while it was in the harbor?

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Admiral Smith: No, sir, it was not.

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Senator Lucas: Then it is still difficult for me to  
18 understand why the Navy didn't know exactly what General  
19 Short was doing with respect to sabotage, or with respect  
20 to his alerts, in view of the fact that General Short's  
21 great responsibility was to protect that fleet while it  
22 was in the Harbor.

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Admiral Smith: I saw the Army go on the alert on the  
24 late afternoon of the 27th, the streets were full of them,  
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1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h7 2 going in all directions, manning the bridges, public  
3 utilities, but I did not know how far their alert went.

4 Senator Lucas: And you never inquired, as Chief  
5 of Admiral Kimmel's staff?

6 Admiral Smith: No, sir, I did not.

7 Senator Lucas: Did you assume that General Short's  
8 movement of troops at that time was in response to the  
9 message of the 27th he had received?

10 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. I returned the next  
11 morning and reported to Admiral Kimmel that the Army was  
12 on the alert.

13 Senator Lucas: Did you see the message that General  
14 Short received, that was sent by General Marshall on  
15 November 27?

16 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: Did you have a chance to analyze  
18 that?

19 Admiral Smith: Yes, I did.

20 Senator Lucas: Was there anything in that message  
21 which would have caused you as Chief of Staff to have  
22 gone on a sabotage alert and that alone?

23 Admiral Smith: I don't recall the wording of that  
24 message, but I do recall that he was cautioned not to  
25 disclose intent and not to alarm the civilian population.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: That is right. That is one of the many things that was in there.

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Also, to take a defensive deployment. That was Kimmel, as I recall it.

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Admiral Smith: That was the Navy message.

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Senator Lucas: That is right.

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Well, the morning that you saw the troops of General Short moving around in the streets, did you report that to Admiral Kimmel?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I did.

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Senator Lucas: What did you tell him?

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Admiral Smith: I said the Army went on the alert last night, I saw them do it.

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Senator Lucas: You believed as a result of what you saw that they were really on an all-out alert?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir; I thought they only had one kind.

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Senator Lucas: I think that is all.

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Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions.

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The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

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Mr. Murphy: Admiral, how many times have you testified before today about Pearl Harbor?

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Admiral Smith: I testified before the Hart Board,

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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the Naval Court of Inquiry, and the Hewitt Board. I was not called before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. Murphy: Are you the Admiral Smith who described Admiral Kimmel saying that the situation in the outlying islands would be a certain way over his dead body?

Admiral Smith: That wasn't exactly as it happened.

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Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Will counsel produce that testimony.

Where was that expression used, "over his dead body"?

Admiral Smith: That was in a conference between

Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Mr. Murphy: Where did you give the testimony?

Admiral Smith: In Admiral Kimmel's office.

Mr. Murphy: Before what Board and in what inquiry?

Admiral Smith: I think it is in the Hart inquiry.

I remember the testimony. I can give it to you.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to have it exactly so there will be no mistake and no misquoting.

Does counsel have it? Do you know where it is, Mr. Masten?

Admiral, while I am looking for that, you say the Navy didn't fear sabotage?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, not so far as the Fleet was concerned.

Mr. Murphy: Isn't it a fact that you were on a sabotage warning at Hawaii on an order issued on it for two solid years before Pearl Harbor and the reason you didn't go on sabotage was that you were sabotage-minded for two solid years and were guarding against it? Is that a fact or not?

Admiral Smith: What would sabotage be, a ship in the Fleet? It would be something from the inside, would

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 it not? We have always been alerted against that.

3 Mr. Murphy: I am saying that there is testimony in  
4 one of these hearings that the reason why you didn't go  
5 on a special sabotage alert is that you were alerted to it  
6 for two solid years. Is that not a fact?

7 Admiral Smith: I should say for more than two solid  
8 years if you have in mind the kind of alert, sabotage alert,  
9 that I mean. We had had cases in the past where a ship  
10 prepared to leave a Navy Yard would find emery in her bearings  
11 or when a ship was overhauled. We were always alerted against  
12 sabotage.

13 Mr. Murphy: Is it or is it not a fact that there had  
14 been sabotage precautions taken for two solid years by the  
15 Navy at Pearl Harbor before December 1941?

16 Admiral Smith: I don't doubt it.

17 Mr. Murphy: Isn't that the reason why you didn't  
18 have to take any special precautions, you already were taking  
19 them?

20 Admiral Smith: No, that is not. I hope the ships  
21 are still alerted against sabotage.

22 Mr. Murphy: Let me take the next proposition. You  
23 said you saw the Army guarding the public utilities; that  
24 was your testimony?

25 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.



Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Didn't you know that the Army been guarding public utilities for two months before, that they were guarding the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets?

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Admiral Smith: It was not in evidence for the man in the street.

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Mr. Murphy: What is that?

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Admiral Smith: It was not in evidence to the man on the street.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, you were the Chief of Staff, do you now know whether or not the Army at Pearl Harbor were guarding the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets?

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Admiral Smith: I do not.

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Mr. Murphy: Did you have any conference at all with the Chief of Staff of the Army from the day of his appointment until after the attack and if so, when?

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Admiral Smith: I had several conferences with his predecessor, Colonel Hayes.

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Mr. Murphy: No. I am talking about Colonel Phillips. From the day of his appointment to the day of the attack did you have a single conference with Colonel Phillips?

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Admiral Hayes: No, not in person, no.

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The Vice Chairman: May I inquire while you are looking

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
The Vice Chairman

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through your papers?

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Mr. Murphy: Yes.

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The Vice Chairman: Admiral, I was interested in the statement you made about what you thought would be of value for future consideration.

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: And you stated you thought that there had been too much secrecy.

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: In the Navy.

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: Now, you wouldn't apply that to these intercepted Japanese messages, would you?

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Admiral Smith: Oh, no, but I have never heard that the Japanese, or that any other nation, ever broke our most secret codes. To my mind there was no danger in transmitting those messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor over our system.

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The Vice Chairman: You think there was no danger at all involved?

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Admiral Smith: Absolutely.

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The Vice Chairman: In transmitting those highly secret Japanese messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor?

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Admiral Smith: I am positive there was no danger. Our

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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own most secret messages were sent by the same system.

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The Vice Chairman: Was it known at that time that there was no danger in transmitting these highly secret Japanese messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor?

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Admiral Smith: Well, it was believed, certainly --

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I was once a crypt analyst, in my early career, and the character of our secret devices are such that it was

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certainly my opinion, and I believe the opinion of all

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other Naval officers, that our system was safe. If not

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safe, then it was unsafe to send our own messages back and

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forth between Washington and Pearl Harbor, messages which

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had to be sent.

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The Vice Chairman: I can understand that, Admiral, but

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the fact is that Japan did not know that we had broken her

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code, did not know that we were intercepting, decoding and

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translating these highly important messages; that is a

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fact, isn't it?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, now, wasn't it highly important

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that every effort be made to continue the situation that

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prevented Japan from knowing that?

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Admiral Smith: Most important, yes, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: And every precaution should be taken?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: And in the opinion of those in charge of this highly important work that there was some element of danger involved, that certainly was an important aspect of it, wasn't it?

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Admiral Smith: The only expression I have heard of danger of imparting leakage is over the scrambler telephone. I agree with that. But there was no danger of leakage in passing on the secret Japanese messages unless a leak was expected in the headquarters of Admiral Kimmel, and I am certain there was no more danger of a leak there than there was in the Navy Department in Washington.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, the fact that we had broken the Japanese code and the fact that they had not broken our code always involved some element of danger that they might break our code, didn't it?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And that was something that should have been carefully guarded at all times, wasn't it?

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, but we had messages in the air every day. They had plenty of material of our own upon which to practice. Passing on these magic messages in our code would only have added to the quantity of material. I don't see that it would have increased the danger.

25

The Vice Chairman: Well, if we had transmitted every one

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 of these Japanese messages that we intercepted it would  
3 certainly have increased the possibility of Japan finding  
4 out that we had broken their code, wouldn't it?

5 Admiral Smith: Not unless they knew that we were  
6 passing those messages out; but that same message when placed  
7 into a Naval cipher is so disguised that there is nothing  
8 that a crypt analyst could use to recognize the Japanese  
9 message as a Japanese message, after placed in the American  
10 cipher.

11 The Vice Chairman: Well, it was highly important?

12 Admiral Smith: It was highly important, yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: To our success in the war and the  
14 security of our armed forces that Japan not find out that  
15 we had broken their code?

16 Admiral Smith: Most important, yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: And every precaution should have  
18 been used to try to prevent them from finding that out?

19 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: It would naturally follow if they  
21 had ever found that out they would have changed their code?

22 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: And it might have been very disastrous  
24 to us, mightn't it?

25 Admiral Smith: It would have been disastrous to us

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: The Vice Chairman  
Mr. Murphy

2 possibly and certainly would have been advantageous to  
3 the Japanese because had they known we were breaking their  
4 code the great ambush at Midway might not have taken place.

5 The Vice Chairman: That is the question I was going  
6 to ask you next. Isn't it true that some of our greatest  
7 successes in battle during this last war were due to the fact  
8 that we were breaking their code and had the information?

9 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, I assume, Admiral, that  
11 you would not take the position that your general statement  
12 as to too much secrecy in the Navy would apply to a matter  
13 of this type?

14 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: All right. That is all.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now, Admiral, did I understand you to say  
17 that there was a discussion at a meeting between the Army  
18 and the Navy staff about the possibility of an air raid  
19 after the receipt of this war warning?

20 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: It was never even discussed, was it, the  
22 possibility of an air raid, at that conference?

23 Admiral Smith: I do not recollect it having been  
24 discussed, no.

25 Mr. Murphy: Let me refer you to your testimony in the

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Hart investigation on page 50, question 130:

"Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated action to be taken with respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning?

"A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except the danger of sabotage by the large Japanese population in the islands. That's to the best of my recollection."

Question 131:

"Q. Did the question of possible attack arise?

"A. No."

Does that refresh your recollection?

Admiral Smith: I think that is correct.

Mr. Murphy: Do you now think there was a discussion about sabotage at that meeting on the 28th? Who would be talking about sabotage at the time you were discussing sending planes to Wake and Midway?

Admiral Smith: If the question of sabotage was discussed it was raised by the Army.

Hook Follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: My question is, Was it?

Admiral Smith: I do not recollect.

Mr. Murphy: Now, when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand he said that he got these code destruction messages and he said he didn't show them to the Army nor did he order them to be shown. Did you, as Chief of Staff, order them to be shown, or did you, as Chief of Staff, show them to the Army?

Admiral Smith: It was my impression then, and is now, that the Army had the same information.

Mr. Murphy: But the Army, according to General Short, if they had had it even on December 7, it would have been of great significance to them, highly important and he never received them. Why didn't you, as Chief of Staff confer with somebody, your counterpart in the Army, to find out if the people who were to protect your ships knew those things and why they didn't?

Admiral Smith: I was under the impression that they got news.

Mr. Murphy: Don't you think that as Chief of Staff your interest in the security of the Fleet should have been such that you would make inquiry instead of resting on an assumption?

Admiral Smith: I probably should have. There are many



Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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things for a Chief of Staff to do.

We have an Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. They are in close liaison with the Army.

Mr. Murphy: The responsibility of the Army was to protect the Fleet in order for it to carry out the offense and if the fleet wasn't protected, you had no fleet, and here is a code destruction message -- and, by the way, what significance did the destruction of the codes have to you as a Naval officer of vast experience?

Admiral Smith: These were diplomatic codes in various parts of the world, not in all. To my recollection, the code destruction message did not include Honolulu. But if the situation had been reversed, if we feared that Japan intended to attack us, we might very well have told our diplomatic officials in Japan, or Japanese occupied territory to destroy their codes.

Mr. Murphy: But, Admiral, the Navy at Honolulu sent a code destruction message to Washington. What significance did that have to you? The Navy, the U. S. Navy at Honolulu sent a message to Washington that the Japanese at Honolulu were destroying their machines, their systems.

By the way, let me quote that exactly.

Do you have Exhibit no. 37, counsel, please?

(Counsel hands document to Mr. Murphy)

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, on the 6th of December, there  
2 is a message from COMFOURTEEN to OPNAV:

3 "BELIEVE LOCAL CONSUL HAS DESTROYED ALL BUT ONE  
4 SYSTEM ALTHOUGH PRESUMABLY NOT INCLUDED YOUR EIGHTEEN  
5 DOUBLE FIVE OF THIRD."

6 The "eighteen double five of third" was another message.

7 There is the U. S. Navy informing Washington about  
8 the destruction of systems at Honolulu. Wouldn't that  
9 be highly significant to you?

10 Admiral Smith: There is a very good point to be  
11 raised. That is the Commander of the 14th Naval District,  
12 the Naval Base Defense Officer.

13 If the Fleet is in port, it helps him support the  
14 Army. If the Fleet has one ship in port, that one ship  
15 helps him.

16 If the Fleet is not in port, he does it himself. But  
17 that is his duty, to keep the Army informed. He is working  
18 for and with the Army in this respect. That is not the  
19 function of the Commander in Chief.

20 Mr. Murphy: I will come to that.

21 First of all, what conferences did you have with the  
22 Chief of Staff of Admiral Bloch in this critical period?

23 Admiral Smith: I had none.

24 Mr. Murphy: Now, then you say it was Admiral Bloch's  
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1 responsibility to protect the fleet.

2           Isn't it a fact that all Admiral Bloch had was four  
3 old destroyers, one or two small ships, and nothing else?

4           Admiral Smith: Quite true, but this message refers  
5 to something else. This refers to his Intelligence. He  
6 He had plenty of that.

7           Mr. Murphy: But if there was a conference between  
8 the Chiefs of Staff, don't you think that you would call  
9 on your Intelligence to give each of the Chiefs of Staff  
10 a report on Intelligence, and then have the combined judg-  
11 ment of the three Chiefs of Staff as to how best to meet  
12 the danger?

13           Admiral Smith: No; I would say that was rather a  
14 matter between the two Intelligence officers.  
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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: But if the Intelligence officer does not do  
3 his work who is over the Intelligence officer and who is re-  
4 sponsible for him? Isn't it the Chief of Staff?

5 Admiral Smith: Yes.

6 Mr. Murphy: Let me come, if you will, to page 48 of this  
7 report. I see question 114:

8 "Q. Did these discussions include coordinated ef-  
9 forts to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack  
10 Pearl Harbor?

11 "A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding  
12 General or Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an  
13 attack upon Pearl Harbor, except by submarine."

14 But the question is, Admiral, did the discussions include  
15 a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

16 Admiral Smith: I do not recollect that.

17 Mr. Murphy: All right. I will now take you to page 42  
18 of the Hart inquiry, Question 67:

19 "Was it your belief that the Army and the Navy,  
20 operating through the local defense forces, were capable  
21 of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base  
22 against air attack?

23 "A. We thought so at the time. I realize now we  
24 were not."

25 Did you so think, Admiral?

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Admiral Smith: I did. I also thought that Oahu could not  
3 be taken. I know now that it could have been.

4 Mr. Murphy: Oahu?

5 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: You say it was taken?

7 Admiral Smith: It could have been at the time had the  
8 Japanese brought with them an amphibious force such as we now  
9 know in our own Navy today.

10 Mr. Murphy: Now, in the Naval narrative there is a re-  
11 port and I hope counsel can locate it. I have it but I can  
12 not put my finger on it, where you spoke about Admiral Kimmel  
13 saying "Not over my dead body."

14 I refer you, however, in the Hart inquiry to page 40,  
15 question 57:

16 "Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of per-  
17 sonnel and materiel readiness of the Army to carry out its  
18 commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior  
19 to the Japanese attack?

20 "A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week pre-  
21 ceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy De-  
22 partment, and General Short had orders from the War De-  
23 partment, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all  
24 the Marines off of the outlying islands, and all the Marine  
25 and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I re-  
3 member it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor  
4 was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was un-  
5 decided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands.  
6 We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain  
7 there for the duration, in case of war, because they would  
8 have to take off from a carrier and could not come back,  
9 and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring  
10 them off, and during the discussion of this, with General  
11 Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army  
12 Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present,  
13 and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the  
14 Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral  
15 Kimmel said, 'What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?'  
16 And General Martin replied, 'We do not allow them to go  
17 more than fifteen miles off shore.' That was a shock to  
18 all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, 'Then, they  
19 will be no damn good to me.' The exchange was never made  
20 because the war broke beforehand. The only dispute between  
21 the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General  
22 Short said, 'If I have to man these islands, I shall  
23 have to command them.' Admiral Kimmel replied, 'No, that  
24 won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands I  
25 wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports,' or

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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words to that effect, and General Short said, 'Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them.' That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out."

Now, then, in the Naval narrative, Admiral, they quote you in different fashion. Are you aware of how they quote you about this "lead body" business?

Admiral Smith: I have been told about that Naval narrative. I don't know who prepared it but someone did it in great haste and I understand that it is full of errors.

The Chairman: We will recess at this time until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 o'clock P.M., January 29, 1946 an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock A.M., Wednesday, January 30, 1946.)

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