

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 472

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 28 November 1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis

Subject: JAAF Suicide Organization & Operations

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt. Col. HANABANI Masao; Oct 41-Feb 43, instructor at Army Air Academy, Feb 42-Aug 43, attached to Air Service Board; Aug 42-Aug 45, military affairs section of the War Ministry.

Where interviewed: USSBS Headquarters


Interrogator: Major Edwin McElwain, GSC

Interpreter: Lt. Comdr Walter Nichols, USNR

Allied Officers Present: Capt Chalmers W. Roberts, AG
Lt. John Palfrey, SC

Summary:

Answers to previously submitted questions were given and further explanations offered in reply to questions. Number of planes and organizational setup during the Okinawa and, in part, Philippines campaigns; plans for defense against invasion of Kyushu; tables giving suicide planes at the end of the war.



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Q. The first set of questions concerns suicide operations by the Japanese Army Air Force during the Philippines Campaign. First - how many JAAF aircraft were employed in the Philippines suicide operations? Give their types and the number of each.

A. (prepared in advance) The number of planes used was about 220. (in response to questions) Special attack units were formed to meet the emergency and those who took part were volunteers. They were not forced to do so. The first suicide attack - an ad hoc, informal unit - was employed near Biak in May, 1944, and was led by Major TAKATA Katsushige. He used a KI 45, mark 2, and attacked destroyers. After that, Lt KOBI did the same thing about August, 1944, off the Nicobars in the Indian Ocean. Maj TAKATA was CO of the 5th Flying Regt and his was the first planned attack although there may have been other cases that occurred but the pilots did not think of suicide before their takeoff. In Lt KOBI's case, it was judged to be a deliberate attack although he didn't say so.

Seventeen special attack units were formed in Japan and sent south - 14 to the Philippines and three to Formosa. These volunteers were formed into units about the end of August when units here at home had heard about what was being done in the field and about the brave exploits of their fellow pilots. The climax came after the Saipan campaign. It was the propaganda effect of the attacks by these isolated pilots which caused enthusiasm in Japan - back in August - and which inflamed the pilots so that they felt they had to organize these units in order to help out and carry on. They heard that good tactical results were achieved by crashing the planes. All 14 of the units sent to the Philippines were expended. About half of them were fighter units (with 12 planes each) and the others were bombers (with 9 planes each). The KI 43 was the chief fighter used but also used were KI 27, 51, 48, and 67.

Out of every 12 planes sent out from Japan about 10 arrived in the Philippines. The 220 figure I presented as the total of suicide planes used in the Philippines includes those in these 14 units. The pilots came both from tactical and training units; those from tactical units came from the 10th. Flying Div (Tokyo area) while the others came from Rensei Hikotai (Operational Training Unit) and from Kyodo Hikoshidan (Advanced Training Flying Divs). These training personnel flew the KI-27s.

Q. How many JAAF suicide planes were believed to have been successful in hitting their objectives?

A. (prepared in advance) The number of planes scoring hits is estimated at 50%.

Q. Did the JAAF or the JNAF initiate the first suicide attack on shipping during the Philippine campaign? When was the first JAAF special attack launched? From what unit?

A. (prepared in advance) The 24th Flying Regt was the first unit. On 6 Nov 44 Maj NISHIO Tsunesaburo made the first planned special attack (TOKKO).

Q. List the JAAF units that participated in suicide attacks during the Philippines campaign.

A. (prepared in advance) Number and class of all types of aircraft used:

October	original strength	1200 planes
October	replacements	500 "
November	"	700 "
December	"	600 "
January	"	120 "
Total		3120 planes

About 50% of the planes were fighter planes, about 20% assault (SHUGEKIKI) and light bombers, and the rest various other types. Airforce units which engaged in the Philippines campaign are shown in a separate paper (See ANNEX #1). Of all these about 160 planes sent from Japan and 70 to 80 of those in the Philippines were used as special attack planes.

- Q. Who was in command of the few joint (JAAF-JNLF) Kamikaze operations in the Philippine theater?
- A. (prepared in advance) In joint operations, the Army mainly attacked the transports while the Navy mainly attacked the Task Force.
- Q. The next set of questions concern the Okinawa Campaign. First, how many JAAF aircraft were employed in the Okinawa suicide operations? Give their types and the numbers of each.
- A. (prepared in advance) About 920 planes (673 planes from Kyushu and about 250 planes from Formosa).
- Q. How many JAAF suicide aircraft were believed to have been successful in hitting their objectives?
- A. (prepared in advance) About 40% (about 370 planes).
- Q. Give the areas from which JAAF suicide planes staged, the number and type of aircraft, including trainers, and the location of each.
- A. (prepared in advance) The special attack forces sent from Kyushu bases were designated as SHIMBU units and were each organized into Number "X" SHIMBUTAI. The unit numbers went from 18 to 400 and were not continuous. There were about 76 units. The special attack forces sent from Formosa bases used the code name MAKOTO and were designated as the MAKOTO Number "X" unit.

(in response to questions) A total of 65 units actually took part since 20 units were in a primary training stage only and were not useable. In addition three units remained from Formosa, making a total actually used of 68 units during the Okinawa campaign. The actual number of planes used was about 920 of which 673 went from Kyushu as I have stated in my paper. The record of these units from the Sixth Air Army is reliable but the records from Formosa were not reliable because communication was difficult. The special attack units used from Kyushu were called SHIMBU, meaning "courageous". The common numbering system was for units from 18 to 400; numbers 1 to 17 having been used in the Philippines as I said earlier. Other units having low numbers - such as HJJA number 1 etc - were in a series all their own for training only and were not in the main numbering series. These names were given by the units themselves. The main numbering series was set up by Koku Hombu (Air HQ) for everybody and these names were not official at all. I can't tell you how many numbers were missing in the numbered series, 18 through 400.

- Q. List the JAAF units that participated in suicide attacks during the Okinawa campaign.

- A. (prepared in advance) The Sixth Air Army:

Unit	Plane Type	No. of Planes
1st KOGEKI SHUDAN HQ (12th Flying Brig)	KI-51	about 30
	KI-43	" 40
2nd KOGEKI SHUDAN HQ (100th Flying Brig)	KI-48	about 50
3rd KOGEKI SHUDAN HQ (6th Flying Brig)	KI-45	about 20
	KI-43	" 150
	KI-27	" 150
	type 2	" 50
	KI-36	" 40
	type 99	" 30
	KI-51	" 30
	KI-51 (sic)	" 80
KI-61	" 40	

List of attacks:

Attack No.	Date	Planes Used
1	4 Apr 45	about 40
2	11 " "	" 70
3	14 " "	" 80
4	18 " "	" 60
5	22 " "	" 70
6	8 May "	" 50
7	16 " "	" 40
8	25 " "	" 90
9	5 June "	" 30
		530

Note: Throughout the period of this whole campaign, 140 planes in small groups (10-12 planes) made surprise attacks:

Organization of the Sixth Air Army:

Flying forces-

- 6 Flying Brig (65 Flying Regt, 66 Flying Regt)
- 7 " " only HQ
- 12 " " only HQ
- 100 " " (101, 102, 103 Flying Regts)
- 2, 60, 110 Flying Regts; 76 Special Attack Units
- 10 Flying Div used specially as an interceptor force. (NOTE: 10 here appears to be an error for 12).

Ground forces-

- 41 ab, 51 ab (sector HQ)
- airfield battalions - 17
- airfield companies - 3
- airfield construction units - 8

Signal forces-

- 1 FTB (2 air signal HQ)
- 19 FTL, 24 FTL (air signal units)
- TM 11 (air-ground radio units)
- AF 1 (meteorological unit)

Supply and repair forces-

- 2 branch depots 7 FS (2 branch depots of the repair depot)
- 10 FH, 12 FH (supply depots)
- DS 10 (independent maintenance units)

Type of personnel used in special attack units:

- Operational units.....10%
- Advanced Flying Training Units.....20%
- Flying training units.....30%
- Primary training units (Renshu).....20%
- Flying training divisions.....20%

Q. The final questions are about the KETSU (defense of Japan against invasion) Operation. List the deployment of all JAAF suicide units, types and numbers of aircraft including trainers and the location of each unit.

A. (prepared in advance) Exclusive of the 20 units left over from the Okinawa operation, we first prepared 170 units and trained them. Next, we prepared six units in Manchuria. When the war ended we were in the midst of studying the further preparation of several hundred planes. The disposition of the Special Attack Force as of 9 August 1945 is shown on the attached (see ANNEX #2). Furthermore, there were 100-odd planes prepared in Formosa.

Q. How many planes were in the group of suicide units which were being planned when the war ended?

A. About 600 or 700 units were contemplated by September or October. Originally each unit consisted of 12 planes but when in actual campaigns, about six for each unit. The commander's ability and competence governed this. The planes on the chart (ANNEX #2) were all ready - pilots and planes.

Q. Do you have an estimate of the number of planes ready to escort these special attack planes?

A. Total planes, including fighter defense and fighter escort, about 800. There were, in addition to the planes shown in the charts (ANEX #2) about 150 in Formosa and about 200 more in China - the 13th Flying Div (in China) had, beyond those already committed to KETSU and shown here, about 200 more planes which were to be committed.

Q. What was the reason for the establishment of the 30th Flying Group (sent to hikoshudan) in October 1944 and for sending it to the Philippines?

A. It was organized from the pick of the Akeno Flying Training Division, which can well be called the fountainhead of operational fighters, in view of the importance of the Philippine campaign. At first it was to be a reinforcement unit and had no connection with the special attack units. When it got to the Philippines, however, it controlled some special attack units and its fighters flew cover for the suicide missions. Some of the pilots themselves volunteered and went on suicide missions. The 30th Flying Group was made up in Japan of the HQ of the group and the newly organized 200th Flying Rest. To this the 16th Flying Brig (51st and 52nd Flying Rests) was added. All these were sent to the Philippines.

Q. Did army suicide planes make attacks on Allied ships at Iwo Jima or during the Mariannas campaign?

A. No such attacks were made by Army units in either campaign. However, at Iwo several, possibly two or three, bombing attacks were made by planes from the Hamamatsu Flying Training Div (Kyodo Hikoshidan).

Q. Did Army suicide planes ever go on missions with more than one person in the plane?

A. When twin-engine planes were used, a crew member often went along with the pilot. A radio operator for example might go along. This was true with the BANDA and FUGAKU special attack units in the Philippines.

Q. Did the Army at any time use women pilots or crew members as has been reported during the war?

A. Women were never used nor was there ever any plan to use them.

Q. During the Philippines Campaign we had a report from a U.S. carrier that a Japanese suicide plane had crashed on the carrier deck and that when it was examined it was found that the pilot, dressed in some sort of ceremonial robe, had his feet tied to the pedals of his plane. Can you tell us anything about such a case?

A. I never heard of such a thing. It might have occurred on the pilot's own initiative, however.

NOTE: On 20 Oct 45 the questions listed above which brought forth the prepared answers were put to Maj SHIBA Bujiro, staff officer of the JAAF Air HQ. The following Q and A took place at the time the questions were submitted:

Q. In the Philippines special attack operations of the JAAF, were certain veteran pilots prevented from volunteering because of their flying experience?

A. Yes, some of the most experienced pilots were held back. Many of our best pilots, though, were suicide pilots in the Kamikaze units which were formed.

Q. How were the suicide units in the JAAF first formed?

A. Suicide units initially formed themselves. The war in the Philippines was going badly and Kamikaze appeared to be the only effective weapon remaining.

Q. Who ordered the formation of the first formal JAAF suicide units?

A. The Fourth Air Army. Individual suicide attacks were found not to be effective. By organizing into units, the remaining aircraft could be used with maximum effectiveness. Kamikaze was organized as a tactical plan. It was found to be an effective weapon and it became a part of the strategy for the defense of the home islands.

Q. How experienced were the suicide pilots at Okinawa compared with those in the Philippines?

A. They were less experienced. Many pilots had but 100 hours flying experience. Even the pilots that flew cover for the special attack planes often had as little as 300 flying hours.

Q. Regarding KETSU operations, how did the JAAF suicide force fit into the defense plans?

A. There was a general lack of organization - poor staff cooperation and the units were uncoordinated. The plans called for the expenditure of all JAAF aircraft; none were to be held back. The fighters which flew cover for the suicide units were to fly conventionally until all suicide aircraft had been used, then they were to become suicide pilots themselves.

Q. Considering the number of inexperienced pilots, did the JAAF plan to use pathfinder aircraft to lead the planes to their objectives?

A. Yes, it was talked about - staff officers leading the suicide flights to the target, that is - but most of us believed it wouldn't be necessary.

Q. How close to the beach did the JAAF plan to allow Allied ships to approach before launching suicide attacks?

A. The fighters could attack as far out as 400 miles but the farther out the more difficult the mission. The closer to the beach that the Allied ships came, the easier and more effective the suicide attacks. With the number of inexperienced pilots in the JAAF suicide units, I think the main suicide attacks would come when the ships were lying directly offshore.

NOTE: This interrogation was conducted by Lt. Robert Garred USNR, with Lt. Cmdr. D. Bartlett, USNR, as interpreter, and with the following officers present: Capt. C. M. Roberts, AC, and Capt R. E. Elsas, SC.

ANNEX #1:

JAAF Units Engaged in the Philippine Campaign

(Note: The paper submitted by Lt Col HANATANI was a report of "14th Area Army Subordinate Units (Air)" prepared by the Imperial Japanese War Ministry on 25 Oct 45. The paper lists the following Jap units with the number of personnel assigned to them - the entire list is reproduced in this annex, including both flying and air-around units)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No. of Personnel</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>No. of Personnel</u>
4th Air Army Hq.	398	12th Flying Regt.	552
4th Flying Division Hq.	100	200th Flying Regt.	513
1st Raiding Group Hq.	121	16th Flying Brig. Hq.	94
2nd Air Signal Unit Hq	97	51st Flying Regt.	322
132nd Airfield Bn.	372	52nd Flying Regt.	322
4th Special Air Signal Unit	259	52nd Ind Flying Sq.	117
5th Special Air Signal Unit	259	44th Ind Flying Sq.	117
Manila Army Air Depot	9557	45th Ind Flying Sq.	117
13th Flying Brig Hq.	94	3rd Flying Brig. Hq.	94
30th Flying Regt.	322	75th Flying Regt.	295
31st Flying Regt.	322	67th Flying Regt.	322
10th Flying Brig.	94	31st Ind Flying Sq.	96
27th Flying Regt. Hq.	394	29th Flying Regt.	322
45th Flying Regt. Hq.	259	18th Flying Regt.	322
15th Flying Regt. Hq.	122	55th Flying Regt.	322
12th Flying Brig. Ho.	94	38th Flying Regt.	322
11th Flying Regt.	322	21st Flying Brig. Ho.	94
71st Flying Regt.	322	66th Flying Regt.	394
72nd Flying Regt.	322	7th Flying Brig. Ho.	94
73rd Flying Regt.	322	12th Air Regt.	532
106th Flying Regt.	122	62nd Air Regt.	532
5th Flying Brig. Ho.	94	2nd Air Regt.	249
74th Flying Regt.	532	20th Ind Flying Sq.	117
95th Flying Regt.	532	22nd Flying Regt.	322
32nd Flying Regt.	394	54th Flying Regt.	322
246th Flying Regt.	322	67th Flying Regt.	322
54th Flying Regt.	322	83rd Flying Regt.	363
3rd Flying Regt.	295	24th Flying Regt.	322
14th Flying Regt.	532	6th Air Sector Command	44
22nd Flying Brig. Hq.	94	10th Air Sector Command	44
17th Flying Regt.	322	13th Air Sector Command	44
19th Flying Regt.	322	31st Air Sector Command	44
6th Flying Brig. Hq.	94	33rd Air Sector Command	44
8th Airfield Bn.	372	127th Air field Bn.	372
12th "	372	136th "	372
14th "	372	137th "	372
26th "	372	150th "	372
31st "	372	151st "	372
32nd "	372	152nd "	372
33rd "	372	153rd "	372
37th "	372	154th "	372
98th "	372	8th Airfield Co.	226
99th "	372	13th "	226
102nd "	458	32nd "	226
103rd "	458	48th "	226
114th "	458	49th "	226
123rd "	372	50th "	226
124th "	372	51st "	226
125th "	372	52nd "	226
126th "	372	53rd "	226

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No. of Personnel</u>		<u>Unit</u>	<u>No. of Personnel</u>	
54th Airfield Co.	226	:	4th Raiding Regt.	816	
3rd Field Airfield Const. Comd.	48	:	1st Glider Inf. Regt.	848	
5th Field Airfield Const. Comd.	48	:	2nd Glider Inf. Regt.	308	
24th Field Airfield Const. Unit	702	:	1st Machine Cannon Raid-		
125th	177	:	ing Unit	425	
126th	177	:	1st Engineer Raiding Unit	425	
127th	177	:	1st Signal Raiding Unit	406	
134th	177	:	6th Air Signal Regt.	1771	
135th	177	:	12th Air Signal Regt.	875	
138th	177	:	17th Air Signal Unit	499	
140th	177	:	22nd Air Signal Unit	449	
7th Field Air Supply Depot	187	:	5th Air-Ground Radio Unit	196	
22nd Field Meteorological Unit	732	:	9th	"	196
297th Ind Motor Tpt Co.	183	:	23rd	"	196
56th Construction Duty Co.	511	:	24th	"	196
2nd Raiding Brie. Hq.	63	:	25th	"	196
3rd Raiding Regt.	816	:	61st	"	196
9th Air Intelligence Regt.	809	:	2nd Navigation Unit	595	

ANNEX # 2.

"Sketch of the Combat Strength of the Air General Army as of 9 August 1945"

Note: (The sketch submitted by Lt Col HANATANI was a map of Japan, Korea and Manchuria and part of China showing in a box for each numbers of aircraft and in some cases numbers of suicide units for the various areas by commands. Certain airfields also were noted in each area. The following set of tables were taken directly from the sketch map and the airfields named under command units are listed therewith.)

(Chart #1)

Air General Army Combined Totals

	: 1 FA	: 5 FA	: 6 FA	: Directly	: Total	: 2 FA	: 1 FD	: 13 FD	: Combined								
	: a/c Unit	: a/c Unit	: a/c Unit	: Attached	: a/c Unit	: a/c	: a/c Unit	: a/c Unit	: a/c	: Total Unit							
K1 43	20	6	7	13	4	5	27	28	20	31	2	10	1	88	31		
K1 44	44				17		61					6		67			
K1 61			4		35	19	39	19						39	19		
K1 100	25				57	36	118							118			
K1 84	56	6	50		136	16	15	4	257	26	38		12	307	26		
K1 109			2				2							2			
K1 45	40	6		4	16	2	56	12	15					71	12		
K1 46	26	2	8		39	2	9	2	82	6	6	4	4	96	6		
K1 51		8	16	5	36	8	52	21	9	9			1	70	22		
K1 102	48						48							48			
K1 48		3	19	1			19	4					8	27	4		
K1 67	26	4			19	8	20		65	12				65	12		
K1 49																	
Other Combat Types	32		151		50		233							233			
K1 48		4		4				8							8		
K1 36		12		3		12		27					9	9	27		
K1 54		3		5		4		11						1	12		
K1 27				10		4		14						2	16		
K1 9		50		48		80		178						10	188		
TOTAL	317	103	257	93	414	159	80	11	1058	365	88	44	2	49	15	1249	383
									x6							x6	
									2196							2298	

Explanation given with chart: "TO" indicates number of units. The other figures are the number of planes ready for use on 9 August 1945. (The character for "TO" in the chart is shown above as "a/c".)

ANNEX # 2.

(Chart #2)

1st Flying Division

KI-43	31
KI-51	9
KI-46	<u>4</u>
Total:	44

Airfields marked: Sapporo, Obihiro

(Chart #3)

1st Air Army

	10 FD	12 FB	5 FB	26 FB	16 FS 28 FS	52 KD	Navy Tsubame II	Total:
KI 43	15					5		20
KI 44	44							44
KI 45	40							40
KI 84		46				10		56
KI 100	25							25
KI 46					26			26
KI 102				48				48
67								
KI 21			17		4	5		26
49								
Others:						24	8	32
TOTAL:	124	46	17	48	30	44	8	317

Airfields marked:

- 26 FB - Hachinoc, Noshiro, Nasuno
- 5 FB - Tsuchiura, Kiryu
- 12 FB - Omiya
- 10 FD - Fields Not Listed.
- 20 FC - Gifu, Nagoya

(Chart #4)

6th Air Army

	11 FD	12 FD	30 FC	6 FB	7 FB	100 FB	51 KD	Directly Attached	Total
Ki 44	17								17
Ki 45		16							16
Ki 61	35						1	9	44
Ki 84	7	13	84			23	9		126
Ki 100		29	28						57
Ki 46			12			5	12	10	39
Ki 51(43)				36					36
Ki 45(102)									
Ki 67									
Ki 21			6		13				19
Ki 49									
Others							50		50
TOTAL	59	58	130	36	13	28	60	10	414

Airfields marked:

- 27 FB - Kobe, Kumagaya
- 11 FD - Osaka
- 100 FB - Takamatsu
- 12 FD - Bofu, Ozuki, Ashiya
- 6 FB - Kurume,
- 7 FB - None Shown;
- 30 FC - Kumamoto, Miyazaki, 2 fields in Kagoshima
- 206 FBS - Fukuoka, Fusan

(Chart #5)

5th Air Army

	1 FB	2 FB	8 FB	53 KD	10 FBS	Directly Attached	Total
Ki 43	1			5	1		7
Ki 61					4		4
Ki 84	50						50
Ki 109						2	2
Ki 40						8	8
Ki 51		12				4	16
Ki 48			19				19
Others				127		24	151
TOTAL	51	12	19	132	5	38	257

ANNEX # 2

(Chart #5 Cont'd)

Airfields marked:

- 1 FB - Keijo
- 8 FB - Keijo
- 1 RBF - Kanko
- 2 FB - (no fields marked tho 2 FB is noted)

(Chart #6)

2nd Air Army

KI - 43	20
KI - 45	15
KI - 84	38
KI - 46	6
KI - 51	<u>9</u>
Total ::	88

Airfields marked: Anshan, Mukden, Hsinking, Chinchow, Liaoyang, Kunchuling, Harbin.

(Chart #7)

13th Flying Division

		Sakigake unit	Total
KI-43	6	4	10
KI-44	3	3	6
KI-84	9	3	12
KI-46	4	-	4
KI-36	8	1	9
KI-48	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>8</u>
Total	38	11	49

Airfields marked: None.

(Chart #8)

Directly Attached to Koku Sogun

	20 FC	27 FB	1 TS	Total
KI 84:	15			15
KI 100:	36			36
KI 67:				
KI 21:	2	16	2	20
49:				
KI 46:	4		5	9
TOTAL::	57	16	7	80

The following notes were later furnished by Lt. Col. KIMURA in further explanation of the charts reproduced above:

"The memorandum submitted on 19 August 1945 at Manila (i.e., by the Japanese surrender envoys) was prepared from estimated figures since the assembly of accurate figures would not have been ready in time for the scheduled departure of the military delegates. The report submitted on 12 September was based on dispatches and documents containing the status of each unit as of 31 August, and is consequently more accurate. The strength figures from Manchuria, China, North Korea, Formosa and the South Sea area were based on the memories of competent authorities since our communication with those areas were cut off."

"The figures (for planes outside Japan proper) have been double checked by collating previous and later information."

"Before the end of the war there were certain planes that belonged to no particular unit. These planes were in a supply reserve status, as it were, and were either planes that had just been delivered from the factories or planes upon which repairs had been completed but which had not yet been assigned to any force. There were about 200 of these planes in all."

"The 383 units indicated (i.e., on the Koku Sogun table above) are those which have completed the temporary organization. The plane numbers which show no units in the adjoining column indicate those units which have been equipped with planes only and have not yet effected temporary organization. Hence, there actually are more units than the temporarily organized 383."

"The airfields (listed after each table above) indicate the location of the main airfields which were set up for the use of suicide planes."

"The planes of the 383 units ($383 \times 6 = 2298$) represent the supply and the total number of planes indicated (in the tables) is the number of planes which could sortie as of August 9, 1945."

"A total of 3300 planes were scheduled for Japan proper and Korea (i.e., for suicide units). The figures for outside of Japan are not accurate. They are estimated to be as follows:

China	About 300 planes
Formosa	" 200 "
Southern areas	" 500 "

"Although the above figures represent the special suicide attack planes scheduled to be outfitted as of November 1; in the event that the decisive battle for Japan had begun, every single plane would have been employed as a special suicide attack plane down to the very last plane."

"The remaining 1000 planes were to have been procured from the planes already allocated to various units in Japan, training units, schools, etc. A summary of these planes by type of planes and number of planes is as follows:

Type	Number
MI-43	60
MI-44	20
MI-61	60
MI-84	40
MI-51	30
MI-48	20
MI-67	15
MI-30	15
MI-54	50
MI-34	20
MI-27	20
MI-9	650
	<u>1,000</u> . "