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# PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A KEY TO DEVELOPMENT

JUMP--McKILLOP  
MEMORIAL LECTURES  
1963

## **The William A. Jump—I. Thomas McKillop Memorial Lectures in Public Administration**

IN recognition of the service of William A. Jump and I. Thomas McKillop to the Department of Agriculture and their contributions to the development of public administration in the United States, the Graduate School in 1952 established the William A. Jump—I. Thomas McKillop Memorial Lectures in Public Administration.


### **WILLIAM ASHBY JUMP**

William A. Jump, who died on January 22, 1949, had been Department Budget Officer since the creation of that position in 1922 and Director of Finance since 1934 when the Office of Budget and Finance was established. His entire career was devoted to public service in the United States Department of Agriculture. In 1947, the Department, in recognition of his outstanding contributions, presented him with a Distinguished Service Award.

Mr. Jump was an outstanding leader in and out of the Federal Government in the field of public administration. Perhaps more than any other man in his lifetime, he influenced the development of modern budgetary and management concepts and the application of these concepts to the formulation and administration of Federal programs. In 1939-40, he served as a member of a subcommittee of the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement. He was one of a group which founded the American Society for Public Administration. After the war, he contributed to the organization of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and in 1947-48 was United States representative on the five-nation Subcommittee on Finance. He participated in the establishment of the United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School and taught in the School for many years, and was a guest lecturer on public administration in many of the leading colleges and universities in the country.

### **I. THOMAS MCKILLOP**

I. Thomas McKillop was killed at the age of 38 in an airplane accident on June 30, 1951. During his short span of years he was an educator, a private management consultant, and a public servant. Born in Scotland, he was educated in America. He joined the staff of the Rural Electrification Administration in 1947 as an Industrial Engineer and later was made Chief of the Management Division. In the Rural Electrification Administration his work was based on agency's philosophy of helping rural people help themselves. Mr. McKillop brought to public administration the philosophy of scientific management of which he had profound understanding, yet in the execution of his daily tasks he always considered the rights of individuals. His contribution to public administration stemmed from a rare combination of native ability, management proficiency, and belief in human values. Mr. McKillop was a leader in the Graduate School's public administration program and one of its most successful teachers.



PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION  
A KEY TO DEVELOPMENT

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THE WILLIAM A. JUMP — I. THOMAS MCKILLOP  
MEMORIAL LECTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
1963

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## FOREWORD

Since the end of the Second World War a great number of former dependent territories or colonies have become independent nations. Nearly the whole continent of Africa, large parts of Asia, and some of the Latin American territories are now no longer under colonial rule. With the coming of independence and the departure of the colonial administrators, these new nations are faced with the problem of developing administrative systems to carry on the business of governing. If these new nations are to maintain their independence and achieve some of the hoped for fruits of that independence there must be a large measure of economic and social development under stable governments.

This concern for public administration and development is not confined entirely to the newly independent nations. Several other countries which have been politically independent for a number of years have recently become more aware of the need for economic development and a better life for their people. In these nations existing institutions need to be adapted or new ones created to meet the challenges facing them.

Experience with governing varies greatly among these developing nations but nearly all are critically short of trained administrators. How to develop the needed institutions to promote economic and social development and train the people to administer them are two of the great problems facing these countries.

It was to these problems that this series of Jump—McKillop Lectures in Public Administration addressed itself.

RAYMOND A. IOANES

*Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service  
U. S. Department of Agriculture*



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The William A. Jump—I. Thomas McKillop Memorial Lectures in Public Administration are offered as a public service by the Graduate School. They are offered in honor of William A. Jump and I. Thomas McKillop, both of whom were outstanding civil servants—employees of the U. S. Department of Agriculture and leaders in the art and practice of management.

The present series of five lectures was planned by the following committee:

Oliver Caldwell, Acting Assistant Commissioner for International Education, Office of Education

Manlio DeAngelis, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Management, Bureau for Africa and Europe, Agency for International Development

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Raymond A. Ioanes (Chairman), Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture

The Graduate School wishes to thank Mr. Raymond A. Ioanes and the very able committee who planned and helped conduct this series of lectures. Mr. Fulker was responsible for carrying out the plans of the committee.

We are deeply indebted to the five speakers who generously shared their time and ideas with us.

All books published by the Graduate School are reviewed by the Graduate School's Committee on Publications. This committee, made up of information specialists and editors, renders invaluable

able service and advice in each phase of production. The members are Theodora E. Carlson, U. S. Office of Education; Jerome H. Perlmutter, Department of State; Robert P. Willing, Department of Labor; Forest J. Hall, Robert T. Hall, Harry P. Mileham, D. Harper Simms, and James McCormick (Chairman), U. S. Department of Agriculture. Vera Jensen, of the Graduate School Staff, works with this committee and is responsible for the production and sale of publications.

This publication was edited by Dr. Burton Baker of the Foreign Agricultural Service. Mrs. Bessie I. Browning assisted in typing the manuscript. We are also indebted to Mr. Kenneth Olson, Foreign Agricultural Service and his staff for suggestions and help in making this publication possible. Mr. Ben Murrow and Miss Dorothy Madert of the Office of Information, U. S. Department of Agriculture designed the cover.

JOHN B. HOLDEN  
*Director, Graduate School*

# ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

**David E. Bell**

**Administrator, Agency for International Development**

It is very significant and highly appropriate that this series of lectures deals with the question of public administration in developing countries, and that this particular subject should be considered under the general auspices of the Department of Agriculture of the United States. This department, in many ways, has been a pioneer in the effective administration of the public interest in our country and in the application to public issues of the best of modern science, technology, and advanced ideas in other fields. In a sense, what the Department of Agriculture has done in the United States is what is needed to be done by public administration in developing countries. Therefore, it seems to me especially significant that we have this series of lectures under these auspices.

I'd like to start with a brief illustration or two of the kind of thing the Department of Agriculture has done, because I think this is an important foundation for what I want to say in a few minutes.

For example, the Department of Agriculture has developed a systematic method for conducting research and applying the results of that research to questions of production, to questions of marketing, to questions of the use of agricultural products. It has developed a system of experiment stations and extension services and has worked closely with the land grant colleges throughout our country.

The Department of Agriculture of the United States pioneered in the development of credit institutions which were devised and adapted to the particular needs of American farmers. Some of these institutions have evolved and developed very radically from what they were when they started. The Farm Credit Administra-

tion, for example, starting as a public institution, is today essentially privately owned.

The Department has devised crop forecasting and other services related to marketing which provide information and help to farmers. The Department has worked in the fields of cooperatives and of rural electrification. Today, it has embarked on a broad new approach to the problem of rural development, bringing to bear all of the resources that can be found locally and nationally.

In all these ways—and this is the key point that I want to emphasize—this Department has pursued a course which is pragmatic, probing, experimental, and designed to meet real problems in the public interest.

In one sense, the work of this Department is remarkably non-ideological. If you look back, you find all sorts of mixtures of public and private activity. If you review the actual experience of United States agriculture it is very hard to fit it into the contemporary argument of socialism versus the free market. Specialized institutions have been developed to meet actual problems and they contain varying mixtures of public and private activity. We do not have socialism in the United States, nor do we have an Adam Smith type of free market.

In one sense, therefore, you would look in vain for a clear-cut ideological basis for what the Department has done. In another sense, I think you can in fact find some very deep and important ideological convictions underlying what the Department has accomplished.

First of all, the Department's efforts, the efforts of the people who have worked here and of those in the Congress who have determined what the Department should do, have throughout been guided by a deep belief in local self-reliance, in individual initiative and enterprise, in handling things as far as possible through small and local groups, and in limiting the Federal Government's efforts to what could only be done through the national government.

Secondly, the Department is essentially a governmental institution. As such it operates within a framework of group pressures, of political pressures, in a democratic political system. As a result, our agricultural programs and policies are full of strains, full of imprecision, full of argument and controversy, but also, by the same token, they rest on the deep strength of the consensus of the population of this country.

The results of all of this effort, as everyone knows, has been an enormously productive agricultural system in the technical sense, and in the sense of producing good lives for millions of people who have worked in agriculture, or who have grown up in rural homes and have gone on to other walks of life.

I stress these elements because, it seems to me, they have a direct bearing on the question before us today—the role of public administration in developing societies. If you consider all the aspects of the Department of Agriculture, you could say that this is what we envision when we say that the public administration in developing countries must be improved, must be developed, must be created.

As we visit and work in the underdeveloped countries, and look at the problems on the ground—look, say, at the problem of rural life and rural development in West Pakistan or India, which is essentially characterized by people living in villages, farming on small plots of land, with very few technical resources, plowing with a crooked stick, using oxen as motive power, the villages being without electricity, without running water, without sewage systems, without schools, many of them, without means of communication, radio, newspapers—going into that kind of a situation, an American inevitably thinks to himself what is needed in this situation is the kind of services that the Department of Agriculture provides. Research services are needed, to find out how to apply better systems of technology to the problems here. Educational and extension services are needed, to get those better ideas across to the farmers who live here. Better supply systems are needed, to get fertilizer, better implements and tools, and other items to the

farmers. Better marketing advice is needed so the farmers will know better what to plant, better marketing systems so they will earn more from their output.

In short, it is a very natural conclusion, when you work in an underdeveloped country, that one of the things that is needed is something like the Department of Agriculture, or more broadly, the system of agricultural institutions we have in the United States. And, if you look at other fields of life in those countries, you come to similar conclusions.

If you look at the schools, if you look at the highway system, if you look at the housing arrangements, if you look at the taxation services—wherever you turn in an underdeveloped society—you see the very great requirement for effective public administration, and you find yourself thinking, “If we only had here the services and institutions we have in the United States, this place would be a lot better off. Therefore, let us go out and start creating the same institutions.”

And here I come to the thesis of what I have to say today, which is that the latter conclusion, in my opinion, is wrong—is erroneous. By and large, I think it is a mistake to conceive that what we are trying to do in underdeveloped societies is to duplicate the institutions that we have here. I think the observation that the people in underdeveloped societies need the kinds of resources and services for solving their problems that we have is probably a correct observation. But to go from that to the conclusion that they need parallel institutions—the same kind of institutions that we have—is where I think we go wrong.

My thesis is that we cannot transplant United States systems and institutions in the field of public administration. Instead, it seems to me, we should be trying to develop effective systems and institutions in other countries that grow out of their background, fit their environment and their capabilities and their problems—institutions that will enable them to meet their needs in progressively more satisfactory fashion as the years go by.



I'd like to try to support this thesis essentially by raising four questions.

The first question is, what has been our experience, what have we done thus far in trying to help underdeveloped countries improve their public administration? Are we in danger of trying to improve public administration in developing countries simply by copying advanced countries' institutions and methods and therefore failing in our fundamental task?

The basic methods we have used, with some variations, have been two. First, we have brought to the United States large numbers of persons from underdeveloped countries. These may have been students, in the strict sense, or they may have been government officials, or officials of other kinds of institutions. Second, we have attempted to establish, in the underdeveloped countries, schools, institutions, and departments of public administration, in local colleges and universities, or in separate agencies or institutions of one kind or another.

So far as the training is concerned, we have brought to this country several thousand young people, under the foreign aid program, to study public administration in the direct sense. In fiscal year 1963, more than 700 were selected for public administration training. In addition, we bring persons to this country to study agriculture or education or health or some other functional field, and a substantial part of their training while here naturally is related to the administration of such specialized services.

Our experience indicates certain obvious risks in doing this sort of thing. Are we simply teaching these people how we solve our problems and not teaching them how to solve their problems? Does it do any good, for example, for a public health engineer to learn how the municipal waterworks in Cleveland is run when his problem, when he gets back home, is going to be to try to install systems of pumps in villages where there is no effective water supply at present apart from streams and ponds? Is it useful for public administrators from underdeveloped countries to come

here and learn how the Internal Revenue Service does its job, when back in his own country nobody has ever been sent to jail for tax evasion and there is, therefore, no effective sanction for the kind of taxation system we have here?

These are questions that we must answer in considering training programs for the participants we bring here. So far as the establishment of schools and institutes abroad is concerned, there are also risks—mainly the risk that we duplicate the form and not the substance. I have personally seen cases in which a school of public administration was established in an underdeveloped country, the degree of M.P.A. was offered, the substance of the instruction was quite similar to what would be offered in this country at Syracuse, or some other good school—and then the graduate had no place to turn, because the government in that country had no understanding or appreciation of an M.P.A., no desire for people with M.P.A. training, and, in general turned a very cold shoulder to the persons who had gone through this advanced training.

Other risks in such a course, in establishing schools and institutions abroad, are equally obvious. Any of us can read reports that have been developed in such schools and institutes—studies, for example, of village government—which are very interesting to us, and very impressive to anthropologists, but relate to nothing in the local society and have no impact when produced.

I state these questions in rather extreme form deliberately because I think they are real and have to be met. I do not, however, conclude from this that the training we have been doing, or the efforts to establish schools and institutes abroad, have been wasted. Quite the contrary. In my observation, in most cases the persons who were managing the training programs for these visitors, and the persons who were organizing the schools and institutes abroad, were well aware of these risks and set out to meet them. A person who was going to be concerned with drilling wells in villages was not sent to look at the municipal waterworks in Cleveland, but was sent out, perhaps with the Bureau of Reclamation, in a spe-

cially organized training program, so that he did learn something that would be useful to him when he went back home. Persons who have set up schools and institutes abroad have been very deeply concerned about trying to build something which would have roots in the local scene and effectiveness there.

The reason I state these questions so sharply is to emphasize the point that we must aim at the right target. When we bring people here for training, or when we try to establish institutions abroad, we should be emphasizing the problem solving capability. We are not in a position to impart the knowledge that they need. To a very large extent, we don't have it.

I was making this point in a recent conversation, and using as an illustration the skills, the abilities, the competences one would need to run a Department of Agriculture in a developing country. Someone summarized the point precisely by saying, "The fact is, there isn't anybody in the United States who knows how to run a Department of Agriculture in a developing country." We can't teach them that. We can teach them some things that will be useful. We can show them how we do some things from which they can learn. But we must never be under the illusion that we have, ready made, a set of ideas and blueprints which we can simply hand over for application in underdeveloped countries. Their problems are different from ours.

Let me mention briefly, in closing, several elements of the problem which the developing countries inevitably must face and we do not. First, they must face the problem of priorities, in a way that we don't. If they started out to duplicate the full range of agricultural facilities that are available in the United States, even if they understood that those facilities would have to be adapted to the local background, it would be a hopeless agenda. They could not possibly do it for many, many years. In consequence, they have to select those things to do first.

This is not a problem we face today. We went through it years ago. It was solved in some manner, but none of us here remem-

bers how, for we weren't involved in those decisions. But that is a kind of problem they have every day in all the underdeveloped countries, and which we don't really understand very much about.

Secondly, they have enormous problems of dynamics, of very rapid change in their societies. They are bridging centuries in a few years. These are problems we have not faced. They add dimensions and aspects to the problems concerning which we have very little to offer.

Thirdly, they often have language problems which are far more serious than anything in our own experience. You know the situation in the subcontinent of India, where there are seventeen different major languages, each spoken by more than five million people. What does it mean to build an agricultural system in India with that kind of language problem as part of the surrounding framework of conditions? We don't know what that problem is like, but they have to solve it.

And finally, the problems of motivation, which most of us take for granted, are very different problems in the different societies and cultural backgrounds which exist in the various underdeveloped countries. But they must be met before any substantial step forward can be taken.

This all supports the proposition that we should be primarily concerned with trying to help create the problem solving capability, when we are working on public administration problems in underdeveloped countries.

A second question which I would raise is that, in my opinion, we typically think of public administration in too narrow a framework in our training programs and in establishing curricula, subjects for research, and so on. Public administration necessarily is set in a framework of attitudes, mores, beliefs, and this point must be kept in the forefront of our work in underdeveloped countries. Let me give you a couple of illustrations.

First, as many observers in underdeveloped countries have pointed out, one of the difficulties in developing an improved public

administration frequently is a serious deficiency in standards of honesty and integrity. It would be easy to be "holier than thou" about this. It would obviously be a great exaggeration to say that this is a problem that doesn't exist in the United States. Plainly it does, but not to the same degree. There is really a very substantial difference. The standards for public behavior in the United States, with all their deficiencies, and despite all the times they're honored in the breach, are much clearer and much higher than those in many underdeveloped countries, and this is a problem that must be met. Now the question is: how is this to be done? What do we know about the way to create an attitude among public servants that will establish high standards of service to the public interest?

I suspect some useful work on this subject could be done if we had some well-directed historical research. I'm reliably advised by one of my ex-colleagues on a university faculty that there are many instances in our own history and in British history where public services were at least as corrupt and graft ridden as any today in any part of the underdeveloped world. The example used by the person who told me about this was the British customs service in the 17th century, which is asserted to have been as corrupt a public service as ever existed anywhere. That isn't true today. Today we all think of British public services as models of integrity and honesty. The question is: how did they get from there to here?

This is the question that confronts many underdeveloped countries today. Most of us don't know how to begin answering that question. But it is a real question and it has to be faced and it's one of the elements of any useful work on public administration in underdeveloped countries.

A second illustration. We take for granted in the United States that a democratic attitude exists in any group that we are involved in. This has a very long history in our own society. The town meetings in New England and many, many other roots make it

automatic and natural for us to think in terms of democratically organized local groups, whether public or private, as essential aspects of any effort to do something for any community. But this sort of thing does not exist in many parts of the world.

In India, for example, there is no strong tradition of local self-government. There is, instead, an unbroken tradition for five thousand years of imperial, centralized government. Through all that period of time, the villages have had a rudimentary local organization. There is no background on which there could have been developed, for example, systems of local control and local financing of education. This is not a tradition in India.

Think of the difference. When we think of education our whole basic set of concepts rests on the notion that this is a local function, locally controlled and locally financed. It is exactly the opposite in India and in many other countries, and the whole problem of public administration in the field of education—the problem of effectively developing, planning, and operating an educational system—takes on an entirely different context. It is an entirely different kind of a problem, starting from these two different types of backgrounds. This again demonstrates that in thinking about how to improve public administration in underdeveloped countries, we have to take into account a far broader range of issues than are sometimes thought of as being related to public administration. We have to develop an attitude of research, of curiosity about the surrounding circumstances, of experimentation, and of problem solving if useful work is to be done.

I'd like to raise as a third question, a rather sensitive point which, I think, supports my main thesis that we do not have answers that can be easily transferred to underdeveloped countries.

Would we not agree that there are problems that we have not solved satisfactorily for ourselves? In such areas, we certainly have little basis for using ourselves as a model.

The first and perhaps most obvious of these is the problem of urbanization. Many observers in the United States, I think with a

great deal of merit, are pointing out that we have extremely serious problems in the growth of "megalopolis"—the vast arrays of urban population, incoherently organized, with rapid movement to the suburbs leaving the deteriorating downtown sections behind, with serious problems of traffic, juvenile delinquency, and all the rest. And when one asks what we could say to the city fathers of Calcutta, India—a city of several million persons—if they came to us and said, "What is the experience in the United States that I can draw on to advise me how effectively to organize Calcutta to meet its problems?" I'm afraid that we might conclude there isn't much we could offer. I suspect the conclusion to draw is that there are many problems faced by underdeveloped societies and also by ourselves, with respect to which our best attitude is one of, "Let's work on these problems together; let's see if, together, we can undertake research and experimentation that will be useful for all of us."

Other illustrations of the same point are the problem of steady and substantial economic growth, a problem the United States has not distinguished itself in solving in recent years, and the problem of developing effective international organizations. In the United Nations, in the international financial institutions, in the common market in Europe, in many other cases, we have institutions developing today, which are often clumsy, hard to manage, expensive, and quite inefficient. At the same time, they are all we have. They are attempts to meet real problems which must be met through international cooperation and organization. Clearly, our problem is to learn from experience and improve these institutions as rapidly as we can. And that is a problem we and the underdeveloped countries have in common.

Lastly, I would point to a final question which is: how would we deal with problems that the underdeveloped countries have and the advanced countries have not? Let me give two illustrations. First, the problem of what has come to be called (at least in government circles) the problem of insurgency, which ranges all the way from riot control to guerrilla warfare. This problem of active

terrorism, active conflict, guerrilla type activities, exists in many countries today. It exists and it has to be solved. It frequently requires a sophisticated and complicated method of solution which makes great demands on the system of public administration; and yet, by and large, it is a problem the advanced countries cannot claim to have studied very thoroughly. We have few books or courses about it. We have to join in trying to work out solutions with the people in countries that are actually on the firing line.

The other illustration I would offer is the problem of population control. Many countries want to achieve population control. The people of many countries are deeply anxious to do so. None of us today has either the technical or the social and governmental advice to offer which would enable them to do so. It's not a problem we have tried to meet through governmental means in this country, nor would I expect that we will in the future. But it is an illustration of the kind of question which public administration must be prepared to meet in underdeveloped countries.

Let me conclude by stating the major points that I have been suggesting here this afternoon. First, it is indeed true that the improvement of public administration is a critical need in underdeveloped countries. You can, if you wish, say that there is no need more critical. Secondly, I think we have made some headway in learning how to help underdeveloped countries achieve that improvement in public administration—but insofar as we have accomplished this, we have done so not by teaching them solutions to their problems, but by helping them to establish a problem solving capability.

Finally, I think it is plain that we are dealing with a subject which has a very ample agenda of unfinished business. It's a fascinating field. There are many, many, important unanswered questions which will call on many of us, including I hope many of you here, to engage ourselves through active participation, or research, to help solve in the years to come. I hope that the remaining lectures in this series will cast light on some of these unanswered questions.



# PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES

S. O. Adebo

Nigerian Representative to the United Nations

I am very grateful indeed to the sponsors of this program for the opportunity they have given me to participate in this lecture series on public administration. I do not mind confessing that I am more at home in this sort of company than I am in the United Nations, because most of my life has been spent in public administration and I am only just now learning to be a diplomat. I am going to discuss this afternoon a special aspect of public administration and that is public administration in the newly independent countries. I shall limit my opening remarks because I would like to leave as much question time as possible in order that I may myself be able to gain from this exercise. From the questions that you ask me and from the observations that you make, I hope I shall be able to add to my own experience in public administration.

Although there are several alternative ways to approach this problem, I feel that the most useful one for me is to tell you about my own experience in dealing with practical problems of public administration in an emerging country like Nigeria. For you to be able to follow me, I should let you know what Nigeria is, where it is, and how Western Nigeria fits into the Nigerian picture. Pardon me if I tell many of you what you already know, but there are still a number of people in this country who ask me from time to time whether Nigeria is in Ghana. Whenever they ask that, I ask them whether the United States is in Canada. Well, Nigeria is on the west coast of Africa; it is a very large country, as magnitude goes in Africa. It is of course a small country compared to the United States. But the United States is not a country, it is a subcontinent. Nigeria is very large geographically but, compared

to other countries in Africa, it is even larger by way of population. Our population is just about 40 million people or about two-ninths of yours, but we think it is a very large population because that means 40 million mouths to feed every day of the year. Ours is a federal country like yours but instead of fifty constituent states we have only four.

We have a federal constitution in which the Supreme Court is the supreme authority. We have a federal government and we have four state governments. The state governments all have their own civil services and the federal government has its own civil service. Western Nigeria is one of these constituent states. I was in charge of the Western Nigeria civil service before I accepted my present appointment. In point of fact I started my government career in the federal service of Nigeria, that is to say, I was a federal civil servant. Before that I was a railway man—you call it railroad official here. I was a railway man in Nigeria and one of the offices I held there was general secretary of the federation of railway trade unions. It was part of my experience, then, to have been a trade unionist, to have served the federal government of Nigeria, and to have served in the State Government of Western Nigeria in the capacity of chief civil servant who was the chief adviser on administration to the government of that territory. In that capacity, I was able to deal with the problems of public administration.

Another point that I ought to make here is one that you all know very well. That is that in Nigeria we are British-oriented. That is to say, we were trained by the British. I was a product of the training of the British colonial service and therefore you see before you somebody who combines a little of the strength of that service with a great deal of the weaknesses of it. The British Civil Service, the methods of recruitment, the methods of advancing people, the methods of training, the whole structure of the service itself, are altogether different from the American system. Now is not the time to go into all the differences but I want to underline

the fact of the difference so that whenever I say anything, you may make allowances for the fact that this fellow has been trained from your point of view in the wrong place.

In 1957 my country seriously started out on the path of self-government and independence. In that year two of the regions (there were only three then) became self-governing. The ministers, the locally elected and appointed ministers, became masters in their own house as far as internal order, security, and administration were concerned. They could run the region the way they pleased internally. Foreign affairs were still in the hands of the British government. And both regions decided that they were going to be not only political masters of their own houses but administrative masters as well.

At that time the top posts in the administration of each region were held by British officials. Both regions decided that as soon as possible those posts must be taken over by Nigerians. As head of the civil service of Western Nigeria I was charged with the task of implementing that policy and bringing about the transformation of the civil service of Western Nigeria from one in which the top posts were held by British officials to one in which they should be held by Nigerian officials. It was easy to make that policy. It was quite a different thing to put it into force. My civil service colleagues and I in Western Nigeria put our heads together. We made an analysis of the position and we, of course, discovered the problems of public administration to which we had to find answers. In the first place, almost all Nigerian civil servants in Nigeria at that time had been confined to junior positions. I called them together and told them that the time had come when they would have to pull up their socks and be ready for the great struggle. That, of course, put life into them. It inspired them to great efforts. But enthusiasm and patriotism are not enough to get things properly done. The role of public administration in any country is well known to you. Even politicians most critical of the administrator appreciate that without the ad-

administrator they could not possibly govern. In this country the distinction between the administrator and the politician is rather fine. Because of the nature of your hierarchy you make more general use of political appointees than we do in Nigeria or the British do in the United Kingdom or even the French do in France. Nevertheless, whenever you are appointing people to the top of departments you have to consider not only whether they have been good politicians but whether they have learned to administer anything in their lives. In France in the inter-war years the country could not have continued without the good administrators they had. So we were quite sure that if the politicians in our country were not to be let down we would have to produce at all costs the right type of administrator. We had to examine whether the type that was bequeathed to us by the British was the right type for our purpose.

In many ways it was the right type. Their selection of people was always wise, but in Britain the administrator is selected from college, and put into his chair, as it were, to sink or to swim. He learns as he goes along, but the quality of the intake is such and the quality of those under whom he serves is such that, on balance, the system works. My colleagues and I felt that for a country like Nigeria, which was going to make such a radical transformation of the public service in so short a time, that system simply would not work. We had not all the time in the world to experiment with throwing people in at the deep end and letting them sink or swim. So we decided that training was of the essence of the solution to our problem, and therefore in both those regions to which I referred, the eastern and the western, a big program of training was put into action. We sent officials all over the world. Some of them we sent to this country, some of them we sent to Britain, a few we sent to Germany. We have not regretted the expenditure of time and money involved.

We had to train very fast and train very hard. Now that was one way in which we tried to meet the emergency. But however

good that sort of training may be, it is still very essential for the public administrator to learn a lot at his desk. To meet this problem we instituted an emergency program of appointing supernumerary officers to understudy the European heads of departments. It was a very bold scheme indeed. There were a great many skeptics who said it would not work. I did not blame them at all. The British Governor of Western Nigeria at that time told me quite frankly and honestly, but I think erroneously, that it would fail. I told him that whether or not it would fail it was the only thing that had any chance at all of success and we had to try it.

We appointed half a dozen people, comparatively young people; four of them were graduates, two were not. We were not looking simply for college graduates, we were looking for people who combined good intelligence with a flair for administration, people who were educable, people who had the energy and the enthusiasm to face the problems which we had to overcome. We appointed six such persons, and we at once attached them to six heads of departments. Now if that had been all we did I am quite sure that we would have failed, but that was not all. The scheme as originally formulated was for these people merely to sit by the head of department and learn how the latter dealt with papers. But from the personal experience of myself and of my few colleagues who were working with me we knew that you could only learn to govern by governing. There was no other way. You could see a man govern for twenty years. You could not begin to do it until you yourself had tried your hand at governing. So whenever the head of a department went on vacation we did not allow his number two to take over. We sent his number two on vacation at the same time to save him embarrassment and we put the supernumerary Nigerian official in the place of the number one. So the Nigerian official tried his hand at administering the department. It was a very bold scheme, bold in conception, bold in execution. It was called a gamble by quite a few people but I

am glad to say it was a gamble that paid off. The senior official did not go away for too long. British officials in Nigeria at that time used to go for three months vacation at a stretch which was plenty of time in which a man could learn to govern or misgovern but it was not long enough time for him to sink the boat. So the boat was still there when the substantive director of the department returned and we were able to say whether the supernumerary official had fulfilled our expectations.

I am glad to be able to tell you that all six of the people that we took on at that time are now securely in charge of their different departments of the Western Nigeria civil service. A lot more who were taken on later are also in charge of departments. Today there is not a single department of that service that is not being controlled by a Nigerian official. What these officials lacked in the way of long experience was made up by their enthusiasm and their eagerness to learn. It is wonderful how much energy people can put in when they are faced with an emergency. It is like being at war. It is wonderful how much production people will put in, how much suffering they will undergo, if they feel that there is an emergency in which their own interests are engaged.

The biggest single administrative problem that we had to face, then, was that of replacing the British officials. That problem was not confined to Western or Eastern Nigeria, it was not confined to Nigeria alone. It is a problem that faces all newly independent countries. The decision was taken by our leaders that the British officials should be replaced, not because they thought that the British officials were bad administrators, not because they hated or distrusted them, but because they felt that political independence was a sham unless you had also a great measure of administrative independence. You just could not be politically independent and remain administratively dependent, over a long period of time, without misunderstanding and tensions arising between the expatriate administrator and his indigenous political master. If you tried, you would get into difficulty. The foreign official who re-

mains in a policy-making position in a newly independent country lays himself open to misunderstanding. If anything is done wrong it might be attributed to him, not to plain error on his part but to his lack of full identification with the country's interests. This does not mean that one should send away foreign officials recklessly. The thing to do is to organise a well-considered plan of gradual replacement. But gradualism must not be interpreted to mean retaining foreign officials in key policy-making positions for too long a time because it is not good for them, and it is not good for the country. It is not good for third party countries either. I remember when I was in charge of the Western Nigeria civil service some of our friends from overseas would come, for example, from the United States or Germany, saying they had come to find out what they could do to help us develop our economy in Nigeria. They would ask that I introduce them to the appropriate permanent secretary, the title we give to the head of a department. If I summoned the official and they discovered him to be a non-Nigerian their attitude would change at once. It was not because they distrusted the official or the country to which he belonged. It was just that they felt that there was something embarrassing in the situation. If they wanted to discuss the possibility of German competition with a British firm in Nigeria they could not be expected to hold the discussion with a British official. It was not that they felt that the British official would necessarily be partial to the country of his birth. Whether he was or was not, the discussion would still be embarrassing to both parties.

So, my friends, the decision to replace the British officials holding policy-making positions in Nigeria was not the result of ill will toward or distrust of those who had been helping us over the years. No! It was based on the practical consideration that, in the interest of the country, the interest of the official, the interest of third parties, it was a good thing that the foreign official should be replaced as soon as possible.

Another exercise we have felt it necessary to undertake in

Nigeria is a review of the qualification for entry to the different grades of the civil service, a review of the classifications of the grades themselves, and a review as well of our post-selection training arrangements. For this purpose, we examined the practices prevailing in France, the United States, and Canada. We were already acquainted with those of the United Kingdom. In this connection, I paid a visit in 1960 to Chicago, which is the headquarters of the American Society for Public Administration. From it I got a lot of literature and I spoke to a number of officials. I also went to Canada and spoke to the Canadian officials. I found the Canadian system very interesting indeed. Canada in many ways combines the good practices of the United States with the good practices of Great Britain. In addition Canada is for our purpose a simpler country to study. It is not so vastly complicated as the United States. The immensity of your country, the immensity of your resources makes it really difficult to apply everything here to countries in the stage of Nigeria's development. But I was able to obtain from both the United States and Canada a lot of knowledge that was very useful when we began to replan our system.

As I pointed out earlier, Nigeria is a British-oriented country. As I also had occasion to mention, the British do not believe in giving special training to their administrative cadets. From the British point of view, a first-class brain, particularly if produced by Oxford or Cambridge, can, without any special training, govern anybody and anything in the world. In the British context, the concept has worked. It has worked in the suitable soil in which it was nurtured. Unfortunately I did not go to Oxford or Cambridge, so I would not be able to tell you the secret. In any case, our conclusion in Nigeria is that we require a more systematic post-selection training for our candidates than the British system provides. We recognize that public administration is a profession. You do not make a man a medical practitioner by teaching him physics, chemistry, and biology and then giving him a surgeon's knife and



letting him sink or swim. So in regard to public administration we took the view after a review of our problems that if a candidate had passed through college without training in public administration we should give him instruction in that subject. In addition we should add a bit of law and a bit of economics, before assigning him to an administrative desk and asking him to dictate letters and reply to questions from other citizens. We want the poor citizen to be enlightened rather than befuddled by his answers. So we felt we had to train the cadet a little before we unloaded him onto the public.

The result is that, in the East, the West, and the North today we have institutes of administration. All three of the institutes have been established with help of one kind or other from this country. The Ford Foundation, I believe, helped the Eastern institute. The institute of administration in Zaria (North) obtained considerable help from Pittsburgh University. The institute of administration that has just been established in Western Nigeria obtained some advice from Pittsburgh and a great deal more from New York University. We are grateful for the assistance that your country has given us in this regard.

So we have three institutes in Nigeria training people to be good administrators. But formal education in administration is not enough, as you all know. For that reason, part of the training or retraining that we give to our young people to fit them for administration in a newly independent country consists of sending them abroad in order to meet administrators in other lands and exchange experiences with them. Such trainees have invariably returned inspired and better equipped for their tasks at home. We shall continue to require this sort of assistance. It is very vital assistance indeed and we know that we can always count upon you to give it. For instance, this Graduate School might be able to open its doors to us. If some of our administrators came here, they would surely learn something. I do not think it would be a one-way benefit either. Contact with Nigerian officials might enrich your experience too.

I have given you an indication of some of the problems peculiar to a newly independent country, as we have in practice discovered them in Nigeria, and I have also indicated some of the solutions we have tried to fashion in our own way to meet these problems. You may feel, as we do, that we have not done too badly. But we have still a long way to go. I wish we had more time for me to enlarge on some of the things I have briefly said, but time is short and I therefore have to come to an end. I want to say once more how grateful we are to you for inviting us, my fellow Ambassador and my friend from the International Monetary Fund, to come and participate in this very useful program of yours.

# PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH

Hamzah Merghani  
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The problems and challenges with which developing countries are faced today represent some of the underlying causes of the problems and tensions of the world community. The division of the world between poverty and backwardness on one hand, and affluence on the other, and the existence of a state of dependency and subservience in the relations of some countries to others, can only aggravate the state of tension in which we live today. Therefore the efforts on part of the world community to bridge the gap between the "haves" and "have nots," and the substitution of partnership and fellowship in place of dependence and subservience are important elements in an international policy aimed at reducing tension and creating a better world. It follows from this that any approach in the field of public administration, insofar as and as much as it contributes to the realization and implementation of these important elements of world policy, either internationally or nationally, is truly multilateral whatever the source of such effort.

If it is generally recognized and accepted that public administration in developing countries can only achieve positive results if it is conceived in relation to the specific needs of such countries, and takes into consideration their stages of development and the political, social, and economic realities, there should be no ground for any fundamental differences in the approach to this problem.

The philosophy underlying assistance and the nature of such assistance must therefore be based on an objective study and deep understanding of the problems of developing countries in their

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*"The views expressed are my own personal ones and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations." Hamzah Merghani.*

own setting, including an appreciation of the means and capabilities which the peoples in these countries possess and the methods which they have adopted for the solution of these problems.

In spite of differences in geography and history, all developing countries face some similar problems. Each shares a passionate urge and desire to face up to these problems and seeks to solve them through different policies and varying means.

In the first place they are faced in varying degrees with the basic problem of national unity and nation building. Inner unity, a common national sentiment, a common will and a common purpose have to be created or fostered to replace divisive and dissident tendencies and sectional interests. Loyalty to nation has to transcend all other loyalties. Differences of tribes, religions, races, communalism, and regionalism have to be integrated into a larger and more transcending loyalty to a functional national society. Hence, the old traditional functions of the state of maintaining national unity and preserving law and order can still be the most important function of a new state threatened by potentially dangerous internal dissension and strife.

Secondly, the developing countries share a common desire to assert their independence and personalities against a background of previous political or economic dependence or domination. This is not merely a question of exercising their national sovereignty and becoming masters in their own houses. It also involves establishing relations with the rest of the world on a new basis of equality and mutual respect. They are no longer content to leave to the stronger nations the problems facing the world community. They realize that their tremendous efforts to pull themselves out of the state of backwardness, dissension and dependence can be jeopardized by serious tensions in the world or by armed conflicts. Apart from these practical and selfish interests they are also becoming much more aware of their moral responsibilities as members of the world community and conscious of their possible role as objective and disinterested parties in the conflicts between big powers.

Thirdly, there is hardly any underdeveloped country, which is not conscious of and concerned with the problem of economic and social development. There is a general recognition, both within these countries and outside them, that without an accelerated pace of development the rising expectations and hopes of the peoples of these countries cannot be met. The absence of such an effort might therefore lead to serious tensions and frustrations. There is also the strong feeling among developing countries that the political independence and equality which they have gained and established for themselves is inadequate and meaningless without a sound and viable economic base.

All these countries find themselves under strong pressure to do something and do it quickly to exploit and use their material and human potentials in the optimum way. They are discovering that to achieve this there is no alternative to planning and that, whatever the political thinking and whatever the basic values, the government must and is expected to take a leading role in the process of modernization and progress. All this involves a high degree of painful change in traditional relationships, in institutions, and in attitudes of mind and way of thinking.

The pursuit of national unity could, in certain circumstances, mean that economic planning has to operate within severe limitations. Equitable geographical distribution of investment might not be the best and most effective use of limited resources and might militate against the proper strategy of planning. But this might have to be done in favour of creating a common interest and common sentiment for the purposes of national unity. The same consideration might also result in a distribution between consumption and production which is not justified by purely economic considerations. Similarly economic and social development, involving basic changes, might create new tensions or clashes of interest between classes and communities and make the achievement of national unity and cohesion more difficult. The same interaction can be seen between requirements of economic development and national independence and prestige in the conduct of foreign policies and relations. The basic problems, taken

together, require far-reaching and extensive transformation in the political and administrative structures of these countries and call for fundamental adaptation in the habits of thinking and procedures which were inherited from the old days and which were developed in relation to limited functions of the state.

Developing countries have responded to this challenge in different ways in accordance with their national heritage and historical background. But underlying this variety there is a general inclination towards a strong government, a strong executive, and a high degree of centralization. It seems to be generally accepted that without a strong government and a strong leadership the tasks of national unity and rapid economic and social transformation become difficult if not impossible.

The developing countries have followed different paths in interpreting the meaning of a strong government, in developing their institutions, and in finding a political and ideological rationalization for their actions. Three broad categories can be identified:

First, there are the conservatives and traditionalists whose main concern is to preserve the fundamental existing relationships. By temperament and interest they are also in favour of maintaining the basic features of the *status quo*. Their support and appeal is to traditional and possibly religious elements within the society.

Second, there are the reformists. They are not opposed to modernization and change but want to see this achieved gradually without far-reaching structural changes in society. A synthesis of the old and new and a gradual and subtle transformation through education and persuasion are, for this group, the best and safest way of achieving their aims without disrupting the basis of society and without obliterating its fundamental elements and heritage.

The third group comprises the revolutionaries and radicals who seek to establish new basic relationships related to economic and political functions and who thereby seek to eliminate the political power and political influence of traditional groups, be they religious, tribal, or racial. This group varies from the doctrinaires who are guided by an imported ideology to the pragmatists and

practical politicians who create their own ideology and coin their own political labels. Their methods range from persuasion, propaganda, and the one-party system to the use of force and coercion and the suppression of all opposition in the name of national unity and homogeneity.

Although the search for political rationalizations and ideologies and the establishment of political systems have in most cases overshadowed the problems in the field of administration, the experiences of these countries indicate that failures in achieving national goals are often due more to lack of effective administration than to inadequate political philosophy or ideology. It is conceivable that if equal attention were given to the problems of public administration, the situations which call for radical means and extreme political measures might not have arisen. The task of establishing an effective administration or reforming or improving an existing one, is therefore a vital and difficult one. The chances of success can be improved if the developing countries and those providing technical assistance in this field recognize certain considerations.

In the first place, a solid commitment to social justice is an essential prerequisite. The public service can only give its best if it can share in the benefits of its efforts. The cooperation and participation of the public which is important for any effective government cannot be forthcoming if it feels that it is working for the enrichment of others.

Secondly, public administration can only be developed in relation to the cultural, political, and moral conditions in the country. There is no common or universal prescription. It is only natural for developing countries in their search for solutions to their problems to want to borrow from developed countries. But it must be remembered that the organizations and administrative structures and concepts of developed countries have grown as an accommodation to conditions in those countries which are materially different from the conditions in developing countries. Some of the institutions of developed countries are the result of devel-

opment. They are necessary for them because of their advanced stage of development; also highly developed countries can afford refinements which are not necessarily essential for developing countries. A complicated and complex organization which might be necessary for a country rich in human resources can defeat the very purposes of development in a country at an early stage of its development, because such complex systems draw resources away from areas which can produce better results.

Thirdly, the improvement in administration and its adaptation to social and economic needs should be considered as a process related to the various stages of development. This calls for planning and programming such improvements on a long-term basis. Where this is possible, and where there is the necessary positive acceptance and commitment on part of the government and society, comprehensive reforms, taking in all aspects of the administration, are more fruitful. Where this is not possible a start might be made in selective areas in the hope that this would in itself pave the way and gather the momentum for more comprehensive reform. What is impossible today might very well be possible tomorrow. But it should be recognized that limited improvement if not followed by further advance in the same direction can neither be sufficient nor permanent.

In drawing such plans, the countries' own resources in expertise in public administration and training should be taken into consideration together with resources available from multilateral and bilateral sources. Such planning, however tentative and approximate, is the best way to make effective use of resources and the best guarantee against waste and duplication of effort.

In planning such programs, developing countries will find themselves concerned with the problems and intricacies of creating new institutions or transforming and adapting existing ones. This is a difficult process yet an important one, particularly in relation to the transfer of knowledge and adaptation of techniques and technology to the needs of development. The basic elements



of institutions are their capacity and powers to perform economic or social functions, to evolve and adapt themselves to changing circumstances and to survive. But while institutions are important, the development of the human element is paramount, particularly in the earlier stages. Thus training and self-development of an efficient cadre of administrators at all levels is just as important for these countries as the existence of political leaders and elites. These administrators should have the capacity and experience to draw on the resources of the appropriate professionals and specialists. Needless to say that the administrator has to develop a high degree of sensitivity to political realities. The administrator often finds himself carrying on his functions in an atmosphere of intrigues, clashes of personalities, and shifting politics. A firm conviction in his own ideas and ideals, an appreciation of politics, an objective disinterested attitude, a tough fibre and staying power, an understanding of human nature, and an understanding and general appreciation of science and technology are therefore important attributes. The basic challenge is how to produce such administrators in developing countries in a short period of time. Time is of the essence. Administrators are needed now and not tomorrow in this crucial period for most of these developing countries.

There is also the other fact that in most of these countries there are not many trained administrators who can be relied upon to train others on the spot and on the job.

Technical assistance in public administration to developing countries should not attempt to import readymade systems, institutions, concepts, or models, but should assist those responsible in those countries to find new solutions to their problems in relation to their needs, capabilities, economic and social situation, and the particular stage of their development. In their way technical assistance becomes, not a question of transferring organizations and methods, but an imaginative undertaking of creating something new suited to the environment, and of creating something which

is capable of growth and adaptation in relation to changes brought about by economic and social development. The character of technical assistance in public administration stems from the fact that it is concerned with the basic problems of national unity and homogeneity and economic and social development. Technical assistance in public administration is therefore part of the total assistance which countries receive in the various other fields and as such it must be coordinated with it. Of course people in these countries do not wish to close their minds to what is being done and thought elsewhere. Technical assistance should therefore provide such knowledge, but it cannot absolve the leaders of these countries from the intellectual responsibility and obligation to analyse such experience and use it to find their own solution rather than merely copy it.

The major function of technical assistance is to help the country identify its major needs and objectives in this field, assess its own capabilities to meet these objectives, and determine the gaps which have to be met through assistance from outside. In other words, the starting point in technical assistance is to assist the country to draw up plans and programs for improvement in public administration, and, if one can use the term, adopt a strategy to achieve the major objectives in such a plan. The main task and the main decisions must be undertaken by the leaders of the country themselves and the main solutions must be discovered by them. They must be cognizant of the fact that no solution is either final or entirely satisfactory and that the process of improvement and adaptation must therefore be a continuous one. Continuity of effort can only be maintained if such responsibility is given to a permanent body or institution.

The United Nations has responded to such requests as it has received, by sending an expert or a team of experts to review the whole field of public administration and training and to discuss and to agree with the authorities on a long-term and comprehensive program in training and administrative reform,

and the machinery which is required for implementing such a program.

Recently, the United Nations received a request from a developing country for assistance in drawing up a program for adaptation of its public administration system to its economic and social development requirements and to review its training effort in the public sector. The U.N. responded to this request by sending to this country a distinguished authority in the field of public administration who had recently been engaged in assisting another country of similar cultural and political background to overhaul its government and planning machinery with a great deal of success.

Another example is the mission which is now being assembled in response to a request from a newly independent country in Africa for assistance in the field of training. In this case, the mission will be composed of three experts of outstanding ability. They will have to examine the country's total requirements in training in all fields, including public administration and vocational training, in relation to the present and prospective economic situation, to its educational system and the material available for training, and to future employment openings in the private and public sectors. The mission will be composed of a distinguished authority in public administration, a specialist in manpower problems and vocational training, and a specialist in education. Briefing and substantive support will be given by the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the International Labor Organization. The country which has asked for assistance is a small and newly independent country with very limited financial resources and even much more limited educated, trained, and experienced human resources. It cannot afford a multiplicity of competing training institutes or programs and it is quite conceivable that the solution to its problems might be a multipurpose program or institute. A solution to the peculiar problems of this country can be of great interest and significance,

as it might be possible to apply whatever pattern emerges from this effort to quite a few similar situations in neighboring countries.

A third example is a four-man mission composed of a public administration specialist, an economist, a fiscal and financial expert, and a constitutional lawyer, which is helping two neighboring countries to assemble all the relevant data which might help these two countries to negotiate and decide on some form of political or economic association. Once the two governments decide on an appropriate form of association or cooperation, the mission will help in drawing up a program of technical assistance for the implementation of such decision.

In addition to these special missions the United Nations has now several regional consultants attached to the regional Economic Commissions who are ready to give assistance to member governments in planning long-term programs in the field of public administration. In Africa, the Economic Commission is now engaged in a series of studies of the training programs of some of its member countries. These studies, which are being undertaken in conjunction with the governments of these countries, will determine the training needs and indicate the gaps which exist in their present programs, the additional programs that will be required, and the form and extent and sources of technical assistance called for. Countries providing bilateral technical assistance in those areas have been invited to participate in planning and are kept fully informed of the progress.

Underlying all this is the belief that training, administrative development, and reform can be achieved only through a rational and realistic plan on a comprehensive and a long-term basis in relation to specific situations in a country. Viewed in this light technical assistance, though merely supporting and contributing to national effort, must still be an extensive and long-term effort. There is therefore less scope for competition or struggle for influence, but more for cooperation and pooling of resources.

The view that technical assistance in public administration is a

limited operation both in terms of quantity and time does not seem to be borne out by the experience of those who are engaged in this effort. Apart from short-term missions, the other forms of technical assistance comprise a variety of approaches and techniques. Among them are: the advisory experts appointed either as general public administration advisers or to advise in a specific field or on specific problems; the OPEX<sup>1</sup> program where the expert is involved in operational and executive functions and has the same status as a national civil servant; the program for fellowships ranging from short-term observation tours to long-term courses at foreign universities; and the establishment of public administration schools or institutes for training national administrative staff of all levels and for undertaking advisory and consultative services for government departments. Workshops and seminars at national, regional, and interregional levels have also become an important form of technical assistance for training officials of developing countries and affording them an opportunity for exchange of experience and views. Consideration is now being given to a limited and experimental exchange of civil servants in Africa. Finally, there is the program of research and dissemination of information and documentation.

The delays in recruiting experts is one of the most unsatisfactory features of multilateral assistance. This arises from the recruitment procedure on an international basis and the scarcity of qualified experienced people with and intellectual sympathy towards the problems of developing countries. The peak of demand for assistance has not yet been reached and this problem will progressively become more acute. Some serious thinking and positive action on the part of countries which are at present the main source of supply of such experts is urgently called for. The ex-colonial administrators make up a reservoir of talent and experience with intimate knowledge of local conditions in developing

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<sup>1</sup>OPEX is the popular name given to the United Nations program for providing operational and executive personnel.

countries. In certain circumstances they have been most valuable; however some of them find it difficult to make the necessary adjustment in their approach and attitude of mind toward their former dependencies.

Much of the criticism about the qualities of the experts and the time-consuming process of recruitment would be overcome if it were possible to form a permanent staff of technical assistance experts specialized in the problems of developing countries. There are innumerable difficulties in this proposition, particularly in relation to a multilateral organization. But it is an idea worth exploring even in a limited way.

An encouraging feature in this respect is the increasing number of experts from developing countries. Their experience in their own countries can be very valuable to the countries which they serve. The experience of the United Nations regarding the OPEX program is very encouraging. There are certainly problems where such experts occupy sensitive positions in sensitive situations. Nevertheless the program has proved to be very popular, and extensive use has been made of it, particularly by newly independent countries which, for one reason or other, had to face an exodus of their previous expatriate civil servants. One of the greatest difficulties in connection with this program is finding understudies for the OPEX personnel who can take over from them within a short period of time. In some countries such understudies just do not exist. If funds from the expanded program of technical assistance are made available for financing OPEX operation, the prospects for much more effective assistance seem to be very promising.

It is now generally recognized that training is the cornerstone and most important element in technical assistance in public administration. The experience of the U.N. supports this general consensus. It also indicates that training must as far as possible be carried out on the spot and that the training programs should be designed to meet the special needs of the country.

Training public administrators can only be effective as it is

integrated into the national plan. The trend in certain developed countries to offer specially adapted courses for foreign students from developing countries is a move in the right direction and can be of great significance to the fellowship programs.

Another development worthy of mention is group fellowships or study tours. If properly planned and carefully implemented they can be of great value. The U.N. is now organizing a study tour for senior African local government officers which will take them to India and Yugoslavia. These senior officers will watch how a local government system is actually operating and find out the problems facing these countries and how they are solved. It will also be an opportunity for those officers coming from different regions to exchange views and ideas on their own experience and relate it to the experience and problems of the countries which they visit. The group will be asked to write a report on their main impressions and observations.

How the recommendations and findings of such groups are utilized by the participating countries is a problem which should receive more consideration. One approach is for the national government to hold a seminar to consider the recommendations, relate them to its own problems, and translate them into a program of action. Very soon the U.N. will be assisting in such a national seminar and it is hoped that the results might lead to some positive action on the part of the governments.

Finally, one of the most important forms of technical assistance is the preparation and dissemination of information and documentation on problems of public administration. Developing countries will continue to be interested in the availability of such information. There is an urgent need for research studies and textbooks specially orientated to the problems of developing countries. The research should draw from the reports of experts who have been involved in technical assistance in developing countries. The administrative aspects and organization for planning and implementation of plans is a priority area for study. Conclusions based on the experience of developing countries including both

achievements and failures can be of great value to those concerned with such problems in other developing countries.

Methods and techniques of training, particularly in relation to situations where countries are faced with the necessity of entrusting complicated and responsible positions to their nationals without much experience and without much preparation is another area where research and study can be very fruitful. The problems of decentralization, urbanization, housing, land reform, and community development need further research in relation to the requirements of developing countries. Equally important are fiscal and budgetary problems—purchasing, supply and stores control, and accounting procedures. The administration of taxation and collection of taxes are also of great interest to developing countries.

Research and study are fields where international cooperation can be extremely fruitful. The U.N. is playing its role through cooperation and collaboration in a number of research projects with national and nongovernmental organizations.

Thus far we have been mainly concerned with the present. What about the future and what are the prospects? Perhaps there is no better way to find an answer to this pertinent question and to conclude this talk than to pose some of the issues which deserve deeper reflection and understanding.

To understand the goals of public administration in developing countries we have to consider them in terms of the rapid change and flux in which most of these countries are involved. At this stage the majority of these countries are more concerned with the adjustment of their entire social, political and administrative structure, with the demands of their societies seeking to modernize themselves, than with the limited objectives of a stable and well-established system. This creates a broader dimension and leads to a closer and more intimate connexion between public administration and public policy. Administrative development becomes, under such circumstances, very closely connected with political development. Where there is virtual identification between the party



and the government such as under the "one-party" system, the two processes become indistinguishable. Even where these two processes are separate and distinct they are bound to react on each other. The political system comprising all the institutions and instruments by which public decisions are made represents the framework within which the administrative system operates. The two systems in a sense complement each other and together represent the means by which the new state maintains its unity and deals with its responsibilities, domestic and international. The development of the two systems side by side might very well be seen as a process in which public administration will gradually claim a large part of the field, which politics reserves for itself, or the reverse may be the case. Public management may find itself less concerned with decision-making than with carrying out decisions which it had little part in making.

Should there be a deliberate and conscious effort on part of those concerned with public administration to influence political development and adaptation of the political systems? If so, how can this sensitive subject be dealt with?

Bear in mind that governments in underdeveloped countries have no alternative but to do much more than is customary for governments in developed countries. In fact they are expected by their own people to play a leading role in the modernization and in exploiting the immense potential that modern technology places at their disposal. The diversity and magnitude of this problem may lead the political leaders to concentrate tremendous political and economic powers in their hands. In such cases, the distinction between a strong and effective government and an authoritarian government tends to be very much blurred. To free their people from want and give them the material comforts they need, leaders may use methods which impinge on basic freedoms and other human values. A view, which seems to be widely held, is that an authoritarian system achieves quick results because it ensures political stability. Because it gets things done it is therefore justifiable during the early stages of development. The opposite

view is that basic human freedoms and rights are too important to sacrifice, even temporarily, to accelerate economic development.

Can those concerned with public administration contribute towards the clarification of this important dilemma and help resolve it? Is it not possible to demonstrate that rapid economic and social development can be achieved by organizations and means which are compatible with respect for individual freedoms and rights? Should there be more emphasis in the endeavour to establish administrative systems that in the words of the Charter of the United Nations "reaffirm the faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human persons," and "Promote progress and better standards of life in larger freedom"?

Another point for thought is the extension of the functions of governments in less developed countries into fields which are traditionally reserved for private enterprise and private management such as industrial undertakings, large agricultural projects, and financial institutions. There is an urgent need to adapt and apply business management techniques to the government sectors concerned with the management of public enterprises. There is also an urgent need for training in management to equip those responsible for running these public enterprises. There is a great deal of horizontal mobility between the national civil service and the personnel of these enterprises and consideration should be given to introduction in the training programs of suitable courses in business management as distinct from the regular public administration courses. The public servants in these developing countries are the entrepreneurs and managers in relation to an ever expanding and important sector of the economy, and our approach and concepts of public administration might therefore take this important fact into consideration.

Finally, there is a need to harmonize at an international level the policies and approaches to the problems of technical assistance in the field of public administration. There is a wide scope for exchange of experience without interfering with the freedoms or the operational policies of the providers of such aid.

# PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

**Roberto de Oliveira Campos**  
**Brazilian Ambassador to the United States**

It is an honor and a privilege for me to have this opportunity to participate in the 5th Series of the Jump—McKillop Lectures in Public Administration. I shall go about it in a rather adventure-some fashion by talking from notes and not from any coordinated text. This is indeed something bold when dealing with a foreign language, particularly a rather irrational foreign language, such as English. Before I embark on this rash adventure, let me express my deep appreciation for the comments made by Mr. Coffin on my past endeavors. I am sure that you realize that his kind words were much more the utterances of an imaginative friend than the objective summation of a psychoanalyst. I wish to thank him just the same. We have maintained a long and fruitful friendship, viewing our problems at times from opposite angles, but without forgetting our joint endeavor of promoting the economic development of the Hemisphere.

One of the advantages of talking from notes rather than from a prepared text, other than that of being free to murder the English language, is that of giving free room for imagination. This is particularly important when you are not a specialist on the subject under discussion and have to resort more to imagination than to deep-seated knowledge. When I was first invited to give this lecture, I was understandably hesitant. What could an economist, victim of a fairly narrow professional training, say to people so well versed in broad problems of public administration matters and who, in addition, have taken specialized courses in economic development?

I would like to say at the outset that my reason for accepting the task was not any romantic yearning for the cross-fertilization of social sciences. I have always believed that when a social scientist becomes too interested in interdisciplinary adventures it is be-

cause he no longer has anything to say on his own field of science.

My reasons were quite different. The first one is that substantial conceptual modifications have been introduced recently in the study of economics by what we call "developmental economics." This change has been the great emphasis placed on the so-called nonconventional inputs: organization, technology, management, and entrepreneurship. Until recently the emphasis of the economists was much more on the conventional factors of production under the general heading of land, labor, and capital. Looking now more closely at the intriguing and difficult problem of development, the economists are discovering that they were guilty of having overemphasized the importance of physical investment in roads, dams, buildings, and the like, and underestimating the enormous contribution of qualitative improvements of the human factor of production through technology, organization, management, and entrepreneurship.

The second reason why economists are now much more inclined to discuss problems in other social sciences, particularly in the complicated and unreliable art of administration and governing, is the realization of the difference between the "spontaneous" type of development, which was characteristic of most cases of economic growth during the 19th century, and the present pattern of what we call "derived development."

In the first model of development, which was roughly the one according to which both the United States and Great Britain evolved, development was very vigorously pushed by the entrepreneurship of individuals or groups or families possessed by a special demon, the need-achievement (to use a pedantic word of modern psychology). This special demon found its manifestation in the competitive spirit, in the acceptance of technological change, in the propensity to innovate. In the present-day pattern of derived development, it is the masses rather than the vigorous entrepreneur that, by applying pressure for increased consumption, impel the governments to take a leading function in promoting economic development.

This derived pattern of development leads to one important consequence. It necessitates a much greater degree of government intervention as an organizer and motivating force in the growth process. Accordingly, there is a much more important role for public administration and also a much greater emphasis on programming and planning which are aspects of public administration.

It is true, of course, that in addition to those basic questions of motivation and impulse, there are reasons requiring public administration to play a much greater role in the present-day developing countries than was the case in the countries of earlier industrialization. Among these reasons, I would cite the following: (a) imperfection and smallness of markets leading often to dangerous private monopolistic positions that may have to be averted or restrained by government intervention; (b) the abnormal uncertainty and risk in present periods of rapid economic and social transformation which act as a deterrent to private entrepreneurs; (c) equity considerations that impose the need for reducing income disparities, either between persons or between regions, a task for which the fiscal system is the only adequate instrument.

Thus public administration turns out, increasingly, to be one of the first chapters of any rational theory of economic growth. While relevant for all of the developing countries, the importance of public administration in the emerging countries of Africa and Asia goes beyond directing the organizational process in economic and social fields. It has the immense task of creating a national unity and a national personality capable of surmounting the centrifugal force of tribal and regional rivalries and, on the other hand, instilling the ferment of change in traditional societies.

In Latin America, where countries achieved over a century ago their political independence but still linger in the throes of underdevelopment, the task is narrower than in Africa and Asia, but no less important. The task is to organize the governmental participation in economic and social development and to launch the reforms designed for modernization of the societies.

In this lecture, I shall confine myself largely to public administration in Latin America. I shall not attempt any detailed list of techniques, flaws, or possible improvements, because I believe this already has been the subject of lectures here, and there are many competent public administrators who could enlighten you better on this type of problem. I shall therefore not dwell on individual malfunctions of the public administration system in Latin America, but concern myself largely with general economic and social questions, such as attitudes and motivations, which are both preconditions and conditioning factors of public administration. It will be thus more a disquisition on the economic and social background within which public administration has to operate in Latin America than on any specific field of public administration.

If we attempt to examine attitudes towards public administration in Latin America, we shall find a number of adverse psychosocial attitudes, which it is important to examine objectively. The main drawback to improvement of public administration in Latin America is perhaps the tradition of State paternalism that is present in virtually all of the countries. There are several consequences of this traditional trait. It affects the recruitment of employees, which is more often than not conducted by the system of affiliation or allegiance to political clienteles rather than by systems designed to measure concrete achievement; it encourages padding of government offices; it tends to insulate state enterprises from the winds of competition; and it explains the generally flabby nature of the control procedures over government operations and government enterprises.

The prevalence of paternalistic attitudes varies greatly from country to country and several of them have already made a dent in this tradition by objective systems of evaluation of performance and recruitment of personnel. By and large, however, there remains an unhealthy inheritance of paternalistic elements in the administration, which prevents an impersonal handling of public affairs conducive to impartiality of administration and efficiency of operations.

Another traditional flaw in attitude is what I might call the overcentralization in decision-making. This may manifest itself both at the regional level and at the sectorial level. At the regional level, there is an excessive weakness of provincial and local governments, leading to overconcentration of decision-making at the center. In fact, I recall that one of the most plausible rationalizations advanced in favor of the construction of Brasilia, the new capital, was that it might be the only way of preventing the President of the Republic from continuing to be in effect, though not in name, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, compelled to take cognizance of minute problems of city administration.

At the sectorial level there is clear evidence of this same basic flaw in attitude. There is relatively little room for delegation of authority both because of the low level of competence of intermediate echelons of the public service and of the reluctance of the middle layers to take on or accept responsibility for policy decisions. This has led to a peculiarly perverse solution which in fact does not solve the problem at all. It is the excessive fragmentation of the administrative machinery by the creation of autonomous agencies which do manage to decentralize somewhat the decision-making process but at the cost of ruining the mechanism for centralized control, evaluation of performance, and establishment of working norms. Thus, some more flexibility in decision-making is attained only by impairing the mechanism for administrative coordination.

A third problem which is vital in the analysis of the present public administration picture in Latin America is the absence of an adequate and realistic theory on the role and limits of government intervention. Throughout the continent one finds complete disbelief in regulatory powers of the government. Parallel with this one finds overconfidence in the managerial performance of government enterprises as well as underestimation of the waste involved in the excessive and premature socialization of many enterprises.

Several distortions arise from the lack of a proper theory on the

limits and role of government intervention. One is the continuous temptation of government organizations and enterprises to indulge in what we might call subsidy-pricing, namely, the charging for services at rates that are inadequate to cover the costs or to finance expansion. This leads to a wrong distribution of the financial burden of state services, which is transferred from the user to the general public through inflationary deficits or through general taxation, when specific taxation or levying of adequate user charges for the cost of services would be the correct solution. There is also the problem of giving a political tone or character to management, which is an almost inevitable consequence of often ill-concealed attempts to enlarge the area of government intervention prompted by the disbelief in the efficacy of government regulatory powers. Let us mention finally the old problem of absence or inadequacy of sanction against inefficiency and corruption in government enterprises.

There is, therefore, a great need for a correctly formulated theory of the role of government intervention in Latin America. I shall try to sketch a possible theory of government intervention applicable to countries in our stage and level of development.

Two premises must be recognized at the outset. The first one is that in the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, as well as in other developing countries, a much greater degree of government intervention is needed and desirable than is the case in mature, cumulative-growth economies, such as that of the United States. This need for greater government intervention exists even though admittedly the level of governmental efficiency tends to be much lower. The reasons behind this need are not only that traditional areas of investment—such as social overhead outlays for health and education as well as for the economic overhead in the form of flood control, irrigation, sanitation, and road-building—are of overwhelming importance in the early stage of development, but that even in the directly productive sectors there is need for special incentive and government action. A few cases can be



cited to justify government intervention beyond the traditional area of investment.

First, there is the need for pioneer investment in the opening of new areas and in creating sources of power. Second, another motivation, which is somewhat more debatable but still important, is what might be called preclusive investment, arising from the need to implant government monopolies as a deliberate measure to prevent the creation of private monopolies. Third, there is the need for supplementary investment in cases where the technical lumpiness of the investment or technological progress necessitates changing the scale of investment. For instance in both Brazil and Argentina, government intervention was proved necessary when the problem was to change the scale of steel production from small charcoal furnaces to modern open-hearth steel-making procedures. This change required a greater accumulation of capital than private enterprise at the present level of private savings and investment could provide. There is, finally, what we might call expiatory investment, which is an attempt of the government to correct bottlenecks in several investment sectors, such as power and transportation. These bottlenecks are in many cases the result of inadequate incentives or punitive policies adopted in relation to private enterprise. This has been the case in virtually all Latin America, where privately owned railways, and in some cases, electric power companies, proved incapable of financing their upkeep and expansion in the face of rigid tariff rates in an age of inflation. The government had then to intervene to atone for the inequities visited on private enterprise and to undertake a job of its own. To these reasons I might add the need for assuring a better distribution of investment and income between regions. There are thus several powerful reasons why the scale, intensity, and frequency of government intervention in Latin American economies is bound to be much greater than that which would be considered as advisable or rational in this country.

There is a second important premise, which is often overlooked

in Latin America; that is, that the only criterion for the division of roles as between public and private enterprise should be their respective suitability and efficiency for the assigned tasks. I am using the term suitability in a broad fashion to cover also political and security considerations of a paramount nature that make necessary or advisable the presence of the government. This second basic premise is often overlooked in Latin America where the debate between private enterprise and government intervention is carried along on ideological lines rather than based on a pragmatic evaluation of the relative efficiencies of the two sectors in fulfilling any specific task.

I would like to expatiate on those two premises in an attempt to develop some policy norms that might throw light on this emotionally debated problem of government versus private enterprise in Latin America.

The first norm would be that, whenever feasible, indirect controls through credit, taxation, and foreign exchange policies should be preferred to direct controls and to administrative rationing, basically for two reasons: (a) the technical and ethical problems inherent in the administration of direct controls; and (b) the desirability of preserving some of the basic allocating and guiding functions of the price system.

The second norm would be that regulatory controls should be in principle preferred to direct managerial control, and the latter to full ownership by the government. This principle is based again on two considerations: (a) that the government's financial and managerial resources are inadequate in Latin America even for those traditional tasks which are completely inaccessible to private enterprise; and (b) because the socially desirable controls can in most cases, though not in all, be enforced without either managerial control or full ownership by the government.

The third norm would be that government investment as a rule should concentrate on the economic and social overhead, with exceptions being made, however, to admit and encourage govern-

ment intervention even in directly productive sectors, when the following conditions prevail: (a) there is "capital lumpiness," namely when the size of the investment effort is so capital-intensive that it exceeds the capability of private enterprise to mobilize resources; (b) there is need for pioneering either in a regional sense, the opening of new regions, or in a technological sense, the implanting of new techniques; (c) the maturation period exceeds the waiting capacity of private entrepreneurs; this often turns out to be the case in modern technology when the construction of large steel mills or large dams require four or five years, so that economic profitability is not reached until an exaggerated period elapses, a period which exceeds the saving capacity of private enterprise; and (d) there is need for avoiding the formation of private monopolies which may become a source of excessive private power or private exploitation.

A fourth norm would be for government operational intervention, when needed, to take the form of mixed companies with private participation in financing, management, and control, rather than the form of state monopolies except when security or strategic considerations are paramount.

A fifth norm would be that government planning and investment should hopefully be based on noninflationary methods of raising resources through taxation, internal borrowing, or foreign loans, rather than on deficit financing, although the latter may be resorted to on a limited scale. Perhaps one could add another norm that experience has proved extremely difficult to implement, which is for the government to preserve its capacity and willingness to withdraw from a sector after the pioneering stage is completed. I say advisedly that this is a difficult norm to follow because having been a development banker, in charge of promoting government investment in several fields, I found it virtually impossible to withdraw state participation from many projects even after the child had well surmounted the weaning stage.

I expatiated a bit on the scope, limits, and rationale of govern-

ment intervention, because I believe they are at the very core of the problem of public administration in Latin America, where a comparatively small number of skilled administrators are saddled with quite impossible tasks. Not only do they have to conduct the normal operations of the government, but they also have to supervise a proliferation of government enterprises and entities, in fields that could best be handled by simple regulatory controls, if only our statesmen were less skeptical about the effectiveness of regulatory controls and more skeptical about the efficacy of government management.

It seems to be a peculiar twist of opinion that many people, while recognizing that a regulatory agency requires a smaller number of trained personnel, and therefore could be more adequately staffed than a whole host of different government agencies, still prefer somehow to face the awesome responsibility of direct administration instead of relying on a relatively small and effective body of regulators.

Let me now deal with another problem of public administration in Latin America which I would call "abnormal discontinuity." Discontinuity in administration takes place both at the operational level and at the policy-making level. At the operational level, the frequent succession of governments confronts a civil service that is floating without real roots, which does not benefit from regulated recruitment procedures and at times has no *esprit de corps*. This leads to excessive instability of the government machinery in response to changes of government. Of course, public administration is essentially a political task and the administrator cannot and should not be inert to political changes. But there is some intermediate point between complete inertia, creating a divorce between political orientation and administrative behavior, and complete upheaval with each change of administration resulting in complete disruption of the effectiveness of government operations. Fortunately, I think substantial progress has been made in most of the Latin American countries towards endowing the civil serv-

ice with a greater degree of continuity. Certainly in Brazil, we have overcome a substantial part of the problem and perhaps indulged in the opposite excess by giving excessive stability to public officials, in the anxiety to overcome the problem of periodic disintegration of the government machinery at the occasion of government changes.

Discontinuity at the decision-making level is what an American economist recently called "the pseudo-creative response." Each new administrator, each new government becomes sometimes possessed of a convenient amnesia and forgets all of the progress made, the research and experience accumulated by the preceding governments. With unnecessary originality, it is decided that a fresh start must be made. This only too often occurs in our countries, although I might say that even in some much more stable and mature societies, such as the United States, one often finds succeeding governments embarking feverishly on unnecessary originality.

We might come now to what Professor Hirschman of Columbia University called the "dilemma of motivation versus understanding." In developed societies which have completed their process of maturation, technical creativeness and continuous adaptation lead them to incrementalist attitudes in problem solving. They usually tackle problems when they are ready for solution and when the solution is feasible. The so-called "late-comer societies," particularly those affected by the revolution of rising expectations, on the other hand, are in a hurry to develop and are often impatient in problem solving. (I find myself in great difficulty, I might add, to select appropriate terminology to describe the underdeveloped countries. Having been for the most part of the post-war period engaged in one way or the other in studies and debates on economic development, I found that the terminology develops much faster than the developing countries themselves. Originally they were called the poor countries, reflecting the rather fatalistic notion of the prewar days. Then a dynamic concept was injected

—they were called the backward countries presumably because at some point they might be able to move forward. Then they were called, successively, the undeveloped countries, the underdeveloped countries, the emerging countries. Now that they are shaken by the wind of rising expectations, some facetious soul has called them the “expectant countries.”) Well, one of the characteristics of the expectant countries is to attack simultaneously many-sided problems, which do not offer a real possibility of solution. Once failure results, they move to the other extreme and relapse into some sort of ideological fundamentalism, which is the attempt to seek a solution not by increments of reform but by drastic revolution.

This basic dilemma between motivation and understanding is a serious one and undoubtedly affects the direction, meaningfulness, and effectiveness of popular decision in Latin America.

Even in the conception of the Alliance for Progress one can find an acute manifestation of this syndrome. The Alliance for Progress is predicated on the notion that many-sided and multifarious reforms should be attempted for the modernization of society. But this poses immediately the problem of compatibility between short-run and long-run objectives. In the long run, there is perfect compatibility among the several objectives that make up the grand design of the Alliance, namely agrarian reform, fiscal reform, educational reform, creation of a suitable climate for profit investment, and reasonable price stabilization. In the short run, however, it is quite questionable that those objectives are reconcilable. So while there is nothing wrong in approaching these problems from many angles, the Alliance for Progress, as a catalog of evils to be cured and as an indication of desirable reforms, is apt to create more problems than it solves if this strategy is not implemented through incrementalist tactics. One ought to be satisfied at times with partial incremental reforms, rather than to be overly ambitious and to expect complete social transformation in one fell swoop.

Some of those dilemmas are already being felt in Latin America.

If one presses, for instance, violently for agrarian and tax reforms, aiming at redistribution of income, it is unrealistic not to expect, at the same time, a deterioration in the climate for private investment, simply because private investors are precisely the property groups that are likely to get panicky at the reforms. So if one ascribes priority to reform—and that is probably a correct and desirable posture—then one ought not to be too sanguine in expecting an improvement in the private investment climate. In fact, one should be sophisticated enough to countenance its temporary deterioration. I think the executive branch of the American Government is probably conscious of the existence of this problem, but from speeches that I hear in certain quarters of Congress, there is very little if any awareness of the problem that there may be a short-run incompatibility between otherwise desirable objectives. One should not get impatient, discouraged, or otherwise irritated by the fact that, parallel with the push for reform, one has to sacrifice temporarily some other important objective. Similarly, price stabilization measures are desirable in themselves and useful for long-run development, but at times are rendered more difficult by the push for social equity and social justice. At the moment when the preaching of the gospel of social justice really takes hold, it is bound to stimulate claims for welfare benefits and wage adjustments which, though desirable in themselves, and perhaps non-postponable, may render the achievement of price stabilization a still more complicated task than it normally is.

I think I have outlined some of the main problems that form the context within which the public administrator has to operate in Latin America. It is my hope that some limited usefulness will be derived from this analysis, which admittedly does not go into any detailed description of Latin American administrative procedures and problems. As an economist, I would like to conclude these short notes with a quotation from one of your economists, Kenneth Boulding, who has been pleading all along for a balanced approach to this problem of relationship between private

enterprise and public administration. His way of formulating the problem brings perhaps a nice cautionary note on the way to approach those problems in Latin America. "The socialist," he says, "is likely to be too optimistic about the power of government to do good and the liberal too optimistic about the power of the market to prevent evil."



# PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—THE U. S. APPROACH

**Hubert H. Humphrey**  
United States Senator, Minnesota

I have traveled hundreds of thousands of miles as a United States Senator trying to measure, evaluate, and understand the reason why so many people in the world continue to live in abject poverty, and why there continues to be so much political instability. Why does democracy seem to have such a hard time raising its head? And, why in some areas, is it so short-lived? Why does it so frequently succumb to dictatorships, military juntas?

Is there some basic flaw in the societies of Latin America, Asia, and Africa? There is no basic flaw in the people. People everywhere have the same hopes and dreams as you and I. They want freedom just as we do. They are willing to work and sacrifice to get ahead.

Their idealists and their visionaries have caught their imaginations in these new nations. Sometimes they have mustered enough strength to overthrow the ancient tyrannies and try democracy. But all too often, visions fade in the vacuum of administrative incompetence. A handful of doctors, lawyers, or college professors cannot cope with the raw and angry problems of a people who demand more than they have had. Regularly, tragically, the dreamers are bogged down or are pulled down. The dreary cycle of incompetence, corruption, and finally violence is again repeated. All too often, democratic experiments are replaced by military coups. Why? It is not solely because the military have the guns. Possibly part of the answer is that the officer corps is the only group in an underdeveloped nation that is trained in administration.

One of the great tragedies in the developing nations is that

there are so very few nonmilitary personnel who have the necessary training and motivation to enter government service. By default, juntas come to power and stay in power through a failure of democratic leaders to govern efficiently and honestly.

The debate on foreign aid which has occupied the Senate for the past several weeks, gives a sharp focus to the discussion today on "Public Administration in Developing Countries—The U. S. Approach." Many people have been frustrated with our foreign aid program. The problems are inherently complex. They involve issues of foreign policy, domestic and international economics, and problems of national security. Our capacity to grasp and administer the problems is compounded by the tremendous variety in the nature of the problems and needs among the different countries.

There is a broad range of conditions. At one end we have countries just emerging from primitive societies. At the other, some will soon take their places among developed nations. To the different stages of economic development we must add the overlay of different languages, religions, cultural patterns, and different political traditions. Iran has centuries of Persian tradition. Some new African states have a national identity only several years old. Some countries have a handful of high school graduates. Others had distinguished universities before America was discovered. Some countries have rich natural resources. In others a slim living is eked from the soil still scratched with a pointed stick. A thousand variations make it difficult to grasp the foreign aid program and make it difficult for the State Department and the Agency for International Development to administer with the ball-bearing smoothness that some people very unrealistically want.

One problem is present everywhere: every emerging country has serious deficiencies in public administration. It is difficult to "get things done" through government. There is a shortage of trained managerial talent. There are inadequate fiscal and econom-

ic institutions geared to the needs of the government; inadequate services to the public, particularly the rural areas; and lack of enough modern training institutions to produce skilled public employees.

We can't push a button and improve public administration in 60 countries. We know at home that good administration does not come overnight and it does not come by decree. Furthermore, what fits our American democratic heritage often does not fit countries where government must base itself upon tribal structure, or colonies with an inherited tradition from British or French Civil Service. In Latin America the Spanish heritage, military tradition, and the Napoleonic code modify in various ways the structural ideas of the American government.

In our policies, we recognize this. For 12 years, the Agency for International Development and its predecessor agencies in our government, and the United Nations have given limited technical assistance in the field of public administration. Before that the Census Bureau extended training and advisory service which helped make a success of the 1950 census of the Americas. The Bureau of the Budget trained some foreign nationals as early as 1947.

This kind of technical assistance has continued in terms of training, institution building, and advisory services.

In recent years we have trained 500 to 800 people per year from 60 countries, in various arts of public administration. In most cases nationals with some command of English have come to the U. S. for six months to a year. Training combines some specialized courses with observation and work experience in Federal, State, or local government offices.

This has been valuable. It could not possibly reach enough people, however, to make possible rapid improvement in administration in many countries. Therefore a new approach stresses group training of the participants in their own language. In the past year 30 Chileans have been trained in tax collection and ad-

ministration, in Spanish. Our hosts here today, the Graduate School of the Department of Agriculture, have trained several groups of Congolese in French. The Alliance for Progress has stepped up the use of Puerto Rico in training Latin Americans.

Training 1,000 or even 10,000 individuals per year in the United States would not be enough to meet the manpower needs of these countries. Think of a country with one lawyer, one personnel man, or just one agricultural agent—and he has never driven a tractor or made an important decision. Further training in the United States can be costly, and possibly totally unsuited to the needs of the foreign country. There is no point in having a tax man study the use of our computers if his country is just moving from the abacus to the adding machine. Rather we must build up educational and training institutions abroad, adapted to local needs. Our major resources now go in this way.

An early example was the Institute of Public Administration of the Philippines. The University of Michigan collaborated here. As it grew, U. S. assistance was discontinued. Filipinos man this center now entirely. They train their own people to serve their government, as well as train officials from other countries in the Far East. Michigan State University has helped Brazil set up a school of Business Administration. A full Brazilian faculty of twenty-five gives a four-year course. A thousand key business executives have been trained.

Some of the greatest needs are for training below the university level. The Alliance for Progress has stressed this. Chile has now a Tax Training School. Three hundred and seventy-five Chileans have received intensive training, the first time any Latin American revenue personnel have participated in planned, organized, and full-time training. In Guatemala and Paraguay, a total of 1,000 public employees per year are trained. In Peru, the Institute of Public Administration of New York assists a major program in the Peruvian Institute of Public Administration.

In all, the U. S. supports thirty-seven training institutions abroad

in Public and Business Administration and Economics. Twenty-one of these are operating under the Alliance for Progress. I want to emphasize too that other organizations than the U. S. government are encouraged to share the load. The Ford Foundation helps in Colombia and Venezuela. The United Nations is giving increasing attention to the emerging countries of Africa.

We are also stressing direct advisory services to foreign governments. Not all American technicians are men in field clothes advising farmers, or nurses showing mothers how to bathe babies. Some 300 Americans, from the U. S. government, private consulting firms, and universities are working with governments. They are not writing surveys and reports. They are working at modernizing government programs.

Last year Americans helped Jordan install a new budget system. This year they established a new accounting system. In Chile, personnel from our Internal Revenue helped reorganize their internal revenue system, streamlining procedures, writing manuals, decentralizing activity. In Taiwan, fiscal reform is well underway. Automatic Data Processing there has put some taxes on computers and prepares lists in days that once took years. Daily posting of receipts and disbursements is done by IBM machines. Program and performance budgeting is becoming standard in all agencies. In Panama, Americans have established a well-organized Staff Office to the President, who can now get top-level advice in planning, budgeting, personnel, and administrative management.

There is no question that administrative progress has been made in the past ten years. But we have a long way to go in completing the day-to-day administrative improvements which are essential for economic and social development. Waste and inefficiency continues—far more than either the American taxpayers or the developing countries can afford. We have made progress in the mechanics of administration. We now must attack more intangible and difficult political problems—the problems of decision-making at the policy level.

The political problem in administrative modernization can be framed in three questions:

1. How can we convince the have-not nations of the urgency of administrative reform?
2. How can the machinery of government be adapted to cope with and assist in rapid and constructive social and economic change?
3. How does one get the mechanism of government to be effective outside the capital cities—in the rural areas?

These are formidable problems. Let me elaborate on them.

It is not easy to define and it is harder to create a sense of urgency regarding administrative reform. This is often true in the United States, even when we have a reform tradition. It is doubly difficult in countries where there is no such tradition.

Administrative reform must come from within. Reform is substantially a political process. Outsiders can give technical help; but are severely restricted if they try to move beyond that point.

We can do some things to help create a climate and a will. The Alliance for Progress has illustrated some ways to “get things moving.” Before the Alliance, tax advisors usually just wrote reports which gathered dust in the archives. At Punta del Este, however, the Charter focused on tax reform. The President stressed it. Officials like Teodora Moscoso stressed it. Our missions and embassies talked it. It became an important item for discussion in the press. Taxation still isn’t fashionable in most of Latin America, but the problem is off dead center. It is being discussed, legislation has been enacted, administrative practices are changing and collections are rising.

Ecuador provides an example of a different approach to administrative reform. We have loaned Ecuador substantial sums for budgetary support and for some high-priority programs. To make sure they worked, Ecuador got a loan of \$1.6 million from the Agency for International Development specifically for administrative and fiscal reform. They are using the money well to this

end. In this way both foreign and domestic resources are being mobilized to bring about substantial reforms of a basic character.

It is very important indeed to improve the machinery of government. This can still leave the government impersonal, however. Millions of pesos may be saved by a better budget system, but this may not get milk to babies. Better administration must contribute directly and immediately to better public services that people can see, feel, and identify with.

This is a major problem for us all over the world. Economists can and have made workable plans. Engineers have detailed feasible projects. Often these are not developed, because countries lack the administrative skills to carry them out. How, for example, does one get agrarian reform or any major economic or social program going where an official government work week is 28 hours, or where government employees must hold down two or three jobs to make an adequate living?

There is a long way to go. There needs to be more urgency for administrative reform. Administration must institute practical programs in the service of people. The machinery of government must get out into the rural and outlying areas. In saying that progress has been made, I am not denying that there is a long way to go.

Most governmental machinery in developing countries is geared to a "normal" time and pace that is completely out of date. In most cases the institutions do not even exist that can respond to current needs with the urgency required.

I believe we need some new ideas in recruiting in public administration. We must find ways to team up experts in agriculture, education, and administration. We can make better use of talent in other agencies of our government, Federal, State, and local. Through multilateral agencies, more use can be made of the experience of foreign countries in creating institutions needed by the developing ones. Our own universities can do more thinking about administrative institutions abroad.

Even more complex than recruiting personnel, however, is the problem of extending good government outside of the capital cities. Most developing countries have a tradition of centralization. Seldom is there a deep philosophy of public service. Able people leave small communities of limited opportunity to seek the advantages of the capital. Officials are reluctant to delegate authority to those who may not exercise it properly. Regardless of the difficulties of conditions, however, unless public services get to the people in rural areas, economic and social development is not successful.

At this point the work of the Peace Corps should be mentioned. This is precisely what Peace Corpsmen—and women—do. They get out into the rural areas, the primitive villages, and work. The best of American youth show a willingness to roll up their sleeves and serve the rural people. That is not a tradition in many countries where youth of similar families and status get away as fast as possible to the cities of opportunity. Apart from the value of the projects they develop, this example of the Peace Corps may yet be one of the most effective tools in helping us crack this problem.

How does one get rural development going, if buying a shovel has to be approved in a capital 500 miles away? How does one plan land reform without maps? How does one develop agricultural production with few clear property titles? When no one below a Cabinet level can coordinate anything or even tell local specialists to get together and talk over problems, it is hard to get anything moving. All decisions cannot be made at the top.

Facing up to these problems, we have shifted our emphasis in public administration in two ways from our technical-assistance approach of earlier years:

First, we tailor our assistance to the overall development plan of a country, rather than only to do a good, but isolated project. This is our emphasis particularly in Latin America. We are trying to help reshape the economics and societies of the member



nations through a concerted attack on outmoded patterns of life and government.

Secondly, we are trying to make the skills we teach last and endure. We do not wish just to demonstrate a better way of doing things and hope that something will stick. We are trying to build our skills permanently into new and reformed institutions to carry them on.

We are also trying to develop these skills by creating institutions suited to the particular country's needs, special characteristics, and national aspirations.

We have much to learn from the countries in which we work. We must establish confidence and effective working relationships with people in all these differing countries and I emphasize their difference. This takes time. But it is time we have to take if our efforts are to be meaningful and successful in getting at the roots of the public administration problems.

It will take time, therefore, for important improvements in public administration to be made. When they are, they can have a profound and lasting effect on the societies, the political structures, and the economies of the developing countries.

It is then that Americans will perhaps acknowledge the service of those in their leadership—in the Executive and Legislative branches—who fought off shortsighted attempts to prevent the spending of a few cents per American citizen for so vital a purpose in the development of a modern free world.

Often we hear that the people of other nations tend to think of Americans as excessively materialistic in our approach to society and life. Perhaps our friends overseas have some justification for this harsh view of us. In our efforts to help the developing nations to economic and social progress, we tend to be most expressive in our pride for the development of the material resources. We boast of new buildings, new factories, new equipment and new supplies of products and goods which can be touched and seen. Yes, we have made a respected name for ourselves in our assistance

to develop the natural resources and the material resources of underdeveloped nations.

But what about the human resources of the new nations? There is a double lock on the door to real social and economic progress in the underdeveloped nations of the world. Two keys are needed to open that door. One is, of course, capital—the means to develop the physical and material resources of each nation. The other key is education and training of the people, to develop the modern skills needed for social and economic progress.

We can not neglect the vast, untapped human resources in Latin America and other struggling areas of the world. These nations must have administrative, managerial, and supervisory skills—and not just in the public, or governmental sector of society.

Frankly, we are not getting below the governmental level in the underdeveloped nations and developing pools of managerial talent among the people—particularly the middle class.

We must work to mobilise the talents of our own expert managers and supervisors to share their skills with the citizens of underdeveloped nations. In business, in labor unions, in cooperatives, our leaders have perfected supervisory skills necessary for solid success. Those skills must be shared with the people of other nations if they are to develop the capability for managing their own affairs and are not to become used to outside leadership and management.

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Mr. David E. Bell was appointed Administrator of the Agency for International Development in December 1962 after having served as Director of the Bureau of the Budget since January 1961. After World War II in which he served in the Marine Corps, Mr. Bell worked for a short period in the Bureau of the Budget. He then joined the White House Staff as Administrative Assistant to President Truman. After leaving the Government service in 1952 he attended Harvard University and then spent three years in Pakistan as field supervisor of a group of experts who drew up a five-year economic plan for that country. He returned to Harvard University as a Lecturer in Economics in 1957 and remained there until his appointment to the Bureau of the Budget in 1961. Mr. Bell attended Pomona College in California. After graduation he attended Harvard University where he obtained a Masters Degree in Economics in 1941.

Chief S. O. Adebo is Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Commissioner-General for Economic Affairs. He was educated at Kings College, Lagos, and later at the University of London where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree and a Bachelor of Laws degree. After his University training he became a Barrister-at-Law. He entered the Nigerian Civil Service in 1941 and became Chief Secretary to the Government of Western Nigeria and head of the Civil Service. He is the joint author of a report on the "Nigerianization" of the Civil Service of Nigeria.

Mr. Hamzah Merghani is Director of the Division of Public Administration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations. Prior to joining the Staff of the United Nations, Mr. Merghani was Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economics of the Republic of the Sudan. He has also served in a number of positions in the Sudan. He was Alternate

Governor of the Royal Bank, Chairman of the Economic Planning Commission of the Sudan, Director of the Governing Board of the Central Bank, and a member of the Governing Council of the University of Khartoum.

Ambassador Roberto de Oliveira Campos entered the diplomatic service in 1939 and served in the United States Embassy in Washington, the United Nations, and the Consulate at Los Angeles. He was advisor to the Brazilian Delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. He served as advisor and alternate representative for Brazil at numerous meetings of United Nations agencies. He also served as Special Advisor, Executive Office of the President, and as Director and President of the National Bank for Economic Development. Prior to his present appointment he was Brazilian Ambassador in charge of financial negotiations in Western Europe.

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey was first elected to the U. S. Senate in 1948. He was re-elected in 1954 and in 1960. He is a member of the Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Government Operations, and Small Business Committees. In 1956-57 he was a United States Delegate to the United Nations. In 1958 he was a delegate to the UNESCO Conference in Paris and an advisor to the American Delegation to the Conference on Nuclear Testing in Geneva, Switzerland. Senator Humphrey was educated at Denver College, the University of Minnesota, and Louisiana State University. Prior to being elected to the U. S. Senate he was a pharmacist, a college teacher, and Mayor of Minneapolis.

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