

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
 (Reclassify when filled out)

CONFIDENTIAL
 I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VT-94 (b) Based on or at USS LEXINGTON (CV16) (c) Report No. VP4-1
 (d) Take off: Date 20 June 1945 Time (LZT) 0445 Love (Zone); Lat. 18-03 N Long. 166-36E
 (e) Mission Attack Ground Installations on Wake Island (f) Time of Return 0750 L (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
TBM-3E	VT-94	9	None	8	4 - 500 lb. G.P.	.1 - .01

TBM-3E VT-6 USS HANCOCK

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
F4U-4	VBF-94	12	USS LEXINGTON	F4U-4	VBF-6	12	USS HANCOCK
F6F-5	VF-94	12	USS LEXINGTON	F6F-5	VF-6	14	USS HANCOCK
SB2C-4E	VB-94	14	USS LEXINGTON	SB2C-4E	VB-6	15	USS HANCOCK
*TBM-3E	VT-50	9	USS COWPENS	F6F-5	VF-50	12	USS COWPENS

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
			(ZONE)	NONE		
			(ZONE)	NONE		
			(ZONE)	NONE		

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) None

(i) Did Any Part of Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? No If so, Describe Clouds _____ (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(j) Time of Day and Brilliance of Sun or Moon Morning - Bright Sun - Broken to scattered clouds (k) Visibility Unrestricted/35 mi. (MILES)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			GUNS USED	(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER			
			NONE			

* Number of planes from ships other than LEXINGTON are based on ComCar Div 11 Secret Op Order 1-45. Exact participation should be taken from their AG-1 report

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) **Ground Installations *WA2-02**
05, 34, 27 (FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK) (b) Time Over Target(s) **0620 Love** (Zone)
- (c) Clouds Over Target **2300 ft. Cumulo-stratus clouds, 5/10th covered**
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target **Partially obscured by clouds** (e) Visibility **35 Miles**
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type **Glide Bombing** Bomb Sight Used **None**
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
- Bombs Dropped per Run **4** Spacing **15** Altitude of Bomb Release **2000**
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed **None** Probably Destroyed **None** Damaged **None**

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 WA2-27 Power & distillation plant approx	75 x 150'	2 TBM-3E VT-94	8 500# G.P.	None	Slight damage from blast effect misses
2 2 Revetment in disposal area across from WA2-27	Approx. 100' at opening	1 TBM-3E VT-94	4 500# G.P.	Possible	Slight
3 4 WA2-02 Barracks Area meter circle	1300' dia	2 TBM-3E VT-94	8 500# G.P.	4	All bombs hit target area but results indeterminate.
4 2 WA2-34-Power & distil. plant	250x100' 2 bldg.	3 TBM-3E VT-94	12 - 500# G.P.	None on WA2-34.	No bombs dropped in water. All 12 on hit target area WA2-02.
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

Pin-point targets assigned were not hit due to cloud conditions over the target. All planes dove through the clouds, breaking out at approximately 2300 ft. Aiming was against target area WA-202 for 5 planes, and all claim hits. Exact damage estimation is not possible due to the already pock-marked condition of the target area.

* Jicpea Bulletin 80-44 for target description.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? **Yes** Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

The attack, carried out as planned, was made following one VBF and one VF sweep of the atoll. After making one run, the 12 VF rejoined the 18 VT and 14 VB comprising the strike group assigned to target area WA-2. Rendezvous made at 12,000 feet, about 15 miles northwest of the atoll. Approach made by proceeding south until in position to turn into the lagoon and to make northerly runs on the targets on northwest Wake Island. Vt lost 5000 feet before pushover which was made over the south shore of Wilkes Island. The three 3-planes sections broke up, with one section assigned to WA2-27, one to WA2-34, and one to WA2-02 and 05. Glides of about 35 degrees were used, speeds approximately 290, and release at 2000 feet. Evasive action was taken by changes of altitude and course up to the push-over point, but thereafter until pull out, evasive action was not possible in the TBM-3E. Evasive action was taken on retrieval made normal to the beachline. Planes broke through the clouds at about 2300 feet, and released on targets of opportunity; 5 planes hitting target area WA2-02. One pilot did not release due to an electrical failure of the bomb release system and being too low for emergency release. One plane dropped over the target, hitting only the north beach. The planes assigned to target WA2-27 missed. The remaining 5 planes hit target area WA2-02. Several of the planes strafed while in the bombing runs. All targets assigned were camouflaged, difficult to locate in the pictures provided for briefing, but were relatively easy to pick up in the bombing run.

It is recommended that section leaders be prepared to take an appropriate interval during the approach so as to achieve a position satisfactory for taking evasive action and for picking a push-over point that will put the section on assigned targets. If all the planes stay together in close formation up until the push-over point, evasive action is impossible and trailing sections have an extremely hard task of hitting their targets from a push-over point selected by a leader to facilitate his own bombing run.

The photographs provided for briefing were taken from about 20,000 feet and were not too satisfactory. Much better shots were made by VF(P) on the first strike and proved helpful at later stages.

Operational: YE made homing, recognition, approach, and rendezvous in assigned sector easy. A microphone button on some plane in the strike became jammed and made communications on the strike very difficult. Flight operations were conducted with minimum difficulties. The TBM3E performed well under full load conditions. The 15 planes assigned to the squadron were operational for the first strikes and 13 were operational at days end.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

- Guns, Gunsights
- Turrets
- Ammunition
- Bombs, Torpedoes
- Bomb Sights
- Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

- Radio, Radar
- Homing Devices
- Visual Signals
- Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

- IFF
- Signals
- Battle Lights
- Procedures

PROTECTION

- Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection
- Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

- Parachutes
- Life Belts, Life Rafts
- Safety Belts
- Emergency Kits
- Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

- Compasses
- Driftsights
- Octants
- Automatic Pilots
- Charts
- Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

- Flight
- Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

- Airframe
- Control Surfaces
- Control System
- Dive Flaps
- Landing Gear
- Heating System
- Flight Characteristics At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

- Engines
- Engine Accessories
- Propellers
- Lubricating System
- Starters
- Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

- Auxiliary Plant
- Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

- Plane Servicing Equipment
- Personnel Facilities

Communications

The following notes were taken by Townsend, G.J., ARM3c(CA), who was flying in a TBM equipped with a spot jammer and an APR-1 receiver:

- "1. After taking off picked up a signal on 217 mc. This signal was picked up at about 30 mi. from ship. Someone was jamming this signal with a barrage jammer. (barrage jammer was covering 9 mc).
- "2. A signal was picked up at 203. No one was jamming it." (Townsend was instructed to jam a signal at 207 if he found one. The 203 signal was jammed later by a barrage jammer).
3. Townsend jammed a signal at 209 mc. (This probably the signal expected at 207 mc.) The receiver calibration could easily have been off 2 mc. He stated that the 209 mc signal seemed to be tracking. This signal came on and off intermittently.
4. At this time a barrage of jammer was heard in the neighborhood of 209 mc.
5. By this time the barrage jammers were covering from 201 mc to 228 mc. There was a null in the barrage at 205 mc to 207 mc. The most effective part of the barrage was from 209 mc to 228 mc.
6. Townsend stated that several of the barrage jammers were shutting off the equipment and turning it on again. This should not be done. The operators will be cautioned about this practice.
7. The above notes are set down as Townsend took them in a more or less chronological order.
8. Inasmuch as this was Townsend's first flight under fire, it is my opinion that he did an excellent job of observation and acted in a very cool manner.

"H.F. MARKER
RCM Officer."

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

W.W. GOODRICH, Lieut, A, USNR,
SIGNATURE RANK AND DUTY
ACI OFFICER.

F.C. BAMMAN, Jr., Lt. Cdr., USN
SIGNATURE RANK AND DUTY
Commanding Officer.

22 June 1945
DATE