091.412

Book #1
Letters #1 -114

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
G-2
FAR EAST COMMAND

File. 091.412
Date From - To 1951
Line No 1 To 114
Book #1

G-2 FILE COPY
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LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.412

Sheet #12

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~rmk 105~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~1 Nov~~	~~CINCUNC~~	~~DA 85738:Korean Pamphlet History of The United States~~
rmk 107	DEPTAR	3 Jan	Comd in Chief	LTR: Unclassffied Propaganda leaflet Comunist Matters
~~rb 108~~	~~G-2~~	~~17 Nov~~	~~PSYWAR~~	~~C/S: PSYWAR Insturctions.~~
~~pmb 109~~	~~US Pacific Fleet~~	~~30 Nov~~	~~C of Naval Oprts~~	~~C/S: Navy participation in PSYWA~~
~~cd 110~~	~~G2~~	~~5 Dec~~	~~PWYWAR~~	~~C/S: Propaganda Leaflets~~
~~cd 111~~	~~G2~~	~~6 Dec~~	~~C of S~~	~~SPOT REPORT: Subversive Leaflet~~
~~rmk 112~~	~~GHQ UNFEC~~	~~4 Dec~~	~~All psychological warfare units~~	~~LTR: Policy directive No. 78 Enemy guerilla forces~~
~~cd 105~~	~~CINCUNC~~	~~21 Nov~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~C 57693: Korean pamphlet "History of the United States"~~
~~rmk 112~~	~~CG 2nd Log Comd~~	~~28 Nov~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~GIJ -8619-11? Guerilla ops plan utilize pre ent 500 watt xmtrs Kwanju Iri~~
~~rmk 113~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~26 Nov~~	~~CINCUNC~~	~~C-58014: Broadcast intercepts fro Peking Pyongyang and Moscow~~
RMK 114	CCC	20 Dec	Cofs	C/s: Signing of Communist Peace ballots by American Military personnel
~~RMK 115~~	~~GHQ~~	~~30 Nov~~		~~Sun Chung Shan (Sun Yat Sen)~~
~~cd 105~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~5 Dec~~	~~CINCUNC~~	~~DA 88723: Korean pamphlet 2History of the United States~~
~~rmk 116~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~23 Dec~~	~~CNCFE~~	~~DA-90309: Pleased to note that weeklyFEC0M opns PSYwar reprts give special attn to Opn RATTRAP~~
~~rmk 116~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~27 Dec~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~DA-90410: PsyWar operations in anti-guerilla campaign~~
~~rmk 11 6~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~28 Dec~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~C-60324: PsyWar support of Operation Rattrap~~

18277—FEC P&PC—9/51—30M

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Sheet # 10

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~cd 86~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~26 Jun~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~DA 94925: Cdr Kiley JCS and LCDR Blackwell OPNAV T Special Flt Gen Weyland's plane ETA 28 Jun~~
~~cd 88~~	~~G3~~	~~14 Jul~~	~~AG/G1/G2/PsyWar~~	~~C/S: Technical Memo ORO-T-3 (FEC) US PSYWAR OPERATIONS IN THE KOREA WAR (Booklet filed separately)~~
~~cd 89~~	~~G2~~	~~19 Jul~~	~~ESS~~	~~C/S: Leaflets from Gajoien Kanko Hotel~~
~~hs 90~~	~~G3~~	~~21 July~~	~~G2 & others~~	~~C/S: Technical Memo ORO-T-2 (FEC)~~
~~hs 90~~	~~GHQ FEC~~	~~16 July~~	~~AG, DA~~	~~LTR: Same as above (File Separate)~~
~~hs 90~~	~~G2~~	~~31 July~~		~~B/S: Technical Memo ORO-T-# (EUSAK)~~
~~hs 91~~	~~CI DIV~~	~~1 August~~	~~G2 6th Army~~	~~LTR: Subversive Propaganda HASEGAWA, Yukio~~
~~hs 91~~	~~CI DIV~~	~~1 August~~	~~G2 GSUSA~~	~~LTR: Same as above~~
~~hs 92~~	~~G2~~	~~31 July~~	~~PSYWAR~~	~~C/S: Psywar Lecture~~
hs 93	CI DIV	28 July	G2 GSUSA	LTR: Alleged South Korean Govt Documents Publisized in Japan by Leftist Koreans
~~hs 94~~	~~G2~~	~~6 August~~	~~SGS~~	~~C/S: JCS Policy Memo 80~~
~~hs 85~~	~~STATE DEPT~~	~~25 July~~	~~SCAP~~	~~250332 Z: authorization granted to utilize for VOA purposes voluntary tape recording transcri of POW statements~~
~~hs 95~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~25 July~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~DA 97053: ORO group to complete a report on PSYWAR in Korea~~
~~rb 85~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~28 July~~	~~SD Wash DC~~	~~CX 67902: CINCFE concurs, subject to review of material by this Hq prior to use.~~
~~rb 95~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~27 July~~	~~DA Wash DC~~	~~CX 67828: ORO pers which DA desires to send to Korea.~~

0286—FEC Printing Plant—12/49—15M

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Sheet # 9

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~76~~	~~G-2~~	~~19 June~~	~~Psy War sec~~	~~C/S: CCF Mass Burial.~~
~~83~~	~~G-2~~	~~19 June~~	~~Unk~~	~~B/S: Comments by C in C on PSYWAR~~
~~76~~	~~G2~~	~~21 June~~	~~PswWar Sec~~	~~C/S: CCF Mass Burials~~
~~83~~	~~PSYWAR~~	~~19 June~~	~~G2~~	~~C/s: Comments by CinC On PsyWar~~
~~84~~	~~Gen Ennis~~	~~11 Jun~~	~~Col Barrett~~	~~X REF: Employment of Chi Nationalist Artists and Advisers in PSYWAR~~
56	PSYWAR Wash DC	12 June	CINCFE	DA 93711: Commie propaganda on bacteriological warfare.
56	CINCFE	15 June	DEPTAR	C 64985: marked decline communist accusations bacteriological warfare
56	DEPTAR	13 June	CINCFE	DA 93880: invite reps of Red Cross and UN make immediate ~~investigation charges~~
~~HBS 71~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~16 June~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~DA 94201: spare parts for xxpa speaker planes~~
~~HBS 76~~	~~GG 8th Army~~	~~16 June~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~G 319: mass burial of enemy dead~~
~~HBS 85~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~19 June~~	~~GG 8th Army~~	~~CX 65291: XXXXX VOA correspondent James GREENFIELD to have full xxxx access to PsW~~
~~cd 85~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~23 Jun~~	~~GG 8th Army~~	~~C 65578: Permission VOA correspondent James Greenfield be permitted access to PW in Korea~~
~~cd 85~~	~~CG 8th Army~~	~~21 Jun~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~G-6-3744: Request from a Mr. Pierce, accredited war Correspond~~
~~cd 86~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~22 Jun~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~DA 94641: Navy rqsts auth for LCDR R E Blackwell visit ur hq~~
~~cd 86~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~24 Jun~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~CX 65665: Navy req auth send LCDR R E Blackwell to FEC for 10 days~~
~~cd 87~~	~~PSYWAR~~	~~26 May~~	~~G2~~	~~IOM: Suggestions by General HQ~~

0286—FEC Printing Plant—12/49—15M

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Sheet # 8

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~72~~	G2	10 Jun	C of S	MEMO: Anti-Armistice Rally in Pusan
~~73~~	G2	29 May	C of S	MEMO: 8th Army Proposal for Surrender Inducement
~~74~~	G2	8 Jun	CAS	C/S: Communist Propaganda Re National Police Reserve.
75	Spec Proj	8 Feb	G2	IOM: Evaluation of PsyWar
~~76~~	G2	4 Jun	C of S	MEMO: Report of Mass burials of C CCF dead near the front lines
~~77~~	G2	2 Jun	C of S	C/S: Prppaganda on conditions in China
~~78~~	G2	7 Jun	C of S	MEMO: Conference between Gen Enni and Gen Crabb re PsyWar
~~71~~	CINCFE	2 Jun	DEPTAR	CX 63998: Necessary to cannibaliz parts from unmodified speaker plan nbr 7695
~~76~~	CINCFE	3 Jun	CG 8th Army	C 64057: En in area DS 1396 DE 1391 making mass burials of dead
~~79~~	CINCFE	1 Jun	8th Army	C 63849: Photographs suitable for use in PSYWAR are desired of en dead with theri arms and equip
~~80~~	G2	15 Jun	C of S	C/S: PSYWAR Directed at the CCF
~~81~~	G-2	17 June	See Dist	B/S: Establishment of PSYWAR Sec.
~~82~~	Gen Bush	17 June	Chow Tsugn-ta Formosa	Ltr: Ltr From Chow Tsung-ta concerning PsyWar Warfare.
~~71~~	DEPTAR	7 Jun	CINCFE	DA 93225: AIA -4 loud speaker equip procured Navy 1942/43, only no parts
~~89~~	PSYWAR O	19 Jun	C of S	C/S: Comments by CinC on PsyWar

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Sheet #7

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
65	G2	1 June	CofS	C/S: PSYWAR Bland Group
66	GHQ FEC MIS	1 June	CofS	MEMO: Immediate Requirements of PSYWAR GHQ
~~67~~	~~G2~~	~~28 May~~	~~AG~~	~~C/S: Printing Requirements for PSYWAR Leaflets~~
~~60~~	~~CG FEAF~~	~~24 May~~	~~CG 315th A DIV~~	~~AX 7902: auths "Voice" missions flown during daylight hrs.~~
63	G2	5 June	CofS	C/S: Publicity on PWYWAR
66	GHQ FEC MIS	2 June	CofS	MEMO: Raddio to Sec of the Army
~~68~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~25 May~~	~~DA~~	~~X-ref: Aibborne Loudspeaker Equipment~~
~~69~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~27 May~~	~~CG FEAF~~	~~X-ref: 1/4 Additional PsyWar sorties per week be flown~~
63	G2	8 June	PIO	C/S: PSYWAR Publicity
56	CINCFE	28 May	DEPTAR	C 63554: Communist radio stations in N.Korea, China and Soviet Union are stressing charges that UN Forces in Korea have waged germ warfare
~~70~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~27 May~~	~~DA~~	~~X REF: En casualty figures are played up daily in our Korean broadcasts and Chinese and Korean leaflets~~
56	DEPTAR	30 May	CINCFE	DA 92688: You are auth to deviate from overnight Guidance Nbr 716
~~71~~	~~CG 8th Army~~	~~31 May~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~G-5-5720: It has become necessary to cannibalize parts from unmodified speaker plan nbr 7965~~
56	G2	13 Jun	C of S	MEMO: DA Radio re Countering BW Propaganda
56	G2			SPECIAL BREIFNING FOR CINC - En CW and BW Activities in the FE

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Sheet #6

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~51~~	PSYWAR BR	14 May	G2	IOM: Summary rpt of Paywar activi
~~52~~	CG FEAF		CINCFE	AX 7195: Rqst for classified missions by GHQ PsyWar Div,
~~53~~	CG FEAF	10 May	CINCFE	A 7327: Modification of voice equip on C-47 acft 43-16147
~~54~~	G2	19 May	CofS	C/S: PsyWar Section (assgnment of Col. WHITE as head of)
~~55~~	G2	16 May	G2 JLCOM	LTR: Communist Propaganda re Conversion of Firearms at Tokyo Ordnance Center
56	G2	23 May	C of S	MEMO: Communist Propaganda on Biological Warfare
~~57~~	G-2	25 May	C of S	C/S: PsyWar Leaflet concerning US aid to ~~Korea~~ India.
~~58~~	~~G2~~ DS	21 May	C of S	C/S: Appointment of Baron Karl G. E. LAGERFELT as Chf of Swedish Mission
~~59~~	G2	24 May	C of S	X REF: Procurement of Loudspeaker Airborne Equipment
~~60~~	CG FEAF	18 May	CG 315th Air Div	AX 7655: Leaflet drop mission in cargo type aircraft
61	CG 8th Army	23 May	CINCFE	G-5-4005: Return of Voice Plans 20 May modified for Loudspeaker Operations at 5000 to 7000 ft
61	CINCFE	23 May	CG FEAF	CX 63177: Daylight missions at 6000 feet
56	GHQ FEC MIS	25 May	CofS	MEMO: Commie Propaganda on Biological Warfare
62	GHQ FEC MIS	28 May	CofS	MEMO: PsyWar Exploitation of PW Surrender
63	G2	30 May	PIO	C/S: Publicity on PsyWar
~~64~~	GHQ FEC MIS	28 May	CofS	MEMO: PSYWAR "Voice" Airplane Operations

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Sheet #5

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
39	GHQ MIS	20 April	CofS	MEMO: Factors governing Scale of PSYWAR Opns in the FEC
~~40~~	G2	18 Apr	C of S	C/S: CinC signature for reproduction on PSYWAR leaflets
~~41~~	STATE DEPT	15 Apr	SCAP	1419322: Commie propaganda here notes that no change in US "aggressive" policy and intentions has resulted fr MacArthur recall
~~42~~	G-2	25 Apr	C of S	C/S: PSYWAR Annex to OI-10.
~~43~~	G-2	25 Apr	C of S	Memo: Rqst for additional Aircraft for Leaflet Drops.
~~44~~	G2			B/S: Countering Soviet Propaganda DR No 1.12
~~44~~	G2	26 April		B/S: Countering SovietPropaganda DR No 1.13
45	AG GHQ	28 Aor8	CG FEAF	Ltr: PsyWar Program 17 Apr.
45	AG GHQ	Unk	CG FEAF	Same As Above.
~~46~~	GHQ FEC MIS	2 May	Maj.Gen.M.D. TAYLOR	LTR: PsyWar Leaflets, Korean Campaign
47	G2	4 May	CG FEAF	LTR: Strategic PsyWar
~~48~~	G2	5 May	D of S	X REF: Action to combat the Gen Communist offensive in the FE
~~42~~	JA	28 April	G1	C/S: PSYWAR Annex to OI-10
~~48~~	MIS GHQ FED	11 May	CofS	MEMO: Utilization of offenxive means to combat communism
~~48~~	GHQ FEC MIS	11 May	CofS	MEMO: Same as above
~~49~~	GHQ FEC	11 May	CG, 8th Army & others	LTR: Consignee Combination
50				SUMMARY OF FM 33-5 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS

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Sheet #4

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~24~~ 24	~~8th Army~~	~~23 Feb~~	~~C-in-C FEC~~	~~LTR: Major Psywar Projects~~
~~32~~	~~GHQ MIS~~	~~26 Mar~~	~~CofS~~	~~MEMO: Req for Add Aireraft for Leaflet Drops~~
~~32~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~27 Mar~~	~~CG, FEAF~~	~~MSG: Same as above.~~
~~28~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~16 Mar~~	~~DEPTAR~~	~~C-57824: U.S. planes dropping poison Gas.~~
~~28~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~16 Mar~~	~~CG~~	~~C-57868: U.S. planes allegedly dropping poison gas.~~
17	GHQ FEC (CAW 2723)		TAG D of A	LTR: Contingency Plan for exploitation of Psychological Opportunities created by the Korean Situation
~~24~~ 33	~~Spec Proj~~	~~28 Mar~~	~~G2~~	~~IOM: Communist propaganda on Germ warfare~~
~~29~~	~~CG 8th Army~~	~~21 Mar~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~C-3-3836: Primarily the great difference in the total # of NK and CCF PWS.~~
~~29~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~21 Mar~~	~~CG 8th Army~~	~~Z 44914: Rqst info as to when reply may be expected.~~
~~29~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~21 mar~~	~~CG 8th Army~~	~~Z 44962: Disregard MSG Z 44914.~~
~~11~~	~~G2~~	~~2 Apr~~	~~Chf PsyWar D of A~~	~~LTR: PsyWar Activities~~
~~34~~	~~Col Brattom~~	~~12 Apr~~	~~Gen Gerguson~~	~~Ltr: info rqstd by Gen Ferguson on UN. PsyWar Activities.~~
~~35~~	~~G-2~~	~~13 Apr~~	~~G-3~~	~~C/S: Leaflet Coordination for Tactical PSYWAR Control.~~
~~36~~	~~GHQ FEC~~		~~CG FEAF~~	~~LTR: Psychological War~~
~~37~~	~~EUSAK~~	~~11 Apr~~	~~Spec Projects~~	~~LTR: Request for Leaflets~~
~~38~~	~~CAW~~	~~17 Apr~~	~~C in C~~	~~MEMO: PsyWar Leaflet air drops~~

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Sheet #3

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
24	G-2	10 Mar	C of S	MEMO: Major PsyWar projs.
17	~~XX~~ G2	13 Mar	C of S	C/S: Contingency plan for PsyWar in Korea Situation
~~25~~	~~G2~~	~~9 Mar~~	~~CIE~~	~~C/S: Soviet propaganda distributed by Japan-Soviet Friendship Society~~
26	~~XX~~ ~~CAW~~	11 Mar	Chf PsyWar Spec Staff US Army Korea	LTR: Chinese Exploitation of
27	Gen CAW	10 Mar	MIS Div	X REF: Letter fr Shen CHANG-HUAN re Psy War
24	CINCFE	10 Mar	CG 8th Army	C 57507: Major PsyWar Projects
~~28~~	~~STATE DEPT~~	~~13 Mar~~	~~SCAP~~	~~122259 Z: Peiping radio alleged Amer Planes dropped poison gas Han River front Feb 23~~
~~29~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~10 Mar~~	~~CG 8th Army~~	~~CX 57443 analysis regarding RxyWxxxxxxxxxxx relatively low surrender rates of Chinese Commie soldiers~~
~~30~~	~~PI~~	~~21 Mar~~	~~G-2~~	~~C/S: PsyWar.~~
16	G-2	20 Mar	C of S	C/S: Orgn for PsyWar & unconventional warfare.
16	G-2 FEC	20 Mar	??	Ltr: GHQ PsyWar Staff Sect.
~~31~~	~~Gen CAW~~	~~24 Mar~~	~~Gen R A McClure~~	~~Ltr: Prototype psychological Warfare plan relating to the EUCOM Gen Alert Order.~~
24	@@ G-2 FEC	25 Mar	CofS	MEMO: Maj PsyWar projects.
~~32~~	~~G-2~~	~~26 Mar~~	~~C of S~~	~~Memo: Rqst for Additional Aircraf for Leaflet Drops.~~

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Sheet #2

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~12~~	AG	18 Feb	CG FEAF	~~Ltr: Conduct of Psychological Warfare Against Chinese Communist Troops.~~
~~15~~	GHQ FEC MIS	28 Feb	UNC, Tokyo Admin office	LTR: Req for two copies of all Psywar Leaflets
16	DA	14 Feb	CINCFE	DA83412: Developmt of the PsyWar Sp Opns Program.
17	TI	~~XXX~~ 1 Mar	CAW	IOM: Comments on "Contingency Plan for Exploitation of Psychological Opportunities Created by the Korean Situation".
17	G-2	2 Mar	Chief of Staff	Memo: Same As Above.
17	G2	7 Mar	DS	C/S: Contingency plan for exploitation of Psychological opportunite by the Korean situation
~~18~~	~~DEPTAR XX~~	~~21 Feb~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~X REF: AN/AIA-4 sets presently installed in C-47 acft in Korea~~
~~19~~	~~Dr. Prange~~	~~4 Mar~~		~~M/R: Tape recording in PSYWAR for Dept of Defense radiox program~~
20		4 Mar		MEMO for records: Tape recording in PSYWAR for Dept of Def radio program.
~~20~~	~~G-2~~	~~7 Mar~~	~~QM & G-4~~	~~X Rf: Newsprint.~~
~~21~~	~~G-2~~	~~5 Mar~~	~~G of S~~	~~X Ref: Use of UN flag replica.~~
16	DA	22 Feb	CINCFE	DA84112: Unconventional warfare as defined in unconventional warfare annex to emerg war plan.
~~22~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~24 Feb~~	~~8th A~~	~~056281: Errors in Chin text of leaflet #8007.~~
~~23~~	~~FEAF~~	~~26 Feb~~	~~CINCFE~~	~~AX4131: Tests conducted on M16A1 Adapter clusters used to rels leaflets.~~

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SECRET

86853

Mr Wheeler
26-7166

(Signing of Communist "Peace Ballots"
by American Military Personnel)

Chairman, Counter-measures Committee

CofS
Thru: G-2

20 Dec 51

1 1. Reference is made to attached memo from SGS (Incl 1) which returned the papers on this subject to the Committee to resolve the differences expressed by TI&E in Note 4 of the attached check notes (Incl 2).

2. This paper began with a routine forwarding by G-2 to G-1 and CIE of information pertaining to the general subject (Note 1 of Incl 2). G-1, after consulting with other interested agencies, sent the paper to the Committee with the recommendation that publicity be given to this activity in an effort to prevent US Military Personnel from engaging in such activities. The Committee endorsed the G-1 suggestions and referred the matter to PIC and TI&E for appropriate action (Note 3 of Incl 2). At that time the concurrences of the interested agencies were obtained. The TI&E misunderstanding arose at this point and in Note 4 of Incl 2, TI&E expressed a partial non-concurrence, whereupon the paper was referred back to the Committee to resolve the differences. The paper was sent to TI&E, after discussion of the apparent misunderstanding, and TI&E prepared Note 5, sending the paper back to the CofS through IG and G-2. IG concurs and the G-2 concurrence was previously given (Note 3).

3. CofS approval of Tabs B and C of Incl 2 is requested. Tab B is a draft command channel letter prepared by TI&E to implement this action and Tab is a G-2 prepared, declassified version of a classified report to be duplicated and distributed with the command channel letter. As stated in the correspondence of Incl 2, the Countermeasures Committee endorses this action and recommends approval.

2 Incls:
1. Memo fr SGS
2. Series of c/ns, subj as above, w/4 Tabs

A G-2 File Copy
SctyDiv/ExGp/RPW/bbc

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OFFICE THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

GHQ, ~~SCAP~~ FEC
G RECORDS
Filed AG 091.412

IN REPLY REFER TO:

G3 091.412 (11 Dec 50)

3 January 1951 02011
1328

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Propaganda Leaflet COMMUNIST MATTERS

TO : Commander-in-Chief
Far East Command
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
ATTN: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
For : Psy War Branch

1. In connection with the inclosed photostatic copy of a propaganda leaflet forwarded to this Office from USAF-AFCSI, carrying the photograph and purportedly bearing the signature of Major Charles T. Barter, the following comments are offered, namely:

The significance of the effect of this leaflet would be most accurately measured by the following factors:

a. The number found in mail to the U.S. (as this was).

b. The number of such leaflets kept by our service men.

c. The tenor and amount of discussion by our service men concerning the arguments contained therein. At that point where a, b and c, or any of them, become sizeable, we should become concerned.

2. It is suggested further that the inclosed leaflet be sent to OCofS, Troop Information and Education Division in order that that Division may take countermeasures, through its orientation facilities, against the possible consequences of the inclosed type of propaganda leaflet.

1 Incl:
(Cy of NK Propaganda Leaflet)

per
CHARLES L. BOLTE
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

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091.412

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RECEIVED
12 JAN 1951
CHQ-FEC
G-2 G.O.
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RECEIVED
21 JAN 1951
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MISI

OUT
5 JAN 1950
G-3 GSUSA

GS 091.4 (11 Dec 50)

IN REPLY REFER TO:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: (Declassified) Propaganda Leaflet COMMUNIST MATTERS

TO : Commander-in-Chief
Far East Command
APO 500, c\o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

ATTN: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

FOR : Psy War Branch

1. In connection with the inclosed photostatic copy of a propaganda leaflet forwarded to this Office from USAFE-FECSI, request that photographs and typewritten descriptive data be furnished immediately to Major General T. Betts, the following comments are offered, for your information:

a. The number found in Line of the U.S. (as this was)

b. The number to which leaflets kept by our service men

c. The fewer and fewer to those mentioned suggests that the point made, as originally presented, was misunderstood.

2. If is suggested that the inclosed leaflet be sent to OCCUS, Tokyo for information and Education Division in order that that Division may take cognizance of the possible consequences of the inclosed type of propaganda leaflet.

The significance to the title of this leaflet would be most accurately measured by the following factors:

a. The number found in Line of the U.S. (as this was)

b. The number to which leaflets kept by our service men

c. The fewer and fewer to those mentioned suggests that the point made, as originally presented, was misunderstood.

If is suggested that the inclosed leaflet be

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1328

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Troop Information and Education Section

APO 500
20 January 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Psychological Warfare

1. Reference, Department of the Army letter on NK propaganda leaflet.

2. TI and E information media, including Stars and Stripes, AFRS radio programs, Troop Information Program discussions, orientation procedures for replacements, and pamphlets produced by Department of Defense and by TI and E Section, GHQ, have been used with the intention of giving members of the Armed Forces a level of factual knowledge to make enemy propaganda ineffective whenever it is encountered. Much of the information provided through these media prior to the Korean war has since been applicable to the war situation, and, since the outbreak of the war, the information disseminated has included specific reference to the U.S. and U.N. position in the Korean situation.

3. In pamphlets now in preparation by TI and E Section, GHQ, it is intended to include discussions of enemy propaganda methods, including the techniques of the repeated lie and the use of the names of prisoners. It is believed inadvisable to give the specific propaganda item at hand the dignity of recognition. It is contemplated, therefore, that reference to particular items will not be made, and that the troop information program will continue along present lines, as indicated above.

4. Any suggestion which Psychological Warfare desires to offer in this connection will be welcomed by TI and E.

K C Strother

KENNETH C. STROTHER
Colonel, Infantry
Troop I&E Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

37

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Troop Information and Education Section

APO 500
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Kenneth C. Structner
KENNETH C. STRUCTNER
Colonel, Infantry
Troop Info Officer

CONFIDENTIAL





DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

WHOM ARE YOU FIGHTING FOR?

Fellow U. S. officers and men still engaged in fighting in the southern tip of Korea!

(*Maj. Charles T. Barter*)

This is Major Charles T. Barter of the Hqs., 63 FA, 24 Div., calling upon you in the name of our 386 fellow soldiers in the POW camp to listen to reason and stop fighting!

Whom are you fighting for? Are you fighting for the U. S.? Nonsense! Are you fighting to help the South Korean army? Still greater nonsense! Have you seen the South Korean army put up a really hearty resistence? I haven't, nor any of our fellow soldiers in the POW camp.

We were ordered to Korea on the understanding that we were helping the South Korean regime. In our movement through the liberated areas we discovered the awful truth, namely, that the people of South Korea do *not* want Syngman Rhee's puppet regime any more, that they are jubilating over the fact of their liberation from the grip of his iron rule, and that the South Korean army are surrendering wholesale to the People's Army.

We further found out another truth. North Korea was *not* the aggressor; Rhee had staged the whole show under the wire-pulling of the small clique of our ruling men in America. That is why our Government has deliberately distorted the whole picture of the Korean situation by making us masquerade as the so-called "U.N. allied forces." The very so-called 'resolution' which our Government has induced the Security Council to adopt has no legal validity in view of the absence at the time of the adoption of two of the permanent member states, China and U.S.S.R. Whatever cloak we may put on top, the fact of our armed aggression cannot be denied. Whatever we may say, the blame for this outrageous destruction and slaughter is to be laid at the door of the U.S. Government.

We had suspected Russian influence behind the Korean scene. But *nowhere* have we seen any evidence of Russian help. That is an utterly groundless suspicion.

This war started as an internal affair. It is no longer such, because we are here on the scene. It is no longer a fight between the South Korean army and the People's Army, because the U.S. forces have become the main forces in the fight against the latter. It has now assumed the nature of a war between the Korean people and the U.S. aggressors. What reason have we for fighting against the people of Korea?

The South Korean people and the People's Army are totally different from what we had expected. The People's Army do *not* kill their POWs, nor do they put us to *any* labor: in fact, the treatment we are getting is remarkable. The South Korean people are 100% out of sympathy with the South Korean puppet regime. Is it our business to fight for a regime which the people look upon as their enemy?

Give up your guns! Stop sending those planes! The most seriously wounded who are now in the POW camp, such as PFC Edward R. Loyston and Cpl. Earl V. Siegmund, are due to our own planes, and not the People's Army. The planes that litter the sky daily merely cause havoc on *non*-military targets of civilian life and innocent women and children. What have the Korean people done to *us* to deserve this mass slaughter?

That's why I call upon you to stop fighting at once. We simply cannot afford to make our country a permanent enemy of the Korean people for generations to come!

Dear officers and men of U.S. Forces!

Do you want to stay in Korea—dead? Join us in the POW camp, so that we may the sooner be able to return home in safety!

What if the havoc which we have seen done to the peaceful homes of Korea should be inflicted on our own homes? Have you not seen through this aggression under false pretences?

Let us fight against all and every instigation of war! Let us join our strength together to stop this military intervention in Korea which is threatening world peace!

Charles T. Barter

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

OFFICIAL U S AIR FORCE PHOTOGRAPH
BASE PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE
San Antonio, Texas

I certify that this {photostat / photograph} was taken by me and that it represents the actual appearance of the subject matter at the time and place indicated:

Date: NOV 10 1950 Hour: 1230

Place: Base photo Lab.

Signature of Photographer: J Bruce Edmondson

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

당신들은 누구를 위하여 싸우고 있습니까?

조선 남단에서 아직도 싸우고 있는 미국 동포 장병들이여! 나는 24사단 63야포대대 본부 소속「촬스 T. 바아터」소좌로서 나와 같이 포로수용소에 있는 386명의 이름으로 당신들의 리성에 호소하여 컨투를 정지할것을 웨치는 바입니다

당신들은 누구를 위하여 싸우고 있습니까? 미국을 위하여 싸우고 있습니까? 그것은 어불성설입니다 당신들은 남조선 군대를 돕기위하여 싸우고 있습니까? 그렇다면 더욱 어리석은 짓입니다 남조선 군대가 정말 번뻐있게 귀항하는것을 당신 눈으로 본 일이 있습니까? 나 자신과 수용소에 나와 같이 있는 장병들은 한번도 본일이 없습니다

우리들은 남조선 정권을 돕는 다는 명목으로 조선에 출동명령을받았습니다 그러나 우리들은 해방된 지역을 통하여 다니는 동안에 다음과 같은 놀랠 사실을 발견하였습니다 즉 남조선 인민들은 리승만 괴뢰정권에 대하여 진절머리를 내고 있다는 것 그리고 리승만의 폭압통치로부터 해방된 사실을 춤추고 좋아 한다는 것 그리고 남조선군대가대량적으로 인민군에게 투항하고 있다는 것 들입니다

우리는 또 한가지 사실을 발견 하였습니다 북조선이 침략자이기는커녕 리승만이가 미국의 한줌도 못되는 지배층의 조종하에 이번 내전을 꾸며 냈다는 사실입니다 우리 정부가 소위 U. N. 련합군이라는 가면을 우리에게 씌워서 조선에 보내여 조선정세에 대한 진상을 의식적으로 은폐한것도 이 때문입니다 우리 정부가 안전보장 리사회로 하여금 채택하게 꾸며낸 소위「결의」도 그 채택 당시에 二대 상임 국가인 중국과 쏘련이 출석치 않았으므로 법적으로 아무 효력을 가지고 있는 것이 아닙니다 무슨 허울 좋은 가면을 뒤집어 씌우던 간에 미국이 무력적으로 침략하였다는 사실은 부정못합니다 우리가 뭐라고 변명하던간에이 천인공로할 파괴와 도살행위에 대한 죄는 미국정부에 있는것입니다

조선문제의 배후에는 로씨아의 세력이 있다고 의심했었는데 실제로 와보니 로씨아가 원조하고 있다는 증거는 아무데서도 보지 못하였습니다 아주 터뮤이없는 의심이였던 것입니다

이 전쟁은 내전으로서 비롯한 것인데 인제는 벌서 내전이 아닙니다 그 리유는 미군이 참가하고 있는 때문입니다 미군이 인민군을 대항하는 싸움에 있어서 지도적 역할을 하고 있으므로 이는 벌서 남조선군과 인민군과의 싸움이 아닙니다 인제는 조선 인민과 미국 침략자간의 전쟁의 성질을 띠우게 되였습니다 조선인민을 적으로 삼아 우리가 싸워야 할 리유는 무엇입니까?

남조선 인민과 인민군은 우리가 생각하고 있던것과는 전혀 딴판입니다 인민군은 우리들 포로를 죽이기는 커녕 로동도 시키지 않습니다 사실 우리가 받고있는 대우는 훌륭한것입니다 남조선 인민들은 남조선 괴뢰 정권을 지긋지긋하게 생각하고 있습니다 인민들의 원쑤로 생각하는 정권을 위하여 싸우는 것이 우리들의 할 일입니까?

총뿌리를 거두라! 비행기를 보내는 것을 중지하라! 전사「에드워드 R. 로이스톤」과 오장「얼 V. 시그먼들」을 비롯해서 현재 포로수용소에 있는 가장 중상을 입은 사람들은 인민군이 아니라 미국비행기 때문에 부상을 입은 것입니다 매일 같이 창공을 어지럽히고 있는 비행기들은 시민생활의 비 군사적 목표와 무고한 부녀자와 어린아이들에게 참화를 입힐 뿐입니다 조선인민이 우리 미국인에게 무엇을 하였기에 이런 대량 학살을 받아야 합니까?

그러므로 나는 당신들에게 컨투를 즉시 중지하기를 호소하는 바입니다 우리 나라가 조선인민에게 대대 손손 길이 길이 원쑤가 되게 내버려둘수는 도저히 없습니다

친애하는 장병들이여!

당신들은 죽어서 조선에 남기를 원합니까? 우리들이 있는 포로 수용소로 오시라 그러면 그만치 빨리 무사히 귀국하게 될것입니다

조선의 평화스러운 가정들이 입은 참화가 고국에 있는 우리들의 가정에도 가해진다면 어떻게 될것입니까? 허울좋은 가면을 쓴 이 침략전쟁을 아직도 지긋지긋한줄을 모릅니까?

여하한 전쟁도발 행위라도 반대하여 싸웁시다 세계 평화를 위협하고 있는 조선에 대한 무력간섭을 중지시키기에 우리들 다 같이 힘을 합합시다

I
11,083

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

1230

Hour:

NOV 10 1950

Date:

Place:

Signature of Photographer

OFFICIAL U. S. AIR FORCE PHOTOGRAPH
BASE PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE
San Antonio, Texas

(photostat)

I certify that this (photograph) was taken by me and that it represents the actual appearance of the subject matter at the time and place indicated:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

5 8 9 3 2

SUBJECT: Communist Propaganda Received in Amami Oshima

CI Div 1st Ind

G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 27 October 1951

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters Ryukyus Command, APO 331

1. Per request contained in basic communication, forwarded herewith are the following translations of original documents (Inclosure 1, Exhibits I thru VIII):

a. Gist translations of propaganda leaflets: Exhibits I, II, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII. (Inclosure 2)

b. Full translation of Exhibit III, leaflet entitled: "Two Hundred Thousand Island Citizens Who Cry Yearningly for Their Motherland, 'Death Before America'"! (Inclosure 3)

2. The "All Kyoto Free Labor Association," more usually translated All Kyoto Day Laborers Union (Zen Kyoto Jiyu Rodosha Kumiai), which furnished the inclosed propaganda material, has an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 members and is a Communist-dominated organization. It is affiliated with Communist-dominated labor federations and other Communist-front organizations. It has been particularly active since early in 1950 and has been responsible for several cases of assault against public officials.

3. The Maruyama Incident referred to occurred on 9 Dec 50 as the direct result of a Communist-sponsored rally held in defiance of a police order prohibiting it. The disorderly rally, in which day laborers were prominent, resulted in the arrest of 110 out of an estimated 1500 demonstrators, and injury to approximately 100 rally participants and 45 policemen. There were no fatalities. The Communists have distorted the facts and utilized this incident in their propaganda campaign as another example of "imperialistic oppression" and "police brutality."

4. This is for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S/ Cook
R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

3 Incls:
Dup copy Incl 1,
S/I, w/d
Added 2 Incls
2. Gist translations
(Exs I,II,IV,V,VI,VII,VIII)
3. Full Translation
(Ex III)

Cy to Cic/PP

file
KL

G-2 File Copy
CI Div/OPNS/LMF/gw

102

091.412

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Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

Ltr fr ACofS,G-2,RYCOM, to ACofS,G-2, GHQ,FEC, APO 500, dtd 26 Sep 51,
Subj: Communist Propaganda Received in Amami Oshima.

MEMO FOR RECORD: (To 1st Ind fr G-2,GHQ,FEC to ACofS,G-2,RYCOM, dtd 27 Oct 51)

Per request fr G-2,RYCOM, propaganda material translated by TIS returned together with translations. Brief explanatory comment on incident included for RYCOM info.

Mr L M Faust
26-8861

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

COPY

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HEADQUARTERS RYUKYUS COMMAND
Office of the A C of S, G2
APO 331

26 September 1951

AIB

SUBJECT: Communist Propaganda Received in Amami Oshima

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
General Headquarters
Far East Command
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Transmitted herewith is a Summary of Information prepared as a result of information received by this office.

2. On 17 September 1951 Yamamoto, Naotsu, Naze City Assembly Chairman delivered to the Naze City police a parcel he had received through the mail. This parcel contained a magazine entitled "The Rubber Sole Story" and referred to as "The Truth about the Aruyama Incident."

3. Attached hereto are copies of propaganda received, marked Exhibit 1 through 8.

4. Scanning of the magazine by the civil police and CIC translators indicated that the exhibits are communist propaganda.

5. It is requested that translation of these documents be made by your headquarters as this headquarters does not have the qualified personnel to translate the exhibits and the report be rendered to this headquarters.

1 Incl
S/I in dup

ROY E MOORE
Colonel, GSC
A C of S, G2

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

TRANSLATION

GIST:

EXHIBIT I

THE CHIKATABI (TN-Rubber-soled Work Shoes) STORY

All-Kyoto Day Workers Union

This booklet, put out by the All-Kyoto Day Workers' Union, deals with the day workers' sorrowful plight and other circumstances leading up to the Maruyama Incident. It particularly deals with the day workers' struggle for a "Mochi Allowance" (TN-Mochi is a traditional Japanese rice preparation used during the New Year celebrations and on various other festivals) which finally lead to the holding of a mass rally at Maruyama Park where the day workers and the police clashed, resulting in injuries to scores and mass arrests. It gives statements of eye witnesses to the riot who charged the police with brutality, and a brief account of the trial which ensued.

The day workers were victorious in their "Mochi Allowance" struggle. The last portion contains statements by various labor union leaders acclaiming the action of the day workers and the All-Kyoto Day Workers' Union.

****

EXHIBIT II

Mimeographed one-page publication dated 15 August, "Free Labor"

1. Workers who were sent to the ENOKI River staged a strike on the 14th, demanding transportation and the construction of toilets and a shack for rest purposes. They intend to have HOSHINO fired.

2. On the 12th, comrades of NISHIMAIZURU found 25 policemen and the president of the Yamato Industrial Company at a GEISHA party, and lodged a protest.

3. At a rousing rally on the 13th, propaganda, strikes, sabotage, dismissal of HOSHINO and KUWAHARA, ousting of spies and anti-unionists, and payment of taxes to the union instead of the Municipal Office were decided.

4. Municipal Assembly members are censured by workers at ENOKI River.

5. Our fund collection campaign for an overall peace treaty, peace and independence is receiving full support from all quarters, including NRP members, who ousted SAKURAI.

6. Our distribution of handbills protesting war and favoring an overall peace treaty in conjunction with demands for OBON allowances is putting the mayor in a dilemma. Use of these handbills is the best way to hamper the Americans, and win the OBON allowance.

7. Two hundred inhabitants of AMAMI OSHIMA are fervently hoping for Japanese control of the island.

****

Enc 2

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Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

TRANSLATION

CHST:

EXHIBIT IV

Day Workers' Special Bulletin: Permit No. 2490

Strive for conclusion of a peace treaty with AMERICA, the SOVIET UNION, CHINA, BRITAIN and FRANCE! Those who reject a peace treaty are war mongers!

****

EXHIBIT V

Day Workers' Special Bulletin: No. 2490

Oppose the increase of rice prices aimed at preparation for war! Oppose an increase of electricity charges designed in the interests of aircraft production!

****

EXHIBIT VI

"Day Workers" Extra; Permit No. 2490

Grant us OBON allowances! Our fathers who died in the war are waiting for us to visit their graves!

****

EXHIBIT VII

Mimeographed leaflet issued in the name of the All-Kyoto Day Workers' Union

Mr ONOKI sneaked in the back door to attend the send-off party held in his honor. Were it a just peace treaty conference he was to attend, it would not have been necessary for him to act that way.

Let us expose his henchmen at the working places and in the homes.

Oppose the separate peace treaty drafted by DULLES.

Support an overall peace treaty and thereby reduce unemployment and win a daily pay of 300 yen.

Oppose secret military agreements which drive Japanese to the battle fronts.

****

EXHIBIT VIII

A handwritten letter of encouragement to residents of KISHIMA from the All-Kyoto Day Workers' Union, dated 24 August: (TN-The following is a summary):

We, the members of the union, are greatly interested in your struggle for racial independence.

Despite police oppressions, 2,000 persons staged an anti-war demonstration in SHIN KYOGOKU. Our peace and anti-war front, supported by various major unions, has dealt a severe blow to the enemy. He is tottering before the just demands of the laborers.

We are determined to obstruct the conclusion of a separate peace treaty and are praying for your efforts.

Oppose a secret military agreement.

Don't send ONOKI to the San Francisco conference.

Oppose the peace treaty drafted by DULLES.

Encl 2-7-2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813562
By md NARA Date 1/12/12

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSLATION

KAGOSHIMA Ken AMAMI OSHIMA ( )

TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND ISLAND CITIZENS WHO CRY, YEARNINGLY FOR THEIR MOTHERLAND, "DEATH BEFORE AMERICA"!!

The two hundred thousand island citizens of KAGOSHIMA Ken OMAMI OSHIMA who are about to be given in trusteeship under the separate peace treaty (The Dulles Plan) have united. Signatures of 99.9 per cent of the people have been collected, general conferences have been held in each village, and shop. Yearning for their motherland, partial strikes have been conducted to plead reannexation to JAPAN.

The two hundred thousand island citizens are struggling with determination to repatriate to JAPAN en masse if YOSHIDA ( ) insists upon going through with the separate peace treaty. (The following telegrams were addressed to the Japan Communist Party).

1. The City Council, representing the will of the entire population of this city, declares itself opposed to trusteeship. We request your help in realizing reannexation to JAPAN.

AMAMI OSHIMA, NAZE Shi City Council.

2. We express our full-hearted gratitude for the territorial policies of your party. The entire people of AMAMI OSHIMA fervently desires reannexation to JAPAN, and is determined to fight to that end with slogans opposing trusteeship, which disregards the will of 200,000 people as evidenced by the signatures of 139,348 over 14 years of age representing 99 per cent of this group. Consider the cry of the entire population and fight for us.

AMAMI OSHIMA Japan Reannexation Conference.

3. We oppose trusteeship and will fight until reannexed to JAPAN. We request your aid.

AMAMI All Government and Public Workers UNION (AMAMI ZENKANKO)

4. We are opposed to the trusteeship which disregards the will of the residents. We love freedom, will defend freedom, and request reannexation to JAPAN to preserve racial independence. All the people who advocate an overall peace treaty will unite and fight until our purpose is accomplished. We request your cooperation in realizing our objective.

AMAMI All Communications Workers Union (AMAMI ZENTEI)

5. We are absolutely opposed to the AMAMI Islands Trusteeship Bill. We are resolute in our determination to fight for reannexation to JAPAN. Consider the feelings of 200,000 residents and fight harder for us.

All the people of AMAMI OSHIMA KOMIYA CHO

6. We have united to face the emergency confronting our race. We are opposed to trusteeship and will fight for complete reannexation to JAPAN. We request the aid of your party.

AMAMI OSHIMA, KASARI Mura ( ) General Meeting

7. The draft of the peace treaty attempts to place the former KAGOSHIMA Ken OSHIMA Gun and the RYUKYU Islands under trusteeship. We are resolved to give absolute opposition to this aggressive plan.

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By md NARA Date 1/12/12

To the bitter end, we desire the return of Japanese sovereignty. To overcome the grave emergency facing the survival of our race, we ask your party to fight for us.

Members of 21 KAGOSHIMA Ken OSHIMA Gun City, Town and Village Conference.

8. We will fight to the end to destroy the scheming of Imperialists and overthrow traitor YOSHIDA. The entire people of the island is firmly united. We request the aid of your party.

AMAMI OSHIMA TAWAGO Mura Village Conference ( )

9. The twenty one AMAMI OSHIMA cities, towns and villages have started a fast as of the 1st (TN-Day) to realize their appeal for reannexation to JAPAN. Consider the feelings of more than 200,000 residents and cooperate with us to the fullest extent.

AMAMI OSHIMA Japan Reannexation Conference.

10. We, 1500 GONIYA CHO residents, will conduct a fast from the 1st to the 3rd (TN Day) to realize the appeal for reannexation of AMAMI OSHIMA to JAPAN. Consider our feelings and cooperate with us to your fullest extent.

People of GONIYA CHO

11. On 1 August The Third General Conference of all Residents was held and resolutions passed. It was resolved that we absolutely oppose trusteeship and ardently desire reannexation with JAPAN. We will participate in a partial strike from the 1st (TN-Day). Visualize the tearful residents who yearn for their motherland and cooperate with us.

People of AMAMI OSHIMA KIKAI CHO ( )

It is the cry of the 200,000 isolated on a far off island and the Japanese faced with a racial emergency. The four islands, including HONSHU, of the Japan chain of islands are in no different circumstances in the hands of the foreigners. Destroy the separate peace treaty which enlists youths in the army and makes JAPAN a military base. Arise to join the patriotic struggle for peace and independence of the race.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

People's Republic of CHINA ( )

It is the view of the Soviet Union that a Peace Settlement should be based on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea as soon as possible. Any Peace Settlement based on the above principles should be followed by the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea within a specified period. The Soviet Union is prepared to render all possible assistance to the Korean people in the restoration of their economy destroyed during the war. The Soviet Union is also prepared to render assistance to the Chinese People's Republic in the restoration of its economy destroyed during the war.

People of KOREA

I do not wish to speak at length on the subject of Korea at this time. I will only say briefly that we should like to see the Korean question settled peacefully. We believe that the first step should be the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. We believe that the Korean people should be permitted to settle their own affairs. We believe that the Korean question should be settled by the Korean people themselves. We believe that the Korean people should be permitted to settle their own affairs. We believe that the Korean question should be settled by the Korean people themselves.

People of KOREA

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

SECRET

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CI Div

APO 500
28 July 1951

SUBJECT: Alleged South Korean Government Documents Publicized in Japan by Leftist Koreans

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
GSUSA
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Attached hereto as Inclosure 1 are copies of alleged South Korean Government documents which were published and distributed in booklet form by the Fatherland Defense Committee, a covert leftist Korean organization in Japan.

2. The documents, which were purportedly obtained from the South Korean Government Record Preservation Office, consist mainly of correspondence written by United States Public Officials, South Korean Mission personnel in Washington, D. C. and President Syngman Rhee.

3. The booklet (Inclosure 2) entitled "Documents and Materials Exposing the True Instigations of the Korean Civil War," deals mainly with the explanation of these documents and their relation to the causes of the present Korean hostilities. Todate, the booklets have been sold only to members and sympathizers of the Japan Communist Party.

4. This is for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

2 Incls:
1. Copies of South Korean Gov't Documents
2. Booklet entitled "Documents and Materials Exposing the True Instigations of the Korean Civil War"

S/
R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, GSC
Deputy

G-2 File Copy
CIDiv/OPNS/EGT/paw

Copies to Dir; Hqns

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

SECRET

MEMO FOR RECORD:

This action transmits copies of alleged correspondence between US officials and S Korean gov't officials which are being publicized in Japan by leftist Korean organizations. Copies also forwarded to DS for info.

Maj Tobin 26-8457

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

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COPY

KOREAN EMBASSY
Washington, D. C.

January 11, 1950

Your Excellency:

This letter is being prepared just before the pouch leaves for the airport so that I may give you some encouraging news which I have received confidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U. S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan, Korea will occupy an important position. I have every hope that we will get much more help, militarily speaking, as a result.

I have had word from a confidential source in the State Department that President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permission for armament for Korean ships and planes. Thus I am confident that there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on the Bakdusan, for the President's order will remove the principal and important obstacle.

The Turkish representative on UNCOK has met with me and I found him to be a strong and sympathetic person. I feel sure he will make a good Commission member.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully yours,

/s/ John M. Chang

JOHN M. CHANG

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

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KOREAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 14, 1950

Your Excellency,

I arrived in Washington June 10 (Saturday) with my family, and I am happy to report that my wife's condition is good. She stood the strain of the trip better than I expected, and is now under the care of a heart specialist here. We are both most grateful to your Excellency for the many kindnesses extended to us, and for your graciousness in arranging our trip.

On the day of my arrival, I arranged a small dinner party in honor of Mr. Dulles. It was necessary that we have the party that day, because Mr. Dulles is leaving Washington today, and Saturday (June 10) was the only possible opportunity he had to meet with us. We had Mr. and Mrs. Dulles, Mr. Dean Rusk (Mr. Rusk had succeded Mr. Walton Butterworth as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs). Mr. & Mrs. Niles Bond, and Mr. and Mrs. Allison. Mr. Allison is in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and will go with Mr. Dulles on his tour of the Far East. I had ample opportunity for a full discussion with Mr. Dulles,and was asked many questions. This visit Mr. Dulles is about to make is most important in view of the fact that he has a strong voice in preparing decisions of the State Department concerning the Far East. I am confident that his visit may bring about a change in the Department's policy with regard to the Far East. I impressed upon him how much our people are looking forward to his visit, in the hope that it will bring about a firmer stand in the State Department on the anti-Communism issue. I summed up the hopes of our people and our Government as to Mr. Dulles' part as follows:

1. He should make a strong statement, assuring Koreans that the United States will stand behind Korea both in peace and in trouble, both economically and militarily. His statement should declare that Korea should be placed within the United States' line of defense in the Pacific. (Mr. Dulles said at this point that the United States had never made an official commitment with respect to military support with my country, except under the Atlantic Pact, and there were qualifications even in that agreement. He said that not even the Philippines had any such agreement with the United States. But, he added, he was certain that the United States would not abandon Korea, and that he is even now preparing a statement to the effect that Korea would be backed by the United States. He said he would assure the Korean people that the United States would assist them)

2. We want more planes and long range guns in order to render our defenses more effective.

3. Korea should participate in peace treaty negotiations with Japan, because we have fought the Japanese longer and more than any other country.

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4. Korea should take an active part in the formation of a Pacific Pact, if such a Pact ever comes into being, and we would like to see the United States take an active part in the formation of the pact. (I regret, I told Mr. Dulles, that Korea was left out of the Baguio meeting, despite the specific promise of an

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C O P Y

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
Seoul, Republic of Korea
18 June 1949

President Syngman Rhee
Kyung Mu Dai
Seoul.

Dear President:

I just returned from the American Embassy where I had a very cordial conversation with Mr. John Muccio on two subjects, namely-concerning my mission to South American States, and about U.S. aid with air and ocean fleets in case we have to fight.

On the matter of my visiting the central and South American States, Mr. Muccio said he would wire to State Department, requesting that Department to send word to the U.S. diplomatic representatives in Latin America about my contemplated visit so that they may help me in dealing with the Latin American States when I am there, besides Mr. Muccio himself will write to his coleagues in Latin America of my coming.

On the matter of aid to be given us with U.S. Air and ocean fleets in case we have to fight the North Bear, Mr. Muccio said he would do the cultivation work for the matter with his Government so that things shall be ready in case we need. Mr. Muccio's words are too good to believe but those are what he said to me this morning. Mr. Muccio said he regrets that I have to leave the important job of teaching the youths in the Army and the youths in general about loyalty and devotion to our Fatherland and to the sacred cause of democracy and of Christian civilization. I replied I will return and keep up the work which I have started.

We have to let Mr. Muccio know the countries that you want me to visit so that he may contact with the U.S. diplomats in those countries. Will report more fully when I see you next time. I enclose an extra copy so that you may give it to Mr. Cynn Sung Mo.

Faithfully yours

/s/ Peong Koo Yoon

Peong Koo Yoon

N. B. Hither due to their jealousy or something, both Lee Chul Won and Ben, in certain respects, non-cooperative and discourteous. Lee Chul won made an announcement that he appointed Kim Kil Jun an adviser to OPI.

C O P Y

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

G-2 file copy

COPY

Telephone
Longacre 3-4420

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Empire State Building
Room 6010
350 Fifth Avenue - New York, N. Y.

Cable Address
KORUNMISON

For your reference a copy of the release is enclosed herewith. In connection with your letter to Dr. Oliver dealing with the same problem, I expressed my own frank view with a sense of loyalty to you. I am of the firm conviction that unification of Korea can be brought about only through exercise of the sovereign power of our Government. Any policy of compromise or conferences is out of the question, which truth has been demonstrated in our past bitter experiences by the habitual tactics that are used everywhere by the Soviet Union to obtain world hegemony. The cold war cannot go on indefinitely like this. All these world problems could not be possibly solved without a third world war. Our plan of achieving unification must be mapped out in march with the developments of the world situation as a whole. In the meantime, our national preparedness in military power and economic strength is the most compelling task imposed upon our Government. Such are the views I dare to express with utmost frankness which I beg you to give full consideration. I am sure Dr. Chang will make a report on his part. I am doing the same based on my discussions with some important delegates at Lake Success.

MR. KIM AND MISS MOH

Mr. Kim has been very helpful to me after his assignment to my headquarters. His charming personality, his command of good English and his wide acquaintances with the Press all have contributed to this. I am really grateful to you for assigning him for a further period. As for Miss Moh, I have changed my original recommendation for her return. This change has been influenced by the fact that Mr. Kim will be absent for at least 2 or 3 weeks on his mission to the South American countries and also that Miss Moh herself desires to stay here until after the adjournment of the Chinese question at the United Nations. I hope you will approve her stay through the month of November at least.

SOME OF MY FINANCIAL REQUESTS

Ever since my appointment to this country I have tried to manage my personal and official affairs within the boundaries of the budget. In spite of this my financial condition is not in good shape. I need a further allowance of at least $1000. to adjust the financial situation I am faced with. I made three special trips to Canada, Indiana (Yarnell), and to Virginia and South Carolina (Halsey). In connection with these trips I spent about $650; Canada ($300), Indiana ($250), Virginia and South Carolina ($100). And Miss McIntyre began to send our rent here beginning the period July 1st. But, as you know, the Empire State Building office was contracted from the month of June. Therefore I need another remittance for $200. covering that period. So I should like to have another remittance of $1000 in connection with these items.

Further I request you to permit my wife to buy $1000 exchange. I need that amount for my personal use, for purchasing some books, personal effects and for additional

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dental treatment. Especially I have to buy books, old and new, in foreign languages. My library was gone during the days of my prison life and its aftermath under the Japanese regime. Some winter clothing is also needed. I hope you will give favorable consideration to these requests.

With a sense of loyalty and esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ P O Chough

Chough, Pyung Ok
Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary, Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Korea and Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

POC:fp
Enclosures

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Washington Embassy
Muccio
Tokyo
Admiral Soha

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Office of Chief of Naval Operation July 18, 1949

My dear Admiral Radford:

The Government of the Republic of Korea desires to express to you its sincere appreciation for the friendly visit made by a unit of your fleet consisting of the Cruiser Manchester and the auxiliary destroyers under the command of Admiral T. H. Binford.

This visit has greatly enhanced the already existing good feeling between the United States and Korea. We particularly appreciate this significant manifestation of your friendship for us, and we are desirous to express our gratitude in return. We have learned to respect and admire the noble spirit shown by Admiral Binford and by the officers and enlisted men under his command. This Government hopes that this unit, in its present form or enlarged grouping, will call on us again and often. Indeed, we shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchon, Pusan, Yosu, Mukho and the Naval Base of Chinhae, as temporary Mobile Bases of any such a unit of your Fleet.

Such an arrangement as this will not only further solidity the friendly relationship between our two nations but also be a source of encouragement to all the peace-loving democratic nations, in and around the Pacific. We cannot convey this suggestion to the Secretary of the United States Navy. We may not be able to offer you all the conveniences and facilities for the comfort of our visitors but we shall strive to be genial hosts.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the high esteem of our President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, and the hope that you will also honor us by a personal visit in a near future.

Most sincerely yours,

Won Il Soha
Rear Admiral
Chief of Naval Operation

Admiral A. W. Radford
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
United States Navy

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

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PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Empire State Building
Room 6010
350 Fifth Avenue - New York 1, N. Y.

Telephone
Longacre 3-4420

Cable Address
KORUNMISON

November 3, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to make a brief report covering the following subjects:

THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In view of the fact that I have made telegraphic reports at the various stages of the deliberations, that you must have heard a detailed report from Harold Noble and that various official documents of the United Nations covering proceedings on the Korean discussion are to be sent to the Foreign Minister, I shall not dwell much upon details of the deliberations. I want only to point out that the Four Powers draft resolution was passed by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority; that is to say, 48 to 6, in spite of the opposition from the Soviet Bloc. It is gratifying to note those friendly nations which had supported Korea's case in Paris last year are still steady and strong in sympathy toward Korea, in spite of the continuous and tragic development in China since then.

THE NEW FEATURES OF THE RESOLUTION

The characteristic difference between the December 12th, 1948 resolution and the present Four Powers draft resolution lies in the fact that the present resolution emphasizes the urgency of observation on the security situation existing in Korea now, and in the future. That is the reason why military experts are to be attached to the United Nations Commission on Korea. With the unification of Korea as the ultimate objective, the Commission's chief function this year is to make observations on the security situation. The second difference is found in that the existence of the Commission is indefinite; it will continue its work until the problem of unification has been achieved.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMISSION

I am happy to report that as the result of strong presentation made by our Delegation, the United States Delegation and the State Department, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the Secretariat seemed to have given due attention to the need of strengthening the Commission. Syria is dropped and Turkey is nominated in lieu of that former troublesome member country. Secretary-General Lie has further assured me he had requested various member governments on the United Nations Commission on Korea to nominate their representatives from among persons of strong conviction and high experience and rank, with a view of having a system of permanent chairmanship that will insure steady and stabilized functioning of the Commission.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT

As I reported to you by radiogram, Mr. Bertil Renborg was appointed as the new principal secretary in lieu of Dr. Wertheimer. The Secretary-General and Mr. Cordier (American), Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, have assured me that Mr. Renborg is a man of strong conviction and leadership. He is a Swedish citizen and has been charge of the Division of Communications and Records. He had ten Years' experience in the foreign service of the Swedish Government. They further have assured me that those five objectionable persons; namely, Shahbaz, Katz, and three others will be changed and that an entirely new and sound secretariat will be constituted.

No Signature

H. E. Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea

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OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
Seoul, Republic of Korea

of the war, air bases to be selected by His Excellency, the President of the United States of America at or in the vicinities of------ and -----. The President of the Republic of Korea further will authorize His Excellency, the President of the United States of America to maintain forces on Korean territory as well as on Korean waters for the duration of the war and in accordance of the provisions of this treaty on the under standing that the presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereignty of Korea.

Article 7. It is further recognized and understood that should a war of liberation have to be carried on to Manchuria in retaliation to Chinese Communist Army's attack upon Korea, His Excellency, the President of the United States of America will assist His Excellency, the President of Republic of Korea to bring the war of liberation to a victorious conclusion; and in return, the President of the Republic of Korea, except the reconstruction of North Korea which shall be the sole concern of the Republic of Korea, pledges to put the development of the natural resources of Manchuria and other parts of East China under a joint administration of the United States of America and Korea.

Article 8. Point I. This treaty shall be executed in duplicate, in English and Korean languages, of which the former shall be

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recognized as the authoritative version. Point 2. Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of this treaty, and should the high contracting parties fail to

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Sandy Hollow Farm
Route 6
Norwich, Connecticut

July 7th, 1949.

Dear Admiral Denfeld:

Since my visit with you in June, through the courtesy of White House Secretary Hassett, I have anxiously awaited some word regarding my request.

The long Fourth of July holiday has, I know, intervened but I am under the spur of a chief of state, who has assigned this mission to me and regards it as urgent. To recapitulate:

President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea wishes the Government of Korea to retain the best qualified American Naval officer available to serve the Republic of Korea for these purposes:

1. To maintain, at the expense of the Republic of Korea, the one-time secret Japanese naval base at Chin-Hai, Korea, at maximum efficiency for the sole purpose of its immediate utility to us, a friendly power.

2. To do this so that the Republic of Korea may, within its limitations, make what it believes to be a substantial contribution to peace and security in Asia and evince in some measure its gratitude to the United States of America for our country's military might in freeing the Korean people from their long period of bondage under the Japanese.

3. To make this extraordinary base actually a potential foothold for us on the Asiatic mainland because President Rhee knows that Russia covets it and it is now ours, for future and effective use, if you deem it necessary, in this distraught world, to the security of the United States.

As I told you when I had the privilege of seeing you, an important military man of our nation suggested I see Vice Admiral James L. Kauffman and offer him what I believe to be a vitally important post. For I have seen Chin-Hai and was greatly impressed by its natural and man-made fortification, its underground reservoirs for millions of gallons of fuel oil, its ship repair installations, deep water advantages and--above all--its location on the land of a people who posses an almost child-like faith in American integrity.

Unfortunately, Admiral Kauffman, upon his retirement, had made commitments from May 1st on of this year which he considered unbreakable. The man who originally suggested Admiral Kauffman had told me this might be the case and I inferred that if it were I should turn to you.

I say Admiral Kauffman, not by design but accidentally, on the fifth anniversary of our establishment of the Normandy beachhead. The coincidence made an indelible impression upon me. I know the unforgettable part our Navy had in this tremendous achievement and I thought, as I talked with him, how this offer of President Rhee might, under other circumstances, save thousands of American lives whereas in Normandy, because we lacked a

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beachhead, many thousands of American lives had had to be expended.

Before I left Washington last week, I talked on the telephone with your aide, Commander Miller, and said that if you had any suggestion or recommendation (of an American Naval officer, retired or active) he could call me collect at Norwich, Connecticut, 5647 J-1; also that my address was "Sandy Hollow" Farm, R.F.D 6, Norwich, Connecticut.

No Signature

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C O P Y

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1949

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to report to you on the recent developments and my activities at our Embassy in Washington.

On April second Dr. Chough and I had a long conference with General Wedemeyer of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. We presented to him a strong appeal for military aid to Korea, illustrating it by a detailed analysis of the Korea military situation and needs of the Korean defense forces. General Wedemeyer now has the report under consideration. His immediate and specific advice in regard to the Air Force is that it is expensive in up-keep and not more than a minimum force should be maintained. Bombers are likely to kill our fellow countrymen. Light planes with arms for reconnaisance and intelligence are the most valuable. In case of full-scale invasion we can apply for United States aid. The Navy's greatest need is for small fast ships as an efficient coast guard. The General's intelligence reports show that early estimates of the strength of the military force of north Korea were exaggerated both as to number and equipment and the prospects of an invasion from the north are slim at this time. General Wedemeyers personal and confidential advice is that highly trained, trustworthy and competent young men be sent to North Korea to infiltrate among the Koreans there, sow distrust in the communist cause and the People's Government and prepare the way for the Republic. Meanwhile, the General will do his utmost for us and will consult with Secretary Acheson in our behalf.

Dr. Chough and I also visited Senator Knowland of California and made a similar appeal to him. He assured us of his sympathy and support.

Yesterday I enjoyed a lengthy conversation with Congressman Kee, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, stressing an appeal for ECA funds and military aid. He will do his best to help us. I have it on good authority that the ECA allocation for Korean aid, about $190 million will pull through the Congress. I suggested to Congressman Kee that a Pacific Pact is the next step, and he agreed.

Since my presentation of credentials to President Truman on March twenty-fifth, I have been very busy making courtesy calls on the members of the diplomatic corps in the city. All the Ambassadors have offered their strong support. The Ambassadors of El Salvador, Egypt, Iran and Brazil are seriously considering the request for formal recognition of our government. Sr. Nabuco of Brazil suggests that your Excellency write a letter to the President of his country informing him of the establishment of the Republic of Korea and your election as President and assuring him of the good will of our Government. A reply from the President of Brazil will constitute a recognition of our government. I told the Ambassador of our population problems and he has assured me that he will take up the question of immigration of Koreans to Brazil with his Government for early action.

No Signature

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Copy No. 35

FACTORS SIGNIFICANT FOR OR CONDITIONING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A U.S. INFORMATION PROGRAM

VI. FAR EAST

OIR Report No. 4849
January 28, 1949

Embassy of the United States of America
Mar 25 1949
SEOUL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

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OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

American Embassy,
Seoul, Korea.

June 20, 1950

My Dear Colonel Limb:

I have so much for which to thank you that it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to do so adequately.

The dinner which you gave in our honor last night was something I shall always remember. The setting was really glorious, the company distinguished, the entertainment most interesting to us, and last, but not least, the food was delicious.

Your address at the Seoul National University on the occasion of my reception of an honorary degree was an eloquent tribute, which I shall long cherish and pass on to my children and grandchildren.

You may be sure that my faith in the future of Korea is strengthened by my visit here, and I hope that our two countries can continue along the way of mutual support.

The antique celadon vase and bowl will grace Mrs. Dulles' living room in New York and always keep fresh the memory of our visit with you.

Above all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that will require courageous and bold decisions.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

s/ John Foster Dulles
t/ JOHN FOSTER DULLES

His Excellency Colonel Ben C. Limb,
Seoul,
Korea.

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Authority 813562
By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

COPY

April 10, 1949

Dear Dr. Chough:

I thought your radiogram inquiring as to the advisability of openly asking for military aid was very timely. However, I did not wish to proceed openly in the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements made by Mr. Muccio, who was reported to have secured "something". When he came to see me with Mr. Drumright, I quietly asked him what had been accomplished, and he said this: "The military aid has been granted and the President has signed certain documents relating to it." I am not sure whether he referred to the President's signature on the military aid request or on the ECA agreement. He further said that the publicity regarding a direct request for further military aid might hurt the plan. I thought he was right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arms to Koreans as they would oppose giving sharp knives to children. Our enemies have spread propaganda to the effect that the ignorant, thoughtless Koreans might attack the Soviet Union, thus bringing about a clash between Russia and the United States. This idea is prevalent among some Americans in Korea even now. For such reasons, the thought of giving military aid to Korea is considered dangerous to the United States.

What you and I are trying to do is to convince the world that we are not as foolish as we have been represented to be. We must make it known that we can manage our own affairs as well as any other well organized nation can. It is in this respect that publicity work is most important. The Americans are beginning to learn more about us and their estimate of our strength and capability is rising higher every day. But unless we can be sure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers in the United States, it would be too risky to make an open demand for arms and ammunition. This is why I have thought it best to keep your mission confidential.

Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known to the proper authorities. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and ammunition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of the obligation it owes us.

No Signature

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/12

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KMAG

971ST COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
TAEJON DISTRICT OFFICE
APO 235

File No._____
27 January 1949

SUBJECT: Execution of Military Prisoners, Taejon(1040-1490).

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 271000 January 1949, execution of Military prisoners was to be held just outside Camp Taejon. Upon arrival at the scene a lack of preparation was noticed. At approximately 1030 20 prisoners were blindfolded and led to the post and tied. No Medical Officer was on the scene and only ten riflemen to fire on the twenty prisoners. The Advisor to the 2nd Korean Army Brigade immediately stopped the executions and advised to have a Medical Officer present and to either get ten more riflemen or execute ten prisoners at a time. Ten of the prisoners were untied and led to the rear of the firing point. A medical officer and ten riflemen were summoned. At approximately 1130 final preparation was completed and the executions were started. B-2

The ten prisoners were then retied to the post and the riflemen were assigned a post to fire upon. Each fired the alotted rounds into the prisoners assigned. One clip of M-1 was used in each volley. Then the Kun Ki Dai officer, in charge of the executions went down the line and fire from one to three rounds in the bodies that showed signs of life. In some instances he had to fire on them the second time making three time in all. After each group was pronounced dead by the medical officer, who merely went part of the way down the line and pointed to the dead and the live, the bodies were carried from the posts to the pit to the side of the execution scene. Firing was heard in the pit, evidently on those that still showed signs of life. B-2

Foursgroups were executed, the first group totaled 20, the second 18, the third 18 and the fourth 13. Totaling 69 in all. After the first group was executed at approximately 1130 the rest of the executions followed in order and at 1215 all were executed. B-2

All prisoners executed were from the 14th (YOSU) Regiment, from the Yosu-Sunchon area. They all appeared to be young and estimated overall average of eithteen years of age. Prisoners were shoeless and were clad in underwaar and some in fatigues.

B-2

After the first group which was led to the bost from back

(end)

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C O P Y

September 30, 1949

To : Dr. Robert T. Oliver

From: President Syngman Rhee

I received your letters and thank you for them.

I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or anything of that kind. Please contact Mr. K. and Mr. Mead in a very confidential way and find out all what is necessary. In case you think that it would not be advisable to employ Mr. K. in regard to what Mr. W. told you we may have to drop the matter. In my last letter I asked you to find out from the National Press Club more about K. We simply cannot engage anyone who has not a good business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter.

There is some criticism about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more I think of your work the more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your tem of service in the University. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office. How often I wish we had you here.

I wish I had time to write out from time to time some of my thoughts relating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been impossible. I will try however. One thing is that I want to tell you briefly concerning our situation.

I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal communist army in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il Sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position. The natural boundary line along the river and the Paikdoo Mts can be made almost impenetrable with sufficient number of planes and two or three fast running naval vessels standing at the mouths of the two rivers with fighting planes defending all the coast lines including Cheju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great invasions of Emperor Tang, Emperor Soo, the Mongols and the Japs. I believe we are ready to repeat the successful defense of our nation against

(end)

C O P Y

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COPY

Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea
To The United Nations
Empire State Building
Room 6010
350 Fifth Avenue - New York 1, N. Y.

Telephone
Longacre 3-4420

Cable Address
KORUNMISON

October 12, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Heated discussions are going on now at Lake Success on such important problems as the Greek problem, the Italian Colonies, Human Rights and Religious Freedom, the China question and Atomic Energy Control.

As for our problem it will probably come up before the General Assembly in the latter part of next week even though there may be usual delay tactics that will be employed by the Soviet Bloc. The resolution affecting Korea which had been adopted at the Special Political Committee will certainly pass through the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority.

AS REGARDS JOHNSTON

In compliance with your wishes, I had taken up the case of Dick Johnston with General Adler of The New York Times and he had assured me that he would not make an immediate change of position for Johnston, which fact was indicated also in General Adler's letter to me.

I have made an appointment with Mr. Sultzberger for today to deliver personally your letter to him.

YOUR LETTER TO OLIVER

It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing about our desired unification. However, after taking into consideration all the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and the international opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken. It must be recalled that the Greek Government itself has been persuaded by the friendly powers from taking military steps against Albania.

I do not see what or how Oliver can do under the present circumstances in connection with this serious problem. I am sure he cannot publicize such a proposal as our fixed government policy. Nor do I think that it would be wise for him to make public such matters of secret import. I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our Government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune.

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Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for laying before you such outspoken views but I should like to assure you that I have felt that it is my bounding duty to be candid in order to be of loyal service to you.

PACIFIC PACT

Ambassador Chang and I have had a full exchange of views on the subject matter. In view of the situation existing, which was described in my last report, we do not see how the proposal you have in mind can be effected as a reality. The matter of the Pacific Pact is entirely entrusted by Quirino in the hands of Romulo and he in turn has a program somewhat different from that which you, Generalissimo Chiang and President Quirino had in mind. He has lined up already such important countries as India, Australia, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, etc. This Romulo plan

No Signature

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED 28 JUL 1951 GHG GS

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

No Signature

comforters as lights, wastefully, thankfully, burns, Pakistan, etc. Life formula byes
Chinese and President Chiang had it mind. He has lived up strongly once important
and he is run has a program somewhat different from that which you generally cause
manager of the Pacific Fact is entirely unfounded by Chiang at the hands of Formo
sa see how the proposed war may it mine can be effected as a result. The
In view of the situation existing, which was described it we last report, we do
am sorry to have had a full exposure of views on the subject matter.

PACIFIC PACT

be caught it order so be of lower service to you.
but I should like to assure you that I have left that it is we pointing ugly of
Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for delving before you such outspoken views

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By DB NARA Date 1/13/12

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/72

CONFIDENTIAL

06808

3832

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

SPB/JWG/FCD/tl

File No: **Subject:** Evaluation of PsyWar **Date:** 8 Feb 51

FROM: Spec Proj **TO:** G2 **PHONE:** 26-8939
THRU: MIS Div **NAME:** Col Dahlquist

Comment Number 1

1. Incl 1 is letter from Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Director of ORO FEC to Mr. Greene, Chief, PsyWar Branch, G2, which states that ORO Operations will need to be completed by 1 Mar 51 and an attempt will be made to have preliminary evaluation on PsyWar completed by 20 Feb 51 and that most probable broad conclusions will be:

a. PsyWar on basis of the results per unit effort expended (or cost per unit) has probably been the most effective military effort of the Korean war.

b. PsyWar effort has been too small and too meagerly supported compared to its capabilities.

2. Letter states that the most probable recommendations will be that PsyWar effort be more strongly supported, and that PsyWar branch be made a special staff section.

3. Letter further states that Mr. Murray Dyer and Mr. W. R. Young will be required to return to the United States on 1 Mar 51, that Director of ORO has been asked by CofS to recommend a limited staff to continue work in FEC and comments are requested on desirability of having one research analyst continue in PsyWar.

4. Incl 2 is draft of Mr. Greene's proposed reply to Dr. Johnson which expresses appreciation for services of ORO; hopes that Mr. Young can be retained for a longer period and that a research analyst will be provided PsyWar.

5. Recommend approval of draft reply for Mr. Greene's signature.

2 Incls
1. Ltr fr Dr Johnson
Dir, ORO, 2 Feb 51
2. Draft of reply

J. W. G.

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(75)
091.412

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By NARA Date 1/13/12

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

CAW/2659/06808/rep

File No: **Subject:** Evaluation of PsyWar **Date:** 11 February 1951

FROM: Gen Willoughby **TO:** Col Ives - ACTION **PHONE:** **NAME:**

Comment Number 2

1. The kind intervention of Dr. Johnson, Director of ORO, attached as blue Tab 1, does call for a letter of appreciation, which Col Greene correctly sensed. However, the reply obviously should be for the signature of Gen Willoughby. The Deputies for Administration and Operations must be on the alert for this sort of super erogation of command perogatives, which are psychologically undesirable.

2. In addition prepare letters of recommendation for Mr. Murray Dyer and Mr. Young, again for signature of Gen Willoughby, with the authenticating signature and stamp of G-2, signature of Col Greene in the lower left hand corner. In this connection, a green certificate should be provided except that I believe the certificate should now be amended to include the Korean hostilities perhaps by a special annotation in the left hand corner. (Maj Fess, PDM, has this action.)

2 Incls:
n/c

MIS Div (Sp Proj) - Info
Capt Barkovich - Info
CAW - File

---C.A.W.---

WMI/2659/06808/rrr

From: Col Ives **To:** Gen Willoughby **Date:** 15 Feb 1951

Comment Number 3

1. Paragraph 1, C/N 2 is noted for compliance.
2. TAB 2 is finalized letter to Dr. Johnson for signature.
3. TABs 3 and 4 are drafts of proposed letters of commendation for Mr. Dyer and Mr. Young, for edit and/or approval.
4. TAB 5 contains Green Certificates for Mr. Dyer and Mr. Young for signature. It will be noted that the text of these certificates includes reference to Korean Operations.
5. Recommend:
   a. **Signature**, TABs 2 and 5
   b. Approval, TABs 3 and 4

5 Incls
1. n/c
2. Finalized Ltr to Dr. Johnson
3. Draft Commendation - Mr Dyer
4. " " - Mr Young
5. Green Cert - Mr Dyer & Mr Young

---W.M.I.---

SUS: 14 Feb 51

ACTION

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/12

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: **Subject:** Evaluation of Psywar **Date:** 11 February 1951

FROM: Gen Willoughby **TO:** Col Ives - ACTION **PHONE:** **NAME:**

Comment Number	
2	

1. The kind intervention of Dr. Johnson, Director of ORO, attached as blue Tab 1, does call for a letter of appreciation, which Col Greene correctly sensed. However, the reply obviously should be for the signature of Gen Willoughby. The Deputies for Administration and Operations must be on the alert for this sort of super erogation of command perogatives, which are psychologically undesirable.

2. In addition prepare letters of recommendation for Mr. Murray Dyer and Mr. Young, again for signature of Gen Willoughby, with the customary closing signature and stamp of G-2, signature of Col Greene in the lower left hand corner. In this connection, a green certificate should be provided except that I believe the certificate should now be amended to include the Korean hostilities perhaps by a special annotation in the left hand corner. (Ia) Pers. PDM. has this action.

2 Incls:
n/c

MIS Div (Sp Proj) - Info
Capt Berkevich - Info
CAW - File

From: Col Ives **To:** Gen Willoughby **Date:** 13 Feb 1951

1. Paragraph 1, C/M 2 is noted for compliance.
2. TAB 2 is finalized letter to Dr. Johnson for signature.
3. TABs 3 and 4 are drafts of proposed letters of commendation for Mr. Dyer and Mr. Young, for edit and/or approval.
4. TAB 5 contains Green Certificates for Mr. Dyer and Mr. Young for signature. It will be noted that the text of these certificates includes reference to Korean Operations.
5. Recommend:
   a. Signature, TABs 2 and 5
   b. Approval, TABs 3 and 4

5 Incls
1. n/c
2. Finalized Ltr to Dr. Johnson
3. Draft Commendation - Mr Dyer
4. " " - Mr Young
5. Green Cert - Mr Dyer & Mr Young

GHQ FEC 11 FEB 1951 APO 500 CIR/PAC/CD

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By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

CAW/2659/06808/rep

File No: **Subject:** Evaluation of PsyWar **Date:** 20 February 1951

FROM: Gen Willoughby **TO:** Col Ives-ACTION **PHONE:** **NAME:**

Comment Number 4

The essential part of this correspondence is a letter of acknowledgement of Dr Johnson, Dr of ORO, attached as Tab 1. Tab 2 in your IOM No. 3 is supposed to contain a finalized letter to Dr Johnson. See your sub par 2 att Col Ives. On inspection Tab 2 is found to be empty. What is the story?

5 Incls:
1. n/c
2. w/d
3,4,5, n/c

CAW - File

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

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OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
G-3, GHQ, FEC
APO 500

2 February 1951

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Psywar

TO: Mr. J. Woodall Greene

1. According to the fiscal limits established for ORO's operations in FEC by the D/A, ORO's operations will need to be substantially completed in FEC on or about 1 March. ORO will attempt to have a preliminary evaluation on Psywar by 20 February.

2. The most probable broad conclusions will probably be:

a. Psywar, on the basis of the results per unit effort expended (or per unit cost), has probably been the most effective military effort of the Korean war.

b. The Psywar effort has been too small and too meagerly supported compared to its capabilities.

3. The most probable recommendations:

a. That the Psywar effort be much more strongly supported.

b. That the Psywar branch be made a special staff section.

There will be many additional detailed conclusions.

4. Because of the need to use special analysts and IBM machines, the final analysis will be completed in Washington, but the report will be submitted to G-2, GHQ, FEC. In other words, no report will be submitted to D/A in Washington.

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Incl. 1

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

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SUBJECT: Evaluation of Psywar 2 Feb 51

5. Return of Mr. Murray Dyer and Mr. W. R. Young. will be required on 1 March.

6. The Director, ORO, has been asked by the Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC, to recommend a limited staff to continue work in FEC after 1 March. This will need to be approved by D/A.

7. Your comments are requested on the desirability of having one research man continue analysis of Psywar after 1 March. This individual would probably have to come from Washington.

Ellis A Johnson
ELLIS A. JOHNSON
Director

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/12

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Ref: CAW 2659/06808

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
15 February 1951

Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Director
Operations Research Office, G-3
General Headquarters, Far East Command
APO 500

Your letter of 2 February giving a preview of probable broad conclusions of ORO psychological warfare evaluation has been read with great interest.

The Psychological Warfare Section, an operational agency of G-2, is gratified when expert scientific opinion assesses our efforts creditably on the basis of a comparison of results against a background of limited manpower (or cost per unit). Your evaluation will serve as inspiration for all who are engaged in psychological warfare operations.

We greatly regret to lose the services of Mr. Murray Dyer and Mr. W. R. Young who came to us when we were in critical need for skilled radio personnel and these gentlemen have made outstanding contributions to PsyWar radio broadcasting operations. When the Korean situation required PsyWar to send its key radio personnel to Korea, including the Chief of the unit, Mr. Dyer because of his experience, training and sound judgment was able to direct the successful operations of broadcasting from Japan. Mr. Young's professional writing ability, cooperation and application proved of immeasurable worth in the radio broadcasting unit.

The necessity for Mr. Dyer's return to the US is understood. I am hopeful, however, that something can be done about retaining the services of Mr. Young for a longer period and until we are able to recruit a qualified replacement.

CAW File

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We are not unmindful of the contributions which you and members of your staff have made to PsyWar efforts and we regret the necessity for curtailing ORO operations. We particularly hope that something might be done to provide at least one research analyst for work in PsyWar Intelligence where necessity exists for expert analysis and evaluation for use in radio, leaflets and in planning.

I take this occasion to thank you for your letter and the opportunity to see a preview of the anticipated psywar evaluation report which I know will prove of high value. With deep personal regards.

Fraternally yours,

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Letter from Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Dir, ORO, FEC to Mr. Greene, Chief, PsyWar states ORO operations will be completed by 1 Mar 51; preliminary evaluation will becompleted 20 Feb 51. States further the broad conclusions and recommendations to be included in report:

Conclusions:

a. PsyWar on basis of results per unit effort expended (or cost per unit) has probably been most effective military effort of Korean War.

b. PsyWar effort has been too small and too meagerly supported compared to its capabilities.

Recommendations:

a. PsyWar effort to be more strongly supported.

b. PsyWar be made a special staff section.

2. Letter advises that Mr. Murray Dyer and Mr. W.R. Young will return to the US 1 Mar 51 and that Dir, ORO, has been asked by C/S to recommend limited staff to continue work in FEC and requests comments on desirability of having one research analyst continue in PsyWar.

CSM 26-7489 JWG 26-8053

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29976

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

1 June 1951

SUBJECT: Immediate Requirements of PSYWAR, GHQ

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

Reference telephone conversation from Office of the Chief of Staff (Lt Col Moorman) to PSYWAR, G2 (Mr. Greene), 1 June 51, the following items are urgently required by PSYWAR GHQ for immediate operational needs:

a. Expedite the six (6) Public Address Sets AN/AIA-4A mounted in appropriate aircraft as requested in GHQ message CX 63353 dated 25 May 51 and CX 56370 dated 26 Feb 51.

b. Request advance party of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group as stated in FEC Note 5 of telecon 4751, dated 27 May 51 to OCPW, DA, depart for FEC as soon as possible and be given air priority shipping.

c. FEAF is re-examining aircraft requirements for all purposes which include psychological warfare and considers additional aircraft and personnel from ZI will be required for psychological warfare purposes. When the request is submitted by FEAF to USAF, it is believed Dept of Army can be of considerable assistance in supporting such action at Departmental level.

G-2 File Copy

R.F.E.

MEMO FOR RECORD:
In telephone conversation SGS (Lt Col Moorman) and PSYWAR (Mr. Greene) SGS stated that CinC had received a radio from Secy of the Army which pointed to present PSYWAR opportunities in Korea and desire for all out efforts. CinC was asked what DA could do to support activities. PSYWAR was directed to furnish list of immediate requirements.

TNS 26-7489 JWG 26-8939

H/c Holdsworth
2 Jun. 1522

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

SECRET

29875

Col Power 26-6166

PSYWAR Plans Group

G2 CofS 1 June 1951

1. 1. Reference your verbal instructions to implement a planning branch in the PSYWAR Branch, G-2.

2. Currently a large portion of the personnel assigned to the PSYWAR Branch are engaged in duties connected with actual implementation of PSYWAR operations, i.e. preparation of leaflets and news sheets, arrangements with FEAF for dropping such leaflets, preparation of radio programs, and staging such programs. These operational activities normally should not be a responsibility of a staff section but lack of a proper PSYWAR operating unit made it necessary for the PSYWAR Branch to assume these functions. Shortage of trained PSYWAR personnel has not permitted constitution of an adequate staff group in the orthodox sense.

3. To overcome this problem a PSYWAR operating unit was requested from the ZI, and as a result, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L Gp) was alerted for shipment to FEC. The CO San Francisco Port of Embarkation has been directed to move this unit to FEC. Readiness date was set at 10 July. Allowing for time to move unit from its home station, Ft Riley, Kansas, to the port and thence to FEC, it is estimated that unit should arrive in FEC on or about 1 August. Arrival of this unit will relieve the PSYWAR Staff Group of the "operating" function and will permit reorganizing personnel, currently available, into a proper staff section.

4. In the meantime, as an interim measure, a request was forwarded to DA, 27 May 51, for immediate shipment of sixteen (16) selected individuals of this unit as an advance group to arrive FEC on or about 15 June. Reaction of DA to this request has not yet been received.

5. In the event DA approves request (par 4 above) arrival of this group of key individuals will make available sufficient personnel of the present PSYWAR Branch for Staff planning duties for the time being.

6. In view of above, recommend no additional action be taken to request PSYWAR planning group until DA reply to interim measure mentioned in para 4 above is received. In the event request is disapproved action could then be taken to request PSYWAR DA to procure capable PSYWAR staff planners to enable the PSYWAR staff section to function properly until arrival of the entire RB&L Group.

----------R. F. E.----------

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

G-2 file

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SECRET

CORRECTED COPY

1 JUN 1951
DISPATCHED
CHG
G2

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By NARA Date 1/13/12

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Authority 813562
By AQ NARA Date 1/13/12

SECRET

MEMO FOR RECORD:

CofS suggested to Gen Ennis that G2 request a staff planning group from DA for assignment to FEC PSYWAR staff group.

Gen Ennis directed preparation of above check sheet.

G.W.P.
26-6166

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/72

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

29875

CHECK SHEET

Col Power 26-6166

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject: PSYWAR Plans Group

Note No.	From: G2 To: CofS Date: 1 June 1951
1.	1. Reference your verbal instructions to implement a planning branch in the PSYWAR Branch, G-2.

2. Currently a large portion of the personnel assigned to the PSYWAR Branch are engaged in duties connected with actual implementation of PSYWAR operations, i.e. preparation of leaflets and news sheets, arrangements with FEAF for dropping such leaflets, preparation of radio programs, and staging such programs. These operational activities normally should not be a responsibility of a staff section but lack of a proper PSYWAR operating unit made it necessary for the PSYWAR Branch to assume these functions. Shortage of trained PSYWAR personnel has not permitted constitution of an adequate staff group in the orthodox sense.

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5. In the event DA approves request (par 4 above) arrival of this group of key individuals will make available sufficient personnel of the present PSYWAR Branch for staff planning duties for the time being.

6. In view of above, recommend no ~~further~~ additional action be taken to request PSYWAR planning group until ~~action is taken by~~ reply to interim measure DA ~~on request~~ is received mentioned in para 4 above. In the event request is disapproved action could then be taken to request PSYWAR DA to procure capable PSYWAR staff planners to enable the PSYWAR staff section to function properly until arrival of the entire RB&L Group.

- R. F. E. - - - - - - - - - -

FEC AGO Form No 37

0931—FEC Printing Plant—2/50—50M

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

CONFIDENTIAL

30 May 1951

MEMO TO GEN ENNIS

1. Reference FEAF suggestion that they replace Col Ambrose (currently on DS in PSYWAR G-2), following information submitted:

a. Mr. Greene states that Gen Crabb (FEAF) called on him yesterday and discussed several matters including the subject of replacement of Col Ambrose. Gen Crabb felt that Col Ambrose should be assigned to an AF aircraft unit for professional reasons since his experience in such assignments had been limited. Gen Crabb stated further that Col Ambrose' personality was such that he irritated people in his operations section when he came to FEAF in an effort to coordinate PSYWAR matters - a job that Mr. Greene has given him on several occasions. It was Gen Crabb's belief that it was in the best interests of Col Ambrose, and PSYWAR as well, to replace him.

b. Mr. Greene commented on the above to the effect that he concurs in Gen Crabb's suggestion, that Col Ambrose had not proved too effective in his liaison contacts with FEAF or in his other staff duties in the PSYWAR Section, particularly in t
problems of PSYWAR planni

OK

c. Gen Crabb di
Mr. Greene believes it w
FEAF who have had the sa

OK

d. Gen Crabb a
officers sit in on plann
our section would be ke
he would have one of hi
Mr. Greene informed hi
(part of FEAF Opns Sec
so far there had been
correct this.

Col Power —
Gen Ennis wants to
see if a request to
R A for a second
planning staff officer. Work up
a justification.
BMS

2. Reference que
no one seems to know o
problem in PSYWAR from the very start has been one of personnel shortage. Most all of the available people have had to be used to carry on operations. As a result PSYWAR has never been able to constitute an adequate staff group for planning purposes. Our plans for constituting a special staff section contemplated a separation of operations from this staff section as soon as possible. The arrival of the 1st RB&L Gp (ETA July) will permit this.

3. Recommend that we not oppose the replacement of Col Ambrose.

BSB
R. S. B.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

CONFIDENTIAL

30 May 1951

MEMO TO GEN ENNIS

1. Reference FEAF suggestion that they replace Col Ambrose (currently on DS in PSYWAR G-2), following information submitted:

a. Mr. Greene states that Gen Crabb (FEAF) called on him yesterday and discussed several matters including the subject of replacement of Col Ambrose. Gen Crabb felt that Col Ambrose should be assigned to an AF aircraft unit for professional reasons since his experience in such assignments had been limited. Gen Crabb stated further that Col Ambrose' personality was such that he irritated people in his operations section when he came to FEAF in an effort to coordinate PSYWAR matters - a job that Mr. Greene has given him on several occasions. It was Gen Crabb's belief that it was in the best interests of Col Ambrose, and PSYWAR as well, to replace him.

b. Mr. Greene commented on the above to the effect that he concurs in Gen Crabb's suggestion, that Col Ambrose had not proved too effective in his liaison contacts with FEAF or in his other staff duties in the PSYWAR Section, particularly in that he has not shown too much ability to grasp problems of PSYWAR planning.

OK c. Gen Crabb did not mention who he would send as a replacement but Mr. Greene believes it will be one of a group of several USAF officers in FEAF who have had the same PSYWAR schooling and experience as Col Ambrose.

OK d. Gen Crabb also suggested to Mr. Greene that one of our PSYWAR officers sit in on planning conferences in FEAF Operations Section so that our section would be kept posted on overall FEAF operations. He also said he would have one of his officers sit in on our planning conferences. Mr. Greene informed him that we had repeatedly asked the FEAF PSYWAR Section (part of FEAF Opns Sec) to participate in our planning conferences, but that so far there had been practically no response. Gen Crabb said he would correct this.

2. Reference question of PSYWAR having been offered a planning group, no one seems to know of any such offer having been made by anyone. Our big problem in PSYWAR from the very start has been one of personnel shortage. Most all of the available people have had to be used to carry on operations. As a result PSYWAR has never been able to constitute an adequate staff group for planning purposes. Our plans for constituting a special staff section contemplated a separation of operations from this staff section as soon as possible. The arrival of the 1st RB&L Gp (ETA July) will permit this.

3. Recommend that we not oppose the replacement of Col Ambrose.

R. S. B.

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By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

29059

APO 500
28 May 1951

SUBJECT: PSYWAR "Voice" Airplane Operations

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

1. PSYWAR officer, Eighth Army, reported by telephone late afternoon today that in one operation 27 May the PSYWAR "Voice" airplane had induced a group of approximately two hundred (200) CCF troops to come out of the hills and had successfully "talked" this group to our lines where they surrendered. He also reported that several operations had been conducted today with some success but that details were lacking.

2. Details of these operations will be included in the Eighth Army's weekly operation report on PSYWAR (due here Thursday 31 May) and will be covered in our report to DA which will be prepared Saturday 2 June.

G-2 File

G.W.P.
R.F.E.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Report mentioned in above memo made verbally by Lt Col Connor, 8th Army PSYWAR Officer to Mr Greene, PSYWAR/G-2 GHQ and telephoned by Mr Greene to Col Power. General Ennis directed informational memo be forwarded to CofS.

GWP 26-6166

DISPATCHED
29 MAY 1951
GHQ
G2

(64)
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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

RESTRICTED

31745

Col Power 26-6166

PSYWAR Publicity

G2 PIO 8 June 1951

1. 1. Reference telephone conversation PIO (Col Preston) to G2 (Col Power) in which Col Preston suggested consideration be given to the following:

a. Advisability of discontinuing distribution of PSYWAR leaflets to representatives of the press in view of the prohibition against publicity on PSYWAR.

b. Furnishing PIO with statement that PIO can give to members of the press explaining why publicity on PSYWAR is prohibited.

2. G-2 agrees that distribution of leaflets to the press should be discontinued and will hereafter furnish only two (2) copies to PIO for his information only.

3. Reference item 1b above, G-2 recognizes PIO's desire to give to the press satisfactory explanation for the prohibition of PSYWAR publicity and interposes no objection to informing the press of the substance of paragraph 15, FM 33-5 (Aug 49) which is quoted for your information as follows:

"15. PUBLICITY. Psychological warfare operations by their very nature are known to the enemy. However, experience indicates that any widespread publicity concerning details or specific techniques of psychological warfare operations, particularly that which gives any indication of boasting of success, is disadvantageous. Such publicity tends to increase the enemy's soldier's resistance to psychological warfare measures and gives the enemy propagandist a good counterpropaganda theme. The necessity for appreciation of the capabilities of psychological warfare and for support of such operations by the civilian public and the armed forces must be considered in regard to publicity. The weight of the several factors concerning publicity will provide the basis for release of information concerning psychological warfare operations in any particular case. Emphasis of specific or widespread success in psychological warfare should be avoided."

4. It is G-2 opinion that publicity on PSYWAR should be controlled by the PSYWAR Officer, GHQ and that this should be effected by continuing to prohibit all publicity on PSYWAR except that prepared and released by him.

S/
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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1954
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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By DR NARA Date 1/13/12

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

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30808

Col Power
26-6166

Publicity on PSYWAR

G2 CofS 5 June 1951

1. 1. Your attention is invited to press release attached hereto as an inclosure. This release, apparently prepared by PSYWAR Officer, DA (Brig Gen McClure), contains information on:

a. Effectiveness of our PSYWAR Program

b. Past and current operations

c. Contemplated innovations

d. Current PSYWAR objectives

2. Current FEC policy prohibits all publicity on PSYWAR except that which may be prepared and released by GHQ.

3. While visiting in FEC recently Gen McClure indicated to FEC PSYWAR officer (Mr. Greene) that he considered it advisable to give publicity to PSYWAR operations in order to acquaint the public with the fact that we have been active in this field. It was his idea that cognizance of our efforts by the public would facilitate his efforts in obtaining support for PSYWAR.

4. While it may be necessary for him to release sufficient information to make the public, and particularly Congress, aware of the importance of PSYWAR in order to obtain appropriations and other support, it is felt that our current theater policy of frowning on PSYWAR publicity emanating from this theater should be continued in effect.

1 Incl: Press Release

R. F. E.

G-2 file

MEMO FOR RECORD:
Above C/S, prepared at direction of Gen Ennis, is self explanatory.

G.W.P. 26-6166

FILE

(63)

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

29508

Col Power 26-6166

Publicity on Psychological Warfare

G-2 PIO 30 May 1951

1. 1. References are:

a. Check sheet PI to CofS thru G2, subject: "Recommendations to EUSAK for Checking Security of News Releases," dated 3 March 1951.

b. CINCFE Radio to Eighth Army Z 45425, dated 13 March 1951.

c. FEAF Publicity Release No. 862 (Incl 1).

2. Policy approved in Reference 1a apparently was not announced to subordinate commands other than Eighth Army.

3. Recommend that action be taken to inform FEAF and COMNAVFE of policy of prohibiting publicity on PSYWAR except for that publicity prepared and released by GHQ.

1 Incl:
FEAF Publicity Release
dtd 29 May 51

- - - -

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30 MAY 1951
GHQ
G2

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By NARA Date 1/13/12

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

28 May 1951

SUBJECT: PsyWar Exploitation of PW Surrender

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

PsyWar Eighth Army phoned Mr. Greene 1400 27 May and stated that up to 1200 hrs 27 May over 1000 CCF had been captured west of Chunchon and that they were making extensive drop on front line of surrender and good treatment leaflets in conjunction with voice broadcasts from the air and ground. Mr. Greene advised that immediate shipment of 1 million surrender passes would be made followed by an additional million 29 May. Later reports indicated 2 full CCF companies had surrendered. PsyWar Eighth Army was further advised to exploit this if verified by tactical leaflet identifying company and inviting other units to follow. Also that PsyWar FEC would prepare leaflet along same lines for airdrop night of 28 May.

Note: Later report. IX Corps reported 2598 PW's, mostly Chinese, taken in 24 hour period ending 271800K, 1806 captured by 24th Division. CCF PW's stated that two (2) enemy battalions wanted to surrender.

Prior to 27 May no unit larger than a squad had been surrendered as a unit. If it is verified that two (2) companies did surrender as reported, vigorous steps in exploitation will be continued.

G2 File

R.F.E.

M/R: 1. Lt Col Conine, SGS (Tel 26-7142) called the Duty Officer and req verification of a report that had reached the CinC to the effect that two Chinese companies had given up with officers and men. If this or similar incident of mass surrenders or surrender by units are true, CinC desires PSYWAR take immediate action to exploit this situation. 2. CinC wants report on his desk the first thing in the morning (28 May 51) as to the action PSWAR has taken. 3. Lt Col Conine req that he be notified this evening (27 May) as to the veracity of the report. 4. The above info was conveyed to Col Ewert, Sr Duty Off and Mr. J. Greene for action.

AGB

1. T/Intel (Mr. Robbins) teleph 8th Army and was unable to secure verification; Takenton will phone if can verify. 2. Mr. Greene phoned his 8th Army epople to keep in touch and prepare leaflet exploiting theme of unit surrender if story can be verified. (8th A has facilities for printing and can operate anytime; in Tokyo we do not have night facilities unless prearranged). Mr. Greene already had sent over today 1 million surrender leaflets; more tomorrow. Will print special leaflet tomorrow if story true. 3. Mr. Greene drafted Memo for CinC on steps taken and planned if rumor verified and turned over to Col Power to present to Gen Ennis first thing tomorrow morning. (Memo sent to CofS, 28 May 51).

Ewert

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By NARA Date 1/13/78

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

GB/GWP/dd
23 May 1951

OUTGOING MESSAGE

proofread JR

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: CG FEAF . . . . . PRIORITY (COURIER)

INFO: CG ARMY EIGHT . . . . . ROUTINE

CX63177 Ref Eighth Army Msg G-5-4005 KGO dtd 23 May 51 passed to you for action. Request favorable consideration if such ACTION is considered feasible under conditions stated.

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

APPROVED:

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, GSC
Deputy

Copies to:
CofS (5)
G-2 (return)
G-2 MISD (return)
G-2 MISD/Spec Proj (return)
G-3

Reference message is G-5-4005 KGO.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Cited Eighth Army radio recommended that FEAF be requested to reconsider prohibition of daylight PSYWAR missions and allow daylight missions at 6000 feet, within roughly 2 miles of front lines and away from known heavy flak areas. Eighth Army radio passed to FEAF for action 23 May 51.

Instant msg self-explanatory.

GWP 26-6166

G-2 File Copy

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/78

4214
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

23 May 1951

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO: CG FEAR

INFO: CG EIGHT ARMY

passed to you for action

Ref Eighth Army Msg G-5-4005 KGO dtd 23 May 51 Request favorable consideration if such action is considered feasible under conditions stated.

OFFICIAL:

M/R

Cited Eighth Army radio ~~requested~~ recommended that FEAF be requested to reconsider prohibition of daylight PSYWAR missions and allow daylight missions at 6000 feet, within roughly 2 miles of front lines and away from known heavy flak areas. Eighth Army radio passed to FEAF for action 23 May 51 Instant msg self explanatory

GWP

26-6166

Distrib

C of S
G-2
G-2 (Col Penn)
G-2 (MIS Div)
G-2 (PSYWAR)
G-3

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813562
By NARA Date 1/13/78

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3054

SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

ENEMY CHEMICAL & B.W. ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST

1. The attached letter from G-2 DA forwards the following study on the above subject with supporting details:

a. The recent appearances in Communist propaganda of the alleged use by American forces of toxic chemical and biological agents against the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces in Korea have become so numerous as to raise the suspicion that the Communists may be building up a justification case.

b. Pravda on 10 May stated that "American troops are using tear gas in Korea and have other types of poison gas shells in reserve in Japan." The North Korean Communists have demanded the trial of our Commanders in the Far East as war criminals for "using bacteriological warfare in the Korean war." An official protest has been forwarded by the North Korean Government to the United Nations embodying this accusation. There are numerous other broadcasts along this line.

c. At the same time G-2 has received numerous reports indicating preparations of a chemical and biological warfare potential in China. The details of these reports are contained in the attached Tab A.

d. On the basis of present evidence it is concluded that the Communist propaganda against alleged use of American CBW transcends the ordinary hate campaign and probably is, in addition, a justification for Communist preparations in these fields and possible future use. There is no concrete evidence available to indicate that the Communists are planning the immediate use of CW or BW.

2. G-2 concurs in DA conclusions above. This subject has been mentioned previously in the Daily Intelligence Summary including a speculation on 29 Mar 50 that this propaganda campaign was a possible justification for use. The substance of this report will be published in the DIS and will be brought to the attention of the Chemical Section and intelligence collecting agencies.

G-2 Files

Incl:
DA ltr w/Incl.

Distribution:
Chemical Section
Medical Section
FEAF
COMNAVFE
G-2
G-2 File
T/Intell
T/Intell Opns
JSOB
MIS Div

(56)

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By NARA Date 1/13/78

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

13 June 1951

SUBJECT: DA Radio Re Countering Communist BW Propaganda

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

1. Reference is made to subject Radio, DA 93711, with comment thereon by Chief of Staff (Incl 1).

2. In accordance with instructions contained in Chief of Staff comment a draft statement for release is attached as Incl 2 for consideration of CinC. Statement has been prepared along lines proposed by PSYWAR, DA.

3. It will be recalled that the CinC recently queried PSYWAR, G-2 on advisability of countering communist charges that UN forces were resorting to Bacteriological Warfare and that PSYWAR, G-2 recommended that no direct answer or denial of such charges be made but that these charges be counteracted indirectly in our PSYWAR leaflets and radio broadcasts by pointing out measures undertaken by UN forces to safeguard health in Korea. These recommendations were approved by Chief of Staff (initials DOH) 27 May 51. The PSYWAR, G-2 recommendations above were in consonance with the then current guidance received from Washington. See Incl 3 for extract copy of cited guidance. However, on 30 May, radio was received from PSYWAR, DA (Incl 4) stating that State Department was revising guidance on the subject and authorizing direct denial of charges.

4. Subject radio (Incl 1) indicates that State and Defense Departments feel that communist charges have increased to such an extent that General Ridgway should publicly issue direct denial of communist charges and contains PSYWAR, DA suggested outline for such statement. However, trends as indicated by radio broadcasts from Peiping, Pyongyang, and Moscow show a marked decline in enemy BW propaganda rather than an increase as indicated in subject radio. Beginning 20 May enemy propaganda has tapered off to zero. The last broadcast covering such propaganda was made 31 May. In sharp contrast, the communists have been placing considerable emphasis on countering our positive propaganda on UN forces health program for Korea and assistance given areas on combatting disease brought into Korea by CCF.

5. PSYWAR, G-2 believes that the original policy against direct denial either in the form of public statement or in PSYWAR leaflets and radio broadcasts is sound. Furthermore, it is believed that the action proposed in subject DA radio would undoubtedly be followed by a renewed propaganda campaign on this subject by the communists. It will be recalled that a denial was made in UN report submitted at the end of May (Incl 5).

6. A proposed reply to DA which sets forth the views contained in paragraph 5 above is attached as Incl 6.

7. Recommend that no statement as proposed in subject radio be released and that proposed radio (Incl 6) be approved for dispatch to DA.

51
R.F.E.

6 Incls:
1. DA Radio 93711 W/CofS comment
2. Dft Publicity Release
3. Ext Cy State Dept Guidance No. 716
4. DA Radio 92688
5. Cy of PSYWAR part of UN report
6. Dft radio to DA

H/cb
C/S 4 Bush
13 Jun 1951

M/R: CinC query referred to in para 3 inst memo was ansered by G-2 Memo to CofS dated 25 May 51, subj: "Communist Propaganda on Bilological Warfare." Info relative to decline in enemy propaganda referred to in para 4 inst memo obtained from PSYWAR, G-2 (Mr. Greene) and is based upon daily surveillance by PSYWAR personnel. Otherwise inst memo self-explanatory.

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GWP 26-6166

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PRESS RELEASE

In a brazen effort to divert public attention from their own incompetence and callous disregard for human suffering, the Communist propaganda machine in recent weeks has alleged that disease in North Korea is caused by bacteriological warfare waged by the United Nations forces.

These malicious falsehoods not merely lack even the slightest foundation in fact; they constitute a monstrous perversion of the truth on a scale that is remarkable even for the Communists.

The United Nations forces have neither used nor contemplated the use of bacteriological weapons in Korea. Any suggestion of the sort would be repugnant to the very purpose of the United Nations effort in Korea. On the contrary, the UN forces have lent vigorous assistance to the Korean public health program and have taken extraordinary measures to prevent and control disease in Korea among civilians as well as among soldiers.

Faced with the enormous problems arising from the influx of millions of refugees fleeing from Communist tyranny, the United Nations Command has carried out a disease control and prevention program whose success is the more remarkable because it has been conducted under battle conditions and the most difficult circumstances. The incredible laxity of public health measures in Communist-controlled areas is a constant and dangerous threat to the maintenance of public health in adjacent free areas.

It is manifest that if these Communist allegations had the slightest factual basis, the proper course would have been to call for an immediate investigation by impartial representatives of the International Red Cross and the United Nations Commission (UNCURK) who are already in Korea. The failure of the Communists to ask for such an investigation, like their persistent refusal to permit impartial representatives even to enter areas under the control of the aggressors, is clear and unmistakeable proof not only that these allegations are brazen lies, but also that the Communists have much to conceal from public view.

It is not difficult to understand why the Communists fear the revelation of the facts concerning public health in areas under their control. They have utterly failed to take even the most elementary precautions for

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Incl 2

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protecting civilian health in the areas which they have subjugated. The testimony of thousands of civilian refugees and former enemy soldiers is eloquent proof of this. Current propaganda efforts by the Communists to shift to the United Nations forces the responsibility for this tragic situation arising from their own incompetence, are a further demonstration.

Even more striking is the total indifference, marked by callousness almost beyond belief, which the Communist leaders have shown to the suffering of their own soldiers. Among the Chinese and North Korean prisoners taken by the United Nations forces have been many thousands who during their service with the Communist armies of aggression, contracted various diseases for lack of proper health measures and prompt medical treatment.

The United Nations forces have extended to these prisoners the best and most modern medical care, identical with that provided our own soldiers. A naval vessel of the UN Command, with expert doctors and professional assistants, and every necessary medical facility, has been made exclusively available for the treatment of the most seriously ill among these enemy soldiers. Yet unscrupulous Communist propaganda has been cynical enough to try to misrepresent as a bacteriological warfare station this vessel which is providing Chinese and North Korean soldiers the medical treatment denied them by Communist officers.

Thousands upon thousands of these soldiers have described how they were forced by Communist officers to continue fighting despite serious illness or combat wounds. No one realized more acutely than these enemy soldiers the striking contrast between the treatment accorded them by the UN forces and that given them by their own army. No amount of Communist prevarication can hide from them the truth which they have seen with their own eyes.

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By AQ NARA Date 1/13/78

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT COPY STATE DEPT OVERNIGHT INFO POLICY GUIDANCE NO 716, 18 May 1951
(Radio Cite No. NR 180016 Z)

X X X X X X X X X X X

"2. Korea.

Media should not give added currency and emphasis to north Korean Communist charges to UN that US is using biological warfare in Korea by dignifying those charges with direct refutation. Rather, opportunities should sought to demonstrate that epidemics of smallpox etc, on which charges are based, are undoubtedly result of Communist leaders callous disregard for welfare of both their troops and civilian population shown by their failure to take adequate measures to prevent outbreaks of disease. Comment should also point up fact that UN Forces, ROK civilians and all POWs are subject to intensive innoculation programs, and that other sanitation programs are being actively and constantly pushed throut ROK."

X X X X X X X X X X X

Incl 3.

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By NARA Date 1/13/12

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EXTRACT from 16 - 31 May UN Report.

X X X X X X X X X X X

"Heavy Communist losses during the winter and spring have been followed by malicious Communist propaganda alleging that UN Forces have resorted to bacteriological and chemical warfare. These charges are wholly groundless and manifestly absurd. But it has been definitely established that not only the enemy's armies, but also the civilian population under their domination, have suffered terrible losses to disease because of the lack of basic preventive and curative measures. By depriving the civilians of their normal food stocks, the Chinese and North Korean masters have aggravated the effects of communicable diseases; by providing virtually no medical care, they alone bear the guilt of wanton and inhuman neglect. Signed Ridgway."

X X X X X X X X X X

Incl 5

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By NARA Date 1/13/78

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE GB/MISD/GWP/dy
13 June 1951

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DA WASH DC . . . . . ROUTINE

URMSG DA 93711 trends as indicated by broadcasts Peiping, Pyongyang and Moscow show marked decline communist accusations bacteriological warfare beginning 20 May and tapering off until 1 June when tirades ceased entirely. Therefor consider inadvisable to issue further denials particularly when May 30 UN report by this headquarters contained denials. Other themes your message currently employed, and epidemic control vessel was amply clarified prior to decline of communist bacteriological propaganda.

OFFICIAL: APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, GSC
Deputy

Copies to:
CofS
G-3 (return)
G-2 (return)
G-2 MIS Div (return)

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. DA Radio 93711 stated State Dept suggests and Defense Dept concurs that in view of increasing virulence Commie propaganda on BW, consider it desirable Gen Ridgway publicly issue denial charges. PSYWAR DA proposed general outline for statement.

2. Denial of commie charges was made in UNC report to UN dated 30 May.

3. In memo to CofS, 25 May 51 subject: "Communist Propaganda on BW," G-2 proposed policy refraining from direct answer and denial but countering indirectly by PSYWAR leaflets and radio broadcasts covering measures undertaken by UN Forces to safeguard health in Korea. CofS approval policy 27 May 51, initials "DOH."

4. Daily surveillance of enemy radio broadcasts indicates decline in such propaganda started 20 May 51. Last such broadcast made 31 May 51.

5. PSYWAR, G-2 considers it inadvisable to lend dignity to Commie charges by making further denial. Further denial would probably be followed by renewed enemy propaganda charges on this subj.

6. Approved by CofS (initials _____), ___Jun 51.

DRAFT

GWP_____26-6166

Incl 6

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By NARA Date 1/13/78

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

25 May 1951

SUBJECT: Communist Propaganda on Biological Warfare

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

1. Incl 1 is draft PSYWAR Section for the 31 May UN report to the United Nations Security Council, including reference to recent Communist propaganda on biological warfare.

2. Incl 2 is draft radio to DA, concerning screening of press releases on disease and biological or chemical warfare.

3. Radio Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow have for some time been charging the UN forces with atrocities and the use of germ and chemical warfare in Korea. The attached charts (Incls 3, 4, and 5) show the incidence of these themes during April over the North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet radios.

4. Even in the aggregate, however, these themes constitute a relatively small percentage of total Communist radio time, and it is unlikely that they reach very many people. Many broadcasts are by short wave, and there are very few short wave receivers in the Orient. Others, suchhas Pyongyang medium wave broadcasts, are audible only within a short radius because of low transmission power.

5. An established principle in PSYWAR is that enemy charges should not be directly answered. The reasons for this are particularly strong in this case. The majority of Korea's radio receivers are in UN held territory, where people would find it difficult to pick up Communist broadcasts even if inclined to do so. A UN radio denial would reach many more people than the original Communist broadcasts did, and thus would merely help the enemy by spreading his propaganda to people who would otherwise never hear about it. A denial is fundamentally defensive and many people will reason that if the charges were not at least partly true, there would be no need to deny them. To dignify enemy charges with an answer is an admission of concern. The best way to counteract whatever effect such charges may have is to develop positive propaganda on what the US and UN are doing to prevent and control disease in Korea. This is being done.

6. It is probable that this enemy propaganda is intended primarily to create doubt or suspicion in the minds of foreigners who learn of the charges through their own press or radio relay. There are plausible motives for this. One is to divert attention from Communist setbacks in Korea, for it is noteworthy that atrocity, gas, and germ warfare charges increase after major Communist reverses. Another reason is to create an alibi for Communist inability to cope with disease in North Korea, which may be due to the influx of Chinese troops. A third reason may well be to create justification for their own possible use of germ or gas warfare.

If it is considered necessary to report these enemy charges to the United Nations, as is done in Incl 1, we must anticipate increased enemy propaganda of this type when UN report is publicized. Furthermore publicity in connection with Gen Sam's return to the U.S. may similarly result in exploitation by enemy propaganda. FWC/G-2 plans to vigorously counter enemy propaganda by anticipatory positive propaganda (radio and leaflets) released prior to these two events. General themes to be used: (1) UN/US efforts to combat contagious diseases in all of Korea, (2) contagious diseases brought into Korea by Chinese.

8. It is recommended:

a. That the FEC make no departure from the accepted PSYWAR principle

DISPATCHED 25 MAY 1951 G-2 GHQ

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Authority 813562
By NARA Date 1/13/78

Memo to CofS, Subj: "Communist Propaganda on Biological Warfare," 25 May 51 (cont)

that enemy charges not be directly answered or denied.

b. That the FEC continue positive propaganda on US and UN action to prevent and control disease in Korea as proposed in par 7 above.

c. That Incls 1 and 2 be approved.

R.F.E.

5 Incls:
1. Draft PSYWAR Section UN Report
2. Draft radio to DA
3. Chart Korean Broadcasts
4. Chart Chinese Broadcasts
5. Chart Russian Broadcasts

MEMO FOR RECORD:
Prepared in accordance with verbal instructions from Gen Ennis to PWB (Mr. Greene) 23 Mar 51. Self-explanatory.

TNS 26-7489 JWG 26-8939

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Authority 813562
By NARA Date 1/13/78

SUMMARY OF FM 33-5, "PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS"

Psychological warfare consists of dissemination of ideas and information intended to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of the enemy, and aid in expediting defeat of enemy armed forces by decreasing their morale and combat efficiency, inducing them to surrender or desert, and sustaining morale of friendly elements in enemy areas. It must create and maintain confidence, credibility, and audience interest.

National level: A national propaganda agency outside the armed forces is anticipated in a future war. This agency may be in the State Department, or another Executive Department, or may be independent. However organized, the program will bear a close relationship to the psychological warfare activities of the armed forces. During wartime there must be mutual support and coordination between any national propaganda agency and psychological warfare of the armed forces to avoid conflicts and inconsistencies. Coordination of psychological warfare in combat operations and the national propaganda, both tactical and strategic, directed to any segment of the enemy or his coalition, results in mutual support. Enemy home front morale reacts on the morale of his armed forces, and vice versa. It is essential that the themes employed in psychological warfare activities do not conflict with national policy and that military commanders anticipate being called upon to support the national propaganda program. Basic psychological warfare plans are approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff where not only the interest of all the armed forces but also those of the civilian agencies can be coordinated. Subsequent continuing coordination will be provided through propaganda guidance and directives.

Staff Responsibility: Responsibility for general supervision of Army psychological warfare at the Department of Army level rests with the Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff United States Army. At theater, joint and combined task force, and theater Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters, this responsibility may be charged to a general staff section other than operations. However, at army group, army, corps, and division levels of command, primary responsibility for general staff coordination and supervision of psychological warfare operations rests with the operations officer. At theater and other high levels, details of planning for and conducting psychological warfare operations are performed by a special staff section headed by an officer designated as the psychological warfare officer.

Department of Army level: The General Staff, USA, is charged with psychological warfare planning, policy guidance, operational direction, Department of the Army liaison with joint agencies and non-military governmental agencies; sociological and psychological research; foreign propaganda analysis, and development of new and improved techniques.

Theater level: Details of planning and operations are normally assigned to a special staff section at the theater level. Duties of this section include: advising theater commander and his staff; planning, supervising, and coordinating psychological warfare operations in support of theater operational plans; coordination with other agencies, with political advisers to theater commander, and with national information services; evaluation of effectiveness of friendly, allied, and enemy psychological warfare; and proposing and planning use of new techniques; conduct operations such as theater-wide broadcasting from fixed or mobile radio stations; preparation of standard leaflets on subjects such as fair treatment of prisoners and safe conduct passes; news leaflets for air-drop; and black (covert) propaganda, if any.

Theater Psychological Warfare Division will usually consist of a chief, deputy chief, and five sub-divisions: Plans and Policies, Operations, Administration, Liaison, and Intelligence.

The Psychological Warfare Chief must discover appropriate psychological targets; plan for exploiting them; give technical supervision to psychological

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warfare activities within the command and advise on those in subordinate commands; supervise reports; and coordinate activities with other staff agencies.

Plans and Policies Group develops theater psychological plans; coordinates operations in the theater; develops new and improved techniques; estimates enemy vulnerabilities; plans and originates strategical and tactical psychological programs to exploit enemy vulnerabilities in conformity with national policy.

Operations Group prepares and arranges for the dissemination of propaganda material from Plans and Policies group by the most effective media; plans and supervises general and specialized training of personnel in psychological warfare; provides information, advice, and staff supervision for operations, conducts theater-level operations where required, and studies enemy operations.

Administration Group performs all administrative functions (personnel, supply, transport, fiscal, communications, etc.) which cannot be assumed by other headquarters agencies.

An Intelligence Group is necessary in large scale theater psychological warfare operations. Its duties are to establish intelligence requirements; conduct interrogations, interviews, and document research for information of use in psychological warfare; investigate and evaluate effectiveness of friendly, enemy, and allied psychological warfare; select, evaluate, and interpret for psychological warfare use, intelligence from all sources; indicate enemy psychological and morale strengths and weaknesses; estimate probable effectiveness of proposed plans and of current activities; analyze enemy propaganda activities to discover information useful for counterpropaganda and maintain data and records.

Liaison Group maintains close liaison between the theater psychological warfare division and corresponding units in subordinate or adjacent commands, other staff sections, and civilian propaganda agencies in the theater.

Field Units: Trained and organized units, including specialists familiar with the customs, traditions, and attitudes of the enemy, will be provided subordinate commands to put propaganda concepts into the language and form most likely to be accepted by the enemy. Specific physical facilities include: mobile printing equipment to produce leaflets or news sheets for dissemination by shell or aircraft; mobile public address systems mounted in vehicles and in aircraft; mobile broadcasting stations to disseminate programs to front line troops as well as to civilians in the rear areas.

Leaflets are classified as strategical, general tactical, local tactical, news sheets, and air-drop newspapers. They can be used with complete uniformity over a large area and hence are suited for use in large scale operations, or they can be used to exploit a particular tactical situation, such as advising the enemy that they are surrounded and that their only course is to surrender or be killed. Strategical leaflets are suited for a steady campaign against the morale of the civilian as well as the military and can cover wide areas. News leaflets and news sheets must contain selected, truthful information and are effective in establishing credibility and influencing the enemy. Both strategical and tactical leaflets must be coordinated with the overall program to be effective.

Radio is best suited for dispensing news and information to enemy troops and civilians over a wide area. It has limited use for psychological warfare in the combat area because of the small number of receivers in the hands of the troops and because it is difficult to establish an audience on a particular schedule and frequency. Broadcasts are made from fixed stations or from mobile broadcasting stations.

Loudspeaker systems mounted on small vehicles, tanks, or aircraft are particularly effective for local appeal, directing surrender, and delivering information to the enemy at close range.

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By NARA Date 1/13/78

Intelligence: The success of psychological warfare depends on a constant and voluminous flow of timely and accurate intelligence on the military situation, enemy morale, and related subjects. The tasks of intelligence in this regard are to discover promptly the major weaknesses in enemy morale; to anticipate situations in which psychological warfare may be used profitably, and furnish facts with which to exploit them; and to provide a gage of effectiveness of psychological warfare operations, both of allied, friendly, and enemy forces.

The following sources have proven especially useful in psychological warfare operations: prisoners of war, enemy civilians and refugees; captured documents; enemy broadcasts and press reports; agents; and special research on enemy areas. Although availability of complete intelligence is essential to psychological warfare operations, intelligence and psychological warfare officers must be careful that security is not violated and jeopardized in dissemination of material to the enemy.

Psychological warfare operations require, in addition to the usual order-of-battle information, intelligence on subjects such as:

On enemy troops: unit strengths, casualties; availability of replacements; time in combat; friction with civilians, among services, arms, or units, or between officers and enlisted men, rear echelon and combat troops, or regional or racial groups; command inefficiency or corruption; age groups over 45 or under 18; discipline; injustices in military legal system; desertion or absence without leave; insubordination, strikes, riots; immorality, drunkenness, debauchery; home front conditions; complaints about pay, food, living conditions, recreation, promotions, mail, health, sanitary conditions, medical care, individual equipment, uniform, leave and passes; and enemy counterpropaganda measures.

On enemy civilians: war aims of government, political and industrial leaders; disaffected or subversive elements; expected postwar problems; nature and success of domestic propaganda; racial or religious animosities; friction between government and church, government and industry, labor and capital, etc; police organizations and popular attitude towards them; food shortages or distribution inequities; blackmarketing; profiteering; shortages of housing or consumer goods; high taxation; public health; currency debasement; labor problems; civilian reaction to bombing; guided missile, or similar offensives.

Evaluation of effectiveness: Methods of evaluating effectiveness of psychological warfare include: study of enemy countermeasures, enemy morale changes, and observer reports; prisoner interrogation; number of prisoners having leaflets in their possession; and fluctuations in rate of taking prisoners. Enemy countermeasures are the best indicators of effectiveness, and information from enemy morale changes and observer reporters are important supporting factors.

Defense against enemy psychological warfare: The best weapon against enemy psychological warfare is proper motivation and full information to the individual soldier; a complete information and training program which gives the individual soldier an understanding of the enemy and his tactics (especially in psychological warfare) as well as confidence in his own ability and that of his unit, and belief in his country and its objectives. Prohibitions against listening to or reading enemy propaganda are un-American and do more harm than good. Direct replies to enemy propaganda are usually inadvisable because they dignify that propaganda and lend it substance by taking special cognizance of it. Physical action such as firing on loudspeakers or aircraft, or jamming broadcasts, may be taken if justified by the cost.

Training: Psychological warfare training is of two types: general training for all field forces, and specialized training for those who are to be psychological warfare specialists. General training will include the

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By NARA Date 1/13/78

nature and mission of psychological warfare; its role in support of combat; its capabilities and limitations; its media and their dissemination in the field; use of surrender leaflets; and defense against psychological attack. Specialized training will include, in addition to these subjects, detailed study of enemy psychological strengths and weaknesses; sources and use of intelligence; preparation and dissemination of psychological warfare leaflets, news copy, radio scripts, and loudspeaker messages; and evaluation of effectiveness of allied, friendly, and enemy psychological warfare operations.

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Authority 813562
By [illegible] NARA Date 1/13/72

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
4 May 1951

SUBJECT: Strategic Psychological Warfare

TO: Commanding General
Far East Air Forces
APO 925
ATTENTION: Deputy for Intelligence

G-2

1. Reference your letter, FEAF SR No. 299, dated 29 April, requesting information concerning effects of UN strategic propaganda upon North Korean civilians.

2. The military situation has not thus far permitted any systematic field study of the effects of UN strategic propaganda upon North Korean civilians, since most of North Korea has remained under enemy control except during parts of October and November, 1950.

3. During the brief period in which parts of North Korea were in friendly hands, psychological warfare investigation and evaluation teams under contract with the Department of Army were sent to Korea. It was necessary to give priority to the study of the effects of UN strategic and tactical propaganda on enemy troops; however, it became clear that a number of enemy soldiers had been influenced to surrender because of assurance by North Korean civilians that the UN forces treated prisoners well. ORO Staff Memorandum, ORO-S-39 (EUSAK), a report on this project conducted by the International Public Opinion Research Office, recommends the intensification of propaganda to North Korean civilians as one means of influencing enemy soldiers. A copy of this report is attached for your information.

4. No further reports have yet been completed on the effectiveness of strategic propaganda upon North Korean civilians. However, Allied experience in World War II clearly establishes the value of strategic propaganda, both to troops and to civilians in enemy territory, and such propaganda occupies a vital position in psychological warfare planning in this theater. Detailed studies of World War II experience and results have been published in the following documents, among others:

a. United States Strategic Bombing Survey: "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale."

b. United States Strategic Bombing Survey: "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale."

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
5 MAY 1951
DISPATCHED

SECRET

SUBJECT: Strategic Petrographical Matters

TO: Commanding General
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

ATTENTION: Deputy for Intelligence

1. Reference your letter, FEAF AS AC No. 925, dated 25 April, re-questing information concerning efforts of UN strategic bombardment upon North Korean military installations.

2. The following strategic bombardment upon North Korean military installations is suggested to achieve maximum effectiveness in the shortest practicable time. However, it is realized that logistic limitations may preclude such a program.

a. Initial attacks against strategic bombing objectives in North Korea should be directed against petroleum refining and storage facilities.

b. Initial attacks against strategic bombing objectives in North Korea should be directed against transportation facilities.

3. The military significance and economic importance of the following strategic bombing objectives in North Korea are considered sufficient to warrant their attack at the earliest practicable date:

a. Initial attacks against strategic bombing objectives in North Korea should be directed against petroleum refining and storage facilities.

b. Initial attacks against strategic bombing objectives in North Korea should be directed against transportation facilities.

4. Reference your letter, FEAF AS AC No. 925, dated 25 April, re-questing information concerning efforts of UN strategic bombardment upon North Korean military installations.

5. Attached hereto is a report entitled "Strategic Bombing Objectives in North Korea" (SECRET) CIC-22-0190, dated 17 April 1951, prepared by Air Force Intelligence Section, General Staff, FEC. Also attached hereto is a report on data required to determine the effect of strategic bombing upon North Korean military installations.

6. It is requested that the Deputy for Intelligence, FEAF, advise this headquarters of the action taken on the above matters.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[illegible]
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 820518
By [illegible] NARA Date 1/13/11

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813562
By AQ NARA Date 1/13/72

Subj: "Strategic Psychological Warfare", 4 May 1951

c. SHAEF Report, "Leaflet Operations," October 1945.

d. The Public Opinion Quarterly, issue for Fall, 1949, "Some Psychological Lessons From Leaflet Propaganda in World War II."

5. Copies of any subsequent reports or studies on this subject will be made available to you by the Psychological Warfare Branch, G2, GHQ, which is charged with continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of UN propaganda in this theater.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl
Report, ORO-S-39
1 Feb 51

/s/ R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, GSC
Deputy

G-2 File

MEMO FOR RECORD:
Delf-explanatory.

TNS 26-7489 JWG 26-8939

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Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/72

CONFIDENTIAL
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22583

IN REPLY REFER TO:
CONTROL NO. FEAF SR NO. 299

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

DATE 29 April 1951

12219

SUBJECT: Effect of UN Behind-the-Lines Propaganda Leaflet Drops

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Far East
APO 500
Attention: G-2

FROM: Headquarters
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

DEGREE OR NEED FOR THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC INFORMATION

- ☐ URGENT - REQUESTED BY _____ OTHERWISE CANNOT BE USED
- ☐ GREAT - DESIRED BY _____ OR AS SOON THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE
- ☒ ROUTINE - DESIRED AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE

1. Request the intelligence material described below be furnished this Headquarters, ATTN: Director of Intelligence, bearing the Control Number FEAF SR NO. 299.

2. On any documents requested, this office has indicated whether loan or retention copies are desired by using one of the following remarks: *("Loan"); ("Retention if possible, otherwise loan");* or *("Retention only")*.

3. An effort is being made at this Headquarters to evaluate the effects of UN behind-the-lines propaganda leaflet drops on the civilian population of North Korea.

4. Request copies of any reports or studies you may have made on the subject. If you do not have any material relevant to the subject, a special project is not requested.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

C. C. Andrews
Lt. Col. USAF - For
CHARLES Y. BANFILL
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Intelligence

REMARKS *(Including guidance, if appropriate)*

-DI-C-51 7613

INCLS:

FEAF AG NO 19540

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CLASSIFICATION

6545—FEC P&PC—10/50—1.5M

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1 MAY 1951
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SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

CONTROL NO. FEAF SR NO. 595 — DATE 29 April 1951

IN REPLY REFER TO:

SUBJECT: Effect of UN Bering-Five-Times Propaganda Leaflet Drops

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East — FROM: Headquarters Far East Air Forces

Attention: C-5

FAO 200 — FAO 925

FOR THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC INFORMATION / DEGREE OR NEED:

- [X] ROUTINE – DESIRED AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE
- [ ] GREAT – DESIRED BY _____ OR AS SOON THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE
- [ ] URGENT – REQUESTED BY _____ OTHERWISE CANNOT BE USED

1. Request the intelligence material described below be furnished this Headquarters, ATTN: Director of Intelligence, bearing the Control Number FEAF SR NO. 595

2. On any documents requested, this office has indicated whether loan or retention copies are desired by using one of the following terms: ("Loan"); ("Retention if possible, otherwise loan"); or ("Retention only").

3. An effort is being made at this Headquarters to evaluate the effects of UN Bering-five-times propaganda leaflet drops on the civilian population of North Korea.

4. Request copies of any reports or studies you may have made on the subject.

5. If you do not have any material relevant to the subject, a special project is not required.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CHARLES Y. BANFILL
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 895518
By NARA Date 1/13/11

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/72

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1951

AG 452( )GB Psy War progress ind

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500

TO: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

1. Current aircraft requirements for the support of FEC psychological warfare requirements represent an absolute minimum at this time; furthermore, studies as to the effectiveness of present operations indicate that the results currently being achieved through psychological warfare fully justify the effort expended.

2. A program has been initiated to progressively attack the morale of the enemy soldier from the moment he enters Korea until he arrives in the battle area. As this program reaches full implementation, it is anticipated that aircraft requirements will have to be increased.

3. Therefore, after careful study, and for the reasons outlined in pars 1 and 2 above, your recommendation as to cancellation of requirements cannot be favorably considered at this time.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RIDGWAY

G2 file

MEMO FOR RECORD

MF AG 452 (26 Mar 51) GB, 27 Mar 51 CINCFE to CG FEAF, reg four (4) additional acft each week for 1ft drops in Korea. Ltr, Vice Cmdr, FEAF to CINCFE, 17 Apr 51. Subj: Psychological Warfare Program, reg instr in MF AG 452 (26 Mar 51) GB, above, be rescinded. Instant 1st Ind is reply. Appvd by C of S 26 Apr 51. Initials D.O.H.

AB 26-6164

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND APO 500 APR 1951 G-3 DECLASSIFIED

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

MEMO FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Communist General Tan Ewan Ala Korean War

1. Current significant redeployment for the support of PEC psychological warfare unit known as Special Activities Detachment 10 presently operating in the Pusan area as cover for clandestine activities.

2. Information which could jeopardize the security of this project.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 81556
By NARA Date 1/13/12

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813562
By AG NARA Date 1/13/12

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COPY

HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
OFFICE OF THE VICE COMMANDER
APO 925

17 Apr 1951

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Program

TO : Commander-in-Chief
Far East
APO 500
ATTN: G-2

1. This headquarters desires to support the psychological warfare program to the fullest extent; however, it is believed that your most recent request for additional leaflet missions requires the diversion of more bombing effort than is justified. Your message MF AG452, dated 27 March 1951, will increase FEAF's air commitment to four B-29's per week in addition to seven cargo aircraft sorties presently provided.

2. The lack of evidence attesting to the effectiveness of this operation in rear areas raises a question as to the desirability of reducing our bomb carrying capacity by 320,000 pounds per month by diversion of this air effort.

3. In view of the above, request that instructions contained in your above cited message be rescinded.

/s/L. C. Craigie
/t/L. C. CRAIGIE
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

FEAF AG NO 18455

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