

9 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Dunigan; Mr. Hyde,  
Mr. Cunningham; Maj. Gen. Vasiliev;  
Col. Woolworth; Mr. Sandusky;  
Mr. Crowe, Mr. Edwards

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - TOJO  
OSHIMA  
SHIGEMITSU  
SHIRATORI  
HATA

WITNESS

Katakura, Chu  
Ishihara; Kanji (Kwanji)  
Ugaki, Kazushigo  
Okamura, Heiji (Possibly the  
same as Neiji)

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Doc. No. 3006

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*EPM*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3006

28 April 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Printed Pamphlet, "Opinions on Cleaning Up the Army" (SHUKUGUN NI KANSURU IKENSHO) by Capts MURANAKA, Koji, and ISOBE, Asaichi

Date: 11 July 1935 Original  Copy  Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes  No

Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: CS, GHQ, SCAP (Col Bratton)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ADACHI, Kenzo; HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; TANAKA, Kiyoshi; ISHIHARA, Kanji; UGAKI, Kazushige; TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu; KOISO, Kuniaki; OKAMURA, Heiji; CHO, Isamu; OKAWA, Shumei; NAGATA, Tetsuzan; Col. SHIGEFUJI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: October (Brocade Flag) Incident; Manchurian Incident; Ultra-Nationalistic Societies

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

First part of this pamphlet, (for authorship of which the writers were later executed), deals with author's diatribes against two "spies" KATAKURA, Chu, and TSUJI, Masanobu, whom they accuse of having dreamed up the fact of a conspiracy, and being of the camp which attacked ARAKI, MASAKI and HATA for shielding younger officers from punishment. (pp 23-24)

It is also mentioned in passing that the ringleaders of the October Incident were, among others, Col HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Major CHO Isamu; Capt AMANO, Isamu, OKAWA, Shumei; KITA, Ikki, and NISHIDA, Chikara.

Of main interest is Part V, which a memorandum by, according to CIS, a LtCol TANAKA, Kiyoshi, (though the file shows it as a Major "X"). Its title is "Record of the So-Called October Incident; and is dated July 1932.

Doc. No. 3006

The tract discusses first two events leading up to the October Incident; they were the SAKURAKAI (Cherry Blossom Society) and the March Incident.

#### SAKURAKAI

This organization of young officers was started by LtCol HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, and about twenty other army officers below the rank of Colonel sometime before 1930. Its aim was reformation of the nation, and its members did not hesitate to use armed force.

The tract describes the various cliques, maintaining that the terrorist-destructionist groups came out on top. An example was a general inspection of the Second Division General Staff, held in 1930 -- which emphasized national reformation in connection with the Manchurian and Mongolian problems. Charges this due to HASHIMOTO in Russian Section and NEMOTO in Chinese Section. This later induced the Vice-War Minister (SUGIYAMA) to try to make use of the SAKURAKAI in the March Incident.

#### THE MARCH INCIDENT

In January, 1931, General UGAKI, then War Minister, decided to form a cabinet, and talked about national reformation with SUGIYAMA, NINOMIYA, KOISO, Kuniaki (then Chief of Military Affairs Bureau), TATEKAWA, HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, and LtCol NEMOTO.

NINOMIYA shortly asked HASHIMOTO to draw plans for the "changes" since UGAKI was ready to "step out", which he did.

The author says UGAKI supporters included TATEKAWA, (then Chief of Military Affairs Bureau), KOISO, Kuniaki, and NAGATA, Tetsuzan; and that a) they would not hesitate to use armed force to make UGAKI premier, and b) social reformation would come later -- this to be a plan to seize the political powers.

Included in the plans were provisions that:

"Necessary expenses were to come from Army Secret funds (KIMITSU-HI)"

OKAWA was to join with 10,000 of the proletariat  
HASHIMOTO was to be liaison officer.

On 7 February, at a meeting with LtCols SAKATA and NEMOTO, plans for cutting off the Diet, attacking political party HQ and the Prime Minister, and two generals, one of them to be KOISO or TATEKAWA were to proclaim IGAKI premier.

However, the conspiracy was never carried out, because KOISO and others changed attitude, though HASHIMOTO was determined to the end.

OCTOBER INCIDENT

HASHIMOTO quoted as telling author on 4 August 1931 that the KWANTUNG Army would carry out a conspiracy September 1931, as an excuse for "solution" of the MANCHURIAN-Mongolian problem.

This event, he thought, would also give opportunity for a political revolution at home.

Therefore, plans for seizing power at the time were made. Involved were HASHIMOTO, Major CHO, Isamu, and several others, who lived and entertained lavishly during the time they were forming the plot.

Their plans included the usual attacks on leading government personalities and buildings, and the establishment of a new cabinet as follows:

Prime Minister and War Minister  
Home Minister  
Foreign Minister  
Finance Minister  
Chief of Metropolitan Police  
Navy Minister

Gen ARAKI  
LtCol HASHIMOTO  
TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu  
OKAWA, Shumei  
Maj CHO, Isamu  
Rear Adm KOBAYASHI, Shozaburo

Manpower was to include almost twenty companies of Tokyo troops. Some of the conspiracy had spread too far, however, because of HASHIMOTO's extravagance, and his disclosure of the plot to SUGIYAMA, who told KOISO others. ARAKI attempted to negotiate, without success, and on October ten of the leading conspirators were arrested, detained, and transferred. None were punished.

INAMI, as War Minister, reported to the Cabinet and the matter bidden publication in newspapers for all time.

WH WAGNER

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

10 November 1947

MINAMI

KATAKURA, Tadashi - Direct

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\* DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KATAKURA, Tadashi  
BY MR. BROOKS

The witness identified and verified Exhibit 3430 as his affidavit.

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\* The affidavit stated that the witness was attached to Kwantung Army Headquarters from Aug. 1930 to Aug. 1932, connected especially with the handling of secret telegrams. The copies of telegrams attached were the same as the telegrams handled by him at that time. Incoming telegrams addressed to Commander HONJO or C/S MIYAKO were first handed to the witness by the Code Section and then submitted to the superior after the witness read aloud to him \* the gist. Outgoing telegrams from the Commander or C/S to Central authorities were first drafted by him and after the superior approved the draft, it was incoded and then dispatched. When shown Exhibits 3422-A to P, the witness identified them as the ones mentioned in his affidavit.

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There was no cross-examination of the witness.

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: KATAKURA, Chu

Date of Birth: 18 May 1891

Address: No. 2658 Kamimeguro, 5-chome, Meguro-ku, Tokyo

28 May 1919: Graduated from the Military Academy.

25 December 1919: Appointed sublieutenant.

15 December 1922: Promoted to lieutenant.

26 December 1925: Entered the Military Staff College.

16 March 1929: Promoted to captain, assigned to the company-commander of the 27th Infantry Regiment.

1 August 1930: Assigned to the staff of the Kwantung Army.

8 August 1932: Assigned to the staff of the 12th Division.

1 August 1933: Assigned to the staff of the General Staff Office.

1 August 1934: Promoted to major.

26 September 1934: Assigned to Munitions Headquarters of the War Department and to the Military Affairs Bureau of the Department.

18 January 1935: Appointed secretary of the Manchurian Affairs Board.

1 March 1937: Relieved of secretary of the Manchurian Affairs Board. Assigned to the staff of the Kwantung Army.

8 December 1937: Assigned to the attache to the Manchurian and Japanese Joint Committee.

1 March 1938: Promoted to lieutenant-colonel.

5 August 1938: Assigned to the attache to the Manchurian Cultivation Committee.

29 August 1939: Relieved of the attaches to the said two Committees.

9 March 1940: Promoted to colonel.

1 March 1944: Promoted to Major-General.

KATAKURA, Chu

20 Feb 47

Gave copy of Memo for the file dated 13 Jan 47 to Mr. Dunigan; to be returned to us.

Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

Date: 21 March 1947

KATAKURA, Chur (or Chu)

File #300, Serial #110 is a report of James M. McEwen, dated 9 May 1946. McEwen states that on the above date he interrogated KURODA, Otoshiro. On the date of the interview, KURODA was Consul General without portfolio. Other positions he has held are: Commerce Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office from December 1936 till early May 1938, Third Secretary to the Embassy in Manchukuo from January 1938 to April 1940, and he was First Secretary in the Embassy in Berlin and Hamburg from 1940 until about 1 April 1946. The following excerpt is taken from McEwen's report:

"He states positively that the Manchukuoan Government was a puppet of the Kwantung Army, not of the Japanese Government - no department could operate without consulting the officers in Section 4 of the army. During his stay there, Colonel (later Major General) KATAKURA, Chu was chief of the Section, and NAGAI, Yatsuji (later Major General) was sub-chief. They knew and applied the Five Year Plan - (KURODA could not tell me where a copy of the plan is at this time but has promised to assist in searching for it) Conferences concerning all matters were supervised and argument controlled therein by the Chief of Section 4. He said further that the Kwantung Army always felt that the Japanese Foreign Office was its "enemy" and dealt with it as such. For a time this was true of its attitude towards the South Manchurian Railway, but that changed when the offices in the railway were occupied by Japanese friendly to the army.

"Hoshino was the most powerful civilian in the Manchurian Government. His position as head of the General Affairs Bureau made him such. He was fully cooperative with the Kwantung Army."

File #250, Serial #38, consists of a translation of an article entitled "Leaders Who Sponsored Militarism" by MASAYUKI, Shiroki. The article is not repeated here but attention is called to the fourth paragraph on page 4 thereof.

Attached hereto is a sheet listing the various decorations received by KATAKURA.



KATAKURA, Chu ( )

Date	Class of Decoration	Achievement	Recommending Ministry
1934, 4, 29	Military Order of the Golden Kite, Fifth Grade	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
1934, 4, 29	Order of the Dichsomatic Light Rising Sun, 7 win-Rays	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
1940, 4, 29	Minor Cordon of the Order of the Golden Kite	China Incident	War Ministry
1940, 4, 29	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	War Ministry
1937, 12, 20	Manchukuo Decoration, Ching Yuan Chang, 3rd Grade	Japano-Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
1942, 12, 28	Manchukuo Decoration, Chu Kuo-Chang, 2nd Grade	Japano-Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
1939, 12, 27	Commandor Coronne, Italie	Japano-Italian Amity	Foreign Ministry

REPORT BY: LT. JOHN A. CURTIS  
13 Jan 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KATAKURA, Chu

Address: No. 2658 Kamimeguro, 5-Chome, Meguro-Ku  
Tokyo.

File 300, Serial 110: Chief of Section 4 of the Kwantung  
Army. No department of the army could operate without con-  
sulting this section.

File 69, Serial 99:

File 299, Serial 20: Contains same information.

File 250, Serial 38:

Copies: 3 File  
1 Mr Newbill

1st Denial

KATAKURA, Chu

Request by: Tojo, Hidetki.

Address: No. 2658 Kami-Meguro 5 chome,  
Meguroku, Tokyo.

Former Major General with long service in  
Kwantung Army.

This witness is able to testify concerning  
the origin and development of the  
"Manchurian Incident"

KATAKURA, Chur

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: No. 2658 Kami-Meguro 5 chome, Meguroku, Tokyo.

Former Major General with long service in Kwantung Army.

This witness is able to testify concerning the origin and development of the "Manchurian Incident".

Doc. #2047  
Det. Doc. #2047

Exhibit # \_\_\_\_\_  
Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

United States of America, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT



I, KATAKURA, Tadashi, having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in our country, to hereby depose and say as follows:

1. I was formerly a major-general, I live at No. 2658, Kami-meguro-gochome, Meguro-ku, Tokyo.
2. I was attached to the Kwantung Army headquarters from August, 1930, to August, 1932, and connected specially with the handling of secret telegrams. The copies of telegrams attached hereto are truly the same as those telegrams which were handled by me at that time.
3. Among the said copies of telegrams attached hereto, the incoming ones at the Kwantung Army headquarters addressed to the Commander Honjo or the Chief of Staff Miyake were, first of all, handed to me by the Code Section, and then submitted to the said superior concerned, after my reading aloud to him the gist thereof. The outgoing telegrams from the Commander or the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the central army authorities were, first of all, drafted by me under the order of the said superior concerned. Upon his approval of my draft, I had it translated into code by the Code Section, and then the dispatch was made.

Def. Doc. #2047

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I do hereby swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Aug. 15th, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ KATAKURA, Tadashi

I do hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the said deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in my presence on the same day at the same place as above written.

Witness : /S/ MATSUZAWA, Tatsuo

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DIRECT EXAMINATION of KATAKURA, Tadashi,  
By. Mr. T. OKAMOTO.

- 18882 \* The witness stated he lived in Tokyo, and at the time of the end of the war he was a Major-General in command of the 202nd Division. On September 18, 1931, he was at Port Arthur, attached to the staff of the Kwantung Army.
- 18883 \* He had gone to Manchuria in August, 1930, and had stayed there until the end of August, 1932. In the fall of 1930 he toured the eastern part of Northern Manchuria, and in the summer of 1931 the western part of North Manchuria.
- 18884 The NAKAMURA Incident took place at that time and he made spot investigations of it, going to the Taonan District. About June 27 NAKAMURA had been killed by Chinese soldiers in the western part of Taonan. \* The Army learned about it in the early part of July, 1930. It was immediately reported by the Kwantung Army to the War Ministry and GHQ, and to the Japanese consulates in Manchuria. About July 15, Harbin Special Service sent out a search network from Taonan and Tsitsihar. About July 23 or 24 they came upon the first important clue. \* A Japanese railway official in Tsitsihar heard from a Chinese from Taonan of the killing. The Kwantung Army sent the witness to Taonan and they immediately set upon investigation.
- 18885
- 18886 \* The reason why the announcement of the Incident was first made in August was that there were various matters which had to be negotiated with China with definite, accurate evidence; otherwise the whole thing could be rubbed out in some way or another. To avoid the possibility, they had to have definite evidence.
- 18887 During his North Manchurian tour and his trip investigating the NAKAMURA Incident, if he wore ordinary civilian clothes or Chinese clothes he was frequently molested by railroad guards on trains. \* The various railway guards made frequent appeals that they were being molested by Chinese. It was a matter of custom to travel outside the railway zone in Chinese or civilian clothes.

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- 18888 Independent railway guards, on the average, patrolled the railways about three thousand times a month. Despite this, frequently lines were cut down and various other obstructing incidents took place. \* It was the policy of the Kwantung Army to settle such incidents peacefully and localize the dispute. With respect to minor military matters, the questions were settled by the Mukden Special Service Department, and important matters were handled by the Consulate-General. On the Chinese side, the matter was taken care of by staff officers of Chang Hsueh-liang and the Liaison Office of Chang's Government. It was customary for the Special Service to negotiate with the GHQ of the Chang Army while the Consulate-General negotiated with the Liaison Office.
- 18889 \* The witness stated that he first heard of the outbreak of the Mukden Incident at 11.30 p.m. on September 18. On that day General HONJO, accompanied by ISHIHARA and other staff officers, were returning from an inspection and were to arrive by that evening. At Port Arthur there was only the chief of staff, MIYAKE, the witness and another staff officer. There was a dinner party that evening among the Military Academy, and the witness returned home late. At 11.30 he received the telephone call from Captain KONISHI, officer of the day, who was very excited. \* He stated that an unexpected and big incident had occurred at Mukden and an important telegram had arrived.
- 18890 The witness returned to Headquarters and saw the telegram which reported the Incident and that a section of the railroad had been bombed. The witness then ran with the telegram to the home of MIYAKE. By "bombing" is meant "blown up".
- 18891 The witness' duties then were to assist ITAGAKI in connection with public relations work and the handling of business affairs in the general staff office. \* The commanding general of the Kwantung Army was at his home. The report to him was made by the chief of staff at about 2340. \* It was the established procedure for such telegrams to be sent to the witness because he was assistant staff officer in public relations or liaison work as well as the handling of business affairs within the Kwantung Army.
- 18892
- 18893



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18894 All staff officers assembled at the chief of staff's house and went to headquarters and asked the commanding general to come. When they had assembled at GHQ, another telegram arrived simultaneously with the commanding general. It stated that the Japanese company at Kosekidai was \* fighting with about three or four hundred enemy troops who had machine guns and infantry and were bringing in more.

18895 General HONJO, with respect to the first report received, said that action should follow operations plans already established, by concentrating forces around Mukden and waiting for the opponent to move. After receiving the second report, HONJO changed the original plan by taking the step to gradually increasing all forces and attacking the enemy. At that time he cautioned, since the situation around Changchun and Kirin was unknown, \* they should revise the original plan made in peacetime and try to draw enemy forces toward Changchun and he suspended the plan of calling Japanese forces to Mukden from Changchun. The decision was based on regulations governing the function of Kwantung Army Headquarters and the operational plans as drawn up in peacetime.

18896 There were some differences, however, with the peacetime plans. General HONJO left Port Arthur between 3.00 and 3.30 \* on September 19. He took ISHIHARA and the main body of staff officers with him, leaving behind most of the directors of the various departments of the Army, such as the ordinance, medical, intendance, and legal department chiefs, and the chief of staff to clear up business in Port Arthur.

18897 The Japanese residents along the railway lines had heard of the Incident, and many desired to see the matter satisfactorily settled once and for all. \* Many of the Japanese spoke very emotionally. They arrived at Mukden about noon on the 19th, and established command posts in the station master's office. In the evening they transferred headquarters to the Totaku Building and established billets at an inn. They kept these headquarters until the end of August, 1932. Instructions from Tokyo concerning the Mukden Incident came by telegram from chief of general staff KANAYA, \* and General MINAMI, at six p.m. on

18898

September 19.

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18901 He recalled the contents of these telegrams to some extent. \* The witness stated that he met General TATAKAWA on the night of September 19 in Mukden. General HONJO sent ITAGAKI from Liaoyang to meet TATAKAWA at Mukden. On the night of the 19th, because of the various telegrams from Tokyo, there was a conference of staff officers, and the witness  
18904 \* was ordered to bring TATAKAWA to the meeting for his opinion. It took the witness a long time to locate TATAKAWA, but he found him and brought him to the inn around midnight. When the witness first met him, TATAKAWA stated that he had arrived only yesterday, and had seen ITAGAKI. Meanwhile the Incident had broken out and he could not do anything about it. He was planning to see HONJO, but was unable to do anything about the outbreak of the Incident.

18905 TATAKAWA went to the inn and talked with the staff officers. He \* strongly stressed the fact that although the outbreak of the Incident was regrettable to the Kwantung Army, no matter what the Chinese did the Japanese should not move its forces into northern Manchuria. TATAKAWA saw HONJO early on the morning of the 20th.

18908 \* The witness stated that besides assisting ITAGAKI, he also performed the role of chief secretary to the commanding general and chief of staff, and was in a position to be informed of nearly all things. On September 20 there was a request from the president of the Kirin Residents Association and the adviser of the Kirin Army to have a dispatch of troops sent into that area. ISHIHARA, in charge of operations, was in favor of sending armed forces, but HONJO would not  
18909 approve. \* He had heard personally HONJO's reason for his refusing to send troops.

In accordance with the policy from Tokyo of non-aggravation and non-extension, HONJO desired to settle the issue peacefully and with as much moderation as possible. In view of the disorder and unrest in Kirin and the need for protecting Japanese residents, it was believed that an early settlement of the situation there would enable them to bring about a more effective protection of the railways and secure the safety of the residents.

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18910 In view of the fact that if these forces were withdrawn immediately on settlement the matter would be in accord with the policy of non-aggravation, HONJO decided to send the troops. \* After this, around the 23rd or 24th, most of the Kwantung Army forces were withdrawn into the railway zone. HONJO issued orders insuring a stricter discipline in the ranks, and ordered preparations to clean up any unfinished matter.

The chief of the army general staff sent a wire, stating that since the incident had been more or less settled for the time, he would like to have the Kwantung Army take action thereafter after contact and consultation with Tokyo.

18911 From the Harbin Special Service Department and the Japanese Consulate General in Harbin, \* they learned that law and order was becoming worse and worse from September 20, it being reported that Chinese armies retreating from Changchung had engaged in riots and that there were anti-Japanese posters pasted, and hand grenades had been thrown.

18912 \* Around September 22 or 23, a request  
18913 came from Harbin \* that since the situation was extremely acute, they wanted to have troops sent to safeguard the area. So far as the Kwantung Army was concerned, in view of TATEKAWA's statement about advancing troops into Northern Manchuria and in the light of the instructions from Tokyo requiring consultation and contact, because of the frequent requests from Harbin the Kwantung Army sent the Central Army authorities for their views on action to take. Instructions were received from Vice War Minister SUGIYAMA that troops would not be sent to Harbin.

18914 \* Around the 24th, a third request came  
from Harbin, and a final inquiry was made of MINAMI  
and KANAYA for their permission to send troops.  
18915 \* The witness stated that it was customary for him  
to personally receive all important telegrams  
addressed to the commander of the Kwantung Army and  
18916 to the Chief of Staff, except personal ones. \* These  
telegrams were in code, and were decoded by an extra  
secretary named NAKAMURA, and he brought the  
decoded telegrams to the witness.

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18924 He was familiar in general with important telegrams. The witness stated he saw the telegram and showed it to ITAGAKI, ISHIHARA, MIYAKE, and HONJO. The witness handed the telegram personally to HONJO and spoke of its gist to him, and showed the telegram to the various officers concerned. He reported to HONJO that KANAYA had sent instructions stating that troops should not be sent to Harbin. The telegram from MINAMI was also shown to his superior officers in the same way, and gave the gist of it.  
\* The gist of the telegram was that instructions had already been received from the Prime Minister that it was the policy not to protect the area, and that the matter had been reported to the Emperor.

18925 In the light of the instructions, HONJO abandoned the idea of sending troops and of defending or protecting the area. About December 20 a telegraphic instruction was received from the Vice Minister of War under orders of the Minister, that there was a rumor that military administration was being carried out in Manchuria, but that no such steps should be taken.  
\* Since the directive was rather unexpected, the Kwantung Army began investigating. It was discussed with the IWATA Battalion in Yinkow, by guiding the Chinese on the spot to maintain law and order, and had given rise to the misinterpretation as to military administration.

18926 At Yinkow, during the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese had established a military administration. After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, this battalion went in and guided the local authorities to establish law and order. This was misinterpreted.

\* On the order of HONJO, Miyake cautioned the various units to be careful that its actions be not interpreted as military administration, and reported the details to Tokyo. The witness was familiar with the reports made to central Army authorities. He believed that the making of DOIHARA as Mayor of Mukden was not contrary to the principle of these reports. He had heard from the commander of the Kwantung Army and his Chief of Staff of the reasons for appointing DOIHARA as Mayor.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
(March 21, 1947)  
(DEFENSE - Division II - Manchuria)  
KATAKURA - Direct

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18927 At that time there were many Chinese public establishments, facilities, and organizations in Mukden, \* but most of the Chinese leaders had abandoned the locality. Since Mukden was the center of Manchuria, efforts were first directed toward establishing law and order there. DOIHARA was appointed Mayor temporarily to serve until a competent person could be found. No other military men participated in the administration of the city. However, the president of the Japanese Residents Association and several others participated as councilors.

18928 Whenever law and order broke down in China, the first thing that was formed was a committee for preserving and maintaining law and order. In this case, the Liaoning Committee was created. \* The Chairman was Yuan Chin Kai, and there were some Japanese committeemen. Yuan was recommended as chairman by important Chinese leaders. There was no connection with the Kwantung Army. The witness had met Mr. Yuan for the first time when he called on the commander of the Kwantung Army in early October, 1931. He was known in the northeastern area as one of the three civilian officials, \* and had been vice-president of the Northeastern Political Council under Chang Hsueh Liang.

18929

Since the Kwantung Army was opposed to establishing military administration and preservation of law and order was important, the Kwantung Army cooperated with the various organs on the spot and maintained close contact. No orders were issued, but through cooperation they sought to maintain law and order.

18930 Shortly after the outbreak of the Incident a few men were sent to Mukden, and gradually a staff department was established there. \* At first the staff office consisted of ITAGAKI, the witness, and four others. There was also there the Investigation Section personnel and the General Affairs Department were there, and later four sections. At first ITAGAKI was chief of the General Affairs Department, and the witness was his assistant.

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The First Section operations was under DOIHARA; the Second Section was Intelligence, the Third was Law and Order; and the Fourth dealt with the Press.

18931 About September 22, ANDO, Chief of the  
18932 Military Service Section, came on the orders of  
MINAMI to Manchuria to investigate four problems.  
\* As soon as ANDO reached Mukden he met with  
HONJO, Chief of Staff MIYAKE, ITAGAKI, ISHIHARA,  
and the witness, and one other. \* The first question  
of ANDO related to the situation in guarding and  
patrolling Fushun. The second was to investigate  
into the report that the Kwantung Army had attacked  
the Chinese in spite of the fact that on September  
18 the Chinese troops had declared non-resistance.  
The third question was the report that a certain  
staff officer in a telephone conversation with the  
Japanese Consul-General in Mukden had used offensive  
language. The fourth question was an investigation  
into operational matters, because it was said that  
so swift was the action of the Kwantung Army that  
its preparations had been made in peacetime.

18933 The Fushun matter was due to the fact  
that one company was stationed in Fushun, and \*  
captain KAWAKAMI, its commander in the middle of  
September, had assembled various officials connected  
with the South Manchurian Railway, and had made an  
important proposal. He is supposed to have said on  
September 16 or 17 that the second investigation  
squad probing the NAKAMURA Incident would return,  
and an acute situation might arise depending on the  
move the Chinese made, and since no preparations had  
been made for any trains at Fushun, some arrangements  
ought to be made. Various circles were surprised at  
this, and the South Manchurian Railway sent one of  
its directors to Fushun to confirm KAWAKAMI's meeting.  
This director had returned to Dairen on the 17th,  
because he had heard that there was nothing much in  
the offing.

18934 This information reached Consul General  
HAYASHI. Since Japanese-Manchurian-Chinese relations  
\* were extremely acute, he was much surprised and sent  
a letter to HONJO about the matter, but it arrived late.  
This information was reported to Tokyo.

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HONJO never saw HAYASHI's letter until the 19th in Mukden, which was relayed from Port Arthur. Because of the tense situation of some of the army officers, HAYASHI, out of his pre-conceived over-cautiousness had expressed a desire that the young officers would not make any mistakes, and that fact had been reported in a very over-exaggerated form.

18935 After HONJO had talked with HAYASHI on the 19th, \* he immediately sent Lt. Col. SHIMAMOTO to investigate the facts. On September 20 the witness and the chief of staff paid a visit to HAYASHI, and the matter was fully explained. This was also reported to Colonel ANDO.

With respect to the non-resistance of Chinese troops, ITAGAKI, at the outbreak of the Incident, was in Mukden and learned from HAYASHI that since the Chinese forces took an attitude of non-resistance he would like to have that considered by the Kwantung Army, but in view of the fact that fighting had already started nothing could be done. It was considered that this was nothing more than the old Chinese policy of making Japan relax its vigil.

18937 \* ITAGAKI requested ANDO to go to the actual scene of the fighting and investigate the situation from the company and battalion commanders engaged in the fighting, and to find out from the actual battlefield whether fighting had broken out despite the non-resistance or otherwise. HONJO told ANDO to go to the scene of the fighting. ANDO further inquired into the two other questions, and went to make his two investigations.

18938 \* With respect to the arrogant attitude of a certain staff officer, ITAGAKI was said to have used sharp words of an offensive character to HAYASHI during the telephone conversation on the non-resistance policy. ITAGAKI himself, in HONJO's presence, made the explanation.

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18939 With respect to the preparations point, the witness stated that since the Kwantung Army was a small force, the policy in the event of an emergency was that they should carry out their action by careful operational planning and a high degree of training. \* However, since the position of HONJO had twice changed, the movement of troops could not be carried out as desired. As a result, ISHIHARA was very much irritated.

18940 From investigations conducted on the 19th and 20th, it was learned that Captain KAWAKAMI in Fushun, after hearing the results of the second investigation party on the NAKAMURA Incident, felt much relieved. He went to the emergency muster on September 18 without even carrying his binoculars. \* This report was submitted to ANDO, and the request was made that he personally investigate on the spot. Before that HONJO had conducted an investigation on the spot, and the report was made to ANDO.

18941 The Kwantung Army had sent OYAMA, USUDA, SHIMAMOTO, and others as an investigating party. OYAMA and SHIMAMOTO are still alive, but ANDO is dead. ANDO investigated for about four days, and returned to Tokyo \* on the 27th.

18942 The witness stated that he knew about the independence movement in Kirin and that it became independent. At that time there was in Kirin a Manchurian relative of Hsiun Tung, who was a representative of Chang Tso-hsiang. He had long advocated restoring the monarchy, and did not like to serve under Chang Hsueh-liang. Lo Chen-yu contacted him in Kirin after the incident.

\* About September 22 or 23, Lo Chen-yu went to Mukden and met ITAGAKI, and after contacting Hsi Hsia and Chang Hai-peng he returned to Mukden. He stated that he had found that Hsi Hsia had made preparations for independence and wanted to have Hsiun Tung come to Kirin. Lo was going to Tientsin to call him and left for there by way of Dairen. Hsi Hsia, after consulting Chang's group at the end of September, issued an independence declaration.



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- 18943 ITAGAKI told the witness about the conversation, and the witness drafted the telegram sent to the central authorities. \* The Vice-Minister of War sent a telegram that the Kwantung Army should not take part in the monarchial restoration movement around the end of September. For purposes of obtaining intelligence reports, the Kwantung Army made various contacts but did not directly participate in the movement. By exchange of information, he meant various intelligence reports. He did not participate directly in this, but it was his duty to put into concise form the information obtained.
- 18944 \* Kirin is about 400 kilometres from Mukden. On October 1, Chang Hai-peng proclaimed independence in Taonan. Also at Shangchenchen, half way between Mukden and Kirin, Yu Chih-shan proclaimed independence. So far as the Kwantung Army was concerned, it had no troops stationed at Taonan or Shangchenchen.
- 18945 \* With respect to giving financial or monetary contributions to such movements, the witness stated that the special funds available for such purposes to the Kwantung Army was no more than 50,000 yen annually, and the Kwantung Army had no money to spend for such purposes as independence movements. The special fund was available only for expenses for gathering intelligence, patrolling, and receptions. Assistance and support had been asked for from the South Manchurian Railway and others, but they helped with their own private funds, that is, with personnel and staff members of the SMR.
- 18946 \* The SMR helped the Kwantung Army in transportation matters and to the preserving of law and order. The Kwantung Army sent one or two persons of the SMR for purposes of contact and liaison, but they never utilized them for independence or autonomous movements.

In view of the central authorities policy, the Kwantung Army specially emphasized the preservation of law and order, and its attitude toward the various independent movements in Manchuria was one of watchful silence and contact after the movements matured.

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18947

\* At the beginning of the Incident, Ma Chan-shan was at Heiho as the third brigade commander. At that time Wan Fu-lin was the governor of the province of Heilungkiang, with the capital at Tsitsihar. When the Incident broke out, he was away and his son, Wan Kuo-pin, looked after his business.

18948

At that time the Japanese acquired the Chinese code, and it became easy to intercept coded Chinese messages. It was learned that Wang Fu-lin was anxious to have Chang Hsueh-liang return to Heilungkiang. His son was afraid that Chang Hei-ping might come to Tsitsihar with Japanese support.  
\* However, the people in the area had heard that the Japanese were not coming, and popular support of Chang Hei-ping became strong. Wan Fu-lin, thinking his son was too weak, called Ma to Tsitsihar and appointed him commander of the provincial forces. Ma and Chang Hei-ping clashed at Nun-kiang.

18950

After Manchukuo was founded, Ma became a director-general of military administration by concurrently holding the posts of War Minister and Chief of Staff.

\* Toward the end of November, Ma was defeated by the Japanese and retreated to Hailun. At that time ITAGAKI went to Hailun and had an interview with Ma. After ITAGAKI had explained Japan's intentions, Ma was persuaded to accept the position. At that time Chang Chin-hui, in Harbin, made strong efforts to have Ma become governor of Heilungkiang. Later, in February, 1932, Ma was appointed Minister of Military Administration.

18951

The witness stated that on October 18 he learned about the October Incident in Japan through a message from Tokyo, to the effect that the Kwantung Army should not take any action to become independent of the Army in Japan. \* That day KAWAGISHI, the Emperor's aide, was to deliver the Emperor's message to the troops in Mukden. Since this was very important and realizing that it was highly improper to show such a telegram suspecting the Kwantung Army to the commander-in-chief when he was participating in the ceremony, the witness delayed presenting the telegram.

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18951 The witness thereafter showed the Imperial message to General HONJO, and he heard from Army units in the field that a similar telegram had been received from Tokyo. He started an investigation, but as a result of the investigation there was nothing.

18952 \* On October 17, a telegram arrived reporting that part of the younger officers had been apprehended in Tokyo. HONJO wrote a message to the chief of the Army General Staff and to the War Minister explaining the situation in the Kwantung Army so that the central authorities would know the real situation.

For investigation purposes, General SHIRAKAWA came to Manchuria because of the feeling that something was in the offing. En route he found out there was nothing to investigate in the Kwantung Army, and he did not conduct any investigation.

18953 \* The witness stated that Yu Chung-han was one of the three foremost leading civil officials in Manchuria. On November 3, 1931, he came to Mukden and met HONJO. The witness was not present, but heard the contents of the conversation from ITAGAKI and saw the document tendered by Yu. In the two points mentioned to HONJO, one was that the Incident

18954 had developed to such a state that in order to secure law and order, \* the area should be separated from Nanking and a new country founded on the kingly way. The principle would be a no-military one, and establish and observe the principle of non-menace and non-aggression. It was to be established as a sort of Monroe doctrine.

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18965 \* In Yu's opinion, so long as a state founded on the Kingly Way was to be established in the northeastern area, a state like Switzerland should be established without arms on the principle of non-menace. If there was a national defense army, in the light of the defeat by Soviet forces in 1929 and in the light of the defeat in 1931 by the Japanese Army, the army for the new area would have to be one which could be put up against both the Japanese and Russian armies.

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18966

\* With respect to the attitude of HONJO, in October and November he issued frequent statements and instructions stating it was the duty of the Kwantung Army to devote itself only to preserving law and order, and was not to interfere in any way with political matters and adopt an attitude of watchful silence.

18967

\* At the end of September, a Mongolian created a small force and attacked Chinese troops about 250 kilometers northwest of Mukden and created an Inner Mongolia autonomous army. Chang Chin-hui, a director of the Chinese Eastern Railway, was near Mukden when the Incident occurred and immediately went to Harbin, and with two others declared independence. However, since he did not have any arms, his proclamation was very weak.

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On November 13, Pu-Yi returned to Manchuria, \* landing at Yingkow. The witness knew the circumstances of his coming, as observed by headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

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On September 26, Luo Chen-yu had reported that certain men were entertaining a desire to see the restoration of the monarchy, and on the 27th he left for Tientsin. On October 1 there was a sudden communication from headquarters of the Tientsin garrison, that Pu-Yi would come to Manchuria if he had the support of the people inhabiting the area and if he had the understanding that Japan would support his return. He felt that it was not time for him to go. At that time they heard that Chin-liao, of the Liaoning Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order had gone to Tientsin to bring Pu-Yi into Manchuria. Various voices were heard from \* Dairen and other parts of Manchuria supporting the restoration.

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In the latter part of October, DOIHARA was sent to Tientsin personally by HONJO and without any connection with the General Staff or the War Ministry. He had two assignments. \* One was to collect intelligence with respect to the Tientsin-Peiping area, and the other was to study the measures to be taken if Chang Hsueh Liang should move south of the Great Wall into China Proper.

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18971

Another duty was to observe into the possible attitude of the Chinese generals in the Peiping-Tientsin area in the event Chang Hsueh-liang should withdraw toward Tientsin. One other duty was entirely military, a study of the question if Chang Hsueh-liang should withdraw into North China and would clash with Japanese forces there and the services of the Kwantung Army would become necessary, what the Japanese side should do in such event. He was also, because of the clamor being heard in the area, to sound out whether Pu-Yi \* would like to go to Manchuria. HONJO, on this last point, gave strict instructions to DOIHARA not to make any commitments as to whether Pu-Yi was to become chief executive or emperor.

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DOIHARA, while personally sent by HONJO, was carrying out official duties, and it was due to the personal orders of HONJO in his official capacity and not his private capacity. HONJO had authority to send staff officers for various purposes. Around the first part of November, \* DOIHARA reported to the Kwantung Army that Pu-Yi wanted to come as soon as possible and had the idea that if he went, the problem of Ma would be settled and the people of Mongolia would support him. He wanted to establish his government in Kirin. DOIHARA inquired as to what he should in view of the fact that KAWASHIMA, the Consul-General in Tientsin, was opposed to Pu-Yi's going. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army instructed DOIHARA to put the matter off because there were various unsettled military problems. DOIHARA then reported that Pu-Yi wanted to cross the Liao-Ho before it froze. The Kwantung Army \* then re-issued its previous instructions.

18973

On the night of November 11, a telegram came from the Tientsin Army that it was moving to Yingkow on the morning of the twelfth and that Pu-Yi was going there that day, and asked the Kwantung Army to do what it could for him. This was to enable Pu-Yi to escape from the uprising of November 8. On the twelfth the message was sent to Yingkow to receive Pu-Yi, but he did not land. He landed on the 13th, unexpected. Since he landed without any previous advice and suddenly, he was sent to a hot spring called Tang-kantzū near An-shan.

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18974 There was a sudden unexpected attack by Manchurian bandits on the spring. \* While Pu-Yi was anxious to go to Kirin, since the Kwantung Army had rigid instructions from central authorities it was decided to send him to Port Arthur to segregate him from the various factions.

At the end of September or early in October, the Vice Minister of War, acting on MINAMI's orders, telegraphed that the Kwantung Army should not connect itself with the restoration of the monarchy movement in Manchuria.

18975 \* Upon Pu-Yi's arrival, Chang Hai-pen gave  
18976 him a present of 200,000 yuan, \* and sent an emissary to welcome him. Also, Lao Tan-yan went to see him, and Ling Sheng, son of a tribal Mongolian chief, called on him. In Port Arthur, Pu-Yi was placed under the protection of the administrative office of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and this action was taken by the army on consultation of the consulate general and the administrative office. They prohibited interviews with Japanese. He was free to interview Manchurians to the extent that no personal harm would come to him. This was adopted by the administrative office for the Kwantung leased territory. \* In Port Arthur, Pu-Yi stayed at a hotel.

18977

The witness said he knew about the provincial self-government guiding board. The only relations that the Kwantung Army had with it was with the third section when it contacted this body on preserving law and order, and the 4th section contacted it with respect to press relations. No officers of the army were in any way connected with the body, and the Kwantung Army gave no money to it. However, he heard that the Liaoning Province committee for the maintenance of law and order did give money.

18978

With respect to the independence of the Liaoning Provincial Government, on November 3, after the previously mentioned conversation between Yu Chun-han and HONJO, Yu gave every support to Yuan Chin-kai, and had him change the name of the committee for maintaining law and order into the Liaoning public office, and proclaimed the independence of the province.

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\* The witness stated that he had read a Japanese translation of the Lytton Report. He recalled the statement in the report that General Tsang Shih-yi was held in the custody of the Kwantung Army, but stated he had never heard that he was so held. He knew about the fact of Tsang's appointment to the chairmanship of the provincial government of Mukden. He was a native of the province, and was at first uncertain, but with the support and on the persuasion of the influential Mukdenese, he accepted the post of provincial governor.

With respect to the Manchurian Incident, General HONJO issued to the chief of staff and other departmental chiefs, an important direction containing four points. One concerned the separation of Chang Hsueh-liang from Nanking. Another contained HONJO's observations on establishing various regimes in certain areas in Manchuria. Another was his ideas on the foremost leaders in Manchuria, and the fourth point was the Japanese attitude and state of mind as to the settlement of the incident.

18982

\* With respect to the severance of relations of Chang Hsueh-liang with Nanking, it was felt that there was no room for his return to Manchuria, and that the coming of the Nanking government into the area would confuse the situation. Yu Chun-han believed there was no alternative but to establish an independent state to promote the well-being and security of the people in the area. HONJO felt that there was no alternative but to have men like Yu establish an independent state to secure the people.

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With respect to the establishment of independent regimes, HONJO believed that no outside power should be exercised and there should be no outside interference or support, but that time was necessary to settle the incident. \* Pressure should not be applied merely to try and settle the issues as promptly as possible.

With respect to the problem of leaders, it was HONJO's instructions that they should not stick to any one person, such as Pu-Yi, but should give full consideration to public opinion.

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\* The point was that to secure Japanese interests it was necessary to promote collaboration with China and to foster a feeling of harmony and to establish a long-term relationship uprooting the evils interfering with it. Chang Hsueh-liang had his headquarters then at Chin-chou. There his forces increased in strength, and trenches were prepared.

18985

With respect to the rioting in Tientsin toward the end of November, on November 26 the commander of the garrison there sent a telegram to the commander of the Kwantung Army for reinforcements. HONJO decided to bring a part of the forces at Mukden to Hsin Min, and bring back the second division from Tsitsihar to Mukden. \* He then prepared for an advance toward Chin-chou. However, the troops sent to Hsin Min were recalled after they went part way. This was due to the fact that the commander of the Hsin Min garrison had reported that the military uprising had relaxed and an order from the central authorities saying that the troops must not be sent. When they were withdrawn there were about two battalions at Tsitsihar, and other units were concentrated along the railway zone.

18986

The witness stated that NINOMIYA visited in Manchuria at that time, \* to do liaison work for the General Staff in Tokyo and study the Manchurian situation. There were often differences of opinion between the Kwantung Army and the central authorities, and the coming of NINOMIYA had some relation to this. There were rumors afloat that there were officers in the Kwantung Army who had strong views, including the desire to put HONJO under confinement, and further rumors that the younger staff officers were sending messages to Tokyo without approval of senior officers. The Kwantung Army desired to have NINOMIYA understand that all important documents were approved not only by the commander, \* but also his chief of staff. HONJO explained this to NINOMIYA.

18987

HONJO was a strict disciplinarian and meticulous as to details, and strict in the conduct of business.



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18988 The witness stated that in the Chin-chou area plain clothes men, \* brigands, and police attempted to create disturbances in southern Manchuria. The witness knew of the Chinese proposal to set up a neutralized zone. \* Negotiations were begun by Nanking and other parties, but this proposal was withdrawn because of Japanese troop withdrawals from Hsin-Min.

In the railway area south of Mukden, in November there were about one thousand bandit incidents involving about ten thousand bandits. In the bandit armies there were regular army soldiers in plain clothes.

18990 The Kwantung Army sent its views and opinions to the central authorities with regard to the withdrawal of Chang Hsueh-liang south of the Great Wall. \* It had ideas on how to meet the situation. On orders of the Tokyo Government, the Japanese Minister in Nanking and his Embassy began negotiations for the withdrawal of forces from Chin Chou. In the early part of November, Chang Hsueh-liang promised to withdraw, but did not carry out his promise. They learned then that Japan had made an important proposal to the League of Nations with respect to punitive measures against bandits.

The Kwantung Army then set up a plan to send a military emissary directly to the Chin-Chou regime to have it stop its policy of creating disturbances in Manchuria and to have it withdraw. The plan failed. Tsang Shih-i sent a representative to Peiping to have Chang withdraw from Chin-Chou. At first he agreed to withdraw, but he did not carry out the agreement.

18992 The Kwantung Army devoted its efforts to restore and preserve law and order east of the Liao-Ho River. \* There was a collision between Chang and the Kwantung Army west of Yinkow. On December 27, as a result of this incident, Japan issued a statement, on the 28th the Kwantung Army crossed the river and began a punitive expedition against bandits. The enemy retreated. Afterwards a part of the 20th division and officials from Mukden arrived to take over the task.

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18993

\* After the Kwantung Army forces entered Chin Chou they were divided, and the work of the Kwantung Army was devoted to preserving and maintaining law and order in South Manchuria. Various Koreans in prison were released.

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About the middle of December, various Mongolians met at Tai-lai, between Taonan and Tsitsihar, and as a result a decision was made to create an independent autonomous regime. At that time there were internecine struggles between Hsi Hsia and a number of others. \* The Kwantung Army received information about this from Harbin to the effect that Hsi Hsia, after taking Chin-hui into custody, would establish his lines east of Harbin and resist Kirin. As a result, the Kirin Army, under Yu-Shen-Cheng, started an attack toward Harbin. As a result messages were received for troops to protect the Harbin area. A part of the forces were sent with an understanding from the authorities in Tokyo.

18995

\* There was a difference between both the situation in Manchuria and the Japanese government policy in September and November. With respect to the sending of troops to Harbin, an understanding was sought with the Chinese Eastern Railways to use these southern lines. This was done through the consul general at Harbin, and two battalions were sent under that understanding. \* The troops were sent to Harbin about the end of January, 1932. Troops were sent to Chin Chou at the end of December, 1931. In the meantime the government of Japan had changed, and the INUKAI Cabinet was in. Fewer troops came to Harbin, the policy was adopted of not using them for preserving law and order in the city. This was left to the Chinese. The Japanese were to check the retreat of the Ting-Chao forces.

18996

18997

Ting was made provincial governor of An-Tung and councilor of Manchukuo. \* Many others pledged allegiance to Manchuria. Defeated and surrendered soldiers were employed in the Manchukuo Army or police, or absorbed into civilian life. There was no such thing as prisoners of war. The Japanese attitude then was that those who took a hostile attitude toward Japan would be punished, but those who ceased resistance would be welcomed and absorbed into Manchurian life. They were not treated as POWs.

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18998 About January, 1932, there were arrangements made and consultations between the central authorities and the Kwantung Army. At the request of the general staff office in Tokyo, \* ITAGAKI made a trip to Tokyo to try and explain the conditions within the Kwantung Army and the situation as developing in Manchuria. At the same time he was to have the central authorities understand HONJO's determination and will. It was HONJO's determination, in the light of the independence movements, the issues could not be settled except in accordance with the movement.

19000 \* General HONJO held a conversation with Yu Chun-han. In addition, ITAGAKI had made a tour of the various areas in Manchuria and listened to the leading people. As a result it became known  
19001 \* that the Kwantung Army had no intention of occupying Manchuria, and that Japan had no territorial designs on Manchuria. However, the Manchurians said that they would be much embarrassed and placed in a difficult and embarrassing position if the Nanking government came into Manchuria or if the Chang Hsueh-liang regime should return. They were unanimous in this opinion. This was the basis of HONJO's resolve.

19002 \* He had heard this from HONJO personally at a staff meeting on his return from Tokyo. Upon returning from Tokyo, ITAGAKI reported and the witness heard it. He reported that the War Ministry and General Staff understood the situation, but there was no intention by ARAKI and other military authorities to establish an independent state.

19003 However, they both understood that the Chang regime could not return to Manchuria and that the Nanking authority could not be established there. \* It was their intention to see that law and order was maintained in Manchuria in accordance with the movement for autonomy and independence.

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19,003                   While ITAGAKI was in Tokyo HONJO had an interview  
with Ambassador YOSHIZAWA who was en route to Tokyo and he  
19,004                   transmitted an important message to him. \* The Chief of  
Staff MIYAKE, ISHIHARA and the witness were present at the  
interview. HONJO mentioned three points.

19,005                   He mentioned the point with respect to the rapid  
maturity of the independence movement and his idea that the  
situation should be settled in accordance with its growth.  
He mentioned to YOSHIZAWA that he would not like to see the  
issue settled as a political one between political parties  
for selfish benefits. The third was his hope that in the  
light of the facts that the soldiers who had devoted their  
efforts in the incident \* had come from the fisheries and  
farms in Japan, he would like to see their community condi-  
tions improved. He added that he would like to see a mission  
sent from Japan to the United States to have the United States  
understand the situation and better relationships between the  
countries.

19,006                   YOSHIZAWA replied that after he had entered Man-  
churia it seemed that the clouds had been cleared and his  
feelings were much different than when he was in Geneva.  
He had a pretty good grasp of the situation in Manchuria  
and would do his best \* to carry out the hopes and desires  
of HONJO.

With respect to advisors of Pu-Yi, there was at  
this time a disagreement of views between the group around  
Cheng Hsiao-hsu and the group around Lo Chen-Yu. Lo's con-  
tention was that the Manchurian Dynasty should be restored  
under Pu-Yi. Cheng felt it all right if Pu-Yi at first  
became only the foremost leader of Manchuria.

19,007                   The Kwantung Army \* and General HONJO did not  
feel particularly favorable to the restoration of the  
monarchy but they did not touch on the question of Pu-Yi  
as leader. The witness stated he was familiar with the  
Northeastern Administrative Council. In January 1932 there  
was a joint proposal presented by Hu Chu-ha, Tsang Shih-i  
and Chao Hsin-Po on the independence movement to merge the  
various movements. Toward the end of January there was a

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19,008 split in ranks in two of the groups, resulting \* in fighting in the neighborhood of Harbin, and the meeting was postponed until February. Toward the middle of February, Ma Chan-sha, Hsi Hsia, Tsang Shih-i and Chang Ching-hui met in Mukden. On February 16 this group created the Northeastern Administrative Council. Yu Chun-han was not included. The conference was confined to the leaders of the various provinces who had actual military and administrative control. Yu did not participate because he was not qualified and because \* he was ill.

19,009

The Kwantung Army, instead of intervening or participating in the Council, requested it to provide the Kwantung Army with information. Tang Yu-lin was not included, but he agreed to have his name included among those who participated in the Council decision. \* None of the close followers of Fu-Yi participated in the Council. None of the close followers of Fu-Yi held political or military control in the provinces. His followers felt that Fu-Yi would come if he had the unanimous support of the people. The Japanese did not participate in the Council.

19,010

The conference resulted in a unanimity of views with respect to severance from Nanking and Chang Hsueh-liang and on the establishment of a new state. There was a divergence of opinion on the new national structure. \* Hsi Hsia and the Mongolians advocated a monarchy; Tsang and others a republic. Chang Hin-hui gathered together these conflicting opinions and proposed the idea of a democratic form of government under a regency. He took this to Port Arthur.

19,011

Fu-Yi's final decision was that the national language would be Manchurian, the head of the state a regent, the calendar be Tatung, and the name of the state Manchukuo, with a five colored flag. No request was ever made by HONJO to Fu-Yi regarding his decision.

19,012

The witness knew of the existence of certain documents sent by Fu-Yi to HONJO at that time, they having been explained at a conference of staff officers. The gist of them was that Manchuria would thank Japan for her part and would entrust national defense and preservation of law and order to Japan under certain specific conditions. One was

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19,013 that in garrisoning or stationing Japanese troops the expense should be shared. Second, Japan would superintend and control transportation from the standpoint of national defense. Third, that in view of the fact that the principle of Manchukuo was harmony among the five races, Japan would be asked to recommend \* some government officials.

With respect to the independence of Manchukuo, HONJO took a position of cooperation and assistance. His attitude had gradually changed. Outside of the Kwantung Army headquarters, divisional commanders and units in Manchuria devoted full time to maintaining law and order and did not concern themselves with political problems. HONJO did not permit this in any form.

19,014 The witness stated he was much surprised to read in the Lytton Report that it stated that General TAMON had participated and assisted the independence of Kirin. \* When TAMON was sent to Kirin in September 1931, he persuaded Hsi Hsia to pledge allegiance to Manchuria and to surrender his army. TAMON was present when Hsi Hsia announced Kirin independence and it appears that his advice was misinterpreted as participation in the independence movement.

19,016 There is some difference as to the assistance given by Japanese residents in Manchuria to the various independence movements, depending on the time. \* Before the setting up of the new state, at first some cooperation was given to maintain peace and order and to assist in transportation and industry, and in securing the livelihood of the Japanese residents. They did not give any cooperation whatsoever to the independence movements. The Japanese residents did not give any such cooperation. From the end of 1931 there were some Japanese, at the request of the leaders of the provinces, who became advisors, but this was purely administrative and not cooperation in the conduct of the movement or the establishment of the new state.

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19,017

There was an important change \* in the status of the Japanese as a result of the founding of the new nation. In accordance with the declaration founding the state and its organic law, the Japanese residents became citizens of Manchukuo. Japanese military and diplomats representing Japanese organs were excepted.

19,018

The witness stated that it was a mistake to say, as the Lytton Report had said, that there was no independence movement in Manchuria before September 18, 1941. He knew when the Lytton Commission came to Manchuria, having been informed that it was coming at the end of 1931. It was the attitude of the Kwantung Army to have the Commission see and understand the true situation as to Japanese military actions, as well as the various independence movements without hiding anything, \* so that it could familiarize itself with all details on military and political developments.

19,019

The Kwantung Army and the Japanese diplomatic organs were not opposed to Wellington Koo coming to Manchuria. However, the Manchukuo government and its leaders, especially its Foreign Department, were much opposed to his coming. The Kwantung Army had to concern itself with the matter, since protection of Koo's person was their concern.

19,020

The witness attended the conversations held between HONJO and Lytton and there were conferences and consultations between members of the Inquiry Commission and officers of the Kwantung Army. The true situation was fully explained to the Commission.

19,021

Everything testified to before this Tribunal was told to the Commission and the witness told to the Commission all he said in the Tribunal. His recollection was that everything was explained to the Commission except purely internal matters of military importance. The witness was never required to testify by the Commission and he never talked to the Commission outside.

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- 19,022      At HONJO's meeting with Lytton, HONJO told Lytton  
\* that the Kwantung Army action was based purely on self-  
defense. He mentioned the special character of Manchuria  
and explained the circumstances and events leading up to  
independence. He explained that in order to settle the  
various problems and issues once and for all, there was no  
way except independence of the area through collaboration  
between Japan and China to establish a long range relation-  
19,023      ship of mutual collaboration and assistance. \* It was  
his view that the only way to settle the long-standing  
issues was true mutual collaboration, cooperation and aid  
between Japan and Manchukuo. He further stated candidly  
that in light of the East Asiatic conditions Japan would  
have to take charge of Manchukuo national defense, and for  
the time being at least, of the preservation of its law  
and order. This was HONJO's opinion as commander of the  
Kwantung Army. He received no instructions from the central  
authorities.
- 19,024      The views of the Kwantung Army were not only for  
the protection of Japanese interests in Manchuria, but the  
acquisition of the friendship of the Manchurian's on a moral  
19,025      basis. \* Along these lines the gist of the Cabinet deci-  
sion at the time of the independence of Manchukuo around  
the end of March was transmitted to the Army. This was dis-  
closed to the staff officers of the Kwantung Army. The  
19,026      Cabinet decision was divided into three items. \* The de-  
cision was very long and he did not recall every word.
- 19,027      The witness knew that in May 1932 there was a  
new SAITO Cabinet, with Count UCHIDA KOSAI as Foreign  
Minister. This resulted in a change of Japanese policy  
toward Manchuria. The new policy was positive and the  
new Cabinet recognized Manchukuo. In August HONJO was  
transferred and succeeded by a new commanding general.  
19,028      MIYAKE, Chief of Staff, \* had been transferred to another  
post in April and his successor, HASHIMOTO, had been sent  
to another post in August. The witness was also trans-  
ferred.

In September 1932 HONJO reported to the Emperor  
on military matters and the witness went to the Palace with



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19,029 him. The witness heard the Emperor's message and the discussion following the formal report. Three remarks were made. \* First, there was an inquiry by the Emperor as to the flood situation in North Manchuria and the actual situation was explained. The second inquiry was whether the people of Manchuria were happy that a new state had been created. The reply stated that as a whole the leaders were very ardent, but that the vast majority of the people were not yet awake to modern government and politics, but it was a fact that the people entertained high hopes, since conditions had improved since the war lords were in control. The third inquiry was whether the incident was a result of a plot on the part of the Kwantung Army. HONJO emphatically stated that the Kwantung Army and he, as commander-in-chief, had not \* participated in any plotting.

19,030  
19,031 The witness stated he then became staff officer to the 18th Division, and after that, in August 1933, a member of the general staff. The Cabinet decision of March 1932 was composed of three items, the first of which was the measures to be considered by Japan on the formation of the new state. \* The second was Japanese external relations, and the third was with respect to the settlement of various details, such as debts and obligations.

19,032 While there were no words to the effect about the Kwantung Army's military control of Manchuria, he recalled that the decision included matters pertaining to national defense and maintenance of law and order, and the Kwantung Army's attitude toward it. It was not an instruction, the decision being sent to the Kwantung Army merely as a matter of reference. There were no special measures to be taken on the basis of this, except to maintain peace and order as had been done previously.

19,033 When he joined the general staff in August 1933, \* as a member of the 4th Section of the 2nd Division, his duties included assembling intelligence and formulating publicity plans. He concurrently held a post in the 5th Section of the Division as an assistant in connection with Manchurian affairs.

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About June of 1933 the Tangku Truce was concluded between North China and Manchuria and in July the Dairen conference was held at Dairen, with representatives from Japan, Manchuria and North China. As a result, the military strife with North China and Manchuria was brought to a close temporarily and other problems were to be thereafter settled through amicable processes.

19,034 The witness knew that a monarchy had been established in Manchuria \* as he was assistant on Manchurian relations in the general staff office and so learned of it. In one section on the Japanese side there was opposition, but the majority were not opposed to the monarchy. Military men, the general public, statesmen, and political circles opposed the monarchy and others favored it.

19,035 In December 1934 the witness was transferred to the War Ministry as chief of the Manchurian Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. In that office he learned that following the Dairen conference various postal, customs, telegraphic, etc. problems were amicably settled between 1935 and 1936, and there were no particular problems with regard to Manchuria, particularly up to the spring of 1935. In the spring of 1935 there was an incident involving the peace preservation corps near Yu-Tien and a dispute involving Yu Hsueh-chun. \* He knew that later Japan abolished extra-territoriality in Manchukuo. It was in February 1935 when the War Ministry proposed to the Foreign Ministry that the Foreign Office create a committee for relinquishment of extra-territoriality. \* The decision to relinquish it was taken in June 1935 and the first part carried out in June 1936, and the final relinquishment completed in December 1937. Japan, however, reserved matters with respect to administration of military matters, shrines, and educational matters.

19,038 At the time of the incident on February 26, 1936 the witness was chief of the Manchurian Section, Military Affairs Bureau. \* He had had direct experience with the incident. As soon as he learned of its outbreak on the morning of the 26th, he went to the War Ministry to suppress the uprising. He finally reached the official residence. He told the soldiers who were holding security lines for the

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19,039 rebels that they should not engage in an uprising, and while requesting them to abandon their activities, he requested permission to see the War Minister. While conversing with the Vice Minister one of the rebels shot at him and started to attack him. \* He was taken to the hospital.

19,040 In March 1937 the witness was again transferred to the Kwantung Army. He was handling Manchurian questions and in December became chief of the 4th Section. The China incident had not yet broken out. The China incident was a great obstacle in building and developing Manchukuo. \* Manchukuo was only five years old at the time and in the midst of a reform, centrally and provisionally, and in the midst of a five-year industrial plan. He knew about the five-year industrial plan. Manchukuo felt greatly menaced because of successive Soviet plans and felt the need of building its strength to meet the situation. The plan was very small in its scale and primary emphasis \* was placed on the development of Manchuria economically and strengthening its industrial basis. This plan was based on a budget not exceeding 2,004,000,000 yuan. As a result of the outbreak, funds and materials were no longer available to carry it out.

19,041

At Japanese request the plan was expanded, but the benefits did not accrue to Manchuria since the plan was directed toward assisting the prosecution of the China incident rather than for developing Manchuria itself. The people of Manchuria felt that they were carrying an unnecessary load and it became difficult to solicit foreign capital into the development of Manchuria.

19,042

As a result of the final relinquishment of extra-territoriality in December 1937, the Kwantung Army was revised and the 4th Section became extremely small, with only about ten men, and it was maintained for the purpose of liaison work with Manchuria.

19,043

With respect to the modification of the Manchurian five-year plan, due to the outbreak of the incident \* Manchuria offered to a very small extent to cooperate with Japan. However, most of the modifications came from Japan's demand to make it possible to prosecute her China incident. The 4th Section had nothing to do with this. When asked how Japan's

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demands were communicated, the witness stated that the decision was first made in Japan at the Manchurian Affairs Board. It was then transmitted by the Minister of War to GHQ, Kwantung Army, and the 4th Section transmitted it to the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo. The 4th Section only transmitted Japan's demands.

19,044 The Kwantung Army itself sometimes made requests on Manchukuo. \* As far as it was concerned, it did not issue any orders but merely suggested or expressed a desire, or through its commander-in-chief or chief of staff persuaded the Director-General or President of the General Affairs Board.

19,045 With respect to the stationing of troops, various problems occurred as a result of relinquishing extra-territoriality. The Kwantung Army had the Foreign Office, because of a peculiar situation, investigate the possible cases where a foreign country stationed troops in an independent nation and it was decided that special consideration be given so that Manchukuo could be respected. \* One example was that in case a Manchurian civilian committed any unlawful act against the Kwantung Army, his trial and punishment would be done by Manchurian civilian courts instead of court martial. Also, Japanese Army procurements had to be made in accordance with Manchukuo laws. To put it briefly, Japan would, by submitting as much as possible to the laws of Manchukuo, relinquish the privileges which the army enjoyed by not exercising extra-territoriality, and which an army would enjoy under international law. Official documents on this were exchanged between the Japanese Ambassador, the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, and the prime minister of Manchukuo.

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19,049

The witness stated \* that when he was attached to the 4th Section of the Kwantung Army he was a member of the Central Committee of the Concordia Society. He did have some connection with its establishment. There was a meeting of the committee to establish the society in Hsinking on July 18, 1932. They discussed formalities or ceremonies in connection with inaugurating the society and for purposes of liaison two representatives of the Kwantung Army, two from the Manchukuo Government, and six from the Preparatory Committee of the society attended the meeting. \* The committee for establishing the Concordia Society discussed various matters pertaining to its establishment, whereas actual preparations were handled by the Preparatory Committee. The committee for establishment had nothing to do with the formation of the society.

19,050

19,051

The witness, as chief of the 4th Section, and his predecessor, who was chief of the 3rd Section, were members of the Central Committee for establishing the Concordia Society as liaison officers between the Kwantung Army and the society. \* This Central Committee was more of an advisory organ and decisions were made by the Chairman of the committee. In addition to himself, the other members of the Central Committee were the Japanese Embassy Consular, the Director General of the Kwantung Administrative Office, and other Japanese officials in Manchukuo. Their purpose was to promote harmony in Manchukuo and foster Japanese-Manchukuo collaboration.

19,052

Commanding General HONJO and succeeding commanders were for the most part honorary advisers of the society. The Kwantung Army had one or two members on the Central Committee. \* No other officers of the Kwantung Army were members of the Concordia Society other than the Supreme Advisor to the Manchukuo Army. Members of the Japanese military were not allowed to participate in politics in Manchuria, such as the Concordia Society.

19,053

The witness stated that the formation of the Manchukuo National Army may be divided into three stages. At first, in the early period of the establishment of the

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19,054 state the armies of Chang Hsueh-liang and the various autonomous independent armies gathered together to maintain law and order and improve their quality. Around 1937 the Manchukuo state army and its police combined to maintain peace and order and the Department for the Maintenance of Law and Order was created. In 1940, in response to the desire of the people a conscription law was passed and a national defense \* army was created, with a small but highly trained officer and men group.

19,055 General Yu Chun-han changed his thinking. At one time he had advocated a policy of no armies. At a later stage he favored the extension of a Manchukuo national army. In Japan there had been two views with respect to a national army in Manchukuo. In the past, in China, they did not cultivate the soldiery and good people did not become soldiers. However, in Manchukuo, the feeling grew \* to one of respect for the profession of arms as a result of the new national consciousness. The second view was that in light of the situation on the border the Manchurians had a strong feeling that they must be able, through strength and anti-aircraft and other weapons, to defend their borders. Japan believed this spirit was to be commended, since it was conducive to joint defense.

19,056 The cost of Japanese armies in Manchuria for the most part came out of Japanese military expenditures. At the request of Manchukuo, Manchukuo was allowed to bear a part of the expenses for the stationing of Japanese troops there. This was an agreement arrived at between HISHIGARI, commander of the Kwantung Army, and Cheng Hsiao-hsu \* in 1934, which provided that Manchukuo would pay for stationing Japanese troops to the extent of 10 percent of its budget. Expenditure in the first year did not exceed nine million yuan. This system was suspended in 1938. Since then Manchukuo supplied such funds as it felt necessary, while Japan suspended its expenditures and suspended the 10 percent which Manchuria had originally given. This was carried out under General UEDA and the witness was section chief in charge of the matter.

Before the incident, interest on railway loans was around 8 percent, but after the establishment of the state, the interest rate decreased to 7.9 percent. This

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19,057 was gradually decreased so that in 1939 \* there was no interest on railway loans.

With respect to relinquishment of extraterritoriality Japan made three reservations. One had to do with military administration. At that time Japanese residents in Manchuria were also under Manchukuo law Manchukuo subjects, but at the same time under Japanese law were Japanese subjects. They had the obligation of military service to Japan. Their number was so large that part of the business relating to them was handled by Japanese.

19,058 \* The second reservation was with respect to education. Since there were many Japanese in Manchukuo, and so few educational facilities, education of the Japanese was for the time being left in Japanese hands.

The third was in connection with shrines in the railway zone. Since most of the shrines were left in the zone, the administration was left for the time being in Japanese hands.

19,059 The witness stated he did not participate in the formation of the Manchuria Heavy Industries Company. However, as chief of the 4th Section, Kwantung Army, he gave positive cooperation in developing it. \* Toward the aim of the formation of this company there was opposition both in Manchuria and Japan. In Manchuria the railway opposed because important economic activities had been taken away from it, and the younger officials of the Manchukuo Government opposed because of differences of views on how to apply planned economy. Opposition in Japan came from various industrialists who were envious of Mr. ARKAWA. The extreme nationalists in Japan were also opposed because they felt that the enticing of foreign capital into Manchukuo would lead to a second Harri-man incident. Ever since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident the Kwantung Army had advocated the importation of foreign capital and was never opposed. The Kwantung Army \* never opposed the open door policy in Manchukuo.

19,060

The witness was chief of the 4th Section until August 1939. He went back to Manchukuo in July 1941 as the senior staff officer of General YAMASHITA, Hobun, of the

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Kwantung defense army. This Kwantung defense army was under General UMEZU, commander of the Kwantung army, and was assigned to defend the Kulunbur and Hei-ho, the areas outside the Manchukuo border.

19,061

He learned of the outbreak of the Pacific war in Manchukuo. His observation while in Manchukuo was that while at first its people were ready to cooperate with Japan, \* as the steady demands placed by Japan for material from Manchukuo increased, dissatisfaction began to grow. The witness said he had gone to Manchuria many times and had served as an assistant in compiling the history of the Manchurian incident in the general staff office.

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KATAKURA  
by Mr. Yamada, counsel for ITAGAKI

19,062

The witness stated that the suggestions made by the central authorities to the Kwantung Army which were adopted were carried out. When asked whether there were always instructions, the witness stated there were directions on matters which required a reply. The Kwantung Army was always obedient to the orders of central authorities and absolutely obedient to all Imperial commands. However, if the directives were at variance with the opinions and views of the Kwantung Army, \* the Kwantung Army would repeat its presentation of its views to the central authorities. Imperial orders are orders issued by the chief of the general staff in carrying out the Imperial prerogative of the Supreme Command. It is an order issued by the chief of staff at the instruction of the Emperor.

19,063

When asked whether staff officers could hold meetings with people such as ITAGAKI had with Ma in their personal capacity, the witness stated that there were two attitudes held by staff officers with respect to the outside. In the case of ITAGAKI meeting Ma, this being important, he would meet the person on directions and instructions of the commander of the Kwantung Army. In less important matters, the staff officer, when he had a general mission to accomplish, might on his own, for purposes of collecting and gathering intelligence and other data, meet such persons at his personal discretion. \* After such negotiation official reports were made.

19,064



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19,065 With respect to the Nun-Kiang bridge, which was destroyed by General Ma's forces, toward the end of October negotiations were begun for repairing it at the request of the railway. They asked for its repair for the purpose of hauling grain. President UCHIDA of the railway, when making his request through HONJO, at the same time through Consul General HAYASHI submitted \* a request to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA for beginning of negotiations. SHIDEHARA wired instructions to HAYASHI and negotiations were begun by Consul SHIMIZU. While the negotiations were continued, a repair corps was dispatched, and fighting began.

19,066 The witness stated that the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army assisted the commanding general in recommending Japanese officials to Manchukuo. So far as the actual personnel question was concerned, \* they were actually recommended by the Director General of the General Affairs Bureau of Manchukuo. This was transmitted to the Kwantung Army. The chief of staff on order of the commander would transmit the same to Japan, submitting a request. The witness repeated that he had discussions with members of the Lytton Commission.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Tavenner

19,068 The witness stated that from August 1930 to August 1932 he was a captain. At first he was an assistant in charge of publications and outside liaison and the handling of clerical matters. Later he became a staff officer. He also served in a secretarial capacity to the commander and to the chief of staff.

19,069 Kuanchengtze and Nanlin are located in Kirin. The witness stated that he had failed to mention that Japanese troops \* attacked Chinese garrisons at these points on the 18th because he was not asked the question. He also stated that on the 18th Chinese troops were disarmed at Feng Huan-cheng and Yingkow, but stated there was no attack on troops at Antung or Liaoyang. He had not spoken of these matters because no questions were asked. He also had not told the Tribunal that on the night of the 18th the Japanese Fleet was ordered from Fort Arthur to Yingkow and reinforcements requested from Korea, because no questions were asked.

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19,072

When asked how he could reconcile his statement that the Kwantung Army had no connection with the organization of the Committee for Maintenance of Peace and Order with the statement in the Lytton Report that the Japanese military invited Yuan Chin-kai and eight other Chinese to form a Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order, the witness stated that the Liaoning committee was formed by these men and they later came to the Kwantung Army in connection with the appointment of a Japanese advisor. He spoke from personal knowledge when he said that the Kwantung Army or its headquarters had never at any time, on its own, taken any part in forming or organizing such a committee.

19,073

Asked how he could reconcile the statement that the Kwantung Army had no connection with the organization of this committee with his previous statement that it was Tokyo's intention that the Kwantung Army keep in close contact with the various local regimes and preserve law and order in parts of Manchuria, the witness stated the Kwantung Army had nothing to do with the establishment of these committees. It did maintain contact and liaison with them \* after establishment to seek cooperation in maintaining law and order since the Kwantung Army did not establish military administration. From around January 1932 the Kwantung Army sought the cooperation of leaders of the various provincial governments. To put it briefly, the army had nothing to do with the formation or creation of the committees, but did maintain contact with them after they were established.

19,074

When asked was it not a fact that while the Kwantung Army was not present at their birth, they acted as nursemaid until maturity, the witness stated that the Kwantung Army was not a nursemaid for these organizations. Such a committee, after it was formed, was a full-fledged adult.

19,075

The case of the Self-Government Guiding Board was different. It was created in the various localities to foster and promote the growth of the Self-Government Guiding Board. For this purpose a committee was created under the leadership of Yu Chun-han, composed of Manchurians

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19,076

and some Japanese. The original and first aim of the Self-Government Guiding Board was to serve \* as a guide with regard to self-government, but from January 1932 on it started on an enlightenment movement in connection with the formation of a new state. In January 1932 Yu Chun-han and Tsang Shih-i met in connection with the establishment of a new state. In the same month Heilunkiang proclaimed its independence and other provinces followed suit. His recollection was that the Self-Government Guiding Board was begun on November 1931.

19,077

The committee was organized under the Chinese and there were a few Japanese on the committee. The entire membership was around 100 or between 100 and 120. He did not believe, however, that the number of Chinese or Manchurians on the committee were as few as 15. The Self-Government Guiding Board in the provinces \* was broken down into sub-committees. He thought that the Self-Government Guiding Board for operation purposes was broken down into about five sections. He was not familiar with the details because the problems of maintaining law and order were in the hands of the 3rd Section, while he was in the 4th Section, handling press relations. He was, therefore, not directly connected with the affair.

19,078

19,079

In 1931 and 1932 he was with the General Affairs Section as assistant to ITAGAKI and not in the 4th Section. # He was in the 4th Section in December 1937. Since there had been many changes in the organization of the Kwantung Army, the function of the 4th Section would be different. He stated he was not familiar with the functions of the General Affairs Section of the Self-Government Guiding Board. There were many Japanese associated with it, but he would not say that it was entirely Japanese.

19,080

When asked whether the Kwantung Army did not do everything it could to promote independence movements in Manchuria, the witness stated that HONJO expressed his opinion to central authorities in November and forwarded his recommendations in January. In connection with this, studies were made by the Kwantung Army. However, actions of the Kwantung Army were to be taken after consultation with Tokyo and in accordance with the development of the

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19,081

situation in Manchukuo. The action was to be taken in consideration of the needs as they arose, and was so taken. By the words "needs as they arose" he meant as already spoken, of the three changes in the attitude of the Kwantung Army. In 1932 the central authorities in Tokyo were opposed to an independent state, but not to establishing a unified regime. At that time there was a Cabinet change in Japan, \* and the change in government policy resulted in a change in the deployment of the Kwantung forces. For these reasons various steps had to be taken when necessary.

It might be said that as a result of ITAGAKI's meeting with prominent leaders in Manchuria, and the assurances given by him to them that Japan had no intention of occupying Manchuria or entertained any territorial desires, this assurance of ITAGAKI served as a suggestion in carrying out their independence movement.

19,082

Manchurian leaders did not desire the return of the Chang regime or the extension of Nanking Government authority. ITAGAKI's assurances in telling them this may have served as an impetus to the Manchurian leaders to do something themselves and in that sense it may be said that indirectly there was some stimulus given to carrying on the independence movement.

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19083

\* The witness stated he did not know of any case of Yen Hsi-shan driven on August 18, 1931 from Kwantung Province by airplane. He stated there was no such attack on him. He further stated that he never heard of stock prices falling because of a military expedition.

19084

\* He stated he was not familiar with the alleged opposition of Shih Yusan to the Nanking regime, because he was not connected with intelligence duties with regard to Chinese affairs. He did not know that DOIHARA had aided Shih. What he personally handled in connection with the Manchurian Incident and matters that took place at the conference of staff officers he was very familiar with, but there might be certain other matters with which he was not familiar.

19085

He did not know that DOIHARA had been recalled to Mukden because of aid he had given to \* Shih. He said he was familiar with the NAKAMURA Incident because he handled it, but there was no such thing as the army attempting to use the killing as a means of solving Manchurian and Mongolian problems by enlarging its importance. However, due to newspapers in Manchuria and Japan exaggerating the activities of the Chinese because of their indignation changed their attitude.

19086

The witness stated that the program of the Kwantung Army to restore law and order was different from the recommendations of the Cabinet of March, 1932. \* Immediately after the incident, the Kwantung Army sent troops to maintain law and order, which is natural for an army to do. The Cabinet decision of March, 1932, was referred to the army for reference, and it did not bind the army in its activities. The Kwantung Army received the decision as reference, but acted in accordance with instructions of the chief of staff and war minister.

19087

The action taken by the Kwantung Army at the outbreak came as a result of the personal decision of the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army. After that, \* instructions came from the Chief of Staff and the War Minister, to the effect that it was Japan's policy not to aggravate or extend the Incident. There were no instructions from them previous to that time.

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- 19088 \* When asked whether the Cabinet decision did not intend to use the policy of subjugating the bandits and protecting nationals as an excuse for seizing military power in Manchuria, the witness stated that the Kwantung Army had not acted in accordance with the Cabinet decision but in accordance with the directions of the Chief of Staff to maintain law and order. On its own, the Kwantung Army did not engage in anything such as grasping of military power.
- 19089 \* ANDO arrived in Manchuria on September 22. With respect to the report to Tokyo that the Kwantung Army had attacked the Chinese in spite of Chinese declaration of non-resistance, the witness
- 19090 said that it was their impression \* that the report was sent out by the Japanese Consulate in Mukden, judging by the discussions with them.
- When asked whether it was not a fact that ITAGAKI knew at the time of the outbreak that the Chinese had declared a non-resistance policy, he stated he did not know this from what ITAGAKI reported to HONJO or from what he spoke to the witness.
- 19102 \* When asked whether he learned that a telegram was sent on the morning of September 19 to the Foreign Ministry that ITAGAKI had had such
- 19103 information, \* the witness stated that on the 19th when HONJO arrived in Mukden, ITAGAKA made a brief report on the military situation and on his negotiations with Consul-General HAYASHI. On the same day HAYASHI called on HONJO and spoke of the incident at Fushun and this matter. A simple reference was made. From Tokyo there came instructions to the effect that since there were strange reports emanating from the Railway, the Kwantung Administrative Office, and other organs, all matters should be thoroughly investigated.
- 19105 \* He stated he was not familiar with the telegram sent by HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEMARA on the morning of September 19. \* The witness stated
- 19106 that with respect to that telegram, its purport became known to ANDO when he arrived in Manchuria to investigate, and it was on that occasion that he became informed of that telegram.

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However, as to its contents, he learned briefly and simply about it when ITAGAKI reported to HONJO. This telegram had stated that China had declared she would fight on the non-resistance policy. He also learned on September 20 that HAYASHI had sent a telegram about September 15 or 16 saying in substance that a big event was to occur soon. He learned this from the Consulate-General, together with MIYAKE.

19108 \* The witness said he wanted to correct this. What he had learned about was that three telegrams had been sent from Mukden by the consul general on the morning of September 19.

19109 \* HAYASHI on the 17th, had sent a letter to HONJO, and after the outbreak of the Incident he sent two series of three telegrams to Tokyo, together with the message which he had written to ANDO on the 17th of September. TATEKAWA arrived in Manchuria on September 18. The purpose of his mission was not known until he arrived in Manchuria. On the 17th, the Kwantung Army received a telegram stating that TATEKAWA \* was coming to Manchuria and would like to have ITAGAKI and ISHIMARA to go to Mukden for purposes of liaison.

19110  
19111 Since various wild rumors were afloat in Tokyo following the NAKAMURA Incident, TATEKAWA was sent to Manchuria to cope with the situation. The Kwantung Army was unable to understand on what grounds TATEKAWA was sent. He stated that insofar as he knew, TATEKAWA's mission had no connection with HAYASHI's telegram if he sent one. When asked whether HAYASHI's life was in danger from the Kwantung Army from his messages, he stated that he had met HAYASHI very frequently \* and had never heard anything of this kind.

When asked whether HONJO was restricted to quarters when the Incident broke out, the witness stated that on September 18 HONJO returned to his residence after inspection, and the witness went to the chief of staff to report and then took the report to HONJO, who was at home in the bath.

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19112 When HONJO arrived at Kwantung Army headquarters at midnight on the 18th, he was unescorted except for his aide. When asked whether ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA did not really control the policies of the Kwantung Army, he stated that ITAGAKI was in charge of public relations and ISHIHARA of operations. In the Japanese Army it is the custom of the high command not to have any officer interfere with the work of the officer in charge. If an officer \* is in charge of operations, no other officer should interfere with him, and no other person was allowed to know about the operation.

19113 With respect to the question raised in Tokyo that the swift action of the Kwantung Army showed that preparations had been made in peacetime, the witness stated that according to ANDO's explanation, this was a question addressed by SHIDEHARA to MINAMI. \* He did not know where SHIDEHARA got his information, but he must have received it somewhere.

19114 With respect to HONJO's visit to the Emperor, the Emperor did not refer in his question to any definite plot. He merely inquired about the truth of the rumors to the effect that the Incident was the result of a plot. \* The Emperor did make an inquire as to whether it was due to a plot. Emphasis should be placed on the word "rumor". His inquiry was to the effect that he had heard rumors of a plot, and he wanted to know whether this was true or not. This question was asked one year after the Incident and after the Cabinet had accepted the Kwantung Army's explanation of what had occurred.

19115 \* He did not know all the details of the Imperial audience, but the discussion was a very informal one. When asked whether all those soldiers of the Chinese Army who took a hostile attitude were punished by death and that was the reason for saying there were no POWs, the witness said that he meant that of course some would be killed or wounded in combat. However, many surrendered in groups; others escaped; and they would therefore fall into three categories of killed and wounded, those who surrendered in groups, and those who escaped or were missing. These surrendering troops were unlike regular troops, and their method of fighting was different.



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19117 He did not mean that those who were captured were punished or killed. Those who resisted and did not surrender to the Japanese troops, the fighting continued vigorously. The witness stated he was not referring to those who were hostile after capture. Those who still showed a hostile attitude were enemies and not under Japan's control. There were only three alternatives, to absorb them, to have them surrender, or to fight them to the end. Of course, there were troops which dispersed and escaped.

19118 With respect to HONJO's conference with YOSHIZAWA in January, 1932, \* the witness stated it was not a formal conversation, but a consultation.  
19119 It was an important conversation, \* but not formal. However, YOSHIZAWA did not completely support HONJO's views. He understood what HONJO told him, and said he would try to do whatever he could.

19120 In response to a question from the Court as to whether the soldiers who surrendered but refused to cooperate were punished with death, the witness said there was no case of non-resisting Japan after surrender. After surrender, some of the soldiers became honest, good peasants. Others became police officers. \* Others joined the various armies for independence. There were none in Japanese hands. As to those who were punished, some were for the time being confined by the Japanese or transferred and confined by Chinese. There were no POW camps.

19121 The witness stated that the special funds available for intelligence work, patrolling, and receptions was not used for any other purposes. The persons in charge were ITAGAKI and the independence officer. This was sometimes referred to as the KIMITSUHI fund. \* While he was not the officer in charge and could not give exact figures, he had said that 50,000 yen was approximately the amount allotted to the Kwantung Army in peacetime. This was not used at all for independence.

19122 The witness was not present at ITAGAKI's conference with General Ma when ITAGAKI persuaded him to become War Minister of Manchuria. \* Ma had become the first War Minister.

Page

19123           The Vice-Minister was a Manchurian, but he could not remember the name. In addition to the War Ministry, there was the Foreign Affairs Department, Civilian Affairs Department, Finance Department, Industry Department, Transportation Department, Justice Department. \* In the early stages of the state there were some departments which had vice-ministers and some which had not, and in the early stages all vice-ministers were Manchurians. At least until August, 1932, when the witness left Manchuria, there were all Manchurians. Later the Japanese became vice-ministers.

19124           \* The witness stated that he was related by marriage to MINAMI.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. OKAMOTO.

19125           When asked when speaking about punishment of surrendered Chinese troops he had not used punishment in another sense, \* the witness stated he did not refer to them after their surrender. He was referring to them while they were continuing hostile enemy activities. Those who resisted were enemies of the Japanese troops. Those who surrendered were welcome under the principle of Japanese-Manchurian friendship.

19126           When asked what he meant by the word "absorb", with respect to the surrendering troops, \* the witness said he used the word in the sense that the soldiers would be absorbed into society in general after pledging unity with Japan.

Padashi

1.5

KATAKURA

INTERROGATION OF: YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi  
PLACE : Room 371, War Ministry Building  
INTERROGATOR : Mr. D. N. Sutton  
DATE : 25 March 1947

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Q Did you stop in Manchuria on your way from Geneva in the fall of 1931; and if so, approximately what time?

A As I have told you already I left Paris perhaps on the 27 of December '31, and therefore when I entered into Manchukuo it was already in '32. And I arrived here in Tokyo on the 14 of January. The date when I met General Honjo at Mukden was a date between the 5 and the 10 -- I have forgotten the exact date, but between the 5 and the 10.

Q Will you please give the purport of your conference with General Honjo on that occasion?

A Well, I don't remember the details of the talk I had with General Honjo, but the General explained the events which occurred since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident and the future program about the organization of the Manchoukuo--the State of Manchuukuo. He was thinking of bringing Mr. Henry Pu-Yi to make him the -- to bring him to the throne of the Manchoukuo. I confess that I don't remember the details which General Honjo explained to me. I don't think that interview which I had with the general was a so important one. General Honjo was under me when I was the Japanese Minister in Peking. He was Military Attache to the Legation in Peking, so I knew him very well, and it is quite natural that he came to the station to meet me at Mukden when I arrived there on my way home from France. And perhaps I was invited to a dinner that evening. After that dinner the interview took place. I am unable now to recall the details of the talk which I had with him, but the general was speaking what he told me was explanation of the campaign which he made since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident and his future plan of forming an empire in Manchuria.

Q Was General Honjo sponsoring or guiding the movement for the organization of an independent government in Manchoukuo?

A Oh, yes. He being the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army-- the top man, you see--is responsible for every military campaign and so on. He was assisted by General ITAGAKI-- ITAGAKI was still at that time a colonel--and General ISHIHARA, who

was still a lieutenant colonel at that time. ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA were the real spirit of the Kwantung Army, and the program, as I understood, was formed by these two men. I was told so.

Q By whom?

A Oh, everybody whom I met since my arrival in Manchoukuo. The information which I obtained while in Paris was rather scanty, but when I marched toward the East my information had been increased. According to those informations ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, lieutenant colonel at that time. Later he became a general -- These two men -- but of course General Honjo, being the top man, took every responsibility.

Q Did you understand from General Honjo that he together with ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA were attempting to organize an independent government in Manchuria, or was the independent movement entirely spontaneous and without any direction on the part of the Kwantung Army?

A Now, you see, owing to the lapse of fifteen years since that time I can not recall it in a detailed manner what General Honjo told me, but as I understood, there was a movement for the independence in Manchuria by the populace. At the same time General Honjo and his members of the staff, on which ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA were most prominent -- On their part they had a program of their own, of course.

Q A program of their own for what purpose or to what end?

A Well, independence of Manchuria, and to make Mr. Henry Pu-Yi as Chief Executive, and so on.

Q That was the program of the leaders--of General Honjo, ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, as leaders of the Kwantung Army?

A And on other part the leaders in Manchuria themselves had the same idea. I was told so. It was at the end of February, I believe-- if I remember correctly--that I had asked for a visit of Lt. Col. ISHIHARA at my office, by which I mean the Foreign Office. I asked ISHIHARA to postpone the independence of Manchuria as long as possible because I was afraid of the intervention by other powers if the Kwantung Army hurries up to the formation of the new empire. To my request ISHIHARA told me it was impossible because everything was already prepared in Manchuria.

Q That was in February 1931?

A '32.

Q Did you ever talk with ITAGAKI around that time with regard to the independence movement -- I mean, either when you were

in Manchuria or in Tokyo?

A Yes, I met him in Korea. I came back from France by way of Siberia, Manchuria, and Korea, and I went to Shimonoseki and took the train there. I made a stay of one day in Seoul when ITAGAKI was returning to Mukden from Japan by an airplane, and he met me at the Chosen Hotel.

Q When was that?

A About the 10 of January. I can not say the exact date.

Q Did he discuss with you --

A Not "discussed", I asked him. I wanted every possible information about the Manchurian so-called Incident, and what the Kwantung Army was thinking of, so I wished to have talks with leading officers, military officers--especially people like ITAGAKI or ISHIHARA--and I had taken a chance of seeing ITAGAKI during my short stay in Seoul. Although I can not recall the details of what ITAGAKI talked to me at that interview I am sure he explained the same thing as what General Honjo told me in Mukden.

Q Was ITAGAKI at that time planning to bring Henry Pu-Yi in as the ruler of the State which they anticipated setting up in Manchuria?

A He may have mentioned or may not have mentioned. I don't recall it exactly.

Q Was ITAGAKI working at that time to set up an independent state in Manchuria?

A I think so.

Q That was your impression?

A Yes. Although I can not tell you that ITAGAKI told me to that effect. As I have told you, there were two sides of this story: the one is a movement of the populace, the other the plan made by the Kwantung Army. They both went parallel to each other.

Q Did you know that the government in Tokyo had notified the Kwantung Army not to participate actively in the independence movement?

A The Tokyo government? -- Well, by -- I can not say the Tokyo government as a whole had any intention of that sort. But I myself being the Foreign Office man made every possible effort not to hurry up the independence. On one of the occasions,

- yes, there were two occasions, in the latter half of January-- in the latter half of January, Yes--I received a statement setting forth several items. That statement came from the War Office, and I forgot now the other items, but the only item which I still keep in my memory is the independence of Manchoukuo. I went to the home residence of the Minister of War --
- Q Who was he then?
- A ARAKI. And I had a conference at which General ARAKI and Vice Minister and the Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs --
- Q Who was the Vice Minister?
- A Let me see -- He used to be the Chief of General Staff -- General -- Let me see.
- Q KOISO?
- A No, KOISO was at that time still Director of the Military Affairs.
- Q General MASAKI?
- A No, MASAKI was Vice Chief of the General Staff. I became Foreign Minister January 14, 1932. In the beginning of my assumption of office as Foreign Minister, KOISO was not Vice Minister, but a month later he was made the Vice Minister of War.
- Q Was MUTO at this conference you were talking about?
- A Yes. I may have been wrong to have said, if I have said so. In any case Vice Minister and the Director of Military Affairs and Vice Chief of General Staff--that is to say, General Masaki--and some others were present at the conference. The conference was to consider the statement made by the War Office which was shown me, and I made that visit to attend that meeting. At that meeting I agreed to every other item, but I opposed to the independence of Manchoukuo, and this disagreement lasted about -- but I did not agree to the last. But I was obliged to recognize the development of the situation. The developments came one after another without recommendation of the Foreign Office in Manchuria.
- Q The leaders of the Kwantung Army were the compelling force in the organization of the separate state and recognition of the separate State of Manchoukuo ?

- A Separate State of Manchoukuo, yes.
- Q I will appreciate it if you will read this statement which KATAKURA, Tadashi, or rather, the testimony which KATAKURA, Tadashi, gave on yesterday relative to the interview which you had with General Honjo at Mukden, and state whether or not this is correct, and if not, in what particulars it is in error.
- A I am unable to recollect the talk I had with Honjo at that time as KATAKURA has explained yesterday. I have not such memory as KATAKURA. As I have said, Honjo explained what transpired since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident and his intention was to remove the capital of Manchoukuo from Mukden to Chanchung, which was later known as Sinking--the new capital. As soon as Manchoukuo was established the capital was intended to be removed from Mukden to Chanchung.
- Q And Chanchung was later called?
- A Sinking. Chinese character "Sin" means "new"; "king" means "capital."
- Q I see, new capital.
- A According to this explanation the Manchurian Incident occurred as a result of a movement for reforming Japanese fishing and farming abilities. I can not recollect that sort of thing. You see, after my return to Tokyo I saw General ARAKI and other military leaders on the occasions of Cabinet meetings and other occasions, and the most important meeting I had with General ARAKI was the one which I have mentioned, which I have told you already, about the Manchoukuo--the establishment of the Manchoukuo. Nevertheless, the Manchoukuo as an independent state made appearance on March 1 in that year. And Mr. Henry Pu-Yi was made Chief Executive. -- "The price of cotton had gone up" -- I can not recall that HONJO said that sort of thing.
- Q Do you remember whether KATAKURA was present when you were talking with HONJO?
- A I have forgot. I don't remember.
- Q You don't remember?
- A No.
- Q Do you know him personally?
- A Oh, yes. I met him in Manchuria, you see, several years later than the Manchurian Incident occurred. I made a visit to Manchuria

in 1934--5. On that occasion my visit to Manchuria, he was the Chief of the 4th Section of the Kwantung Army stationed in Mukden, the most important post he had at that time as Chief of the Economic Section. I thought that it was our first contact when I saw him on that occasion. I don't remember that he was himself present on the occasion of the interview I had with General HONJO. I knew HONJO very well because he was the Military Attache to the Legation when I was the Minister in Peking

Q When was that approximately?

A I held that post for more than six years. I was in Peking as Japanese Minister for more than six years -- I mean, I am the record-holder.

Q What years, what period was that?

A It was -- You see, I must calculate in your calendar --

Q What year in Showa?

A Until the fourth year of Showa. I left Peking for good in August the Fourth Year of Showa.

Q You were in Peking then from about 1924 to 1929?

A Something like that. There were three consecutive Military Attaches, and General HONJO was the middle one.

Q Some of the leaders of Manchuria understanding the desires of the Kwantung Army started the so-called independence movement, and the leaders engaged in the activities-- Is that correct?

A Engaged in activity of hurrying up the independence.

Q There were two camps of the movement, one on the part of the populace, and one on the side of the military, each working with the other?

A Yes.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

1 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Investigation Division  
FROM : Mr. D. N. Sutton  
RE : ANDO, Chief, Military Service Section, War  
Ministry, 1931

1. KATAKURA testified (R. 18930-18940) that Colonel ANDO was sent from Tokyo to Manchuria to make an investigation of four questions:

- a. The situation with respect to the guarding and patrolling the Fushun.
  - b. The report that the Kwantung Army had attacked the Chinese despite the fact that on the night of September 18 the Chinese troops had declared non-resistance.
  - c. The report that a certain staff officer had used offensive words in a telephone conversation with the Japanese consul-general in Mukden.
  - d. An investigation into operational matter because the Kwantung Army had acted so swiftly with the outbreak of the incident that it appeared that preparations had been made in peace time.
2. Will you please ascertain as promptly as possible:
- a. Whether Colonel ANDO made a report and if so what facts it contained. Ascertain first whether the report is in our document center and if not try to obtain a copy of it from the War Ministry.
  - b. Were there any other questions referred to Colonel ANDO for investigation?
  - c. Did his report cover other questions than those set out in the record?

3. We would like to have this information as promptly as possible as it may be useful in court with the next witness.

D. N. SUTTON  
Associate Prosecutor